JASON Magazine 39-3

*EINDE VAN SIBERIË

*LIBIA

*NORTHERN IRELAND

*GEORGIA

Separatisme /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůĞ ǀƌĞĚĞƐͲ ĞŶ ǀĞŝůŝŐŚĞŝĚƐǀƌĂĂŐƐƚƵŬŬĞŶ Ƈ ũĂĂƌŐĂŶŐ ϯϵ Ƈ ŶƵŵŵĞƌ ϯ Ƈ 2014

JAS N MAGAZINE

SEPARATISME Inhoud JASON Magazine is het kwartaalblad van stichting JASON Hoofd-­ en eindredactie Kevin Klerx, Natalia Kadenko en Ivo Roodbergen Redactie Alba I. León, Enitsa Gabrovska Gijs Kist, Iñigo Alexander, Ivo Roodbergen, Maaike Kooijman, Quint Hoekstra, Rigtje Jeeninga, Karlijn Arts, Dana Cohen en Raphaela Kormoll

Inhoud 4 8

Vormgeving Lilian Timmers, Yoram Otten en Senta Bemelman Dagelijks Bestuur Voorzitter – Michiel Blomaard Vicevoorzitter – Erik Koning Secretaris – Werner Kiel Penningmeester – Jason Halbgewachs Hoofdredacteur – Natalia Kadenko Activiteitencoördinator – Yasmin Zahed Public Relations – Hester Torn Algemeen Bestuur Dr. Bart Beltman, Dr. Francoise de Companjen, Kolonel b.d. Marco Hekkens, Drs. Simon Minks, Drs. Pim van der Putten, Mw. Marjolein de Ridder MA, Mw. Elsa Schrier MA, Dr. Niels van Willigen en Kapitein-­ter-­zee mr. Niels Woudstra Raad van Advies Voorzitter – Dr. W.F. van Eekelen Prof. dr. J.Th.J. van den Berg Prof. dr. H. de Haan Luitenant-­kolonel b.d. prof. M. de Haas Prof. drs. V. Halberstadt Generaal-­majoor b.d. mr. drs. C. Homan Drs. D. Leurdijk R.W. Meines R.D. Praaning Mw. drs. L.F.M. Sprangers Prof. dr. A. van Staden Drs. L. Wecke Adres Studentencentrum Plexus t.n.v. stichting JASON, Kaiserstraat 25, 2311 GN Leiden Telefoon: 071-­527 7972 E-­mail: info@stichtingjason.nl Website: www.stichtingjason.nl

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Beste Lezer,

Het eind van Siberië?

Werner Kiel

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The Battle over Nagorno-­Kara-­ bakh Dana Cohen

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back Iñigo Alexander

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Libië: de afwezige staat Christiaan Duinmaijer

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Is Taiwan struggling for inde-­ pendence Raphaela Kormoll

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+RZ WKH ÀJKW IRU LQGHSHQGHQFH became the clash of religions Karlijn Arts Column: Responsibility to protect Leon Wecke

Understanding Georgia Quint Hoekstra

African Refugees in Israel Dana Cohen

A short story on separatism-­ building in Ukraine Natalia Kadenko

Vrijheidsstrijders, of guerrilla’s, zijn termen die vaak gebruikt worden als het gaat om separatistisch geweld. De eerste term klinkt wat positiever dan de tweede, maar beiden komen op hetzelfde neer. Vaak betreft het een groep mensen die als gemeenschappelijke doelstelling hebben een bepaald gebied onafhankelijk te maken van de natie waar het tot dan toe toebehoort.

Separatisten hebben gezorgd voor grote conflicten in het verleden. Denk maar aan de Algerijnse vrijheidsbeweging in de jaren ’60 die een bloedige oorlog voerde met haar voormalige kolonisator Frankrijk. Of meer recent de strijd in voormalig Joegoslavië waar de verschillende volkeren vochten voor hun eigen grondgebied en hun vrijheid.

In de huidige maatschappij hebben we te maken met tal van separatistische bewegingen, vaak gewelddadig van aard, kijk naar de pro-Russische beweging in Oekraïne.

Maar ook de huidige ontwikkelingen in Irak en Syrië hebben te maken met een dergelijke beweging, beter bekend als Islamitische Staat. Of wat dacht u van de FARC die al decennia strijdt in Colombia?

Uiteraard hoeft separatisme niet gewelddadig te zijn. Zo probeerden de Schotten met een referendum hun eigen natie te krijgen, iets wat ze uiteindelijk niet lukten, maar wel een motivatie voor de Catalanen, die ook streven naar onafhankelijkheid.

In dit JASON-nummer zullen we beide vormen van separatisme tegenkomen. Siberië, waar door middel van onder andere migratie een vorm van separatisme ontstaat, en Libië, waar geweld en separatisme de laatste jaren hand in hand gaan. Maar ook artikelen over Nagorno-Karabakh, Zuid-Soedan, Noord-Ierland en Georgië. Kortom, een JASON-magazine met voldoende afwisseling.

Ik wens u veel leesplezier met dit nummer.

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ISSN 0165-­8336 Stichting JASON noch de redactie van JASON Magazine is verantwoordelijk voor de in de bijdragen weergegeven meningen Drukkerij Noordhoek, Aalsmeer

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Voorwoord

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Kevin Klerx Interim-hoofdredacteur JASON magazine

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SEPARATISME Siberië en separatisme

Het einde van Siberië?

In zijn satirische roman Het Suikerkremlin schetst de postmo-­ derne Russische schrijver Vladimir Sorokin een ontluisterend en dystopisch beeld van het Rusland van 2028: een primitieve, neo-­feodale samenleving, het Kremlin wordt bewoond door een Keizer die met harde hand regeert; een grote muur be-­ schermt het land tegen eventuele indringers en de Russische taal is doordrongen van Chinese woorden. Fictie en voer voor doemdenkers, of een toekomstschets waarin toch enige reali-­ teitszin schuilt? Wie de toekomst van Rusland wil kennen moet naar China kijken, zo menen sommigen. Ÿ De Chinese stad Heihe ligt aan de zuidelijke oever van de rivier de Amoer die Rusland van China scheidt. Aan de noordelijke oever vinden we de Russische stad Blagoveshchensk, waar de Russische overheid onlangs een triomfboog met het opschrift “de grond langs de rivier de Amoer zal altijd Russisch zijn” plaatste.1 Het schrille contrast tussen het leeglopende Siberie en de economische groei van China is hier goed zichtbaar. Bron: paulnoll

WERNER KIEL

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erwijl alle ogen zijn gericht op de ‘crisis’ in het oosten van de Oekraïne, ontwikkelt zich in Ruslands verre achterland – het gebied dat zich uitstrekt van het immense Baikalmeer tot de Beringstraat- een geleidelijke en onzichtbare, maar niet minder bedreigende tragedie.

Tenminste, als we de waarnemers in Moskou moeten geloven. Het dunbevolkte Siberië dat we vooral kennen van Stalins Goelag-kampen, de eindeloze toendra en de onuitputtelijke reserves van grondstoffen en mineralen wordt bedreigd door de (illegale) instroom van Chinese immigranten en vooral, door een sociale en economische crisis. Bovendien wordt de Russische bevolkingskrimp die de strategen in het Kremlin Rusland al tijden hoofdpijn bezorgt, in deze regio het sterkst gevoeld. De Wit-Russische president Aleksander Loekasjenko legde de vinger op een gevoelige plaats toen hij in zijn reactie op de onrust in Oost-Oekraïne zei dat Rusland “eerst zijn eigen problemen moet oplossen alvorens naar het buitenland te gaan.” 1 De leiders in het

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Kremlin zijn zich duidelijk bewust van de gevaren van het op de loer liggende separatisme in bepaalde delen van het land, en namen in mei 2014 nog een wet aan die hoge straffen oplegt voor elke uitlating die ook maar enigszins riekt naar separatisme. 2 Hoe kan Rusland een onmetelijke landmassa

Vandaag de dag loopt Siberië leeg terwijl de metro-­ polen lonken als Siberië, waar praktisch niemand wil wonen, binnen de invloedssfeer houden?

Crisis en leegloop De voornaamste interne factor die de Siberische (autonome) republieken vatbaar maakt voor separatisme is de bevolkingskrimp die overal in Rusland hoog is, maar juist hier hoger dan Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

gemiddeld en extra sterk gevoeld wordt.

In tegenstelling tot de opstandige republieken op de Noordelijke Kaukasus zoals Tsjetsjenië en Ingoesjetië, of de republieken Tatarstan en Basjkirostan die een sterke regionale identiteit hebben en een grote mate van regionale automie in het bestuur genieten, kan het uitgestrekte oostelijke achterland niet simpelweg worden samengehouden door decentralisatie en extra financiële middelen vanuit Moskou. Vandaag de dag loopt Siberië letterlijk leeg, terwijl de metropolen Moskou en Sint-Petersburg lonken. In de Sovjettijd wist men arbeiders naar de Siberische vlakten te lokken door er steden te bouwen waar het leven volledig om een bepaalde industrie draaide. Magnitogorsk is het ultieme voorbeeld van zo’n volledig geplande stad die uit het niets werd opgetrokken rond een ijzer- en staalfabriek onder Stalins vijfjarenplannen. 3 Toen de Sovjet-Unie aan haar einde was gekomen, kwamen deze fabrieken onder het wildwest-kapitalisme van de woelige jaren ’90 voor een habbekrats in handen van slimme oligarchen. Een

groot deel van de industrie bleek niet rendabel te zijn en niet opgewassen tegen buitenlandse concurrentie. De fabrieken sloten hun deuren, het leven in de Siberische steden stierf uit en het grootste gedeelte van de bevolking trok er weg. Toen Vladimir Poetin na de eeuwwisseling de veelal dronken president Boris Jeltsin opvolgde, kende het land voor het eerst op zijn minst weer stabiliteit. Poetin had een verleden bij de Russische veiligheidsdiensten en een elite van zogenoemde silovoki – politici uit de militaire- en veiligheidsdiensten, vormde het centrum van het centralistische politieke systeem dat hij opbouwde. Om alle regio’s onder deze ‘machtsverticaal’ van het Kremlin te krijgen werden onder andere twee oorlogen gevochten in Tsjetsjenië. Poetin wist de onrustige Kaukasische republiek, tenminste voorlopig, weer onder de controle van Moskou te krijgen door er de Kremlin-marionet Ramzan Kadyrov te installeren en er aanzienlijke financiële hulp heen te sturen. Voor Siberië, echter, is een ander soort strategie noodzakelijk die de structurele econo-

mische en sociale crisis in het gebied aanpakt. En hoewel de (veelal Chinese) immigratie enerzijds een bedreiging vormt, kan Siberië tegelijkertijd niet zonder buitenlandse werkkrachten.

De belangrijkste bedreiging is de groeiende eco-­ nomische en po-­ litieke macht van China Externe bedreigingen Zoals Dimitri Trenin in zijn scherpe analyse uitlegt, wordt Ruslands ‘post-imperiale’ status bedreigd van drie kanten door drie beschavingen bedreigd: in het Westen door Europa, in het zuiden door de Islamieten en in het oosten door de Chinezen.4 De Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

belangrijkste bedreiging van buitenaf is ongetwijfeld de groeiende economische en politieke macht van China in de regio, door de Russen ook wel de yellow threat genoemd. De meer dan 4000 kilometer lange grens die Rusland en China scheidt is poreus en onmogelijk hermetisch af te sluiten. Gezien het geringe aantal Russen in de zuidelijke regio’s van het Verre Oosten (zo’n 5 miljoen) en het relatief grote aantal Chinezen in Noord-Oost China (104 miljoen), kan een relatief kleine instroom van 4 á 5 miljoen Chinezen in Rusland reeds serieuze gevolgen hebben voor de etnische balans in de regio.5 Het is onduidelijk of de grote instroom van Chinese immigranten toeval is, of het gevolg van een doelbewust beleid dat China hier zou kunnen voeren om op de lange termijn voordeel te halen uit de situatie.6 In het uiterste geval zou dit de annexatie van Siberië door China kunnen betekenen.

Gedurende de afgelopen driehonderd jaar is de Russisch-Chinese grens verscheidene malen opgeschoven in het voordeel van Rusland, en aan het einde 5

JAS N MAGAZINE

SEPARATISME Siberië en separatisme van de 19e eeuw bezetten Russische troepen delen van Mantsjoerije om de groeiende invloed van Japan in de regio tegen te gaan.7 Strategisch gelegen eilanden in de rivierstromen van de Amoer, Argoen en Oessoeri rivieren waren lange tijd onderwerp van een bevroren grensconflict tussen Rusland en China. Dit conflict werd lange tijd genegeerd zodat samenwerking op het gebied van bijvoorbeeld wapenhandel kon doorgaan. Aan de Russische zijde leefde echter de angst dat China de regio zou destabiliseren middels migra-

Wat nationale identiteit betreft tast men na twin-­ tig jaar nog steeds in het duister tie en corruptie teneinde de gebieden waarop het aanspraak maakte weer onder controle te krijgen.

In 2004 koos Poetin eieren voor zijn geld en werd een grensverdrag gesloten waarbij de geclaimde gebieden eerlijk werden verdeeld.8 Hiermee zette Poetin de deur open voor nauwere banden met China. Na de Russische annexatie van de Krim in maart 2014 kan Rusland een alternatieve handelspartner en afzetmarkt meer dan goed gebruiken.

Chinese immigratie in Siberië blijft des-

alniettemin doorgaan, en daarmee blijft vooral onder Russische waarnemers nog steeds de angst dat Siberië uiteindelijk een aanhangsel zal worden van China of misschien zelfs wordt geannexeerd.

Betrouwbare cijfers van het aantal Chinezen dat zich op dit moment in Rusland bevindt zijn er niet, maar als we de geruchten moeten geloven gaat het om miljoenen. Moskou en Beijing zijn het er in ieder geval over eens dat het er minstens 500.000 zijn.9 Aangezien er nauwelijks Russen zijn die in de Siberische provincies willen wonen en werken, en Rusland überhaupt met een bevolkingstekort kampt, kan deze bedreiging enkel worden tegengegaan door een migratiebeleid te voeren waarbij de regio niet verder verchineest maar een meer diverse stroom immigranten aantrekt zoals Vietnamezen, Indiërs en andere bevolkingsgroepen uit de regio.

Verchinezing van de regio zou immers tot separatisme zou kunnen leiden.

Andere specialisten, onder wie Ben Judah, schrijver van het gewaardeerde werk Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love With Vladimir Putin,troffen tijdens hun reizen door Ruslands verre oosten een situatie aan die geenszins strookt met de werkelijkheid die specialisten in Moskou en Beijing schetsen: in de provincies Chabarovsk en Birobidzjan – een provincie die ooit het thuisland van de joodse gemeenschap in de Sovjet-Unie had moeten worden – trof hij alleen op het platteland her en daar wat Aziatische boeren aan die liefst zo snel mogelijk

Ż Enkele eilanden in de rivierstromen van de Amoer en de Oessoeri waren lange tijd onderwerp van een slepend grensconflict tussen de voormalige Sovjet-­Unie/Rusland en China.

Bron: The Economist

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Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

weer terug naar hun thuisland zouden gaan.10 Opvallend is dat hij er, in plaats van de verwachte massa’s Chinezen, juist veel grotere groepen immigranten uit de Kaukasus en Centraal-Azië aantrof.

Een ander mogelijk en niet onwaarschijnlijk scenario is dat de autonome regio’s in het oosten niet voor onafhankelijkheid, maar voor oncontroleerbaarheid zullen kiezen.11 Men kampt er met een sociale en economische crisis, een bevolkingskrimp die hoger is dan het reeds hoge gemiddelde in Rusland en de banden met Europees Rusland zijn er alles behalve nauw. Oncontroleerbaarheid door Moskou stelt de regio’s in staat om te concurreren voor de hoogste subsidies uit Moskou. Men weet dat Moskou bereid is te betalen voor stabiliteit, aangezien de regering ook grote sommen geld betaalt aan bijvoorbeeld het bewind van Ramzan Kadyrov in Tsjetsjenie. Separatisme in het verre oosten door toedoen van buitenlandse invloeden is eigenlijk alleen denkbaar in het geval van de republiek Boerjatië, waar de boeddhistische inheemse bevolking nauw verwant is aan de Mongolen. de geschiedenis van Siberië kent echter slechts één geval van een poging tot separatisme: de volksrepubliek Toeva - ingeklemd tussen het Baikalmeer en Mongolië - verklaarde zich in 1921 tijdens de burgeroorlog onafhankelijk en het zou nog tot 1944 duren voordat Stalin erin slaagde de republiek bij de Sovjet-Unie in te lijven.12 Nationale identiteit De kwestie Siberië legt tevens de vinger op een andere pijnlijke plek: het ontbreken van een nieuwe ideologie en de problematische herdefinitie van het ‘Russisch zijn’ na het uiteenvallen van de Sovjet-Unie. Wat nationale identiteit betreft tast men na twintig jaar nog steeds in het duister. Pogingen tot het ontwikkelen van een nieuwe staatsideologie leidden tot weinig meer dan enkele abstracte theorieën waar men in praktijk weinig mee kon. Alleen het zogenoemde ‘Eurazisme,’ dat in de jaren ’90 nieuw leven werd ingeblazen, leek enige invloed te hebben op het nieuwe beleid. Volgens deze conservatieve filosofie, van wie Aleksander Doegin ongetwijfeld de meest controversiële vertegenwoordiger is, is Rusland een absolute tegenpool van het trans-Atlantische Westen (de Verenigde Staten in het bijzonder) waarmee het onvermijdelijk in conflict zal komen. Rusland moet zien te overleven door expansie en slimme allianties met Duitsland, Iran en India. Wellicht hadden Kremlinideologen als Vladislav Soerkov dit in

Ż Gaspijpleiding bij de Russisch-­ Chinese grens. Kort nadat de V.S. en EU verschillende malen sancties afkondigden tegen Rusland, sloot het staatsbedrijf Gasprom een omvangrijke gasdeal met China.

