Rivista Marittima - Articoli in inglese Giugno 2021

GIUGNO 2021 - Anno CLIV

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GIUGNO 2021

RIVISTA

MARITTIMA MENSILE DELLA MARINA MILITARE DAL 1868

Situazione di sicurezza nel «Mediterraneo allargato»

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* RIVISTA MARITTIMA *

Paolo Casardi

SPECIALE 150 anni - Regia Scuola Superiore Navale di Genova UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI GENOVA SCUOLA POLITECNICA - DIPARTIMENTO DI INGEGNERIA NAVALE, ELETTRICA, ELETTRONICA E DELLE TELECOMUNICAZIONI Marco Ferrando, Massimo Figari, Paola Gualeni, Michele Martelli, Francesco Materno, Carlo Podenzana-Bonvino, Veronica Vigna

PRIMO PIANO

Security situation in the «enlarged Mediterranean» Possible implications for the Italian Navy

A moment of "EUROMARSEC 21", the European mission in the Gulf of Guinea to combat illicit trafficking at sea, which ITS RIZZO participated in.

Paolo Casardi A career diplomat, he served in Rome, Paris, Maputo, London, Brussels, New York and Santiago. He dealt with all branches of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activity, and was subsequently given a seat on the Board of Directors of the Farnesina with the post of Inspector General of the Ministry and Posts abroad. After leaving active service, he was coopted as a member of the Circle of Diplomatic Studies, where he was later, elected Co-President, carrying out, both within and outside of the aforementioned framework, research and academic activities in the field of international relations. He has authored articles and essays in specialist magazines and publications. He acts as scientific advisor to the Italian Navy with regard to the humanities area.

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Rivista Marittima June 2021

Security situation in the «enlarged Mediterranean»

Introduction In order to contextualize the security situation in the "enlarged Mediterranean" (1), it may prove useful to point out that, in my opinion, politically speaking there are five challenges, some old and some new, that the enlarged Mediterranean puts us up against at this time: — The first is the constantly expanding unrest in the area and particularly in the southern part. Unrest comes about due to: 1) local conflicts; 2) aggressiveness of middle regional powers; 3) interests of great powers and global powers. These three points are often connected. This therefore confirms the well-known principle that resolving internal conflicts of sovereign States runs the risk of continuing in perpetuity when the interests of local parties are added to those of regional powers and, even more so, when one or more global powers are involved. See, in particular, the ArabIsraeli conflict; — the second is the migration question, which the international community has, as of yet, not given a satisfactory answer to. Along with the aspects related to sea transit to Europe, many more must be regulated: cooperation with African and Middle Eastern countries to increase the supply of jobs in Africa; assistance and filtering in camps to be set up immediately south of the southern Libyan border; assistance and an additional more thorough filtering in Libya, in the camps that the UNHCR (2) should set up for this purpose in collaboration with the EU, while the latter also takes on new responsibilities related to the control of the Libyan borders; — the third is the decreased mediation capacity of the United Nations in resolving international conflicts, due to an atmosphere of greater exchange of views, compared to the past, within the Security Council between permanent and non-permanent members. For the very same reasons, this goes hand in hand with a decreased mediation capacity of the great global powers, compared to the time of the Cold War — the fourth is the pandemic. This calls for a series of urgent operations of national and international significance which, on the one hand may favour temporary truces in conflicts, but on the other end up delaying the steps needed in favour of reconciliation and stability;

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— the fifth challenge is at sea, where tensions arise between States, mainly due to the phenomenon of the territorialization of the seas; it is known that seabeds, rich in many resources are being currently exploited thanks to modern technology. Hence the rush of coastal States to ensure, through the delimitation of their own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (3), the international legitimacy for the exploitation of offshore oil, gas and so on, which was and is at the heart of many ongoing tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. Even at sea, there are threats posed by non-state actors, which Italians are well acquainted with, such as criminal organizations that oversee human trafficking, piracy and the smuggling of weapons, drugs and so on. The latter are difficult to repress (at the Naval Museum of Venice (4) there is a lance that was captured at sea from Somali pirates by one of our units circa 1920), but they are linked to certain geographical areas and their ambitions are more pragmatic than political. Human trafficking, on the other hand, is one of the most negative aspects of an extremely far-reaching issue, namely emigration from the least fortunate places on the planet to the richest and most stable countries. As has been said, this has not as yet received due attention and care from the international community, due to the known wars and lastly the pandemic.

As far as we are concerned, the role of the Armed Forces in the geopolitics of the enlarged Mediterranean will be strengthened, both in the event that conflicts persist, and in the opposite case, should efforts to favour stability chart some progress. This is because, in the first case, the deterrence capacity of the respective Armed Forces must be increased. Moreover, in the second, peace operations, which will require a considerable intervention of troops and materials for their deployment on the territory, air cover, maritime surveillance, military police etc., should be initiated; this just covers the basics of any peace operation, which then, depending on its nature and where it takes place, will require many integrations.

As proof of the above, the various wars fought for example in Syria, Yemen or Libya, not only lasted more than ten years and are not over yet, but, in view of the disasters caused to the population and therefore

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Security situation in the «enlarged Mediterranean»

to civil society, which will be long in recovering, some external powers have lined their pockets with new military bases and appealing economic contracts.

To this regard, it must be noted that the recent "proximity war" in Libya, finalized with the "ceasefire" agreement of October 2020, has changed the strategic situation in the Mediterranean area, with the new presence of Turkish and Russian troops in the Libyan territory. This is a particularly sensitive situation for Italians who are witnessing, immediately beyond their country's "southern liquid border", the setting up of important military, naval and air bases of a global power such as Russia and a military power like Turkey that, although a NATO member, has given clear signs that it plans on broadening its strategic ambitions in the Mediterranean. After all, Libya is a country of great strategic value due to the influence that may be exercised in the Mediterranean from its territory, as well as on the African continent and in particular on the Sahel, from its southern borders. And that's when the aforementioned new presences, furthermore opposed, constitute a disturbing unknown variable for us, as well as for the European Union and many other countries and local and global international organizations. Hence, the urgency behind the request that Russia and Turkey comply with the "ceasefire" clauses, which they themselves signed at the time, withdrawing

Prime Minister of the Libyan National Unity government Dbeibah (left) with Erdogan, president of Turkey “(...) although a NATO member, has given clear signs of plans of broadening its strategic ambitions in the Mediterranean” (Image source: trt.net).

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all the military forces under their respective direct authority from Libya.

In a recent "Diplomatic Letter" (5) I also suggested that the EU should take on greater responsibility for the control of Libyan borders and assistance on Libyan soil to emigrants and their transit northwards.

After more than a decade of wars throughout the "enlarged Mediterranean" region, today it is vital that the search for stability be prioritized over any attempt to make partisan interests prevail, whose international legitimacy and justification have often been proven unfounded. Instead, some constants must be maintained, perhaps with renewed energy, such as the fight against the Islamic State and terrorism in all its forms, which is still active and aggressive, particularly in Africa. As a Circle of Diplomatic Studies we have repeatedly recommended that a general conference on the area should be convened, as a method, even a long-term one, for resolving conflicts, but the format could also be different and informal. What has been missing thus far is a genuine reassessment of the advantages of diplomacy and negotiation, in the face of the use of war to resolve international and national disputes, with the ensuing disasters it brings about.

The short term We must reflect upon the urgent nature of our national interests, as a country of raw material transformation, therefore of import-export, which push us to keep the security situation in the areas near us well in hand.

First of all, the Mediterranean means navigation and trade flows between Suez and Gibraltar. This was amply confirmed after the clear signs of general complications that occurred following the navigation accident that occurred last April to the large Panamanian container ship Ever Given (6). That ship ran aground while crossing the Suez Canal and blocked it for a week near the Great Bitter Lake (where, after September 8, 1943 our two largest and most modern battleships: Italia and Vittorio Veneto (7), survivors of the war against the Allies and then against Germany, were confined for years with flag, commander and crews).

Hence our traditional predisposition to stability, precisely to ensure the continuity of trade flows. Any in-

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terruption of these flows; any serious problem that may arise for the Suez or Panama Canals, or the straits from Malacca to Bab-el-Mandeb, causes not only serious damage to the Italian maritime sector, but creates problems for the industrial district of Milan and with it all the other districts. The central role the sea plays in our economic system does not lie in calculating what the maritime sector is worth for our GDP, but in the fact that, without freedom and safety of navigation, our import-export system will simply stop.

The security situation in the "enlarged Mediterranean" In this area, any tension runs the risk of also having repercussions on our country. This vast area, which includes the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and part of the Indian Ocean, on one side, and the Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea on the other, is no longer as it was in the Cold War. Globalization has brought more and larger ships to these seas, has widened the Suez Canal (although not nearly enough, as we have seen) and has enhanced port infrastructures (in Italy less than elsewhere). An increase in merchant ships size should certainly be limited, particularly for ecological reasons (see also the recent sinking of the Singaporean MVX Press Pearl container ship, full of chemicals, plastic and oil, off the tourist west coast of Sri Lanka). However, the difference in the Mediterranean is also significant for the Navies. Since 1990, the US Navy has been significantly reduced shifting its focus on other theatres, especially the Far East; however, we are witnessing the silent, yet significant growth of some Navies, which previously had not been very sizeable, such as the Algerian (8), the Egyptian and the Turkish. In certain cases, they are also equipped with "great power" military assets, such as the Algerian submarines, equipped with deep strike systems, i.e. the ability to strike targets thousands of kilometres from the sea.

Furthermore, the three aforementioned Navies possess at least one, if not two each, large amphibious ships capable of exercising command and control in complex operations, where landings of men and vehicles with extensive use of helicopters are envisaged. Turkey (9) is also equipping itself with two brand new multipurpose amphibious assault ships (LHD) (the first has already

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The Panamanian container ship EVER GIVEN, the central figure of an accident which resulted in the blocking of the Suez Canal and of maritime traffic for a week (vesselfinder.com).

been launched) of the same tonnage as our Cavour, which may, in the future, be transformed into aircraft carriers. The ships in question will nonetheless be armed with a great number of naval drones. The Israeli Navy remains modest in size, but equipped with the latest technologies. Finally, also thanks to the renovated base in Syria, Russian warships have increased their presence in the Mediterranean, the Chinese are also beginning to show themselves: they have opened a large and articulated permanent base in Djibouti and their ships make frequent port of calls at the Piraeus, afterwards occasionally visiting Italy. The first port visit to Taranto by a Chinese naval group took place in 2012. They said they were visiting the Mediterranean countries with the most ancient civilizations, namely Egypt, Greece and Italy. In reality, it was the first military "peek" at the nautical routes of the "Silk Road" in this sea. They recently indicated their willingness to join the UNIFIL naval component in Lebanon, within which assets of our Navy will shortly be deployed again.

None of these Mediterranean or extra-Mediterranean Navies may be defined as belonging to hostile countries. However, the ancient Latin axiom which said: "if you want peace, prepare for war", translated today means that only those who have adequate deterrence can convince a rival or mere interlocutor, in the area of interest to us, not to resort to war as a means for resolving international crises. To this end, aircraft carrier

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Security situation in the «enlarged Mediterranean»

Cavour recently acquired the ability to embark and operate the F-35B, (STOVL, Short Take Off and Vertical Landing) aircraft, enabling us to be among the four Navies in the world (United States, Great Britain, Japan and Italy), capable of operating with the JSF (Joint Strike Fighter), a fifth-generation aircraft. Thanks also to the Orizzonte class destroyers and FREMM frigates, the Italian carrier Group has become the most technologically advanced among the Navies of the Mediterranean countries, including France and Spain, able to participate in the most qualified levels of naval exercises in the Atlantic Alliance.

