JASON 40-2

MEDIA EN CONFLICT

ISIS PROPAGANDA – RUSSISCH (MEDIA)BELEID –YOUTUBE OORLOG Internationale vrede- en veiligheidsvraagstukken * jaargang 40 * nummer 2 * 2015

JASON MAGAZINE

JASON Magazine is het kwartaalblad van stichting JASON Hoofdredactie; Kevin Klerx en Ivo Roodbergen, Eindredactie: Quint Hoekstra, Kevin Klerx en Ivo Roodbergen.

Redactie Alba I. León, Claudia Elion, Dana Cohen, Gijs Kist, Iñigo Alexander, Quint Hoekstra, Raphaela Kormoll, Karlijn Arts, Bas Kleijweg, Nienke van Heek

Inhoud 4 8

Vormgeving Rianne Pelleboer en Lilian Timmers Dagelijks Bestuur Voorzitter – Michiel Blomaard Vice-voorzitter – Erik de Koning Secretaris – Werner Kiel Penningmeester – Jason Halbgewachs Hoofdredacteur – Ivo Roodbergen en Kevin Klerx Activiteitencoördinator – Yasmin Hosseini Zahed PR en acquisitie – Hester Torn Algemeen Bestuur Dr. Bart Beltman Dr. Francoise de Companjen Kolonel b.d. Marco Hekkens Drs. Simon Minks Drs. Pim van der Putten Mw. Marjolein de Ridder MA Mw. Elsa Schrier MA Kapitein-ter-zee mr. Niels Woudstra Raad van Advies Voorzitter – Dr. W.F. van Eekelen Prof. dr. J.Th.J. van den Berg Prof. dr. H. de Haan Luitenant-kolonel b.d. dr. M. de Haas Prof. drs. V. Halberstadt Generaal-majoor b.d. mr. drs. C. Homan Drs. D. Leurdijk R.W. Meines R.D. Praaning Mw. drs. L.F.M. Sprangers Prof. dr. A. van Staden Drs. L. Wecke Adres Studentencentrum Plexus t.n.v. stichting JASON, Kaiserstraat 25, 2311 GN Leiden

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Syrië: een conflict door de ogen van de betrokkenen Nienke van Heek

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Security threats in Europe’s neighbourhood Francoise Companjen en Werner Kiel

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Violence Through Arab Cartoons Christiaan Duinmaijer

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Boobs on the ground Bas Kleijweg

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Telefoon: 071-527 7972 E-mail: info@stichtingjason.nl Website: www.stichtingjason.nl ISSN 0165-8336 Stichting JASON noch de redactie van JASON Magazine is verantwoordelijk voor de in de bijdragen weergegeven meningen Drukkerij Noordhoek, Aalsmeer

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Sexual assault in the US Army Dana Cohen

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Voorwoord Beste Lezer,

De Russische media Claudia Elion

Nationalism, a tool for power Karlijn Arts

Incident Leon Wecke

Activiteitenverslagen

Mededelingen & Activiteiten

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De media heeft meerdere functies en kent daardoor vele gezichten. Voor de één is het een manier om zaken voor het voetlicht te brengen, terwijl een ander media misschien gebruikt om het publiek te masseren. Interpreteer media daarom vooral als een tijdelijke uitkomst, voortkomend uit een belangenstrijd tussen vraag en aanbod en niet als een eindproduct.

In Media en Conflict ligt de focus deze keer op gender, publieke opinie en letterlijke oorlogsvoering via het gebruik van media, bijvoorbeeld de YouTube-oorlog. Het principe van mentale oorlogsvoering, het veroveren van hearts & minds, is niet nieuw. De wijze waarop dit in bijvoorbeeld het Syrië-conflict via burgerjournalistiek gebeurt, is dat wel. Een land waar de burgerjournalistiek nog moet groeien is Rusland. De overheid heeft het grootste gedeelte van de media in handen en veel vrijheid is er niet om onafhankelijke journalistiek te bedrijven.

Vrijheid is ook iets waar Oekraïne ooit van droomde, maar wat nu verder weg lijkt dan 25 jaar geleden. Francoise Companjen, onderzoeker en universitair docent aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, schreef samen met Werner Kiel een uitvoerig achtergrondartikel over de huidige crisis tussen Rusland en Oekraïne en hoe dit zijn impact heeft op Europa.

Iets lichter van kost zijn cartoons, al herinneren de recente aanslagen in Parijs en Kopenhagen ons aan het feit dat dit helaas nog niet algemeen gedachtegoed is. Het beeld, dat als gevolg van het zien van de vreselijke beelden vervolgens bij een groot gedeelte van het publiek ontstaat, is dat van een Midden-Oosten zonder satire. Onzin. Een artikel waarbij cartoons uit kranten uit Irak en Jordanië tegenover elkaar zijn gezet, laat treffend zien hoe Irakezen en Jordaniërs met dezelfde problemen worstelen als de Fransen of Denen dat doen.

Gender in het Amerikaanse leger is een gevoelig issue. In dit magazine een artikel met een verrassende invalshoek; als wij denken dat vrouwen niet geaccepteerd worden in het leger, dan is het de moeite waard om dit artikel te lezen. Die positie is namelijk nog positief vergeleken met homoseksuelen in het leger. De positie van vrouwen in het leger komt ook terug in het artikel over ISIS. Een vrouwelijke gevechtspiloot die een symbool is geworden in de strijd tegen islamitisch terrorisme is iets wat u op de laatste pagina’s van dit magazine kunt treffen.

Al met al een veelzijdig magazine, waar media en conflict een rode draad vormen. Ik wens u veel leesplezier.

Ivo Roodbergen Hoofdredactie JASON-magazine

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This We’ll Defend

Sexual assault in the U.S. Army

Fighting Sexual Assault in the U.S. Army

“The women asked to be here, so now let them take what comes with the territory,” was the response of Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez after several female soldiers on duty in Iraq died of dehydration. They reportedly stopped drinking fluids in the afternoon to prevent having to use the toilet facilities in the dark out of fear of being assaulted by their male colleagues.1 Sexual assault in the U.S. army is not merely an issue of women’s rights, but of public health, the upholding of the morals and values that define the army, safety for all its servicemen and women, and success of the army’s missions in combat.

DANA COHEN

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ne of the first times the media reported on military sexual assault (MSA) was in 1991, after more than one hundred U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aviation officers were accused of sexually assaulting at least 83 female and 7 male attendees of the Tailhook convention in Las Vegas. Many more scandals followed over the years, and all are similar in that commanding officers were allegedly aware of the situation but did not intervene.

Although estimates vary widely due to a lack of conclusive research, between 9.5% and 33% of servicewomen report

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attempted or completed rape during their service. When including other forms of assault such as sexual harassment, the numbers rise to 22%-84%.2

“between 9.5% and 33% of servicewomen report attempted or completed rape”

▲ Soldiers and Airmen at the Sisterhood Against S

Sexual assault is defined as “unwanted physical contact involving sexual body parts,” including but not limited to rape, while sexual harassment refers to “unsolicited verbal or physical contact of a sexual nature.”3 Estimates for male MSA victims range from 1% to 12%.

Although statistics seem to imply MSA is a gendered problem, the disproportionately high amount of male servicemembers actually provides for an approximately equal amount of female and male victims. 4

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“the response they received after reporting the assault was worse than the assault itself”

Sexual Assault Conference at the Al Faw palace in Baghdad, Iraq, July 23, 2010. Credit: Staff Sgt. Daniel Yarnall

A worrying trend is the fact that three out of four victims feel too intimidated to report abuse to a superior, and those who do are often discouraged from pressing charges. Victims fear retributions, citing physical intimidation and the fact that ranking officers use, or allow others to use, sexist speech5.

Female participants in a 2014 research report being treated as inferior, harassed, and verbally abused by colleagues and superiors alike. They state that the

response they received after reporting the assault was worse than the assault itself. They were “marked by superior and fellow service members as troublemakers, and this label followed them from assignment to assignment.” They were disbelieved, blamed, and labeled as promiscuous6, while the event was trivialized and officials frequently refused to pursue the matter7.

TRAUMA Both sexual assault and sexual harass-

ment leave many physical, psychological, and emotional traces. Frequently named are PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder, typified by symptoms such as recurring and upsetting recollections of the traumatic event and a lower social and work functioning), depression, anxiety, problems with interpersonal relationships, and suicidal tendencies.

Military sexual trauma (MST) leads to PTSD and poor physical health even more frequently than non-military trauma of sexual assault. Physical

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JASON MAGAZINE Sexual assault in the U.S. Army symptoms include pelvic and back pains and chronic fatigue. Reasons MST is stronger than other abuse trauma include the closeness of the victim to the perpetrator, continued exposure to the perpetrator and thus chronic threat of further abuse, lack of support, and restrictions on reporting the abuse and pursuing justice8.

Sexual abuse affects men and women differently. For instance, male victims tend to experience confusion regarding their sexual identity and masculinity9.

Where women sufferers of MST are prone to develop PTSD and hypothyroidism, men are more vulnerable to bipolar and psychotic symptoms. The differences can be explained by the army’s traditional gender roles, leading male MSA victims to feel emasculated, weak, and feminine10.

MSA does not merely impact individual victims but also society at large.

High prevalence of MST substantially increases the use of medical services, bringing a financial burden to the state11.

Almost half of all female veterans using Veteran Affairs services for stress disorders report experiencing attempted or completed rape during their service12. They even find themselves sliding into homelessness at an increased rate13.

In addition, work and social functioning of servicemembers facing sexual harassment typically decreases 14 This negatively impacts unit cohesion and endangers military missions15 In 2010, Robert Gates, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, even labeled MSA “a threat to national security.” 16

gender roles … a high value placed on control, power, and competition … and mandatory heterosexuality.” Research shows links between sexist, hostile, and stereotyped attitudes towards women – including the belief in rape myths – and sexual abuse perpetration. Male victims of MSA are generally the younger, weaker, more ‘feminine’ men, usually positioned in roles seen to be more often occupied by women17.

Sexual assault is also more likely to occur in environments where unprofessionalism is accepted, and where commanding officers are unconcerned with abuse Furthermore, when women are excluded from combat roles, they cannot achieve high ranking positions, upholding power imbalances18. Only rarely do male soldiers assault their female superiors; generally the victims are of a lower rank19. Another important reason for the frequent occurrence of MSA is the high rate of prior sexual abuse perpetration. Approxima-

the case will also be reviewed by the next-highest general court-martial22.

The convening authority used to be able to overrule any guilty verdict without legal basis, but the 2014 NDAA act prohibits this in sexual assault cases. Also, mandatory minimum punishment – dishonorable discharge for servicemembers and dismissal for officers – has been put in place. In line with the seriousness of the offense, those accused of MSA have to appear before general rather than summary or special court-martials, meant for minor misconduct and intermediate-level offenses23. This shows servicemembers that the military takes their wellbeing seriously and appropriately punishes those who harm them.

The 2015 NDAA amendments shifted the military’s goal from defending the accused to researching whether the accused may be guilty. It is now prohibited to consider the military character of the alleged perpetrator, and rape allegations have to be investigated by trained lawyers. Victims now have a right to not testify at a hearing, lowering the threshold to press charges. Furthermore, veterans who believe they were dishonorably discharged unfairly because they made MSA allegations will be able to put their case up for review24.

“sexual violence cannot be eliminated unless the broader social norms that enable it are also eradicated”

Causes of high prevalence One of the reasons suggested for the frequent occurrence of MSA that factors promoting sexual violence are deeply structured into military life. Army bases are strife with “sexualized and violent language, the general acceptance of violence, [and] the learned ability to objectify other people.” Although violence is necessary for military institutions, in recent years the American army has introduced training methods such as desensitization, which promotes violence as an acceptable means to any end. Moreover, the military is filled with hypermasculinity – “an extreme form of masculinity based on beliefs of polarized

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tely 13% of servicemen report having perpetrated at least one attempted or completed rape before enlisting20.

WHAT’S BEEN DONE? The American government and army have shown willingness and desire to combat MSA, and much has already improved. In 2011, the ban on being openly gay was discarded. Apart from being discriminatory, the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy kept many male victims silent out of fear for being seen as homosexual and punished 21. The 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) both increases victims’ rights and decreases the risk perpetrators walk away scot-free. Victims can no longer be cross-examined on things such as ‘possible ulterior motives’. Special programs providing free legal counseling for victims were set up and the five-year statute of limitations on sexual assault and rape was lifted. Since 2014, any sexual assault case not referred to the court-martial gets reviewed by a superior authority. If this convening authority agrees with the initial decision,

WHAT’S NEXT? There is definite need for more research on MSA and MST. The lack of knowledge on male sexual victimization is especially troubling since men outnumber women in the military by at least six to one. In certain fields, male MSA victims even outnumber female victims.

Moreover, research found the decrease in overall functioning and productivity after sexual harassment was twice as high in men as it was in women. Including male victims in future research would potentially enable more effective prevention and treatment programs, challenge the notion of stereotypical victims, and help break the taboo on male victimization 25. To help identify risk factors in new recruits and enlisted servicemembers, research is needed on abuse perpetrators 26. One undoubtedly necessary change is to prohibit, without exception, the enlistment of convicted abuse offenders. Would-be recruits showing sexist and/or violent attitudes

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▲ American soldiers being briefed on sexual harassment and sexual assault at Kaiserslautern, Germany, June 21, 2013.

Credit: Staff Sgt. John Zume

should be denied, and a zero-tolerance policy should be installed for enlisted servicemembers.

One campaign, successfully piloted to prevent sexual assault, was the KnowYour-Power Bystander Social Marketing Campaign. During six weeks, 21 images were shown on table tents and posters in a military installation. The goal was to make the entire community feel involved with the issue of sexual violence to decrease the likelihood of perpetration, increase the tendency to intervene, and create an atmosphere in which victims are less likely to remain unheard27. The Bystander campaign builds upon the notion that sexual vi-

“Research shows links between sexist, hostile and stereotyped attitudes towards women and sexual abuse perpetration”

olence cannot be eliminated unless the broader social norms that enable it are also eradicated. It uses social self-identification methods, approaching the target audience, whether male or female, as possible family members, friends, or coworkers of victims. Notably, in pilot groups where men were addressed as potential rapists and advised how to avoid being accused of sexual assault, participants actually showed worse attitudes on several levels – e.g., the belief in rape myths – than before participation. After participating in the Bystander Campaign, on the other hand, soldiers were more likely to report personal responsibility in MSA prevention. The long-term influence should be explored, however, to optimize the campaign’s impact on its target audience28.

sary strain on national public health due to the high frequency of MST in veterans. Although substantial improvements have been made regarding the treatment of abuse accusations, there is an acute need for more research on the prevalence, causes and effects of MSA. Specifically, more data should be collected on male victims and on perpetrators of sexual assault. Finally, the Bystander Campaign should be introduced to more army bases nationwide and eventually worldwide, and its effects should be monitored closely to ensure it lives up to its utmost potential combating MSA.

