Wen-hao Lu
Brexit
Huai-jen Wang
Balancing US, China
Kennedy Lin
Building the Indian Navy
Wan Chih-hung
Japan’s Defense Industry: Opportunities for Taiwan
Scott Romaniuk
Tobias Burgers
Shih-yueh Yang
Scott Romaniuk, Tobias Burgers & Shih-yueh Yang
Submissions: Essays submitted for publication are not to exceed 2,000 words in length, and should conform to the following basic format for each 1200-1600 word essay: 1. Synopsis, 100-200 words; 2. Background description, 100-200 words; 3. Analysis, 800-1,000 words; 4. Policy Recommendations, 200-300 words. Book reviews should not exceed 1,200 words in length. Notes should be formatted as endnotes and should be kept to a minimum. Authors are encouraged to submit essays and reviews as attachments to emails; Microsoft Word documents are preferred. For questions of style and usage, writers should consult the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors of unsolicited manuscripts are encouraged to consult with the executive editor at xiongmu@gmail.com before formal submission via email. The views expressed in the articles are the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their affiliate institutions or of Strategic Vision Manuscripts are subject to copyediting, both mechanical and substantive, as required and according to editorial guidelines. No major alterations may be made by an author once the type has been set. Arrangements for reprints should be made with the editor. Cover photograph of Kurdish Peshmerga resistance fighters is used courtesy of Kurdishstruggle under a Creative Commons license.
Editor
Fu-Kuo Liu
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(ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 6, Number 31, February, 2017, published under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.
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The editors and staff of Strategic Vision would like to wish our readers well as we begin the new year. The Asia-Pacific region continues to undergo important developments. We hope that students and scholars in the academic community have the chance to keep-up with these events. In support of that effort, we offer our latest edition of Strategic Vision.
We open this issue with Dr. Wen-hao Lu, currently attending the US Marine Corps War College in Quantico, Virginia, who examines the unprecedented nature of the Islamic State and how this terrorist group will likely continue to pose a global threat.
Huai-jen Wang, a PhD student at the ROC National Defense University and a former navy commander, examines how Britain’s recent Brexit vote will have an impact on the United States as well as the European Union.
Next, Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy Lin, a PhD student at the ROC National Defense University, argues that some Southeast Asian countries are adjusting their relations with the United States and China to accommodate China’s growing regional clout.
Commander Wan Chih-hung, a PhD student at the ROC National Defense University, offers a theoretical analysis of India’s recent push to beef up its naval forces in answer to China’s own drive to build aircraft carriers.
Finally, Scott Romaniuk, Tobias Burgers and Dr. Shih-yueh Yang argue that Japan’s recent interest in entering the armssales business could represent a potential source of military hardware for Taiwan.
We hope you enjoy this issue, and look forward to bringing you the finest analysis and reporting on the issues of importance to security in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region.
Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu Editor Strategic Vision
Wen-hao Lu
In June 2014, the Islamic State took control of Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq, as well as several border cities in Syria. The leader of the Islamic State subsequently declared his intent to establish a caliphate. These moves dramatically shocked the international community. Although the Islamic State is a Sunni extremist group with only about 30,000 jihadists, it was able to defeat Iraqi government forces and take several important cities in a short time.
The Islamic State has a different strategy compared
with other terrorist groups and it carries out its military operations and objectives with the goal of creating a state. The rise of the Islamic State was made possible by its sophisticated support network, and by a lack of opposition from corrupt Iraqi forces. Moreover, the Islamic State has multiple sources of funding, an effective social network and media strategy, and a strict structure. This distinguishes the Islamic State from regular extremist groups and enables it to undertake broader, more ambitious operations.
The United States dismantled Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s military after invading in 2003 and spent US$20 billion to build a new 800,000-strong force. This force was intended to keep the peace when the US military withdrew in 2011. Five years ago, when Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero was in charge of training Iraqi forces to provide security for their country, he called them “fearless and absolutely reliable.” Today, however, Iraqi soldiers struggle against the ferocious militants of the Islamic State, and in the wake of humiliating defeats on the battlefield, Barbero now says the United States was wrong to pull all of its troops out of the country and not leave behind a residual force to support the Iraqi army.
Iraqi Major General Ahmed Salim Bahjat has described corruption as “the biggest danger to the country, more dangerous than terrorism.” The widespread corruption in the former government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the political circles around him trickled down to the army. The performance of the Iraqi military was far from perfect, even before the US pullout. Endemic problems of fraud in military contracting, extortion at security checkpoints, and the padding of rosters with non-existent soldiers are things the US military was never able to
solve, and sometimes ignored. A recent investigation into corruption in the Iraqi military shows the situation has become far worse. Iraq’s new government has discovered 50,000 “ghost soldiers” who received army salaries without showing up for work, a practice which accelerated the military’s collapse in the face of Islamic State fighters.
