Belarus: Media Dissidences in the Face of Authoritarianism

Belarus Media Dissidences in the Face of Authoritarianism February 2022

Belarus: Media Dissidences in the Face of Authoritarianism

Undergraduate Research Report funded by the Nanovic Institute for European Studies Keough School of Global Affairs University of Notre Dame February 2022

About this report Recommended citation: Belarus: Media Dissidences in the Face of Authoritarianism.

Notre Dame, IN: Nanovic Institute for European Studies, 2022.

About the Nanovic Institute for European Studies The Nanovic Institute for European Studies, an integral part of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, enriches the intellectual culture of the University of Notre Dame by creating an interdisciplinary home for students and faculty to explore the evolving ideas, cultures, beliefs, and institutions that shape Europe today. To pursue its mission, the Institute works to promote European studies at Notre Dame, transform its undergraduates, professionalize its graduate students, foster its interdisciplinary faculty research, and build its international network.

The views expressed in this report are strictly those of the individual authors and do not reflect the opinions, official policy, or position of the Nanovic Institute for European Studies or the University of Notre Dame.

Table of Contents Abstract.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................................. 3 1. A Quiet Collapse: Belarus and the Fall of the Soviet Union................................................................................................ 4 2. Post-Soviet Belarusian Politics: The Rise of Lukashenko................................................................................................... 6 3. The 2020 Election: Unexpected Contenders, Unprecedented Crackdown............................................................. 10 4. Censorship and New Media Alternatives.............................................................................................................................. 14 5. Lukashenko’s Attempts at Regime Preservation............................................................................................................... 17 6. International Responses to the Lukashenko Regime....................................................................................................... 19 7. Recommendations for the Way Forward.............................................................................................................................. 23 Bibliography......................................................................................................................................................................................... 27 Contributors......................................................................................................................................................................................... 44

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Abstract This report outlines defining points in Belarusian history, from the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic up to the fall of the USSR, as well as the history of the national identity of Belarus. It analyzes the sociopolitical environment and tactics that provided President Alexander Lukashenko with the opportunity to rise to legitimate power, and subsequently transition to autocracy. The report asks questions about how the media influenced the resistance movement against autocracy, how the rest of the world should respond, and how the events in Belarus are relevant to democracy everywhere. The report argues that alternative forms of media on the internet offer a space for opposition that the state-run media would otherwise censor, exemplified through the rise of opposition candidate Sviatlana Tikhanovskaya in 2020 through social media.

The authors of this report also explored to what extent the U.S. and EU governments should be involved, based on their histories of spreading liberal democracy throughout Eastern Europe and their security goals. This report additionally seeks to provide policy recommendations to develop a more democratic Belarus. These topics will be examined with a special eye on the role of the media, both as a repressed form of communication and a means to voice dissidence.

Key Words: Authoritarianism; Belarus; Media; Dictatorship; Censorship.

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Belarus: Media Dissidences in the Face of Authoritarianism

Introduction Though democracy is imperiled in much of Europe, there remains at least one country where it has yet to take root: Belarus. In contrast to the many former Soviet states that have moved towards democracy, Belarus retains much of the repressive nature of the former USSR. Save for the relatively competitive election of 1994, the presidential elections of Belarus have been neither free nor fair, resulting in the repeated re-election of the same candidate: Alexander Lukashenko, often described as “Europe’s last dictator.” Under Lukashenko, modern-day Belarus is characterized by iron-fisted authoritarian rule. He has been able to maintain his grip on power through widespread restrictions on media freedom, particularly through censorship and repression of dissenting media. After almost 30 years of authoritarianism, Belarus has re-entered the global conversation with the eruption of unprecedented protests after a widely contentious 2020 election. With democratic ideals in question throughout much of Europe, the existence of—and responses to—a repressive authoritarian state on the border of the European Union is an important case study into the contemporary interplay between democracy and authoritarianism. Developing effective responses, especially as the role of media in society—and resultingly, media control—grows, is crucial in confronting future cases of authoritarianism, and in preserving democracy and human dignity around the globe.

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1. A Quiet Collapse: Belarus and the Fall of the Soviet Union Historian Andrew Wilson once described the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) as “the most Soviet of republics.”1 For centuries, Belarus had lacked statehood, governed by entities such as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Russian Empire.2 In existence from the early 1920s, the BSSR was another chapter in Belarus’s stateless history.

Despite early attempts to forge a cohesive identity, the BSSR and its people lacked a shared sense of what it meant to be Belarusian for most of the almost 70 years that the state existed. The idea of a Belarusian nation was not prevalent and was often confined to small, intellectual circles—a likely factor in the conspicuous lack of dissidence against the government by its citizens throughout the country’s twentieth-century history.3 In the 1920s, the government of the BSSR initiated a process of Belarusization (belarusizatsiia) as part of a Soviet-wide campaign of “nativization” (korenizatsiia), including the classification of Belarusian as the polity’s official language and the founding of the Institute of Belarusian Culture in 1921.4 Belarusization flourished until the mid-1930s when the USSR’s new constitution focused on Russification to achieve unity.5 While the idea of the Belarusian nation still existed, a national identity struggled to take hold due in no small part to the Belarusian language being confined to government documents rather than being in widespread household use. In so far as a Belarusian national identity did exist, this was the direct result of Soviet attempts to create it.6 The lack of a common 1

Andrew Wilson, “Politics Either Side of Independence, 1989-1994,” in Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021), 143.

2 Jan Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), xiv-xv.

3 Andrew Savchenko, “Borderland Forever: Modern Belarus,” in Belarus—A Perpetual Borderland (Boston: Brill, 2009), 149.

4 Nelly Bekus, Struggle over Identity: The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness” (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 72-73.

5 Ibid, 75.

6 Ibid, 80.

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Belarusian identity, national language, or political representation for most Belarusians significantly contributed to the USSR being able to hold power within the BSSR with little opposition.

