Second, by not trying to harmonize the provisions, the Court of Appeals neglected to consider a rather clear way in which the provisions can coexist. Section 10 addresses jury trials in criminal cases. Section 15 deals with jury trials in general (i.e., jury trials in both civil and criminal cases). Section 10 can be given effect by limiting its application to jury trials in criminal cases. Indeed, there is no question that Section 10 is, by its express terms,79 limited in this way. Section 15, on the other hand, can be given effect by limiting its application to civil cases. This is a logical way to harmonize the two provisions and give effect to both of them. Neither provision needs to die. Third, suppose the Court of Appeals was correct in moving at once to an analysis of which provision is the more specific. The Court erred in determining that Section 15 is more specific than Section 10. The Court’s entire statement of its reasoning was quite brief: Article I, section 15, titled “Right to trial by jury” is more specific than article I, section 10, which explains the general rights of an accused in criminal prosecutions. 80 So because Section 10 also speaks of rights defendants possess (i.e., confrontation, compulsory process, grand jury indictment) Section 10 is less specific than Section 15? This is debatable. The contrary conclusion – that Section 10 is more
79 80
Tex. Const. art. I, section 10 (“In all criminal prosecutions . . . .”). Pacas v. State, 612 S.W.3d at 593. 38