The Islamic State is the richest terrorist organization in history, with assets totaling over US$2 billion in 2014. If the Islamic State were to be viewed as a country, its GDP ranking, issued by World Bank, would put it at number 165 in the world. This surpasses 26 other countries, such as Liberia and the Solomon Islands. Islamic State militants, who once relied on wealthy Persian Gulf donors for money, have become a self-sustaining financial juggernaut, earning more than US$3 million a day from oil smuggling, human trafficking, theft, and extortion, according to US intelligence officials and private experts.
In addition to smuggling oil, the Islamic State has also extended its control over a number of other important natural resources. It has gained control over several natural gas fields in Syria and Iraq, including the largest Iraqi reserve of natural gas at the Akkas field located in Al-Anbar province. The region also
includes phosphate mining and cement plants, which also fall under control of Islamic State.
It is also relevant to note that Iraq and Syria have always been fertile ground for grain production. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Iraqi provinces under the Islamic State’s control, especially the Nineveh and Salah ad Din governorates, are the most fertile in the country, accounting for 30 percent of national wheat production (or 1 million tons) and 40 percent of national barley production.
It is worth remembering that the most effective method of financing a terrorist group is the practice of terror against the local people and international travelers. Since its inception, the Islamic State has relied on kidnapping and other forms of criminal activity to fund its activities, targeting businessmen, local politicians and clerics, in addition to foreign nationals. According to estimates, the Islamic State raises as much as US$10 million per month through ransom payments.
The Islamic State puts governing structures in place to rule the territories it conquers once the dust settles on the battlefield. It has gone from being a purely military force to building a system that can provide basic services, such as making sure that gas and food are available to its citizens. From the cabinet and the governors to the financial and legislative bodies, the Islamic State’s bureaucratic hierarchy looks a lot like those of some Western countries whose values it rejects.
In fact, the Islamic State is not a mere terrorist organization, but rather a terrorist army and an ambitious government. Though its fighters are few in number, the Islamic State has a strict top-down structure which resembles larger government structures. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the Boss of The Islamic State, his Cabinet advisers, and his two key deputies comprise the executive branch of the government, known as Al Imara. It is worth noting that the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC)—which reports directly to the executive branch—is the caliphate’s religious monitor,
Image: KAZ Vorpal
appointed to make sure that all the local councils and governors are sticking to Islamic State’s version of Islamic law.
Under Abu Bakr’s command, there are two powerful deputies who oversee Syria and Iraq. The group has probably split the governance of the Islamic State into Syrian and Iraqi branches simply to make it easier to run. The two deputies deliver orders to the governors in charge of the various sub-states in Syria and Iraq under IS control, who then instruct local councils on how to implement the executive branch’s decrees. These decrees cover everything from media relations and recruiting to policing and financial matters.
Media efforts are an integral and essential part of the Islamic State’s operations, on par with its military and administrative effort. In this respect, it is greatly helped by the decentralized nature of social media—particularly Twitter. The Islamic State has allowed each of its supporters to effectively create and operate his own ministry of information, echoing a standard party line as well as creating and spreading their own messages. The importance of social media to the Islamic State is evident in the way that pictures
of Abu Bakr declaring the caliphate on 4 July, 2014, appeared on Twitter even before the video of his full speech was uploaded to YouTube, helping to ensure that it would be carried on most major international news networks.
The Islamic State has several media divisions that produce and disseminate online media materials. AlFurqan and Al-I’tisam are responsible for the visual material: the first concentrates on military warfare and showing the strength of the state, while the second is dedicated to social and religious activities and sermons. Overall, the Islamic State is crowd-sourcing its propaganda. There is no precedent for this, given the novelty of social media platforms and file-sharing sites, and so, in a counterintuitive move, the Islamic State has maximized control of its message by giving up control of its delivery.
On 7 August, 2014, former US President Barack Obama announced that he had authorized limited airstrikes against Islamic militants in Iraq, scrambling to avert the fall of the Kurdish capital, Erbil,
Islamic State flags affixed to the group’s fleet of sport utility vehicles. The terrorist group is well-funded not just by donors but by selling oil.
and returning the United States to a significant battlefield role in Iraq for the first time since the last American soldier left the country at the end of 2011. A deployment of another 1,500 troops was sent to join the training and advise-and-assist mission in Iraq against Islamic militants. The Obama administration has ruled out any possibility of putting boots on the ground to battle Islamic State forces. The strategy instead focuses on recovering the strength of the Iraqi Army by providing training and assistance and supporting Iraqi forces with intense airstrikes.
Although recently inaugurated US President Donald Trump claimed during his campaign that Obama’s “leading from behind” strategy only served to weaken America’s leadership role in the world, and has demanded a more aggressive strategy against the Islamic State, it is unlikely that the new administration will deploy significant numbers of US troops without consideration of American casualties. One possible strategy for the Trump administration, according to proposals by senior officials, could be a dramatic increase in the supply of weapons to Kurdish fighters in Syria, significantly more US airstrikes against the
jihadi group, and an expansion of American Special Forces operating on the ground.
