Countering China’s threat to maritime East Asia .........................4
Experts see Taiwan Strait war on the horizon
Turkey catches the Shanghai Spirit
Sun Charles Yang Diren Doğan
Europeans seek strategic role in Indo-Pacific
Seeking Putin’s ‘point of no return’ in Ukraine
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Chung-young Chang, Fo-kuan U Richard Hu, NCCU
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The editors and staff of Strategic Vision would like to wish our readers well this autumn. The world continues to watch in dismay as the Russian military continues its offensive in Ukraine. The war is, of course, leading analysts and policymakers in Taiwan to take note, and in this issue we offer two perspectives on the ongoing war.
We open this issue with Dr. Shao-cheng Sun, an assistant pro fessor at The Citadel, who looks at the increased aggressive mari time activities of China in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, and how this poses a grave threat to the security of the entire region.
Next, Dr. Charles Yang of Taipei’s Chinese Culture University examines the recent phenomenon wherein political and mili tary circles in the United States are issuing frequent predictions about just when the Taiwan Strait war will break out, and how they may vary in the exact timing, yet they all agree that the time is getting nearer.
Diren Doğan, a former Taiwan MOFA fellow at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies, follows this up with her examina tion of how Turkey, along with other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, tilt on the axis of a transforming global system, and what that means for the new world order.
Finally, Dr. Dmytro Burtsev, a visiting scholar from Ukraine at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica, Looks at the war raging in his country and offers his insights into the motivations of Russian leaders, and whether they have indeed crossed their point of no return.
We hope you enjoy this issue, and that our coverage helps to make sense of current geopolitical realities. We look forward to bringing you the finest analysis and reporting on the issues of importance to security in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region.
Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu Editor Strategic VisionThe People’s Republic of China (PRC) has increased its aggressive maritime activities in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, posing a grave threat to the security of the entire region. In the East China Sea, Chinese vessels routinely patrol waters around Japan in an attempt by Beijing to project its naval presence out into the Pacific Ocean. Since 2012, Chinese Coast Guard vessels have operated almost daily near the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, hoping their presence there will bolster Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over that island group.
In the South China Sea, The PRC has advanced its territorial claims in the contested waters using vari
ous hostile approaches, including building artificial islands, increasing maritime patrols, and deploying weaponry. Chinese fishing and coast guard vessels have constantly operated in the exclusive econom ic zones (EEZs) of Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Indonesia. In the Taiwan Strait, Chinese warships routinely conduct drills near the island in a clear attempt to intimidate Taiwan’s leaders. They also practice anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) tactics that would be employed to prevent US forces from coming to Taiwan’s defense. China’s military aggressions have made the use of force to achieve its goal of unification more likely.
In the face of China’s maritime expansion, leaders
Creative options called for to counter China’s rising threat to maritime East Asia Shao-cheng SunThen-Vice President Joe Biden meets with Capt. Greg Huffman on the bridge of USS John C. Stennis during the 2016 Rim of the Pacific maritime exercise. photo: Luke Moyer
from Taiwan, the United States, and Japan all believe that there is a need to enhance maritime security cooperation. For example, in January 2021, China passed a law that authorized its coast guard to use weapons against foreign ships, if they “illegally enter China’s waters.” In response, Taiwan and the United States signed on March 25 a memorandum of under standing to establish the Coast Guard Working Group (CGWG), bringing the Taiwan-US relationship ever closer. Security scholars have begun to discuss ways of coast guard cooperation, communication, and conflict de-escalation between Japan and Taiwan. This paper proposes options for enhancing TaiwanUS-Japan maritime security cooperation, by review ing their current cooperation and suggesting policy recommendations.
Taiwan is located at the center of the First Island Chain. Based on this geostrategic advantage, Taiwan is a valuable asset for the United States and Japan, and an irreplaceable factor for confronting China’s maritime ambitions in the region. With China’s mari time activities increasing, coordination on maritime
issues between Taiwan, the United States, and Japan is being advocated strongly.
In terms of Taiwan-US maritime security coopera tion, Taipei and Washington have increased their joint efforts to fight against China’s incremental poaching in Taiwan’s territorial waters. For example, Beijing has dispatched hundreds of sand dredgers to the Republic of China’s (ROC) offshore islands to steal sand from the ocean floor for construction projects in China, as well as to intimidate the local populations and strain ROC Coast Guard resources. The coast guard has seized many of these dredgers, and scared off many more, but their numbers are overwhelming.
The Taiwan-US CGWG has among its objectives preserving maritime resources, reducing illegal fish ing, and participating in joint maritime search-andrescue operations. The group focuses on improving communications, building cooperation, and shar ing information between the two counties’ respec tive de facto embassies: the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). This is accom plished through their designated representatives, the US Coast Guard and the ROC Coast Guard Administration.
This working group symbolizes the US-Taiwan ef fort to counter China’s use of its own coast guard, bol stered by its civilian fishing militias, to assert Beijing’s territorial claims. It is hoped that the CGWG mecha nism will enhance future naval cooperation in con fronting China’s naval expansion in the Pacific Ocean. For example, TECRO stated that the coast guards of both countries would forge a stronger partner ship and contribute even more to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region. The AIT echoed that the United States supports Taiwan’s meaningful participation and contributions to issues of global concern, includ ing maritime security, law enforcement, information exchange, and global cooperation.