Safety on the territory Furthermore, if we look at the current security situation on the territory, there is practically no area of the "enlarged Mediterranean" that may be said to be free from tensions. Indeed, it may be certainly said that it is the area of the world with the highest concentration of permanent or creeping conflicts.

Perhaps we can currently surmise that the western Mediterranean area of the Atlas chain is calm, but in reality, we know that there is always a smouldering tension between Morocco and Algeria, also on account of the issue of sovereignty over the territory of Western Sahara (a former Spanish colony) that still persists between Moroccans and the Sarawi people. We are also

aware of the situation in Libya, where the road to peace is still arduous, despite some important progress in the negotiations between the Libyan parties. Not to mention the Sahel, where jihad and other armed groups are active and where, just a few weeks ago, Idriss Déby, president of Chad, died in battle (10) as he was engaged in a clash with the rebels of the "The Front for Change and Concord". The Gulf of Guinea (where a new EU anti-piracy naval mission is being geared up) retains many of its traditional problems and is also experiencing new ones. The Horn of Africa is also home to unresolved tensions in both Ethiopia and Somalia.

Crossing the Red Sea, we see that the conflict in Yemen has yet to be resolved, while life in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria is anything but normalized. Israel is still struggling between the unresolved Palestinian issue and its scorching relations with Iran, which have been further aggravated by the recent 11 Day War, which took place from May 10 to 25 inclusive. In the Caucasus, the old Russian/Georgian and Russian/Chechen tensions and those in NagornoKarabakh persist to this day, even after the recent conflict. The Persian Gulf and Afghanistan are still potentially explosive (while NATO is withdrawing).

This context, which is extremely alarming in and of itself, has recently been worsened, as has been said, by the potential conflicts that revolve around the issue of territorialization of the seas, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, and by a recent resumption of unrest in Ukraine and therefore in the Black Sea.

War and peace. Which of the two will prevail?

CAVOUR aircraft carrier during the "Ready For Operations - RFO" campaign to acquire the F-35Bs certification that “(...) enables us to be among the four Navies in the world capable of operating a fifth-generation aircraft”.

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At this juncture, international diplomacy is actively at work, while the attitude of President Biden and the American administration bodes well for the United States' recovery of the traditional values of the liberal West and of its worldwide support, along with its ability to act as a mediator in conflicts, rather than just an interested party. For its part, due to the well-known difficulties in finding an agreement between its members, the European Union has as of yet been unable to exercise its leadership, in an attempt to resolve disputes and resume a strategic role. However, faced with the urgent nature of the current crises and hopefully being able to

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Security situation in the «enlarged Mediterranean»

count on the support of the United States, the EU could try to be more daring diplomatically speaking.

In recent years, the EU has been able to exercise a holistic role throughout the area in only one activity in the expanded Mediterranean. We are speaking about "Maritime Security", thanks to the Irini operations (11) (against arms smuggling off the Libyan coast) and, previously, Sophia (against migrant trafficking), the Atalanta (anti-piracy) operation in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and Frontex operations (management of flows to Europe) throughout the Mediterranean. The Council of the EU has now authorized, for the anti-piracy action, the launch of a "pilot case" featuring a new "authorized maritime presence" mechanism in the Gulf of Guinea.

As far back as 2014, the High Representative Federica Mogherini had promoted the adoption by the European Council of the document on European Maritime Strategy and, shortly after, the corresponding Action Plan. I remember that the first major project financed by the "European Defence Fund" was also an Italianled maritime security project. It is worth noting the primary and Command role undertaken by the Italian Navy in some of these operations, in addition to the meritorious task of consulting and proposing that the Navy had taken on in preparing the aforementioned documents and in the inter-European intellectual debate that surrounded them. In this regard, I recall the interesting international seminar organized on board Cavour in July 2014 in Civitavecchia, to discuss these matters.

"Maritime Security" can therefore be considered an excellent textbook example of what the Italian Government and the Navy in particular can do, making use of an international organization, in this case the EU, as a multiplier of the Italian effort aimed at safeguarding the national interest. The results may be improved in the future, but getting started is most important. The same principle evidently applies to NATO.

What else can the Government and the Navy do to help restore stability in the Mediterranean?

First of all, let's see how far international diplomacy can go, if it is effectively enhanced by new American positions of openness and mediation. An event of great significance, President Biden's first ever international

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visit, starting next June 10, will be to Europe to participate in the G7 Conference in Cornwall. This will be followed by the NATO summit in Brussels and meetings with EU leaders, as well as at various bilateral meetings with Heads of State and Government taking place on the sidelines of the aforementioned occasions, concluding with the summit with President Putin in Geneva. This is an exceptional panoply of contacts, through which we will become better acquainted with the true intentions of the President and American foreign policy and his attitude towards Europe and Russia.

Let us also see if the member states will allow the EU, in this new general diplomatic situation, to take more daring positions in favour of stability. The Italian Navy can certainly continue to participate and possibly take command of peace operations, with the EU, with NATO, or with the UN. However, it must also be ready to take on, with its own significant presence and renowned training capacity, and possibly with other allied Navies, a deterrent role towards those seeking to take advantage of the destabilization of the area to better satisfy their particular interests.

The long term It is in the long term that, subject to the hoped-for greater integration between member countries, we will work to establish a form of European Defence that is as advanced as possible. We do not even know if it will include all member countries. On the basis of PESCO, it will probably be constituted of an important nucleus of States, which consider Defence to be an essential instrument of democracy and European Defence as an added value to the national one, a great multiplier of security, particularly if it is carried out in an increasingly integrated Europe. This is a long-term process as it will take time before European countries eventually reach a compatible level of political integration and are also convinced to pay the costs needed in order to have a European defence worthy of the name. Some related issues are, for the moment, far from being resolved, such as nuclear power. However, just getting organized on more “conventional” sectors and capabilities, such as space, missile defence, even hypersonic, cyber defence, air and sea, amphibious, strategic transport, ar-

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Security situation in the «enlarged Mediterranean»

tificial intelligence, submarines equipped with deep strike systems, unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles, will take a long time.

In the meantime, however, more advanced forms of coordinated interventions may be organized, such as a planned peacekeeping force and, for the first time ever, under a fully integrated command structure with HQs in Brussels, while, in order to deal with crises of a certain entity, we will rely on NATO, possibly with agreed-upon forms of European aggregation within it.

NATO will therefore long remain the only military organization capable of defending Europe from a major crisis. This constant makes us understand how, at least in terms of security, we would be well advised to accept with conviction the invitation of the new US President Biden to once more consider Europe and the United States as an integral part of a single Western bloc.

Deterrence and Peacekeeping Forces It is worth acknowledging, as mentioned in the introduction, that both if the situation should worsen, as well as in the event, hoped-for by most, that the urgent nature and general convenience of diplomatically engaging in favour of peace is recognized, the importance of the Armed Forces in the "enlarged Mediterranean" will increase. In fact, in the first case the military strengthening of the West, both as Europe and as a transatlantic Community, must take place in order to constitute a threshold

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO secretary general, “(...) the only military organization capable of defending Europe from a major crisis”. (Image source: nato.int).

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of deterrence needed to avoid direct involvement in the broadening of the conflict, or, should this circumstance be unavoidable, at least to be able to get out of it with the least consequences and the greatest results. However, if reasonableness and the rejection of further conflicts finally prevailed throughout the "enlarged Mediterranean", the Western Armed Forces would still be called to a great commitment: that of taking part in the numerous "Peacekeeping Forces" that international diplomacy must provide, to ensure the success and duration of new peace agreements. At least for the first ten or twenty years many forces, including naval ones, will be needed to cover an area as vast as the " enlarged Mediterranean", to guard the hoped-for progress made on the road to stability, in the Mediterranean, including the Black Sea, in the Atlantic, in the Red Sea, as in the Persian Gulf, or in the Indian Ocean.

In order to respond adequately to all this, high-profile decisions and achievements are needed for the Italian Navy. One such is completing the fleet, that is all the measures connected with its efficiency, for example those relating to a modest, but indispensable increase in the currently scarce personnel, even taking into account how technological progress has reduced the numbers needed for the crews of naval units. All this is even truer when it comes to the tasks carried out by the Italian Navy in distant countries, which the latter, deservingly and wisely for our national interests, has never failed from the Italian unification to date. A few days ago, the European Council indicated its intention to ensure a "significant" naval presence of the EU in the Pacific. This stems from the European desire to respond favourably to President Biden's invitation to operate jointly, globally, as a "Western bloc".

In this regard, an observation could also be made on Mozambique (which owes its internal pacification above all to Italy and the Community of St. Egidio. You might recall that in the Nineties, the then lieutenant colonel of the Alpine troops Claudio Graziano, was in command of one battalion of Alpine troops in that country, while the commanders of the UN peacekeeping force were at first brigadier general Luigi Fontana (Taurinense brigade) and later brigadier general Silvio Mazzaroli (Julia brigade).

Afterward in that country, ENI discovered important gas fields in the sea and on land. The construction sites on

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the coast entrusted to TOTAL, on the border with Tanzania, are today under repeated attacks by the new-born jihad in southern Africa, while even those at sea, where ENI works, are potentially exposed to similar dangers.

Finally, we must work on the standardization of armaments both within the Atlantic Alliance and in the EU, in order to support any progress in political and defence integration. Standardization would be equally extremely useful for military operational purposes for the allies even now. Progress must also be made on the integration of the major European shipbuilding and armament groups, in order to withstand stiff competition from the rest of the world. With regard to these last two needs, it will be very important to be able to continue to count on funding from the European Defence Fund, established a few years ago. These are, of course, matters on which the Italian Navy is obviously not called to make decisions, but where it can offer its technical advice to facilitate guidelines and initiatives.

The Italian Navy thus affirms itself as a fundamental pillar of national defence, as well as an important instrument of influence, also within the framework of the international organizations it is a part of, in favour of Italian efforts aimed at restoring stability in the "enlarged Mediterranean". Its well-known naval diplomacy skills have become a tradition since the times of the Italian unification. Today it goes hand in hand with an excellent development program, which the Italian Navy has given itself within the framework of relevant laws, suited to the aspirations of "peace in security" of our country and to the specific objectives of Italian foreign policy in support of our legitimate national interests. These characteristics make it a key player, together with our other Armed Forces, in the future of

Final photo of the XII Regional Seapower Symposium which took place in Venice in 2019. “The international naval symposium, held every two years in Venice, which is attended by most of the world's navies has authoritatively established itself as one of the two main Italian actions of "preventative diplomacy", together with the other exercise, known as MED (...)”.

our international relations. This, clearly, after the desired-for imminent end of the insurmountable limits of action set by the current pandemic. The international naval Symposium held every two years in Venice (unless otherwise dictated by anti-covid measures) is attended by most of the world's navies, including all the most noteworthy ones. It has authoritatively established itself as one of the two main Italian actions of "preventative diplomacy" (in this case "Maritime Security" for the "enlarged Mediterranean" area), together with the other exercise, known as MED (12) (Mediterranean Dialogues), organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ISPI. An excellent instrument, which could be promotional (Inshallah!) as well as support the development of a multilateral negotiating diplomatic system for the future stabilization of the area.

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NOTE (1) As is well known, the paternity of the enlarged Mediterranean can be attributed to the War Institute of the Italian Navy; this concept then brought about a scenario which subsequently acquired ever greater importance. On the subject, among many, see P.P. Ramoino, Quali sono i confini del “Mediterraneo Allargato”?, in Analisi Difesa, November 22, 2020, at: https://www.analisidifesa.it/2020/11/quali-sono-i-confini-del-mediterraneo-allargato.