Much of the USSR deteriorated in the late 1980s with perestroika (the policy of restructuring the USSR’s political and economic system), but Belarus remained largely unchanged in its pro-Soviet sentiments. Glasnost, another 1980s Soviet policy shift that was intended to create more openness in government, also loosened censorship, allowing people in various areas of the USSR to outwardly oppose the Union, especially through nationalism.7 This media freedom, however, did not widely affect Belarus due to its weak national identity. The first real currents of opposition to the mainstream communist leadership came after discoveries of the Stalin-era mass graves of Belarusian victims at Kurapaty, leading to the formation of the Belarusian People’s Front (BPF).8 The BPF promoted the development of Belarusian culture and independence but lacked a clear aim for an alternative political system. The party failed to gain any real traction, acquiring only 27 of the 345 available seats of the legislature in the 1990 elections.9 The movement was hindered, in part, due to the nature of its leaders; as Belarusian nationalism was strongly tied to the intelligentsia, many of the leaders of the BPF were young intellectuals who had no real political experience.10 Protests against the BSSR government did occur after the uproar from the mass grave scandal, but these demonstrations were neither widespread nor nationalistic, focusing on socioeconomic issues instead of calls for an independent Belarusian state. In a 1991 referendum on whether the USSR should remain intact, conducted throughout the entire union, 83% of Belarusians voted to preserve it, almost 10% Thomas Remington, “A Socialist Pluralism of Opinions: Glasnost and Policy-Making under Gorbachev,” in The Soviet Union, ed. Peter Waldron (Great Britain: Ashgate, 2007), 501, 519.

8 Wilson, “Politics Either Side of Independence,” 144; Savchenko, “Borderland Forever,” 150-151.

9 Savchenko, “Borderland Forever,” 155.

10 Wilson, “Politics Either Side of Independence,” 145.

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higher than the USSR-wide average.11 Organic desire from citizens in the BSSR to form a sovereign Belarusian state simply was not a major force driving Belarusian independence unlike most of the other USSR constituents.

Belarus did eventually gain sovereignty, but it was not the direct result of a cohesive anti-USSR sentiment from Belarusians. Interestingly, the Belarusian Communists were the ones who proposed official Belarusian independence. On July 27, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Belarus enacted a Declaration of Belarusian State Sovereignty. One year later, the leaders of Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics met with the new leader of Belarus, Stanislav Shushkevich, to promulgate the Belavezha Accords, signed in December 1991. These accords officially declared the dissolution of the USSR. While Belarus’s signing of these accords may seem like a proactive move for Belarusian independence, in reality, the state was following the decision made by the much more politically powerful entities of Russia and Ukraine.12 The fall of the Soviet Union in Belarus came not as a shout but as a whisper, and leaders in the new country of Belarus failed to effect any meaningful changes to transition the country from its Soviet past. The lack of a distinct, non-Soviet national Belarusian identity as well as political polarization and government inaction after the Union’s fall left a vacuum of power at the dawn of independence.

2. Post-Soviet Belarusian Politics: The Rise of Lukashenko Alexander Lukashenko has dominated Belarusian politics since he rose through the ranks of the Belarusian government, an ascent made possible by the power vacuum following the fall 11 12

Wilson, “Politics Either Side of Independence,” 150.

Savchenko, “Borderland Forever,” 156, 158.

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of the USSR. The future president had a poor upbringing in a rural part of the BSSR and was involved with the Communist party throughout his early life. While he strongly supported the maintenance of the Russia-Belarus relationship after the collapse of the USSR, he had few other political ideas. An opportunist, Lukashenko floated to whichever party would host his ambitions for leadership, first as a liberal and later with the Communists for Democracy.13 Lukashenko lost his first bid for office when he ran for the Congress of the USSR, but he succeeded in establishing a reputation for his unwillingness to yield to party politics and propaganda directed against him. In 1990, Lukashenko capitalized on this reputation in a second campaign, this time for the Deputy to the Supreme Council of Belarus, the legislative body of the still-Soviet BSSR. He gained office for the first time with this victory and later joined the influential anti-corruption commission in the new Belarusian government in 1993. In a country rife with corruption, citizens came to see Lukashenko as “a fighter for social justice as well as a practical man who could really improve the collapsing economy.”14 In the early 1990s, the post-Soviet, independent Belarus was facing an economic crisis and decline in living standards under the liberal democratic rule of its first parliamentary chairman, Stanislav Shushkevich.15 Disillusioned with self-governance, many Belarusians desired a return to the old, “familiar pseudo-prosperity” and stability of membership in the Soviet Union.16 This support for economic and political integration with Russia proved to be key in Lukashenko’s popularity in the first presidential election in 1994. During this first—and, to date, only—“absolutely democratic election in Belarus,”17 Lukashenko played on the class divide, angling himself as a humble voice Wilson, “Politics Either Side of Independence,” 148.

Savchenko, “Borderland Forever,” 179.

15 David R. Marples, The Lukashenka Phenomenon: Elections, Propaganda, and the Foundations of Political Authority in Belarus (Trondheim: Program on East European Cultures and Societies, 2007), 14.

16 Andrew Savchenko, “Borderland Forever,” 181.

17 “Populist in Belarus Sweeps to a Presidential Victory,” The New York Times, July 11, 1994, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/11/world/populist-in-belarus-sweeps-to-a-presidential-victory.html.

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for the common people and promising to redistribute the “spoils” of the elite, who had little in common with the lower class in terms of language, ideology, and even religion.18 The landslide victory for Lukashenko symbolized a triumph of the masses over the aristocracy.

Once elected, Lukashenko wasted no time consolidating his power through various referendums. In 1995, the official result of his first referendum signaled overwhelming support for strengthening ties to Russia through symbolic gestures, such as giving the Russian language equal status, and through closer economic alliance. These results demonstrated a lack of domestic nationalist sentiment in Belarus. These symbols, like the flag and coat of arms, addressed the nostalgia for soviet membership and a Belarusian view of the country as more of a Russian constituency than an independent nation. By far the most wide-reaching consolidation of power, the 1995 referendum gave the President the right to dissolve parliament, setting Lukashenko up to fill the parliament with loyalists.