Looking at the issue of Taiwan-Japan maritime secu rity cooperation, the two countries revived decadeslong stalled negotiations on a fishery agreement to finally conclude a pact in April 2013, despite being unable to agree on the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands. Under this agreement, Taipei and Tokyo agreed to resolve fisheries issues stemming
from overlapping EEZs. They also exempted their fishing boats from each other’s law enforcement agen cies. Furthermore, in October 2016, the first TaiwanJapan maritime affairs cooperation dialogue was held, in which delegates covered bilateral cooperation on a range of issues such as fisheries and marine technol ogy. Moreover, an agreement in principle was reached to allow Taiwan’s coast guard assets to coordinate with their Japanese counterparts for the purposes of rescue at sea.
In 2018, the two countries signed a pair of MOUs to enhance cooperation in tackling smuggling and ille gal immigration. On 26 August, 2021, Sato Masahisa, head of the Liberal Democratic Party’s committee on Taiwan relations, tweeted his hope that “one day, Japan, US, and Taiwan coast guards will train to gether.” On 28 August, the ruling parties of Taiwan and Japan held a virtual meeting on coast guard co operation, at which the two parties discussed how to improve deterrence and security capabilities, such as information exchange and bilateral cooperation.
These developments reflect a growing consensus in Tokyo that China’s rising threat against Taiwan will have serious implications for Japan’s security as well.
If Taiwan were to be annexed by China, this would pose a grave threat to the US-Japan security alli ance. If the United States decided to defend Taiwan, it would surely seek support from Japan and would rely on US forces posted there. Now that the United States has further improved security ties with Taiwan, this has encouraged Japan’s leaders to reassess their Taiwan policy. What follows are suggestions for poli cymakers in formulating maritime security policies to deal with a potential crisis.
First, Taiwan-US maritime security cooperation must be enhanced. In an effort to support Taiwan, a US Navy destroyer and the Coast Guard Cutter Munro staged a series of routine exercises in the East China Sea, including conducting routine Taiwan Strait tran sits on 27 August, 2021. Before transiting the Taiwan Strait, the Munro participated in a drill with the Japan Coast Guard vessel Aso that included communica
tions, search and rescue, and confronting threats. They exercise emphasized that participating vessels were following international law at all times, but the drills nonetheless sent a clear message to China. Looking forward, vessels from the ROC Coast Guard and Navy could also conduct joint maritime drills, maritime law-enforcement training, and exercises with the US Coast Guard and Navy vessels.
Second, US allies should be encouraged to support Taiwan. To deter China’s military aggression, the United States and its treaty partners should issue a warning to Beijing that their intervention would be likely in the event of a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. Washington could also encourage its allies to support Taipei in joining the regional security framework. For example, the US Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) aims to bolster the capabilities of re gional allies and partners to resist Chinese coercion. The PDI also highlights investments to improve allied and partners’ capabilities and to develop innovative concepts to counter threats using cutting-edge tech nologies. Under the PDI framework, the United States could encourage East Asian countries to enhance their security cooperation with Taiwan.
Third, Taiwan-Japan maritime security coopera tion should be established. Since the inaugural mari time dialogue in 2016, the two sides have discussed maritime-related issues to resolve potential points of friction. Tokyo may find the need to create a mecha nism for dialogue with Taipei to discuss the issue of risk-control at sea. The ruling parties of Taiwan and Japan have already held a virtual meeting on coast guard cooperation. The two parties discussed how to improve deterrence and security capabilities, such as information exchange and bilateral cooperation. These dialogues could serve as a format for future communication between the two governments. Since the United States and Taiwan established the CGWG, and US-Japan Coast Guard cooperation has become solid, the US government could facilitate the estab lishment of a similar working group between Taiwan and Japan.
Peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is a critical point of interest for both the United States and Japan. Given China’s growing assertiveness in the region, it is imperative for security planners to explore creative approaches to pursue greater se curity cooperation. After Taipei and Washington
established the CGWG, it has become clear that a similar mechanism between Japan and Taiwan would be indispensable.
Several suggestions have been proposed. First, Taipei and Washington need to advance bilateral maritime security cooperation: their coast guards and navies should conduct joint maritime exer cises. Second, the United States and its allies could warn Beijing that they will definitely respond to any Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The United States should also push its allies to establish security cooperation with Taiwan. Third, to institutionalize a Taiwan-Japan security mechanism, Tokyo and Taipei should estab lish a routine pattern of “legislator-level 2+2” talks. Lastly, since Taiwan and the United States have set up a working group for their respective coast guards, and since US-Japan coast guard cooperation has become robust, the US government should help Japan estab lish a similar working group with Taiwan.