(2) https://www.unhcr.org/it/notizie-storie/notizie/libia-unhcr-e-wfp-insieme-per-assistere-migliaia-di-rifugiati-e-richiedenti-asilo-con-cibo-demergenza.

(3) See F. Caffio, s.v. Zona economica esclusiva and following items in Idem, Glossario di Diritto del Mare, in Rivista Marittima (monographic issue), 2020 (V ed.), pp. 201 et seq.

(4) https://www.marina.difesa.it/cosa-facciamo/per-la-cultura/musei/museostoricove/Pagine/default.aspx.

(5) Published in Rivista Marittima, April 2021, pp.90-93.

(6) https://www.vesselfinder.com/it/vessels/EVER-GIVEN-IMO-9811000-MMSI-353136000 (01/06/2021).

(7) https://www.marina.difesa.it/noi-siamo-la-marina/storia/la-nostra-storia/accaddeil/Pagine/1947_02_09_Rientro_Italia_navi_battaglia_Italia_e_Vittorio_Veneto_internate_ ai_Laghi_Amari_Canale_Suez_da_ottobre_1943.aspx.

(8) https://www.cesi-italia.org/articoli/1277/deterrenza-e-proiezione-regionale-lo-sviluppo-della-marina-nazionale-algerina-in-unottica-mediterranea.

(9) https://www.cesi-italia.org/articoli/1167/la-nuova-postura-della-marina-turca-e-le-crescenti-ambizioni-di-ankara-nel-mediterraneo.

(10) https://www.notiziegeopolitiche.net/farnesina-sgomento-per-la-scomparsa-del-presidente-idriss-deby-itno.

(11) https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/EUNAVFOR_MED_Operazione_Irini/ Pagine/default.aspx.

(12 ) https://med.ispionline.it.

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PRIMO PIANO

The legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zones.

What stage is Italy at?

Paola Giorgia Ascani

W

hen we focus on the majority of maritime tensions and disputes currently taking place in the world, we find a single common denominator: the EEZs - Exclusive Economic Zones. Introduced by UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, they are the most consistent innovation in the international maritime field, but also the punctum dolens of international relations between States that exercise their Sea Power.

The legislation that characterizes them sometimes

causes uncertainty in application unsuited to stemming attempts at hoarding, not so much of the basins they border, but of the resources (abundance of fish in the seas and natural and energy resources) that are contained in them and under the seabed.

In general, Part V, relating to the regulation of EEZs, was included in the Convention in compliance with the intent to recognize and give legal value to the interests of coastal States. In fact, with the establishment of the EEZs States have seen their powers over the adjacent

Lawyer of the Courts of Rome since 2006, she mainly practices in the criminal field and protection of human rights. She advocates before the Supreme Court of Cassation and higher courts. Member of the Criminal Law and Procedure Commission of the Council of the Bar of Rome, her contributions on the discipline of contracts, patents and trademarks and intellectual property have been published by the Giuffrè publishing house. She was tutor and member of the board of the Criminal Chamber of Rome and of the Alberto Pisani Study Center. She has curated, from a juridical and legal point of view, editorial photography projects on humanitarian and international matters. She is a legal and forensic advisor to the Circle of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Coast Guard controls during fishing activities. In the new Italo-Greek agreement, the current rights of Italian red shrimp fishermen in the future Greek EEZ are preserved (wallnews24). Below: the UNCLOS logo (hanoi times).

peace, but we do not adequately realize how much the same risks, in the last decade, have made their way inshore. The discovery of natural gas fields in a quantity never before found in the West, not even in Northern Europe, has forever changed the balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, off the coast of Egypt, Italy, Greece, Turkey as well as Israel and Lebanon (1), also changing the interests and roles of the players involved.

The policies of individual States, as well as of the international organizations which they belong to, have undergone an abrupt change, tending towards the preservation of prerogatives of power in the energy sector or towards management, which is becoming, in some cases, common. The EEZs are at the centre of all this upheaval of intents, interests and politics.

The hoarding of depths rich in resources, the extension, above and below the water, of one's power of exclusive exploitation, means earning a very wide segment of supremacy from today to the next decades.

What do we mean by the legal regime of EEZs

seas expanded, although not in an indiscriminate or automatic manner. Unlike the continental platform, on which sovereignty extends by natural law, the EEZ must be declared, being the manifestation of a treaty obligation to be exercised with the involvement of frontager or neighbouring States in the marine area concerned.

The establishment of this discipline resulted in conflicting interests and claims on maritime areas, and a new era in the exploitation of the sea and its resources has begun. No less important is the impetus given to geostrategy, in every part of the world. We are often surprised at the proliferation of disputes off the coast of Asian countries, the events in the Chinese seas take up more and more space in the calculation of the risks that the entire international system runs in terms of global

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First of all, we must define the Exclusive Economic Zones pursuant to UNCLOS, to which articles 55 to 75 are dedicated. Articles 55 and 57 legally qualify the EEZ as an "area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, which does not extend beyond 200 nautical miles (2) subject to the specific legal regime established in other parts of this Convention, which harmonize the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State with the rights and freedoms of other States”. Art. 56 provides and lists the rights of coastal States, defined as sovereign, (exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of natural resources, biological and otherwise) on the resources contained on the seabed and in the marine subsoil, as well as in the water column above, to be extended also to the activities necessary to carry them out. Articles 61 and 62 deal, among other things, with the methods of exploitation of fish resources, and provide that the State that owns the EEZ establishes the quantity of resources

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The legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zones. What stage is Italy at?

necessary for internal needs in relation to the exploitation capacity, introducing the principle by which the surplus must be distributed, subject to bi- or multilateral agreements, with third countries.

Under the jurisdictional profile, UNCLOS recognizes the jurisdiction over the installation and use of artificial islands, plants and structures, the conducting of scientific research and the protection and preservation of the environment to the State that holds the EEZ. In relation to the exclusive rights of the coastal State, the Convention preserves the rights and establishes the obligations of third States within the EEZ of others. Art. 58 reaffirms the obligation to safeguard certain international freedoms relating to the high seas, applying it within the EEZ, where the right of navigation, overflight, laying of pipelines and submarine cables by foreign countries remains (3). This regime strikes a legal balance between exclusive exploitation rights by the State that owns the EEZ and freedom of the seas for third States. The compromise between exclusive rights and international freedoms made by the Convention was made possible by adhering to a functional conception of law. That is, both cases are functional with respect to the activities to be carried out lawfully, on the one hand the exploitation of resources, on the other the exercise of communication, air and sea traffic. A confirmation of the functional nature of the applied law comes from the following art. 59, which governs the residual legal situations compared to those just now regulated in a specific way, establishing that the Convention does not attribute rights or duties to the coastal State or other States, and identifies the principle of equity in relation to the circumstances to solve any conflicts, and to the interests of the parties in the specific case. The principle of equity is also the one according to which, articles 69 and 70 UNCLOS (with reference to articles 61 and 62), protect and introduce the rights of the so-called disadvantaged States, that is, those without access to the sea or with a coastline that is too small, which risks precluding them from exploiting marine resources.

The law provides that part of the surplus of the biological resources of the Exclusive Economic Zones of the neighbouring coastal States is to be redistributed to them according to agreements. The Convention also deals with regulating the methods of delimitation of the Exclusive

16

Economic Zones and establishes that, in the case of frontager or contiguous States, they must be traced and defined on the basis of international law dictated by art.

38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, or according to equity, alternatively with the discipline of the solution of disputes provided for in Part XV UNCLOS (art.74 UNCLOS, duty of cooperation in good faith). On this point, to settle the numerous disputes that have arisen, the International Court of Justice (4) has also intervened several times to establish that when the delimitation occurs at the same time, there must be a single line. The multiple EEZs that have been established thus far in the Mediterranean derive, in fact, from bilateral agreements (the Cyprus/Egypt EEZ established in 2003, the Cyprus/Lebanon one in 2007). The legal regime of the EEZs reflects the spirit with which the case was introduced into international law: the greater recognition of the coastal States’ sovereign rights to exploit natural resources, even beyond the territorial sea. It is a regime based on a series of rules of a customary nature, the fulcrum of which already existed prior to the approval of UNCLOS. In the seventies the same prerogatives, now recognized by the Convention, were peacefully exercised by the States; in relation to them, UNCLOS carried out a mere coding function. The phenomenon, known as creeping jurisdiction (5), had already extended State sovereignty to marine areas, today EEZs, like the territorial sea. The exact definition of the legal nature of EEZ was reached, with a compromise between the two approaches that emerged from the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. These reflected the opposite claims of the major fish markets in the North (Russia, United States, Japan, CEE countries) with fleets capable of fishing far from national borders, compared to those of developing countries further south, which powerlessly witnessed the depleting of resources off the coast. According to a first theory, the EEZ was nothing more than a portion of the high seas within which the coastal State could exercise functional rights for the achievement of economic purposes, without prejudice to the regime of freedom of the seas.

The second theory, defined the EEZ, as an area of extension of State power (like the territorial sea) wherein the rights of the coastal State could be exercised, exclud-

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The legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zones. What stage is Italy at?

dence, making them correspond to a lack of connection ing other State powers, thus denying the freedoms trafrom the point of view of law. The disciplines of the EEZ ditionally recognized to other States on the sea. A soluand the continental platform are therefore not superimtion was needed that would allow coastal States to posable. The interpretative complexity derives from the safeguard the exploitation of their basins, saving them impossibility of conclusively applying one, rather than from those who came from afar, claiming the freedom the other, legal regime in the territorial zone of 200 nauof inshore navigation. The final position subsumed in tical miles, which remains subject to two, not complethe Montego Bay Convention was, so to speak, median, mentary, regimes. Both the one and the other regulation placing the EEZs in a sphere halfway between the terriare incomplete in terms of recognizing the rights of the torial sea and the high seas. A third genus that unites, yet coastal State. This problem then leads to conflicts on the at the same time keeps distinct, the prerogatives of boundaries of the EEZs, as none of the interested States coastal States and those of third States, in the strip beand third parties lends itself to renouncing their own extween the territorial sea and the high seas. The compromise of the definitive regulation of the EEZ harmonises specific rules, exclusive sovereignty and general freedoms and, as mentioned above, is functional in nature.

Nonetheless, it leads to hybrid legal conclusions, which generate not a few difficulties in practice and therefore risk of conflict between States, as the history of the initiated files at the International Court of Justice demonstrates (6).

Furthermore, the fact that the rules governing the exploitation of biological resources, and not of the seabed and subsoil, are inherited from the regulation, already conA map indicating the borders of the Greek-Egyptian agreement. One of the many new jurisdictional artained in the Geneva Convention rangements in the eastern Mediterranean Sea (ISPI). of 1958, might superficially apclusive rights in favour of the others. Specifically, it pear to support the argument that the Convention on the bears remembering that in the EEZs the legal regime for rights of the sea has only collected the existing institutes, exploitation concerns natural resources, be they biologsubsuming the rules of the continental platform into ical or mineral, while that of the continental platform apthose of the EEZs. The reality is very different, the two plies only to non-biological resources. From a legal point disciplines are far from coinciding, as demonstrated by of view, this distinction, which may seem insignificant, art. 56, par. 3 UNCLOS, in which express reference is actually generates a relationship of specialty of the rules made, for rights related to the resources of the seabed relating to the platform with respect to those EEZs that, and subsoil, to the provisions of Part VI, relating to the in the application stage, would mean the prevalence of continental platform, and not V, which concerns the the former over the latter. This circumstance is also evEEZs. It is therefore clear that even in the 1982 Convenident from the tenor of the rules that authorize the estabtion the intention was to keep the rules of the EEZ and lishment of the EEZ. These are rules that grant rights to those of the platform separate, for various reasons that the coastal State that, as such, requires an express mango beyond the subsisting, partial geographical coinci-

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The legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zones. What stage is Italy at?

