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Cosa fare dell'acqua, imparando dall'Europa Laboratorio Servizi Pubblici Locali
Abstract Due anni fa, più di un mese prima del Referendum sull'acqua bene comune, nell'annuale Rapporto sull'Italia dell'Ocse c'era un ampio capitolo sulle politiche ambientali. Vi erano incluse alcune riflessioni sul servizio idrico (in coerenza con la tradizionale esperienza dell'Ocse sul tema): allora ignorate, erano tuttavia indicazioni di buon senso e in linea con le migliori esperienze europee, ancora perfettamente valide.
REF Ricerche srl, Via Aurelio Saffi, 12, 20123 - Milano (www.refricerche.it) Il Laboratorio è un'iniziativa sostenuta da (in ordine di adesione): ACEA, Federutility - Utilitatis, SMAT, IREN, Confcommercio - Imprese per l'Italia, CO.MO.I. Group, SIBA.
La missione del Laboratorio
Dal 1° dicembre 2013 ha iniziato la sua attività il Laboratorio Servizi Pubblici Locali (Lab SPL), un forum di analisi e discussione che intende riunire selezionati rappresentanti del mondo dell´impresa, delle istituzioni e della finanza al fine di rilanciare il dibattito sul futuro dei Servizi Pubblici Locali. Molteplici tensioni sono presenti nel panorama economico italiano, quali la crisi delle finanze pubbliche nazionali e locali, la spinta comunitaria verso la concorrenza, la riduzione del potere d’acquisto delle famiglie, il rapporto tra amministratori e cittadini, la tutela dell’ambiente. Nonostante questi avvenimenti, il comparto dei Servizi Pubblici Locali in Italia raramente è fonte di un dibattito “sistemico”: prevalgono nella discussione contrapposizioni e dicotomie (pubblico vs. privato, stato vs. mercato, locale vs. nazionale, …) quasi mai sorrette da analisi quantitative ed economiche. Per esperienza, indipendenza e qualità nella ricerca economica REF Ricerche è il “luogo ideale” sia per condurre il dibattito sui Servizi Pubblici Locali su binari di “razionalità economica”, sia per porlo in relazione con il più ampio quadro delle compatibilità e delle tendenze macroeconomiche del Paese.
Donato Berardi Direttore e-mail: dberardi@refricerche.it tel. 02 87078150
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Dal Rapporto OCSE 2011 emerge una situazione critica per il servizio idrico italiano
Le esperienze europee virtuose fanno scuola
Le linee guida tracciate dal Rapporto sono ancora oggi un punto di riferimento
Merita raccontare una vicenda dell'estate del 2011 dalla quale ancora possiamo imparare qualcosa. Sempre che si voglia che - prima o poi - l'Italia torni ad essere un Paese civile. Il 9 maggio 2011, l'OCSE presenta a Milano il suo Rapporto annuale sull'Italia. Sono presenti il Presidente Gurria ed il VicePresidente Piercarlo Padoan - attuale Ministro dell'economia del Governo Renzi. Il terzo capitolo del Rapporto (Allegato 1) è dedicato alle politiche ambientali (prezzi e governance in particolare). In questo contesto, non potevano mancare alcune riflessioni sulle condizioni in cui si trova in Italia il sistema idrico, a confronto con le migliori esperienze europee. Si discute di regole, di modalità di gestione, di tariffe, sia dal punto di vista dell'efficienza (che come è ben noto, è un prodotto delle regole e non della proprietà - pubblica o privata - degli impianti o delle cose trasportate, siano esse liquidi come l’acqua o energia come il gas o persone come nei bus), sia dal punto di vista dell'equità (ad es., se questo è un obiettivo importante, il diritto all'acqua delle persone può essere ben previsto da tariffe che garantiscono un'offerta gratuita di acqua a tutti per consumi vitali). Diciamo che le quattro pagine dell’OCSE sono caratterizzate da buon senso, e soprattutto è questo il modo di ragionare di chi impara dal meglio dell'Europa (Allegato 2). Peccato che in Italia siamo in piena campagna per un Referendum sull'acqua bene comune (unico Paese al mondo, in cui serve un Referendum per sapere cosa sia l'acqua...), e quindi il giorno dopo Piercarlo Padoan riceve un articolo di insulti su un quotidiano tra i più letti (Allegato 3). Data la decadenza del Paese, e l'intera campagna di menzogne che ha accompagnato il Referendum, la cosa non stupisce. Per fortuna, le pagine del Rapporto OCSE del 2011 sono ancora perfettamente valide oggi, essendo la cosa più intelligente che sia stata scritta in materia. È in quella direzione che stiamo andando, e l’arrivo di Piercarlo Padoan in via XX Settembre è una buona notizia.