In the face of China’s maritime expansion, there is an urgent need for strategic planners to create more practical and creative options for developing a strong trilateral maritime security cooperation to counter the rising threat posed by China. n
Strategic Vision vol. 11, no. 54 (October, 2022)
Though timing varies, predictions agree: war is coming to Taiwan Strait Charles Yang
In recent years, political and military circles in the United States have begun to issue frequent predictions about just when the Taiwan Strait war will break out. While those predictions vary, they all share the same dire warning: the time is get ting nearer. Just recently, during the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping stated that, “we will never promise to give up the use of force” regarding Taiwan. This came at a time when high-level US officials have been reiter ating warnings about an impending cross-strait war. Do they have access to relevant information, or are
they engaging in political propaganda? Taiwanese people are very concerned.
On September 18, 2021, Nikkei Asia published an interview with Admiral Philip Davidson, who at the time was the head of the US Indo-Pacific Command, in which the admiral expressed his belief that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would have the capability and the capacity to forcibly unify Taiwan within the next six years. Speaking at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing this May, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines describes as “acute” the threat that Beijing would use force to
at: d88341003@ntu.edu.tw
annex Taiwan before 2030. US intelligence agencies, she clarified, did not believe that the Ukraine war would prompt China’s leader Xi Jinping to accelerate his plans to take over the island.
More recently, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on October 17, 2022, that China had changed its approach and was now operating on a “much faster timeline” to an nex Taiwan. Two days later, Michael Gilday, the chief of naval operations for the US Navy, said that the fleet must be prepared for a Chinese inva sion of the island, which could happen at any point before 2024. “When we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind, that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window; I can’t rule it out,” he opined. “I don’t mean at all to be alarmist by saying that. It’s just that we can’t wish that away,” Gilday added.
Taiwanese people have heard similar arguments many times, from politicians speaking on cross strait issues. Much of the public has become so inured to such sensationalistic talk that they have come to greet any new pronouncements as a kind of bluff, or taunt. This is partly the reason why people have a negative attitude toward the idea of a longer conscription pol icy, and many politicians have avoided discussing defense policy in public, using the special budget to increase national defense spending in order to avoid people’s objections.
Last year, for example, the Republic of China (ROC) National Security Bureau Director-General Chen Mingtong predicted that Taipei and Beijing wouldn’t come to blows anytime dur ing the tenure of ROC President Tsai Ing-wen. He changed his position on October 20, 2022, however, when he said that recent theories sug gesting an invasion date of as early as 2023 or 2025 might be based on China’s renewed attempts to force Taipei to the negotiating table using the threat of war.
He did not specify what those negotiations might in volve. A former Democratic Progressive Party deputy secretary-general and pan-green opinion leader, Dr. You Ying-lung, interpreted this statement as mere politicking, saying that Chen was spreading fear in order to aid his party in the election campaign.
Opinions are split among Taiwanese people on what implications these predictions of war by senior US officials may have. Prior to the outbreak of hostili ties in the Russo-Ukrainian War, the vast majority of experts in the world, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself, doubted whether the Russians would actually attack. It was the United States that repeatedly warned about a Russian in vasion. The results hint at the superiority of US in telligence capabilities. In addition, a public survey conducted in October 2022 by a foundation run by KMT Legislator Johnny Chiang showed that over
48 percent of Taiwanese respondents believe that the United States will deploy troops to help defend Taiwan, even though Washington did not send troops to aid Ukraine.
While there are many parallels, there are impor tant differences that distinguish the situation in the Taiwan Strait from the Ukraine-Russia relationship prior to the outbreak of war. For example, Russia’s military was already massing on the Ukrainian bor der, ostensibly conducting a military exercise. In the ory, there would have been no need to bring so many
“Taiwan has accelerated the stockpil ing of key supplies such as food, min erals,chemicals,andfuel,andistaking monthly inventories in response to a possiblemilitaryconflict.”
supplies if it were only an exercise. On the contrary, if the US intelligence community watches carefully with satellites, it should still be able to see clues of
is indeed approaching,
such a buildup across the Taiwan Strait. So far, the PRC has shown no signs of sending unusually large numbers of troops to the coastal provinces. Are the proposed timetables for the Chinese attack, made by so many high-level officials from America, based
nities to demonstrate obedience to the United States. The United States has the will and ability to influence decision-making in the ROC government. If war is really approaching, Taiwan is clearly not ready.
on a US political offensive, or on the PRC’s military preparations? Taiwanese people deserve more clar ity on just what information goes into making these predictions.
President Tsai took a political risk when she con sented to ease restrictions on imports of US beef and pork products without negotiation, and the people recognize that the Tsai government has had opportu
As reported in The Washington Post, “Taiwan is building backup communications systems, stock piling supplies, sharpening its hybrid warfare skills, reforming its system of military reserves and trying to prepare a frightened population for what might come.” Despite these efforts, several unknowns re main. For example, how will these supplies reach the people once the war breaks out? People in Taiwan are all too familiar with onerous government paperwork, especially on logistics and civil defense issues.