Ultimately, no matter what strategy is used, the Islamic State will not be eliminated without dealing with the sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shiites in Iraq. The trust between the two groups has been broken due to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s intent to mitigate Sunni power so as to create his political elite. The endeavor to rebuild the trust will take a long time to fulfill, no matter how many troops or how much money is thrown at the problem. The recent advance of the Iraqi security forces, with the international community’s effort, has achieved success in driving Islamic State fighters from their main stronghold of Mosul and significantly weakened the strength of this terrorist organization. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to believe that global stability will be free of the toxic Islamic State in the near future. The only way to drive the Islamic State away is to decrease sectarian conflict. Until this problem is solved, it appears likely that the Islamic State will continue to cause upheaval and violence in the region, and around the world. n
On June 23, 2016, British citizens made history by casting their votes to leave the European Union (EU). In a surprising and monumental decision, the motion to leave the EU won by 52 percent to 48 percent. The referendum turnout was 71.8 percent, with more than 30 million people voting. Prime Minister David Cameron, who had supported Britain’s membership in the European Union, consequently resigned on July 13, after which Theresa May, leader of the Conservative Party, became prime minister. In order to leave the EU, the UK has to invoke an agreement called Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty which grants both sides two years
to agree on the terms of the split. May has said that she plans to trigger Article 50 to start the two-year process of Brexit talks by March 2017, and after a phased process of implementation, the UK will fully exit the EU by March 2019. However, no one really knows how the Brexit process will work, because Article 50 was only created in late 2009, and has never been used.
Prime Minister May has stated, “we will seek a new and equal partnership between an independent, selfgoverning Global Britain and our friends and allies in the EU.” The impact of Brexit will not only affect the European balance of power, but also the global
financial and strategic arrangement. Despite these assurances, the transition is likely to cause a great deal of upheaval in the Western order.
From the European perspective, uncertainty over Brexit may well persuade some companies to refrain from investing in Britain for the benefit of the remaining European Union countries. Amsterdam could be one of the immediate beneficiaries due to the transfer in bank assurance. If new customs duties are imposed on “made in UK” products, British industry would be penalized, which could spur some British companies to relocate some of their production to the continent.
The banking sector is one of the areas expected to be most affected by Brexit, due to the role played by the United Kingdom—and especially London—in world finance. The HSBC Bank, which fears the abolition of the “financial passport” of English Banks to operate in Europe, is considering transferring its headquarters from London to Paris. Other institutions, if deprived of convenient access to the EU market, could also leave London to settle on the continent.
The devaluation of the British currency may appear as a means of salvation for the British econo-
my. A 20-percent drop in the Pound Sterling would immediately restore competitiveness to British exports, to the detriment of businesses in the EU. The battle for export markets will therefore be tougher for European companies. However, a devaluation of British currently would cause inflation in England,
which the government does not want. For Europe, if British growth slows down, it will also harm an important export market for European products. This can only weaken the growth of the Eurozone.
The real risk is the threat of tax dumping. If the UK becomes a tax haven with a 10-percent corporate tax rate, then many European companies could relocate their headquarters out of the EU. Such dumping could happen if Brussels removes the financial passport from British banks. It will all depend on the upcoming negotiations. The coming period will create uncertainty and companies will hesitate to invest
“Brexit will inevitably be used and manipulatedbypopulistpartiesinEurope who are dissatisfied with the structure andregulationsoftheEU.”Norwegian forces near the Arctic Circle during the military exercise Cold Response 2009. photo: Soldatnytt
because they need visibility.
In economic affairs, French influence and position may be compromised as a result of Brexit. With the absence of Britain, Germany’s economic clout will only increase. Without Britain’s presence as a balancing factor, France may have a more difficult time wielding influence in the face of a more dominant Germany.
Brexit will inevitably be used and manipulated by populist parties in Europe who are also dissatisfied with the structure and regulations of the EU. The example of Brexit will embolden their efforts, and increase their strength. Those who support the solidarity of the EU will be at a much greater disadvantage as a result of Brexit.
London’s decreased influence in financial markets as a result of Brexit may also produce a scramble and increased competition between European financial centers to take advantage of the loss of Britain. If this is not handled well, it could add to the sense of divi-
sion and frustration which currently exists in the EU.
Brexit will also produce mixed results for the relationship between the United States and Britain. The United States and Britain may see strengthened relations as a result of decreased British interaction with the continent, but the United States will lose a great deal of ability to influence the EU via Britain. This could weaken US goals in Europe, particularly in regards to the pursuit of a free trade agreement with the EU.
The impact of Brexit will immediately diminish the power of the EU in the United Nations Security Council. With the loss of Britain, France will be the only permanent European member of the UN Security Council. Europe’s ability to influence security-related decisions will be marginalized in the future. Moreover, France will also be the lone nuclear
power in Europe.