Map of the Italian EEZ and special marine areas (Laura Canali for Limes).

ifestation of will, and a declaration, and are therefore less incisive. This is not the case for the platform, on which the sovereignty of the coastal State is recognized as an inalienable right. Basically, in the event of a conflict to establish the rights of the coastal State over the area within 200 nautical miles, the prevailing discipline will be that relating to the continental platform, regardless of whether the State has declared its EEZ, in the same way in which it is undoubtedly applicable even beyond 200 nautical miles. If, on the other hand, it is a question of establishing the rules applicable in the case of exploitation of the mineral resources of States without a platform, the same discipline would be inapplicable on the seabed within 200 miles from the coast, as only the legal regime defined for the EEZ would apply, which, by the express will of the UNCLOS conventional imprinting, ignores the morphology of the territory, in order to allow, in any type of dispute, the implementation of the Convention. If, from the economic point of view, linked to the rights of exploitation the question is difficult, but still clear to sort out in the event of a conflict, the same cannot be said in cases in which one of the voices of discord concerns the clarification and limits of the content of the freedom of navigation.

Last April there was news of significant tension off the coast of the Laccadive Islands, in the Indian Ocean, due to military exercises carried out by the US Navy consisting of destroyer USS John Paul Jones. Accord-

18

ing to the Indian government, the warship should not have transited the EEZ under international law and the rules on EEZs and CP (Continental Platform) contained in the UNCLOS, but the United States objected to the non-existence and illegitimacy of Indian claims.

To further support the validity of its claims, in the Official Communiqué of the American 7th Fleet, the United States openly confirmed that the exercises, part of the FONOP - Freedom of Navigation Operation - took place without the authorization of India.

In addition to recalling that the United States never ratified UNCLOS, unlike India which proceeded in 1995, it bears mentioning that the excellent relations between the two countries were not at issue, because the exercise was aimed not at harassing India, but at downsizing the Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea, demonstrating that the rights and claims in the EEZs reflect a purely random nature of maritime law in those areas. However, the universal legal question remains, beyond the claims of the disputing parties, whether military naval exercises can be qualified as an expression of freedom of navigation within an EEZ and whether this in some way restricts the exclusive rights of the State that owns the EEZ itself. The answer has yet to be found. The sore point is that this problem derives from an actual discrepancy of UNCLOS, wherein there is no provision that expressly prohibits the carrying out of military exercises or manoeuvres in the EEZ, due to the fact that the legislators of the Convention did not want to do so. In principle, the comparative reading of art. 19, paragraph 2, lett. b UNCLOS, establishes that military manoeuvres are prohibited by the Convention in the territorial sea, in terms of harmless passage, therefore the discrepancy with respect to the EEZs might only be illusory and, in reality, reveals the desire to sanction their lawfulness. It bears mentioning that some Convention signatory States have declared the prohibition of military manoeuvres, and Italy is not among these. Finally, taking into account that the legal regime of freedom in the Area, or the interna-

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The legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zones. What stage is Italy at?

tional sea space beyond the outer limit of the continental platform, remains res nullius to this day, that is nobody's property, free from national jurisdictions (unlike the EEZs) and therefore subject to international standards, a common heritage that no State in the world can make its own, it may be argued that the shadow of national sovereignty unfolds as we move away from the mainland, State powers fade from the territorial sea towards the high seas, passing through the contiguous zone, the EEZs and the continental platform. The ultimate goal of a greater jurisdictionalization of marine areas starting from the coast allows and satisfies the need for fair use between States.

Map of the extension of the Italian EEZ boundary (Laura Canali for Limes).

The Italian situation In the Mediterranean basin, the question of EEZs is particularly delicate. The creation of Exclusive Economic Zones has always been particularly difficult in the Mediterranean Sea due to the morphology of the basin itself, which is identified as semi-closed. In art. 123 UNCLOS has dedicated a general obligation of enhanced cooperation to these type of seas, with a view to avoid, as much as possible, litigations and disputes for the delimitation of areas of exclusive sovereignty, according to the geopolitical implications of the basin. This has meant that traditionally, the Mediterranean States preferred to establish Ecological Protection Zones (EPZ), valid for establishing the boundaries of fish exploitation, whose discipline, in large part, is already suited to guaranteeing them the same prerogatives as the EEZs. This custom has changed in recent years due to some events such as the discovery of huge hydrocarbon deposits in the eastern Mediterranean area, which extends from Israel up to the Greek coasts. Therefore, the EPZs have shed their skin and, to a large extent, States have begun to replace them with the establishment of EEZs. One of these is Italy. The proclamation of its ecological zone took place with Italian Law 61/2006, in order to legally protect itself against the initiatives of other Mediterranean States, especially frontager and adjacent States, which began to proclaim

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their own exclusive zones in the form of "ecological and fishing zones or fishing areas" with the aim of transforming them, only at a later time, into real EEZs (7). The delimitation of the EEZs in the Mediterranean is made increasingly complex by the scarce distance between opposite coasts, almost always less than 400 miles, which involves the reciprocal lapping of the frontager EEZs. Thus, the establishment of fishing areas was more suited to meeting the need of safeguarding fish resources from the aggression of Asian fishing vessels in continuous increase in the Mediterranean, as well as the growing need for environmental protection of marine biodiversity and repopulation of species. This explains why, since 2003, there have been transformations of the Ecological Protection Zones into EEZs in precursor countries such as Croatia (Parliament decision, October 2003), France (decree, October 2012), Spain (royal decree, April 2013), Tunisia (provision, June 2005) and Libya (decision of the General People's Commission, May 2005), followed by Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Monaco, Syria and Turkey. Italy has long remained indifferent to the EEZ revolution, some even spoke of "Zee-phobia" (8). The disdained and little-known subject has always been linked to fishing, an area in which Italy has never claimed its rights.

The first time that the Italian voice was raised in the UN forum was in 2018, following the occupation of the Italian marine spaces up to 13 miles off the coast of Sardinia (with an overlap of 70 miles to the Italian EPZ, es-

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The legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zones. What stage is Italy at?

tablished in 2011) from Algeria with the declaration of its EEZ. The reasons behind Italy's behaviour are probably attributable to an erroneous perception of the changes in the balances of the Mediterranean that occurred in recent years to the detriment of Italy, which has long been the only player and the consequent effort to acknowledge a more complex and articulated scenario in the Mediterranean. The truth is that, by now, the EEZ regulation is the true fundamental law of the sea, and Italy too, especially following unscrupulous foreign initiatives, has acknowledged that it must take a step forward to protect its national heritage not only in terms of exploitation, but above all with regard to the affirmation of its sovereignty.

In this action, it is vital that the various institutions that, in various capacities, have competences on the portion of the maritime environment included in the EEZ work in a synergistic way, avoiding overlaps that would inevitably lead to ineffectiveness and possible internal conflicts.

To this end, without prejudice to individual institutional responsibilities, all the actors involved must collaborate within the framework of a univocal set of rules that recognizes specific roles and safeguards peculiarities in the broadest respect for the principle of the best use of the public resources invested. In this context, it is essential that the Italian Navy be granted the role of coordinating activities on the high seas as well as the performance of specific tasks in favour of other institutions, thanks to the availability of a differentiated set of operational capabilities that can act at a multidisciplinary and multidimensional level.

The content of the bill for the establishment of an Italian EEZ The awareness of the multiple implications of the proclamation of an Exclusive Economic Zone, in relation to the new geopolitical and strategic dynamics created in the Mediterranean, led to the Chamber of Deputies’ approval of the bill for the establishment of an Italian EEZ, presented in 2020. The document, A.C. 2313, which finds the legal conditions in the Italian ratification of the Montego Bay Convention with Italian law no. 689 of 1994, also obtained technical and financial approval, wherein it is emphasized that the expansion of the maritime space, pursuant to the current Italian Legislative Decree

20

201/2016, is subject to a series of EU implementation obligations, and that with reference to the so-called marine waters, the Italian Legislative Decree 190/2010, already provided, for the Italian legal system, in implementation of EU obligations, the program to achieve and maintain a good environmental status within the exercise of a right already permitted by current legislation. Basically, the legislative framework can already accommodate, without any modification, not even financial, the establishment of the EEZ. The content of the bill A.C. 2313, authorizes the establishment of an Exclusive Economic Zone beyond the external limit of the Italian territorial sea (art. 1, paragraph 1), envisages that the instrument of law is a decree of the President of the Republic (Article 1, paragraph 2) , on a proposal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, following a resolution of the Council of Ministers, to be notified to the States whose territory is adjacent to the territory of Italy or faces it. Paragraph 3 of art. 1 establishes the external limits of the EEZ to be determined on the basis of agreements with the States whose territory is adjacent to the Italian one or faces it.

Pending the stipulation, the external limits of the EEZ are defined, on a provisional basis, so that they do not hinder or compromise the conclusion of the agreements themselves. In art. 2, the sovereign rights of Italy are established, contained in the international regulations in force, finally in art. 3, it is specified that the establishment of the EEZ does not compromise the exercise, according to general and international treaty law, of the customary freedoms of navigation, overflight and laying of submarine pipelines and cables, as well as of the other rights provided for by the international regulations in force. Essentially, an almost total and peaceful reference to the regulations of the Convention on the subject of EEZs. Italy's decision to acquire an EEZ is the urgent viaticum needed to appear competitively on the Mediterranean strategic and economic scene. In short, Italy is now aware that the Mediterranean is no longer just nostrum.

Legal aspects of the Italo-Greek agreement on the EEZ There will be no need to elaborate any further proposals in relation to the future Italo-Greek EEZ, another delicate issue that must be resolved quickly. Given that, from a regulatory point of view, the delimitation will require the

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The legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zones. What stage is Italy at?

mere adaptation of the old bilateral agreement, stipulated in 1977, the EEZ with Greece is particularly important and necessary, following the energy objectives and partnerships created with the signing of the bilateral agreement in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EastMed) project. [point after parenthesis inserted] In fact, the pipeline will transport gas from the fields of Israel and Cyprus, to Greece, Italy and other countries of south-eastern Europe, making them definitively independent from Russian supplies. But, with the Italo-Greek agreement, Italy also becomes an active player in facing the new Turkish-Libyan axis created with the 2019 Memorandum of Understanding, already condemned by Greece and the EU, as contrary to current international law, and therefore, in fact, having no effect for the international community.

At the moment, the Greek and Italian governments have entered into a simple pactum de contrahendo pro futuro, that is to say a declaration of intent to reach the common delimitation of the EEZ in the very near future.

This pro futuro agreement can prevent, and eventually resolve any dispute, particularly in reference to the recall made to the joint commitments already stipulated by the two countries within the common European fisheries policy and in the exploitation of energy resources in offshore areas, off the Salento coast, where interests are extremely common. These merits derive from the good legal quality of the agreement itself. The prerequisite, as anticipated, is the old treaty signed in 1977 for the delimitation of the continental platform, ratified by Italy with Italian Law 290/1980. The new understanding indicates it as the basis for the new delimitation "of sovereign rights and jurisdiction" exercisable by each State (art. 1, par. 1). In particular, the new marine border will be identified as the extension of that of the continental platform to the water column above, as per established international practice. This solution, from a legal point of view, is in itself the most suitable to settle any critical issues due to the different time of establishment of the two institutes (CP and EEZ). The case of CP, codified in the Geneva Convention in 1958, was qualified as a norm of customary international law in 1969 by the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the case of the North Sea CP. The institution of the EEZ, which appeared with Part V of the UNCLOS, was codified only thirty years later, therefore all the States that had already

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defined their own CP, including marine soil and subsoil, also found themselves having to consider the sovereignty over the overlying water column, introduced into coastal maritime sovereignty by the EEZ regulations. This is the origin of the custom of extending the agreed-upon seabed and subsoil boundary line directly to the waters above, by virtue of practices with flawless practical implications. On the one hand, to prevent the different areas from falling under different jurisdictions, with the aggravation of disputes and problems of managing the overlapping of competences and sovereignty; on the other hand, the identification of an objective geographical parameter leaves little room for any dispute to arise. The case of the previously ratified Italo-Greek border, which the future delimitation agreement of the EEZ will operate upon, falls into this typology. It is therefore, in nuce, an effective and fully legitimate agreement that can also act as a precedent for future delimitation agreements to be entered into by Italy and Greece, with Tunisia and Turkey respectively.