CONCLUSION The American military has become known for widespread scandals of sexual violence and cover-ups. Although the media focuses on female victims, about half of all victims are male. MSA is not merely a problem of individual victims but of the entire army and consequently of the country as a whole. It obstructs national interests by damaging unit cohesion, which can negatively impact military missions abroad and at home, while it also puts unneces-

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Biography Dana Cohen is a graduate of the University of Utrecht, where she studied Gender Studies during her BA and Conflict Studies and Human Rights during her MA.

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JASON MAGAZINE YouTube oorlog

YouTube als wapen in Syrië Naast de grondoorlog, die al sinds 2011 woedt in Syrië, is er sinds 2012 tegelijkertijd een tweede conflict gaande: een YouTube-oorlog. Niet fysieke, maar mentale oorlogsvoering staat hierin centraal. Groeperingen pogen de reputatie en legitimiteit van de vijand onderuit te halen. Het resultaat hiervan is dat er een verharding ontstaat, die leidt tot verdere polarisatie van het conflict.

NIENKE VAN HEEK

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e onthoofdingsvideo’s van James Foley, Steven Sotloff, David Haines, Allan Henning en Peer Kassig veroorzaakten wereldwijd een golf van verontwaardiging. De filmpjes werden uitgebracht door Al-Hayat, de mediatak van de Islamitische Staat. Zij staan bekend om hun gelikte en koelbloedige propagandamateriaal. Dit wordt ook vertoond in de onthoofdingsfilmpjes, die zeer professioneel opgezet zijn en wereldwijd verschenen op internet, maar ook op verschillende televisiezenders. Veel mensen realiseren zich niet dat deze filmpjes onderdeel zijn van een veel grotere verslaglegging van het conflict in Syrië. Verschillende groeperingen plaatsten meer dan een miljoen filmpjes op YouTube.

Zowel voor- als tegenstanders van het regime van Assad maakten zich schuldig aan het uploaden van het materiaal.

Hierdoor kan de burgeroorlog bijna live gevolgd worden door iedereen die het wil zien. Er wordt daarom gesproken van een nieuw en nog ongeëvenaard

het verleden in staat gebleken om veel internationale websites te blokkeren, zoals Facebook, YouTube and Amazon [2]. Reporters without Borders schaart Syrië onder de landen waar internet het meest ingeperkt wordt [3]. Het regime heeft daarbij de grootste mediabedrijven van het land in eigen beheer. Via deze media propageren zij een Syrisch nationalisme, waarin de president en

wat verder bijdroeg aan de gebrekkige verslaglegging in het land. Sinds het begin van de opstanden is geprobeerd de verregaande censuur in het land te omzeilen. Mobiele telefoons, camera’s en laptops werden het land in gesmokkeld door Syrische politieke activisten in diaspora. Hierdoor kwam sinds juli 2012 een stroom van filmmateriaal het land uit. Dit materiaal wordt onder andere gedistribueerd via YouTube en LiveLeak en wordt verder opgepakt door internationale media3, die voor hun verslaglegging grotendeels afhankelijk zijn van deze burgerjournalistiek. Het verspreiden van dit materiaal blijkt niet ongevaarlijk, verschillende burgerjournalisten zijn opgepakt of vermoord4.

Filmpjes tonen martelaren die in de strijd zijn gestorven en die glimlachend in hun dodenkleed gewikkeld liggen

fenomeen: een YouTube oorlog1.

De internetdekking in Syrië is laag.

In 2012 had slechts 22,5% van alle burgers in Syrië toegang tot het internet; op dat moment ruim vijf miljoen gebruikers. Bovendien is het regime in 8

zijn regime een prominente plaats innemen en in een zeer positief daglicht gezet worden. In deze situatie leerden activisten nuttige vaardigheden om deze regels te omzeilen, die in de burgeroorlog goed van pas kwam2.

De YouTube-oorlog begon in 2011, toen de Arabische Lente ook zijn weerslag vond in Syrië. In de loop van de tijd werden er steeds minder visa werden uitgegeven aan journalisten, waardoor het steeds lastiger werd om het land binnen te komen en om een meer plurale vorm van journalistiek neer te zetten. Bovendien nam de onveiligheid in het land steeds verder toe,

YOUTUBE In het begin van het conflict waren er nog filmpjes te zien van vreedzame opstanden, maar naarmate het conflict veranderde in een bloederige burgeroorlog, werd de inhoud van de filmpjes steeds gewelddadiger en extremer.

Omdat YouTube strikte regels heeft opgesteld aangaande geweldig materiaal, heeft in het verleden filmpjes verwijderd. Een voorbeeld hiervan is het filmpje van Hamza al-Khateeb, een

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▲ Wounded civilians bron:: wikimedia

13-jarige jongen uit Syrië die ontvoerd werd door het Syrische regime. Zijn lichaam werd drie weken later gemarteld en verminkt teruggebracht bij zijn familie5. De YouTube-clip laat de overleden jongen zien, waarbij commentaar geleverd wordt op zijn verwondingen.

Het filmpje werd later op YouTube teruggeplaatst.

Ondanks de regelgeving aangaande gewelddadig en aanstootgevend materiaal blijf verreweg het grootste deel van de filmpjes online staan. Dit komt mede doordat YouTube een clausule in zijn regelgeving heeft waarbij een uitzondering gemaakt wordt voor het plaatsen van gewelddadig materiaal dat educatief, informatievoorzienend of wetenschappelijk is. Onder deze clausule vielen onder andere filmpjes die gemaakt werden tijdens de Arabische Lente6.

Het conflict in Syrië is in de loop der jaren een uitermate ingewikkeld en divers conflict geworden, waarin veel verschillende partijen elkaar bevechten.

De oppositie bestaat uit verschillende fracties, waarvan het Vrije Syrische Leger, Jabhat al-Nusra en ISIS momenteel de meest bekende zijn. Deze partijen bevechten niet alleen het regime, maar ook elkaar. Grof gezegd kan er een indeling gemaakt worden in vier grote categorieën: jihadisten, Koerden, Assad-aanhangers en gematigde oppositie7. Naast de strijd op het slagveld, voeren zij hun digitale oorlog uit door

middel van hun filmpjes.

Groeperingen, met name jihadistische, zetten vaak hun logo bovenin beeld, zodat duidelijk is van wie de filmpjes afkomstig zijn. In de filmpjes zijn verschillende talen en dialecten te horen. De aanwezigheid van buitenlandse strijders is Syrië wordt duidelijk door de niet-Syrische dialecten, bijvoorbeeld uit de Golf. Ook wordt er veel in het Engels gepubliceerd. Dit is mede afhankelijk van de doelgroep van de filmpjes. Veel filmpjes worden gemaakt om binnen Syrië bekeken te worden, maar bepaalde filmpjes worden gebruikt om mensen in het buitenland bewust te maken van de situatie in Syrië. Waar het conflict in Syrië zelf draait om het veroveren van grondgebied, zijn trots en eer in het online conflict veel belangrijker. De wapens in dit online conflict? Het appropriëren van nationale symbolen, het besmuiken van de reputatie van de vijand en het laten zien van de eigen kracht.

De YouTubeoorlog begon in 2011, toen de Arabische Lente ook zijn weerslag vond in Syrië

MARTELAARSCHAP Met betrekking tot het appropriëren van nationale symbolen is de rol van de martelaar interessant. Al sinds het begin van de opstand zijn op YouTube veel filmpjes te vinden van gedode of ernstig gewonde mensen, die standaard geduid worden met het Arabische woord shahid, wat vertaald kan worden als “martelaar”. Veelal zien we korte filmpjes van ongeveer twintig seconden, waarin uitgelegd wordt wie het slachtoffer is, waar hij vandaan komt en wanneer (en soms hoe) hij gestorven is. Deze informatie wordt regelmatig vergezeld door religieuze leuzen. De filmpjes kunnen bijzonder schokkend zijn. Zo toont het kanaal Jobarrevo filmpjes van kinderen die gedood zijn bij de aanval met chemische wapens in 2013.

De rol van de martelaar in het Syrisch nationalisme is een bijzondere, omdat het regime elk jaar de dag van de Martelaren viert op 6 mei, waarbij ook een ceremonie gehouden wordt bij het graf van de Onbekende Soldaat. Op deze dag worden Syrische slachtoffers herdacht die in 1916 zijn gedood in de Ottomaanse executie van Syrische nationalisten. Eenzelfde ceremonie wordt in oktober gehouden om de slachtoffers van de Oktoberoorlog te herdenken, die gestorven zijn voor het Syrische vaderland. Deze ceremonies kunnen gezien worden als een middel van het

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Syrische regime om haar macht te consolideren via nationalistische symbolen en zijn een sterk propagandamiddel.

Door zelf filmpjes van slachtoffers van het Syrische regime online te plaatsen, haalt de oppositie een deel van de macht van de propaganda van het regime weg. Het beeldmateriaal staat in schril contrast met wat het regime laat zien via de officiële mediakanalen5 De slachtoffers worden daarnaast als helden weggezet en de gruweldaden worden duidelijk gemaakt voor wie het maar wil zien8.

Veel van de filmpjes zijn gewelddadig. Verschillende partijen nemen een camera mee het slagveld op en laten de oorlog door hun ogen zien. We zien bombardementen, we zien een stad bevrijd worden of we zien een direct vuurgevecht met de vijand. Daarnaast zien we direct geweld op individuen en groepen. Mensen worden doodgeschoten, geslagen met een zweep, ondervraagd of op allerhande manieren gemarteld. Ook zien we verschillende onthoofdingen.

Deze uitingen van geweld worden om verschillende redenen gefilmd.

Ten eerste dient het als een intimidatiemiddel en als medium om de eigen kracht te laten zien. Dit kan bijvoorbeeld gebeuren door een gevangene te vermoorden of te vermoorden terwijl er gefilmd wordt, maar ook door het laten zien van wapenarsenaal of het vernie-

Zo toont het kanaal Jobarrevo filmpjes van kinderen die gedood zijn bij de aanval met chemische wapens in 2013 len van gebouwen. Op een bepaald moment zijn groeperingen dit soort filmpjes ook gaan gebruiken om fondsen te werven door indruk te maken op investeerders, met name uit de Golf en Saudi Arabië 1. Via Twitter en Facebook wordt deze vraag om geld vervolgens verder verspreid. Ook gebruiken groeperingen YouTube als wervingsmiddel, om zo buitenlandse strijders naar Syrië te halen en om hun ideologieën verder te verspreiden. Filmpjes van de strijd zetten het deelnemen aan de strijd in Syrië neer als een plicht, maar ook als iets dat positief en spannend is. In deze context wordt het martelaarschap als iets positiefs neergezet, als iets heroïsch; een nobel doel. Filmpjes tonen martelaren die in de strijd zijn gestorven en die glimlachend in hun dodenkleed gewikkeld liggen. Ten tweede dient geweld als een middel om de tegenstander in een kwaad daglicht te stellen en om te tonen wat andere partijen de huidige groep aandoen. In dit geval zien we eenzelfde soort geweld, alleen wordt hier duidelijk genoemd dat het geweld

afkomstig is van de andere partijen.

EFFECTEN Het is uiteraard de vraag wat de effecten van dit YouTube conflict nu zijn. Internationaal gezien is YouTube is een goed middel gebleken om aan de wereld een conflict te tonen dat met de beperkte toegang van journalisten anders moeilijk getoond had kunnen worden. Uit bovenstaand verhaal blijkt echter dat de verslaglegging naar alle waarschijnlijkheid niet geheel objectief is, omdat YouTube gebruikt wordt om de macht van de tegenstander te verkleinen en wordt ingezet ter zelfverheerlijking. Bovendien zijn het doorgaans zeer specifieke en schokkende filmpjes die internationaal gezien onder de aandacht komen. In een YouTube conflict met meer dan een miljoen filmpjes worden veel filmpjes niet of nauwelijks bekeken. Het zijn de zeer schokkende filmpjes die de aandacht trekken. Zo kreeg in 2013 kreeg de aanval met chemische wapens in Syrië

Free Syrian Army ► symbols• bron: wikimedia

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grote internationale aandacht. De filmpjes werden bekeken tot in het Witte Huis. Ook kwam in 2013 een filmpje van de Syrische rebel Khalid al-Hamad, beter bekend onder zijn geuzennaam Abu Sakkar, onder internationale aandacht. Hij liet zichzelf filmen terwijl hij de organen van een Syrische soldaat uit zijn lichaam sneed en een hap van één van de bloederige organen at9.

Grote nieuwskanalen als de BBC en CNN berichtten over dit filmpje. Deze filmpjes en de mensen die zichtbaar zijn in deze filmpjes worden vervolgens neergezet als barbaars, middeleeuws en inhumaan. Hetzelfde gebeurt op dit moment met de (onthoofdings)filmpjes van ISIS, die hetzelfde effect teweeg brengen.

Het blijft daarbij de vraag in hoeverre YouTube nationaal gezien bijdraagt aan het omvormen van meningen van verschillende groepen in het conflict.

Het lijkt waarschijnlijk dat de filmpjes voor de verschillende groeperingen in het conflict een motivatie vormen om nog verder te polariseren. Het geweld en de daarmee gepaard gaande beelden en verhalen roepen veel haat en agressie op ten aanzien van de andere partijen.

Een interview met de Syrische oppositiestrijder Khalid al-Hamad laat de impact van de filmpjes zien. Hij vertelt hoe hij op de mobiele telefoon van zijn slachtoffer een filmpje vond waarin een Syrische vrouw en haar twee dochters

verkracht werden met een stok. De rebel werd hierop zo woedend dat hij de soldaat vermoordde en zijn organen at. Zijn motto is een motto dat velen delen in dit conflict: oog om oog, tand om tand [9]. Dit gegeven maakt dat een oplossing voor het conflict nog ver weg blijft en met het voorduren van het gevecht op de grond, lijkt ook deze YouTube oorlog voorlopig nog niet ten einde.

Biography Nienke van Heek heeft een bachelor Internationale Ontwikkelingsstudies van de Universiteit van Wageningen en een bachelor Islam en Arabisch van de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen. Momenteel zit zij in de laatste fase van de onderzoeksmaster Midden-Oosten Studies in Leiden. Hier specialiseert zij zich op de politiek van het moderne Midden-Oosten en de Islam.

Summary Next to the civil war that has been raging in Syria since 2011, we see the rise of a new and unprecedented phenomenon: the first YouTube war. Different groups in the conflict have been placing movie clips on YouTube, in which they try to intimidate the enemy and in which they show the atrocities of the different parties in the conflict. This does not lead to more understanding or changes of heart among the different groups, but leads to a further polarization of an already complicated conflict.

◄ Rebels bron: wikimedia

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JASON MAGAZINE Russian threat

Security threats in Europe’s neighbourhood Echoes from Georgia in Ukraine today

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The 2014 events in Ukraine have given a strong incentive to rethink EU-Russian relations. These international relations are embedded in a complex network of security, energy and economic trade forces, involving not only the EU and the OSCE, but also NATO and transatlantic relations. Germany – the strongest economy in the EU and economically closely interwoven with Russia – has2 a leading role in helping to resolve the conflict though safeguarding its national interests at the same time3. The events in Ukraine – the annexation of Crimea and violence by pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine –, however, are not an isolated case.