The 1996 referendum further amended the constitution to create a “super-presidential system,”19 which granted Lukashenko powers to appoint and dismiss government officials. He was also given the power of presidential decrees, to be taken as law without requiring approval from parliament, and a term extension through 2001. This was the turning point when he truly became autocratic: he presented a façade of “pseudo-democratic institutions,” like the ceremonial elections each term, while effectively using repressive tactics to maintain control.20 What may have been an accidental rise to power of a person in the right place and right time became a deliberate plan for the development of authoritarianism in 1996. Lukashenko was re-elected for a second term in 2001 with 75.6% of the votes through a “fundamental flaw[ed …]

Oleg Manaev, Natalie Manayeva, and Dzmitry Yuran, “More State than Nations: Lukashenko’s Belarus,” Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2011): 93–113, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24388184.

19 Grigory Astapenya, “1996 Referendum: The Constitution of the Dictatorship,” interview by Yuri Drakakhrust, Prague Accent, November 26, 2017, https://www.svaboda.org/a/28877709.html.

20 Erica Frantz, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, s.v. “Autocracy,” Oxford: Oxford Research, 2016.

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electoral process” that included blocking the opposition, early voting measures which skewed the ballot counting, and censorship of the media.21 Over time, the Lukashenko who had once fought back against the propaganda of the reigning party began to become a master of propaganda himself, controlling all official media and cenorsing those who pursued true investigative journalism. When his government released the election results, they were widely speculated to be fabricated to oversell his approval, especially as his rule became less popular term by term.

By the time Lukashenko eliminated term limits in a 2004 referendum, the opposition to Lukashenko’s regime was aware of the need to present a united front and selected non-partisan Alexander Milinkevich as the opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential race. After Lukashenko’s victory, rioting in a “Jeans Revolution” broke out, and Milinkevich and another candidate were jailed for “hooliganism.”22 The 2010 and 2015 elections followed a similar pattern: an unfair election, riots, and Lukashenko’s open, physical repression of opposition.

Media coverage of the suspicious disappearances of Lukashenko’s opponents was silenced. Aleh Byabenin, a journalist involved in the investigations, was found hanged. The events of the past three decades have given rise to a political infrastructure that severely punishes those who speak out against Lukashenko, creating a vertical power structure wherein Lukashenko essentially controls the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.23

“Limited Election Observation Mission: Presidential Election, 9 September 2001,” OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, accessed December 23, 2021, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/belarus/111402.

22 Ilya Barabanov, “Only hooligans do not like Lukashenka,” Gazeta.ru, March 29, 2006, https://www.gazeta.ru/2006/03/29/oa_193969.shtml.

23 Andrei Sannikov, “The Accidental Dictatorship of Alexander Lukashenko,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs 25, no. 1 (2005): 75–88, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26999249.

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3. The 2020 Election: Unexpected Contenders, Unprecedented Crackdown 2020 marked Lukashenko’s fifth time running for re-election, but on this occasion the autocrat found himself in an unusually vulnerable position. The Belarusian economy was in crisis owing to Lukashenko’s maintenance of a state-led economy that was over-reliant on subsidized Russian imports. His response to the Covid-19 pandemic, moreover, amounted to negligent denialism—describing the virus as a “psychosis” and eschewing lockdowns for his preferred treatments of vodka and saunas.24 By the time the election was announced in May 2020, societal discontent was running at an all-time high.25 Lukashenko’s desire to avoid competition quickly became clear as the government moved to arrest or otherwise disqualify prominent potential opposition candidates. Lukashenko’s most potent competition was no established politician, but a blogger named Sergei Tikhanovsky, whose Youtube channel “Country for Life” provided a forum for common Belarusians to speak candidly about their problems with the government. Tikhanovsky’s channel grew immensely popular in 2020 with 24,000 subscribers, more than twelve times the number following the state-run Belarus 24 channel. After announcing his candidacy, he was arrested and barred from running.26 His wife Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, a 37-year-old stay-at-home mother and former English teacher, launched a campaign in his stead.27 Tatyana Zenkovich, “Belarus Protests: beleaguered economy underpins anger at Lukashenko government,” The Conversation, August 26, 2020, https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-beleaguered-economy-underpinsAnger-at-lukashenko-government-145063; James Rodgers, “In Belarus, President Lukashenko Has Unique Response to Facing Coronavirus,” Forbes, April 4, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesrodgerseurope/ 2020/04/04/in-belarus-lukashenko-has-his--own-ways-for-the-country-to-face-coronavirus/?sh=266a9202279d.

25 “Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko Under Fire,” BBC News, September 11, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-53637365.

26 “Belarus’ Bloggers: A ‘Bigger Threat' Than Political Parties for President Lukashenka?” Current Time, July 14, 2020, https://en.currenttime.tv/a/30724427.html; Sarah Rainsford, “Belarus: The stay-at-home mum challenging an authoritarian president,” BBC News, 1 August 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53574014.

27 Rainsford, “Belarus.”

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Opposition supporters were subject to arrests during signature collection drives, “solidarity chain” rallies, and an “unsanctioned public gathering” in which hundreds lined up to submit complaints to the Central Election Commission (CEC).28 Meanwhile, the dominant state-run media acted as an arm of Lukashenko’s campaign, reporting uncritically on Lukashenko and ignoring his opposition or smearing them with conspiracy theories. Independent news outlets pushed back, covering what the state media would not: the arbitrary arrests of activists, the obstruction of opposition candidates, and, most inflamatory, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s growing popularity. 29 In mid-July, Tikhanovskaya joined forces with Veronika Tsapkala and Maria Kolesnikova, the wife and election agent of two other disqualified candidates.30 With the opposition united behind her, Tikhanovskaya became an increasingly viable candidate.31 She ran not with a typical platform but with the promise that, if elected, she would hold new free and fair elections and then resign.32 Her supporters rallied around the image of the slipper, referencing their desire to “squash the ‘cockroach’”—the epithet given to Lukashenko by Tikhanovskaya’s husband Sergei.33 By late July, her rallies were attracting thousands of supporters, a fact noted by

Tatsiana Ziniakova, “Belarus: Rule of Law Dimensions of 2020 Presidential Elections,” World Justice Project, August 18, 2020, https://worldjusticeproject.org/news/belarus-rule-law-dimensions-2020-presidential-elections; “Belarus Opposition Protests End in Arrests,” BBC News, June 20, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe53115921.