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OECD Economic Surveys: Italy © OECD 2011
Cosa fare dell'acqua, imparando dall'Europa Chapter 3 Allegato 1. OECD Economic Surveys, Italy, May 2011, p. 91
Environmental policy: getting prices and governance right
3.
In many areas environmental indicators are improving, although there have been frequent changes in some policy instruments, especially in energy related areas, where central government makes and enforces policy. Greater use of cost-benefit ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: GETTING PRICES AND GOVERNANCE RIGHT analyses of policies, regulations and investments, could improve the extent to which least-cost solutions are chosen. The decentralisation process in Italy has assigned different localities or interest groups. No-one wants a waste-management facility next responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of most environmental policy door, but with suitable compensation paid (and financed by waste producers) it should be to sub-national governments and, while appropriate in many ways, this may be possible to find an acceptable solution; ultimately the authorities need the power to resulting in some excess and slowerand diffusion of best practices. Transport and expropriate, with fair costs compensation external monitoring to ensure that the energy policiesiscontain a number ofcompensation potential inefficiencies, expropriation necessary and the is just. particularly with regard to full implementation of the polluter-pays principle, since policy does not always succeed in making all polluters pay the same marginal cost for similar pollution. Box 3.9.and Recommendations waste and innovative Policy with respect to household packaging waste ison advancing in some areas, but also overshadowed by recurringwaste crisesmanagement in the South companies, which, whilewhile Where feasible, fully privatise publicly-owned strictly enforcing requiring tendering forhave provision of local exacerbated by the rules involvement ofpublic organised crime, also been thewaste resultservices. of poor The implementation of tenders and In their outcomes, as well as the and subsequent operation planning and mismanagement. both waste management water supply, theof the services should be monitored by the Competition Authority. The Authority might need cost-efficiency of economic and environmental management would be improved by more resources, or a separate national regulator, to do this effectively. a programme of privatisation, provided independent national regulators are While the operation of the packaging waste recycling consortia seems effective, the established to provide the appropriate framework. Competition Authority could be asked to verify the absence of efficiency-impairing restraints on competition that result from their monopoly position.
Revisit the attribution of authority in waste management to ensure that the imposition of external special commissioners is necessary only in extreme cases of incompetence or corruption, rather than to overcome conflicts of interest or “nimby” problems. Continue to encourage increased separation of household waste, but increase Allegato 2. OECD Economic Surveys, Italy, May 2011, pp. 116-119 “upstream” taxation on consumer products and related packaging, as a function of the costs, economic and environmental, of disposal.
Water supply and pricing As in most medium-sized or large countries, problems of water supply and water pollution are typically local or at most regional concerns. This section looks briefly at the key issue of water pricing.