This raises a more important question: If war is in deed approaching, why doesn’t the United States pres sure the Tsai government to extend its existing fourmonth mandatory military training for conscripts to at least a year, and to include women in such training in order to build a stronger defense against Chinese invasion? After all, the United States has claimed
“Taiwanesepeoplearefrequentlyread ingthepredictionsofvariousseniorUS officialsthataChineseattackonTaiwan isonthehorizon.Thisiscontrastedwith a perceived lack of concrete action on the issue.”
that it seeks peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and similar policies have certainly been suggested by former US Defense Secretary Mark Esper and vari ous US think tanks.
Some experts assert that the Tsai administration has done more than her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou to strengthen Taiwan’s military, and that everything is on the right track. In terms of perceptions, however, the feeling is different. There was much less saberrattling coming out of China during the Ma admin istration, largely due to Ma’s China-friendly policies and the fact that China was still perceived in a rela tively positive light in the international community back then. Nevertheless, there are a small minority of people in Taiwan who blame Beijing’s more ag gressive stance on President Tsai.
Some political analysts have predicted that an an nouncement to extend mandatory military train ing will be made after the nine-in-one elections on November 26, 2022, are over. Experts in this field
generally agree on one thing, however: war between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is getting closer and closer. If the Tsai government can convey a sense of urgency to the Taiwanese people, without making them think it is merely scaremongering for political and electoral gain, then this will be a positive achieve ment for the administration.
In short, Taiwanese people are frequently reading the predictions of various senior US officials that a Chinese attack on Taiwan is on the horizon. This is contrasted with a perceived lack of concrete action on the issue from the government. Such a war would be devastating to Taiwan, and to the region, and hence the government should take it seriously and take more proactive measures in the nation’s defense. For example, just like the eased restrictions on US beef and pork imports, Tsai could act more decisively on inplementing, rather than continuing to examine, concrete measures to shore up the nation’s defense. Surely this would give the people of Taiwan more confidence that the government is serious about pre paring for the worst while hoping for the best. The former is equally as important as the latter. n
Strategic Vision vol. 11, no. 54 (October, 2022)
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), was founded under the name The Shanghai Five to address the security and economic challenges faced by its founding members, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Security problems such as border insecurity emerged in the Eurasian region after the collapse of the USSR and with the emergence of a new strategic environment in the post-Cold War period. This laid the foundations for the 1996 founding of the SCO.
With the evolution of global geopolitics to a unipo lar structure, as well as the rise of Islamic Terrorism
following the 9/11 attacks, the organization expanded in both membership and scope, adding to its agenda such themes as multilateralism, terrorism, separat ism, and the development of cooperation between member countries. Today, the SCO has nine mem ber states, three observer members, and six dialogue partners, and constitutes one of the most important dialogue mechanisms behind the “Rise of Asia” thesis. Organizations under the SCO umbrella are a poten tial platform for countries to conduct multilateral di plomacy. In this context, for example, the SCO Heads of State Council Summit held in September 2022 provided the necessary environment for actors with
various disagreements to come together. Likewise, founding-member Russia, which is subjected to sanc tions due to Moscow’s war in Ukraine, was able to attend the summit and hold bilateral meetings on the sidelines with many regional actors, particularly the PRC and Turkey, the latter being a NATO mem ber country.
In the transformation of the global system, Asia’s remarkable position has undoubtedly increased the strategies developed for the Asian geography and the countries in the region. In this context, the fact that countries exhibit a strong cooperation mecha nism with each other and keep channels of dialogue open provides an important opportunity for them to emerge from the challenges of a transforming global system with the least amount of damage. The SCO covers more than 40 percent of the world’s popula tion and more than 30 percent of the world’s gross
domestic product, and so this begs the question of whether the SCO can serve as an alternative to the Western-dominated world order.
The leadership regimes of China and Russia both frequently refer to the need for a new world order, and announced in a February 4, 2022, joint declara tion that their partnership “has no limits.” Moreover, today’s SCO includes large Asian countries like India and Pakistan, as well as large but politically isolated countries like Iran. However, defining the SCO as an alternative to the West is contrary to the organiza tion’s founding purpose, and to the strategies of the countries in the organization.
The main mission of the SCO is to serve as a po litical, economic, and military organization for the Eurasian region, aimed at maintaining regional peace and security, as well as to guard against attempts by external forces to instigate color revolutions, such as Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution and Egypt’s 2011 Lotus Revolution. The animating ethic of the SCO is the “Shanghai Spirit,” which is itself influenced by the
PRC state government motivations, along the lines of the so-called Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as proclaimed by Chinese leader Zhou Enlai in the early 1950s, which focused on mutual non-aggression, co-operation, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Like this antecedent, the Shanghai Spirit likewise focuses on such buzzwords as mutual trust, equality, consultation, mutual benefit, and di versity—essentially a rededication the Westphalian norms of national sovereignty.
Thus, in foreign policy, SCO members undertake a commitment to not interfere in the internal affairs of other states, to not target third countries, and to fol low the principle of openness. In this context, while the political systems of many member states differ from each other, care is taken to establish the relation ship between the countries on a level playing field.
The leadership photo taken at the SCO Heads of State Council Summit in Samarkand memorializes an important moment in terms of visualizing the organization. The photo illustrates how the confab brought together the leaders of many countries, such
as India, China, and Pakistan, which have territorial disputes with one another.