29 “Coverage of the 2020 Presidential Elections in Belarusian Media,” (Minsk: Belarusian Association of Journalists, 2020), https://baj.by/en/analytics/coverage-2020-presidential-elections-belarusian-media-final-report.

30 Kalinovskaya, “In Belarus, 3 Women Unite” 31 Tony Wesolowsky, “The Accidental Candidate in Belarus who is Trying to Unseat ‘Europe’s Last Dictator,’” Radio Free Europe, August 5, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/the-accidental-candidate-in-belarus-who-is-trying-to-unseateurope-s-last-dictator-/30767486.html.

32 Ido Vock, “‘Everyone is scared in Belarus:’ Svetlana Tikhanovskaya on migrant crisis and taking on a regime of terror in Europe,” New Statesman, November 20, 2021, https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2021/11/ cannon-fodder-svetlana-tikhanovskaya-on-lukashenkos-repression-and-the-belarus-migrant-crisis.

33 Andrei Makhovsky, “‘Stop the Cockroach’: protests rattle Belarus President Lukashenko before elections,” Reuters, June 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-election/stop-the-cockroach-protestsrattle-belarus-president-lukashenko-before-election-idUSKBN2391YQ. 28

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the Belarusian government, which conveniently carried out “emergency repair work” at Tikhanovskaya’s campaign sites, forcing her to cancel appearances just before the election.34 The August 9 election was carried out without independent international observers, and though state-run media was quick to call the election for Lukashenko, poll workers and independent news outlets reported numerous instances of fraud, such as ballots for opposition candidates being placed in piles for Lukashenko and vote totals for Tikhanovskaya and Lukashenko being swapped.35 In the CEC’s official vote totals, Lukashenko garnered 80% of the vote, with Tikhanovskaya trailing far behind with 10% and the other opposition candidates receiving less than 2% each.36 Widespread doubts remain about the true winner of the popular vote. Tikhanovskaya rejected the results and claimed to be the true winner of the elections.37 The leader of Honest People, a Belarusian activist group, posited that Tikhanovskaya received many more votes than the CEC reported, but “given the manner in which the vote [was] rigged, [...]no one knows the real result of the election.”38 In a survey by London think-tank Chatham House, 50% of respondents reported having voted for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, and just 21% for Lukashenko.39

“Belarusian Authorities Cancel Opposition Campaigning Ahead of Election,” Radio Free Europe, August 5, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/belarusian-authorities-invent-pretexts-to-cancel-opposition-campaigning-ahead-of-election/3 0767039.html.

35 “Belarus Election: Lukashenko wins another term, election commission says,” Deutsche Welle, August 10, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/alexander-lukashenko-wins-belarus-election/a-54506718; Kostya Manenkov and Daria Litvinova, “Belarus Poll Workers Describe Fraud in Aug. 9 Election,” AP News, September 1, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/international-news-ap-top-news-europe72e43a8b9e4c56362d4c1d6393bd54fb; “Coverage of the 2020 Presidential Elections.”

36 “Belarus Election,” Deutsche Welle.

37 Andrew Roth and Yan Auseyushkin, “Belarus Opposition Candidate Rejects Election Result After Night of Protests,” The Guardian, August 10, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/10/belarus-oppositioncandidate-rejects-election-result-protests-svetlana-tikhanovskaya-lukashenko.

38 Manenkov, “Belarus Poll Workers Describe Fraud in Aug. 9 Election.”

39 “Belarusians’ views on the political crisis,” (London: Chatham House, 2021), https://belarusinfocus.pro/ sites/default/files/20210209_-_opinion_poll.pdf, 4.

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The immediate aftermath of the election saw the eruption of the largest demonstrations in Belarus’s history.40 With most of the opposition leaders, including Tikhanovskaya, having fled the country, the protests were decentralized and largely organized through social media with the help of popular bloggers. Another novel feature was the strong role played by women, who called for global female solidarity against repression as they took to the streets dressed in white and carrying flowers.41 The government responded with repressive measures, the brutality of which was also unprecedented in Belarusian history. Thousands were detained, with many subject to torture by electric shock and beatings.42 Though the mass demonstrations tapered off, dissidence continued in widespread forms, including flash mobs at shopping centers, popular athletes calling for new elections, and the singing of opposition anthems at theater performances.43 By the end of the year, more than 30,000 protestors had been taken into custody.44 Amid the protests, outrage, and calls for a new election, Lukashenko was sworn in for his sixth term in secret on September 23rd, 2020.45

Rachel Treisman, “One Week After Election, Belarus Sees Giant Protests Against ‘Europe’s Last Dictator,’” NPR, August 16, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/08/16/903036245/one-week-after-election-belarus-sees-giantprotests-against-europe-s-last-dictat.

41 Belinda Goldsmith, “‘Women in White’ from Belarus protest globally for peace and a new vote,” Reuters, August 17, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-election-women/women-in-white-from-belarus-protestglobally- for-peace-and-new-vote-idUSKCN25D1LI. 42 “Belarus: Unprecedented Crackdown,” Human Rights Watch, January 13, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/ 01/13/belarus-unprecedented-crackdown.

43 Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Belarus protestors battered, bruised, but defiant after 100 days,” BBC News, November 17, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54961111.

44 “As Belarus Protests Enter Sixth Month, Lukashenka Repeats Vague Promise Of Change,” Radio Free Europe, January 10, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/as-belarus-protests-enter-sixth-month-lukashenkarepeats-vague-promise-of-change/31040652.html.

45 Scott Neuman, “Belarus President is Secretly Inaugurated Weeks After Disputed Election,” NPR, September 23, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/09/23/916000965/belarus-president-is-secretly-inauguratedweeks-after-disputed-election.