Bron: Paulnoll

het achterhoofd bij de oorlogen die in 2008 werden gevoerd in Abchazië en Zuid-Ossetië en de annexatie van de Krim in maart van dit jaar.

Over de Russische identiteit zeggen de Eurazisten het volgende: Rusland is een unieke beschaving tussen Europa en Azië in, en moet zijn eigen ‘derde pad’ volgen. Ten aanzien van Europa zullen de Russen, bijna in letterlijke zin, altijd ‘Slaven’ zijn, maar ten aanzien van de Aziaten zijn de Russen een ontwikkelde, vooruitstrevende natie. In praktijk, echter, zien we dat Russen vooral het Europese gedeelte van hun identiteit benadrukken. Aangezien het grootste gedeelte van het land geografisch gezien in Azië ligt, zou men er dus beter aan doen zich op ‘interne expansie’ richting Siberië te concentreren. Volgens de Slavofielen is de Russische nationale spirituele cultuur onmogelijk zonder de heilige Siberische grond, dus het is zaak voor de autoriteiten in Moskou om deze regio te koesteren.13 Te meer omdat buitenlandse expansie, welke altijd een belangrijke rol heeft gespeeld in de geschiedenis van Rusland, binnen de huidige internationale politieke orde praktisch onmogelijk is geworden.

Conclusie De bedreiging van Siberië is serieus, maar het lot van de regio is daarmee geenszins beslecht. Rusland zal een einde moeten maken aan de isolatie van de regio door sterke banden met

Europees Rusland te creëren. Immigratie vormt een reële bedreiging, maar als men de regio economisch wil laten heropleven kan men hier tegelijkertijd niet zonder. Belangrijk is dat de immigratiestroom gediversifieerd wordt.

Een veel serieuzere bedreiging dan deze (illegale) migratiestromen, echter, vormen de zwakte van de Russische staat en de sociale en economische crisis in de regio.14 Net als in de rest van Rusland zal het systeem grondig hervormd moeten worden: effectievere wetgeving, onafhankelijke rechtspraak en een transparant social-economisch systeem zijn onontbeerlijk als men het gebied onder controle wil houden.15 Wat de Siberische provincies betreft is het vijf voor twaalf, en de leiders in het Kremlin zouden er verstandig aan doen zich op deze interne aangelegenheid te concentreren in plaats van geobsedeerd met het buitenlandbeleid bezig te zijn.

SUMMARY

The author emphasizes that immi-­ gration of Asian people (mainly from China) to Siberia can lead to a threat for this region. Russia has to revise his economic policy to revive this region.

However, the weakness of the Russian state and the social and economical crisis in this area is a much bigger threat. Russia has to change its system to keep control over Siberia and to make it for vivid.

Werner Kiel was voor JASON nauw betrokken bij de organisatie van de conferentie ‘Russia and the Netherlands in International Peace and Security Relations’ die op 6 en 7 juni 2013 plaatsvond in het Vredespaleis. Werner studeerde Liberal Arts & Sciences en Ruslandkunde aan de Universiteit Leiden, leerde Russisch in Sint-Petersburg en Moskou en was enige tijd als stagiair verbonden aan de Nederlandse ambassade in Bakoe, Azerbeidzjan.

Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

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JAS N MAGAZINE

SEPARATISME The Battle over Nagorno-­Karabakh

The  Battle  over  Nagorno-­�Karabakh 7KH YLROHQW FRQà LFW EHWZHHQ $]HUEDLMDQLV DQG $UPHQLDQV LQ WKH mountainous Nagorno-­Karabakh region has been the dead-­ OLHVW RI &DXFDVXV FRQà LFWV DQG LQGHSHQGHQFH ZDUV 6R IDU WKH ÀJKWLQJ KDV FRVW FDVXDOWLHV DQG KDV PDGH RYHU RQH PLO-­ OLRQ SHRSOH UHIXJHH $OWKRXJK D FHDVHÀUH KDV EHHQ LQ HIIHFW since 1994, sporadic episodes of violence continue to erupt and claim fatalities. Karabakh-­Armenian forces are still occu-­ pying Nagorno-­Karabakh and seven surrounding districts. Alt-­ hough the region only comprises 4400 square kilometers and has a population of merely 140,000, a spectacular 20,000 sol-­ diers are stationed there.1 As one of the most heavily militarized zones in Europe and surrounded by Caucasian instability, there is a serious risk of war breaking out again in the near future.

DANA COHEN

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his article will first give some background information about the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and then address international law regarding the legal status of the region. The article will explore Azerbaijanis’ and Armenians’ respective collective identities to explain the main security concerns of both groups. Lastly, it will focus on past peace negotiations and conclude how the situation should be approached.

Background The Karabakh region has hosted many ethnic groups and minorities, who historically lived in peaceful coexistence.

For the larger part of modern history the area has been reined by the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian Empires.

From 1822 until nearly a century later, Nagorno-Karabakh was ruled by the Russians. During this period, Azerbaijani and Armenian nationalism grew and with it resentment towards the other. Violent attacks were still scarce,

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Ÿ The Azerbaijani city of Khudaferin which was ethnically cleansed and destroyed by Armenian forces Source:Adam Jones, 8 Juni 2012

but frequently occurred when Russian power weakened.

Clashes in which between 3,000 and 10,000 people were killed broke out in 1905, coinciding with the first Russian Revolution. In 1917, the Russian empire underwent two revolutions and withdrew its power from the region.

The power vacuum left behind led Azerbaijani and Armenian parties to fight for control. In March 1918, or Bloody March, between 10,000 and 15,000 people, mostly Azerbaijanis, got killed in clashes in Baku. Armenia soon took control over Armenian-dominated provinces in Russia and began to expel Azerbaijanis and Turks.2 In May 1918 the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia were formed; Azerbaijan claimed Nagorno-Karabakh, granting it autonomous status. The Karabakh-Armenians initially agreed, but the Armenian government rejected it and installed a puppet government. 3 War between Armenia and Azerbaijan – and between Armenia and Turkey Stichting  JASON   4  Nr.  39  4 Nummer  3

– broke out. Consequently, Armenia committed acts of ethnic cleansing and thousands of Azerbaijanis and Turks living in Armenia were killed.4 In 1920 the USSR officially took over Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Although over 90 percent of the population was now Armenian – a direct result of mass expulsions – the USSR granted it to the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic on 5 July 1921. Speculations abound that Stalin purposefully arranged this, knowing very well it would result in lasting disagreements between Azerbaijanis and Armenians and thereby securing Russia’s powerful position.5 During Soviet times, Armenia repeatedly requested Moscow to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian sovereignty.6 Although small bouts of violence between Karabakh-Armenians and Azerbaijanis occurred, the situation remained relatively calm until February 1988. Anti-Azerbaijani clashes and ethnically-motivated murders took place in Yerevan, causing many Azer-

baijanis to flee Armenia. The situation escalated when two Azerbaijani youth were killed near Nagorno-Karabakh. In turn, Azerbaijanis started to kill Armenians in Sumgait in front of policemen.

At least 26 Armenians were killed and hundreds more injured.7 The next year Nagorno-Karabakh held unauthorized elections and a majority voted for independence, but Moscow placed the region under Azerbaijani jurisdiction again. Nevertheless, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh maintained it belonged to the Armenian SSR. Shortly after the fall of the USSR, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic declared national independence. In response, Azerbaijan started to expel and murder Armenian citizens, settling Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia in their place.

In 1992 full-pledged war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

On February 25, 613 Azerbaijanis (mostly women, children and elderly) were tortured, raped and executed in Khojali. Armenian and Karabakh-Ar-

menian troops won control over most of Nagorno-Karabakh and occupied Azerbaijani-majority regions. While fleeing the approaching Armenians, hundreds of Azerbaijani civilians died in the mountains.8 On May 12, 1994, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia.

Armenian-Karabakh forces, however, are still occupying Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts. Nowadays almost no Azerbaijanis live in the area, which is de facto outside of Azerbaijani control.9 The status of Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan claims its territory is occupied by Armenia. Although unwilling to give Nagorno-Karabakh up, Baku agrees to grant the territory a maximum of autonomous power. The Karabakh-Armenians themselves claim independence on the basis of the right to self-determination of peoples. Meanwhile, Armenia states it merely supports the Karabakh-Armenians’ right of Stichting  JASON   4  Nr.  39  4 Nummer  3

secession but is not actually involved in the conflict. All signs, however, point to the contrary. Armenia is in clear breach of both the prohibition on the use of force and the prohibition against intervention. The latter includes anything from arms supplies and financial support to incitement “intended to lead to overthrowing power relationships�.

Armenian funding makes up between fifty and ninety percent of NagornoKarabakh’s entire budget. They are in fact so heavily dependent on Armenia that some are speaking of a ‘de facto annexation’.10 The international community (including the United Nations, The Council of Europe and the OSCE) holds that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan and Armenian-Karabakh forces are occupying it illegally. There are some11 who claim the international community is tainted by opportunistic motives.

The United States, Europe and Russia have personal interests in Azerbaijan not only because it borders both Russia 9

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SEPARATISME The Battle over Nagorno-­Karabakh and Iran, but also due to its prosperity in crude oils and its pipeline structure.12 Dr Heiko Krüger, a German attorney at law, commentator on international and European legal affairs and Caucasus secession expert, argues that the internationally held perspective is right nevertheless. In his book ‘The NagornoKarabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis’, he gives a highly detailed analysis of the contemporary situation according to international law. His most important points will be summarized below.

Under the principle of uti possidetis, Azerbaijan can only call on the principle of territorial integrity if NagornoKarabakh was completely under Azerbaijani jurisdiction before the formation of the Republic of Azerbaijan.13 This was indeed the case, the deciding factor being the 5 July 1921 decision by the Caucasian Bureau to grant Azerbaijan sovereignty. NagornoKarabakh could thus only successfully secede during Soviet times if Soviet Law allowed this. However, unilaterally transferring territory from the Azerbaijani to the Armenian SSR was in direct contradiction with Article 78 of the USSR Constitution, which emphasized that territorial alterations could only be implemented with approval of the republic in question.14 Today, Nagorno-Karabakh’s only legal option for independence is international law, which is rarely in favor of secessionism. Although minorities should be granted equality and political participation, they are not by default entitled to independence. The principle of territorial integrity to which Azer-

baijan hails thus takes precedence over the right to self-determination of ethnic minorities.15 Armenian identity Until their independence in 1918, Armenians were historically a nation without a land. Nevertheless, the Armenian identity, built on a shared language and religion, was strong enough to prevent assimilation into the many host countries. Armenian identity revolves

During soviet times Armenia repea-­ tedly reque-­ sted moscow to transfer Nagoro-­ Karabakh around – and is strengthened by – the many tragedies it has encountered and the fear of future prosecutions, leading to a self-perception as a ‘nation of martyrs’. Armenians have faced multiple massacres and deportations, including the 1894-96 massacres that saw between 80,000 and 300,000 Armenians killed by Ottoman, Kurdish and Turkish militias and the Armenian genocide of 1915-16 in which over 1 million were killed. The Armenian narrative speaks of a “thousand years struggle” against the Turks. Since the 20th century, the stereotype of the

Ÿ Vank, a village in Nagorno-­Karabakh Source: Okokokokdido on Wikipedia, 1 Januari 2005

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‘historical enemy’ has grown to include Azerbaijanis.16 Although during Soviet times violence was scarce, Karabakh-Armenians felt discriminated against by the Azerbaijani majority. The only way to save their cultural heritage and identity was by parting from Azerbaijan and reuniting with Armenia. In reality, inequality only happened in the symbolic domain, for instance by not teaching Armenian in schools. Moreover, Karabakh-Armenians felt disadvantaged economically when comparing themselves to Armenians in Armenia. In truth, NagornoKarabakh was one of the richest provinces in Azerbaijan. As often in ethnic conflict, “the actual level of grievance is of less importance than the vision of perceived gain.”17 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic situation worsened, crime and corruption reached all-time highs, and ethnic minorities’ anxieties exacerbated. This counted double for Armenians, for whom Russia was a ‘great protector’ who defended Armenia against their hostile Muslim environment. This, in combination with the fresh memory of the 1988 Sumgait pogrom, motivated Karabakh-Armenians and Armenians to mobilize militarily.18 Azerbaijani identity Like Armenia, Azerbaijan gained independence for the first time in 1918.

Unlike Armenia, however, Azerbaijan – its name only originating from the late nineteenth century – had never been a unified concept. To unite the different ethnic populations, Azerbaijan continues to focus on identity building in its policies, which are therefore heavily based on ethnicity. A top unifying factor is language, which has bonded all Turkic people. In addition, Turkish troops helped Azerbaijan fight against Armenian militias. Since Azerbaijan’s independence in 1992, Turkey has supported Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, albeit merely diplomatically. They also share a common goal in limiting Russia’s power in the region.19 A large part of the Azerbaijani narrative is based on fear and distrust of the other side. What the 1915 genocide did for Armenian nationalism, Bloody March did for Azerbaijani nationalism.

Many independence movements in Azerbaijan took on an anti-Armenian emphasis, and people were radicalized

by Armenian atrocities.20 In addition to the Armenians, Azerbaijanis also tend to distrust the Russians. In early Soviet times, the Azerbaijani-Russian relationship was relatively good and Azerbaijani society become more unified as

Ż Map of Nagorno-­ Karabakh and its surroundings.

Source:Caricato da Vacio op Wikipedia. org

differences dissolved. In time, however, many felt the Russians were supporting Armenia over them. The population radicalized in their nationalism, and became increasingly pro-Turkey and pro-America, anti-Armenia and antiRussia.21 Negotiations Many resolutions have been made regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, calling for a withdrawal of snipers, an end to the Armenian occupation and a return to peace negotiations.22 Although the OSCE Minsk Group has mediated negotiations since 1992, the process is currently at a stalemate. The parties cannot agree on each other’s preconditions. Nagorno-Karabakh, for instance, immediately rejects any proposal in which their final status is not the first priority.23 In combination with ongoing ceasefire violations and threats from Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev that Baku will ultimately resort to a military operation if Armenian forces do not leave its territory, renewed widespread violence is not unlikely.

A major problem is that both parties feel threatened and are therefore unlikely to compromise. Armenians feel unsafe being surrounded by Azerbaijanis and Turks, although this is based more on previous experiences than on the current reality. Turkish-

Russian relations are very good, and Turkey would not undermine them by attacking Armenia. In fact, AzerbaijaniTurkish relations have suffered due to Turkey’s lack of willingness to intervene militarily. In addition, Armenia and Russia signed a defense agreement in 1997, guaranteeing Russia’s help in face of Azerbaijani aggression.24 Azerbaijanis feel threatened, not to a small degree because of their military defeats. With twenty percent of its territory under occupation and military pacts being made between Armenia and Russia, Azerbaijan feels more isolated than ever. In addition, they fear giving up NagornoKarabakh will lead to the disintegration of the entire country.25 To balance out Russia’s massive influence, the involvement of American and European organizations is of great importance for the peace negotiations.

Both Azerbaijanis and Armenians need to feel they can trust the third parties.

Western organizations headed by Christian-majority countries are favorable to Armenians, who often emphasize their distrust of Muslim countries. Azerbaijan has never fully trusted Russia and feels disappointed in Turkey. However, it has a strong pro-American and proWestern sentiment. Organizations such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the UN General Assembly should therefore remain Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

involved in the process.

Attempts should be made to demilitarize Nagorno-Karabakh, the border areas, and the seven occupied districts as much as possible. Since neither the Azerbaijanis nor the Armenians are likely to just withdraw their troops, a possibility of UN personnel taking their place should be explored. This way the territories can be secured while the risk of war remains at a minimum.

Furthermore, stronger pressure should be exerted on Armenia to stop violating international law by supporting the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. All proposals should go hand-in-hand with a guarantee that the rights of all ethnic minorities will be closely supervised even long after an eventual treaty.

Resolving this deeply intractable conflict remains a challenge, but that should not deter us from trying. Stability in Nagorno-Karabakh will not only benefit Armenians and Azerbaijanis but the whole region. It should not be forgotten that violent conflicts tend to have a spill-over effect. As Professor Stephen Blank delicately puts, “What happens in the Caucasus does not stay in the Caucasus.” 26 Dana Cohen is a graduate of the University of Utrecht, where she studied Gender Studies during her BA and Conflict Studies and Human Rights during her MA. 11

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SEPARATISME South Sudan: struggling for peace

One step forward, two steps back South Soudan South Sudan is the world’s youngest country, and also one of the most troubled ones. In July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan obtained the inde-­ pendence it had longed for decades. Unfortuna-­ tely the country is currently facing a terrible famine and a civil war, and is distancing the republic from achieving the ambitions it had once the dream of independence became reality. The combina-­ tion of both ethnic tensions and the friction over the division of oil revenues have lead South Sudan to another African civil war, and has led many to wonder if history is going to repeat itself. Is South Sudan the new Rwanda?