It is also significant because India is not satisfied with the role attributed to it by the United States in the great power competition, and because it includes the Republic of Turkey, the only NATO member country to participate in the SCO summit. In addi tion, the photo includes the leaders of four of the nine countries in the world with nuclear weapons, two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the Independent Turkic Republics, which have a significant portion of the world’s en ergy on their lands. In this context, while the SCO is a formation whose weight cannot be ignored, the future of the organization is gaining importance day by day in parallel with the importance attributed to the Asian continent.
While evaluating the SCO’s importance for Turkey, it is important to realize that Turkey is in a unique geopolitical position with respect to multilateral orga nizations, as the westernmost Asian and the eastern most European country. Turkey’s strategic, bridging role between two important continents includes not only physical connections such as energy and trans portation, but also a diplomatic role. Turkey’s strategy
prioritizes cooperation and effective multilateralism in its relations with the different power axes, as well as in the multilateral platforms in which it takes part. Parallel to this strategy, Ankara benefits from similar mechanisms in its relationships on the Asian conti nent, though it does not see these as substitutes for its relations with the West and the dialogue mecha nisms it shares with Western nations.
Although the SCO is not an alternative to NATO or the European Union, the importance of the SCO for Turkey is hidden in the rich dialogue mecha nism it has created and the importance it attributes to Ankara’s Asia Anew Initiative. The SCO offers Turkey an environment for carrying out dialogue that directly serves the Turkish foreign policy principle of strong diplomacy. While the bilateral and multi lateral diplomatic channels that the SCO opens up include many strategically important actors such as India, Russia, Azerbaijan, and especially the PRC— which is an important actor in Asia given its role in production and supply chains—it also provides an environment for the advancement of relations between countries, as evidenced by the comprehen sive network of agreements signed with Kazakhstan a week after the summit.
On the other hand, the Asia Anew Initiative an nounced by Turkey at the 11th Ambassadors Conference held in 2019 aims to further strengthen Ankara’s ties with the entire Asian continent, in cluding the SCO member states. In line with this aim, the relations with the SCO and a potential step towards membership do not aim for a competition of East versus West, but rather a multilateralism in terms of economic, political, and socio-cultural as pects of the axis.
Asian countries are playing their part in turning the wheels of the world system, revealing the fact
that the axes of power are shifting towards this re gion, along with many factors such as supply chains, logistics connections, energy security, and technol ogy. Parallel to this development, which is defined as the rise of Asia, attention has also turned to the multilateral formations that continue to exist in the
region. In recent years, when the concept of a New World Order is discussed as an alternative to the Western liberal international order, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—which includes the PRC and Russia—is considered to be one of the founders of this new order. Combined with other factors—the organization’s growth, its member states keeping the channels of dialogue open despite disagreements, Iran’s involvement in the organization, and the mil itary and economic rise of Asia—this situation has led to the SCO being perceived as a threat by nonregional actors.
Turkey has enjoyed close relations with the West since the days of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey carries out its strategies both in parallel with the principle of multilateral foreign policy and on the basis of its geopolitical position, however. Therefore, Turkey’s cooperation with non-Western multilateral organiza tions as a link between the two continents is a natural outcome of 21st century globalization. Relations with Asia are a natural extension of the strong diplomatic network that Ankara aims to establish, considering that Turkey is also an Asian country. As a collective defense organization, the SCO is seen as an alterna tive to NATO, though it has a structure that is far different. In light of all this, it is worth keeping an eye on the SCO and the strategies it carries out in coming years. n
“Asacollectivedefenseorganization, the SCO is seen as an alternative to NATO, though it has a structure that is far different.”
The major European countries such as France, Germany, and the UK are facing an unprecedented challenge in Ukraine, as are the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other multilateral organi zations that deal with security issues affecting Europe. Nevertheless, they remain committed to contributing to security and defense in the Indo-Pacific.
At a June, 2022 meeting in Madrid, NATO ap proved its new Strategic Concept for 2030 which takes a global outlook and makes note of events in the Indo-Pacific. Though it falls short of designating the People’s Republic of China (PRC) an adversary or a threat like Russia, it states that Beijing poses “systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security.” The
Strategic Concept prioritizes enhancing the resilience of NATO allies against China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies” that challenge their “interests, se curity and values,” yet NATO remains “open to con structive engagement with the PRC.” In short, NATO remains focused on Euro-Atlantic security, and has not suddenly pivoted onto military competition in the Indo-Pacific, though the latter is an area of in creasing concern.
NATO is enhancing military cooperation and diplo macy with four Asia-Pacific partners, namely Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. In Madrid, leaders from these four nations met for the first time at the summit level and “agreed to step up political dialogue and practical cooperation in several areas,
Dr. César de Prado is a former MOFA Fellow at the European Union Centre in Taiwan, National Taiwan University. He can be reached for comment at cesar.deprado@eui.eu
including cyberspace, new technology and counter ing disinformation.”