FRANÇOISE COMPANJEN AND WERNER KIEL

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nalysis of the Russian - Georgian relations reveal similarities with Ukraine, suggesting a pattern of behaviour. If we can refer to a pattern, this means the crisis is larger than Ukraine itself, showing Russia’s ambitions in general.

What can we learn for a better understanding of Russian foreign policy by comparing the 2008 war on Georgian territory with Russia’s interference in Ukraine in 2014?

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the West thought that Russia had come to terms with the idea that cooperation would be more in their interest than open conflict as reflected also in talks with NATO5.

Kosovo was a first major setback in this process of opening up relations. A Russia-friendly discourse is that the West did not do enough to help Russia get back on its feet after the humiliating implosion of the Soviet Union. More specifically, this discourse recounts that Putin I (2000-2004) reached out to the West but was not taken seriously, hence Putin’s changed attitude in his second (2004-2008) and third term (20122018) of becoming a world power and regaining control over the lost territory after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Let us first have a closer look at the new political and economic or-

ganizations and institutions established by the Russians to replace the dissolved Soviet Union in an effort to maintain control over the Newly Independent States (NIS). These have not proven to be as uniting as was hoped for. What turns out to be effective from a Russian perspective however, is to maintain pressure on its neighbouring states by interfering in the break-away regions

The goal of the EaP is to bring partner countries closer to the EU on the basis of EU values, norms and standards thus creating destabilizing forces which make these countries unattractive for the EU and NATO (art. 5). 6 Moreover this pressure hampers their development because so much energy goes into maintaining territorial integrity. In the case of Ukraine, the EU suffering from “enlargement fatigue” and expecting a candidate country to be sufficiently

prepared (EU values, no corruption) met the Vilnius summit in 2013 with measured enthusiasm. Paradoxically, after Putin’s aggression however, the EU was forced to get heavily involved in Ukraine: exactly the opposite of Putin’s interest7.

The second aspect we need to understand is the international law on territorial integrity, which in the case of the post-Soviet space is based on the last Soviet Constitution, which was translated into international post-Soviet law. The third aspect involved is intercultural communication and a different worldview. The West thinks economically: security strategies have become economic strategies, whereas Russia thinks of security in terms of military, nationalism, and personal political power.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SU After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Russian Federation invested in the creation and maintenance of international institutions that were meant to regulate the politics, economics and defense of post-Soviet states. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was the first of these. At its pinnacle it counted 12 member states among which Ukraine and with a two year delay Georgia, but nowadays the CIS is a loose alliance with various states that either withdrew (Georgia), merely par-

▲ Russian tanks entering the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia. source: BBC (http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-23010526)

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JASON MAGAZINE ticipate (Ukraine), or do not show up at yearly meetings due to disputes with Russia (3 Central Asian countries). The Secretary of the Russian Security Council himself stated that the Eurasian Economic Community was becoming a more relevant unifying institution than the CIS8. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia’s variant of NATO, also appears to have little practical use apart from joint military exercises. Georgia and Azerbaijan have withdrawn because of conflicts with other members in the organization (Russia and Armenia).

The much smaller GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development formalized in 2001 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, meant to prepare these countries for European Integration. It was seen by some as a means to counter Russian influence. It focused on issues such as the ban of national products

by Russia, the frozen conflicts in the region and the recognition of the holodomor – the 1932-3 famine that was practically orchestrated by Stalin - as genocide. Other than that it is not seen as being very active and basically has been bypassed by the EU-Eastern Partnership (EaP) arrangements inaugurated in 2009. The goal of the EaP is to bring partner countries closer to the EU on the basis of EU values, norms and standards. This includes activities aimed at deep integration through Association Agreements, Free Trade Areas, and visa-free regimes.

The Eurasian Customs Union, created in 2010 to be transformed into the Eurasian Economic Union, is Putin’s alternative to the EU and the most recent attempt to keep Russia’s neighbours closely knit. Former Ukrainian president Yanukovych first rejected the European offer because Putin offered him a better deal into the EEU9, but both had overlooked the will of the people, tired of corrupt practices and eager to live in a state that functions properly. Even though Putin emphasizes the economic importance of this union, it seems to be more politically motivated.

All in all, Russia created a number of institutional mechanisms that lost their relevance as the participating countries lacked a common purpose. Putin’s EEU might well be next on this list of failed international organizations through which it aims to keep the Newly Independent States

▲ Foto 4: Euromaidan protests in December 2014. source: Wikipedia

closely knit. Whereas Russia used to influence the politics of these neighbouring states under the pretext of protecting the rights of ‘compatriots’, it now forces them to opt for Moscow-led integration in the EEU as an alternative for the EU. Both Ukraine and Georgia pay high prices for their pro-Western turn.

RECENT POLITICAL HISTORY OF GEORGIA AND UKRAINE Due to Ukraine’s history in Soviet times, its nowadays’ relation with Russia is complex. The largely pro-Russian Crimea (with also a significant amount

(mainly coal mining) is managed by a corrupt oligarchy, which took over the politics of the whole country when Viktor Yanukovych (1950)11 whose initial victory in the presidential elections of 2004 triggered the Orange Revolution (November 2004-January 2005).

Yanukovych was elected president in February 2010. His friends received influential positions all over the country and after four years of corrupt reign, he was forced to flee the country in February 2014 after violent mass protests at Euromaidan because of his refusal to sign an Association Agreement with the EU at the Vilnius Summit.

When Georgia claimed independence from the Soviet Union, the ASSR Abkhazia had in the Likhny declaration of 1989 already declared its independence and the AO South Ossetia followed suit shortly.

This lead to (civil) wars ending in “frozen conflicts” monitored by UN peacekeeping forces, with Russia as the biggest supplier of troops.

After the Rose Revolution of 2003 and the election of pro-Western president Saakashvili, tensions between Georgia and Russia grew with Russia handing out Russian passports in both regions, interfering behind the scenes in the negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia. Tensions increased in terms of visa regime, the throwing out of diplomats, the ban of Georgian products from the Russian market, flights in Georgian airspace, build-up of Russian military at Georgian borders, culminating into the August war of 2008. Russia first occupied the territory of South Ossetia

By backing Cyprus, Russia can negotiate both some kind of naval basis there, as well as get a piece of the gas-action of mostly anti-Russian Crimean Tatars) was transferred to the Soviet Republic of Ukraine by Khrushchev in 1953 for unknown reasons, probably to ‘compensate’ for holodomor. West Ukrainian territories were only annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939 through a secret clause in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and generally consider themselves part of Europe, having once belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Southern Ukraine with the important cities and ports of Odessa and Mikolaev at the Black Sea is more trade-oriented towards Turkey and Romania, and subsequently more open in terms of civil society10. Lastly, there is the eastern Donbass region: its industrial economy

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JASON MAGAZINE Russian threat and then recognized both South Ossetia and the Abkhazia as independent states. Even if the rest of the world with a couple of exceptions did not recognize these states, these borders are de facto closed now and both breakaway regions are being annexed into the Russian sphere12.

The Abkhaz signed a treaty with Russia in November 2014 on an Alliance and Strategic Partnership, and South Ossetia is in the process of signing a similar treaty. After almost seven years, Russia still has not complied with all Six Points of the Ceasefire brokered by then French President Sarkozy. On the contrary: Russia is building a huge fence around South Ossetia cutting through villages, houses and other private property in direct breach of formal borders and Human Rights. Finally, organizing the Winter Olympics on the border with Abkhazia in 2014, making use of Abkhazia’s infrastructure was another way of showing Russian supe-

Moldova, taking control of some sensitive aircraft industry on the way, also splitting the country for easy control.

Comparing the two cases: what Georgia and Ukraine have in common are that both had coloured revolutions (2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine). A difference between the two countries is that the Rose Revolution heralded a clear direction towards NATO and the West with many anticorruption measures put into place, whereas the Orange revolution did not

bring about a stable regime with a clear view of the future for their country.

Georgia signed the EU Associate Agreement, but when Ukraine wanted to sign, Russia came with a better offer and Ukraine switched sides, unleashing protests that then led Ukraine back to the EU-table. In both cases Russia gathered a large number of military troops at the respective borders and subsequently annexed parts of Georgia and of Ukraine by force. In the meantime, various experienced Georgian government officials have been hired by

Putin is said to have bragged about being able to reach the Baltic states militarily in two days riority to the world and specific control in the region.

During Soviet times Russia had sensitive military equipment in ASSR Abkhazia, many Russian generals had their dacha’s there. South Ossetia with its Roki tunnel through the Caucasus mountains is of strategic importance. In an almost straight line down from South Ossetia, the region of Samsa Javakheti close to the Armenian border, used to shelter Russian military camps. Speculations exist that Russian troops could either resettle in Samso Javakheti or simply move on to existing Russian military bases in Armenia itself, thereby able to cut off the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan (BTC) pipeline and perhaps splitting Georgia in two13.

Putin is said to have bragged about being able to reach the Baltic states militarily in two days14. Such statements give rise to more speculations as that the Russian army could easily establish a controlled corridor straight through Ukraine to Transnistria – a Russian-controlled no-man’s land in 16

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JASON MAGAZINE Ukrainians for advice, some Georgians taking on the Ukrainian nationality for this lucrative opportunity.

The West has a bigger interest in Ukraine than in Georgia: Ukraine is large country that borders the EU, whereas Georgia is a small country, small population, further away from Europe. Whereas Europe is dependent on Ukraine for the transit of Russian energy supplies and is directly affected in case of a conflict with Russia, the amounts of oil and gas that Georgia transits from Baku Azerbaijan to ◄ a protester in Georgia. Source: Wikimedia

Ceyhan Turkey on the Mediterranean coast (the BTC line) and from Kazakhstan via Baku to the Georgian port of Batumi and are less significant15.

Whereas Georgia more or less maintained its pro-Western course after the Rose revolution, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was soon deceived as it was more party-bound and lacked the spirit of a pro-European future for the country, a theme that only became a dominating factor in the Euromaidan protests in 2014.

THE PATTERN: PUTIN’S STRATEGY OF DESTABILIZATION AND INTIMIDATION The military advantage of annexing Crimea is clear. Russia had to lease the Sebastopol naval base on the Black Sea coast for its Russian fleet at a high price with a recurring tension about renewing the lease contract every so many years. In April 2010 Medvedev and Yanukovych signed an agreement

western leaders have not taken what Putin says too seriously, yet so far his actions match his words. Unfortunately he has also mentioned the possibility of using nuclear weapons16. From the Georgian and Ukrainian experience so far it is clear that Putin is following the same strategy of intimidation, force and destabilization of former Soviet Republics to regain the influence lost 25 years ago.

WHAT HAS THE EU DONE? So far about 4,700 people have been killed in Ukraine since April 2014 and almost a million have been Internally Displaced17. Russia was immediately excluded from the G8 in 2014 as a result of having annexed Crimea and the EU imposed a series of economic sanctions against Russia: travel bans, asset freezes of officials, suspension of negotiations over Russia’s joining the OECD and the International Energy Agency. A re-assessment of EU-Russia cooperation

nowadays the CIS is a loose alliance with various states that either withdrew (Georgia), merely participate (Ukraine) concerning the extension of the lease: Sébastopol, which has been home to the Russian Black Sea fleet since it was set up by Catherine II the Great at the end of the 18th century, should have been leased until 2042. With the annexation of Crimea the lease and high cost problem is removed altogether.

Does this mean Russia will also want to annex East Ukraine? This scenario is unlikely because it is of no special military importance and furthermore, the Russian tax payer would have to cover for peoples pensions, the high unemployment rates in the region, healthcare, education and the rebuilding of the infrastructure. In view of Russian stagnating economy this would be an extra heavy burden with little to no advantage in return. Apparently it is perceived as more efficient to maintain pressure on Ukraine, destabilizing the country and thus maintaining control at a cheaper price. Question is whether this really is in Russia’s advantage.

From the Western economic logic, it would be more advantageous for Russia to have a prosperous Ukraine importing goods from the Russian market.

Another pattern appears to be, that

programmes is currently ongoing with a view to suspending the implementation of EU bilateral and regional cooperation programmes. Projects dealing exclusively with cross-border cooperation and civil society will be maintained.

The EU has adopted a prohibition on imports originating from Crimea and Sebastopol unless accompanied by a certificate of origin from the Ukrainian authorities. Any kind of investment in Crimea or Sebastopol is outlawed, including tourism, financial aid and loans [18]. Furthermore, the EU embargo includes technology and services for the use of military purposes and oil exploitation in Russia19.

Besides such sanctions the EU has brokered peace talks. During the Minsk talks late August and early September 2014, mediated by the OSCE, 12 points were negotiated ranging from immediate and two-sided ceasefire, to providing the opportunity for the OSCE to monitor the cease fire, to more self-governing power to certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with early elections to be organized on the special status of both regions, exchange of prisoners, economic development for the region,

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JASON MAGAZINE Russian threat encourage national dialogue and such.

Ukraine would regain control over its border and the Russians would withdraw their army and agents 20+21+22.

Unfortunately, all the commitments of the Minsk protocol did not translate into actual results on the ground and whereas negotiations on both high and lower levels continue, even though a planned meeting in Astana was cancelled in January because both Russia and Ukraine keep accusing each other of mobilizing forces in the eastern part of Ukraine. A large column of vehicles was filmed entering Ukraine this January in Krasnodon and Ukraine plans to conscript up to 200,000 soldiers in 201523.

WHAT CAN EU LEARN FROM THE GEORGIAN CASE? Taking Putin’s actions in Georgia as a test case, it could have been predicted that he would do the same with his bigger neighbour Ukraine, as people in Georgia warned several times, and as people in Poland and the Baltic states are warning now: Putin will not stop and he will push his power to the extreme. The Russians are now testing how far they can go with Europe by flying into European airspace many dozens of times, most recently over the Channel, but also by increasing pressure on EU-Greece relations by giving support to Greece, which could have great consequences should Greece need to step out of the Euro zone. Another potential source of pressure on the EU is Cyprus, backed by Russia. Historically, Russians have seen the Eastern Mediterranean as a natural extension of the Black Sea. Under the leadership of

Putin, Russia is trying to regain control in the Mediterranean. The way to go about this is by controlling the natural gas (off shore natural gas) in the Levant Basin as a way to contain the energy independence Europe is striving to achieve. Hungary for example has suggested using Israeli gas to substitute for reliance on Russia. By backing Cyprus, Russia can negotiate both some kind of naval basis there, as well as get a piece of the gas-action24. What the EU can learn from Russian behaviour in Georgia and Ukraine is that he will not stop but continue to find weak spots in Europe trying to get a hold over Europe, rather than cooperating with Europe.

WHAT MORE CAN THE EU DO? Even though the intention of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) is deep economic integration, Russia perceives this mechanism as a security threat. In the Russian worldview, the Euromaidan protests are supported by the West (mainly the U.S.) in order to establish a sphere of influence in Eastern Ukraine “In the modern world extremism is being used as a geopolitical instrument and for remaking spheres of influence.

We see what tragic consequences the wave of so-called colour revolutions led to,”25 so said Putin in a recent speech at the Russian Security Council.