Britain’s decision to leave the EU will also weaken the ability of the West to put pressure on a resurgent Russia. The Kremlin has long sought to undermine the EU and NATO in order to more easily achieve its goal of expanding its sphere of influence in places like the Crimean region of Ukraine, and increase its influence in the region in general. Brexit removes Britain as an influential voice in European efforts to isolate and punish Russia for its military operations in Crimea, and its role in destabilizing the Ukraine. It also empowers the Kremlin by enabling it to deal with strong countries individually, rather than as blocs. It can also be exploited by Russian nationalists as an example of how a lack of unity can lead to weakness. Post-Brexit developments may also lead to new relationships between the United States and continental Europe. While the United States will be keen to maintain strong ties with the United Kingdom, it may also need to strengthen relations with other members of the European Union. Over time, a second special relationship could develop if the United States relies more heavily on France and Germany to manage diplomatic and military affairs with the EU. Germany has already begun to assume the leading
role in the transatlantic economic and trade relationship; a natural position given its status as the dominant economic power and decisionmaker in the EU. Similarly, a Franco-American rapprochement has taken place since France rejoined NATO in 2009. More recently, France has become a privileged ally of the United States in the field of military cooperation, which will be crucial for the future of transatlantic relations in security and defense.
In the long-term, Brexit may weaken Western cooperation, and benefit Russia in its dealings with the West. The United States may decide to re-evaluate its relationship with Britain, and seek to cultivate closer relations with major EU powers such as Germany and France. If this were to occur, it would usher in a transition phase where the US and major EU powers adjust to new roles, and new relations. If this transition phase is not managed well—a likely possibility given European distrust towards the current US administration—it could provide Russia with an opportunity to deepen its influence in Europe. Moreover, a fractured Western order may produce a greater sense of vulnerability in Europe to Russian intimidation tactics. This would provide Russia with an additional weapon in its foreign-policy arsenal. n
In January of 2017, Cambodia informed the United States that it intended to cancel the annual Angkor Sentinel joint military exercise for the next two years, which had already been in the planning stages. Officials claimed that the Angkor Sentinel exercise had to be “postponed” because Cambodian forces would be unable to fully participate as a result of demands on them related to elections to be held in June, as well as a six-month campaign to eradicate drug-related crime. Other activities, including military exchanges and training programs, were not affected. This development indicates that some Southeast Asian nations, such as Cambodia and the Philippines, a traditional US ally, have recently adjusted their diplomatic and military relations to find a new balance between the United States and China, rather than favoring the traditionally dominant United States.
Phnom Penh’s rationale for cooperating with Washington derives mainly from political and economic motivations. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in 1993 after the freely elected Royal Government of Cambodia was formed. Since 2010, Cambodia and the United States have held the annual Angkor Sentinel joint exercise, which is designed to collectively strengthen humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) capabilities, and improve military-to-military cooperation. The drill brings together personnel from Cambodia’s army, the National Center for Peacekeeping Forces,
Mines and Explosive Remnants of War Clearance and the Royal Gendarmerie of Cambodia, with US forces from US Army Pacific, as well as several other units. This exercise is also a part of the Global Peace Operations Initiatives (GPOI) which is a US government-funded security-assistance program intended to enhance international capacity to effectively conduct United Nations and regional peace support operations (PSOs) by building partner-country capabilities to train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies. In Asia, a number of countries have participated in GPOI training events, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, and Nepal.
The United States is also working with Cambodia to further develop its democratic institutions and promote respect for human rights. Increasing trade and addressing challenges from promoting regional security to expanding global health are also important areas of cooperation. Building a closer relationship with the United States helps Cambodia’s government to consolidate its international political legitimacy, which has often been criticized by other governments and human rights groups for violations of international human rights law. The United States also provides significant economic support to Cambodia, and is now its largest export partner.
In his first term, the administration of former US
President Barack Obama was clear that it considered strong relationships in the Asia-Pacific region to be a top priority. Most regional countries doubtless were eager to grasp the opportunity to pursue deeper engagement with the United States in economic, political, security, and geostrategic areas. This interest was strengthened because it was evident that China was rapidly modernizing, and this produced fear and uncertainty about China’s ambitions in the region.
According to the balance of power theory in international relations, a rising power is likely to take advantage of its position to attack weaker neighbors. This creates an incentive for those threatened to unite in a defensive coalition to balance against the rising power. Although Southeast Asian nations were not strenuously balancing against China, some regional countries such as Vietnam nonetheless took measures to enhance defense relations with the United States. In 2012, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a US-Vietnamese strategic partnership.
Following that, the US Navy held annual exercises with the Vietnamese navy, and Hanoi opened its commercial repair facilities at Cam Ranh Bay to all navies. In 2011, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation. In June 2012, then US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta visited Cam Ranh Bay where both countries have conducted joint naval activities.