IÑIGO ALEXANDER

Ż Statue of John Garang, the founder of the SPLM. Source: Amy the Nurse

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Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

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SEPARATISME South Sudan: struggling for peace

W

hen looking at Sudan’s past, it is challenging to find a period where the country is at peace. The ethnic, cultural, and religious differences between the North and the South are the primary roots of the numerous conflicts. The North is predominantly Muslim, while the South is mostly Christian, and there are also over two hundred ethnic groups in South Sudan alone, each with their own languages and cultures1, of which the Dinka and the Nuer are the largest. In the late 1970s, a new factor came into play: oil. The discovery of oil in the South of Sudan filled the Sudanese population with views of a brighter future, as they hoped to follow the steps of the oil-rich Arab countries and enrich their economy, as well as their standard of living2. However, the South soon saw their hopes go up in smoke, as the North of the country proved to be the beneficiary of the exploitation of oil, as it was where the oil refineries were based 2. This sparked the country’s

The discovery of oil in the South of 6XGDQ ÀOOHG WKH population with the view of a brighter future Second Civil War, which lasted over twenty years and resulted in the death and displacement of millions3. In 2005, and end was put to the Civil War as both the central Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) agreed to the terms of a peace treaty4.

In contrast to the civil war from above, the war South Sudan is facing right now originates not so much from the issue of the division of oil. More important, as I will show in this article, is the stubbornness of the leaders of the country that made the friction that already existed due to the unfair division of oil revenues even worse. When, thereafter, the international community looked the other way around when fighting erupted, the clash of interest grew and developed in a situation that lead people to draw similarities between the South Sudanese Civil War and the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

Boycott: where it all began 14

In 2011, a nationwide referendum was held to determine the future of the South of Sudan. Ninety nine percent of the population voted for the country’s independence, making it the world’s youngest country5. South Sudan appointed Salva Kiir, a Dinka politician, as their president and Riek Machar, a Nuer, became the country’s Vice-President. The formation of South Sudan as an independent state raised questions about the distribution of revenues from the exploitation of oil, as South Sudan is home to seventy five percent of former Sudan’s oil reserves6.

However, it was not the debate over the distribution of oil revenues that lead to civil war. In December 2013, Machar and some fellow politicians boycotted a meeting7. The boycott was not well taken by President Kiir. This, in turn, lead to a dispute between officers of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement following orders from Kiir8. Dinka and Nuer soldiers decided to take matters into their own hands, and fighting erupted. The situation quickly got out of hand and resulted on attacks on Nuer civilians in the capital city of Juba on the Dinka soldiers’ behalf 8 Almost unwillingly, the politicians who were meant to lead the country to a brighter future had lead South Sudan straight into a downwards spiral.

Both Kiir and Machar’s stubbornness in their ways only made the friction that already existed due to the unfair division of oil revenues worse. President Kiir felt that the best course of action to take following the fighing in Juba was to accuse Machar of an attempted coup5. However, the amount of truth behind Kiir’s statements is questionable. Machar himself has since denied Kiir’s accusations and, furthermore, believes that President Kiir intentionally created the conflict out of fear of losing his Presidency9. Kiir has had trouble in guiding South Sudan to accomplish its hopeful dreams of development. South Sudan has failed to make the progress its population hoped to see. So much so, a year after independence, President Kiir announced in an open letter to government officials that an estimated four billion dollar worth of public funds had been looted5. This is, understandably, a very large loss for the country and heavily delayed South Sudan’s hopes for economic development. Yet, the loss of funds is not the only factor standing in the way of South Sudan’s development. The revenue made from the country’s oil fields accounts for 98 percent of South Sudan’s budget5. 38 percent of which is invested directly into the country’s military and security Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

Ż Rebel leader Riek Machar at his field office in rebel controlled territory.

Source: REUTERS/ Goran Tomasevic

sectors, with just ten percent being aimed at the country’s infrastructure and a mere seven percent for education5.

Similarities with the Rwandan genocide As tends to be the case, the USA has also been present in South Sudan’s movement towards independence.

The United States heavily backed the creation of South Sudan as an independent state5. Unsurprisingly, the USA was focused on the economic potential of South Sudan, due to its vast oil reserves, and not as concerned with the political consequences of independence; Machar himself was trained by the US Special Forces prior to taking up a life in politics9. Even though the USA has donated billions of dollars’ worth of aid to South Sudan in recent years5, their support of the independence movement has backfired on them. The USA is no longer the dominant presence in the South Sudanese oil sector, as it has been replaced by China5, who’s presence in Africa is ever increasing. On top of

The loyalty of the VROGLHUV ÀJKWLQJ both on Kiir and Machar’s behalf is questionable losing control of the South Sudanese oil industry, the Americans have seen their hopes of the establishment of a new, stable, and promising African nation crumble within a few years.

Kiir seems to be suffering of lust for power, and has shown his authoritarianism at times by strengthening his control over the military and has even delved into press censorship5. Machar, on the other hand, has accused Kiir of wanting to establish a dictatorship9 and believes the current president must be ousted in order for South Sudan to return to a sound democracy. The

numerous conflicts between Nuers and Dinkas have lead people to draw similarities between the South Sudanese Civil War and the Rwandan genocide of 1994. It could be argued that South Sudan is undergoing a so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’, as Rwanda previously suffered beforehand5. The combination of both ethnic tensions and the friction over the division of oil revenues have lead South Sudan to civil war, and has led many to wonder if history is going to repeat itself.

The civil war the country is suffering from is not pushing the country in the right direction, and is distancing South Sudan from achieving the ambitions it had once the dream of independence became reality. The increasing violence and clashes between Dinka and Nuer forces is only creating more instability and division between the two tribes, who were previously able to coexist happily5. The days of peaceful coexistence between the two tribes seem long forgotten as a clear division can be seen Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

between the two fighting factions. The SPLA has been divided between those loyal to Kiir’s government and the rebels who support Machar. However the loyalty of the soldiers fighting both on Kiir and Machar’s behalf is questionable. The majority of the soldiers are merely civilians who do not fully understand the situation they are in. Even though both Machar’s so called ‘White Army’, and Kiir’s troops essentially subsist on violence and plunder; many soldiers simply join in the fighting in the way they believe will best suit their survival and ensure the survival of their family members9. Both Kiir and Machar’s SPLA troops fight over control of the northern areas of the country, where the oil fields are located as well as the White Nile, and thus the connection to the capital city of Juba9. Currently, both Kiir and Machar seem to be convinced that war is the only way to solve the conflict. This is likely to be due to the fact that they both want to see the other out of South Sudan’s 15

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SEPARATISME South Sudan: struggling for peace

Libië en federalisme

Libië: de afwezige staat

Ÿ A South Sudanese government troops alter retaking Bentiu, a provincial capital, from rebel forces. Source: AP

political scope as soon as possible.

Clash of interest leads to political division However, what does this civil war, and its possible outcomes and consequences, mean for South Sudan and the international field?

Uganda is the only country that is openly supporting Kiir and has, on occasions, donated troops to Kiir’s forces.

Worldwide attention has been focused on other international conflicts. The World’s big powers have chosen to invest their time and attention elsewhere, perhaps they see this as a speed bump in South Sudan’s route to independence. Since its independence, South Sudan has taken one step forward and two, very large, steps back. The potential that South Sudan’s independence had was not taken advantage of by the governing body. Kiir and his government did not act fast enough in order to set South Sudan on the track to economic development, and moreover, Kiir soon grew too comfortable in his new post as President of a newly independent country and saw it as a chance to adjust the country to his liking. However his vice-President, Machar, also aimed to remold South Sudan to his liking. This clash of interests proved to be deadly, and the first of the two backwards steps. A country as vulnerable as South Sudan was following its independence cannot afford to start its route to prosperity on such a feeble political base.

The second of South Sudan’s two backwards steps was the boycott that spar16

ked the civil war and the consequent massacre in Juba. This step was a clear consequence of the first. By December 2013, the differences Machar and Kiir had were too vast and were not likely to improve, even for the benefit of the country they fought so hard for. Instead of acting accordingly and finding a

The world's big powers have chosen to invest their time and attention elsewhere compromise, Machar felt it was more sensible to further increase the differences with Kiir and thus boycott a meeting. Yet, Machar’s plan back-fired on him when President Kiir seized the opportunity to emphasize his presence through the use of the military faction of his party. At this point, there was no turning back for South Sudan, the political division had been made clear, which meant that the development that was hoped for would be put on hold.

The political division would give way to a much more important division: the cultural division between the Dinkas and Nuers. This proved to be the last piece of the puzzle of South Sudan’s downfall.

Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

Troubled path or a dead end?

The first years following a country’s independence are never easy. Yet few, if any, expected the situation in South Sudan to deteriorate to such an extent.

Kiir’s, and to some extent Machar’s, greed for power made South Sudan’s path from independence a slippery slope. The country’s quick political collapse increased South Sudan’s vulnerability and now the country is battling a dangerous famine as well as a civil war, and the question regarding the division of oil revenues remains unanswered.

South Sudan seems to have blindly walked straight into what they hoped to avoid.

It is crucial for a new born country to take its initial steps with confidence and determination, in order to implement a solid base for a prosperous government to flourish.

However, South Sudan is struggling to find its footing in the years following its independence. The combination of a famine and a civil war are likely to take some terrible, long lasting consequences. Who knows if a newer, younger country will be the product of South Sudan’s troublesome independence?

Iñigo Alexander is a student of International Studies at Leiden University and his area of expertise is Latin America. He is originally from Madrid and his interests include 20th century history, international relations and political developments.

Ÿ Libische rebel bidt met granaat in de hand tijdens burgeroorlog in 2011. Bron: Nasser Nouri

0HW GH GRRG YDQ 0R·DPPDU *DGGDÀ OLMNW KHW FHQWUDOH JH]DJ LQ /LELs YHU-­ dwenen te zijn en lijkt het land het speelveld zijn geworden van botsende regionale en lokale belangen en machthebbers. De Libische regering staat machteloos tegenover milities die oliefaciliteiten bezetten, en eigen gene-­ raals die tegen de Islamitische milities in Benghazi en de ‘Islamisten’ in de Libische regering in Tripoli in opstand komen, terwijl politici zich drukker ma-­ ken over hun eigen belangen dan over de heropbouw van Libië. Heeft Libië als staat nog wel een kans om voort te bestaan of zal het land uiteenvallen in verschillende regio’s?

CHRISTIAAN DUINMAIJER

Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

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SEPARATISME Libië en federalisme

L

ibië werd pas in de 19e eeuw weer als geografische term in het Arabisch gebruikt.1 Daarvoor zag men Libië als drie aparte gebieden: Tripolitania in het noordwesten, Cyrenaica in het oosten en Fezzan in het zuidwesten. Deze gebieden lagen aan de grens van de verschillende koninkrijken, emiraten en kalifaten rondom de Middellandse zee en werden bestuurd door lokale stammen die zich fel verzetten tegen inlijving door buitenlandse heersers.

Hierbij werd Tripolitania bestuurd vanuit de stad Tripoli, terwijl Cyrenaica bevolkt werd door rondtrekkende bedoeïenenstammen. Pas midden van de 19e eeuw probeerden de Ottomanen een soort centraal gezag te vestigen in de verschillende provincies, die in naam vanaf de 16e eeuw tot het Ottomaanse Rijk behoorden maar feitelijk onafhankelijk waren. In 1858 wisten de Ottomanen het laatste verzet in Tripolitania te breken, terwijl zij hun gezag in Cyrenaica wisten te vestigen door samen te werken met de Sanoessiyya.2 Deze moslimbroederschap werd midden 19e eeuw gesticht door Mohammed ben Ali al-Sanoessi (1787-1859) en droeg een mystieke vorm van Islam uit. De

broederschap wist een soort overkoepelend gezag te vestigen over de stammen in Cyrenaica en verschillende delen van Centraal Afrika.

Aan het begin van de 20e eeuw werd de macht van de Sanoessiyya en zijn

Pas midden van de 19e eeuw probeerden de Ottomanen een centraal gezag te vestigen beschermheer, de Ottomaanse kalief, bedreigd door het oprukkende kolonialisme in Afrika en het Midden-Oosten.

Zo voerde de Sanoessiyya strijd tegen de Fransen in Tsjaad (1901-13) en de Engelsen in Egypte (1915), maar hun belangrijkste strijd was die tegen de Italianen in Libië. In 1911 dwongen de Italianen het Ottomaanse Rijk zijn

claim op de Libische provincies op te geven en werden deze verenigd in de Italiaanse kolonie Libië.3 Hierop riep de leider van de Sanoessiyya, Ahmed Sharif (1873-1933), de heilige oorlog uit tegen de Italianen en claimde Cyrenaica en Fezzan als zijn grondgebied. Vanuit Jebel Nafoesa in het westen organiseerden Arabische en Berberstammen hun eigen strijd tegen de Italianen. Hoewel de opstandelingen erin slaagden om in 1918 de onafhankelijke Tripolitiaanse Republiek uit te roepen, werd de opstand ondergraven door de voortdurende onderlinge rivaliteit en strijd tussen de verschillende Arabische en Berberse stammenleiders.4 Daarom besloten de rebellen in 1922 het gezag over Tripolitania aan de leider van de Sanoessiyya aan te bieden in de hoop om samen een verenigd front tegen de Italianen te kunnen vormen. De strijders van de Sanoessiyya wisten namelijk de Italianen keer op keer te verslaan vanuit hun bolwerk in de Jebel Akhdar in Cyrenaica onder leiding van de charismatische Koran leraar Omar Moekhtar (18581931).5 Pas toen de Italianen onder leiding van Benito Mussolini overgingen op massa-executie en –deportatie van de lokale bedoeïenenbevolking, wisten

Ÿ Protest tegen federalisme in Tripoli: “Geen oosten, geen westen, Libië is een staat”. Bron: Magharebia

18

Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

zij het verzet te breken. Moekhtar werd in 1931 door de Italianen gevangen genomen en geëxecuteerd, terwijl zij een jaar eerder in Fezzan laatste resten van het bedoeïenenleger uit Jebel Nafoesa hadden verslagen. Hiermee was het inheemse verzet tegen de Italiaanse kolonisator definitief gebroken.

Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog boog de Verenigde Naties zich over de vraag wat te doen met de voormalige Italiaanse kolonie Libië.6 Dat het een onafhankelijk land zou worden, was duidelijk.

De vorm nog niet. De stammen uit Cyrenaica en Fezzan pleitten enthousiast voor een federalistisch emiraat onder leiding van de Sanoessiyya-leider Amir Idris, maar de door Arabisch nationalisme geïnspireerde middenklasse uit Tripolitania prefereerde een unitaire republiek. Amir Idris wist de discussie in zijn voordeel te forceren door in 1949 met Britse steun het Emiraat van Cyrenaica uit te roepen. Het emiraat kreeg internationaal weinig steun, maar deze stap zorgde er wel voor dat in 1951 Libië een onafhankelijke, op federale leest geschoeide staat werd onder leiding van koning Amir Idris. De rivaliteit tussen Tripolitania en Cyrenaica maakten het bestuur van het land zeer lastig (te beginnen met het feit dat de Libische hoofdstad alterneerde tussen Tripoli en Benghazi). Dit leidde uiteindelijk tot de afschaffing van de federale structuur in 1963. Maar dat was niet het enige probleem waarmee Libië kampte. Hoewel het arme land sinds 1959 een van de grootste olieproducenten in de wereld was geworden, profiteerden alleen de koning en een kleine elite om hem hen van de olie-inkomsten. Dit leidde tot grote onvrede onder de bevolking wat resulteerde in de coup van de Vrije Officieren in 1969 onder leiding van de 27-jarige Mo’ammar Gaddafi en uitroepen van de Libische republiek.

Panarabisme en fanatisme Vanuit huidig oogpunt is het verleidelijk om de coup door Gaddafi te omschrijven als een coup tegen de heersende elite uit Cyrenaica. Hoewel Gaddafi afkomstig was uit de buurt van Sirte in Tripolitania, waren hij en zijn mederebellen meer geïnspireerd door het panarabisme en socialisme van de Egyptische president Gamal Abdel Nasser dan door regionale belangen.6 Gaddafi ging zelfs zo ver hierin dat hij begin jaren ’70 Libië probeerde te verenigen met andere Arabische republieken (Egypte, Tunesië, Soedan, enz.). Deze pogingen mislukten en teleurgesteld formuleerde hij zijn eigen panarabische, socialistische en anti-imperialistische

Ÿ Ahmed al-­Sanoessi bij uitreiking Sakharov Prijs voor Vrijheid van Meningsuiting.

Bron: Europees Parlement

theorie, waarin hij ook Islam en het bedoeïenleven verheerlijkte. Op basis van deze Derde Universele Theorie werd Libië in 1976 omgevormd tot een staat van de massa’s (Ar.: Djamahiriyya) bestuurd door volkscomités.

De steeds radicalere staatshervormingen van Gaddafi en bijbehorende terreur gecombineerd met internationale sancties ontwrichtte de Libische samenleving en zorgde voor de opkomst van gewapende oppositiegroepen die Gaddafi probeerden omver te werpen.7 Eerst in de jaren ’80 seculiere oppositiegroepen en later in de jaren ’90 Islamitische gewapende groeperingen. Een van de belangrijkste groepen was de Libische Islamitische Strijdgroep die tussen 1995 en 1998 de rebellie tegen Gaddafi in Cyrenaica leidde en verschillende aanslagen op hem pleegde.