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A very striking fact is the high rate of apparent losses in distribution. Most water systems do lose what can seem quite a lot of water.22 Nevertheless, in Italy, with a nationwide average of just over 30%, the rate of loss is as high as 47% in Puglia (Figure 3.8). Yet Puglia is a region with almost no surface water resources of its own, importing most water from neighbouring provinces. A partial explanation may be that the physical losses are rather less than 47% if, as is likely, some of the losses represent water that is supplied but not properly metered or paid for. But another part of the explanation is that the suppliers may have little incentive to reduce distribution losses if the costs of renewing the infrastructure are large relative to the cost of water extraction. The structure of water pricing typically does not in fact give distributors any particular incentive to minimise capital costs; indeed this is one of the key criticisms of the national water monitoring commission (Conviri, 2010). For current management costs, pricing is regulated on the basis of cost recovery with price capping, so that efficiency gains are retained by the supplier. Capital costs are covered by an allowed 7% rate of return on capital; so long as there is no competition and the price elasticity of demand is low, there is no incentive to keep capital costs down. Hence, the pricing structure may on the one hand encourage suppliers to skimp on maintenance costs, allowing excessive leakage, while perhaps encouraging excessive capital investment.
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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: GETTING PRICES AND GOVERNANCE RIGHT
Figure 3.8. Water: distribution losses Water lost as a percentage of water entering the distribution system, 2008 %
%
Puglia
Molise
Sardegna
Abruzzo
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia
Lazio
Campania
Sicilia
0
Calabria
5
0
Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste
10
5 Umbria
15
10
Basilicata
15
Piemonte
20
Liguria
25
20
Veneto
30
25
Marche
35
30
Toscana
35
Trento
40
Emilia-Romagna
45
40
Lombardia
45
Trentino-Alto-Adige
50
Bolzano - Bozen
50
Source: ISTAT, Rilevazione sui servizi idrici, Anno 2008.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932386092
In practice it is not clear that the pricing structure achieves any of the aims set by the law – providing safe water to households and allocating it efficiently among various users. Water prices are on average quite low compared with other European countries; this would not be a problem per se if it reflected relative abundance of water or a particularly low level of costs. However, it is partly due to a long period of public price controls which prevented water prices from rising in line with inflation. Overall it appears that water has been underpriced for a long time and that both price controls and the organisational structure have prevented a rational use of resources. Despite the suggested bias towards capital expenditure in the pricing system, in practice there was a large fall in investment in water infrastructure in the 1990s. The level of investment has not recovered since then, although reported problems with interruptions in water supply – which had risen, especially in the South, around the turn of the century – have fallen back again since 2001 (Istat, 2010). From this overview it is not entirely clear whether the pricing system is in reality distorting the choice between maintenance and investment, or the nature of investment. Other problems are related to the enterprise structure of the industry.
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Most water supply companies are rather small (with the exception of Puglia, where one company serves almost the entire region), and there is wide variation in their apparent efficiency (Benvenuti and Gennari, 2008). Most companies are wholly or partly owned by municipalities (in the case of Puglia by the region). Opening up competition for management, at the same time as allowing mergers across companies, could reduce costs. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: GETTING AND GOVERNANCE RIGHT This process should bePRICES supported by the establishment of an independent authority. Because of the difficulty of entrenched conflicts of interest in local public sector
management, privatisation may be necessary to enforce competition (Bianco and Sestito, 2008; OECD, 2009b). A law requiring privatisation of water management companies was OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: ITALY © OECD 2011 introduced in 2009. Such a policy has been recommended for some time by the Competition Authority, and is also a way to get investment into the sector given that public funds are scarce. Its implementation has been held up by regional challenges to its
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constitutionality (but its legality has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court) and it may also be challenged by a referendum in 2011. One strand of opposition to this necessary reform is based upon a United Nations declaration23 that safe drinking water is a basic human right. Privatisation is unlikely in practice to violate this principle and – while a right to water does not need to mean a right to free water – charging structures which provide a certain quantity of free water to consumers are not unprecedented, such as the one introduced by private water companies in the Flanders region of Belgium in 1997 (O’Brien et al, 2001).