Meanwhile, the European Union’s scope keeps growing in new dimensions, giving more weight to global security concerns. The regional body con tinues to impose economic and political sanctions on Russia while substantially supporting Ukraine and other countries affected by the war. The level of EU commitment is ranked between that of the United States and the UK. In non-military terms, this commitment amounts to taking in more refu gees, providing humanitarian and civil protection aid, and disbursing macro-financial assistance. Yet, the EU is also providing billions of euros to support the Ukrainian armed forces.
In September 2021 Brussels released the EU’s firstever strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which outlined detailed aims in seven priority areas: sustainable and inclusive prosperity; green transi tion; ocean governance; digital growth; connectiv ity (transport, etc.) research and innovation; human security (health, disasters); and security and defense. It is within this last area that naval and maritime is
sues figure prominently: “the EU seeks to promote an open and rules-based regional security architec ture, including secure sea lines of communication, capacity-building and enhanced naval presence in the Indo-Pacific in accordance with the legal framework established by the UNCLOS.” It also aims to face up to a broad range of new challenges, from cybersecurity to non-proliferation of conventional arms and weap ons of mass destruction. The EU will also broaden its partnerships with regional organizations (mainly ASEAN) as well as with like-minded countries to help in EU “missions and operations for peace and stabil ity” and to “support Indo-Pacific partners’ efforts to develop their own peacekeeping capacity.”
Then, in March 2022, the Council of the European Union approved a Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defense, which observed that “a new center of global competition has emerged in the IndoPacific” and highlighted the value of the earlier EU Indo-Pacific strategy to promote a rules-based re
gional security architecture. However, with the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in October 2022, the EU Council officially began a collective rethink of the EU’s overall relationship with the PRC, which in recent years had been experi encing some downturns. Member states are display ing growing concern about China’s global economic projection, regional military threats, and diplomatic support of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. While there is a common sense of urgency, there is not yet a con sensus about how to reconfigure that relationship.
Some European countries are becoming increas ingly hawkish, calling for the EU to prepare itself to swiftly designate China as a threat. Others want the body to take a more moderate stance, incrementally reducing the EU’s economic dependency on China. Germany, for example, is a leading proponent of the view that the EU should not decouple economically from China.
NATO allies are supportive of the defense body’s core mission, and generally would not oppose coali tions of allies willing to engage in crisis management in faraway theatres. Likewise, EU member states sup port the EU’s Strategic Compass and the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Last January, pro-Atlanticist and pro-EU
Italy detailed in a policy document its contribution to all seven priority areas of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, whereas other countries’ commitments are more subdued.
In France’s new national strategic review released in November 2022, Paris vowed to strengthen its ca pability to operate independently in some theaters of operation. France is also committed to working with its partners to build stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
London began experimenting with novel roles in the Indo Pacific. For example, it is a founding member of the AUKUS alliance to develop critical military technologies with the United States and Australia. Meanwhile, it continues to work alongside France and other European actors. For instance, in the past few months, the UK, France, and Germany have all sent naval vessels across the South China Sea and increased their defense collaboration with NATO’s Asia-Pacific partners.
Germany is taking unprecedented security-related actions in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific. Days after
“EuropeiswalkingsoftlyintheIndoPacific theater, though it is carrying a small stick.”
Russia attacked Ukraine, Berlin announced a large in crease in its military spending, amounting to a shortterm windfall of 100 billion euros and a pledge to budget 2 percent of GDP toward defense. In August, Germany proposed a European Sky Shield Initiative to NATO allies, which would integrate several sys tems to defend against air and missile attacks from Russia. Meanwhile, the German Navy sent a frigate to the Indo-Pacific on a six-month deployment in 2021-2022, and announced its intention to deploy more ships to the region for longer periods. In the summer, for the first time ever, Germany deployed a fleet of Eurofighter aircraft to the Indo-Pacific to participate in regional exercises and to show sol idarity with key allies and partners in the region, which include Singapore, Australia, South Korea, and Japan. Germany’s upgraded China strategy is set to be released in the summer of 2023. There are still markedly different positions regarding how best to
engage authoritarian countries on economic, secu rity, and human rights issues, but overall, Germany remains committed to working alongside both the EU and NATO.
In sum, major European countries and organiza tions concerned with European security in the past year and a half, and especially those spurred on by the war in Ukraine, have become increasingly aware of global challenges and threats, especially in the Indo-Pacific, and are committed to enhancing their domestic and external capabilities. There are still issues with the coherence of such a combined ap proach, but synergies are slowly developing in both soft- and hard-power projection.
Right now Europe is walking softly in the IndoPacific theater, though it is carrying a small stick. Only a few countries have taken determined steps to project a broad array of diplomatic, economic, and even military confidence. The next steps for Europe are to increase its awareness of the many interlinked complexities of Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and to develop scenarios for their potential joint evolution to better prepare for contingencies. Despite troubles in Europe and its immediate neighborhood (there are
still plenty of threats and challenges in the Middle East, Africa, and the Artic), European countries and multilateral organizations will have to further com mit to the Indo-Pacific if tensions in that region con tinue to rise and threaten to drag the great powers into conflict.