Gaddafi wist de opstand uiteindelijk te bedwingen door de rebellen letterlijk uit de Jebel Akhdar te bombarderen, waar ze zich naar voorbeeld van Omar Moekhtar hadden verscholen. De opstand bewees in de ogen van Gaddafi dat de bevolking van Cyrenaica niet te vertrouwen was, hoewel de leiders van de groep, zoals Abdel Hakim Belhadj, uit de buurt van Tripoli kwamen. Gaddafi begon door de groeiende oppositie meer en meer steun te zoeken bij bevriende stammen om zijn greep op Libië veilig te stellen.8 Want ondanks de radicale hervormingen van Gaddafi Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

was de stam altijd een centraal onderdeel van de Libische identiteit gebleven, zelfs onder de groeiende urbane bevolking.

Heerschappij der milities De structurele achterstelling van Cyrenaica door Gaddafi maakte het gebied tot een broeinest van onrust en het is niet verwonderlijk dat op 17 februari 2011 de bevolking in opstand kwam tegen Gaddafi. Geïnspireerd door de succesvolle volksopstanden in de buurlanden van Libië verklaarden de steden als Misrata en Zintan zich solidair met de rebellen in Benghazi.9 Midden augustus hadden de door de rebellen gevormde milities Tripoli ingenomen en een maand later werd Gaddafi gevangen genomen en standrechtelijk geëxecuteerd.

Hoewel de rebellen als snel een eigen regering, de Nationale Overgangsraad, hadden opgericht, lag de feitelijk macht vanaf het begin van de opstand in de handen van de milities. Zo werd het hoofd van het Libische rebellenleger, generaal Abdel Fatah Younis, in 2011 door Islamitische militieleden geëxecuteerd en weigerden milities Gaddafi’s lijk en zijn gevangen genomen zoon aan de Nationale Overgangsraad over te dragen.

Na het einde van de burgeroorlog stak het federalisme weer de kop op wegens de voortdurende onveiligheid en chaos in het land. Op 1 juni 2012 (de 64e 19

JAS N MAGAZINE

SEPARATISME LibiÍ en federalisme verjaardag van het Emiraat van Cyrenaica) riepen stamoudsten en lokale politici uit Cyrenaica de autonomie van Cyrenaica (waartoe men ook het gebied tot de stad Sirte rekende) uit en richtten een Overgangsraad van Cyrenaica op onder leiding van Ahmed Zoebair al-Sanoessi, lid van de Nationale Overgangsraad en familielid van de laatste Libische koning.10 De Overgangsraad van Cyrenaica eiste een eigen regering, parlement en politiemacht, waarbij alleen defensie, olie en buitenlands beleid door de landelijke regering in Tripoli zouden worden geregeld. De Nationale Overgangsraad veroordeelde de autonomieverklaring als aantasting van de nationale eenheid, maar boden wel decentralisatie aan als alternatief voor autonomie. Dit standpunt kon op steun rekenen van een deel van de Libische bevolking, met name in Tripolitania, en de nieuw opgerichte Libische politieke partijen. Opmerkelijk genoeg stonden de verkiezingen van de 200 leden van het nieuwe Libische parlement in juli 2012 volledig in teken van regionalisme: Tripolitania mocht 100 parlementariÍrs leveren, Cyrenaica 60 en Fezzan 40.11 Ook de Constitutionele Raad, die de nieuwe Libische grondwet zou moeten opstellen, zou op regionale basis worden samengesteld: 20 vertegenwoordigers uit elk van de drie regio’s.

De verkiezingen leverden een weinig slagvaar-­ dig en verdeeld parlement op De verkiezingen leverden helaas een weinig slagvaardig en verdeeld parlement op, waarin de Islamisten onder leiding van de Libische Moslimbroederschap continue overhoop lagen met meer liberale groeperingen in het parlement.12 Daarbij kwamen geruchten over oliesmokkel en misbruik van overheidsgeld door de Islamisten om hun eigen milities te versterken in plaats deze in het Libische leger te integreren. Dit versterkte de roep om federalisme in Cyrenaica, maar ook in Fezzan. Ibrahim Jadran, de leider van de Oliebeschermingsmacht – een groep milities die verantwoordelijk was voor de bewaking van de voornamelijk in Cyrenaica gelegen Libische oliefaciliteiten en –havens – en het Politieke 20

Op dit punt zal de in februari 2014 verkozen Constitutionele Raad de zware taak hebben om LibiĂŤ enigszins bij elkaar te houden door alle groepen in de Libische samenleving een plaats te geven in de nieuwe Libische grondwet.

Of dit hen zal lukken, blijft een grote vraag mede doordat de Constitutionele Raad feitelijk onvolledig is. Dertien van de zestig leden ontbreken, omdat door aanslagen geen verkiezingen konden worden gehouden in Derna en Berbers de Constitutionele Raad boycotten omdat zij zich met twee afgevaardigden onvoldoende vertegenwoordigd voelden als bevolkingsgroep.17 Ondanks alle goeie intenties van de Constitutionele Raad om een grondwet voor alle LibiĂŤrs te schrijven, is het de vraag of hun grondwetvoorstel door alle LibiĂŤrs zal worden geaccepteerd of juist zal leiden tot verdere onderlinge verdeeldheid.

Ÿ Graffiti met oude koningsvlag en de tekst “LibiĂŤ is ĂŠĂŠn stamâ€?. Bron: Ben Sutherland

Christiaan Duinmaijer is afgestudeerd in Arabische taal en cultuur aan Universiteit Leiden. Tijdens zijn studie heeft hij een jaar aan het Nederlands-Vlaams Instituut in Cairo (NVIC) gestudeerd en zijn master deels aan het Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO) in Parijs gevolgd. Hij is actief betrokken bij het Nederlandse Gezelschap van Internationale Zaken (NGIZ) en Commissie Internationale Politiek van VVD Den Haag en heeft een weblog, Din wa Dawla, over de politiek in het Midden-Oosten.

SUMMARY

Ÿ Inwoners van Tripoli eisen vertrek van milities in november 2013. Bron: Magharebia

Bureau van Cyrenaica, legde vanwege de vermeende corruptie in juli 2013 bijna de gehele Libische olieproductie stil.13 In de maanden daarna richtte hij een eigen leger (Beschermingsmacht van Cyrenaica) van 15-20.000 militieleden, een eigen regering en een eigen oliebedrijf op om olie uit de door hem bezette oliefaciliteiten buiten de regering in Tripoli en staatsoliebedrijf te verkopen. De door Jadran opgerichte Regering van Cyrenaica staat los van de eerder opgerichte Overgangsraad van Cyrenaica. De Libische premier Ali Zeidan reageerde op de acties van Jadran met het dreigement om de bezette oliefaciliteiten en –havens met geweld te ontzetten en elk schip met illegale olie te bombarderen.14 Helaas kon ZeiStichting  JASON   4  Nr.  39  4 Nummer  3

dan zijn dreigementen niet waarmaken, waarna hij in maart 2014 door het parlement werd afgezet. Dit was het teken van aan de Islamisten in het parlement verbonden milities om Jadran’s milities aan te vallen, maar zij wisten deze slechts uit Sirte te verdrijven voordat de nieuwe premier, Abdoellah al-Thinni, een akkoord met Jadran wist te sluiten.

Helaas kostte dit akkoord de nieuwe premier de kop en moest hij na een controversiĂŤle stemming in het parlement aftreden.15 Dit werd door Jadran uitgelegd als een staatsgreep door de Islamisten, maar uiteindelijk pakte niet hij, maar generaal Khalifa al-Hafter, de wapens op tegen de Islamisten. Op 16 mei startte al-Hafter een ongeau-

Ÿ Abd Rabbo al-­Barasi, premier van de Regering van Cyrenaica, na mislukte moordaanslag op hem. Bron: Magharebia

toriseerde, maar onder de Libische bevolking populaire militaire operatie in en rondom Benghazi om LibiĂŤ te bevrijden van de Islamisten en hun milities, die hij beschuldigde van het vermoorden van militairen.16 Hierbij koos het merendeel van het Libische leger zijn kant en vielen Berbermilities uit Jebel Nafoesa om hem te helpen het parlement in Tripoli aan. Het parlement moest hulp van bevriende milities uit Misrata om de aanvallers terug te drijven. Op het moment van schrijven is al-Thinni inmiddels door de Libische Hoge Raad in zijn positie als premier hersteld (en daarmee ook het akkoord met Jadran), maar woedt de strijd tussen Islamitische milities en het Libische leger nog onverminderd door.

Een staat?

Door hun recente gemeenschappelijke geschiedenis lijken LibiÍrs zich alleen te verenigen bij een gemeenschappelijke vijand, zoals Italiaanse kolonisatoren begin vorige eeuw en Mo’ammar Gaddafi in 2011. Zonder gemeenschappelijke vijand lijkt de Libische eenheid als woestijnzand uiteen te vallen in regio’s, stammen, Berbers en Arabieren, Islamisten en niet-Islamisten, federalisten en aanhangers van de eenheidsstaat. Dit is na 2011 verergerd door een machteloze en disfunctionele centrale overheid en proliferatie van ongecontroleerde milities. Zolang dit niet verandert, zal LibiÍ als staat steeds verder desintegreren.

Stichting  JASON   4  Nr.  39  4 Nummer  3

The author describes the regional dynamism of three provinces of Libya (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan) and how they became one country in the 20th century. The federalist system was abandoned in 1963 and was later UHSODFHG E\ *DGGDÀ E\ PRUH SDQ-­ arabist and tribal ideals. After the re-­ YROXWLRQ DJDLQVW *DGGDÀ LQ FDOOV for more autonomy multiplied in Cy-­ renaica and Fezzan due to the poor security situation in the country and the corruption and incompetence of the central government. This lead to clashes between federalists and the central government, while the gover-­ nment itself is torn between Islamic and more secular political factions and militias. The author concludes that the recently elected Constituent $VVHPEO\ ZLOO KDYH D GLIÀFXOW WDVN WR give all regions and factions present in Libya a proper and acceptable place in the new constitution.

21

JAS N MAGAZINE

SEPARATISME Protest in Taiwan

Is Taiwan struggling for independence?

KMT legislator Chang Ching-chung announced that the review process had gone beyond the 90 days allotted for the process and that the agreement should therefore be submitted for a final vote.

According to Cole, “the sudden announcement caught everybody by surprise and sparked anger among the public”. This led to a sit-in outside the Legislature Yuan of hundreds of

end only hours later. After a dialogue between President Ma and representatives of the student protests had failed, the riot police carried out the eviction of protesters armed with batons and water cannons. Between 110 and 137 students and police officers were injured and about 61 arrested. According to Cheng, such a violent confrontation is rare in Taiwan and marks a split between anti-government militants and a main group seeking dialogue with

The current round of student protests revi-­ ved Taiwan’s indepen-­ dence movement from China, which puts the complicated relations-­ hip between mainland and island to the test, thereby providing a se-­ curity risk to the region.

the protest seems to be about the possible econo-­ mic and demo-­ cratic implications tion to discuss important matters, thereby cutting through the bureaucracy.5 Zhang Zhijun’s visit to Taiwan sparked renewed protest amongst the population. This suggests that the Sunflower Student Movement is not only about the economic and democratic implications of the CSSTA, but also – and maybe more importantly - about cross-state relations between mainland China and Taiwan. In the remainder of this article I will explore this relationship more closely and place this current round of protest in the context of the Taiwan question.

RAPHAELA KORMOLL

T

he occupation of the Legislative Yuan, later also the Executive Yuan, between March 18 and April 10 2014 made the headlines for over a month as hundreds were arrested and injured during protests. The so-called Sunflower Student Movement, a coalition of students and other civic groups, represents one of the first violent confrontations in Taiwan since the 1990s. It was triggered by the discussion of a CrossStrait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) between the Republic of China (ROC; Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China (PRC; China). Protesters feared that passing the CSSTA would hurt Taiwan’s economy, negatively affect its democracy and leave the country vulnerable to political pressure from Beijing.

This article puts the current confrontation in the context of Taiwan’s struggle for independence. It argues that the Sunflower Student Movement should be seen as a continuation of the struggle between China and Taiwan on authority over the ROC. Seen as such, the protest not only poses a threat to national security but also challenges the regional and international communities.

22

contact between mainland and island were reassumed. On June 25, for the first time after the Chinese Civil War, a minister of the Chinese mainland was allowed to openly set foot in Taiwan.4 Zhang Zhijun, director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, visited the island as part of the 2014 Wang-Zhang Meeting in the hope to warm the people for closer ties with mainland China. Zhang Zhijun and Wang Yu-chi, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Minister, agreed to establish direct communica-

Ÿ Ma Ying-­jeou: President of the Republic of China -­ Taiwan (2008-­present) and Chairman of the Kuomintang party (2009-­present). Source: Any timeline

The Sunflower Student Movement In June 2013 mainland China and Taiwan signed the CSSTA. It is a follow-on to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed in 2010 and aims at liberalising trade in the service sector. In particular, the treaty would have made investment in service industries like banking, healthcare, tourism, telecommunication, etc. possible. Furthermore, it would have made it easier to set up offices and branches in the other territories and allocate indefinitely renewable visas to businessmen.1 The CSSTA received strong criticism Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

for its potential negative impact on smaller local businesses. Yet, it quickly becomes evident that a lack of transparency in the process of setting up the agreement caused the protests.

The leadership of Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang Party (KMT) pushed for immediate ratification of the treaty, leading to closed-door negotiations. This alerted protesters who compelled the KMT to agree to a clause-by-clause review of the treaty and public hearings.

Although the KMT agreed on June 25, 2013, it procrastinated the review process until March 2014. On March 17,

Ÿ Impressions of the Sunflower Student Movement 2014. Source: KUKUYO

students, academics, civic organisations and others and the occupation of the parliament house by about 300 protesters on March 18. Protesters vowed to occupy the legislature until the scheduled vote for the CSSTA on March 21 unless the review process would be reinstated.2 The so-called ‘Sunflower Student Movement’, which derived its name from the gift of sunflowers to the protesters, hit another peak on March 23 with the temporary occupation of the Executive Yuan by around 200 students. The latter found a bloody

President Ma.3 The occupation of the Executive Yuan was followed by big rallies of pro- and anti-protest groups and ended on April 10 with the vacation of the Legislature Yuan. This was the response to an announcement made by Legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng on April 6, who promised to postpone the review of the CSSTA until legislation for monitoring all cross-strait agreements will have been passed. On June 9, Woody Duh, Taiwan’s economic vice-minister, confirmed that negotiations over the agreement had been frozen.

It was not until the end of June that Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

Understanding the protest At first sight the protest seems to be about the possible economic and democratic implications of the CSSTA for Taiwan.

It has been widely argued that the CSSTA would hurt the Taiwanese economy. Yet, a closer look suggests that this is mainly the fear of smaller local businesses, whereas larger companies support the CSSTA because they see opportunities for their own development, which would probably benefit the Taiwanese economy as a whole. Joe Hhung highlighted that ‘even topnotch macroeconomists can only make an educated guess as to how it would affect the Taiwanese economy.

But their guess is that by and large it would benefit Taiwan’. He criticizes the student protesters for being ‘too young to understand the complicated effect of the trade agreement’.6 Yet, he fails to recognize that the group of protesters is 23

JAS N MAGAZINE

SEPARATISME Protest in Taiwan Ż Taiwanese Student Movement supporters in Los Angeles, California.

Source: Flickr

not only made up of students, but also academics and other civil groups.

A further argument put forward by the protesters is that the agreement would have negative effects for democracy in Taiwan. This can be observed at the national level but also in cross-state relations with China. The Taiwanese democracy is impaired through governance with authoritarian tendencies and a lack of transparency in crossstrait deals, so Cole. 7 This becomes evident when looking at the ratification process of the CSSTA, as President MA Ying-jeou sought to compel the Kuomintang (KMT) to ratify the CSSTA in March 2014. This may suggest that President Ma seeks to prepare Taiwan for unification with China. Vice versa the US-based historian Yu Ying-shih warned that China was trying to undermine Taiwan’s democratic system through the CSSTA in order to prepare for unification.8 Having said this, the current protests could, if successful, mean a further democratisation of Taiwan, so Sui. According to Sui this could provide ‘additional safeguards to let the people, not any political party, decide the fate of the island’.9 Here an allusion to the Wild Lily Movement of 24

1990 becomes evident. The latter was a milestone in the democratization of Taiwan.10 While the Sunflower Student Movement can be seen as an important step in the democratization of Taiwan, the previous paragraph also highlighted it links to the so-called Taiwan question.

The latter revolves around whether 1) Taiwan should remain an effectively independent territory of the ROC, 2) become unified under the PRC, or 3) declare independence and seek international legitimacy and recognition as the Republic of Taiwan. This question is closely linked to the relationship between the PRC and the ROC, which I shall briefly outline, followed by an analysis of the Taiwan question in light of the current round of protests.

The Taiwan question Both, the ROC and the PRC have been engaged in a complicated relationship since 1945. Taiwan has been ruled by the ROC since 25 October 1945. The ROC is an independent political entity which also ruled mainland China until losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949.

The war represented an ideological Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

the Student Move-­ ment indicates that a large part of the Taiwanese population does not support the current line of the KMT’ split between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Kuomintang (KMT) and resulted in the creation of two de facto states: the Kuomintang-led Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan and the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) in mainland China.

Until the late 1980s, both governments of the ROC and the PRC adhered to the One-State policy. It stipulates that there is only one sovereign state encompassing mainland China and Taiwan.