Until recently, the Philippines has also publicly supported the US rebalancing strategy. Under former President Benigno Aquino, the Philippines forged closer military ties with the United States in an effort to deal with the China threat. Manila reinforced its defense arrangement with the United States, holding increased joint naval exercises, and requested that the United States deploy spy planes in the South China Sea area. The Philippines has also offered greater access to its military facilities in exchange for increased US military assistance.
Likewise, Cambodia took the opportunity to balance its foreign policy and improve relations with the United States. Cambodia became more active in regional forums and participated in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting plus Eight, with the first such meeting held in Hanoi on 12 October, 2010, as a link to shape their defense relations. From 2010 until 2016, they achieved a number of military goals in such areas as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), explosive ordnance disposal, countering improvised explosive devices, and leadership training. Additionally, Cambodia collaborated with the United States to send its forces to take part in UN peacekeeping missions in a number of countries.
After the results of the arbitration case on the South China Sea, the relationship between Southeast Asian countries and the United States and China, which are the two biggest powers in the region, has gradually changed, from one of soft balancing to maintaining more equal engagement between the two powers. This shift is related to two broad developments in the region.
The first major development is the continual increase of China’s influence in the region. China’s increasing
influence was reflected in the November 2015 signing of the Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between China and ASEAN. Under this agreement, all sides agreed to explore and undertake economic cooperation activities in economic and technical areas. As a result, bilateral trade has surged nearly 60 times what it was in 1991, to reach US$472 billion in 2015,
and stakeholders eye continued growth, aiming at reaching US$1 trillion in trade by 2020.
Although the Arbitral Tribunal at The Hague issued its final award on the South China Sea dispute, and despite the fact that the United States has been trying to internationalize the dispute, ASEAN-China relations are moving forward. As the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the ASEAN foreign ministers’
“All of ASEAN is nervous about how theTrumpAdministrationwillhandle relations with Asia.”
meeting noted that a solution to the disputes rests on efforts to “enhance mutual trust and confidence,” and to “exercise restraint” by avoiding actions that may complicate the situation. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte also sought to heal relations with China, rather than inflame them by pressing the tribunal’s ruling.
Chinese President Xi Jin-ping told the World Economic Forum in January 2017 that China would advance the building of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific and conduct negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to form a global network of free trade arrangements. This further demonstrates that China is successfully utilizing economic measures to increase its geopolitical influence. As a result, Southeast Asian nations will likely be eager to maintain good relations with China in the future.
The second major development to impact the region was the election of Donald Trump as US president, and his calls for reduced American involvement in
the region. All of ASEAN is nervous about how the Trump administration will handle relations with Asia. Immediately after taking office, Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP), a trade agreement negotiated by the Obama administration and 11 other Pacific Rim countries. He also talked about requiring Japan and South Korea to pay more for US troops stationed on their soil. This has added to an atmosphere of uncertainty pervading the Southeast Asian region.
The impact of these two developments is evident in Cambodia’s decision to postpone its exercise with the United States. Given the growing complexities in the international arena, Cambodia is seeking to hedge its bets and avoid the appearance of becoming too close to the United States. According to Cambodian Defense Ministry spokesman General Chhum Socheath, Cambodian forces try to make
friends with all countries in the region, including the United States, China, Russia and Vietnam, to which they have also sent officers for training.
Cambodia and China have also recently strengthened military ties. The two countries held their firstever naval training exercise at the end of last year. Besides the United States and China, Cambodia also tries to balance relations with other militaries such as such as Japan and India.
In order to ensure and stabilize economic growth, Cambodia is also seeking to diversify its economic exchange and cooperation partners. It recently deepened cooperation with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which is focused on promoting agriculture, improving infrastructure, enhancing social development through health care and education, and strengthening governance through legal reform. Cambodia-China bilateral trade has also increased over the years, reaching US$4.21 billion in 2015, with expectations of reaching US$5 billion within the year.
China has become Cambodia’s largest investor, with over US$10 billion in cumulative investments. In May
2015, Cambodia called on China to further encourage Chinese firms to explore investment opportunities in Cambodia. Vietnam is Cambodia’s second largest import source, and bilateral trade increased to US$5 billion in 2015. These developments have decreased Cambodia’s dependency on US aid and promoted sustainable economic development by strengthening regional economic ties.