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4. Censorship and New Media Alternatives In the months since the 2020 election, the media has become a prime battleground between the autocratic tendencies of the Lukashenko regime and the desire for freedom and democracy among the Belarusian people. While Lukashenko had long restricted media freedom in Belarus and detained journalists, his crackdown on independent media accelerated in the face of the intense post-election protests.46 Dozens of journalists covering the peaceful demonstrations were detained and brutalized at the notorious Akrestsina detention center and then released without charges on the condition that they delete their protest coverage.47 Even ordinary people were arrested over comments on social media: Mikhail Bohdan and Valyantsina Pisaruk were both given two-year parole-like sentences for insulting the police online.48 In all, nearly 500 journalists, media employees, bloggers and online activists were arrested.49 In an attempt to further censor independent media, Lukashenko passed the Law of Mass Media in May of 2021, which “prohibits the media from reporting on unauthorized mass gatherings and publishing opinion polls without having their results approved by the Belarus government.”50 In effect, the law has enabled the government to shut down media organizations without a court order. TUT.by, one of Belarus’s most significant independent media outlets, was accused of violating the law and subsequently denied journalism accreditations, resulting in its

Carmela Caruso, “In Belarus, Media Jailing Used as Tool of Censorship,” VOA News, last modified November 17, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/in-belarus-media-jailings-used-as-tool-of-censorship-/6315919.html.

47 Said, “Four press freedom trends.”

48 “Belarus Launches New Criminal Case Against Independent Tut.by Journalists,” Radio Free Europe, October 7, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-crackdown-independent-media/31497936.html.

49 “Belarus: Freedom on the Net 2021 Country Report,” Freedom House, Accessed January 3, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/country/belarus/freedom-net/2021.

50 Shriansh Jaiswal, “Belarus’ New Media Law: A Nightmare for Journalistic Freedom,” The Promise Students’ Human Rights Blog, UCLA School of Law, August 17, 2021, https://www.promisehumanrights.blog/blog/2021/8/belarus-new-media-law-a-nightmare-for-journalistic-freedom.

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shutdown.51 The law was also used to limit international coverage of the protests by stripping journalists from Radio Free Europe and other foreign outlets of accreditation.52 The state-owned internet service, Beltelecom, has also proved a useful tool for government censorship by restricting online access to TUT.by and other independent news outlets.53 Reports of repeated internet disruptions and the blocking of VPNs—potential censorship circumvention mechanisms—demonstrate the extreme measures Lukashenko is taking.54 Fortunately, Lukashenko’s attempts at media censorship have been met with resistance.

Even journalists of a usually sympathetic outlet, the state-run broadcast channel Belarus One, walked out, refusing to do their jobs if they were subjected to overt censorship.55 The Belarusian opposition is also implementing new communication strategies to ensure continued resistance in the face of Lukashenko’s crackdown on newer, less traditional forms of media. They have begun to rely especially on radio and decentralized social media platforms. Radio Free Europe, which was shut down online, resumed its broadcast on radio waves despite censorship attempts.56 Telegram, a messaging app run through “encrypted social media channels that can bypass restrictions,”57 has become a popular medium to share news and information and coordinate activities.58 Nexta, a news channel hosted on Telegram, has become a prominent source for

“Belarus: Blocking leading online media outlet is a brazen attack on freedom of expression,” Amnesty International, May 18, 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/05/belarus-blocking-leading-online-media-outlet-is-a-brazen-attack-on -freedom-of-expression/.

52 Shaun Walker, “Lukashenko plans ‘people’s assembly’ but Belarus reform unlikely,” The Guardian, February 10, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/10/lukashenko-plans-peoples-assembly-but-belarus-reform-unlikely.

53 Said, “Four press freedom trends.”

54 “Belarus: Internet Disruptions, Online Censorship,” Human Rights Watch, August 28, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/28/belarus-internet-disruptions-online-censorship#.

55 Walker, “Belarus media strike.”

56 Said, “Four press freedom trends.”

57 Katie M. Davies, “Belarus protests: can decentralized media like Nexta bring down Europe’s ailing autocrats?”

The Calvert Journal, August 13, 2020, https://www.calvertjournal.com/articles/show/12048/belarus-protests-nexta-decentralised-media-tech-europe.

58 Said, “Four press freedom trends.”

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protest coverage. While Nexta’s decentralized strategy has made it successful in evading censorship, it also poses problems for its reliability.59 Nexta’s contributors are anonymous, avoiding both government and public scrutiny.

Opposition activists have used internet platforms in more creative ways, not only disseminating information but also directly targeting the regime and its supporters. Some Belarusian activists have developed the Krama app to encourage boycotts against products linked to Lukashenko or the government.60 Additionally, a “cyber partisan” group that consists of members mostly outside of the country has gathered and released sensitive information to the public about law enforcement officers who contributed to dismantling the 2020 protests.61 Further, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya has been able to use Twitter to remain a powerful leader of the Belarusian dissident movement while in exile, styling herself in her Twitter bio as the “leader of democratic Belarus.”62 Lukashenko’s fear of these platforms resulted in one of his most notorious actions against media opposition—the forced landing of Ryanair Flight 4978, orchestrated to detain the co-founder of Nexta, Raman Pratasevicht.63 Though Lukashenko succeeded in arresting this major opposition activist, the extreme action resulted in widespread international condemnation and an increased global awareness of his brutal authoritarian tactics. Lukashenko’s extreme measures against the media evince his desperation to keep his citizens misinformed and powerless and to keep the international community in the dark. Luckily, the creativity and

Davies, “Belarus protests.”

Ivan Nechepurenko and Valerie Hopkins, “‘Our Goal Is to Keep the Regime on Its Toes:’ Inside Belarus’s Underground Opposition,” The New York Times, August 20, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/20/world/europe/belarus-opposition-protests.html.

61 Nechepurenko and Hopkins, “‘Our Goal Is to Keep the Regime on Its Toes.’”

62 “Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya (@Tsihanouskaya) / Twitter,” Twitter, accessed January 23, 2022, https://twitter.com/Tsihanouskaya.

63 “Belarus diverts Ryanair plane to arrest activist journalist,” Deutsche Welle, May 23, 2021, https://p.dw.com/p/3tpYe. 59 60

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innovation of the Belarusian people have allowed them to evade censorship and fight for a democratic future.