The characteristic common to the two stipulating countries, that they both do not have an EEZ, also facilitates the definition of borders, already consolidated by custom. A clause, contained in par. 3 of the same article, anticipates the possible extension of the northern and southern borders, following the establishment of those with the other neighbouring States (Albania, Libya, Malta) (art. 1, par.

3). Fishing rights as per EU regulations and the rights of third countries, pursuant to art. 58 of UNCLOS, shall be preserved by art. 3. It bears pointing out that the two countries would maintain the customs that have already arisen.

An example would be thepreservation of the red shrimp fishery by Italy in Greek marine areas that, following the new agreement, would become part of the Greek EEZ or even the territorial sea. To this end, the States, by mutual agreement, notified the EU Commission of the amendment to the regulation on fishing, to protect Italian fishermen after the proclamation of the Greek EEZ. The latter is a veritable novelty that could become a precedent in international practice: the protection of Italian fishing rights in the Greek EEZ and territorial sea. If this provision is, in abstract terms, already compatible with the international law of the sea contained in UNCLOS, there are considerable doubts with regards to the EU. Given that the Union has exclusive competence in the field of fisheries, unlike

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The legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zones. What stage is Italy at?

the delimitation of marine areas, which are entirely stateowned, the problem of joint fishery agreements and the corresponding protection of the rights held so far by Italian fishermen, remains the only open point for secure enforceability. Assigning the right to fish in the exclusive zone or in the Greek territorial sea (in the event that the Greek territorial sea was extended in the future up to 12 nautical miles) means reserving Italian fishermen the right to access a large area of Greek sovereignty and this on the basis of historical rights that are not disciplined under UNCLOS. The topic, which is often talked about in maritime disputes related to the EEZs, suffice it to recall all the events in the Chinese seas (9), is particularly controversial, since there is no definition of historical law in the Convention, yet art.

15 UNCLOS is reserved as a valid title in the delimitation of the territorial sea. It will therefore be doubly interesting to see the international and European position, also in relation to the fact that the protection of the rights of a category of individuals has never taken place in a delimitation agreement, but rather in specific deeds and documents. The

completeness of the provisions of the treaty is finally expressed in the dispute resolution clause, which grants ITLOS (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea), in the absence of a different agreement between the parties, the jurisdiction to decide.

Conclusions It is clear that a large part of the peace on the seas that States and the international community have on their agendas depends on the arrangements and legal regime of the EEZs. In some cases, the redrafting of maritime borders, or the claiming of existing ones, is leading to real conflicts and strategic policies related to the exercise of Sea Power, which risk changing the current world balance forever. As regards Italy, in the immediate future, it must make the most of the crucial role of the Italian Navy, as a national reference element in conducting surveillance activities on the high seas and in coordinating all the actors who will be involved, in various capacities, in the dynamics of the EEZs in relation to their respective institutional tasks. 8

NOTE (1) Tamar, (about 11 TCF = trillion cubic feet) and Leviathan (21 TCF), Israel, discovered in 2009 and 2010 by Noble Energy and in production since 2013 and 2019 respectively; Zohr, Egypt, (30 TCF), discovered by ENI in 2015 and in production since 2017; Aphrodite, Cyprus, discovered by Noble Energy in 2011, is not large in size and has not yet been developed by the joint venture partners (about 4 TCFs); Calypso, Cyprus, discovered in 2018; Glaucus, Cyprus, discovered in 2019 (58 TCF); Tuna, Turkey, discovered in 2020 (around 14 TCF).

(2) Calculated from the baselines from which the width of the territorial sea is measured.

(3) Reference to the application of Articles 88 and 115 where compatible with Part V, UNCLOS. (4) See F. Caffio, Glossario del diritto del mare, V edition, Supplemento Rivista Marittima, November 2020, pag. 84.

(5) See F. Caffio, Glossario del diritto del mare, V edition, Supplemento Rivista Marittima, November 2020, pag. 84.

(6) Case Somalia vs Kenya, still pending before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), called to decide on sovereignty over the portion of the Indian ocean, licenses for exploration of hydrocarbon fields, and on the right to fish. Case Chile vs Peru, maritime dispute settled by the IGC in 2008 because Kenya refused to recognize the sovereignty of Peru in the marine area included in the 200 nautical miles from the coast and outside the Chilean EEZ and CP (Continental Plate), pursuant to art. 74 and 83 UNCLOS on the delimitation between states adjacent to EEZs. Case Romania vs Ukraine, 2004, in which the IGC had to settle the delimitation of the borders of the CP and EEZ in the Black Sea. Case Nicaragua vs Honduras of 2007, in which the CIG settled the delimitation of the territorial sea of the CP and the EEZs according to equity and international law in the Caribbean Sea for the extraction rights of natural resources and fishing rights between the two countries.

(7) See Andreone, G., Cataldi, G., Regards sur les évolutions du droit de la mer en Méditerranée, in AFDI, 2010, 1 ss.; Andreone, G., Cataldi, G., Sui Generis Zones, in Attard.

(8) Term coined in 2005 by prof. Tullio Scovazzi, professor of international law.

(9) Arbitration award in the case The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines vs The People's Republic of China), on an appeal filed by the Philippines in 2013, in July 2016 the Permanent Arbitration Tribunal in The Hague issued the ruling which established that the “nine-dash line" is a violation of international law. The nine-dash-line is the historical right on which China bases all its claims in the South China Sea. BIBLIOGRAFIA Proceedings from the videoconference of the members of the European Council, March 25 and 26, 2021, available at www.senato.it.

Dossier n. 297, Italian Bill, Istituzione di una zona economica esclusiva oltre il limite esterno del mare territoriale, A.C. 2313, Report of the Chamber of Deputies Studies, XVIII Legislature, May 2020.

Dossier n. 297, Italian Bill, Istituzione di una zona economica esclusiva oltre il limite esterno del mare territoriale, A.C. 2313, Report of the Chamber of Deputies Studies, XVIII Legislature, October 2020.

Parliamentary Acts, Chamber of Deputies, XVIII Legislature, Italian Bill, n. 2313, December 2019.

Technical-Financial Report of January 14, 2021, in relation to the coverage of the Italian Bill, A.C. 2313.

Masulli, M., L’Italia verso l’istituzione della zona economica esclusiva e la partita del Mediterraneo, novembre 2020, at ispionline.it.

De Pascale, F., L’Italia supera la “Zee-fobia”: una novità per la pesca nel Mediterraneo, November 2020, at affarinternazionali.it.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, at un.org.

Italian ratification law UNCLOS Convention, at gazzettaufficiale.it.

Conforti, B., La zona economica esclusiva, 1983, Milan, Giuffrè.

Conforti, B., Diritto internazionale, 2014, Editoriale Scientifica.

Del Vecchio, Zona Economica Esclusiva e Stati Costieri, 1984, Florence, Le Monnier.

Caffio, F., Oltre l’intesa turco-libica: il problema delle ZEE nel Mediterraneo, December 2019, at Analisi Mondo.

Latino, A., Italia e Grecia: zone economiche esclusive e interessi nel Mediterraneo, June 2020, at ispionline.it.

Cataldi, G., Il diritto internazionale marittimo, November 2020.

Nandan, S.N., The exclusive economic zone: a historical perspective, at fao.org.

The list of resolved and pending cases before the International Court of Justice may be found at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/list-of-all-cases.

U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affairs, published April 7, 2021, article: 7th fleet conducts freedom of navigation operation, at c7f.navy.mil.

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PANORAMICA TECNICO-PROFESSIONALE

The AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

of the Future

Evolution of the Naval Infantry in adaptation to 21st century maritime warfare Filippo Colucci

Premise With the decline of the bipolar system of the Cold War, the advent of increasingly fluid and asymmetrical scenarios led to a profound metamorphosis of the geopolitical framework and, consequently, of military strategies. In fact, in the early nineties, the disappearance of the antagonist bloc allowed the United States

of America to assert an undisputed superiority in controlling the seas and, consequently, to consider the latter as a safe operating environment void of significant threats. Thus, the American superpower was able to concentrate its efforts on safeguarding international security, mainly on terrestrial operating environments.

In that phase, the landing forces had to adapt to the

Lieutenant, born in Bari on December 5, 1988. He attended the Naval Academy with Corso Ares (2007-12). Since 2013, at the end of the Amphibious Qualification Course, he has taken on many positions at the Landing Force commands. He attended the All Arms Commando Course at the UK Royal Marine Commando Training Center in Exeter, UK, and the Expeditionary Warfare School at the US Marine Corps University in Quantico, United States. The article is inspired by the final thesis he presented at the 84th General Staff Course at the Institute of Military Maritime Studies in Venice entitled: The Amphibious Forces in the 21st Century Maritime Warfare: a unique instrument of the Navies or a duplicate of the infantry forces?

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Proliferation of missile systems in the South China Sea A2/AD bubble (foreignpolicy.com).

Graphic representation of the vectors for amphibious operations of the Future Commando Force (royalnavy.mod.uk).

new strategic requirements and were used for campaigns that were not necessarily amphibious, specializing in particular in the fight against rebel/terrorist organizations (counter-insurgency) and developing considerable experience in the so-called ground major combat operations. Some known examples of land campaigns of this type, wherein both the US Marines and their allied Navy Infantry counterparts took part, are Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, against the Taliban forces from 2001 to 2014 (from 2006 it became ISAF operation for NATO forces) and Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, against the Mahdi Army, the al-Qaida militiamen, and the pockets of pro-Hussein resistance from 2003 to 2011.

Starting in 2010, after nearly twenty years of US hegemony, further changes in the geopolitical framework have brought about a new phase. In fact, the birth of pseudo-national entities (Islamic State), the new affirmation of regional powers such as Iran, North Korea, Turkey, the Russian Federation and China, question American superiority. Today, this new

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multipolar geopolitical and geostrategic context entails the emergence of disputed scenarios, mainly due to the erosion of US sea control and strategic air superiority capacity.

The aforementioned emerging actors claim control of the most sensitive geographical areas, generating a veritable process of sea territorialization on a political level and brushing up on sea denial strategies on a military level, that is, the denial of control of maritime spaces. Compared to the past, nowadays these strategies have been strengthened by technologically advanced weapon systems that greatly increase their effectiveness and make the sea increasingly contested.

In areas considered sensitive, multiple defense and interdiction systems have been installed that interact in the different operational domains (land, sea, air, space and cyber) and integrate amongst themselvess on different levels, stratifying and overlapping their capabilities, effectively creating the so-called inhibition bubbles, known as Anti Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) bubbles.