In conclusion, smaller countries in Southeast Asia face a delicate diplomatic balancing act between the United States and China. Taking sides with either of these two superpowers presents undue risks. Due to China’s influence on the world stage, and uncertainty about US policy, countries in the region will seek to strike a balance between the two powers. Cambodia’s recent decision to suspend military exercises with the United States is a reflection of this uncertainty, and its desire to balance relations with the two powers, rather than favoring the United States over China. If recent developments in Cambodia are any indicator, Southeast Asian countries will be forced to walk an increasingly delicate balance between the United States and China. n
Wan Chih-hung
India is a future world power which is strengthening its military at a rapid pace. This raises the question of what is driving Indian military development. This paper examines the issue utilizing the framework developed by political scientist Scott Sagan to explain why nations seek to develop nuclear weapons. Sagan’s three models include the security model, the norms model, and the domestic-politics model. Together they are instrumental in illuminating India’s motivations for expanding its naval capability, and in particular, ramping up development of aircraft carriers. An emerging question is whether India is simply worried about hostile neighbors, or if it is seeking to become Asia’s biggest military power.
Many states around the world, and especially in the region, want to understand India’s real intentions for military expansion because this expansion might lead to international tensions. Taken together, these three models help provide a more comprehensive perspective as to why India is strengthening its naval power. The security model is one of the most appropriate explanations for India’s sea power expansion for two primary reasons; robust deterrence and sea control. First, the Indian Navy needs powerful deterrence to prevent a hostile state from harming its interests. The Indian Navy could use its robust sea power to discourage neighbors that seek to undermine its interests and use its nuclear second-strike capabilities
as a threat of punishment. Second, India relies on sea control to protect its own sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Control of the sea is a fundamental and vital part of maritime strategy that secures trade and resources. This is critical for India, as roughly 90 percent of India’s goods pass through the Indian Ocean. Additionally, about 70 percent of India’s oil and more than 50 percent of its natural gas are received from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and Iraq. As a result of this dependency, India’s maritime strategy explicitly notes that whatever happens in the Indian Ocean littoral region can affect national security and constitutes a national interest.
India and China are two future great sea powers that have their own vast strategic needs and maritime interests around Asia. Aircraft carriers are the Indian Navy’s best conventional weapon to deter an unfriendly power—specifically China. Retired US Admiral Bud Zumwalt has described the main mission of an aircraft carrier as “crisis management and
deterrence of full-scale war.” Aircraft carriers can do this because they can deliver striking power to any coastal region on Earth. As Robert Jervis’s deterrence model states, “great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve.” That is to say, a state had better be able to display strong military capabilities to deter a potential threat’s aggressive behavior. According to research from the RAND Corporation, “the Indian Navy hopes to possess three V/STOL carriers … precipitated by Indian fears of regional conflicts spilling over into its security sphere,” citing “the Chinese presence on the Indian Ocean, which Indian policy-makers now trumpet as an inevitable but troublesome possibility.”
In the same vein, in the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, international relations (IR) expert David Scott argues that India is constructing a bluewater navy as a reaction to the emergence of another blue-water navy emerging in the region—specifically, that of China. Beijing is currently building its first indigenous aircraft carrier to add to the one it purchased from the Ukraine and refurbished. According
to Wang Min, a Communist Party secretary in China’s Liaoning province, “the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) needs a total of four carriers by 2020.” Keeping pace, India is not only constructing its third aircraft carrier but is planning to design another indigenous supercarrier, the Vishal, which is scheduled to be commissioned by 2025. India and China will be two robust sea powers that might go headto-head over the Indian Ocean in the next 10 to 15 years. Essentially, a rising China is India’s primary security concern due to its geostrategic significance and economic interests.
Sea control is one of the most significant missions that the Indian Navy undertakes to protect the security of its SLOCs. Prominent naval theorist Geoffrey Till defines sea control as that which “denote[s] a navy’s capacity to use an area of sea for its own purposes for
as long as necessary to achieve those purposes and to deny that ability to others.” Additionally, naval historian George Baer believes that “the first job of the fast-carrier task forces was sea control.” The Indian Navy knows sea control is vital and losing sea control is very dangerous because India cannot afford to lose control of sea lanes. The India Maritime Doctrine of 2009 reveals that the country’s maritime strategy is based on “the freedom to use the seas for our national purpose, under all circumstances.” Clearly, the Indian Navy is tasked with controlling the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the doctrine concludes that “sea control is the central concept around which the Indian Navy is structured.”
Aircraft carriers are ideal weapons systems that can wage war far away from their mainland, and thus support the mission of SLOC protection. Retired Indian Admiral Arun Prakash, former chief of the Naval Staff, has stated that they “aim to exercise selective sea control in the waters of the Indian Ocean by deploy-
The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and the Indian navy fleet oiler INS Shakti conduct a refueling at sea exercise during Exercise Malabar.
photo: Andrew Haller
ing task forces built around the core of aircraft carriers.” India could use aircraft carriers to project power to undertake long-range operations against potential threats from the entire Indian Ocean to the western Pacific Ocean. Accordingly, Indian policymakers may continually expand naval power to compete against rising hostile neighbors and secure sea control.
embarked on building its first indigenous aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant. This prestigious undertaking shows that India is one of the few great powers that have the capability to design and manufacture aircraft carriers.