This all makes clear that EU integration with states in the Eastern neighbourhood can impossibly be merely economic, and that the EU should also offer security guarantees to these countries. It would be good to have the OSCE monitoring and/or UN peacekeeping forces in Eastern Ukraine.

Most recently, various politicians also

Territorial Integrity and the Soviet Constitution If we want to look closer to the different institutions as manifestations of organizing post-Soviet space, we need to understand that today’s international law is based on the way territory was arranged legally according to the Soviet Constitutions. The Soviet Union (SU) was composed of Republics (for example the Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) Georgia and the Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) Ukraine) that on paper were sovereign. These republics included provinces with a certain degree of political and cultural autonomy: the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics such as the ASSR Abkhazia and ASSR Adjara in Georgia. A delineation with less autonomy was the Autonomous Oblast such as the

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AO South Ossetia in Georgia.

Ukraine between 19241940 had the Moldovian ASSR that became a full-fledged SSR in 1940 and claimed independence during the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Thus Ukraine remained with one other province, Crimea that first had the status of Autonomous Oblast, was promoted to ASSR following a referendum in 1991, and has now been annexed by the Russian Federation in 2014. In fact, almost the same pattern as with the Georgian territories South Ossetia and Abkhazia was followed. Only this time instead of having a full-fledged war changing legal borders, the annexing forces involved in Crimea were more covert and not easily identifiable.

want to provide Ukraine with arms to defend itself against Russia. Opponents argue that this will only escalate matters and lead to a full-fledged war. Better to follow the example in the Caucasus and freeze the conflict and introduce peacekeeping forces instead. A UN-peace keeping force logically would consist of military from such countries as India, Brazil, Norway, but most probably also from Russia. The question of the command structure for such a force should be considered carefully in advance.

Finally, the West can do more by opening a NATO basis in Poland.

Because NATO has a 1997 treaty with Russia that forbids permanent bases in the Baltic States, a close alternative is Poland. The basis would consist of a new 4,000 strong NATO ‘spearhead’ force of which 1,000 troops from Britain. In view of Putin’s claim that he can reach the Baltic States militarily in two days, hopefully opening such a basis offers some reassurance to the people of the Baltic States26 and some deterrence to Russia.

CONCLUSION From the Georgian case we can learn that Russia is determined to behave as a world power and to regain control of former Soviet territory and rekindle the influence it had in the Mediterranean.

Experts are divided on whether economic pressure on Russia is working. Fact is that their economy has stagnated, but the question is whether this will change Putin’s political agenda. Some say he has become more compliant during peace negotiations on Eastern Ukraine.

Others point out that the Russian people have been used to self-reliance since Soviet times and are willing to make sacrifices for having a strong leader and regained respect in return. Putin’s increased popularity after the annexation of Crimea (almost up to 80 %), and the fact that many Russians do not see a direct correlation with Putin’s policy and the economic malaise27, make a strong argument for this claim. Economic malaise has so far not prevented Russia from war; in the 1990s, despite Russia’s collapsed economy, the ‘frozen conflict’ zones came into existence and Russia fought a war with Chechnya28.

Besides the Russian people as a whole, we also need to take into consideration the group of extremely wealthy businessmen around Putin. They will not gladly accept lasting damage to their financial interests and a point might be reached where they will put pressure on Putin to come to an agreement with the West.

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Whereas Europe perceives security more and more in terms of economic power, the Russian people and power structures traditionally believe in the effect of a strong military 29 . It appears that Russia has found a way to reassert itself in the post-Soviet space with minimal military force through the destabilisation of neighbouring countries and parts of the EU (e.g. Greece and Cyprus) with specific problems. Therefore, the West should maintain economic and political pressure on Russia and show the intention to curb Russia’s behaviour consistently and unremittingly especially in case they touch any NATO countries.

Meanwhile, the future will depend on which logic will win in Russia: the West’s logic of economic interdependency and cooperation or the Russian logic that is embedded in nationalism, in an identity of Orthodox-Slavic values30 and that is based on military power and destabilisation of former Soviet space and Europe. The Russian proverb “economy is a good servant but a bad master”31 may hint at the answer.

Biography Dr Françoise Companjen is senior lecturer at VU University Amsterdam, managing director of Caucasus Interconnect and has published various articles and books on the Caucasus, most recently a volume on travels to and from Georgia in Europe from an intercultural perspective.

Werner Kiel, is a Master student of Russian/Eurasian Studies and Political Science at Leiden University, interested in Russian culture. He was an intern at the Dutch embassy in Baku and at the Netherlands Institute in Saint Petersburg.

Summary The 2014 events in Ukraine could be extrapolated to the weaknesses of nowadays’ EURussian relations: political and economic organizations failed to unite states and avoid conflict and regions that enjoyed high degrees of autonomy in Soviet times were annexed by Russia through similar strategies of intimidation and destabilization. Meanwhile, Russia and the West are lost in translation: the Western logic of economic interdependency opposed to the Russian logic of military power and nationalism. The 2014 events in Ukraine are very similar to the 2008 events in Georgia, thus constituting a pattern.

The EU should understand that this pattern is likely to continue and maintain economic and political pressure on Russia.

▲January 11, 2014: The Belarusian president Lukashenko receives Putin, Hollande, Poroshenko and Merkel in Minsk for peace negotiations on the situation in the Donbass region Source: RT

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JASON MAGAZINE Iraqi and Lebanese political cartoons

Violence Through Arab Cartoons If you talk about the Middle East and political cartoons, most will think of the cartoons of Charlie Hebdo or the Danish Mohammed cartoons. However, political cartoons are – and have long been – commonplace in the Middle East. Like abovementioned cartoons, Arabic cartoons have experienced their share of controversy and violence. This article will take a closer look at the subjects and reaction to violence and current affairs in political cartoons in Lebanon and Iraq.

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s result of the civil war in Syria and rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, violence in the form of attacks, fighting or bombings is never far away in Lebanon and Iraq. It is easy to be intimidated by this violence and to stay safe and silent, but some Arabic newspapers continue to publish cartoons criticizing the current (political) violence. For this article, the cartoons from four newspapers from last year will be analysed: al-Sabah al-Jadeed and al-Mashriq from Iraq and al-Joumhouria and al-Binaa from Lebanon. As result of their geographical proximity to each other, their cartoons can very easily be compared and contrasted in order to distil their different views on the current developments and violence in their region.

Iraq: Too Much Bloodshed The cartoons of the Iraqi newspapers, al-Sabah al-Jadeed and al-Mashriq,

focus mainly on local politics (corruption, budget deficit, incompetent officials) and ISIS and less on more global developments (oil price, refugees and Tunisian elections). This focus is understandable as most Iraqis have to deal daily with these local issues and their country is currently torn apart by the war against ISIS, which partly carved out their bloody Caliphate in West Iraq. ISIS appears often in the cartoons as black clothed persons wearing baklavas (al-Sabah al-Jadeed), with long beards in Taliban style clothes or as a multitentacled monster (alMashriq). Both newspapers also use the black-and-white flag of ISIS as symbol for the movement.

Both newspapers criticize the violence and influence of ISIS in their cartoons.

Al-Sabah al-Jadeed does this on a more abstract level by criticizing its dominance over the media (Snake charming ISIS

Al-Sabah al-Jadeed (“New Dawn”, since 2004, Baghdad)1 It describes itself as an independent political daily. Its headquarters were bombed in February 2014 after publishing a cartoon of Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader. Its main cartoonist is Assem Djihad.

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fighter with a microphone as snake) and its influence on the Iraqi parliamentarian election in April 2014 (ISIS fighter attracting a pencil with a magnet and cash). Al-Mashriq, on the other hand, choses to focus on the concrete, bloody crimes of ISIS, like the mass execution of the Albu Nimr clan last November in Anbar and the crucifixion of Christians in Nineveh (“Christ(ian) crucified again”). Al-Mashriq blames mostly the sectarian strife in Iraq for the rise of ISIS, showing the Kurds, Sunni and Shia fighting with each other with ISIS as laughing bystander.

It is also critical about the Iraqi army, for example its use of useless ‘electronic sniffers’ to detect bombs (terrorist making fun of a soldier with a sniffer).

But, like al-Sabah al-Jadeed, it also celebrates the military victories against ISIS. While the latter does this again on a more abstract level (‘anti-ISIS’ spray can killing cockroaches), al-Mashriq lists the concrete victories, like at the Baiji refinery (knife wrestled from a terrorist hand) or Amerli (a grave dug by an Iraqi soldier with ‘ISIS’ on the headstone). Al-Mashriq also sees SunniShia cooperation (Sunni-Shia scissor cutting ISIS) and the new Iraqi prime

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▲ Several cartoon from the four mentioned newspapers in the article

minister Abadi as solutions to the ISIS problem (prime minister disentangling the problems of Iraq). However, the newspaper sees Turkey (literally) as a blockade to a better future and even as supporting ISIS (Turkish President Erdogan dragged away from ISIS by the international coalition). The USA, on the other hand, is criticized for being unwilling or too weak to stop the bloodbath in Iraq (Obama looking away while Iraq bleeds).

Lebanon: Fear Thy Neighbour The Lebanese newspaper al-Joumhouria is, besides local affairs, mostly concerned with the terrorist threat to Lebanon. Its cartoons often refer to terrorist

attacks, like the one by ISIS on the Lebanese border town Arsal in August 2014, and the presence of terrorists in Lebanon. Its cartoons use bombs, persons with black beards or covered faces, destroyed towns or streams of blood to depict this threat. It also comments the use of social media by terrorists to spread their message (terrorist telling to decapitate everybody who doesn’t like their Facebook messages). Al-Joumhouria takes a firm anti-ISIS and overtly patriotic stance, celebrating the Lebanese army and its military successes against terrorists (Lebanese and soldier holding the torch of ‘Lebanon’).

As al-Joumhouria is run by a Christian

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Al-Mashriq (“The Orient”, since 2004, Baghdad)2 It describes itself as an independent international daily. In 2007 and 2009, it was sued by the Iraqi trade minister Abdel Fellah Hassan al-Sudani for implicating him in alleged corruption, although he later dropped the charges.

Its cartoons are made by several cartoonists.

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JASON MAGAZINE Iraqi and Lebanese political cartoons businessman and given the presence of a significant Christian population in Lebanon, al-Joumhouria gives special attention to the persecution of Christians in Iraq and in the Middle East (cross leaving Iraq or the word al-Sharq (the East) turning into al-Sharr (evil or disaster). It expresses its support for America’s intervention in Iraq against ISIS (Obama riding as a cowboy into battle) and bashes Turkey and Qatar for supporting ISIS (both countries stirring with terrorist groups ISIS and al-Nusra in a boiling pot).

The second Lebanese newspaper, alBinaa, pays very little attention to local affairs and mainly focuses on Israel in its shockingly anti-Semitic cartoons.

It depicts Israel (evil looking soldier or Jew) as murderous, unreliable, lying and uninterested in peace and even equals Israel to ISIS or Nazis (Adolf Hitler and a Jew as two sides of one coin). Its cartoons mostly comment on the futility of the Palestinian peace process, the bombardments of Gaza and the perceived plans to destroy the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem (a Jewish kid smashing the al-Aqsa mosque on

the lap of mother America, while an Arab offers a peace dove).

Al-Binaa also takes the USA, Turkey, Arab League and the Gulf States on.

It accuses them of supporting Israel (Arab League and USA), creating ISIS (Gulf States, Turkey, Israel and USA) and causing the civil war in Syria. For example, it depicts the International Coalition against ISIS as puppet master with ISIS as puppet and a Gulf sheikh lighting a matchbox with the Syrian regime flag. Moreover, in the view of al-Binaa, the Gulf States and the Arab League do nothing to stop the bloodshed in Gaza and only want to intervene in Syria to stop the Syrian President Assad. From these cartoons it becomes very clear that al-Binaa is the official mouthpiece of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. This small anti-Zionist (or better anti-Semitic) political party holds seats in both the Lebanese and Syrian parliament and supports the Assad regime.

Each his own It is clear that the cartoons in the four newspapers focus mostly on local issues and violence and much less on issues

Al-Binaa (“The Structure”, since 1958, Beirut)3 It describes itself as a social nationalist political daily and is the official paper of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. This Syrian-Lebanese political party was founded in 1932 and adheres to a Syrian nationalistic anti-Zionist ideology. The main cartoonist of al-Binaa is Nafal Dib.

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Al-Joumhouria (“The Republic”, since 1924, Jdeideh)4 The newspaper stopped publishing during the Lebanese civil war, but was revived in 2011

by Elias Murr, a Greek Orthodox Lebanese politician and businessman.

He was wounded in 2005 by a bomb attack possibly carried out by Syria.

The main cartoonist of al-Joumhouria is Ghaghar. farther away. Within this common framework, each newspaper has its own focus and message, even with a common subject as ISIS. While al-Mashriq and al-Joumhouria focus on concrete crimes of ISIS and celebrate concrete military successes against ISIS, al-Binaa and al-Sabah al-Jadeed criticize ISIS in a more abstract way. Al-Binaa strikes the odd tone as it links ISIS to the USA and Israel, but its accusations against Qatar and Turkey for their (perceived) support to ISIS can also be found in the cartoons of al-Mashriq and al-Joumhouria. Al-Mashriq adds the sectarian strife and military incompetence to the reasons for the rise of ISIS. Its fellow Iraqi newspaper, al-Sabah al-Jadeed, doesn’t on the other hand identify any

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causes for the rise of ISIS. This sets it apart from the rest.

The newspapers are divided about the USA and its actions against ISIS. The two Lebanese newspapers take opposite views, while the Iraqi newspapers are critical, but not hostile towards America. The views of the Lebanese newspapers can be explained by their affiliations: al-Binaa is linked to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and choses the side of the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war; al-Joumhouria is, as

Al-Binaa mainly focuses on Israel in its shockingly anti-Semitic cartoons stated earlier, run by a Christian businessman and politician. Thus al-Binaa sees the USA as evil, while al-Joumhouria welcomes American intervention against ISIS. The Iraqi newspapers are critical about the USA for different reasons. While al-Mashriq berates the USA for not intervening sooner in Iraq, al-Sabah al-Jadeed berates America for manipulating the price of oil, on which Iraq depends for its national income.

Al-Binaa is the only newspaper that focuses more on Israel than on ISIS. It pays the most attention to the Israeli bombardments in Gaza of all newspapers, but its cartoons are also the most extremist and anti-Semitic. This antiSemitism, as its support for the Syrian regime of President Assad, can be explained by its link to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Something similar could be done with regard to the focus of al-Joumhouria on Christians in Iraq through its ownership. However, alJoumhouria strikes a far more moderate, liberal, but fiercely patriotic note in its cartoons than al-Binaa.

In short, all four newspapers choose to criticize the violence of ISIS regardless the fact that it is an dangerous group with little sense of humour or clemency. Their choice of subjects seems to be more guided by the ideology of the newspaper than threats. Their cartoons in the different newspapers are clearly political cartoons; primarily intended to bring across a message, secondary to make people laugh. While some cartoonists are more subtle in bringing across their messages, other chose to do this in a more confronting way by depicting concrete crimes or, in case of al-Binaa, by being very anti-Semitic. These would also be the most controversial cartoons from a Western viewpoint.