Yet, disagreement about the legitimate government of this state characterised

and continues to best describe the relationship between PRC and ROC. While the PRC continues to hold on to the One-China principle and seeks to unify China under its leadership, the end of martial law in Taiwan in 1987 and the acceptance of multi-party democracy opened up further pathways for the Taiwan question, as represented by the Pan-Blue and the Pan-Green Coalitions. The Pan-Blue Coalition supports the status quo, yet, at the same time, favours Chinese nationalist identity and greater linkage with mainland China, while rejecting immediate reunification. It maintains close links with the Kuomintang, Taiwan’s ruling party which is in favour of unification.

Opposite are the Pan-Green Coalition and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which favour Taiwan’s independence. They reject unification, the ‘One China’ and the ‘One Country Two Systems’ principles and aim at formally establishing the Republic of Taiwan by replacing the ROC. Although the modern-day independence movement led by the Pan-Green Coalition became a viable force in the 1990s, many supporters argued that a formal declaration of independence is

unnecessary because the ROC is already independent from the mainland. The Democratic Progressive Party formalised this position in the ‘Resolution on Taiwan’s Future’ in 1999. It reads that ‘Taiwan is a sovereign independent country, not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China. This is both a historical fact and a reflection of the status quo. It is not only a condition indispensable to Taiwan's existence, but also a crucial element to the development of democratic political practices and the creation of economic miracles’.11 When Chan Shui-bian (DPP) won the elections in March 2000, he moderated the party’s stance on independence. He promised not to declare independence or change the state symbols if the PRC did not attack Taiwan. In 2007 the DPP sought approval for a new resolution asserting a separate Taiwanese identity, calling for a new constitution and advocating the use of the name ‘Taiwan’. Yet, the ‘normal country’ resolution failed to win the support of the congress.12 Moreover, the party lost the following presidential election in 2008 to the KMT and thus its influence on Taiwan’s independence. Since reassuming governance over Taiwan, the KMT leadership sought closer ties with the Chinese mainland as the earlier discussed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (2010) and the CrossStrait Service Trade Agreement (2013) demonstrate. However, the Student Movement indicates that a large part of the Taiwanese population does not support the current line of the KMT, suggesting that support for unification with China is also vanishing.

Indeed, the Taiwan Indicators Survey Research conducted in June 2014 showed that only 28 percent of the respondents (3.2 percent less than in October 2013) favour an alliance or unification with China, as opposed to 50.8 percent (7.2 percent more) who are against such an alliance. On the other hand, support for an independent country neither called PRC nor ROC declined.

32.6 percent (in contrast to 41.2 percent in April 2013) said that they would accept such an arrangement, whereas 50.1 percent (opposed to 31.5 percent) rejected the idea.13 This new low in support of a proposition for a newly named country may reflect the societies fear about further violent confrontations with the own police forces and its Chinese neighbour. This brings about further security concerns at the national and international levels.

Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

Security concerns The current protest shows that the population is no longer willing to quietly accept the authoritarian tendencies and the lack of transparency in the current Taiwanese government. This may raise concern about further societal upheaval against the regime, not only in form of peaceful protest but also in violent confrontations. This is worrisome in light of the crackdown on the protesters by the riot police during the occupation of the Executive Yuan, which received criticism at the national and international level. In a press release the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), said that it ‘seriously condemns the police violence that took place’. Sherrod Brown, US Senator and founding member of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, urged President Ma to ensure a non-violent, peaceful resolution. He said: ‘My thoughts are with Taiwanese students and other protesters expressing opposition to a proposed economic pact with China […]. The message to President Ma is that when you try to jam a trade agreement through, people will resist’.14 Further to the concerns raised at the national level, the protest should shake up the international community as an escalation of the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan could have far reaching consequences. China repeatedly expressed military threats against Taiwan in case the country declared independence. An escalation of the conflict could lead to the involvement of other countries, such as the United States or Japan, as history has shown. Therefore, keeping a close eye on the developments in Taiwan is advised, although I currently see no threat to the international community.

In conclusion it may be said that the Sunflower Student Movement can contribute to consolidating democracy in Taiwan, which in turn strengthens Taiwan’s position vis-à-vis China. For the future of Taiwan this may provide a further step towards a more independent nation.

Raphaela Kormoll graduated from the University of York (Bachelor) and Leiden University (Master) in International Relations. She is now taking up doctoral research at Durham University, where she focuses on the India-Pakistan conflict and reconciliation at the regional level.

Further to her interest and expertise in peace and conflict studies and (South) Asia, Raphaela is the co-founder and president of the MAIS Alumni Association Leiden University and works on career development.

25

JAS N MAGAZINE

SEPARATISME Northern Ireland and separatism

‘™ –Š‡ Ď?‹‰Š– ˆ‘” ‹Â?† ‡’‡Â?†‡Â?…‡ „‡…ƒÂ?‡ the  clash  of  religions Case:  Northern  Ireland

7KH FRQĂ LFWV LQ WKH 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG FDUU\ PRUH EXUGHQ WKDQ DQ outsider could ever imagine. Especially in the last decades of WKH WK WKH FRQĂ LFWV URVH LQWR D HQRUPRXV FODVK EHWZHHQ UHOL-­ gions. But why is there so much anger? Why are there tensions anyway? This article will try to answer these questions by give you a simplistic overview about the complex history of the dif-­ IHUHQW FRQĂ LFWV LQ WKH 1RUWK RI ,UHODQG 7KLV DUWLFOH ZLOO VWDUW IURP the scratch: the arrival of the people of England and Scotland in Ireland until the last period of warfare, also known as ‘the Troubles’.

KARLIJN ARTS

Q

ueen Elizabeth I conquered almost the whole island of Ireland by the time she passed away in the beginning of the 17th century,1 except for the northern part of Ireland, called the Ulster province.1 This area was in hands of the so-called ‘Ulster clans’, with Hugh O’Neill as a key figure. In the 1590’s he led a number of raids against the English in Ireland. After these raids he gained support of the Irishmen and his power grew in the Ulster province. He and the Ulster clans managed to defend Ulster for a long time. But in the long run O’Neill had to flee from Ireland and the British colonists confiscated the land anyhow.2 In the main time the British colonists, along with the people from Scotland and Wales, had already settled down in the towns located in the plantations of Ulster, were they drove the native Irishmen away. These colonists were especially attracted to the plantations of Ulster,

26

If you want to Ă€JKW DJDLQVW WKH IRA, you have to do it with muscles, not with brains therefore these people are called the ‘Planters’.

But besides the fact that the native Irishmen were driven away from their homes and therefore considering the Planters as intriguers, they also had another religion. The Irish were Catholic and almost all the newcomers were Protestant.3 These two factors contributed to a separation: from this moment on the Catholics (the Irish) lived in other areas than the newcomers, the Protestants. But although the groups lived mostly separated, the tension was still there. This even resulted in several Stichting  JASON   4  Nr.  39  4 Nummer  3

wars, like the Eleven Years War. This war started in 1641 by a group of Irish landowners. They attempted a coup d’Êtat through seizing some strongpoint’s around Ireland. After that they demanded ‘free practice of the Catholic religion, equal rights for Catholics to hold public office and an end to land confiscations’.4 The plot failed and many conspirators were turned in. Even after the Eleven Years War the positions of the Catholics hadn’t improved.

Public practice of this religion was still banned. People who did risked being executed. These punishments continued until the end of the 18th century.5 So, since the arrival of the Planters the native Irishmen felt suppressed: they couldn’t practice their own religion in public and mostly they were refused of important political and social jobs. And this in equal treatment continued for a long time.

Times are changing It was in the 19th century that the na-

tive Irishmen wanted to speak up again.

By the 1880s the demand for selfregulation grew. Especially among the Irish Nationalists, a group of Catholic native Irishmen, who wanted to be less dependent on Britain.6 Around that time some groups were even arguing for full independence, but those groups were just a small minority.

Eventually the British government granted a demand for self-regulation in 1912, but this immediately caused a counter reaction from the Ulster Unionists, a group of Protestant loyalists of England. They were against this devolution and they were afraid of possible Irish Nationalists’ resistance. In a counterstrike the Irish Nationalists, also called the Irish Volunteers, formed their own paramilitary organization: the IRA. They did so to tackle down the Ulster Unionists.7 In 1916 the Irish Volunteers even demanded a republic. This demand was written down in the Proclamation of the Republic and it is considered as

There were over 3500 people kil-­ led by the end of 1998 the founding document of the IRA. It declared an independent Republic and pledged republicans to "equal rights and equal opportunities" for all the Irish people. The support for this form of independence was much bigger than the small minority who argued for independence in the 1880s, but still, not everybody appreciated these ideas. This demand for a republic, also known as ‘the Easter Rising’, was stopped within a week. Almost all the leaders of this movement were executed, sixteen in total.8 The Troubles After a period of relative lesser conflicts, Stichting  JASON   4  Nr.  39  4 Nummer  3

the tension rose once again by the end of the 1960s. This tension caused a chain of events, which resulted in the beginning of the period called ‘the Troubles’.9 There is no official date for the start of the Troubles, but the reason for this period of warfare was clear: the (Irish) Nationalists had enough of the unfair treatment. They experienced job discrimination and therefore they pleaded for a same treatment for everyone. Next to that the police force in northern part of Ireland, also called the RUC, was mainly formed by Protestant policemen. This led to a lot of discrimination against the Catholics.

Therefore the Catholics decided to organize some peaceful demonstrations.10 But besides the peaceful demonstrations the IRA, the paramilitary organization of the Nationalists, attacked an important statue. This statue was especially valuable for the Protestants living in the northern part of Ireland.

This event caused a reaction from the 27

JAS N MAGAZINE

SEPARATISME Northern Ireland and separatism

Column

Libië: Responsibility to Reconsider Leon Wecke

H

(Ulster) Unionists: they also set up a paramilitary organization, which they called the UVF. The Unionists did so because they were afraid that the IRA would plan more attacks. By realizing this paramilitary organization they wanted to make sure the IRA, and thereby the Nationalists, wouldn’t cause any more commotion.

On 21 may 1966 the UVF declared war against the IRA and they were determined to use brutally violence.11 Like an UVF officer quoted: ‘If you want to fight against the IRA, you have to do it with muscles, not with brains.’12 And that was exactly what happened.

From this moment on the situation was getting worse every day. The tension grew and the parties became more and more seperated. At a certain point both parties didn’t even try to listen to each other anymore. On both sides they started to classify each other into religion and political movement without even looking at the individual. That caused a clash in which no party was 28

willing to give in.

A tremendous loss was the result of this clash: there were over 3500 people killed by the end of 1998.13 Including IRA members, UVF members but also children and youngsters, whom were just walking down the street.

Becauses of this enormous number of people who got killed and the duration of the Troubles, almost everybody in Northern Ireland knew someone who was killed or injured during the conflict: some even experienced multiple tragedies.14 Therefore the aftermath and the consequences of this war are still lasting. Everybody in Northern Ireland lived in uncertainty around that time and they all were drag into a conflict of violence and hate in which no one could escape.

The peace process Although the violence between the groups has reduced,15 the memories are fresh and the tension is still there.

After all these conflicts and sacrifices it is hard, for both parties, to let the Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

memories go, which is now a challenge for the new generation. They are the ones who could establish an acceptance for each other. Both parties will stay in Northern Ireland and they all have to find a way to live with each other.

Like in this case, their everlasting conflict isn’t going to stop by more hatred, it will only grow. None of the parties is willing to leave Northern Ireland, so they have to accept each other’s presence. Letting the past go and accept each other will take a long breath, because memories from both sides are loaded with a lot of burden. But still, they surely agree about one thing: never those conflicts again.

Karlijn Arts has recently finished a premaster in Social and Cultural Anthropology. Besides that she is still following a Bachelor in Communication Science at the VU in Amsterdam. But for this half year she is attending International Security courses in Zurich, with a special focus on Egypt and the Middle East.

et werd in 2005 met groot enthousiasme ontvangen, het beginsel inzake Responsibility to Protect: de verantwoordelijkheid van staten om volkeren in gevallen van genocide, misdaden tegen de menselijkheid, oorlogsmisdaden en ethnic cleansing te beschermen. Het was weliswaar geen dwingend internationaal recht, maar wel een beginsel waar de hele Verenigde Naties achter stond. Indien het duidelijk zou zijn dat een staat in gebreke bleef zijn burgers tegen de eerder genoemde grootschalige wreedheden te beschermen en vreedzame maatregelen geen effect zouden hebben, dan was het de verantwoordelijkheid van de internationale gemeenschap om te interveniëren met dwingende maatregelen, zoals van economische aard. Militaire interventie zou als laatste redmiddel toegepast kunnen worden.

De testcase voor Responsibility to Protect en met name voor militaire interventie als laatste redmiddel, werd Libië. De Arabische Lente was nog niet in een Arabische winter verkeerd en Libië zou naar veler verwachting een van de volgende voorbeelden van succesvolle en snelle revolutie worden.

De Libische leider, met wie het Westen tot voor kort veel goede zaken deed, hield op eigen wijze de wind onder zijn etnisch verdeeld volk. Hij was niet van plan het onderspit te delven. Toen ook daar de Arabische Lente zich aandiende. Niet geheel ten onrechte meende de buitenissige heerser dat hij veel goeds voor zijn volk bereikt had en nog veel meer door hem te verwezenlijken was.

Resolutie 1970 van de Veiligheidsraad, waarin met niet-militaire maatregelen gedreigd werd als hij zijn mensenrechtenschendende actie tegen de rebellen niet zou beëindigen, liet hij dan ook aan zich voorbijgaan. Inmiddels bleek de rebellie wel iets meer dan een incidentele opstand. Gaddafi’s antwoord, ondermeer aan het rebellenbolwerk Benghazi, was dan ook dat hij de ratten wel zou krijgen en men op een gedegen afrekening kon rekenen. De terechte indruk ontstond in het Westen dat zoiets als een genocide nabij was. Resolutie

1973 van de Veiligheidsraad hield het realiseren van een no-fly zone in, waardoor de militaire macht van de kolonel voldoende beperkt zou worden en daarmee het volk tegen de eigen heerser voldoende beschermd zou zijn. Het doel was niet regime change, laat staan het vermoorden van het staatshoofd.

Rusland en China onthielden zich, de oorspronkelijke doelstelling indachtig en na lang aarzelen, van stemming, evenals Duitsland, Brazilië en India. De uitkomst van de militaire interventie van de Verenigde Naties, waarvan de uitvoering uiteindelijk aan de NAVO werd toevertrouwd, mondde echter wel uit in regime change en het vermoorden van Gaddafi. Men was het doel (bescherming van de bevolking) in de meest letterlijke zin ver voorbijgeschoten.

Rusland en China zullen zich met vele andere staten wel een, twee of drie keer bedenken alvorens weer in een dergelijke missie van de Verenigde Naties te participeren, en het Libische volk is nog steeds onbeschermd. Drie jaar na Gaddafi heerst er alom chaos in Libië. Het gejuich over het door de NAVO zo efficiënt in praktijk gebrachte beginsel van Responsibility to Protect is allang verstomd. De stammenmaatschappij, door Gaddafi zo uitdrukkelijk in stand gehouden, heerst nog steeds in een land zonder nationale instituties waarmee en waarop een nieuwe staatsvorm gebouwd kan worden.

Men had dat kunnen weten. De case Libië noopt alle partijen van toen tot een herbezinning op het toepassen van Responsibility to Protect: Responsibility to Reconsider. Democratie is soms een moeilijk en soms onmogelijk exportartikel. Veelal is in bepaalde gevallen een dictator, hoe verwerpelijk ook, te prefereren boven een al dan niet opgelegde, maar tot mislukken gedoemde democratie. Een stelling die het westerse bedrijfsleven en ondersteunende politiek wellicht zal beamen.

'ULH MDDU QD *DGGDÀ heerst er alom chaos in Libië

Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

Leon Wecke is werkzaam bij het Centrum voor Internationaal Conflictanalyse & Management van de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen. Daar¬naast doceert hij aan het Instituut Defensie Leergangen, Instituut Clingendael en de opleiding van de Koninklijke Marechaussee in Apeldoorn. Hij heeft verschillende publicaties op zijn naam staan, onder andere op het gebied van de beeldvorming inzake oorlog en vrede.

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SEPARATISME Separatism and Georgia

Understanding Georgia

U

nderstanding Georgia’s politics may also help improve our knowledge of the current situation in the Ukraine.

Separatists there too use Russian support as leverage to further their cause.

And just like in Georgia in 2008, the central Ukrainian government stubbornly resists relinquishing control over the disputed territory. So which factors can be attributed to these phenomena?

To find out, it is time to investigate the Georgian case and discover what happened in those five days of war in August 2008. And more importantly, why.

Ever since Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union, separatists in Abkhazia, South Os-­ setia and Adjara have demanded greater le-­ vels of autonomy and even full secession. The central Georgian government in the capital of Tbilisi has sometimes accepted these de-­ mands, while denying them at other times and insisting on maintaining Georgia’s territorial in-­ tegrity. Six year ago, the latter policy even led to the Russo-­Georgian war. So how can Geor-­ JLD·V SROLF\ ÁLS ÁRSSLQJ EH H[SODLQHG" QUINT HOEKSTRA

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Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

The Five Day War Georgia is a small, Orthodox Christian nation of just four million people. For most of the past few centuries, it has been wedged in by great powers such as the Persian, Ottoman and Soviet empires. It first experienced independence after the First World War, but the Bolshevik revolution in neighbouring Russia soon put an end to that, with the Red Army invading the country in 1920 and incorporating it into the newly created Soviet Union the year after. Yet Georgia always managed to maintain a special status within the communist empire, partly because the former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was born there. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Georgia’s independence was restored on April 9, 1991, by a speech made by prime dissident and later Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

This transformed the Georgian nation from being a minority group in a powerful state to small state with many minorities. These minorities include the Abkhaz people in the North-West, the Ossets in the central north, the Adjara in the South-West and Armenians, Ż Then Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili (shaking hand, left) meets then NATO Secretary-­General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (right) a month after the Russo-­Georgian war. Contrary to the photo’s appearance, Georgian-­NATO’s relationship is inversed in reality, with Saakashvili unsuccessfully attempting to become a NATO member.