The norms model is another driver for India’s maritime expansion because the aircraft carrier symbolizes sea power and sea power projects the image of a powerful state. An emerging China has sharply enhanced its national prestige and image as a great power by purchasing a decommissioned former Soviet aircraft carrier and refurbishing it for active service, rechristening it the Liaoning.
Since acquiring the aircraft carriers INS Viraat and Vikramaditya in 1987 and 2013, respectively, India has
Acquiring aircraft carriers also instills national pride and confidence. Indian Naval expert Uday Bhaskar argues that building aircraft carriers can uproot the image of India as a postcolonial weak state. Displaying an aircraft carrier is an effective way to exhibit a state’s power and to wield influence in the world. India has the option to use its aircraft carriers as a tool for long-range maritime diplomacy by showing its national flag far beyond the region. Furthermore, India is taking advantage of its bluewater navy to become a regional power and to apply for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Indian domestic political support is critical in supporting its maritime power expansion in the post-Cold War era. The government, led by a coalition of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), claim that India should put more focus on its Navy. Multiple rul-
“Indiaistakingadvantageofitsbluewater navy to become a regional power and apply for a permanent UNSecurityCouncilseat.”Members of the Indian navy give a tour of Indian Naval Station Hansa to crew members of Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS O’Kane. photo: Shod Williams
ing parties support naval modernization, and public support is strong as Indian people are proud of these accomplishments. Jaswant Singh, an Indian politician, views naval development as a national priority, asserting that, “today, the Indian navy faces a crisis in terms of its rapidly declining force levels, lack of sufficient funding, and limited warship construction programs.” Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a leader of the BJP, also aimed at building a blue-water naval capacity and decided to increase funding and naval modernization. The Indian government increased the Navy’s defense budget from US$7.5 billion for the years 1997-2001 to US$18.3 billion for 2002-2007. Additionally, the Navy’s share of the defense budget had increased from 11.2 percent in 1992-1993 to 18.26 percent in 2007-2008.
In weighing these three perspectives, it appears that the security model provides the strongest explanation for why India wants to expand its maritime capabilities. India seeks a stronger navy to develop
powerful deterrent capability and to maintain sea control. However, the norms model also helps explain how India’s aircraft carriers symbolize its status as a great sea power, and the domestic politics model adds additional insight into what drives India’s naval development.
If current trends continue, India and China could eventually find themselves competing for control and influence in some areas of the Indo-Pacific maritime region. Dependence on foreign oil and gas is a primary driver for naval development in India, as well as China, and this development may steer both countries into turbulent waters. Increased military expansion could result in a security dilemma that provokes an arms race, and an arms race between India and China could become white-hot. Unless both sides develop effective mechanisms for communication and transparency, the two countries could find themselves in an intense struggle for maritime dominance within the next 10 to 15 years. n
Japan’s aspirations as a weapons supplier presents opportunities for Taiwan
Scott Romaniuk, Tobias Burgers & Shih-yueh Yang
The cross-strait military balance between Taiwan and China is rapidly tilting toward China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in terms of both quantity and quality. With the purchase of advanced Russian fourth-generation fighters, as well as indigenous development of fifthgeneration fighters, Chinese airpower may soon be able to quickly overwhelm Taiwan’s air defense capabilities. One of the key limiting factors of Taiwan’s air defense has been its inability to purchase a newer
model of a fourth-generation fighter, or gain approval and support for the purchase of fifth-generation fighters. Taiwan lacks sufficient technology and production capabilities to produce a fifth-generation fighter, and limited domestic demand would render such a project extremely cost-prohibitive. Thus, it appears that Taiwan’s air force is doomed to operate increasingly antiquated fighters.
Recent developments in Japan may well provide Taiwan with a window of opportunity to purchase
Scott Romaniuk is the Editor of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War (2015) and The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy (2017). He can be reached at scott.romaniuk@unitn.it
Tobias Burgers is a doctoral candidate at the Otto-Suhr-Institute, Free University Berlin. He can be reached at burgers@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Dr. Shih-yueh Yang is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs and Business, Nanhua University. He can be reached at shihyueh@mail.nhu.edu.tw
an advanced fighter, however. Due to Washington’s refusal to sell the F-22 Raptor to Japan, the Japanese government has embarked upon an effort to produce its own fifth-generation fighter, the X-2. With its growing desire to become an arms exporter, its hightechnology industrial base, and its close relationship with Taiwan, Tokyo could potentially supply Taipei with a fifth-generation fighter.
In recent years, profound changes have taken place in the area of weapons research development in Japan. Although its arms industry has had significant collaboration with the United States, native weapon development was conducted on a limited scale. Japan’s arms industry has undergone a revival, however, having adopted the goal of developing greater alternatives to the country’s dependence on US weapons imports. This has resulted in a new drive to develop its own new, high-end, cutting-edge weapons systems. Over the past decade Japan has been developing an ever-increasing array of new weapons systems. Soryu-class submarines and the P-1 naval patrol plane highlight some of the indigenous development taking
place in Japan. Despite this progress, Japan has yet to export any significant military hardware, although it has promising potential as an arms exporter. Much of Japan’s failure to export its weapons systems stems from a lack of expertise and understanding among the Japanese defense industry, as well as the government, about how to successfully market and sell their products internationally.