Box 3.10. The use of result-oriented devices to improve the quality of services in waste and water management: regional policies in the southern regions
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In the last decade, regional policies in the southern regions have given great emphasis to environmental issues. The preservation and sustainable exploitation of natural resources together with the improvement of the quality of environmental services are among the Pagina 5 Cosa fare dell'acqua, imparando dall'Europa most relevant priorities of all programmes implemented within the framework of EU structural funds and national resources devoted to regional development (so-called FAS). In the 2007-13 period, the focus of regional policy strategies in these areas has shifted towards a clearer definition of results to be achieved in terms of minimum service
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management, privatisation may be necessary to enforce competition (Bianco and Sestito,
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2008; OECD, 2009b). A law requiring privatisation of water management companies was introduced in 2009. Such a policy has been recommended for some time by the Competition Authority, and is also a way to get investment into the sector given that public funds are scarce. Its implementation has been held up by regional challenges to its constitutionality (but its legality has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court) and it may also be challenged by a referendum in 2011. One strand of opposition to this necessary reform is based upon a United Nations declaration23 that safe drinking water is a basic
Cosa fare dell'acqua, imparando dall'Europa
human right. Privatisation is unlikely in practice to violate this principle and – while a right to water does not need to mean a right to free water – charging structures which provide a certain quantity of free water to consumers are not unprecedented, such as the one introduced by private water companies in the Flanders region of Belgium in 1997 (O’Brien et al, 2001).
Box 3.10. The use of result-oriented devices to improve the quality of services in waste and water management: regional policies in the southern regions In the last decade, regional policies in the southern regions have given great emphasis to environmental issues. The preservation and sustainable exploitation of natural resources together with the improvement of the quality of environmental services are among the most relevant priorities of all programmes implemented within the framework of EU structural funds and national resources devoted to regional development (so-called FAS). In the 2007-13 period, the focus of regional policy strategies in these areas has shifted towards a clearer definition of results to be achieved in terms of minimum service standards in municipal waste and water management. Rewards for the eight regions of the Mezzogiorno are linked to the achievement of fixed targets in 2013. These targets are aligned with EU structural funds objectives, such as increasing the share of the population served by sewage treatment plants. They may be an improvement on previous rewarding mechanisms which focused more on process (such as setting up plans, or management systems), but there is room for more improvement in specifying targets which are related to environmental or health outcomes, rather than input measures – for example, by targeting water quality rather than the number of sewage treatment facilities. It would also be helpful for such programmes to be accompanied by evaluation, for example to verify whether health outcomes are better in areas where targets have been better respected.
While the above concerns piped water supply to households and businesses, around half the water used in Italy is in irrigated agriculture, much though not all of it in areas with very low annual precipitation. Conflicts between agriculture and other water users seem to have been rather limited, and the annual reports of the national water monitoring commission do not even mention irrigation (Conviri, 2009, 2010).24 The fact that farmers in areas of water scarcity often extract groundwater themselves means that they face the right incentives for efficient use of the water extracted. But uncoordinated extraction (where individual farmers do not take into account the effect of their extraction on the situation of neighbouring farms or other water users) is likely to lead to falling water tables, which damages non-irrigated activities, salinity. Salinity occur either through RIGHT 3. or ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:may GETTING PRICES AND GOVERNANCE evaporation of water applied in irrigation or through infiltration of seawater into some
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low-lying coastal areas. To some extent there is a self-correcting mechanism in that if groundwater becomes too saline, agriculture will cease or adapt, but there may still be OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: ITALY © OECD 2011 externalities where the natural environment is sensitive to this. In most areas there does not seem to be an active policy to avoid these problems, and information about who extracts water and how much is often scarce. To ensure that agriculture uses water efficiently where it is scarce, as well as to reduce problems with excess use of nitrates and phosphates (which are also hard to deal with at the moment because little effort is made to trace use of fertilisers and feed, even in areas where surface water quality suffers from this) more effective use of the existing licensing system would be useful. It would both improve information on which to form policy and could form the basis of a market in water – which is likely to be the best way to deal with increasing water scarcity (Bazzani, 2004).