However, the general message of the

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Arabic political cartoons is clear: don’t let the fear of violent reprisals dull the criticism of political cartoons.

Biography Christiaan Duinmaijer graduated in Arabic Language and Culture at Leiden University. During his study, he studied a year in Egypt and he completed a part of his master in Paris. He is active in the Dutch Association for International Affairs (NGIZ) and the Commission on International Politics of VVD The Hague.

He has its own consultancy, Assarwa, which gives advice on business and security in the Middle East

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JASON MAGAZINE Managing nationalism

Nationalism, a How the annexation of Crimea made sure that Putin gained in popularity

Why is it a smart move for leaders, who are eager to gain support of their people, to start a war and create a national enemy? And how can a national identity be used to gain popularity? In history, and in the future, nationalism was and will be used to maintain power, play with the people, to keep them in control and gain popularity for the persons in charge. Like Putin did once he had to gain support of the Russians during the annexation of the Crimea last year, when his popularity was in decline. During his speeches he played with the national identity of the Russians.

KARLIJN ARTS

N

ationalism is a doctrine invented by the 19th century1. This doctrine became successful because of its function in the social order: it provides a framework of dominant ideas and norms where a whole 'nation’ must live up to2. So, nationalism became a modern, unifying tool to maintain the social order in a nation consisting of millions of people.

This article will discuss the reason how

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the national identity can be enhanced and used to serve the will of the country’s elite. Because besides that nationalism is a good tool to maintain the social order it can also serve another goal: to make the people comply to the will of their leader. Even in times that the status of the person in charge is questioned, look at Bill Clinton after his ‘Lewinsky’ sex scandal in the 90’s, they are aware that they should put focus on something else3. Like Bill

Clinton did, pay more visits international to make ‘his country’ look good, is a logical tactic. In other to make yourself more popular you have to gain the support of the ones legitimizing your reign. How can you best do that?

By reminding them of their common identity of which they care about most: their national identity.

But what does a national identity actually means? How can it connect people and how can it actu-

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◄◄ Propaganda posters to recruit new soldiers ◄ Russian nationalist Source: Wikipedia

tool for power ally help Putin to gain support of the Russians? Before we can answer those questions we first have to start looking at the characteristics of nationalism.

The characteristics of nationalism Nationalism consists out of two characteristics 4. The first characteristic explains that with nationalism the individual members give their primary loyalty to their own national community; this loyalty supersedes their loyalty to other communities. For example those groups based on common kinship or political ideology. The second characteristic of nationalism entails that these national communities desire their own independent state. This independent state would confirm their status as ‘a nation’.

In fact, these two characteristics are a war- causing factor on themselves: by superseding the loyalty for your nation above loyalty for other groups, tension can rise between those conflicting groups. Because choosing one group can lead to loosing the other. Besides that, protecting the borders of your independent nationstate can also lead to tensions with surrounding and invading countries.

Although it is fairly acceptable that those two characteristics of nationalism are war-causing factors, I will argue the other way around. Namely, that war

is the most powerful way to enhance these two characteristics and there with nationalism. At first, war will make sure that the loyalty to your national community will be strengthen, via a national enemy. This national enemy will create an in- group/ out-group division.

Then, because of this strengthen loyalty to your national community, you will be more eager to protect your nationstate. And this enhanced national identity is exactly what leaders want: nationalism is the most powerful tool to keep the society think and feel alike.

As most of us know, nationalism is a social construction5. This means that we build an imaginary community that is accepted as being one nation, even though it consists out of different religions, ethnicities and cultures. This

“Leaders often make use of the national identity in support of their own goal: to remain powerful.”

imaginary community, your nation, is therefore your ‘group’. You feel part of this group and connected to the persons in this community. But, you need an enemy to realize that you have friends.

In this case it means that there need to be other national identities, other nation-states, to actually create your nation-state. In fact, this feeling of ‘we’ as a unity increases when an outsider group is challenging or threatening your group. We see this so- called ‘ingroup/ out-group’ mechanism almost everywhere. Think for example about when two football fans are talking to each other about their favorite football club or look at what happens when a girl with a pale skin enters a room full of girls with a dark skin color. All these types of group interactions trigger an in-group/ out-group reaction, as it does with nationalism. And it is exactly this mechanism where leaders make use of.

Ever since the rise of nationalism in the 19th century, this doctrine has been used to gain the support of the people by its leaders. Was it to gain support for a new law, an economic downfall or even to go to war, they asked the country for support in favor of ‘their nation’.

This use of the national identity, to get a whole nation supporting the war and

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JASON MAGAZINE Managing nationalism thereby the decisions of a country’s elite, was profoundly used during the First and Second World War. In these wars the whole country was encouraged to make a contribution, by working back home, or fighting abroad.

Whereas the last example seems like a general call on the national identity to fight against the enemy, leaders often make use of this identity in support of their own goal: to remain powerful. So, when leaders are under pressure, they will do anything to remain their power. They can do it by suppressing their civilians or by giving them reasons to support their authority without force. But what if you try to gain support by simply letting them rationally consider your capability to rule the country and they find you not suitable for the position? You will give them reasons to support your ruling, just like Putin has been doing for a while.

How Putin uses nationalism

“Nationalism is the most powerful tool to keep the society think and feel alike.”

Since his inauguration in 2000, Vladimir Putin has been struggling to gain support from Russia’s citizens.

Their support was mainly based on the country’s economic performance. But, there were several cases where Putin did try to change the situation and gain in popularity. In these cases, he exploited Russian nationalism, anti-Americanism and anti-immigrant sentiment. For example, Russian citizens were more in favor of Putin when he restored the Soviet-era nation anthem and when Putin dispatched troops to Georgia in 2008. National pride also grew when Winter Olympics were held in Sochi, Russia, in 20146. These cases show the connection between the rise of national identity and the support for its leader.

In fact, this connection is not that strange.

If we look back at the two characteristics of nationalism, loyalty to the nation-community and the preferred existence of an independent state, we

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actually miss one thing: a leader figure/ an elite which holds the community together, which represents the community. This leader should make sure that the national will and the national norms are being met. So, it is not only important to meet the society’s economic but also its social wellbeing.

Therefore, in case a leader cannot meet the (economic) needs of a society, it is important to make sure that the society supports you otherwise. In that case a leader should, like what Putin did, try to maintain popularity by safeguarding other things the society cherish: their national identity. This national identity consists out of different aspects, like a shared language, shared norms and a shared history. During the annexation of the Crimea it were exactly these points which he was referring to in his speeches. To the historic importance of the Crimea for Russia, to the right for the Russians to claim this land.

To Ukraine that unjust claimed that territory. He created a national enemy and gained more support himself.

Putin said: ‘Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride… The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea. This is also Sevastopol – a legendary city with an outstanding history, a fortress that serves as the birthplace of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet… Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolising Russian military glory and outstanding valour… Therefore, I stand assured of your support’7

to serve a leader his own interests: to gain support.

And every leader, including Putin, will do so in the future. Whether consciously or unconsciously. Because this mechanism, nationalism, is internalized like any other norms and values you are brought up with. And therefore it is so hard to resist the words of 'our shared history and our shared language’. Nationalism just feels like it has always been there.

Biography Karlijn Arts finished a pre-master in Social and Cultural Anthropology and is currently studying Communicationsience at the VU Amsterdam and followed a minor in International Security studies at the University of Zurich. Besides that she is a member of the commission International at the ‘Jonge Democraten’ Amsterdam.

It has always been there This article made two points clear.

First, war is a powerful tool to create nationalism. It creates a national enemy while your most important in-group is being threatened. And second, when your position as a leader is being threatened as well, you should use this tool in favor of your right to reign the nation. By using nationalism a leader can use several elements, like shared language and history, to gain support of the society.

Therefore it wasn’t that strange that Putin claimed the Crimea back when his popularity was in decline. He could have used the Crimea and Ukraine as a tool for boosting up the national feeling amongst the Russians; reminded them of 'their history and their rightful ownership of those places'. It wasn’t the first time, and it certainly will not be the last time, that history was used

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Summary In the first place this article will argue that war is a powerful tool to enhance the national identity. It unifies a nation, people become connected and they are in the war together, as one group. Secondly, this article will argue how leaders of a nation can use this strengthened national identity to gain popularity. It will be described how leaders can use nationalism to gain support for their own reign, with focus of the way Putin tried to gain national support for the annexation of Crimea.

JASON MAGAZINE Column

Incident Leon Wecke

Hij stond wat onwennig met zijn pistoolmitrailleur in de aanslag. Ook het kogelwerende vest zat de wijkagent niet lekker. En voor de twee handgranaten aan zijn gordel was amper plaats. Om de tien minuten kwam een gepantserd voertuig van de marechaussee langs gereden, waarvan de chauffeur door zijn kijkspleet turend, de politieman niet eens opmerkte. Bij het station leek de Tweede Wereldoorlog teruggekeerd: massa’s asielzoekers werden in vrachtwagens aangevoerd en vervolgens naar het vliegveld gereden om aldaar onder begeleiding van gemaskerde agenten en militairen en eveneens van een bivakmuts voorziene politiehonden te worden ingeladen.

Moslims, die zich niet wilden uitspreken voor ‘vrijheid en democratie’, werden zonder enige vorm van proces opgepakt.

Zwijgzaamheid was juridisch gelijk gesteld met het verheerlijken van terrorisme. Van jihadisten, van jihadisme verdachte personen, alsmede familie en buren van jihadisme verdachte lieden waren paspoort en Nederlanderschap allang ingenomen. Een ieder die zich wenste te verplaatsen hetzij met een vliegtuig, bus, trein, eigen auto of fiets diende tijd van vertrek, route en bestemming in te toetsen in daartoe van overheidswege verstrekte apparaatjes, die tevens de vinger- en oogafdruk van de gebruiker doorgaven. De politie had eindelijk honderdprocentstoegang gekregen tot alle briefverkeer, telefoonverkeer en internetcontacten. Juichend had het volk de nieuwe maatregelen omarmd, zulks onder de leus: ‘meer veiligheid en minder vrijheid’. ‘Wat willen jullie meer of minder vrijheid?’. ‘Minder, minder’, hadden ze allemaal geroepen. ‘We zullen eraan werken’, had Wilders beloofd. Toen schrok hij wakker. De werkelijkheid was nog ver van zijn droombeeld verwijderd. De meerderheid van het parlement wenste niet ondoordacht te handelen. Natuurlijk meer samenwerking op inlichtingengebied, niet bezuinigen op de veiligheidsdiensten, goed uitkijken bij oversteken, maar dat waren voorstellen die na iedere, tot de verbeelding sprekende, aanslag gedaan werden. Hoe kon het zijn dat in andere ons omringende lan-

den van veel meer incidentenpolitiek sprake was dan bij ons? Burgers waren hier toch ook bang, minstens bezorgd? Meer dan de helft verwachtte een aanslag in de toekomst.

En toch was er geen stevig politiek-militair antwoord zoals in België, Frankrijk en tal van andere landen. Aan de media kon het toch niet liggen? De grootste krant van Nederland, De Telegraaf, had de voorpagina, en wel de hele voorpagina, gebruikt om het volk te waarschuwen voor een aanstaande aanslag in Amsterdam. Of zou niet iedereen De Telegraaf geloven? Ook andere media, kranten, radiocommentatoren en nieuwsduiders op TV hadden meegedaan met de ‘Ik ben Charlie-hype’. Weliswaar was hier en daar melding gemaakt van de pershaters onder de meelopers in de Parijse parade, maar dat viel weg bij het nieuws waar het om ging: de Islamitische aanslag op de vrijheid van meningsuiting. Geert pakte het handboek incidentenpolitiek van de plank.

Er stonden vijfentwintig politieke, psychologische en massacommunicatieve voorwaarden voor een geslaagde incidentenpolitiek opgesomd, maar hij klapte het boekwerk moedeloos dicht en verzuchte: ‘Het was toch een gouden kans, die aanslag in Parijs’.

Zou het kabinet denken dat het slechts een incident was, een ernstig incident, maar niet veel meer dan dat? Zouden de ministers het echt laten bij een beetje meer fouilleren, een paar camera’s meer, handhaven van de identificatieplicht, een beetje meer het internetverkeer aftappen, huiszoekingsbevoegdheden wat verruimen, preventieve hechtenis ietsjes verlengen en wat data aan andere staten doorgeven? Dat zou toch symboolpolitiek zijn. Het leger moet aan de bak! Niet alsmaar vreemde volken beschermen; nu òòk voor de krijgsmacht, ‘eigen volk eerst’.

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Leon Wecke is werkzaam bij het Centrum voor Internationaal Conflictanalyse & Management van de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen.

Daarnaast doceert hij aan het Instituut Defensie Leergangen, Instituut Clingendael en de opleiding van de Koninklijke Marechaussee in Apeldoorn.

Hij heeft verschillende publicaties op zijn naam staan, onder andere op het gebied van de beeldvorming inzake oorlog en vrede.

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JASON MAGAZINE Russische media

▲ President Putin: ‘Man of the Year’ in Rusland – source: kremlin.ru, Russian Presidential Press and Information Office

Roebelcrisis: Poetin's eigen schuld?

"De roebelcrisis wordt veroorzaakt door het Westen" en "Het Westen heeft een nieuwe Koude Oorlog tegen Rusland uitgeroepen" zijn enkele voorbeelden van koppen uit de Russische mediaberichtgeving. Deze crisis heeft veel invloed op de Russische consument en diens dagelijkse levensstandaard. Maar voorkomen Russische media door deze opmerkingen dat de Russische president Poetin minder populair wordt – ondanks de slechte staat van het land? En in hoeverre is de Russische media in staat om de publieke opinie van het land te beïnvloeden?

CLAUDIA ELION

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D

e roebelcrisis is begonnen in 2014; sinds die tijd heeft Rusland (weer) een vertroebelde band met Amerika en Europa. Poetin staat er, volgens het Westen in ieder geval, alleen voor – wat zich onder andere uit in de economische sancties die de Europese Unie en Amerika het land opleggen. De olieprijs keldert, de roebel stort in, de economie krimpt en kapitaal ontvlucht het land massaal. De waarde van de roebel verandert per dag, maar zeker is dat hij al twee keer minder waard is dan een halfjaar geleden. De Russische media leggen vooral de nadruk op de problemen die Westerse landen ondervinden van het embargo dat Rusland heeft ingesteld tegen levensmiddelen uit onder meer de Europese Unie en Amerika, als represaille tegen de Westerse sancties.1 Deze negatieve effecten op het dagelijks leven van de ‘normale’ Rus dragen echter niet bij aan een verminderde populatie van president Poetin. Hij is op 16 december 2014 voor de vijftiende keer op rij verkozen tot “Man van het Jaar”.

Hij heeft met een grote meerderheid van 68% gewonnen van de nummer twee, die slechts 4% van alle stemmen kreeg. De peiling is gehouden onder 1500 respondenten uit 43 Russische regio’s, zo meldt het Russische persbureau Interfax2. Vijftien jaar lang al is hij de held van het land. In 1999 werd Poetin voorgedragen als opvolger van de veel minder populaire Boris Jeltsin en tot twee keer toe is hij herkozen. Ook de Verenigde Staten was ontvankelijk voor de voormalig FSB’er (Federale Veiligheidsdienst van de Russische Federatie, Federalnaja sloezjba bezopasnosti).

