Biannual strategic report 2017

The second Biannual Strategic Report June.2017

June.2017

Issued By The Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies www.arabiangcis.org

CONTENTS Executive Summary...........................................................................................................................7 » Internal Affairs.............................................................................................................................. 11 Presidency of the Republic of Iran ............................................................................................ 11 Military Affairs.................................................................................................................................. 28 Security File ...................................................................................................................................... 34 Economic Affairs ............................................................................................................................. 52 Social Affairs..................................................................................................................................... 70 » Arab Affairs .................................................................................................................................... 93 First Axis The future of Iran-Gulf ties in light of new alliances and transformations ...................................................................................................................... 93 Second Axis The future of Iran’s role in Syria after the fall of Aleppo ...............................................109 Third Axis The future role of Iran in Iraq—Between the battle of Mosul and the Kirkuk Crisis ....................................................................................................................129 Fourth Axis The future of Iran’s intervention in Yemen: Between regional alliances and international events .....................................................138 » International Affairs .................................................................................................................149 Continuity and change in US-Iran relations after Trump’s inauguration...................149 Russia-Iran Relations...................................................................................................................162 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................173

This report tracks three key aspects of the Iranian state during the first half of 2017: Internal Affairs, Arab Affairs, and International Affairs.

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» INTERNAL AFFAIRS

This aspect consists of five parts:

1. The institution of the Presidency: the repor t handles the latest developments in the Iranian institution of the presidency over the last six months. it discusses political grouping preceded the presidential elections held in May 2017, the televised debates t h a t r ev e a l e d t h e p r o f o u n d differences between the Iranian political currents, results of the presidential elections and reasons behind Rouhani’s winning of the second term of presidency, and the challenges facing Rouhani in the next four years. The report also handles the role of IRGC in the Iranian economy and in the presidential elections that ignited differences between this organization and President Hassan Rouhani and the future of relations between both sides, reflections of Rafsanjani’s death on the president, and the future of the Iranian regime after this prominent figure.

In addition, the report discusses

the renewal of conflict between Rouhani and chief of Judiciary and the future of this conflict, and Khamenei’s criticism and threats to President Rouhani and the consequences of these differences between both sides.

2. The military institution: the report handles a number of military developments over the first half of 2017. It tracks the military exercises Iran conducted during this period and the future of these exercises like Wilayah 95, Beit Almaqdis 29 that was conducted by the ground forces of the Iranian army, Imam Ali, Annabi Alazam 11, and a number of exercises between Iran and Oman.

3. Security: in this section, the report analyzes Tehran’s claims about ISIS attempts to break into the Iranian territories to carry out attacks on critical sites in Iran and reveal of ISIS networks in a number of Iranian districts. The report also discusses the twin attacks on the Iranian parliament and Khomeini tomb and possible scenarios of these attacks.

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4. After that, the report handles the security conditions and developments in Ahwaz, Kurdistan, and Sistan and Baluchistan and the future of Non-Persian people crises in Iran. The last two parts of this aspect discuss the number of executions in Iran and controversy over decreasing penalties on drug-related crimes.

5. Economics: the report analyzes the major indicators of the Iranian economy during the first half of 2017 and their future, including the GDP growth rate and its validity, inflation rates, unemployment, trade balance, and other indicators. The report also handles the energy sector- the pillar of the Iranian economy- and its future, which is divided into four parts: the first is the Iranian tendency toward increasing oil production and non-compliance with OPEC agreements concerning freezing oil production. Secondly, the possibility of exporting Gas in the near future after increasing production from the joint fields with Qatar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and GCC countries use of the Iranian points of weakness in the petrochemical sector, and Oil for Food agreement and if it can be the escape from banking sanctions on Iran? The third part discusses the reality of the Iranian banks bankruptcy and its consequences, the reasons behind Iranian people depositing money in unlicensed credit establishments, developments in the banking sector like the rise of interest rate, and future of the frozen funds abroad. Finally, this part handles the Iranian use of the Gulf boycott of Qatar to achieve economic, trade, and strategic goals that might pave the way for strong relations between the two countries, and the GCC countries’ role in diminishing rapprochement between Tehran and Doha.

6. Social: the report handles the health sector in Iran and its negative and positive characteristics. It tracks the most fatal diseases in Iran, the number of infected people and the governmental reactions to confront these diseases. This part also discusses pover ty and unemployment and their impact on the Iranian citizen,

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the governmental reactions to face these problems, and how successful were the regime’s organizations and policies in solving these problems and their social impact.