Box 3.11. Recommendations on water Fully privatise water supply and treatment operators, where feasible, while strictly enforcing rules requiring public tendering for provision of local water services. Allow water companies to charge prices that fully reflect costs including the need to renew infrastructure over time. Social concerns should be dealt with using social policies. The existing national commission, Conviri, should become an independent national regulatory authority to monitor water supply and quality, including water that does not enter public distribution networks, enforcing competition rules (in conjunction with the Competition Authority) and quality standards. Its mandate should also include improving the reliability and comparability of statistics on water. Revisit national legislation on the structure of water pricing. Prices should be set as a function of the cost of supply and the level of demand, not as a function of the nature of the consumer, and should fully reflect the polluter-pays principle. In areas where groundwater resources are overstretched, or potentially so, ensure that extraction is regulated by licensing, abstraction charges and tradable water rights.
Notes 1. In 2007 the production of 1 kWh entailed the emission of 388 g of CO2 in Italy against 427 in Germany, 500 in the United Kingdom and 549 in the United States. 2. The share increases each year: it was 2% in 2001, 6.05% in 2010 and it will be 7.55% in 2012.
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3. In the last IEA policy review of Italy, support for renewable energywas considered among the most Cosa fare dell'acqua, imparando dall'Europa generous in Europe. This may be partly Pagina because 6 other European countries, started to support renewables earlier than Italy. See I-Com (2010), “Il possibile contributo del settore fotovoltaico al sistema Italia”. 4. ENEA (2010) does not specify if RES costs are in current or constant euro. Here we assume that reported costs are in current 2020 euro. The 2005 value of the externalities for Italy from EEA (2008) has been revaluated to 2020 assuming a 2% inflation rate. A more accurate analysis should
companies to charge prices that fully reflect costs including the need to renew infrastructure over time. Social concerns should be dealt with using social policies.
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The existing national commission, Conviri, should become an independent national regulatory authority to monitor water supply and quality, including water that does not enter public distribution networks, enforcing competition rules (in conjunction with the Competition Authority) and quality standards. Its mandate should also include improving the reliability and comparability of statistics on water. Revisit national legislation on the structure of water pricing. Prices should be set as a function of the cost of supply and the level of demand, not as a function of the nature of the consumer, and should fully reflect the polluter-pays principle.
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In areas where groundwater resources are overstretched, or potentially so, ensure that extraction is regulated by licensing, abstraction charges and tradable water rights.
Notes 1. In 2007 the production of 1 kWh entailed the emission of 388 g of CO2 in Italy against 427 in Germany, 500 in the United Kingdom and 549 in the United States. 2. The share increases each year: it was 2% in 2001, 6.05% in 2010 and it will be 7.55% in 2012. 3. In the last IEA policy review of Italy, support for renewable energywas considered among the most generous in Europe. This may be partly because other European countries, started to support renewables earlier than Italy. See I-Com (2010), “Il possibile contributo del settore fotovoltaico al sistema Italia”. 4. ENEA (2010) does not specify if RES costs are in current or constant euro. Here we assume that reported costs are in current 2020 euro. The 2005 value of the externalities for Italy from EEA (2008) has been revaluated to 2020 assuming a 2% inflation rate. A more accurate analysis should consider the levelised social cost of energy, in order to spread the value of the subsidies along the life of the RES plant and should include the benefit from energy security and deduct system integration costs. See Ea Energy Analyses (2008) and EEA(2008). 5. Italy abandoned nuclear power after a popular referendum in 1987. Law 99/2009 sets out a new energy strategy in which electronuclear production should cover 25% of electricity demand by 2030 (estimated on the basis of an installed capacity of 13 GW and an annual production of about 100 TWh). With the return to nuclear power the Italian government aims to improve energy security, stabilize electricity costs and lower the carbon intensity of the electricity sector.