Deze populariteit sluit aan op het feit dat de media de publieke opinie vaak sterk beïnvloeden. De Russische publieke opinie, gemeten door onder andere de peilbureaus Levada en de eerdergenoemde Interfax, geven een redelijk beeld van de sluimerende onrust onder Russische consumenten. Volgens een recente peiling van Levada maakt ongeveer 80% van de Russen zich op voor zware economische tijden. In dit artikel wordt getracht een antwoord te geven op de vraag hoe de Russische media de roebelcrisis afbeeldt en in hoeverre dit invloed heeft op de Russische publieke opinie. Daarvoor zal eerst de crisis worden besproken, waarna de Russische media worden geanalyseerd en de manier waarop zij publieke opinie beïnvloeden. Er kan geconcludeerd worden dat de Russische media, die veelal niet onafhankelijk zijn van het Russische regime, veel invloed hebben op de Russische publieke opinie. De media berichten hun lezers over de roebelcrisis

vanuit een pro-Russisch, anti-Westers standpunt en dragen zo direct bij aan de populariteit van de president en aan wantrouwen van Russische burgers jegens Amerika en Europa.

DE ROEBELCRISIS Rusland is sterk afhankelijk van zijn olie- en gasexport. Tweederde van de Russische export bestaat uit deze koolwaterstoffen. De staat heeft grote aandelen in veel energiemaatschappijen en indirecte banden met de staatsbanken die deze maatschappijen ondersteunen. Nu de olieprijs sterk is gedaald, mede vanwege de onregelmatigheden binnen het oliekartel OPEC, is ook de roebel gevallen. Daarnaast raken de economische en financiële sancties van de EU en Amerika vele Russische bedrijven, waardoor het voor de Russische ondernemers moeilijk wordt om in het buitenland te lenen 3.

Ondanks pogingen van onder andere de Centrale Bank van Rusland om te interveniëren in de economie, is de sluimerende crisis per december 2014 nog niet verholpen. Grote kredietbeoordelaars schatten 2015 niet veel positiever in voor het land: volgens Standard & Poor’s zullen Russische schulden toenemen, buitenlandse investeringen afnemen en het bruto binnenlands product zal dalen met 4,5%.4 De hechte banden die de Russische politiek onderhoudt met bedrijven en banken leiden tot een directe invloed van buitenlandse politiek op de binnenlandse economie. Ook de Russische bevolking maakt inmiddels mee wat de crisis voor het dagelijks leven betekent: de VTB bank (Банк ВТБ) ziet zichzelf genoodzaakt om een limiet te stellen op het bedrag aan buitenlandse valuta dat ze per dag kunnen uitgeven. Ze beloven $3000, maar alleen als je de dag erna op tijd komt en ook nog geluk hebt, kan je het wellicht ontvangen. Prijzen van bepaalde voedingsmiddelen zijn soms met wel 300% tot 400% van de originele prijs gestegen.

President Poetin zegt dat de economi-

Volgens een recente peiling van Levada maakt ongeveer 80% van de Russen zich op voor zware economische tijden.

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sche crisis nog wel twee jaar kan duren, maar dat hij er ook van overtuigd is dat de economie er weer bovenop komt. De roebel zal uiteindelijk weer in waarde gaan stijgen, stelt hij bij zijn jaarlijkse grote persconferentie in Moskou. De economie zou sneller kunnen herstellen als er een einde komt aan de ‘externe factoren’, waarmee hij doelt op de dalende olieprijzen en Westerse sancties.5 Enkele Russische cartoonisten zien dit echter negatiever in. Zij hebben prenten gemaakt die precies de onrust en het ongemak met de huidige situatie afbeelden. Cartoons met vallende roebeltekens in de vorm van sneeuwvlokken; de euro en dollar die samen in een lift staan en tegen de roebel zeggen dat ze ‘naar boven’ gaan; olievaten met daarop het teken van de roebel die over vele poppetjes rollen6. Het zijn enkele voorbeelden van de tekeningen die laten zien dat er ook vanuit een andere hoek wordt gekeken dan vanuit het propagandistische verhaal dat Poetin verkondigt. Tot dusver bereiken deze cartoons echter niet het brede publiek, omdat de cartoons niet via de grootste mediakanalen worden verspreid.

RUSSISCHE MEDIA De Russische media hebben geen ontwikkeling meegemaakt de zoals mediakanalen in het Westen dit hebben gedaan. Dit is te verklaren door de historische achtergrond van Rusland. Het communistische regime van de SovjetUnie tot de jaren ’80 van de vorige eeuw is ontstaan onder het regime van Lenin. Het Sovjet-communisme werd gevormd door het nationalisme van het land en verschilt daardoor van communistische regimes van andere staten, zoals China en voormalig Joegoslavië.7 In de Sovjet-Unie bestond een sterke propagandistische berichtgeving die pro-regime was. Dit is na de val van de Sovjet-Unie aan het einde van de Koude Oorlog deels overgenomen door de regimes van achtereenvolgend (voormalig) presidenten Jeltsin, Medvedev en Poetin. Nu wordt er minder direct gepropagandeerd, maar is er zeker nog sprake van berichtgeving die sterk verbonden is aan het regime.

Door deze specifieke berichtgeving bereikt niet elk nieuwsbericht het brede publiek. Het percentage onafhankelijke media is zeer laag en er zit een strenge controle op berichtgeving door de nieuw ingestelde wetten die de vrijheid van pers beperken. De drie nationale, en tevens meest bekeken en bekende televisiekanalen, kunnen niet meer als neutraal worden gezien.8 Juist deze kanalen geven geen kritiek op het 29

JASON MAGAZINE Russische media handelen van Poetin en tekenen het beeld van een regering dat op het punt staat om in te grijpen. Eenieder die toegang heeft tot de Russische informatievoorzieningen wordt eerder gepropagandeerd dan juist geïnformeerd. Het Westen wordt in ieder geval over het algemeen slecht afgebeeld, terwijl het beleid van het Kremlin nog wel effectief is.

Een voorbeeld hiervan is Pervuj Kanal (‘Het Eerste Kanaal’). In 2013 was dit het belangrijkste Russische televisiekanaal, waar 98.8 procent van de populatie naar keek. Het was een bedrijf waarvan 51% van de aandelen in handen was van de federale overheid.

Het tweede kanaal was Rossyia ofwel ‘Rusland’, dat 117 miljoen kijkers had.

Dit bedrijf was volledig in het eigendom van de overheid. 70% van de Russische bevolking vertrouwt de grootste televisienetwerken en 50% vertrouwt grote kranten, volgens een onderzoek uit 20089 Deze getallen, verzameld uit een vergelijking van statistieken, laten zien dat het Kremlin nog een sterke invloed heeft op de berichtgeving, maar ook dat deze berichten bijna iedereen in Rusland bereiken.

Een voorbeeld van deze berichtgeving is de nieuwsweergave van rt.com, één van Ruslands grootste mediakanalen, over de eerdergenoemde voorspelling van Standard & Poor's. rt.com citeert de Russische Minister van Financiën Anton Siluanov: “A very important aspect is that the rating of Russian obligations in the national currency is still at the BBB-investment grade. Therefore, there won’t be a sharp

tussen 1993 en 2008 zijn er jaarlijks meer dan vijf journalisten gedood. decline in the share of non-resident among the holders of Russian loan bonds.”10 Standard & Poor’s had het investeringsklimaat beoordeeld als BB+, een zeer ongewenst niveau, maar de minister stelt dat dat ‘onzin’ is. Het is één van de voorbeelden waarin uitspraken van Westerse bedrijven of personen worden geridiculiseerd. Andere voorbeelden blijken alleen al uit de nieuwskoppen bij zoekresultaat ‘crisis + ruble’: “Big investor interest in Russia, despite pressure”; “No chance of state default in Russia”; “’What a dreamer!’ Rogozin ridicules Obama claim of Russian economy in ruins” 11 Ook het Russische mediakanaal ‘Pravda’ beeldt het Westen af als ‘hopeloos’. De sectie over buitenlandse zaken kopt onder andere het volgende: “Russia to surround USA with its influence”; “USA helpless in space without Russia”; “USA harbors plans to decapitate Russia within minutes (red. De eerste zin van dit nieuwsbericht is “The West has declared a cold war on Russia”)”12 KRITISCHE MEDIA De media die neutraal of positief over het Westen ◄ Satirical cartoon about Putin’s influence on the media Author: Welleman, wikimedia

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berichten, zoals de nieuwssite www.tass. ru, worden minder vaak bezocht dan de websites die aan de Russische politiek zijn gelieerd. Ook bestaan er zogenaamde Engelse kranten die dagelijks in het Russisch worden uitgebracht, zoals The Moscow Times, maar hiervan is de oplage slechts 35.000 - vergeleken met een oplage van 27 miljoen van de grootste krant Komsomolskaya Pravda heeft de Engelse krant geen groot bereik.13 Er zijn dus wel pro-Westerse of neutrale nieuwsbronnen in Rusland, maar met slechts een minimaal bereik vergeleken met de (semi-)overheidskanalen.

Een aspect dat daarbij onderzocht kan worden, is het aantal dode journalisten in Rusland van de afgelopen jaren en de oorzaken daarvan. Hier heeft The International Federation of Journalists in 2009 een rapport over geschreven. Op basis daarvan is een database opgezet: ‘Deaths and Disappearances of Journalists in Russia, 1993-2007’. Uit bijgevoegde tabel blijkt dat er tussen 1993 en 2008 jaarlijks meer dan vijf journalisten zijn gedood, met 2007 als enige uitzondering. Daarbij ligt het gemiddelde van gedode journalisten of media-stafmedewerkers rond de tien personen per jaar. Bij ‘homicide 1’ heeft de moord direct verband met het werk van de gedode persoon. Daarbij gaat het om zo’n 160 personen, één vierde van het totaal. ‘Homicide 2’ heeft deze relatie minder sterk, maar bewijst wel de verzwakking van de Russische rechtsstaat sinds 1990. In veel gevallen is het niet duidelijk of niet onderzocht wat de oorzaak van de dood was. Er is echter wel een verband zichtbaar: uit de case studie waarin enkele moorden worden vergeleken blijkt dat veel journalisten zijn gedood vanwege hun beroepsachtergrond.14 PUBLIEKE OPINIE Zoals gezegd, hebben media altijd een sterke invloed op de publieke opinie – een beeld dat niet alleen in het Westen wordt bevestigd, maar ook in andere staten zoals Rusland. De Russische publieke opinie en civil society hebben zich echter anders ontwikkeld dan de voor ons bekende manieren. Dit heeft voor een groot deel te maken met de geschiedenis van het land. In communistische regimes maakte de staatspartij gebruik van angst en dreiging om mensen een mening op te leggen die in overeenstemming was met wat de partij wou horen. Nog steeds is er sprake van een bepaalde angst om een eigen mening naar buiten te brengen15 Dit is geen aspect van een zuivere democratie, ondanks dat Rusland daar wel naartoe lijkt te werken door verkiezingen te

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JASON MAGAZINE organiseren en burgerrechten en –vrijheden in de constitutie op te nemen.

De civil society wordt in Rusland niet zelfstandig gevormd, maar opgebouwd en beperkt door de regelgeving die Poetin door de Doema, het Russische Parlement, weet te krijgen. Zo is er bijvoorbeeld een nieuwe wet die een limiet stelt op buitenlandse steun voor NGO’s, een wet die de bloggersvrijheid op internet beperkt en is er regelgeving om protesten en opstanden in goede banen te leiden. Dit leidt tot opmerkelijke resultaten bij peilingen van de publieke opinie. Volgens peilingsbureau Levada zegt 78% van de Russen niet snel mee te doen aan protesten over een dalende levensstandaard. Ook vinden Russen (77%) het onwaarschijnlijk dat er protesten zullen ontstaan over politieke onvrede – en zelfs als deze zouden ontstaan, zou maar 9% van de respondenten er waarschijnlijk aan meedoen.16 Een ander opmerkelijk aspect dat verkregen is uit peilingen, is de waarde die Russische respondenten geven aan vrijheid en burgerrechten. Wat met name belangrijk is voor het land, is de hoge levensstandaard van haar burgers, een goede economie en een sterke militaire macht. Pas als achtste worden vrijheid en burgerrechten genoemd.17 Hieruit valt te concluderen dat de Russische bevolking meer waarde hecht aan nieuwsberichten over de roebelcrisis en stijgende prijzen van levensmiddelen, dan aan berichten over politieke vrijheden. Deze nieuwsberichten komen hen vervolgens weer ten gehore via de grote mediakanalen die bijna allemaal aan het politieke regime zijn gelieerd.

CONCLUSIE In dit artikel werd gezocht naar een antwoord op de vraag hoe de Russische media de roebelcrisis afbeelden en in hoe verre dit invloed heeft op de Russische publieke opinie. Juist in deze maanden is het onderwerp zeer relevant: de manier waarop Russische media het Westen afbeelden, heeft een grote invloed op de Russische bevolking.

Niet alleen de Russische media, ook Poetin legt de oorzaak van de roebelcrisis bij de economische sancties en externe factoren uit het Westen, met name van Europa en Amerika. Daardoor zetten ze het Westen niet in een al te positief daglicht. Dit gaat verder dan de roebelcrisis, na onderzoek blijkt dat de belangrijkste nieuwskanalen het Westen bijna altijd negatief in het nieuws brengen. Alleen al de opmerking dat ‘Amerika een tweede Koude Oorlog had uitgeroepen tegen Rusland’ is zeer ondersteunend voor dit beeld.

▲ Some minority Russian newspapers - Source: Wikimedia

De Russische publieke opinie wordt in sterke mate beïnvloed door de Russische politiek en de media. Aangezien de grootste mediakanalen die (grotendeels) in handen zijn van politieke grootgewichten en het Kremlin vaak veel aandelen in deze bedrijven heeft, wordt het volk indirect ingelicht volgens de wens van Poetin. Geen wonder dat hij voor de vijftiende keer op rij is verkozen tot ‘Man van het Jaar’. Maar omdat de media zo negatief over het Westen bericht en bijna de hele bevolking hiervan op de hoogte wordt gesteld, is de publieke opinie over het algemeen negatief geïnformeerd – je zou het zelfs ‘gepropagandeerd’ kunnen noemen. In het dagelijks leven stijgen prijzen van belangrijke levensmiddelen en boeren verliezen hun buitenlandse afzetmarkt, door zowel de roebelcrisis als de sancties. In plaats van in protest te gaan tegen de nationale politiek heeft Poetin de schuld van beide aspecten bij het Westen gelegd, waardoor de president minder hoeft te vrezen voor zijn eigen machtspositie.

Biography Claudia is nu derdejaars student Internationale Betrekkingen & Organisaties aan de Universiteit Leiden en doet daarnaast de minor Europees Rechtaan de Universiteit van Amsterdam. Haar interesses liggen bij geopolitieke verhoudingen, Internationaal Recht en Europees Recht.