5. Lukashenko’s Attempts at Regime Preservation Lukashenko has also attempted to preserve his regime and limit Western influence through tactics above and beyond his extreme measures against domestic reporting. While the landscape is constantly evolving, the regime’s most salient current tactics involve opposition suppression, Russian support, and constitutional referendums. Though Lukashenko has denied holding his opposition as political prisoners, he has arrested many opposition activists on a variety of charges since the 2020 election. According to the Viasna Human Rights Center, as of January 13, 2022, 981 people in Belarus have been arrested as political prisoners since 2009, with an influx of arrests between 2020 and 2022.64 One of the most prominent targets was Sergei Tikhanovsky, who, in December 2021, was sentenced to 18 years for organizing and inciting mass unrest and hatred. Other would-be 2020 candidates, protest organizers, opposition bloggers, and veteran politicians have also been tried and sentenced, receiving terms ranging from eleven to sixteen years.65 Lukashenko has also relied on longstanding ally Russia for regime survival, both borrowing from its authoritarian tactics and utilizing their support. Lukashenko is launching Russian-like cyber-attacks to hold power: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian disinformation campaign, hacks news sites and the social media accounts of government officials to further Lukashenko’s “Political Prisoners in Belarus,” Viasna Human Rights Center, accessed January 13, 2022, https://prisoners.spring96.org/en.

65 “Belarus: Opposition Leader Tikhanovsky Jailed for 18 Years over Protests,” BBC News, December 14, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59650238.

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agenda, an operation similar in nature to previous Russian attacks.66 Lukashenko is also signaling his military cooperation with longstanding ally Russia. In a December 2021 meeting in St. Petersburg, Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin discussed holding joint war games and military drills to fortify the southern border of Belarus.67 Strengthened cooperation between Belarus and Russia is a concern for NATO security in the region because Belarus lies between Russia and Kaliningrad, a critical stretch of land between Poland and Lithuania. If Putin is able to take control of Kaliningrad, he will be able to effectively cut off Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from NATO without launching a military incursion.

Lastly, Lukashenko released a draft of proposed constitutional amendments that will be decided by a referendum in February 2022. Although initially posited as a shift toward new leadership, if adopted, the new constitution would actually strengthen and extend Lukashenko’s power. It includes the introduction of a presidential term limit to two five-year terms. While Lukashenko had made previous assurances that the constitutional changes would lead to his stepping down from office, they would effectively restart the clock on Lukashenko’s presidency and allow him to remain in office until 2035. Besides allowing the ruling elite to preserve their power, political analyst Igor Tyshkevich adds that the referendum aims to legitimize the regime and create an illusion of democracy, especially in the wake of an election widely condemned as fraudulent.68 At the time of writing, it appears the referendum will pass due to the Belarusian people’s support for term limits.

“Belarus Is Borrowing from Russia Again—This Time, with Disinformation,” Washington Post, November 21, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/11/21/ghostwriter-belarus-russia-disinformation/.

67 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia, Belarus to Hold Joint War Games Early next Year,” News 8 WTNH, December 29, 2021, https://www.wtnh.com/news/international/russia-and-belarus-to-hold-joint-war-games-early-next-year/.

68 “Will violence and repression stop after the referendum? Expert opinion,” Euroradio, January 4, 2022, https://euroradio.fm/ru/nasilie-i-repressii-prekratyatsya-posle-referenduma-mnenie-eksperta; “The opposition and Lukashenka have ‘dead end promises’: why are there no ‘changes’?,” Euroradio, January 4, 2022, https://euroradio.fm/ru/u-oppozicii-i-lukashenko-tupikovye-posyly-pochemu-ne-nastupayut-peremeny.

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Despite Lukashenko’s best efforts at crushing dissent, the myriad creative underground tactics put in place by protestors, and the endurance of their resistance in the year and a half since the 2020 election evince the will of the Belarusian people to stand up to Lukashenko’s authoritarianism. These new forms of protest—unavailable in previous waves of unrest—may mark hope for more durable and widespread dissidence in the future.

6. International Responses to the Lukashenko Regime The Lukashenko regime’s increasing brutality and repression in the aftermath of the 2020 election has been met with political condemnation from the United States and the European Union (EU). The Council of the European Union concluded that it “deeply regrets” the Belarusian authorities’ lack of respect for its people’s “fundamental freedoms and human rights.”69 Current U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken made the U.S.’s position against the Lukashenko regime clear, highlighting the ongoing humanitarian plight and reminding the world that “nearly all independent media outlets are shuttered, and Belarusian authorities are attempting to silence NGOs and civil society using fabricated ‘extremism’ charges.” 70 On December 2, 2021, the U.S., Canada, the EU and the United Kingdom released a joint statement outlining coordinated sanctions that targeted 183 individuals and 26 entities, including Belarusian sovereign debt in primary and secondary markets. The statement called for the regime to release the political prisoners and implement the recommendations of the Organization for

Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Belarus, 11661/20, Brussels: European Council, 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/46076/council-conclusions-on-belarus.pdf.

70 Antony J. Blinken, “Accountability for the Lukashenko Regime’s Continued Acts of Repression and Disregard for International Norms,” U.S. Department of State, December 2, 2021, https://www.state.gov/accountability-for-the-lukashenka-regimes-continued-acts-of-repression-and-disregard-for-int ernational-norms/.

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Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).71 Following the forced Ryanair 4798 landing, the EU imposed a ban on Belarusian carriers flying over EU airspace and using EU airports. Further, the EU has also allocated close to 65 million euro in assistance to the Belarusian people, directed to civil society, youth, independent media, cultural actors, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).72 While these measures speak to strong EU/U.S. coordination in the face of a repressive authoritarian regime, both the EU and the U.S. responses have been complicated by their respective internal tensions and shaped by their complex relationships with Belarus’s close ally Russia.

The U.S. response to Lukashenko has at times seemed inconsistent, owing to changes in administration and foreign policy priorities. Just days after the 2020 Belarusian election, then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Prague to address the Czech parliament on issues of freedom in Europe. Pompeo underscored the threat of authoritarianism in countries like China but failed to mention Belarus, reflecting larger shortcomings of the Trump administration in prioritizing and recognizing the severity of the political situation in Belarus. Transitioning to the current administration, Biden faces the challenge of de-escalating conflict with Russia while also protecting and promoting U.S. influence on the world stage.