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: ITALY © OECD 2011
Allegato 3. Acqua, com'è tempestivo il consiglio dell'Ocse
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di CARLO CLERICETTI la Repubblica - 10 maggio 2011
"L'Ocse raccomanda all'Italia la completa privatizzazione della fornitura e del trattamento dell'acqua, dove fattibile", nonché l'istituzione di un'autorità di controllo sul settore. Ma guarda un po' che coincidenza: mai prima d'ora l'Ocse si era occupata dei servizi idrici italiani, e quando lo fa? A poco più di un mese dai referendum che dovrebbero decidere appunto su questo problema. Non solo, l'organizzazione entra ancor più nello specifico, precisando che le compagnie idriche dovrebbero poter far pagare prezzi che riflettono in toto i costi, inclusa la necessità di rinnovare le infrastrutture. E' appunto il quesito del secondo referendum in materia. Il primo, come si ricorderà, vuole abolire l'obbligo di affidare il servizio a società di tipo privatistico mediante gara, mentre l'altro vuole vietare la possibilità di caricare sulle tariffe il costo degli investimenti. Diciamo subito che su questo secondo punto in particolare si è aperto un dibattito anche all'interno della sinistra, tanto che Enrico Letta, uno dei dirigenti di prima linea del Pd, ha dichiarato nel giorni scorsi che bisognerebbe votare "sì" al primo referendum e "no" al secondo. Molti ritengono che se non si permette di caricare sulle tariffe il costo del capitale necessario agli investimenti questi ultimi semplicemente non si faranno, mentre per l'ammodernamento della nostra rete idrica ce ne sarebbe un'assoluta necessità. E' bene però sottolineare che questa è una tesi che può essere discussa. Quello dell'acqua è un servizio essenziale e in base a questa caratteristica, secondo altri, sarebbe più corretto che i costi per gli investimenti fossero a carico della fiscalità generale. E non è decisiva neanche l'obiezione che, per educare a non sprecare, la tariffa dovrebbe essere sufficientemente elevata: lo stesso risultato si può benissimo ottenere modulando le tariffe in base ai consumi (cioè, oltre una "fascia sociale", che più consuma più paga), come già avviene per esempio per l'energia elettrica. Il costo reale degli investimenti, d'altronde, non è facile da verificare come potrebbe sembrare, così come non è facile stabilire al di là di ogni dubbio quali siano gli investimenti davvero necessari e che riflessi ci debbano essere sulla tariffa per remunerarli in maniera adeguata ma non troppo generosa. In altre parole, ci può essere il rischio che una remunerazione degli investimenti fatta in questo modo si trasformi comunque in una tassa a carico dei cittadini, ma occulta invece che palese. Ma torniamo all'Ocse e alle sue raccomandazioni. Come si spiega questa singolare tempestività nell'occuparsi proprio di questi problemi, con i referendum alle porte e pochi giorni dopo che il governo ha annunciato che sarà costituità un'apposita Authority? Si spiega molto facilmente. E' largamente noto a chi sa qualcosa del funzionamento di questi organismi internazionali che considerano uno dei loro compiti appoggiare provvedimenti che i governi vogliono prendere, ma che risultano impopolari. Tagli di spesa, per esempio, o riforme che riducono i vantaggi del welfare state. E' altrettanto noto che spesso sono gli stessi governi interessati a chiedere a queste organizzazioni di prendere posizione, in modo da poter dire all'opinione pubblica: "Certo, è una misura dolorosa, ma che possiamo fare? E' tanto necessaria che ce la chiede anche l'Ocse (o il Fondo Monetario, o la Commissione Europea...)". E se qualcuno avanzasse dubbi in proposito, chi scrive può affermare di aver sentito con le proprie orecchie un altissimo dirigente di una di queste organizzazioni, nel corso di un colloquio off the record, ammettere che è proprio così, che questa non è una diceria ma quello che effettivamente accade. Alla luce di questa informazione, quanto vale, allora, il consiglio dell'Ocse? marzo 2014
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