For a start, a key development to watch is Europe’s slowly shifting position regarding cross-strait rela tions. Overall, there is increasing concern in Europe about the current phase in China’s yet-unfinished Civil War, which has lasted almost a century. After decades of improving the overall relationship with the PRC, while maintaining quiet but productive relations with Taiwan, the EU’s one-China policy is nowadays suffering unprecedented stress from several sources pulling it in different directions. A few member states (mainly Lithuania) and parlia mentarians in Brussels are pressing for a recalibra tion of the EU’s one-China policy in favor of Taiwan.
While Washington needs help to face a rising China, the core of the EU’s one-China Policy is shaking. However, the European Commission, the European External Action Service, and several member states (mainly Germany) are more hesitant, and aim to maintain good economic relations with both the PRC and Taiwan, although they are developing de fensive measures to better engage with the PRC. In the not-too-distant future, especially if the conflict in Ukraine takes a major turn, those contradictory tensions will likely magnify and require that Europe be more decisive in promoting and using its range of sticks and carrots.
Europe should aim to better sharpen its broad ening array of diplomatic, economic, and military tools. Some rather neutral and dovish countries, as well as the EU overall, will no doubt continue to endorse the values of peace and economic interde pendence. Other countries, as well as NATO, are enhancing Europe’s preparedness as the nations of the region invest in greater military capabilities, im pose economic sanctions, and conduct military drills. Overall, Europe will enhance its global engagement as it deems appropriate, based on the global security context. n
“Europeshouldaimtobettersharpen its broadening array of diplomatic, economic,andmilitarytools.”
Strategic Vision vol. 11, no. 54 (October, 2022)
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has raised many questions, from the implications it will have on the international system to the ba sic reasoning and motivation of the regular Russian troops who crossed the Ukrainian border, to the per ceptions of the conflict among Russian citizens, the latter of whom appear to support their government’s act of aggression.
The general political motivation is obvious and can perhaps best be described as an act of international revenge-seeking by post-Soviet elites. These elites ap pear to be pushing back against changes in the social and international order that began to emerge during the first decade of the Russian Federation, after the dissolu
tion of the Soviet Union. Initial attempts to change the operation of the political system and regime in Moscow by adopting, and adapting to, liberal values ended in fail ure. Attempts at a decentralization of power collapsed under the pressure of a corrupt political regime, which reverted to old methods of controlling the masses using brute force exerted by security, defense, and law enforce ment agencies, shored up by propaganda disseminated by a compliant media and an ideology of dominance based on the purity of the Russian culture.
The Russian Federation became the primary suc cessor state after the collapse of the Soviet Union in a succession that included the transfer of financial, po litical, military, and nuclear assets. On the latter issue,
Dr. Dmytro Burtsev is a visiting scholar from Ukraine currently attached to the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica. He can be reached for comment at: dmytro_burtsev@yahoo.com
to define Putin’s ‘point of no return’ in Russia’s war against UkraineWhen Russian forces attacked the independent nation of Ukraine in February, many expected the war to be over in a matter of days. photo: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Russia inherited the lion’s share of the USSR’s stock pile of nuclear warheads, with an estimated 35,000 nuclear weapons remaining in locations across the vast former empire. Of the fifteen successor states to the Soviet Union, fourteen are nuclear free today.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 can therefore be seen not as something new, but rath er as a continuation of the hybrid invasion which started in 2014 that resulted in the Russian annexa tion of Crimea and apparent Russian support for separatists in Donbas. For this reason, an analysis of the current state of hostilities cannot be divorced from the events of 2014.
Indeed, the roots of Moscow’s current revanchist mindset go back farther than that, and can perhaps first be perceived in the speech given by President Vladimir Putin in Munich in February 2007, in which the Russian leader expressed his distrust of the American-dominated unipolarity that defined global geopolitics in the postCold War era. Even then, Putin identified NATO ex pansion as a potential red line for Moscow, but Western leaders evidently chose to ignore these warning signs. Likewise during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, when
Georgian military. The West, failing to ap preciate the perceived importance Moscow has histori cally placed on Transcaucasia to serve as a buffer zone between Russia and the Middle East, failed to impose any costs on Russia’s aggressive behavior, offering only tepid verbal admonitions.
In 2014, Putin essentially followed the same play book he used in Georgia, only this time it was di rected against Ukraine and resulted in the Russian annexation of Crimea. Finally, the world seemed to be developing a hunch that maybe something was going wrong in relations with Russia. Unfortunately, it took a full-scale invasion for the world to finally understand that Russia was not a silent challenger who uses the rules of the system to circumvent inter national regulations, but a hostile force with disdain for the polite rules of international diplomacy in the civilized world.
Russian diplomacy is intelligent and strong, and if Ukraine had fallen during the first weeks of the invasion, who knows what Putin might have been
Russian forces supported separatist militias in the selfproclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia against themotivated to follow it up with. The ostensible reasons for the invasion—denazification and demilitariza tion—would no doubt have included a campaign of repression among Ukrainian citizens of all social groups and the absolute destruction of everything that can be called Ukrainian.