Therefore, the focus of military operations has now shifted from the hinterland (typical environment of the aforementioned campaigns which took place in the 2000s) to mixed environments, including the coasts where land and air domains join the maritime one. In order to operate effectively in the littoral area, the two

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capabilities of sea control and power projection from sea to land (the so-called Power Projection Ashore) must merge. The latter is the original function of the Navy’s Infantry and amphibious forces, which had, in recent years, given way to the ability to support major combat operations in continental depths and which is therefore currently regaining importance. In order to locally weaken the A2/AD bubbles in littoral areas, multiple "force packages" small in size, but with considerable combat capabilities, must be simultaneously deployed to operate dispersedly (so-called distributed operations).

Nowadays, therefore, many Western amphibious forces are involved in a process of evolution that makes them more suitable tools for this new type of maritime warfare. To take a deeper look at the Brigata Marina San Marco and ascertain what are its possibilities of evolution as a component of Marine Infantry (or "Landing Force") of the amphibious force suited to meeting the challenges of the near future, we must analyze the transformations taking place in the United States Marine Corps (USMC), the most powerful and noble landing force on the planet, which inevitably influences the allies, and the United Kingdom Royal Marine Commando (RMC), a Corps whose strength and structure are substantially comparable to the Italian counterpart.

United States Marine Corps Since 2010, in a world where the sea has become an increasingly contested environment, a process of profound reflection has started on the prospects for the exercise of Sea Power and the concept of the use of naval and amphibious forces. In fact, due to their increasingly frequent use in purely terrestrial operational theaters, in the twenty-year period 1990-2010, the Marine Corps had progressively changed its original Landing Force or Naval Expeditionary Corps light structure, increasing heavy assets for land operations and becoming, in some respects, more like a second land army (1).

In 2012, the US Marine Corps began to hypothesize a return to its original characteristics of Expeditionary Force, that is, a very high readiness Expeditionary

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Corps, able to deploy rapidly anywhere in the world with very little notice and deployable from sea to land thanks to the support of a specially dedicated naval force. This thinking, also corroborated by the emergence of China as a global power, is The first joint USMC-USN publication on littoral combined with operations in a disputed maritime environment the 2015 Strate(US DoD). gic Concept of the United States Navy (USN) (2). This document calls for a return to closer cooperation between the naval forces, in view of an imminent dispute over the sea with equal opponents. Consequently USMC and USN, recognizing the rapid proliferation of A2/AD bubbles, introduced the concepts of Distributed Maritime Operation (DMO) and Expeditionary Advance Base Operation (EABO) as possible contrast strategies (3).

In essence, the layering of complex high-tech sensors and long-range precision weapon systems means that the operational domain in air and sea warfare must be considered a unicum between sea and land. Thus, the maneuvering space, including the air one, expanded, with overlapping functions of sea control and force projection on the ground, in order to undermine the bubble sensors, and "pierce" the latter. In this sense, DMOs have displayed the maximum effectiveness: interdependent and coordinated multidomain maneuvers, performed over a large space by dispersed forces to reduce the opponents’ targeting capacity and, consequently, their initiative. This "long-range maneuver" must needs be supported with several enabling elements: — a robust and redundant command and control system (C2), which allows the operational command to

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coordinate and manage even at great distances, avoiding Electronic Warfare (EW) threats and taking into account pontentially degraded assets; — platforms suited to seabasing, that is, allowing a Force to position itself on the sea for a prolonged period in the most congenial area for the launch of counter-interdiction operations; — EABO capability, i.e. the setting up, in a short time, of contingency locations, based on temporary supports (for example islands or small parts of conquered territory) that allow both the logistic supply of DMOs and the extension of the operational range, as well as the creation of "counter-bubble" elements through the deployment of advanced integrated sensors supporting state-of-the-art weapon systems (anti-aircraft, anti-ship, multi-tube rocket launchers).

Since the Trump administration, the US national strategy has focused attention on China, declaring the Pacific a top priority scenario (4). The guidelines of the new Commander of the USMC (5), General Berger, initiate the evolution of the Corps, entrusting the USMC Warfighting Laboratory (6) with the task of detailing the phases of the transformation. The project reinforces the integration of the Marines with the Navy: the Marines-Navy team must form the "Readiness Force" for operations in the Pacific (7). This line was then confirmed with the new administration, with the publication in December 2020 of the Triservice Strategy: Advantage at sea, a joint strategic document of the three naval armed forces (in addition to USN and USMC there is also the Coast Guard) which highlights, among other things, the essential integration between Marines and Navy in order to be effective in the new operational environment.

One of the fundamental factors for the success of DMOs is an increase in distributed lethality, that is, the independent offensive capacity of smaller units, both in the context of naval carriers and landing troops. The latter must be equipped down to the lowest level with: — offensive potential multipliers, including the ability to request, integrate and coordinate precision-guided fire support also from non-organic sources, the ability to use Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) or autonomously guided aerial systems for tactical informa-

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tion gathering, targeting, EW and the ability to attack targets of opportunity (rockets, mini-missiles, kamikaze drones); — self-defense and resilience capabilities through antiaircraft, counter-surface, counter-UAS and counter-loitering munition systems of suitable size; — widespread network to share a common tactical picture on the battlefield, based on the concept of decentralization of the C2 functions with adequate autonomy of the commanders of minor units – to this end the tactical network must be robust, redundant, and "filtered" upwards through appropriate artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms to avoid congestion of the operating command with information of too low a level; — compatibility with expeditionary and unmanned logistics, i.e. the ability to carry out/receive movements and supplies in a distributed manner on long-range remote piloted (or autonomous) carriers, ensuring sustainability even from sea-based or EAB assets.

The way of waging war in littoral area has changed and thus it is necessary to implement structural changes to the infantry, in conjunction with the remodeling of the Amphibious Readiness Group. In fact, the new US amphibious assault Group will be based on a single major amphibious unit and on other minor units of different types that allow for distributed maneuvering inside and outside the bubble (8). The Marines reduce (and in some cases eliminate) all heavy assets not suited to this type of maneuver, including tanks, towed artillery and pontoon corps, to redirect resources on the capacities listed above. The landing troops are reconfigured into a Marine Littoral Regiment (9), capable of delivering expeditionary units, scalable also at the platoon/company level, which use new generation surface connectors and which, armed with adequate systems, are able to maneuver interchangeably on water and land, evading the opponent's sensors. This is Berger's idea of a "stand-in" force: a set of small light units, utterly different from the massive structures of the current Brigade Combat Teams and future Multi-domain Task Forces of the US Army. The stand-in force must be structured in such a way as to remain within the bubble, creating problems for its systems and setting

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For greater integration with naval forces, the Marines will abandon or reduce the heavy assets that have characterized them in recent years: tanks and howitzers (marines.mil).

up "counter-bubbles". Thus, these units will also be equipped with ground-launch (10) and land-attack anti-ship missiles (a suitable rework for Tomahawk missiles is being evaluated) (11).

Royal Marines Commando The Royal Navy (RN) has long been watching over the freedom of navigation in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, where however the Russians have recently been upgrading their A2/AD systems. Furthermore, the Brexit phenomenon has led to the affirmation of the Global Britain concept (12). The Strategic Defence and Security Review 2021 will entrust the RN with the task of defending national interests anywhere in the world, up to Southeast Asia (13).

In a work commissioned by the RN, the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI), a British defence study center, proposed an operational concept of the

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Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF) to combat the A2/AD threat. The Future Commando Force (FCF), a program which is currently under development and being tested, is part of this concept. With it, the RMC intend to design a force adequate to the new scenarios, consolidating the already strong integration with the British Navy and confirming the traditional divergence from the strategic lines of the British Army.

In addition to the traditional amphibious assault configurations, the RMCs must be able to "task-organize" themselves in small units (squad/platoon level) equipped with high-tech materials. The teams will embark on units of the Littoral Strike Group (LSG). The UK intends to deploy ESF units "permanently" in the areas of interest. A summary of the concept of using ESF is given in Box 2.

In order to easily penetrate the A2/AD bubble gaps and maneuver with lethal efficacy, the FCF will therefore be characterized by: — widely flexible structure to fight even in a distributed way, using suitable next generation aerial or surface connectors; — strong focus on the execution of raids at platoon/company level, an intrinsic capacity in the tradition of the RMC; — strong integration with cutting-edge technologies, in particular remote ones and loitering munitions.

Since 2019, the 3rd Commando Brigade has formed the Littoral Strike Project Team, a commission with the aim of planning the evolution of the FCF and following its developments. In the last year, numerous prototypes have been acquired for experimentation of use in the challenges of the near future: light reconnaissance vehicles, UAS equipped with AI for autonomous discovery of targets on the ground, drones for logistic transport of material, C2 systems up to operator level for sharing tactical picture and new radio equipment.

Other support units are also being adapted: the Commando Engineers acquire more pioneering skills, specializing as "sappers"/Explosive Ordinance Disposal and some elements acquire underwater capabilities (14); Commando Royal Artillery gains more experience

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The Amphibious Forces of the Future

into practice, as forerunners, the new procedures and test the new materials of the FCF.

Situation of the Italian Amphibious Force

A platoon of RMC (Royal Marine Commando) configured to maneuver on rigid-hull boats (royalnavy.mod.uk).

in precision guided ammunition and loitering munitions by designing a new system, known as the Super Lightweight Indirect Fire System.

The Project Team has also promoted an intensive cycle of exercises for field testing of all the aforementioned innovations, in collaboration with the USMC Warfighting Laboratory. In May 2020, the RN established the Littoral Strike Command, a new command of the Amphibious Forces responsible for littoral operations. In the fall of 2020, in the first exercise led by Littoral Strike Command, numerous boats and surface vehicles for littoral operations were tested (15), and RMCs train the newly formed VanGuard Company, a unit of Marines selected to put

In Italy, the Navy Infantry, constituted by the Brigata Marina San Marco (BMSM), was instituted as an integral component of the naval fleet and has constantly maintained this nature. In the post-Cold War period, in addition to the maritime missions conducted by the Italian Navy, the San Marco has participated in numerous land operations, distinguishing itself on every occasion on account of the value and professionalism demonstrated in the field.

During the NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan in 2011, the BMSM demonstrated its ability to deliver an entire regiment-level task force (Task Force Leone), capable of integrating itself into the formation of the Regional Command West and of autonomously carrying out the missions assigned in the area of competence. This was possible thanks to the increase and consolidation, over the years, of the capabilities and equipment for maneuvering and fighting even in a land environment, contributing to operations with command units, staff, maneuvering, maneuvering support and logistical support to maneuvering.

Despite this trend in the decade 1990-2010, the San Marco has always maintained, both for reasons of identity and for the firm will of the Navy, its original connotation of expeditionary force. The BMSM

Royal Marines test new light tactical vehicles and remotely piloted systems during Littoral Response Group X exercise, November 2020 (royalnavy.mod.uk).

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Units of the Italian landing force land on the shore through landing vehicles during an exercise (BMSM).

A team of BMSM riflemen trains in fire assault supported an Italian Navy helicopter (BMSM).

is unique on a national level: an elite light infantry, capable of operating side by side with the air and sea component of the Italian Navy and, if necessary, of being easily integrated with joint, NATO and international assets. The landing force is resilient and effective in operating with adequate logistical autonomy and force protection capabilities. Navy riflemen can be deployed in a very short time in any operational environment and move in a quick and agile manner, even in non-permissive contexts, striking effectively in order to accomplish the assigned mission. Acting in synergy with the air and sea component of the amphibious force, the San Marco units are considered a veritable weapon system of the naval fleet.

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The maneuvering units of the BMSM are highly flexible in use, mobile on a wide range of carriers, including tracked amphibious vehicles, inflatable boats, landing craft and helicopters. Thus they can maneuver directly on the target or land on both sandy and rocky coasts (including some types of high coast) and easily ensure the maneuver on the ground in offensive, defensive and stabilization action. Even the smallest units (platoon/team) are made up of operators with different qualifications (combat medic, rock climber, etc.) in order to be modular and easily "taskorganized".