Source: NATO (2008).

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SEPARATISME Separatism and Georgia all demonstrated the same behaviour: in order to sustain the central Georgian state they deemed it necessary to extend Tbilisi’s influence to the northern breakaway regions. Whenever the Georgian state was weak it struck a deal with the separatists and granted them some degree of autonomy. When it was relatively strong it repeatedly reneged on previous deals and used force to change the status quo.

Georgia’s flip-flopping policy may be accounted for by the fact that states exist in a condition of anarchy. States fear for their survival, especially the young and small ones. It certainly does not help to have a large, militarily strong neighbour, who can quash Georgia’s sovereignty any moment it wishes to. Successive Georgian Presidents have therefore walked a tightrope: advance when they can, retreat when Ÿ Map of Georgia. Source: Wikimedia user ChrisO:

Russians, Turks, Azerbaijani’s and other minorities throughout the country.

Political independence proved to be a difficult path for the new Georgian state. With its outstanding natural beauty it had long been a popular holiday destination for wealthy Russians.

In fact, Georgia itself was one of the more affluent parts of the Soviet Union.

But it lacked the state institutions to manage the transition to independence, and it was not long before the economy collapsed. The first democratically elected President in Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, attempted to tie the state back together by increasing state control over peripheral regions. In addition, he sought to solve the problem of minority calls for autonomy and independence by “strengthening the ethnic Georgian primacy in the republic”.1 This sparked a violent conflict with South Ossetia and eventually led the President to flee the country in 1992. The former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze succeeded him in the same year, and used his contacts in Russia to strike a deal with the Osset people.2 Yet armed conflict did not end there, as the new President opened a new front in Abkhazia. This too, eventually ended with a cease-fire, one that granted the Abkhaz considerable autonomy. Georgia experienced relative stability until 2003, when the Rose Revolution struck. Shevardnadze had come under increased allegations of corruption and was ousted by Mikheil Saakashvili after massive street protests.

In 2005, President Saakashvili offered Abkhazia increased autonomy but this was rejected by the Abkhaz leaders, 32

who now said they wanted nothing less than full independence. Meanwhile, the South Ossetians also voted for independence in an unrecognized referendum.

What followed in 2008 is something some readers may still remember. After the outbreak of low-level, small scale fighting broke out in South Ossetia, President Saakashvili responded by shelling South Ossetia’s capital Tskhinvali on August 8.3 The Ossets then called in help from their ally Russia.

Russian President Dimitri Medvedev heeded the call, sending in Russian forces, which swiftly ousted the Georgian troops. Georgian troops continued their attacks outside of South Ossetian territory, prompting the Russians to cross the South Ossetian border and entering the city of Gori. The Georgians, meanwhile, pleaded for help from the United States and European leaders.

Yet these powers wanted to avoid risking a large scale conflict with Russia, and merely called for dialogue. Russian troops advanced to just 45 kilometres from the capital Tbilisi, creating great fear amongst Georgia’s leaders of being overrun by the Red Army once again.

Eventually, French President Nicolas Sarkozy came to the rescue and mediated a deal between the belligerents that ended the five day war. The parties agreed on the deployment of a Russian peacekeeping force in South Ossetia.

Analysis Now that the what question has been answered, it is time to delve into the question why the Georgian government acted in the way that it did. Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze and Saakashvili Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

President Saak-­ ashvili responded disproportionally by shelling South Ossetian territory they must. The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 appears to be a strategic mistake: Georgia was strong enough to take South Ossetia but was neither prepared nor able to confront Russia. Being locked in by its own actions it had no option but to hope for outside support, which eventually came not in the form of military assistance but in the shape of international mediation by Sarkozy.

Actions by Georgia’s minorities are governed by the same principles as the ones followed by Georgia’s Presidents.

The Abkhaz and Osset people worry that a sign of weakness will tempt Tbilisi to seize the moment and overrun their military posts. They have solved this problem by striking an alliance.

Both minority groups bandwagon with Russia in order to keep the Georgian state at arm’s length. Russia, forever regretting its influence loss in the Caucasus after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, allies with these groups to regain its regional dominance. Georgia, in turn, uses United States support to balance Russia’s power. It also actively seeks NATO membership.4 If Georgia is to resist a possible Russian advance, it knows it must stand as one. That means it cannot afford to yield and grant territorially concentrated minorities too much autonomy

The Stalin Museum The town of Gori illustrates Georgia’s internal divide well. At just an hour’s drive north-­west of Tbilisi and situated just outside the South Ossetian border, residents this town disagree on how to interpret the post-­Soviet world. Gori was Joseph Stalin’s hometown, where he is commemorated in a grand museum, complete with tower, bell and even a lush park. Attracting around 15,000 tourists a year, visitors learn about the Soviet leader’s early struggles in Siberian prison camps and later his life as the Soviet leader. Exuberant foreign dignita-­ ries’ gifts to Stalin are on display, and visitors can even enter the bullet proof train he used to travel around in. The gift shop continues to sell small bronze Stalin statutes. Tucked away under the staircase, there is a small room commemorating the estimated 40 million people who died in Stalin gulags. Some of Gori’s residents appear to still respect Stalin for his successes in defeating Hitler and rapidly industrializing the Soviet Union. Others appear to have changed their views. These Geor-­ gians acknowledge the museum generates much Ÿ Gori’s best known attraction: The Stalin Museum needed employment and wealth for the town, but are uneasy about celebrating Moscow’s rule in the past considering its current hostility towards Georgia.

rights. Instead, it wants to deploy its military as far as possible from the capital in order to create a security buffer between Georgia’s heartland and its border to the north. Losing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as Georgian territory would draw in the Russians too close to the capital. It could also have a domino effect on another minority region, the Adjara in the South West.

In turn, this could lead to a total state collapse and leave Russia to pick up the pieces. Georgia’s insistence on controlling its breakaway regions is therefore not guided by the territory’s economic value (it is sparsely populated and has few vital economic or natural resources) but by the grand strategy of preserving the young Georgian state.

Conclusion Most Western media consider Russia to be the initial aggressor in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Invading Georgia was indeed a grave breach of international law. Yet so too was the Georgian government’s disproportionate shelling of South Ossetia, which quickly escalated the conflict.5 In addition, the Osset people had long declared themselves independent from Georgia. Their request for military assistance of its ally Russia makes strategic sense, seeing as their

survival was at stake. Considering the circumstances, Russia even acted with reasonable self-restraint. With the Red Army’s military supremacy, Medvedev could have taken Tbilisi in mere hours.

This is not to justify Russia’s actions but to highlight Georgia’s folly in underestimating South Ossetia’s ability and impact of drawing in its northern neighbour into the conflict.

The case study shows nations and states alike go through the same process. In order to survive in the international system, states strike alliances. When they feel their core (the capital) is secure, they seek to extend their sphere of influence. Georgia went into South Ossetia and Abkhazia to regain a monopoly on force there, just like Russia entered South Ossetia to increase its sphere of influence. This is what I shall call the capital-periphery problem. Nations and states seek to protect the capital, but doing so requires also controlling the periphery. In the Caucasus, politicians feel the further they have their sphere of influence, the better they have secured the nation’s capital. Each party will therefore seek to enlarge this area, making any territorial gain a zero-sum game. The constant boundary pushing makes conflict likely to persist. This is vastly different from how international Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

relations are conducted in the West, where borders are approached as dichotomous entities: anything until here is mine, anything further is yours.

Apart from understanding how events have evolved in the past and may evolve in the future, there is also a lesson to be learned that can be applied to the case of Ukraine. If the same dynamics and attitudes that govern international relations the Caucasus also apply to Eastern Europe, then a continued conflict between Ukraine and Russia is likely.

Separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine are likely to pursue institutionalization of Russian support, such as the formation of an official military alliance. Faced with the continued threat of a Russian advance and an end to Ukrainian de facto independence, Kiev is likely to seek European support through the signing of the long-awaited Association Treaty with the European Union.

Quint Hoekstra studied Political Science with a specialization in International Relations and Organizations at Leiden University and is currently enrolled in a Master’s programme in Conflict, Security and Development at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

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SEPARATISME African Refugees

African Refugees in Israël

Israel has become a popular destination for Su-­ danese and Ertrean refugees. Can this small state KDQGOH WKH UHIXJHH LQÁX[" DANA COHEN

Over 54,000 African asylum seekers have crossed the border into Israel.1Many are considered illegal infiltrators, while few have been officially recognized as refugees.2 The international community harshly condemns Israel’s policies and calls upon it to abide by international law. The situation on the ground, however, is complex and I argue that the international community should cooperate with Israel to absorb the asylum seekers collectively.

The wave of asylum seekers started in

2005 and consists mainly of Eritrean and Sudanese refugees.3 Eritreans, most of whom Christians, fled their country due to grave human rights violations including religious and political persecution, torture, and disappearances.

Eritreans caught leaving their country without permission, which is rarely given, face severe punishment.4 Most Sudanese come from Darfur where they fled persecution and mass murder.

Others escaped ongoing civil war and governmental persecution in South Sudan.5

Torture In 2006 asylum seekers began paying Bedouin smugglers to take them to Israel, a relatively safe practice at first. Since 2010, however, smugglers regularly hold asylum seekers hostage in Sinai for ransom. The hostages are often tortured while on the phone with their families so they can hear the screams. Abuses include mutilation and deformation of limbs, electric shocks, removing of skin, being hanged from the ceiling by their wrists, and rape.

Some hostages die from their injuries

Ÿ Wife of then-­Prime Minister Ehud Olmert meets with Sudanese Refugees. July 2007 Source: Government Press Office

or are purposefully killed when they cannot pay the full amount of money the smugglers demand. Survivors are faced with crossing the heavily guarded border with Israel on foot. Egyptian border guards shoot at illegal trespassers; between July 2007 and September 2010 at least 85 African asylum seekers have been fatally shot and many more seriously wounded.6

Ÿ Sudanese refugees from Egypt walking to Israel. April 2012. Source: Hillel Assaf.

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Asylum seekers caught by Egyptian border police are detained for long periods of time, while the United National High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is not allowed to visit them.

In breach of Egypt’s Law on Combatting Human Trafficking, trafficking victims are denied medical care, protection, and immunity from criminal charges. Instead, they are charged with immigration offenses and only released after collecting enough money for an air ticket to Ethiopia. The charges are particularly immoral considering the fact that large numbers of detainees were kidnapped in Sudan and transferred to Egypt against their will. Evidence and eyewitness reports show extensive

collusion between Egyptian police and military and the traffickers. Police return escaped hostages to their abductors and turn a blind eye at checkpoints. In breach of the UN Convention Against Torture, Egypt has failed

Hostages are of-­ ten tortured while on the phone with their families so they can hear the screams to prosecute traffickers and officials colluding with traffickers, even though “it was common knowledge who the traffickers were in Sinai.” Many escaped trafficking victims have died at police stations from their injuries because the police refuse to take them to the hospital. At hospitals, some doctors refuse to give treatment to “migrants who are Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

trying to get to Israel where they will be turned into fighters and then attack Egypt.”

On the other side of the border, asylum seekers caught by Israeli soldiers are taken to the newly established open detention centre Holot in the Negev.

Although technically free to leave the facilities, the asylum seekers are obligated to report for roll call three times a day. The provisional status which allows them to stay has to be renewed every one to three months.7 If they fail to meet these obligations, they face imprisonment.8 Although Israel does not deport asylum seekers back to Eritrea or Sudan, it pressures them to leave ‘voluntarily’ and offers them a $3,500 grant when leaving. Dozens of asylum seekers have agreed to be flown to Uganda and Rwanda, countries with track records of deporting asylum seekers back to their countries of origin.

9 This policy is likely in breach of nonrefoulement as will be explained below.

The 1951 Convention After World War II, the United Nations 35

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SEPARATISME African Refugees constructed the 1951 Refugee Convention to guarantee non-negotiable rights to Holocaust survivors and people fleeing the Communist bloc. The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees aims to extend these rights to later refugees. In 1954 Israel ratified the Convention and in 1968 it acceded to the Protocol. However, Israel has failed to adopt the Convention into its common law, rendering the legislation unenforceable in its courts.10

Burden sharing can encourage Israel to facilitate and provide pro-­ tection to all asy-­ lum seekers A key point of the Convention is the prohibition for states to discriminate against asylum seekers because of their “race, religion or country of origin.”11 Israel, however, classifies everyone from Sudan as ‘enemy nationals’, thus denying them the chance to submit a request for official refugee status. Israel justifies this policy on the grounds that Sudan has been involved in sending explosives and weaponry to Palestinian terrorists in Israel and the Gaza Strip.

Although Israel is indeed not obliged to provide asylum to persons who threaten its security, direct evidence against individuals is needed and discrimination against entire groups is unlawful.12 Non-refoulement Another major issue in the Convention is the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning asylum seekers to the state they fled or to countries where they may be persecuted or forcibly returned to their country of origin. Since Israel in fact declared the non-refoulement principle to be binding, it is prohibited from returning African asylum seekers to Egypt where their rights are systematically violated.13 Many asylum seekers in Israel lived in Egypt for several years until the lack of safety and livelihood prompted them to leave.14 Egypt’s reluctance to live up to its obligations has diverted the influx of asylum seekers from Egypt to Israel, effectively shifting responsibility. Likewise, the hardening of restrictions on migration to Europe has increased the number of Africans coming to Israel 36

instead.15 Although this does not relieve Israel from its legal (and moral) obligations, I argue that the international community should recognize a shared responsibility for the fate of African asylum seekers.

In the wake of international condemnation of Israel’s refugee policies, it is noteworthy that many countries violate the prohibition of discriminating against certain asylum seekers. The United Kingdom has singled out Somalian, Liberian, and Libyan refugees, the United States has discriminated against asylum seekers from Haiti, and Macedonia against Kosovar Albanians.

Moreover, many states prevent asylum seekers from entering their territorial jurisdiction, thus avoiding their legal obligation towards them. Australia has blocked entry to its territory of a boat carrying four hundred asylum seekers from Afghanistan. Likewise, the United States has intercepted and destroyed boats with Haitian asylum seekers before returning them to Haiti, also clearly in breach of non-refoulement.

Besides Israel, several states, including France and The Netherlands, have put asylum seekers in group detention to discourage refugees from seeking asylum.16 Israel’s dilemma The arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers is especially difficult for a small country like Israel. The influx of Africans is disproportionately vast because Israel is the only developed country which shares a land border with Africa. Local UN officials even argue that Israel should not offer longterm solutions for asylum seekers until the Egyptian border is better sealed “as that would dramatically increase their number.”17 Sealing its border shut, on the other hand, is morally questionable since it merely blocks Israel’s legal responsibilities towards the asylum seekers (who are after all not yet on its territory), while leaving them unprotected in Egypt. Although this would be legally acceptable, morally it is of the same severity as breaching the nonrefoulement principle.

Notably, Israel has given protection to hundreds of African and non-African refugees. It has given six hundred A5 temporary residence visas to Darfurian refugees in 2007 and two thousand B1 work visas to Eritrean refugees. It has provided refuge to approximately one hundred Albanian Muslim refugees in 1999, one hundred Bosnian refugees in 1993, and several dozen Vietnamese Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

Ÿ Refugees from Sudan's Darfur region in the Rose garden in Jerusalem. July 2007.

Photographer: Milner Moshe (Government Press Office)

refugees in the 1970s.18 Social movements in Israel often demonstrate for asylum seekers’ rights, sometimes by drawing analogies between African refugees and Holocaust survivors.19 To illustrate, dozens of Israeli soldiers who witnessed asylum seekers being shot by Egyptian soldiers have written to then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert: “We have always accused [western] countries for standing idly by during the Holocaust of the Jewish people…

And yet Israel is dodging its moral duty to help these distraught refugees.”20 Moreover, Holocaust survivors have distributed gift baskets and water bottles to hundreds of asylum seekers waiting outside the Population and Immigration Authority Bureau in Tel Aviv to renew their visas in a sign of solidarity.21 Several NGOs and student groups aim at helping individual Afri-

cans or at changing the national laws.22 Israel is thus clearly not unwilling to help refugees, but it simply cannot absorb all African asylum seekers on its own without harming its national stability and economy. Moreover, Israel had never before had to deal with the influx of great numbers of non-Jewish asylum seekers and therefore does not have the resources to deal with all the asylum applications. It also lacks the legislation to officially implement the 1951 Convention’s obligations.23 Burden sharing Rather than merely justifying or renouncing Israel’s breach of international law, however, I propose for the international community to cooperate with Israel in finding a reasonable solution. Thought should be given to

burden sharing: a cooperative network between countries, in which Israel would function as a passageway station for asylum seekers, responsible for initial and temporary care and revising refugee status applications, but not necessarily the permanent and final home.

Burden sharing can encourage Israel to facilitate and provide protection to all asylum seekers at its doorstep, while it simultaneously creates a long-term solution for them. Israel can thus provide safety to all asylum seekers who need it, while not having to fear the unreasonable demand to permanently absorb each and every one of them.

States willing to cooperate by housing recognized refugees could be provided with economical reimbursement.