At the time of writing, Ukraine is still fighting, but this is only thanks to the strong sense of national unity, and of course to foreign aid. This fact makes Russian leaders even angrier: how dare the Ukrainian nation keep fighting for its survival in the face of the regional hegemon, and the only force for spiri tual purity and traditional values that has as its mis sion to stand against Western decadence? This ques tion does not need an answer, because the Russian Federation positions itself as the last fortress in the fight against a corrupted Western civilization, with the goal of defending true humanitarian values. For proof of this fanatical zeal, one need look no fur ther than the recent comments by former Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev, now serving as deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, who likened Moscow’s fight in Ukraine to a sacred battle against Satan, warning that Russia could send “all our en emies to fiery Gehenna.”
Moscow’s goal, according to media reports quoting Medvedev, is to “stop the supreme ruler of hell, what ever name he uses—Satan, Lucifer or Iblis.” Moreover, the Westerners, who are sending aid to the “crazy Nazi drug addicts” defending Ukraine, were repro bates with “saliva running down their chins from degeneracy.” In such an existential—indeed apoca lyptic—struggle, all means to achieve victory are ac ceptable. Ukraine, in shifting closer toward a Western orbit, was positioning itself as a threat to the very existence of Russia and the Russian worldview.
The modern, multipolar international order has been destroyed; it was executed in Ukraine. The main question that remains is: has Russia already passed the point of no return on the road to the deployment of nukes as a final argument? Putin gave a speech on September 21, 2022, in which he proclaimed that he would mobilize his troops. That speech contained an
other detail of importance; the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used.
The only acceptable option for Russia is the uncon ditional surrender of Ukraine. No other options are acceptable but the submission to Russia of total con trol over Ukraine. Otherwise, the Russian Federation will not be able to prove its superiority. Given his to tal control over the Russian regime, Putin alone will make the final decision of whether to use nukes, just as he was the final arbiter of every aspect of the inva sion of Ukraine. The military high command, politi cians, and Kremlin officials understand that most of the world will be hostile to Russia for several genera tions. Given such an understanding, what would be the point of no return for such people?
In that case, Russian nuclear blackmail in Ukraine will only serve to enrich its aims. If successful, the nu clear-weapons gambit will become yet another weap on in the arsenal for unconventional expansion and threatening other international actors. If Ukrainian forces continue to liberate occupied territories such
as Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, which hosted an illegal referendum on whether to join the Russian Federation, it could lead to even more terrible events—precisely the events that the world escaped when cooler heads prevailed and the promise of mutual assured destruction made a nu clear exchange unthinkable during the Cold War. Another critical argument which sounds regularly from Russian authorities is the possibility of the con struction and usage of a dirty bomb by the Ukrainian side. This argument sounds fantastical, as the use of any such weapon by Ukraine would have a catastroph ic effect. Clearly this is propaganda being deployed by Moscow in an attempt to forestall Western support for Kiev, and is a false-flag that is about as believable as Russia’s ostensible justification for its initial attack: that of denazifying the country. Were the allegations true, it would swiftly bring an end to the provision of weapons and tech from Ukraine’s Western partners. More than this, Ukraine would forever be marked as a violator of numerous nuclear non-proliferation treaties and would become an international pariah, destroying any remain ing hopes of winning the war—to say nothing of hav ing dramatic consequences for Ukrainian statehood.
Russian national security doctrine says that nuclear weapons can be used in case of the “existence of a threat to the Russian Federation.” However, Ukraine and major international actors do not recognize Crimea and other occupied regions as the legal ter ritory of the Russian Federation. Moreover, speaking ideologically, the very existence of an independent Ukraine is a threat to Russia.
The situation appears even more urgent because of the claims of former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who claimed that Great Britain is ready to respond to the use of nuclear weapons without any coordination with other NATO member states, in the event of usage of weapons of mass destruction by the Russian Federation in Ukraine. This leads only to the further development of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the growing risk that it will conflagrate into a global conflict—a possibility that has heretofore been evaluated as low, yet ever-present.
Russian control of Ukrainian nuclear facilities in the territories occupied by Russian forces is another problematic factor, especially as regards the issue of nuclear security. Another related problem is that the
area around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in the southeastern part of the country is being used as an artillery firing position and a storage site for heavy munitions. This fact raises the possibility of a nuclear incident that would have much more dire consequences than Chernobyl.
Now the issue is at another point. Do the Russian president and military high command still consider weapons of mass destruction—of any scope, tactical or strategic—as a last-ditch effort to forestall a to tal Russian defeat in the Ukrainian campaign? After the demonstration of American strategic bombers in Poland, and the placement of the US Army’s elite 101st Airborne Division in Romania, just miles from the Ukrainian border, it is obvious that Western countries are preparing for a devastating conventional response to an upsurge in Russian hostility, such as the use of Russian nukes in Ukraine, or an incident at a nuclear power plant occupied by Russian forces. Given the state of affairs as discussed herein, and the fact that the war in Ukraine shows no signs of coming to an end in the immediate near-term, it seems as if Russia has indeed crossed the point of no return. n
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