The combat support assets guarantee the BMSM the ability to operate in a wide spectrum of operations thanks to the various capabilities delivered. These include: use of mortars, counter-tank missiles and very short-range anti-aircraft systems; sniping capability; clearing of the field of fire (obstacle clearance), hasty minefield laying); counter-IED capability (16); integration of canine units; CBRN self-defense (17); management and integration of command, control, communications and IT support infrastructures (C4); amphibious reconnaissance and obstacle clearance; integration of organic and external fire support; battlefield surveillance and target acquisition, also taking advantage of the use of light UAS. The logistic support units are able to provide mobility, supplies and medical support during combat, while maintaining a reduced footprint thanks to the expeditionary connotation of these units too.

This varied configuration and constant being in readiness for immediate operational use today make the Amphibious Force unique in the defense landscape. As we have seen, however, the geostrategic context changes rapidly and the national military instrument must also adapt to these changes in order to remain competitive and credible. Although Italy is not currently involved in the Pacific area, the rapid proliferation of A2/AD technologies could soon bring this new way of waging maritime warfare also into the area of national interest. This concept has been incorporated in the Linee di Indirizzo Strategico (Strategic Guidelines) 2019-2034 of the Italian Navy, which is pushing for the enhancement of

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Reflections on the future of the Italian Amphibious Force

Deployment of 120 mm mortars of the BMSM in shooting (BMSM).

A field workshop deployed in exercise by the BMSM (BMSM).

seabased capabilities, which seems to indicate that a proliferation of bubbles has been foreseen and, therefore, the impossibility of carrying out air and sea and amphibians operations at a "traditional" distance from the coasts.

The doctrine that the USMC is developing is functional to the US operational horizon, but the concepts could be adapted to the enlarged Mediterranean.

Thus, the Italian Navy feels the need for a landing force that is increasingly integrated with the air and sea component, capable of interpreting the maritime power projection in an extremely “maritime” and distributed manner. In this sense, due to its structure and size, the BMSM has an advantage and could easily adapt and reconvert itself to the new operational requirements.

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In order to maintain the role of an agile and flexible force "in readiness", available to the country and political decision-makers for carrying out various types of maritime power projection missions, the San Marco must exploit its advantageous situation in order to adapt to current and future geostrategic developments. In this sense, it is inevitable to look at the USMC, even if a slavish adaptation to their choices is unthinkable, in light of the different operating environments where the two forces could find themselves operating. On the other hand, it can be very rewarding to carefully follow what the RMCs will obtain from the experiments currently underway and from the new British doctrine under definition, as the Italian Navy Landing Force and the RMCs have already a considerable number of points in common or similarities in terms of staff (numbers of personnel), functions (level of integration with the Navy), and attitude (spirit and shared values).

In this sense, the study for the adaptation of the Italian Navy's amphibious force to new scenarios and new challenges is already underway. In this regard, several macro-areas to be developed have been identified.

Operating environment. The proliferation of A2/AD systems, the assertiveness of some regional actors and the territorialization process of the sea surface will undoubtedly bring the new way of fighting also in the enlarged Mediterranean, but there are some distinctions linked to contextualization in the regional operational environment, which is quite different from the Pacific area. The main difference is that the room for maneuvering is narrower than in the Pacific and often intersects the main SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication) of merchant traffic. It is therefore necessary to consider what the techniques for "puncturing" any interdiction bubbles may be, how to effectively employ amphibious troops in the conduct of enabling surprise attacks for subsequent air and sea operations. Notwithstanding, the concept remains that these actions must be conceived in the context of distributed operations, thus providing different packages (even with the participation of allied

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The rapid process of territorialization of the waters of the Mediterranean Sea (Limes, November 2020).

forces, when required) that carry out the raid by acting from different sectors, in order to saturate the enemy defense systems.

Force C2/Structure. By reducing the probability of having to conduct "mass" amphibious operations, involving large maneuvering assets, it will be necessary to evaluate an optimization of the structure, streamlining the levels of command that would be involved in minor tactical actions. This would not be a big novelty in the field of the Landing Forces, considering that in Europe for some time most of these have not had a regimental level (for example, both the Spanish Tercio de Armada and the British 3rd Commando Brigade have a Brigade Command with the battalions directly dependent). Any need to form regiment-level battlegroups could still be met via the "task-organization" method.

Maneuver/mobility. The return to the "maritime" origins of the San Marco should also involve a greater use of fast, armed and suitably protected

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rigid-hull boats, in order to improve the maneuver and combat capability "in the bubble" also in the littoral and riverine areas, to have more mobility options towards the interior of the coast. This would also entail greater focus on the capabilities and related procedures usually associated with operations carried out in riverine and lake environments (socalled Riverine Operations). The usefulness of "asymmetric" anti-ship combat techniques should also be evaluated. Recently, both USMC and RMC have shown interest in such asymmetric anti-ship techniques and are considering (over a long time horizon) the development of new small, fast and stealth surface craft, including the so-called Wing-InGround effect vehicles (WIGs) or ekranoplans. These particular vehicles, already in use in some countries that have traditionally an asymmetrical maritime warfare approach, such as Iran, exploit the dynamic air cushion between the wing and the sea surface to increase the fluid dynamic efficiency of the aircraft

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Both the RMC and the USMC (United States Marine Corps) hypothesize the use of ekranoplans and drones for mobility and logistics during amphibious operations in the near future (United States Naval Institute - royalnavy.mod.uk).

and are therefore capable of high speeds with relatively low power (so-called ground effect).

Logistics. The already rather lean logistics of BMSM must be kept consistent with its characteristics.

It will be necessary to see to, at least, the two following aspects: — increase the seabased logistics capability, in order to provide the necessary sustainment from a base at sea to forces operating in littoral areas. In this context, taking into account the greater distances between the projected units and the "mother ship", it will be necessary to revise the methods of treatment and recovery of the wounded and the "10-1-2" concept (i.e. procedures and timeliness of treatment immediately after the injury), as well as the optimization of supplies, with an eye also to the acquisitions of drones for resupply recently carried out by RMC; — strengthen field support capabilities (in case of operations that allow ground consolidation).

Also in this field, USMC and RMC have begun to evaluate that the ekranoplans, mentioned in the previous paragraph, would be effective to operate in the A2/AD bubble thanks to their high speed (some models can even reach 200 knots) and, if properly designed, their considerable load capacity.

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Communications. In recent years, BMSM has made significant efforts to digitize and strengthen communication capabilities, including digitized operator, the implementation of systems for Blue Force Tracking and the acquisition of tactical satellite communications systems. As already seen in a general manner for DMOs, these capabilities must be optimized and focused on the creation of a robust and redundant network that guarantees communications and sharing of a common picture between multiple dispersed units, through different channels. It is also important to develop a system that separates information at the tactical level from that at the operational level, in order to limit the unwanted effects of information saturation in the operational environment and the harmful tendency to micromanage by operational (or Component) commands towards the sub-tactical level.

Fire support and unit organic weapon systems. The management of fire support up to the platoon/team level must be considered an essential prerogative for the dispersion of operations. In conjunction with the desired-for enhancement of the delivery capacities of naval units and naval Aviation (missiles for ground attack, stand-off ammunition, loitering munitions) it would also be appropriate to enhance the capabilities of the Landing Force to integrate these supports with distributed maneuver, managing to support all the dispersed units with the assignment of a JTAC team (Firepower Control Team). A detached unit should also be equipped with substantial organic fire capabilities. The question of which weapon systems can enhance the attack effectiveness of these units must be evaluated, also considering the use of ad hoc loitering munitions, for example ones that may be launched with shouldermounted mortars (81 mm already supplied or by reacquiring the 60 mm). Similarly, the opportunity to expand the attack capacity of dispersed units also in the new domains must be evaluated, with the integration of electromagnetic attack capabilities (EW) and the possible creation of a Cyber Tactical Team. The latter should clearly be the expression of a broader joint strategy in the field of cyberwarfare.

Acquisition of objectives and intelligence. If littoral warfare will become increasingly focused on

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A possible usage of loitering munitions in the targeting/engagement chain, as conjectured by the 3rd Commando Brigade of the RMC.

surgical interventions and surprise attacks carried out by small units, the acquisition of objectives and the carrying out of an increasingly rapid and timely targeting and engagement cycle will become a fundamental resource for the success of amphibious operations. To this end, the recently experimented idea of setting up Reconnaissance and Objective Acquisition (RAO) teams should be re-evaluated. These would be made up of Firepower Control Teams (or JTAC teams) enhanced by the most advanced ground reconnaissance capability of current recon teams. On the other hand, it will be necessary to set up teams of specialists who are dedicated to preserving the other capacity currently linked to amphibious reconnaissance, that is, the underwater recognition of the landing channels and the demolition of anti-landing obstacles (underwater recognition & demolition). At the same time as the RAO teams, units of specialists in the underwater environment, very shallow water, hydro-survey and shore reconnaissance would be formed, similar to those that are called the Underwater Demolition Team abroad. RAO teams could work in association with infantry platoons (as described in the previous paragraph) or independently. In this second option, they would carry out deeper infiltration in the area of operations, to support intelligence collection and guarantee the implementation of a complete targeting cycle, being able to carry out also the terminal guidance of precision ammunition through laser devices (as alternative to GPS-based systems) and the actual assessment of the damage inflicted

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(battle damage assessment). In the context of target acquisition and intelligence capabilities, the UAS capability bears mentioning, already present at the BMSM, albeit at a minimum. Considering the rapid technological evolution and also considering the very recent developments of land conflicts, it would be appropriate to evaluate, in addition to the enhancement of this capacity, also the preparation of the unit for the use of drones for ground attack, both from seabased assets and from the ground, in particular in anti-tank and anti-artillery role.

Force protection. The infantry units responsible for distributed operations must needs be equipped with robust force protection capabilities in order to withstand attacks from enemy units, even of larger dimensions.

It is therefore necessary to evaluate the vulnerabilities of a team or platoon deployed in isolation, also taking into account the carrier used. Among the various requirements, a point anti-aircraft defense capability is certainly one of them. In order to enhance this capability, already present in the ranks of the BMSM, the now indispensable acquisition of a solid counter-UAS capability, which has long been under the attention of the various Armed Forces and allied countries, must also be added. We must also assess which options are available and economically viable for developing an antiloitering munitions capability. This threat, in fact, is proliferating very quickly and is dangerously lethal.

Integration with Naval Fleet units. Finally, in order to face the challenges of the near future, regardless of the type of the latter, the units of the BMSM must maintain a strong integration with the air and sea component. This integration should not be limited to the ability to embark on amphibious assault ships. It is necessary that the infantrymen are able to embark and be deployed even on different ships, for example the European Multi-Mission Frigates (FREMM) or the new Multi-Purpose Offshore Patrol vessels (PPA), in order to be able to disperse the force packages which can be deployed to the ground. This also implies a necessary adaptation of procedures by the crews of these naval units and an adequate doctrinal development by the Commands involved.

The possible evolution of the BMSM cannot dis-

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regard the maintenance and enhancement of the expeditionary and commando connotation of the landing troops. The fighting techniques, already flexible by definition, must be adaptable to all the domains present in the littoral environment, allowing the dispersion of the force packages and at the same time the maximum integration of the available resources in terms of support.

On the other hand, all this must not lead to a decline in basic combat and land maneuvering capabilities, which remain the foundation of the infantryman training and education. This also in order to keep the link with the other allied Landing Forces (Spain within the Spanish Italian Landing Force, United Kingdom and United States within the existing collaboration, as well as members of the other amphibious initiatives such as the EAI - European Amphibious Initiative, but not only) alive and at the same time to remain integrable in joint formations with Army units (for example, the National Maritime Power Projection Capability) in the event of the activation of more traditional scenarios.