In this part, the report also handles the environmental problems and air pollution and their impact on the Iranian people’s health, the differences between the political elite on the possible solutions to these problems, social violence in Iran and its impact on the Iranian social structure, and finally, the future of Iran’s social state and the regime’s possible scenarios and solutions to solve these problems and their relevance to the Iranian structure.

Arab Affairs This aspect of the Iranian case file during the first half of 2017 consists of four parts: 1. The nature of the Gulf-Iran relations in light of the new changes and alliances after the inauguration of the new US president, Donald Trump in January 2017. In this part, the report discusses future of Gulf-Iran relations by tracking the motives and stages of change of Iran’s strategy toward the GCC countries, comparing these relations with those in the first half of 2017, and the new changes and alliances that influence Gulf-Iran relations.

2. The Iranian incursion of Yemen between regional alliances and international changes by monitoring the Iranian support to HouthiSaleh coalition, indications of decline of the Iranian role in Yemen by handling distribution of the spheres of influence in Yemen knowing that the legitimate forces have regained control of 80-85% of the country with the help of the Arab coalition decisive storm operations, while only 20% is still under control of Houthi rebels in Yemen. This part also discusses Houthi’s obstruction of the international peace initiatives and the results of the Iranian interference in the Yemeni crisis.

3. Future of the Iranian role in Iraq in light of Mosul battle and Kirkuk crisis. The report discusses the Iranian role in Mosul battle, the inclusion of the Public Mobilization Forces in the Iraqi army, mobilization of the Shiite

militias to participate in the battle, and the Iranian strategies and policies to take control of the city. This part also discusses the Iranian goals and indications in Kirkuk crisis where Iran enjoys considerable influence over the Kurdistan National Union and has several instruments of pressure. Finally, the report discusses the challenges facing Iran in Iraq and their consequences during the first half of 2017.

4. The Iranian role in the Syrian crisis after the fall of Aleppo in light of the new developments in the Syrian crisis and their impact on the Iranian role- especially the new US strategy against Tehran, Russia-Iran differences, and Turkey-Russia rapprochement. In this part, the report also analyzes the Iranian role in the international conflict on the Syrian countryside and the indications of the Iranian ignition of conflict on this district, and finally, reflections of Astana talks on the Iranian role in the Syrian crisis and the most prominent Iranian reactions during the first half of 2017.

International Affairs This aspect is divided into two parts: The US-Iran relations after Trump’s inauguration between continuity and change, knowing that relations between the two countries witnessed significant changes over the past few months.

This part discusses the nature of the USIran relations after Trump’s inauguration who adopted a hard line against Tehran, threatened of renegotiating the terms of the nuclear deal, sought to exert more pressure on Iran, increased the US military activities in the Arabian Gulf, escalated confrontation in Syria, and finally, coordinated the US position with the GCC countries against the Iranian

threat. This part also handles the Iranian reactions against the US policies after Trump’s inauguration and the challenges rose when Iran resumed development of its missile program and expanded its influence in the region, but sought to preserve the nuclear deal and its gains.

In light of controversy of relations and difficulty to adopt decisive options either through military confrontation due to its high costs on all sides, or de-escalation of tension and negotiations in light of the Iranian rigid stance and hostile activities, the “above deescalation and below confrontation” position will prevail until Iran fixes up its behavior and complies with the US views or move toward inevitable comprehensive confrontation- the unlikely but not impossible scenario.

Russia-Iran Relations This report handles the impact of regional and international developments on RussiaIran relations- especially Trump’s inauguration President of the United States and the change in the US strategy toward Tehran, the Turkish position on the Syrian crisis, and Russia-Turkey rapprochement and its influence on RussiaIran relations. This part also handles RussiaIran cooperation- especially the Russian support to Iran against the US pressures, how successful Russia was in protecting Iran against any international sanctions, Russia-Iran coalition on the Syrian crisis, the strategy of both countries in dealing with the Syrian civil war after the fall of Aleppo, military cooperation between both countries , analyzing the Russian strategy of supplying Iran with arms, economic cooperation between the two countries- especially in oil sector, and the future of Russia-Iran relations in light of the implications of this report

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To escape this state of confusion and disunity among the mainstream hardliners, the Popular Front for the Forces of the “Islamic Revolution,� a political bloc founded on December 25, 2016, comprising a large number of fundamentalist factions, held a series of meetings aimed at selecting one candidate to represent the fundamentalists in the presidential elections.

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Presidency of the Republic of Iran

D

uring the first half of 2017, a presidential electionwasheldin the Iranian Republic, which was pivotal in the regime’s history due to the circumstances surrounding it.