Meanwhile, brewing internal hostility has called into question the EU’s legitimacy on questions of foreign policy and democracy. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s increasing control over the country’s public funds, institutions, media, and elections is particularly problematic, to the point that the country is no longer classified as a democracy by NGO “Joint Statement on December 2 Sanctions in Response to the Situation in Belarus,” U.S. Department of State, last modified December 2, 2021. https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-december-2-sanctions-in-response-to-the-situation-in-belarus/; “Restrictive Measures Against Belarus,” European Council/Council of the European Union, last modified December 2, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-belarus/.

72 “Belarus and the EU,” Delegation of the European Union to Belarus, last modified December 2, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/belarus/15975/belarus-and-eu_en.

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Freedom House. Poland, with similar infringements under the Law and Justice Party, has been downgraded to a “semi-consolidated democracy.”73 Anti-democratic tendencies within the EU’s own borders have left the body unprepared to deal with them outside, and this lack of consistency has impeded its response to the situation in Belarus. For example, EU sanctions fail to target one of the country’s main exports, potash with 60% potassium content.74 Despite early U.S. sanctions, potash manufactured by state-owned company Belaruskali was still transported into the EU by Lithuania’s state-owned Lithuanian Railways until February 2022.75 This serves as a prime example of stakeholder lobbying—in this case, the EU’s agricultural lobby—influencing member states and blocking passage of an effective, unified response.76 Concurrently, the EU suffers a migrant crisis fabricated by Lukashenko on the border of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.77 While migrants from Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan typically attempt to enter the EU from its southern border, Lukashenko offered a quicker route, assuring migrants that Belarus would “not try to catch [them], beat [them], and hold [them] behind barbed wire.”78 Lukashenko’s actions have allowed him to both exploit and highlight the EU’s incoherence on the issue of migration. On paper, the EU maintains that asylum is a “fundamental right” per the 1951 Geneva Convention, yet Poland has greeted migrants at its

“Democracy Status,” Freedom House, last modified 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/explore-the-map?type=nit&year=2021.

74 Polina Devitt and Andrius Sytas, “Most Belarus Potash Exports Not Affected by EU Sanctions,” Reuters, June 25, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/most-belarus-potash-exports-not-affected-by-eu-sanctions-analysts-2021-0625/.

75 “Lithuania Terminates Railway Contract to Transport Belarus-Produced Potash,” Radio Free Europe, January 12, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-lithuania-railways-potash-contract/31651043.html.

76 Giselle Bosse, “Authoritarian Consolidation in Belarus: What Role for the EU?,” European View 20, no. 2 (2021): 201–210. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/17816858211061839.

77 Alice Tidey, “Police Uncover 455 Social Media Accounts Encouraging Belarus-to-EU Migration,” euronews, December 20, 2021, https://www.euronews.com/2021/12/20/police-uncover-455-social-media-accounts-encouraging-belarus-to-eu-migra tion.

78 “Belarus’ Lukashenko Says Migrants Have ‘Right’ to Go West,” Deutsche Welle, November 26, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-lukashenko-says-migrants-have-right-to-go-west/a-59954017.

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border with water cannons and tear gas.79 Furthermore, the EU has a long history of border externalization that has accomplished an objective prohibited by its own law while shifting the logistical burden to Middle Eastern countries. Lukashenko’s artificial migrant crisis has already succeeded in exacerbating existing splinters within the EU. Frustrated with the lack of EU support, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki made a statement citing “Polish solidarity with other free-world countries long before the European Union and NATO were born,” thus wielding his country’s individual agency—and authoritarian tendencies—as an alternative to EU membership.80 The EU’s vulnerability to Lukashenko’s machinations is also notable in the contentious issue of energy supply. 41 percent of EU natural gas is already imported from Russia, and while the proposed Nord Stream 2 pipeline would provide a low-cost source of natural gas, it would also increase the EU’s energy dependence on Russia.81 Lukashenko controls another natural gas pipeline to Europe, Yamal-Europe pipeline, and has already used it as leverage by threatening to turn it off. From this perspective, the potential ramifications of a Russian-Belarusian cooperation against the EU on energy supply are worrisome.82 Wielding ultimate control over an EU that is struggling to work in concert to reach the goals of its 2030 Climate Target Plan, Russia and Belarus together have the power to send the EU into an energy crisis, destabilizing the economy and increasing the potential for “environmental authoritarianism” within the EU itself.

“Common European Asylum System,” Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission, last modified 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system_en.

80 “#WeDefendEurope,” Chancellery of the Prime Minister, YouTube, November 21, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ST4HOPEWdb0.

81 “From Where Do We Import Energy?” Eurostat, last modified 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/index.html?lang=en.

82 David Meyer, “As Belarus Threatens European Gas Supplies, Here’s How a Migrant Crisis is Turning into a Russia-EU Face-Off,” Fortune, November 11, 2021, https://fortune.com/2021/11/11/belarus-europe-gas-lukashenko-putin-merkel-migrant-poland-lithuania-latvia-eu/.

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Ultimately, the EU’s idealism isn’t enough to hide its internal instability, rendering it vulnerable to future manipulation by Lukashenko. And even with a completely unified response, economic sanctions and political statements only go so far with such an aggressive, repressive dictator. Belarus encapsulates a larger conflict between authoritarianism and democracy, and increased Belarus-Russia cooperation could complicate the geopolitical situation in a region vital to U.S. and EU interests and democracy and the rule of law more broadly.

7. Recommendations for the Way Forward Alexander Lukashenko’s violent and ongoing attempts at suppressing the media and opposition movement in Belarus are well documented. And his February 2022 referendum on a new constitution threatens to further reinforce his hold on power.83 The EU and the U.S. have openly expressed their disagreement with Lukashenko’s presidential illegitimacy and re-emphasized their commitment to the democratic rule of law. The complex nature of events in Belarus, which have threatened the balance of power in the wider European continent, have presented both the Belarusian opposition and international stakeholders in support of democracy with multiple challenges: promoting the growth of democracy in Belarus; strengthening the Belarusian opposition; weakening Lukashenko’s grip on power; and managing the Russian reaction to unfolding developments in Belarus. It is likely that a combination of coordinated efforts from various global actors will be needed in order to identify and analyze issues, trends, drivers, as well as possible options and opportunities for the way forward in Belarus.