Synergies with NATO. In the context of the Alliance, increasing importance is being given to the amphibious concept of the projection of a landing force from the sea among the options to be pursued both in order to activate a credible deterrence and to conduct direct interventions to support the three Core Tasks. To this end, NATO's Amphibious Leaders Expeditionary Symposium (NALES), wherein the Italian Navy has played a leading role from the very start, has been activated. In this context, a specific project is being developed - wherein the BMSM contributes fully and decisively - to implement a permanent projection capability at Brigade level called BSLF, which stands for

Thanks to their intrinsic versatility, the PPAs (Multipurpose Offshore Patrol Vessels) could also be used as ships for littoral warfare and projection from the sea, when suitably armed with anti-ship and ground attack missile systems.

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Brigade Size Landing Force, also making use of the historical collaboration with Spain, in the SIAF-SILF area, to share the overall effort.

Conclusions The fluidity of the current geopolitical and geostrategic context pushes the international community towards a future of chronic instability, where scenarios will be increasingly multidomain and increasingly disputed, with a return to the dispute over maritime spaces, which had been considered safe in recent decades. Thus, the allied countries, in primis the United States, are modifying (each according to their needs) national strategies, tending towards the sustainability of fighting much more on the sea and in littoral areas than was previously done. In this context, the amphibious forces, understood as an inseparable combination between the air and sea component and the navy infantry, gain a central role and a new importance must be given to their original expeditionary connotation.

The latter, in fact, is characterized by: — marked integration and synergy between the Air and Sea Force and the Landing Force; — ability to maneuver interchangeably on stretches of water and land and maximization of the power of fire support; — constant operational readiness and rapid deployment capability; — C2 based on the concept of mission command, with which tactical Commanders are granted the appropriate operative autonomy to carry out the mission; — lean and punctual logistic support, which also allows the establishment of tactical-austere "support points"; — flexible task-organization and scalability of the organic structure, in order to be adequate for the assigned mission.

These features, inherited from classic amphibious warfare, will have to adapt to modern A2/AD scenarios thanks to the implementation of the capability to conduct distributed operations and thanks to the use of technologically advanced weapon systems based on precision guidance and AI. In particular, the support of new technologies must allow, in addition to

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the increase in the offensive capacity of the individual force packages (distributed lethality), also an enhancement of the communication systems and C2, in order to guarantee capillarity and resilience, and the increase of force protection capabilities in terms of delivery of long-range fire support, air defense, counter-UAS, counter-loitering munition and EW countermeasures.

The consequent evolution will make the amphibious force an effective weapon for the challenges of the 21st century. Thus, the countries analyzed as an example,

each according to their own needs and with their own reaction times, invest in the development of the Navy infantry as a fundamental asset of the Air and Sea Forces, differentiating them from the land infantry, while maintaining their ability to maneuver in the land domain, although the maximum expression of amphibious capabilities occurs in the littoral context which is an integral part of the maritime domain. In this way the political decision maker will have a variety of military tools that will make the nation credible in the international context of interest.

8 Box 1

PRE- AND POST-COLD WAR USE OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES At the end of the Cold War, thanks to the accumulated operational experience, the Western Navy Infantries were now considered as very relevant forces for war success. Instituted in the period between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the teams of sailors qualified to use portable firearms aboard ships have progressively changed into landing infantry units, reaching their peak during the Second World War, when they became a symbol of the projection of force from the sea to the land, sanctioning the birth of the amphibious doctrine as it is known today. In the early nineties, the probability of a conflict between equal competitors was reduced and, consequently, the concept of strategic-operational usefulness of amphibious operations as such changed. Thus the so-called "Expeditionary forces" or landing forces are faced with the problem of still being useful as a military tool for political decision-makers.

In the United States, USMC units, a key factor in the Pacific War victory in 1945, were used to project American power during Cold War conflicts, such as the Korean and Vietnam wars, but also in other theaters such as Lebanon, Grenada and Panama. During these campaigns, the USMC achieved numerous tactical successes, earning not only the esteem of political-military leaders but also a broad consensus in public opinion. In 1991, the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations marked the beginning of a transition in types of amphibious operations. The use of amphibious forces no longer had the sole purpose of using the surface of the sea to one's advantage to enlarge room for maneuvers, as took place in Inchon (Korea) for example, but constituted the prodromal action to a land campaign to be carried out in depth.

This trend was confirmed during the global war on terrorism. The climax was reached with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

In October 2001, the land campaign was inaugurated by Task Force 58, made up of 4,400 Marines and commanded by the then General Mattis, who was "disembarked" in the desert, in a landlocked country, more than 700 km from the amphibian ships. The watchword was "the beach is no longer the objective". And this concept was made practice. In fact, in the other theater of the war on terrorism, in 2003 the Iraqi Freedom operation envisaged initial amphibious maneuvers which were only the prelude to a terrestrial occupation campaign.

Both in Iraq and in Afghanistan, in addition to counter-insurgency and stability operations, the primary tasks of the Marine units (and of the other amphibious troops part of the coalition) becomes the conduct of major combat operations, "pure" land infantry operations.

The quick and effective opening of these operational theaters was made possible by exploiting the expeditionary characteristic of landing forces, but after the touch-down, the units were used for land activities. In order to always be ready to meet this increasingly frequent type of employment and to be independent from the other Armed Forces, over the years the USMC reduced the flexibility of its expeditionary structure. It acquired heavy assets, less characteristic of an amphibious infantry, such as field artillery and tanks, reducing synergies with the USN and involuntarily earning the informal title of 2nd Land Army.

Similarly, the RMCs in the years 1990-2000 adapted their way of waging war to the new geopolitical balances and national needs, following the American brothers-in-arms, but differing in some aspects. During the Cold War, the UK continued to exploit the extreme expeditionary capability of Commando units. The RMCs were given the primary task of deploying to the former colonies and areas of national interest, and also concentrated training on the conduct of rapid amphibious operations, such as surprise attacks (so-called raids), even on a small scale.

These actions were focused on temporary raids to disarticulate enemy capabilities rather than on maritime power projection in order to gain positions on the ground. These capabilities, a winning weapon during the Falklands-Malvinas War in 1982, allowed the RMCs to maintain a stronger integration with the Royal Navy (RN) than the USMC-USN integration and, even after the Cold War, limited removal from the British Navy. During this period, the 3rd Commando Brigade participated, together with the Army, in the "desert wars" (Gulf 1991, Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003), but did not opt for a restructuring or the acquisition of heavy assets.

Today some may object that the use of amphibious forces in purely terrestrial operations and scenarios is due to unrealistic choices, which have also involved a considerable waste of resources or duplication of assets. This judgment must be contextualized: after the Cold War ended, the sea was no longer a contested environment and the use of amphibious forces in the terrestrial domain, motivated by the sharing of efforts with the land Army, ensured the survival of precious elite assets, such as the Navy Infantries. But, in recent years, the balance has changed again.

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The Amphibious Forces of the Future Box 2

SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE FORCE As reported by RUSI, in the proposed Operational Concept of the new projection force of the RN, the current amphibious capacity is not suited to ensuring the effectiveness of combat in the operational environment of the near future.

RUSI recognizes that the single package of combat forces that can be generated by the RMC, starting from one or two large amphibious assault units, would not be able to conduct force projection in a littoral context in the presence of A2/AD systems.

Therefore several Expeditionary Strike Forces (ESF) must operate in a dispersed manner in order to infiltrate the Commandos inside the bubble, guaranteeing their survival, even as an alternative to the use of stand-off weapons. Given that Tomahawk and Storm-Shadow type stand-off missiles are certainly a viable option, RUSI then focuses on the configuration of a distributed operation conducted by the RN. An ESF prototype could be structured around three attack groups: — Littoral Strike Group (LSG); — Amphibious Strike Group (ASG); — Joint Strike Group (JSG).

These attack groups are composed and equipped so that, by acting sequentially, they are able to weaken, pierce and overwhelm the enemy A2/AD bubbles, in order to allow subsequent air, sea or land operations.

As may already be surmised, RUSI proposes this composition thinking of embarking FCF units on LSG and ASG, in different configurations.

The Commando teams of the LSG will embark on Littoral Operations Vessel units. These naval units, designed ad hoc, will have low signature both in terms of cross-section radar and in terms of "political visibility" (for example, easily disguised as a merchant unit) and, in an initial phase, will therefore be able to penetrate the A2/AD bubble. Once in the bubble, the LSG will use the different available assets (special forces units, commando reconnaissance units, commando units up to company level, various types of UUV) to degrade the A2/AD systems.

The degradation of the bubble should then allow the second phase to begin, that is the approach of the ASG, whose primary naval unit is an amphibious assault ship. This would make for a rapid and effective deployment of Marines on the ground, even up to battalion level, equipped with the necessary fire support assets, and thanks to the use of fast connectors (up to 25 knots).

The JSG, equipped with an aircraft carrier, is obviously assigned the role of carrier strike, which must guarantee, as far as possible, external support during the first two phases and then approach the littoral in the third phase and guarantee air coverage, for any subsequent operations or withdrawal at the end of the raid as well. This group could be equipped, in addition to the traditional escort units, also with a Ro-Ro unit that allows faster disembarkation and re-embarkation of land logistics assets, assuming the conquest of a port infrastructure following the amphibious assault.

Possible composition of the three attack groups of the ESF (Royal United Service Institute).

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The Amphibious Forces of the Future NOTE (1) The first to nickname the USMC as the "2nd Land Army" was Defense Secretary Robert Gates in 2010, launching a reflection on the need to return to having a Marine Corps with its intrinsic "maritime soul». Bowman T., Marines need to regain “Maritime Soul”, Gates says https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=129405011&t=1602339981613, August 2010.

(2) A cooperative strategy for 21st Century Seapower, US Navy 2015.

(3) See Marine Corps Operational Concept, 2016 and Littoral Operations in Contested Environment, 2017.

(4) See National Security Strategy 2017, and National Defense Strategy 2018.

(5) 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps Planning Guidance, USMC 2019.

(6) Organization based at the USMC University of Quantico (VA) whose institutional task is to generate and examine operational concepts and capabilities inspired by threats and provide recommendations supported by analysis in order to inspire the development and design of the future USMC. (7) See USMC, Force Design 2030, March 2020.

(8) USMC and USN recently presented the design for these units, called Light Amphibious Warship.

(9) Harkins Gina, Marines’ 1st-Ever Littoral Regiment Will Include Combat, Logistics and Anti-Air Personnel, military.com.

(10) The USMC is acquiring Naval Strike Missile systems in a version that can be installed on remote ground vehicles (Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary fires - ROGUE), Vds. Batacchi Pietro, Sistemi d’arma 4.0: come bucare le bolle A2/AD ed impiantare le contro-bolle, X-trà RID, October 2020.

(11) See Clark James, Here’s why the Marine Corps is getting Tomahawk cruise missiles, taskandpurpose.com, February 2020.

(12) See Hunt Jeremy, Discorso all’International Institute for Strategic Studies del 2 gennaio 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-huntbritains-role-in-a-post-brexit-world, October 24, 2020.

(13) Willett Lee, Expeditionary re-structure – UK evolves amphibious CONOPS and force structure, Naval Forces, Vol. XLI, January 2020.

(14) Until now, the RMCs used the Divers teams of the Royal Navy to support underwater recognition & demolition.

(15) Among these, for the first time, also an autonomous vehicle measuring 13 meters (MAST-13, produced by L3).

(16) Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices.

(17) Chemical, Bacteriological, Radiological and Nuclear Threat.

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