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SUMMARY The current ruble crisis of Russia, partly caused by the fall of oil prices and the Western sanctions on Russian companies and persons, does not directly lead to a diminished trust in the Russian president Putin. How does this come? The biggest Russian media channels are strongly linked to the regime and report on news from a pro-regime perspective, with anti-Western news and opinions. The critical media don’t reach the big public and therefore cannot inform all Russians in a more appropriate way. Pro-Russian media strongly influence the public opinion. They blame, as Putin does, the West for the ruble crisis, and the public groundlessly forms its opinion on this news – what, of course, leads to an anti-Western public opinion.

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JASON MAGAZINE Isis and propaganda

Boobs on the

War comes into being through many social factors. Tension between ethnicities, classes and religions boil over into armed conflicts. Though an actual gender war in the literal sense has yet to come, gender is often used to fan the flames of war. Throughout history this has ranged from the Sabine kidnappings at the founding of Rome all the way up to the Congolese Mai-Mai militia needing to rape women in combat areas in order to supernaturally power their battle performance1.

This is also the case on the various fronts surrounding the emergence of the Islamic State In Iraq and Syria.

BAS KLEIJWEG

I

SIS lures recruits with the promise of wives and concubines, to be divided as khums (taxes) among fighters2, while the Kurds fight partly to protect their sisters and daughters from the spectre of sex slavery that occurs under the yoke of the would-be caliphate. But the war is not only a story of faceless women as either victims or prizes, as the case of Major Mariam al-Mansouri (dubbed ‘Lady Liberty’ on social media) tells. As the first female fighter pilot to carry out bombing runs on ISIS targets in Syria, her time in the spotlight is a good illustration of the various aspects of gender propaganda in the current situation in the Middle East.

This article will first look briefly at the history of the stock tropes of gender in propaganda in order to place the situation in the proper context. With the techniques discussed, the article will then focus on how these were adopted to present different

versions of al-Mansouri’s story within the media on the various sides of the political spectrum in the United States.

The reason for examining the United States lies with the fact that two-party system has led to news media that have political profiles far more demarcated than most other Western countries. Yet in the case of al-Mansouri, these usually clear lines got blurred. Finally, some of the harmful consequences of the representation of the fighter pilot’s tale will be brought up, showing how an individual woman’s life can be subsumed as a tool in a larger ideological battle.

THE PROPERTIES OF PROPAGANDA Deepa Kumar opines that “the most prominent role women play in war

▲ Xxxxx. Bron: Xxxxxx.

▲ Mariam al-Mansouri on the right with some of h

narratives is that of victim”3. She needs a soldier to protect her and surely the eager young men are willing to step up to the plate. This particular manner of gendering is not just limited to actual women themselves: one can easily see examples in phrases such as fighting for the motherland, or how Germany’s violation of the neutrality of Belgium during World War 1 was dubbed the Rape of Belgium.4 Women are there to be rescued, as one can see on one of the recruitment posters made in the wake of the assault.

Al-Mansouri as Lady Liberty gives a false impression of her sharing all the Western cultural values that are posited under freedom

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The enemies are brutes, as Image 1 shows. Demonization and dehumanization of the enemy is of course one of the most basic tenets in wartime

JASON MAGAZINE

ground

Destroy This Mad Brute: Enlist (1917), Harry R. Hopps - source: Wikimedia

her colleagues. Source: ABC News

propaganda. The juxtaposition of the brute to the positive masculinity of the gentlemanly soldier has an undercurrent of enforcing order and obedience.

Lynn Stuart Paramore points how this is also the case in the ISIS conflict, where the portrayals of the misogyny of the group are often inflated to make shocking headlines, while the reality is much more nuanced5. ISIS has female brigades and woman jihadis often abandon their country to join the group for precisely the same motives as many of the male jihadis, which contrast with the portrayal of female jihadis as subordinated to and cowed around by their male counterparts.

On the other hand we have the image of the woman as a personification of

La LibertÊ guidant le peuple (1830), a picture by Eugène Delacroix

values. Instead of the helpless mass, she becomes a symbol. The most relevant example in relation to al-Mansouri is the famous French painting of Liberty Leading The People, the barechested

The most prominent role women play in war narratives is that of victim

girl carrying the tricolour over a pile of fallen revolutionaries, as seen in Image 2. She was the inspiration for the Statue of Liberty, also called Lady Liberty, which was the nickname American conservatives gave to the female fighter pilot. Symbols are artefacts of a culture: the fact that the Emirate citizen was given the nickname suggests an optimistic wish that Western values of democracy and freedom continue to spread from France to America and now to the Middle East.

A third element is the notion of emasculation: Professor Jo Fox discusses how a particular form of propaganda used during the World Wars consisted of attacking enemy troop morale using this concept. It consisted of pointing out

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JASON MAGAZINE Isis and propaganda the possibility of girlfriends and wives being seduced by other men back home while the soldiers were fighting on the battlefield6. It is closely tied to the first trope of women-as-victims, but is now used to humiliate instead of to fuel outrage and fear.

THE SLANT OF THE STORY All the tropes discussed above also appear during al-Mansouri’s time in the media spotlight. What was curious about the reception of this story in the American media was that it did not really divide as neatly among partisan political lines as the reputation of a polarized country would suggest. While the Lady Liberty moniker was gushed over by the female hosts on a news program on Fox, the male co-hosts turned to making sexist remarks about parking her fighter jet and referring to her as Boobs On The Ground, for which they were lambasted by the international media, and far more interestingly, by several U.S. army veterans7. While the reaction on the Democrat side of the spectrum such as CNN and MSNBC gave kudos to the woman for breaking gender barriers, many outlets such as The Middle-East Eye were quick to point out the problematic nature of celebrating a single person breaking these barriers in a country were many people do not enjoy the same opportunities at all8. Furthermore, this sort of coverage could be interpreted as celebrating imperialism and all the death that it brings, writer Belen Fernandez asserts in the article in the previous footnote.

According to her, traces of this can be seen in some of the praise for al-Mans-

ouri, which was couched in militaristic gloating at the destruction rained on ISIS. Backhanded compliments for the UAE living up to Western norms by fielding a female pilot were also a part of this Western-centric imperialistic attitude.

When one closely examines what tropes are used in the various pieces, one can come to the conclusion that every outlet makes use of the propaganda techniques in the first part of this article in their coverage. The ISIS conflict is seemingly utilized in order to wage a political proxy war. The reception of the mayor is very much a Western preoc-

The ISIS conflict is seemingly utilized in order to wage a political proxy war cupation amidst the daily atrocities by ISIS that receive much more attention in the media in the Middle East itself.

While the Democratic media often calls out the manner in which hawks use the atrocities inflicted upon women in the Middle East in order to encourage interventionism, the very same notion of women as marginalized victims was used in the case of al-Mansouri to deflate Republican triumphalism.

The most prominent element of the

whole incident is how emasculation gets weaponized. On one side are those sniggering that the jihadis got done in by the gender they rigidly oppress, but as one can see with the controversial remarks of the anchors, this also has an underlying element of misogyny.

It suggests that it is extra humiliating to lose to the woman by virtue that this goes completely against the classic image of what a woman is supposed to be. However, the critical response to such sexism was often a response filled with more emasculation, such as the letter-writing veterans calling the offenders “not real men9. This simultaneous denunciation of discrimination based on gender and embracing the use of gender roles as a stick to beat the opponent with is part of a broader pattern in which propaganda tactics are thought of as valid as long as the right people are targeted.

THE PERILS OF PROJECTION Propaganda is by nature form over content, and no one expects nuance when media adopt its trappings to disseminate a stance as far and wide as possible. But the moment news outlets start producing reports and articles using the same mimetic devices normally reserved for mobilization in an actual war to settle a political score, scepticism is the answer. An obvious objection is that elevating the major to an icon is painting an enormous target on her back. The more she becomes a symbol of the fight against ISIS, the likelier the desire of the insurgent group to take down that symbol. But more than that, it reduces the work she is doing to either acting as an agent of imperialism or fighting for values she does not necessarily share. Furthermore, the role emasculation played in the controversy showed that coverage of the crisis surrounding ISIS easily gave way to a game of media figures debating over who said what terrible thing, mired in conscious and not-so-conscious sexism.

As the article shows, when the propagandistic techniques of war are adapted to news coverage, this coverage becomes an insular affair plagued by the narcissism of small differences.

▲ Fox News’Eric Bolling calls female pilot al-Mansouri boobs on the ground because women have boobs Source: Bustle.com

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â–˛ Mariam al-Mansouri in her fighter jet Source: rfi.ro

Biography Bas Kleijweg has a Bachelor in English Language & Culture, finished at NUI Maynooth, and is currently working on a Research Master in Literary Studies. His interests lie in the ef-

fect the internet has on politics, and how identity shapes international conflicts. Besides this he heads promotion and recruitment at the DEAL Foundation, a non-profit specialized in social entrepeneurJASON magazine * Jaargang 40 * Nummer 2

ship, and writes content for WordLid.nl, a website for upcoming students."foundation and the study association of his study.

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JASON MAGAZINE Activiteitenverslag

Buitenlandse Zaken â–źâ–ş Hoe

is het om daadwerkelijk in het veld van diplomacy & security te werken? Hoe bepaal je positie in het complexe speelveld en op welke wijze probeer je jouw doel binnen deze complexe omgeving te bereiken? Food for thought voor de kleine groep studenten en young professionals die zich donderdag 12 februari mochten melden bij het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken in Den Haag voor de Crash Course Diplomacy & Security Management. Onder andere een uitleg over het Gemeenschappelijk Veiligheidsen Defensiebeleid (GVBD), actuele vraagstukken en een simulatie omtrent de casus Kobani waren enkele van de zaken die de deelnemers voorgeschoteld kregen. Een interessante en leerzame dag die de moeite waard was om te herhalen HESTER TORN

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JASON Studiereis naar Brussel ▼► Europese

veiligheid staat meer dan ooit onder druk. In een tijd van toenemende Russische assertiviteit en conflict op de zuidgrens, kan Europa nog een samenhangend en doeltreffend buitenlands beleid formuleren op het gebied van veiligheid en defensie? En wat is precies de relatie tussen de EU en de NAVO? Op 26 Februari vertrok JASON met een groep gemotiveerde studenten naar Brussel, om deze vragen beantwoord te krijgen.

Eric Povel van de NAVO gaf de eerste presentatie, Public Diplomacy Division, die zich vooral richtte zich op hoe de drie kernrollen van de NAVO−collectieve verdediging, crisismanagement, en coöperatieve veiligheid−zijn veranderd en opnieuw ingevuld sinds het conflict in Oekraïne en vooral sinds de NAVO top in Wales van September 2014.

Hij benoemde kort enkele operationele en politieke verschillen tussen de EU en de NAVO, en hoe die samenwerking op hoog niveau soms beïnvloeden. Tenslotte besprak hij de crisis in de relatie met Rusland, maar benadrukte dat de NAVO als democratische en defensieve alliantie zich nog steeds houd aan alle eerder gemaakte afspraken zoals de 1997 NRFA, en nog steeds openstaat voor een open dialoog met Rusland.

Na een korte lunch vertrok de groep naar de 'European External Action Service', waar Joel Schuyer een beknopt inzicht gaf op de ontwikkeling van dit jonge instituut, en haar rol in het ondersteunen van de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger voor Buitenlandse Zaken en Veiligheidsbeleid (Federica Mogherini) in het formuleren van een 'comprehensive' Europese Gemeenschappelijk Buitenlands- en Veiligheidsbeleid.

De laatste stop was bij het Europees Defensieagentschap, waar enkele experts onder leiding van Rini Goos vertelden over de rol die deze relatief kleine maar invloedrijke instelling speelt in het hervormen en standaardiseren van de Europese defensieindustrieën. Dit heeft als doel om door schaalvoordelen en het delen van kennis, training, regulaties en materieelonderdelen een meer kosteneffectief en hoogstaand Europees defensiecomplex te bereiken.

MATTHIJS MAAS

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JASON MAGAZINE Eindnoten

This We’ll Defend - pag 4 Jamail, Darh. (2009) The Will to Resist: Soldiers Who Refuse to Fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, pp.

133-4.

2 Turchik, J. A. and Wilson, S. M. (2010) ‘Sexual Assault in the U.S. Military: A Review of the Literature and Recommendations for the Future,’Aggression and Violent Behavior, vol. 15(4), pp. 267-277.

Available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1359178910000145. [accessed December 2014], p. 268.

3 Allard, C. B. et al. (2011) ‘Military Sexual Trauma Research: A Proposed Agenda,’ Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, vol. 12(3), pp 324-345. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15299732.2011 .542609. [accessed December 2014], p. 325.

4 Ibid. note 2.

5 Ibid. note 2, p. 271.

6 Burkhart, L. (2014) ‘Being a Female Veteran: A Grounded Theory of Coping with Transitions,’ Social Work in Mental Health. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15332985.2013.8 70102. [accessed December 2014], pp. 17-9, 25.

7 Ibid. note 3, p. 332.

8 Ibid. note 3, pp. 330-1.

9 Ibid. note 2, p. 269.

10 Ibid. note 3, pp. 332-3.

11 Ibid. note 3, pp. 330-6.

12 Ibid. note 2.

13 Ibid. note 6, p. 26.

14 Murdoch, M. et al. (2007) ‘Functioning and Psychiatric Symptoms among Military Men and Women Exposed to Sexual Stressors,’ Military Medicine, vol. 172(7), pp. 718-724. Available at: http:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17691684. [accessed December 2014], p. 718.

15 Potter, S. J. and Stapleton, J. G. (2012) ‘Translating Sexual Assault Prevention from a College Campus to a United States Military Installation: Piloting the Know-Your-Power Bystander Social Marketing Campaign,’ Journal of Interpersonal Violence, vol. 27(8), pp. 1593-1621. Available at: http:// jiv.sagepub.com/content/27/8/1593. [accessed December 2014], p. 1595.

16 Foubert, J. D. and Masin, R. C. (2012) ‘Effects of The Men’s Program on U.S. Army Soldiers’ Intentions to Commit and Willingness to Intervene to Prevent Rape: A Pretest Posttest Study,’ Violence and Victims, vol. 27(6), pp. 911-921. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.27.6.911. [accessed December 2014], p. 912.

17 Ibid. note 2, pp. 271-2.

18 Ibid. note 2, p. 271.

19 Ibid. note 6, p. 17.

20 Ibid. note 16, p. 911.

21 Ibid. note 2, pp. 272-3.

22 Vergun, D. (2014) ‘New Law Brings Changes to Uniform Code of Military Justice,’ www.army.mil.

Available at: http://www.army.mil/article/120622/New_law_brings_changes_to_Uniform_Code_of_ Military_Justice. [accessed January 2014].

23 Ibid. note 22.

24 Vergun, D. (2015) ‘Legislation Changes UCMJ for Victims of Sexual Assault,’ www.army.mil. Available at: http://www.army.mil/article/140807/Legislation_changes_UCMJ_for_victims_of_sexual_ assault/?from=RSS. [accessed January 2015] 25 Ibid. note 14,p p. 718, 723.