Earlier this year Sweden accepted approximately fifty Eritrean asylum seeStichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

kers from Israel in response to a special request by the UN Refugee Agency.24 Possibly it would also be willing to partner with Israel in a structured burden sharing enterprise. Agreements might also be made with Egypt, hopefully ending its policy of shooting at asylum seekers. By relieving Egypt of the burden to integrate all African asylum seekers that arrive in or through its territory, it might also be motivated to live up to its obligations under both national and international anti-trafficking laws, international human rights law, and national criminal law by investigating and prosecuting traffickers and officials collaborating with traffickers.

Dana Cohen is a graduate of the University of Utrecht, where she studied Gender Studies during her BA and Conflict Studies and Human Rights during her MA. 37

JAS N MAGAZINE

SEPARATISME Unheard voice in Ukraine

A short story

Ǧ in

Ukraine

Almost everyone noticed the war in eastern Ukrai-­ QH E\ QRZ %XW LQ WKH PLGGOH RI WKH ÀJKW EHWZHHQ Russian separatists and Ukrainians, an unknown voice is screaming for attention. How a Welsh businessman planted British patriotism in Ukraine in the 19th century.

NATALIA KADENKO

“People of Donetsk! English brothers!

The time is ripe! As you know, Yuzovka (“Donetsk”) is originally an English city, founded by the great English entrepreneur John Hughes. For more than hundred years, we’ve been fooled

by Russians and Ukrainians alike: Russians claiming that the city is Russian, and Ukrainians claiming that the city is Ukrainian! We demand a referendum to return Yuzovka to its primordial womb – into the Great Britain! Glory to John Hughes and his city! God save the Queen!”1 WAs the news of separatism in Crimea were making headlines all over the world, little was known of this particular pro-English separatist movement on the Donetsk soil. Starting as an anonymous initiative on the social network group for Donetsk citizens, this particular appeal was followed by an online “Referendum”. Over seven thousand of people have voted, with 61 percent expressing support for joining Great Britain, while sixteen percent preferred wider autonomy with English as a regional language.1 The Donetsk area with its prominent mining industry owes the foundation of its metal works to the Welsh businessman John Hughes. While the settlements have existed long before 38

he came to Ukrainian (then Russian Imperial) soil, it was thanks to him that “Novorussian society for coal, iron and rails production” gave new life and industry to the area. John Hughes has lived for almost twenty years in the city named “Hughesovka”, or “Yuzovka”, after a Slavicized version of his name.

The walls of his former house are still standing in a silent reminder of the Donetsk’s less known British history.

“For United Kingdom in the steppes of Donetsk!” the British patriots called in the comments. “Stop oppressing the English language!” was the angry demand of the Donetsk people. The demand to protect the minority language should have received more attention from the world community; according to the data from 2012, school education in the area was only given in Russian and Ukrainian in almost equal proportions, with the notable absence of English.2 The English schools opened for the children of miners and engineers that accompanied John Hughes in 1870 never made it past the Bolshevik revolution.

No recognition from your ‘homeland’ Sadly, the demands of British patriots remained unheard by the world in the subsequent mayhem. Shortly after the historical decision to re-join the UK was made, pro-Russian forces took Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

Ÿ Donetsk is the English city – God save the Queen!” Source: donbass.ua

Seven thousand people voted, with 61 percent expressing support for joining Great Britain control of Donetsk and announced the establishment of a “Donetsk People’s Republic”. No comment on the future status of English language has been given.

Meanwhile, the rumors of secret deals between Russian and German leaders have been published in the respected British editions, and surfaced later after the carefully picked quotes of the German chancellor were made public.

The official stance of the UK remained firm: no recognition for separatism or Crimean annexation. Does that mean that the Brits of Donetsk have no chance to be reunited with their homeland? The Donetsk British dominion has to stand up to oppression and fight for their destiny. Perhaps it is time for the Donetsk people to form local self-defense units – after all, it not unlikely that since 1870 every Donetsk household has kept some British-made weaponry in the cellar.

If there was ever a time to use it, it is now.

Natalia is currently busy with her PhD on political problems of international systems and global developments in Ukraine.

She studied International Relations in Ukraine and the Netherlands and holds a minor in English translation. Natalia has completed an internship at the Ukrainian embassy in the Netherlands and studied German during different exchange programs in Germany. During her study she wrote for Debat and Vox Discipulorum.

Her professional interests lies in the area of international migration and European immigration politics, environment and nuclear energy.

Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

Samenvatting In de internationale media, ook in Nederland, wordt de oorlog die woedt in het oosten van Oekraïne belicht als een strijd tussen Russische separatisten, al dan niet met hulp van Rusland, en Oe-­ kraïners. Er is echter meer.

De auteur laat een separa-­ tistische beweging zien die hereniging met Groot-­Brit-­ tannië nastreeft. De groep lijkt overigens op weinig steun vanuit hun ‘thuisland’ te kunnen rekenen.

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SEPARATISME Volgende keer Het decembernummer van JASON Magazine is gewijd aan het thema:

of War

John Kerry ondertekent het wapenhandelsverdrag bij de Verenigde Naties in New York op 25 september 2013 .

Bron: US Department of State

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JASON Magazine is gratis verkrijgbaar voor studenten, young professionals en andere geïnteresseerden. Om u kosteloos te abonneren, geef uw naam, (post)adres en e-mailadres door aan redactie@stichtingjason.nl of via het contactformulier op onze website (www.stichtingjason.nl/contact/).

ƒ De bankencrisis en internationale relaties ƒ De wapenindustrie Een nep kerkhof, opgezet door een Control Arms campagnevoerder naast het gebouw van Bron: de verenigde Contando Estrelas naties.

Bron: Control Arms

Een wapencache, ontdekt in 2008 in Shandand, Afghanistan Bron: ISAF

Wat is stichting JASON? Stichting JASON is in 1975 opgericht door een aantal jongeren met als doel om te informeren over internationale vredes- en veiligheidsvraagstukken.

De afkorting JASON staat voor Jong Atlantisch Samenwerkings Orgaan Nederland.

In de beginjaren van JASON lag het accent vooral op vredes- en veiligheidsvraagstukken binnen de transatlantische betrekkingen. Gaandeweg 40

& Activiteiten

Mededelingen

ƒ Migratie gedreven door drugsoorlogen ƒ Positieve effecten van innovatie ten tijde van oorlog

verbreedde JASON haar aandachtsveld, mede in aansluiting op internationale gebeurtenissen, haar aandachtsveld tot het gehele spectrum van internationale betrekkingen en veiligheidskwesties.

JASON is daarbij niet gebonden aan enige politieke partij en heeft geen levensbeschouwelijke grondslag.

JASON informeert op twee manieren.

In de eerste plaats door de uitgifte van dit magazine, dat drie à vier keer per jaar verschijnt. In elk nummer wordt getracht een gevarieerd overzicht te Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

geven van relevante en actuele onderwerpen binnen het brede spectrum van internationale vredes- en veiligheidsvraagstukken.

Ten tweede informeert JASON door het organiseren van tal van activiteiten, zoals conferenties, debatten, lezingen en excursies. Stichting JASON heeft geen leden, het magazine is gratis verkrijgbaar voor iedereen en alle geïnteresseerden zijn van harte welkom om aan onze activiteiten deel te nemen.

Op de hoogte blijven van onze activiteiten?

Stichting JASON kondigt zijn activiteiten aan via de activiteitenkalender in JASON Magazine, via zijn Facebookpagina (JASON Institute), website (www.stichtingjason. nl/activiteiten/) en een tweeweekse nieuwsbrief. U kunt zich voor onze nieuwsbrief aanmelden via het contactformulier op onze website (www.stichtingjason.nl/contact/).

Vacatures JASON Magazine is op zoek naar vrijwillige redacteurs (studenten of afgestudeerd) die graag artikelen voor het magazine willen schrijven en geïnteresseerd in internationale betrekkingen zijn. Interesse of meer informatie? Mail ons op redactie@stichtingjason.nl.

Aankomende JASON activiteiten 14 november Bezoek aan Europol over het thema cybersecurity Eind november Bezoek aan de Iraanse Ambassade met als thema: rol van Iran in het Midden-Oosten Februari 2015 Jaarlijkse Brusselreis Mei 2015 Symposium: instabiliteit in het Midden-Oosten Iedereen die geïnteresseerd is, is welkom om deel te nemen aan een van de bovenstaande activiteiten. Aanmelden o.v.v. naam en activiteit via activiteiten@stichtingjason.nl.

Adverteren?

Voor bedrijven, universiteiten, instituten en andere organisaties is het mogelijk om te adverteren in JASON Magazine, op de website of activiteiten van stichting JASON. De doelgroep van stichting JASON en JASON Magazine zijn politicologie-, bestuurskunde- en rechtenstudenten, maar ook studenten die los van hun studie geïnteresseerd zijn in internationale betrekkingen en meer specifiek in internationale defensievraagstukken. Neem voor meer informatie contact met ons op via het contactformulier op onze website (www.stichtingjason.nl/contact/).

Doneren JASON wordt mogelijk gemaakt door hardwerkende vrijwilligers die het hun missie zien om de maatschappij te informeren over internationale vredes- en veiligheidsvraagstukken. De activiteiten van JASON kosten geld en daarom willen wij u vragen om bij te dragen aan onze missie. JASON heeft de ANBI-status, waardoor u uw giften aan de stichting mogelijk mag aftrekken van uw belastingen. Het rekeningnummer van de stichting is 667315802.

Voor meer informatie kunt u contact met ons opnemen via het contactformulier op onze website (www.stichtingjason.nl/contact/).

Stichting JASON online Volg stichting JASON online: Facebook: JASON Institute Twitter: @stichtingjason Website: www.stichtingjason.nl

Ÿ Het Europol Bron: Europol.com

JASON Magazine online Het huidige en voorgaande nummers van JASON Magazine zijn online terug te vinden op www.stichtingjason. nl/magazine. Het huidige nummer is online in kleur verkrijgbaar.

Nieuwe JASON magazine lay-out Was het je opgevallen dat het magazine een nieuwe layout heeft? JASON streeft constant naar verbetering. Dat is de reden dat de vormgeving van het magazine is aangepast. Wij zijn erg benieuwd naar wat onze lezer vindt van deze verandering. Daarom stellen wij het zeer op prijs als u ons via redactie@stichtingjason.nl kort laat weten wat u van het magazine vindt. Heeft u liever het oude vertrouwde magazine, vindt u het lettertype prettiger lezen, of ziet u liever nog meer veranderingen? Wij staan open voor suggesties, op- en aanmerkingen. Onze dank is groot.

Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

41

JAS N MAGAZINE

SEPARATISME In beeld

Foto's activiteiten

42

Stichting JASON organiseert allerlei activiteiten zoals bezoeken aan (inter)nationale instellingen, lezingen, symposia en netwerkborrels. Op de website stichtingjason.nl is de agenda te bekijken. Op Facebook (JASON Institute) zijn aankondigingen en foto's van Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

activiteiten te bekijken. Bovenstaande foto's zijn een impressie van het bezoek aan de luchtmachtbasis in Volkel en het symposium 'Lessons learned from conflicts' in samenwerking met Hague Institute for Global Justice en Youth Peace Initiative.

Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3

43

JAS N MAGAZINE

SEPARATISME Eindnoten

Het  einde  van  SiberiÍ?

Pag. Â 4

.U JHU + Âś7KH 1DJRUQR .DUDEDNK &RQĂ€FW $ /HJDO $QDO\VLV¡ S 6RXOHLPDQRY ( Âś8QGHUVWDQGLQJ (WKQRSROLWLFDO &RQĂ LFW .DUDEDNK 6RXWK 2VVHWLD DQG $ENKD-­ zia Wars Reconsidered’. pp. 99-­100 3 KrĂźger, H. p.12-­3 4 Souleimanov, E. pp.68, 100 5 Carley, P. (1998) ‘Nagorno-­Karabakh: Searching for a Solution,’ United States Institute of Peace.

Available at: http://www.usip.org/publications/nagorno-­karabakh-­searching-­solution-­0#alternative. [accessed 01-­07-­2014] 6 Souleimanov, E. p.106 7 Ibid. pp.108-­9 8 Ibid. pp.110-­1 9 Ibid. pp.53,111 10 KrĂźger, H. pp.93-­4,109-­11,117 11 Zie: Asenbauer, H. E. (1993) ‘Zum Selbstbestimmungsrecht das Armenischen Volkes von Berg-­Kara-­ bakh’; Luchterhandt, Otto. (1993) ‘Das Recht Berg-­Karabachs auf Staatliche Unabhängigkeit aus VĂślkerrechtlicher Sicht’, Archiv des VĂślkerrechts, vol. 31 12 KrĂźger, H. p.115 13 86/HJDO ,QF ¡8WL SRVVLGHWLV /DZ /HJDO 'HĂ€QLWLRQ¡ 86/HJDO $YDLODEOH DW KWWS GHĂ€QLWLRQV XVOHJDO com/u/uti-­possidetis. [accessed 01-­07-­2014] 14 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation, on October 7, 1977. Available at: http://www. constitution.org/cons/ussr77.txt [accessed at 01-­07-­2014].

15 Krßger, H. pp.40,53,116 16 Ibid. p.19; Souleimanov, E. pp.55,68 17 Souleimanov, E. pp.105-­6,170,181,184-­5 18 Ibid. pp.55,68-­9,70-­1,165,174 19 Ibid. pp.54-­5,58,139-­40 20 Ibid. pp.81,99 21 Ibid. pp.84-­5,106-­8 22 Resolution 822 (1993) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3205th meeting, on 30 April 1993.

Available at: http://www.refworld.org/cgi-­bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b00f15764. [Accessed on: 01-­07-­2014] 23 Carley, P. 24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Blank, Stephen. Qtd in: Souleimanov, E. p.xi 1 2

44

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Pag. Â 12

BBC. 2014. ‘South Sudan “most fragile stateâ€? in world’. BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­afri-­ ca-­28039164 Accessed: 05/07/2014 2 Lupai, J. 2013. ‘OIL: Is it a Curse or a Blessing in South Sudan?’. Sudan Tribune. http://www.sudantrib-­ une.com/spip.php?article46597 Accessed: 05/07/2014 3 Seymour, L . 2003. ‘Review of Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars’. African Stud-­ LHV 4XDUWHUO\ KWWS DVT DIULFD XĂ HGX Y Y L D KWP $FHVVHG 4 Global Security. 2011. ‘Second Sudan Civil War 1983-­2004’. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/war/sudan-­civil-­war2.htm Accessed: 05/07/2014 5 Smith, D. 2014. ‘South Sudan: the death of a dream’. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/jan/20/south-­sudan-­death-­of-­a-­dream Acessed: 04/07/2014 6 %%& Âś6RXWK 6XGDQ 3URĂ€OH¡ KWWS ZZZ EEF FRP QHZV ZRUOG DIULFD $FHVVHG 04/07/2014 7 Adwok Nyaba, P. 2014. ‘It wasn’t a coup – Salva Kiir shot himself in the foot’ South Sudan Nation. http://www.southsudannation.com/it-­wasnt-­a-­coup-­salva-­kiir-­shot-­himself-­in-­the-­foot/n Accessed: 05/07/2014 8 Young Pelton, R. 2014.‘Saving South Sudan’. VICE. http://www.vice.com/en_uk/the-­vice-­report/ saving-­south-­sudan-­part-­1 Accessed: 05/07/2014

TV Rain, 2014, viewed on May 22, 2014, http://tvrain.ru/articles/aleksandr_lukashenko_ksenii_sob-­ chak_obrabotajte_vnachale_svoi_zemli_a_potom_idite_na_chuzhie_polnaja_versija-­368768/ 2 Luhn, A. 2014. Russia toughens up punishment for separatist ideas – despite Ukraine. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/24/russia-­toughens-­punishment-­separatist-­ideas [ac-­ cessed 8-­7-­2014].

3 Kotkin, S. (1995) Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization.

4 Trenin, D. (2002) The End of Eurasia, p. 131.

5 Ibid: p. 209 6 Haas, M. de, Russian-­Chinese Security Relations Moscow’s Threat from the East? p. 27. Available at: KWWS ZZZ FOLQJHQGDHO QO VLWHV GHIDXOW ÀOHV BUFBVHFXULW\UHODWLRQV SGI >DFFHVVHG @ 7 Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia, p. 204 8 Chan, J. (2008) Russia and China settle longstanding territorial disputes. Available at: http://www. wsws.org/en/articles/2008/08/ruch-­a14.html [accessed 8-­7-­2014].

9 Repnikova, M. & Balze, H.D. (2009). Chinese Migration to Russia: Missed Opportunities, p. 14 10 Judah, B. 2013. Why Russia is not losing Siberia. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-­ russia/ben-­judah/why-­russia-­is-­not-­losing-­siberia [accessed 8-­7-­2014].