“Lukashenka Says Belarus Plans Constitutional Referendum By February 2022,” Radio Free Europe, September 28, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/lukashenka--belarus-constitution-/31482744.html.

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In addition to maintaining and increasing sanctions aimed at Lukashenko and his allies, a variety of informed stakeholders, such as federal agencies and nonprofit policy institutes, have made policy recommendations with the understanding that a voluntary or forceful withdrawal of Alexander Lukashenko is highly unlikely in the near future. In this vein, the European Leadership Network has recommended that Western policymakers invest in “institutional networks, contextual understanding and strategic planning” to respond appropriately to developments in and around Belarus, as well as “take additional steps to address the risks of military confrontation in the region.”84 The Atlantic Council has made several recommendations for President Biden’s administration, including the provision of secure assistance and protection to Belarusian opposition leaders, journalists, and political prisoners, and the management of Russia’s influence in Belarus, specifically with a focus on preventing a “Kremlin crackdown.”85 The Index on Censorship’s Monitoring and Advocating for Media Freedom project recommends that Belarus amend the law on mass media so that journalists can “appeal rejected accreditation requests,”86 as well as train journalists in United Nations (UN) human rights procedures, including the special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council,87 and the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus.88 Despite the recommendations listed, which represent only a fraction of recommendations put forward, there has been a general lack of action by the EU and U.S. in this regard.

Ben Challis, Belarus Beyond 2020: Implications For Russia And The West (London: European Leadership Network, 2020), https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ Belarus-policy-brief-1.pdf.

85 Anders Åslund, et al, Biden And Belarus: A Strategy For The New Administration, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2021), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Biden-Belarus-IB-v3.pdf.

86 “Legislative amendments further restrict media in Belarus, says OSCE media freedom representative,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 18 June, 2018, https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/384786.

87 “Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx.

88 “Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/CountriesMandates/BY/Pages/SRBelarus.aspx.

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Additionally, sanctions and policies that have already been utilized have failed to significantly improve the state of affairs in Belarus. It is important to note though that even in the absence of imminent regime change progress is still very much achievable. The role that media and online freedom play in upholding the values of democracy cannot be stressed enough in this regard.

Free and independent journalism counters misinformation and disinformation.89 Furthermore, when media freedom is limited, the ability of citizens to share and receive information and hold their government accountable begins to erode.90 It is therefore important that the recommendations proposed above be coupled with efforts to: ● Enforce existing laws to protect media freedom and, where laws do not exist, provide appropriate combinations of incentives and penalties in favor of media freedom; ● Inform journalists of their rights and provide adequate options and channels for the protection of those rights; ● Support and advise media channels and civil society organizations on the ground in their efforts to disseminate accurate and/or nonpartisan information; ● Support international media channels in monitoring human rights threats, limitations, and violations in Belarus, with a focus on human rights and the preservation of human life; ● Deepen efforts to regulate social media while safeguarding freedom of speech and avoiding censorship;91 ● Promote alternate forms of media where traditional media is limited.

“Free press ‘a cornerstone’ of democratic societies, UN says,” UN News, 3 May 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/05/1091132.

90 “Media Freedom,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/issues/media-freedom.

91 “Social media and democracy: we need laws, not platform guidelines,” European Parliament, October 2, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20210204STO97129/social-media-and-democracy-we-ne ed-laws-not-platform-guidelines.

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Belarus is not an isolated case. Authoritarian threats to media freedom and other markers of democracy are on the rise in Europe and other parts of the world. In order to make well-informed predictions and recommendations for the way forward, it is therefore important to draw upon lessons from the past, as policy recommendations aimed at strengthening journalism and free speech in Belarus have wider implications for the future of democracy in Eastern Europe, as well as Europe more broadly. If authoritarianism and illiberalism continue to flourish in and around the borders of Belarus, this will undoubtedly threaten the ability of the West to defend and promote democracy in other parts of the globe. Undermining Lukashenko’s hold on power while avoiding events that may threaten Moscow’s security interests will require a deepening of the current measures being led by the EU and U.S., as well as a commitment to increased coordination between them. It is hoped that these efforts, if sustained in the long run, will assist the Belarusian opposition and other willing actors in fulfilling their human rights obligations and strengthening foundations for democracy and media freedom. Otherwise, continued failure to effectively transform the situation in Belarus could potentially catalyze a major shift in global power and help usher in a new world order that is more tolerant of authoritarian and illiberal leadership.

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https://www.svaboda.org/a/28877709.html.

Astapenia, Ryhor. “What just happened and what’s next in Belarus? A rundown of the contentious presidential race, Lukashenko’s surprising struggles, and the likely post-election scenario.” Meduza, August 3, 2020. https://meduza.io/en/cards/what-just -happened-and-what-s-next-in-belarus.

Barabanov, Ilya. “Only hooligans do not like Lukashenka.” Gazeta.ru. March 29, 2006. https://www.gazeta.ru/2006/03/29/oa_193969.shtml.

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“Belarus’ Bloggers: A ‘Bigger Threat’ Than Political Parties for President Lukashenka?”

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“Belarus’ Lukashenko Says Migrants Have ‘Right’ to Go West.” Deutsche Welle, November 26, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-lukashenko-says-migrants-have-right-to-go-west/a-5995 4017.

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Contributors Authors Elizabeth Eggemeier Claire Lyons Katherine Mansourova Nora Murphy Garrett Pacholl Dara-Marie Raggay Anne Rehill Alexia Zolenski

Advising Team Bruna Celic, research program coordinator, Nanovic Institute for European Studies Anna Dolezal, student programs assistant manager, Nanovic Institute for European Studies Katherine Younger, Ph.D., research director, Ukraine in European Dialogue, Institute for Human Sciences (IWM)

Editorial Support Jennifer Lechtanski, graphic designer, Nanovic Institute for European Studies Gráinne McEvoy, communications specialist, Nanovic Institute for European Studies Grant Osborn, assistant director, Nanovic Institute for European Studies

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