26 Ibid. note 2, p. 268.

27 Ibid. note 15, pp. 1597-9, 1613-4.

28 Ibid. note 16, pp. 912, 918-9.

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YouTube als wapen in Syrië - pag 11 Kaylan, Melik. 2013. “Syria’s War Viewed Almost in Real Time.” The Wall StreetJournal, 2709-2013. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324492604579083112566791956, laatst bezocht 1-3-2015 2 Khamis, Sahar, Gold, Paul B., Vaughn, Katherine. 2012. “Beyond Egypt’s “Facebook Revolution” and Syria’s “YouTube Uprising”: Comparing Political Contexts, Actors and Communication Strategies.”: Arab Media & Society 15: 9 3 Reporters without Borders. 2013. 2013 World Press Freedom Index: 24. http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/ classement_2013_gb-bd.pdf, laatst bezocht 1-3-2015 4 Al-Ghazzi, Omar. 2014. ““Citizen Journalism” in the Syrian Uprising: Problematizing Western 1

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Narratives in a Local Context.” Communication Theory 24: 435-454.

5 Ziter, Edward. 2013. “The Image of the Martyr in Syrian Performance and Web Activism.”

The Drama Review 57 (1): 116-136.

6 Youmans, William Lafi and York, Jillian C. 2012. “Social Media and the Activist Toolkit: User Agreements, Corporate Interests, and the Information Structure of Modern Social Movements.”

JournalofCommunication 62: 315-329.

7 O’Callaghan, Derck, Prucha, Nico, Greene, Derek, Conway, Maura, Carthy, Joe, Pádraig Cunningham. 2014. “Online Social Media in the Syria Conflict: Encompassing the Extremes and the In-Betweens. Advancesin Social Networks Analysisand Mining (ASONAM): 409-416 8 Rich, John. 2011. “The Blood of the Victim: Revolution in Syria and the Birth of the Image/ Event.” E-flux Journal 26: 1-8.

9 Baker, Aryn. 2013. “Exclusive: “We will Slaughter all of them.” The rebel behind the Syrian Atrocity Video.” Time, May 14

Echoes from Georgia in Ukraine today

- pag 14

With many thanks to W.H. de Beaufort for reviewing and commenting on this text at such a short notice. The responsibility of the content naturally remains ours.

2 With the United States. The latter has shown more force defending the West.

3 Stephen Szabo on Germany emancipating, redefining itself and also diverging its economic interests to Poland and China. Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics, Bloomsbury Academic, 2014.

4 Russia and Abkhazia signed an alliance on November 24 2014 and are in the process of signing a treaty with South Ossetia. http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/01/17/effectiveannexation-russia-and-georgias-south-ossetia-sign-integration-treaty/ 5 As mentioned in the Russia-NATO founding act of 1997 and the Russia NATO council signed late spring 2002. Jason 2002, 27: 1 page 29-32. The danger of involution and of NATO becoming ‘merely’ a political organization is discussed there.

6 An armed attack against one or more members shall be considered an attack against them all.

7 Karen Donfried, German Marshall Fund: http://www.gmfus.org/archives/karen-donfried-on-pressconference-usa-with-carol-castiel-insights-on-ukraine-russia-u-s/ 8 Russia questions further existence of the CIS post-soviet organisation InfoNIAC 9 The same with Armenia – who was bullied into not signing papers with EU by buying them into ECU/EEU 10 http://time.com/10032/ukraine-donbass-yanukovych-kurkov/ 11 PM 2006-2007; and president of Ukraine from February 2010-February 2014.

12 http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/01/17/effective-annexation-russia-and-georgias-south-ossetia-sign-integration-treaty/ 13 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/russia-overstretching-itself-20151111531816963.html 14 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/en/blogs/natosource/putin-russian-troops-could-be-in-vilnius-orwarsaw-in-two-days 15 There are old Baku-Batumi pipelines but so far new planned ones have not been completed. In the meantime the Kazakhstan oil company KazMunajGaz with encouragement of the EU wanting to be less dependent on Russian energy, is transporting oil from Kazakhstan to Batumi oversea and overland (by road and rail) to the Black Sea. http://www.eurodialogue.eu/Kazakhstan-DefendedIt-%20Interests-for-Oil%20-Transit-via-Batumi-Black-Sea-Port 16 New Eastern Europe, January-February no 1:114. Interview with M. Saakashvili.

17 http://rt.com/news/185700-lugansk-donetsk-special-status/ 18 http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm 19 Ibid.

20 http://rt.com/news/184791-putin-ukraine-kiev-militia/ 21 https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/osce-releases-the-12-point-protocol-agreementsreached-between-ukraine-russia-and-separatists-in-minsk-363816.html : The document is titled ‘Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group’ and signed in Minsk on September 5, 2014.

22 http://rt.com/news/185700-lugansk-donetsk-special-status/ 23 http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/astana-peace-summit-postponed-as-bothsides-mobilize-in-east-ukraine-2-377285.html?flavour=mobile 1

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http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/27/putins-mediterranean-move/ Putin says Russia must prevent 'color revolution', http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/20/usrussia-putin-security-idUSKCN0J41J620141120 26 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2745013/Britain-send-1-000-troops-lead-new-Nato-spearhead-force-based-Poland-amid-growing-threat-Russia.html#ixzz3QiWXn4m3 27 “‘Крымнаш’ и Русскиь север”, Новое Время, июнь 2014 стр. 28/29 28 Leonid Bershidsky, «Poetin vecht door, sancties of niet» NRC Handelsblad Woensdag 4 februari 2015.

29 Mihail Barabanov, «Testing a 'New Look'» , http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Testing-a-NewLook-17213 30 Inglehart’s value survey; Huntington’s clash of civilizations, etc.

31 Although the literal translation of the proverb would be “thrift is fine but stinginess is terrible”, we also encountered this free translation on http://masterrussian.com/proverbs/russian_proverbs. htm and in http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/12/putin-man-year-russiaruble/383809/ 24 25

Violence Through Arab Cartoons - pag 20 Homepage al-Sabah al-Jadeed: www.newsabah.com/wp/; Reporters without Borders, Baghdad Newspaper Bombed after Cartoon of Iran’s Supreme Leader, 11 February 2014: http://en.rsf.org/ iraq-baghdad-newspaper-bombed-after-11-02-2014,45851.html 2 Homepage al-Mashriq: www.al-mashriq.net; Committee to Protect Journalists, CPJ, JFO Cite Press Freedom Abuses in Iraq, 10 June 2009, http://cpj.org/2009/06/cpj-jfo-cite-press-freedom-abuses-iniraq.php 3 Homepage al-Binaa: www.al-binaa.com; Homepage Syrian Social Nationalist Party: www.ssnp.net 4 Homepage al-Joumhouria: www.aljoumhouria.com; Homepage Elias Murr: www.elias-murr. com; Al-Arabiya, ‫( ةخخفم ةرايسب لايتغا ةلواحم نم رملا سايلا ينانبللا عافدلا ريزو ةاجن‬Lebanese Defence Minister Elias Murr Escapes Assassination Attempt with Car Bomb), 12 July 2005: www.alarabiya.net/articles/2005/07/12/14856.html 1

Nationalism, a powerful tool - pag 24 Elie Kedourie (1961). Nationalism. Hutchinson, London.

Ernest Gellner (2008). Nations and Nationalism. Cornell University Press.

3 Farnsworth, S., y Lichter, R. S. (2005): “The struggle over shaping the news”. In Graber, D. A. (Ed.).

(2011): Media power in politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

4 Stephen van Evara (1994). Hypotheses on Nationalism and War. International Security, 5(39).

5 Ernst Bernard Haas (1993). Nationalism: an instrumental social Construction. Millennium-Journal of International Studies, 22(3).

6 Daniel Treisman (2014). Putin's popularity since 2010: why did support for the Kremlin plunge, then stabilize? Post-Soviet Affairs, 30(5).

7 Author Unknown. The Kremlin, Moscow. Source: http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889 1 2

Roebelcrisis: Poetin's eigen schuld? - pag 30 Groot Koerkamp (2 december 2014). Crisissfeer sluimert in Rusland. Financieel Dagblad (http:// fd.nl/economie-politiek/975508/crisissfeer-sluimert-in-rusland) 2 Interfax (16 december 2014). Putin named man of the year in Russia for the fifteenth time in a row, Путин в пятнадцатый раз подряд назван человеком года в России. Verkregen via http://www.interfax.ru/russia/413336 3 Auteur onbekend (20 december 2014). Going over the edge: A deep recession is now a certainty for Russia in 2015. Things could get much worse. The Economist (http://www.economist.com/ node/21636720) 4 zie 3: 5 V. Putin, news conference of Vladimir Putin. Verkregen via http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23406 6 Parfitt, T. (4 december 2014). Russians turn to humour over painful meltdown of rouble. The Telegraph.

7 Robert, T. (1980). Communism and Russia. Foreign Affairs, 58(5) 8 Shiraev, E. (2010). Russian Government and Politics. New York: Palgrave MacMillan 9 Shiraev, E. (2010). Russian Government and Politics. New York: Palgrave MacMillan; WCIOM 1

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(2008e), Poll of September 4. Verkregen via http://wciom.ru 10 Auteur onbekend (27 januari 2015). S&P downgrade ‘groundlessly pessimistic’ – Russian finance minister. Verkregen via http://rt.com/business/226539-rating-downgrade-finance-minister 11 rt.com, 30 januari 2015. Zoekresultaten ‘crisis + ruble’. Verkregen via http://rt.com/search/news/ term/crisis+ruble/ 12 pravda.ru, sectie ‘Russia’. Verkregen via http://english.pravda.ru/russia/ 13 Krasnoboka, N. (datum onbekend). Media landscapes: Russia. European Journalism Centre (EJC).

14 White, A. (datum onbekend). Partial Justice: An Inquiry into the Deaths of Journalists of Russia,1993-2009. International Federation of Journalists, London.

15 Rose, R. (2007). Going Public with Private Opinions: Are Post-Communist Citizens Afraid to Say What They Think? Journal of Election, Public Opinion and Parties, 17(2), pp. 123-142 16 Levada-center (13 januari 2015). Protest Activity. Verkregen via http://www.levada.ru/eng/protestactivity 17 Levada-center (23 december 2014). 68% of Russian citizens consider Russia a superpower.

Boobs on the ground - pag 32 Lent, Michele, and Lauren Wolfe. "Democratic Republic of Congo." Women Under Siege Project.

February 8, 2012. Accessed February 9, 2015. http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/ profile/democratic-republic-of-congo.

2 <no author name given>, Dabiq 4, p. 15, October 2014.

3 Kumar, Deepa. "War propaganda and the (ab)uses of women", p. 297. Feminist Media Studies Vol. 4, No. 3, 2004. http://comminfo.rutgers.edu/~dkumar/Articles/lynch.pdf 4&6 Fox, Jo. "Women In World War One Propaganda." British Library. Accessed February 9, 2015. http://www.bl.uk/world-war-one/articles/women-in-world-war-one-propaganda 5 Paramore, Lynn Stuart. "The Strange Complex Story of Women and ISIS Militants." Alternet. September 10, 2014. Accessed February 9, 2015. http://www.alternet.org/gender/strange-complex-storywomen-and-isis-militants 7&9 Men and Woman of the Truman Project, "An Open Letter to Fox News About 'Boobs on the Ground'." Talking Points Memo. September 27, 2014. Accessed February 9, 2015. http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/an-open-letter-to-fox-news 8 Fernandez, Belen. "Maryam al-Mansouri in Imperial Context." The Middle-East Eye. 1 October 2014.

Accessed February 9, 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/maryam-al-mansouri-imperialcontext-1994529684 1

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JASON MAGAZINE Volgende keer Het julinummer van JASON Magazine is gewijd aan het thema:

Angst

▼ Indiase speciale terreureenheden.

Bron: wikipedia

De Italiaanse maffia en de rol van il▪legale immigranten in Europa.

▪ Pakistaans terrorisme in India

Bron: Contando Estrelas

▲ Indiase speciale terreureenheden.

Bron: wikipedia

▲ Obama (president VS) met Netanyahu (premier Israel) Bron: wikipedia

Wat is stichting JASON? Stichting JASON is in 1975 opgericht door een aantal jongeren met als doel om te informeren over internationale vredes- en veiligheidsvraagstukken.

De afkorting JASON staat voor Jong Atlantisch Samenwerkings Orgaan Nederland.

In de beginjaren van JASON lag het accent vooral op vredes- en veiligheidsvraagstukken binnen de transatlantische betrekkingen. Gaandeweg 42

▪ Israel en Iran: de nucleaire dreiging De angst van medici om in conflictge▪bieden te werken

verbreedde JASON haar aandachtsveld, mede in aansluiting op internationale gebeurtenissen, haar aandachtsveld tot het gehele spectrum van internationale betrekkingen en veiligheidskwesties.

JASON is daarbij niet gebonden aan enige politieke partij en heeft geen levensbeschouwelijke grondslag.

JASON informeert op twee manieren.

In de eerste plaats door de uitgifte van dit magazine, dat drie à vier keer per jaar verschijnt. In elk nummer wordt getracht een gevarieerd overzicht te

geven van relevante en actuele onderwerpen binnen het brede spectrum van internationale vredes- en veiligheidsvraagstukken.

Ten tweede informeert JASON door het organiseren van tal van activiteiten, zoals conferenties, debatten, lezingen en excursies. Stichting JASON heeft geen leden, het magazine is gratis verkrijgbaar voor iedereen en alle geïnteresseerden zijn van harte welkom om aan onze activiteiten deel te nemen.

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Mededelingen Ontvang gratis JASON Magazine!

JASON Magazine is gratis verkrijgbaar voor studenten, young professionals en andere geïnteresseerden. Om u kosteloos te abonneren, geef uw naam, (post)adres en e-mailadres door aan redactie@stichtingjason.nl of via het contactformulier op onze website (www.stichtingjason.nl/contact/).

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Stichting JASON kondigt zijn activiteiten aan via de activiteitenkalender in JASON Magazine, via zijn Facebookpagina (JASON Institute), website (www.stichtingjason. nl/activiteiten/) en een tweeweekse nieuwsbrief. U kunt zich voor onze nieuwsbrief aanmelden via het contactformulier op onze website (www.stichtingjason.nl/contact/).

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& Activiteiten Aankomende JASON activiteiten - begin april: lezing transatlantische relaties met als thema: Trans-Atlantic Cooperation from a Dutch perspective - april: bezoek aan de landmacht - midden mei: lezing omtrent Libië, met aandacht voor interventie Italië, opkomst van ISIS en humanitaire interventies - mei: Boat Tour tijdens de Marine Dagen Houdt voor actuele informatie stichtingjason.nl in de gaten, of onze facebookpagina (facebook.com/StichtingJASON).

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▲ Stichting JASON op een van de voorgaande Marine Dagen.

Bron: Stichting Jason

Stichting JASON online Facebook: JASON Institute Twitter: @stichtingjason Website: www.stichtingjason.nl JASON Magazine online Het huidige en voorgaande nummers van JASON Magazine zijn online terug te vinden op www.stichtingjason.nl/ magazine. Het huidige nummer is online in kleur verkrijgbaar.

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