11 Trenin, D. (2002). The End of Eurasia, p. 203 12 Goble, P. 2008. Window on Eurasia: Separatism Remains Strong in Tuva. Available at: http://window-­ oneurasia.blogspot.ru/2008/06/window-­on-­eurasia-­separatism-­remains.html 13 Ilyin, I. (1998). Put k ochevidnosti, Exmo-­Press, Moscow, p. 219 14 Judah, B. http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-­russia/ben-­judah/russia-­china-­relations-­fantasies-­ and-­reality 15 Trenin, D. (2002). The End of Eurasia, p. 218

1

1

The  Battle  over  Nagorno-­�Karabakh

South  Sudan:  one  step  forward,  two  steps  back

LibiĂŤ:  de  afwezige  staat Â

Pag. Â 17

De feiten over de geschiedenis van LibiÍ tot en met 1969 zijn afkomstig uit: Lïbiyä, in Bearman, P., Bianquis, Th., Bosworth, C.E., Donzel, E. van en Heinrichs, W.B. (red.), Encyclo-­ paedia of Islam, Second Edition, 2014; Collins, C., Imperalism and revolution in Libya, in MERIP Reports nr. 27 (1974), blz. 3-­22; Despois, J., Barka, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2014; Lapidus, I.M., A history of Islamic societies, 2002, blz. 603, 612-­6; Oman, G., Taräbulus al-­Gharb, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2014 2 Triaud, J.-­L., Sanßsiyya, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2014 3 Groot, A.H. de, al-­Sanßsï, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2014 4 Boca, A. del, 0RKDPHG )HNLQL DQG WKH ÀJKW WR IUHH /LE\D 2011, hfdst. 3-­11 5 'H]H VWULMG LV SUDFKWLJ YHUÀOPG ´/LRQ RI WKH 'HVHUW¾ XLW 6 Pargeter, A., /LE\D ² 7KH ULVH DQG IDOO RI 4DGGDÀ, 2012, hfdst. 3 en 4 7 Ibid., hfdst. 6; Duinmaijer, C., 7KH H[ PXMDKLGLQ LQ /LE\D WKH HQG RI D VWUXJJOH, op Din wa Dawla, 5 september 2012: http://dinwdawla.wordpress.com/2012/09/05/9-­the-­ex-­mujahidin-­in-­libya-­the-­end-­ of-­a-­struggle/ 8 Obeidi, A., Political culture in Libya, 2001, hfdst. 5 9 Hilsum, L., Sandstorm, 2013, blz. 266-­70; Pargeter, A., /LE\D ² 7KH ULVH DQG IDOO RI 4DGGDÀ, 2012, hfdst. 8 10 $UH ZH KHDGLQJ WRZDUGV D SDUWLWLRQ RI WKH FRXQWU\", op website COMTEX, 8 maart 2012; Creation of Cyrenaica Council sparks furious federalism row, in Libya Herald, 27 maart 2012: www.libyaherald.

FRP FUHDWLRQ RI F\UHQDLFD FRXQFLO VSDUNV IXULRXV IHGHUDOLVP GHEDWH (ORXUÀ $ Libyans debate federalism, op website COMTEX, 6 november 2012 11 Duinmaijer, C., :LOO WKH HOHFWLRQV LQ /LE\D EULQJ QDWLRQDO XQLW\ RU GLYLVLRQ", op Din wa Dawla, 23 juli 2012: http://dinwdawla.wordpress.com/2012/07/23/8-­will-­the-­elections-­in-­libya-­bring-­national-­unity-­or-­ division/ 12 Mohamed, E. en al-­Majbari, F., /LE\D FRQJUHVV IDFHV ZDONRXW, on website COMTEX, 30 oktober 2013; Stephen, C., Libyans fear standoff between Muslim Brotherhood and opposition forces, in The Guard-­ ian, 21 augustus 2013 13 /HDGHUV RI /LE\D¡V RLO ULFK &\UHQDLFD UHJLRQ FDOO IRU IHGHUDO V\VWHP, op website BBC, 29 oktober 2013; Welkom in Cyrenaica; Oosten van LibiÍ wil meer autonomie, op website Knack, 4 december (ORXUÀ $ Cyrenaica autonomie move starts with security, op website COMTEX, 9 oktober 2013 14 East Libyan drama, op website Energy Intelligence Group, 10 januari 2014; Libyan separatists set up Cyrenaica oil company, op website ANSA, 11 november 2013; 6SOLWWLQJ /LE\D, op website Cyprus Mail, 2 april 2014 15 )HGHUDOLVPH LQ /LE\D 7KH QHYHU HQGLQJ GHEDWH, op website al-­Jazeera English, 9 mei 2014; Waleed, F., -DGKUDQ UHMHFWV 0DHWLJ¡V HOHFWLRQ DV 30, in Libya Herald, 7 mei 2014: www.libyaherald. com/2014/05/07/jadhran-­rejects-­maetigs-­election-­as-­pm 16 /LE\D¡V UHQHJDGH PDMRU +DIWDU LQWHUYLHZHG YRZV ´WR FOHDQVH¾/LE\D RI ,VODPLVWV op website BBC, 21 mei 2014; 0DSSLQJ /LE\D¡V DUPHG JURXSV, op website al-­Jazeera English, 2 juni 2014: www.aljazeera. com/news/middleeast/2014/05/libya-­armed-­groups-­explained-­201452293619773132.html; Ibrahim, N. en Ahmed, M., +DIWHU IRUFHV FODLP WR FRQWURO PRVW RI %HQJKD]L IROORZLQJ GHDGO\ FODVKHV DQG DLUVWULNHV, in Libya Herald, 2 juni 2013; Lamloum, I., Crisis eases as court rules Libya PM election invalid, op web-­ site AFP, 9 juni 2014 17 Libya declares oil crisis over, op website al-­Jazeera English, 3 juli 2014: www.aljazeera.com/news/ middleeast/2014/07/libya-­declares-­oil-­crisis-­over-­20147301210144660.html; /LE\D FRQVWLWXWLRQ GUDIWLQJ body starts work, op website Reuters, 21 april 2014; &RPPLVVLRQ ZDQWV DOO /LE\DQV LQYROYHG LQ GUDIWLQJ constitution vision – paper, op website BBC, 11 mei 2014 1

Pag. Â 8

Stichting  JASON   4  Nr.  39  4 Nummer  3

45

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SEPARATISME Eindnoten

Is  Taiwan  struggling  for  independence?

Pag. Â 22

7KH &URVV 6WUDLW 6HUYLFH 7UDGH $JUHHPHQW (translation 2013). Available at: http://www.ecfa.org.tw/ EcfaAttachment/ECFADoc/ECFA.pdf [Accessed 7 July 2014].

2 Cole, J.M. (2014). 7DLZDQHVH 2FFXS\ /HJLVODWXUH RYHU &KLQD 3DFW The Diplomat. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/taiwanese-­occupy-­legislature-­over-­china-­pact/ [Accessed 05 Sep-­ tember 2014].

3 Chung, L. (2014). More than 150 injured as police evict student protesters from Taiwan parliament.

South China Morning Post. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1455773/taipei-­ VWXGHQW SURWHVWHUV RFFXS\ JRYHUQPHQW KT UDQVDFN FDELQHW RIÀFH >$FFHVVHG 6HSWHPEHU @ 4 J. R. (2014). %LJ EURWKHU FRPHV ZRRLQJ. The Economist. Available at: http://www.economist.com/ blogs/banyan/2014/07/china-­taiwan-­relations-­0 [Accessed 8 July 2014].

5 Chung, L. (2014). Plan could see mainland China visitors to use Taiwan as transit point. South China Morning Post. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1540432/call-­me-­maybe-­visit-­ LQJ RIÀFLDO ]KDQJ ]KLMXQ VHWV GLUHFW OLQN EHWZHHQ >$FFHVVHG -XO\ @ 6 Hhung, J. (2014). Echoes of the Wild Lily Movement. The China Post. Available at: http://www.china-­ post.com.tw/commentary/the-­china-­post/joe-­hung/2014/03/24/403513/Echoes-­of.htm [Accessed 8 July 2014].

7 See 2.

8 Wang, C. (2014). 75$'( 3$&7 6,(*( 3ROLWLFLDQV FLYLF JURXSV ODVK RXW RYHU FUDFNGRZQ. Taipei Times.

Available at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/03/25/2003586494/1 [Ac-­ cessed 05 September 2014].

9 Sui, C. (2014). What unprecedented protest means for Taiwan. BBC News. Available at: http://www. bbc.com/news/world-­asia-­26743794 [Accessed 05 September 2014].

10 see 6.

11 DPP Resolution on Taiwan’s Future. Available at: http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-­9920.htm [Accessed 8 July 2014].

12 Wang, F. (2007). DPP passes ‘normal country’ resolution. Available at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/ News/front/archives/2007/10/01/2003381145/1 [Accessed 8 July 2014].

13 Taiwan Security Research (2014). 6XSSRUW IRU 8QLÀFDWLRQ :DQHV. Available at: http://www.taiwanse-­ curity.org/app/news.php?Sn=5901 [Accessed 5 September 2014].

14 see 8.

clash  of  religions K.D. Boettcher (2001). The Impact and Importance of the Elizabethan Re-­Conquest of Ireland. South-­ ern Illinois University Carbondale. Honors Theses.

Paper 137.

2 Moody T.W., Martin F.X. and Bryne F.J. (1976). A New History of Ireland. Vol. 3, Early Modern Ire-­ land:1534-­1691. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Page 122-­123.

3 Darby, J. (1995) )DFHWV RI WKH FRQĂ LFW LQ 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG $ %DFNJURXQG (VVD\. New York: Macmillan Press. Part one, chapter two.

4 5 + Dorney, J. (2014). The Eleven Years War 1641-­52 – A Brief Overview. Available at: http://www.their-­ ishstory.com/2014/01/10/the-­eleven-­years-­war-­a-­brief-­overview/ 6 McConnel, J. (2011). ,ULVK +RPH 5XOH DQ LPDJLQHG IXWXUH. BBC. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ history/british/victorians/home_rule_movement_01.shtml.

7 Durney, J. (2004). The Volunteer: Uniforms, Weapons and History of the Irish Republican Army 1913–1997. Naas: Gaul House.

8 Buckley, M. (1956). Irish Easter Rising of 1916. Social Science. Vol. 31(1). Page 49-­55.

9 Purdie, B. (1990). 3ROLWLFV LQ WKH 6WUHHWV 7KH RULJLQV RI WKH &LYLO 5LJKWV 0RYHPHQW Belfast: Blackstaff Press.

7 10 12 + + Lynn, B. (2013). &KURQRORJ\ RI .H\ (YHQWV LQ ,ULVK +LVWRU\ WR &RQà LFW $UFKLYH RQ WKH Internet. Available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch1800-­1967.htm.

11 Ruene, J. & Todd, J. (1996). 7KH '\QDPLFV RI &RQà LFW LQ 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG 3RZHU &RQà LFW DQG (PDQ-­ cipation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page 1-­37.

13 Kelters, S. (2014). Voilence in the Troubels. BBC. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/topics/ troubles_violence 14 15 + O’Callaghan, K. (2010). 9RLFHV IURP WKH JUDYH 7KH 7URXEOHV. BBC. Available at: http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=YSb_XhN2L6sv 1

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Pag. Â 30

.Cheterian, Vicken. 2008. War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier. London: Hurst Publishers Ltd, pp. 169.

2 .Ibid, pp. 184.

3 ,QGHSHQGHQW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO )DFW )LQGLQJ 0LVVLRQ RQ WKH &RQĂ LFW LQ *HRUJLD 9ROXPH , SS 4 .In 2006, President Saakashvili unsuccessfully attempted to make Georgia become a NATO member.

Source: Jones, Stephen. 2013. Georgia: A Political History Since Independence. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, pp. 265.

5 ,QGHSHQGHQW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO )DFW )LQGLQJ 0LVVLRQ RQ WKH &RQĂ LFW LQ *HRUJLD 9ROXPH , SS

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Understanding  Georgia  1

African  Refugees  in  IsraÍl

Pag. Â 34

“People who have moved across international borders in search of protection under the 1951 Refu-­ gee Convention, but whose claim for refugee status has not yet been determined.â€?, Martin, D. A., et al. )RUFHG 0LJUDWLRQ in Law and Policy 9, 2007; Lior, I., ,VUDHO 6HFUHWO\ )O\LQJ $V\OXP 6HHNHUV WR 8JDQGD, in +DDUHW] FRP, February 19, 2014: www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.575028 2 “Any person who ‌ owing to well-­founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.â€?, 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(A) 3 Sabar, G., ,VUDHO DQG WKH Âś+RO\ /DQG¡ 7KH 5HOLJLR 3ROLWLFDO 'LVFRXUVH RI 5LJKWV DPRQJ $IULFDQ 0LJUDQW /DERXUHUV DQG $IULFDQ $V\OXP 6HHNHUV , in African Diaspora 3, 2010, p. 45 4 Human Rights Watch, “, :DQWHG WR /LH 'RZQ DQG 'LHÂľ 7UDIĂ€FNLQJ DQG 7RUWXUH RI (ULWUHDQV LQ 6XGDQ DQG (J\SW, February 11, 2014, p. 16 5 Nakesh, O. et al, ([SRVXUH WR 7UDXPDWLF ([SHULHQFHV $PRQJ $V\OXP 6HHNHUV IURP (ULWUHD DQG 6XGDQ 'XULQJ 0LJUDWLRQ WR ,VUDHO, in -RXUQDO RI ,PPLJUDQW DQG 0LQRULW\ +HDOWK 16-­2 (2014), p. 2 6 Ibid., pp. III, 1, 7, 9, 35, 40, 67, 71, 75 7 Furst-­Nichols, R. and Jacobsen, K., $IULFDQ 5HIXJHHV LQ ,VUDHO, in )RUFHG 0LJUDWLRQ 5HYLHZ 37, 2011, p.

55 8 Lior, I and the Associated Press, 6ZHGHQ $FFHSWV 'R]HQV RI (ULWUHDQ $V\OXP 6HHNHUV IURP ,VUDHO, in +DDUHW], January 7, 2014: www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.567450 9 Idem note 6; Lior, I., ,VUDHO 6ODPPHG IRU 6HQGLQJ $V\OXP 6HHNHUV WR 5ZDQGD ZLWKRXW 6WDWXV, Rights, in +DDUHW], April 6, 2014: www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-­1.583973 10 Perry, A., 6ROYLQJ ,VUDHO V $IULFDQ 5HIXJHH &ULVLV, in 9LUJLQLD -RXUQDO RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ 51, 2010, pp.

160-­2 11 Idem note 2, art. 3 12 Idem note 10, pp.163, 174-­5 13 Idem note 10, pp. 161-­2 14 Idem note 4, pp. 61-­2 15 Idem note 6 16 Idem note 10, pp. 166-­8 17 Derfner, L., &RPLQJ LQ 7KURXJK WKH %DFN 'RRU, in U. S. News & World Report 144:7, 2008 19 Idem note 10, p. 165 20 Idem note 3 21 Idem note 10, p. 171 22 Efraim, O., Holocaust Survivors Hand Gift Baskets to Asylum Seekers, in YnetNews.com, March 17, 2014: www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-­4499992,00.html 23 Idem note 4, pp. 61-­62 24 Idem note 8 1

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Pag. Â 38

Kush, L. “V Donetske vspomnili o svoix kornyah i prosyatsya v Velikobritaniyu� [Donetsk remembers its roots and asks to join the UK]. March, 19, 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/ukraine_in_rus-­ sian/2014/03/140329_ru_s_yuzovka_donetsk_fb.shtml 2 Ostrovskiy, P. “V Donetskoy oblasti ezhegodno rastyot kolichestvo shkol’nikov, kotorye vybirayut ukrainskiy yazuk (INFOGRAFIKA) [In the Donetsk area a number of schoolchildren choosing for Ukrain-­ ian is growing every year (Infographic)]. February, 21, 2012. http://novosti.dn.ua/details/174507/ 1

Stichting  JASON   4  Nr.  39  4 Nummer  3

47

SEPARATISME

JASON gaat digitaal Het komende jaar zullen alle 39 jaargangen van JASON Magazine worden gedigitaliseerd en op de website worden geplaatst. Zo kunt u lezen wat JASON schreef over de Iraanse revolutie in 1979, de val van de Sovjet-­‐Unie in 1991, 11 september in 2001 of een van de vele andere internationale vredes-­‐ en veiligheidsvraagstukken die sinds 1976 ter sprake zijn gekomen in het Magazine.

Maar tot onze grote spijt ontbreken een aantal nummers van JASON Magazine in ons eigen archief. Wij roepen dan ook onze trouwe lezers op om ons te melden als zij een van de ontbrekende exemplaren in hun bezit hebben, op redactie@stichtingjason.nl.

op zoek: Jaargang 1 (1976), nr. 1 Jaargang 2 (1977), nr. 1 Jaargang 4 (1979), nr. 3 Jaargang 5 (1980), nr. 1 en 2 Jaargang 6 (1981), nr. 4 Jaargang 16 (1991), nr. 1 Jaargang 17 (1994), nr. 2 Jaargang 21 (1996), alle nummers Jaargang 23 (1998), nr. 1 Jaargang 25 (2000), nr. 1,2 Jaargang 26 (2001), nr. 3 Jaargang 32 (2007), nr. 2

is niet geheel zeker of deze ooit zijn gedrukt: Jaargang 1 (1976), nr. 6 Jaargang 19 (1994), nr. 6 Jaargang 22 (1997), nrs. 3,4 Jaargang 23 (1998), nrs. 3,4 Jaargang 24 (1999), nrs. 3,4 Jaargang 25 (2000), nr. 4 Jaargang 27 (2002), nrs. 3,4 Jaargang 30 (2005), nrs. 3,4 Jaargang 31 (2006), nrs. 2,3,4 Jaargang 32 (2007), nr. 4 Jaargang 34 (2009), nrs. 3,4 Jaargang 35 (2010), nrs. 3,4 Jaargang 36 (2011), nrs. 3,4 Jaargang 37 (2012), nrs. 3,4

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Stichting JASON 4 Nr. 39 4 Nummer 3