In 2016, Japan became the fourth country in the world to fly its own stealth fighter jet, built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The Mitsubishi X-2 Shinshin (sometimes called the ATD-X), which is currently in the test phase, offers a promising opportunity to make further inroads into the international arms market. The X-2 provides Japan with the opportunity to enter into budding military and defense markets beyond the export of stealth submarine technology. Unlike the F-22 and the F-35, Japan can conceivably do whatever it likes with the X-2, which bears a striking resemblance the F-22 Raptor. The costs associated with developing this technology will have to be recovered, and as is the case with all technologies, they will eventually spread to other nations.
Given the increasing number of fifth-generation fighters—including the American F-35, the Russian/
Indian PAK 50s, and China’s recently-demonstrated J-20—the list of possible nations willing to work with Japan on such a project remain limited. With Japan’s relative inexperience in designing next-generation fighters, and testing them in combat, any government that is potentially interested could be reluctant to join forces with Japan. But Japan has a strong track record in military research and development, and it has co-produced advanced equipment with the United States, including the US Navy’s primary air defense missile, the RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 (SM-3).
In terms of supply and demand, Taiwan represents a strong potential market for Japan’s X-2 fighters. Faced with severe Chinese opposition, Taiwan has had difficulty procuring high-end military equipment. Taiwan’s sole weapons provider is the United States, which is required by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to provide Taiwan with defensive weaponry. Despite this law, Taiwan has had its fair share of difficulties in procuring US weapons systems— in particular high-end weapons systems—which it needs in light of China’s rapidly increasing offensive capability and ongoing refusal to renounce the use
of military force to annex the island.
Although Taiwan has been able to buy moderately sophisticated US military hardware—such as the Patriot air defense system, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and MH-60
Blackhawks—it appears unlikely that Washington will sell F-35 fighters to Taipei. The administration of former US President Barack Obama did not even agree to sell Taiwan new F-16C/D updates, let alone signal that it would be willing to sell the more advanced F-35. As a result, the previous government in Taiwan under former President Ma Ying-jeou had mostly given-up trying to acquire new F-16 fighters, and instead settled on an upgrade to its existing F-16 fleet. Despite President Donald Trump’s recent apparent overtures to Taiwan, and an incoming presidential staff that appears more favorable to Taiwan, there is good reason to revisit the question as to whether the
“FacedwithsevereChineseopposition, Taiwanhashaddifficultyprocuringhighendmilitaryequipment.”Dedicated in honor of fallen U.S. Navy Seal Michael P. Murphy, the USS Michael Murphy conducts operations in the Western Pacific. photo: Danny Kelley
new US administration will sell high-end military fighters, such as the F-35, to Taiwan.
Taiwan’s heightened commitment to defense is evident in its recent efforts to boost its indigenous defense industry. This has resulted in the development of remotely piloted aerial vehicles (RPAVs), surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs), and a new generation of cruise missiles capable of hitting targets in China—including major centers such as Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Taiwan has likewise more than hinted at its interest in building a new fleet of submarines—an area of military development in which Japan excels—possibly with the help of the US.
Taipei recently gave the green light to the development of a new jet trainer—a further indication that it is serious about maintaining a foundation of welltrained fighter pilots. The US$2 billion dollar program is set to deliver 66 jet trainers by 2026. While this development is encouraging, Taiwan’s front-line fighter force is still in serious need of an upgrade.
In light of Taiwan’s security situation, and its recent efforts to modernize its armed forces, it is clear that Taiwan could use all the help it can get in defense procurement. In this regard, Japan, and its developing defense industry, would be a natural fit for defense
cooperation. This cooperation could start with the possible shared development of a new fifth-generation fighter jet, based on the current X-2 design. At the same time, this project could serve as a starting point for further and possibly even closer defense cooperation, extending for example into the area of submarine development as well. Taiwan and Japan share the same security interests to a large degree, and defense cooperation makes a great deal of sense from a military and political viewpoint. Likewise, from an economic perspective, defense cooperation would also bring benefits to both sides.
Taiwan, with its limited defense budget, could use an additional strategic partner with the knowledge and means to develop a new generation of weaponry. At the same time, Japan would also benefit from such co-development, as it would lower the research and development costs, and could decrease the cost of production. In view of these arguments, it becomes apparent that Taiwan and Japan could become natural defense partners in the coming years. Therefore, Taiwan’s government and defense-sector industries should increase initiatives to reach out to their Japanese counterparts and lay the groundwork for deeper defense cooperation. n