During this period, Iranian politics was characterized by internal realignments, external challenges, and international crises, so the choice of the Iranian president, who would be assuming power at a stage when Iran’s position was expected to shift in both the international system and the regional environment, was particularly sensitive.

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»»Iranian presidential elections Within the Iranian political system, although the president plays an important and significant role, he is not the true leader of the state. Instead, he is subordinate to the supreme leader, who has the final say on all prominent issues, decides on political and economic problems domestically and overseas, and commands the Iranian armed forces. The president, meanwhile, is responsible for the implementation of the Constitution and exercising the powers of the executive authority, except for the powers of the supreme leader.

The president appoints and supervises government ministers, coordinates government decisions, and selects government policies before referring them to Parliament, in addition to chairing the Cultural Revolution Council and the Supreme National Security Council. Unlike in many other countries, the executive branch in Iran does not control the armed forces, although the president appoints the ministers of intelligence and defense. It is customary, however, even with these positions, for the president to obtain the explicit approval of the supreme leader to appoint the defense and intelligence ministers before presenting the nominees to MPs for a vote of confidence.

According to the Iranian constitution, the president is chosen from a shortlist of figures who are of Iranian origin; who are pious and wise; who have a favorable history; and who are trustworthy, virtuous, and eager to uphold the values of the Iranian regime and the official Shiite Jurist Leadership doctrine of the state. In the event of the president’s death, dismissal, resignation, absence, or illness for more than two months, presidential powers are temporarily transferred to the first vice president (under Section 131 of the Constitution) until new elections are held.

»»Features of Iran’s electoral environment and political alignments Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran has had seven presidents, including the incumbent, President Hassan Rouhani; this does not include Hassan Bani Sadr, the first president after the revolution, who was forcibly removed shortly after taking power. During this period, 12 general elections were held, with Rouhani winning a second term in the 12th and most recent one.

In theory, the president is elected according to the people’s choice through the national election held by “general suffrage or a general ballot“; yet in practice, the regime’s legislation requires that only those candidates pre-approved by the Guardian Council can stand for election. The Guardian Council, like the Shura Council or the Council of Experts on Leadership, is entirely under the control of the supreme leader. The supreme leader, also known as the “Leader of the Revolution“ or “Wali al-Faqih“is the absolute head of the power hierarchy in Iran. While every Iranian citizen theoretically has the right to run in the presidential elections if the necessary conditions are met, this is meaningless if the individual does not meet with the Guardian Council’s approval. There is no doubt that this council does not study the candidacies from any legal perspective but judges them solely in accordance with other criteria irrelevant to those outlined in the Iranian constitution.1 Despite the criticism directed at Rouhani and the emergence of some voices within the reformist movement demanding another candidate to represent the reformist bloc in the presidential elections, most of the reformist-oriented politicians fell in line behind Rouhani, including the Mardom Salari Party, which affirmed its desire to maintain the current government of Rouhani to preserve national interests. The party stressed that reformists expected Rouhani to open the political atmosphere and liberalize the country’s economy and foreign policy to a degree. Among the many reasons cited by the Mardom Salari Party for supporting Rouhani were his significant achievements in recent years in ensuring that international sanctions against Iran were lifted, the associated nuclear agreement he brokered between Iran and the P5+1 nations, and his efforts to preserve Iran’s territorial integrity and his success in repulsing the specter of war over Iran’s nuclear program.2 Some reformists, including Mohammad Reza Tabesh, the deputy head of the “Omid” parliamentary bloc, argued that the reformists should field an alternative candidate in anticipation of potential

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adversity to fall Rouhani’s candidacy. Despite this, the bloc ardently supported Rouhani in electoral debates, responding swiftly to some of the intense questions and criticisms from conservative candidates in televised debates that were aimed at weakening Rouhani and thus reducing his popularity.3 The plan to field another candidate or running mate was predicated on this individual’s tactical withdrawal in the final stages of the election campaign so as not to disperse votes. Indeed, the reformist movement introduced Issaq Jahangiri, the assistant to President Rouhani, as a candidate who would be supportive of Rouhani in the presidential elections.

In addition to the reformist parties, a group of former members of the Iranian Parliament announced their unequivocal support for Rouhani’s candidacy in the presidential elections, forming a body of former deputies to support him.4 Former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, one of Rouhani’s most prominent supporters, played a key role in Rouhani’s election in 2013, when he urged fellow reformist candidate Mohammad Reza Aref to withdraw at the last minute to support Rouhani’s candidacy in the election. In a video posted on Telegram during the 2017 election, he called on all Iranians to vote for Rouhani again to “promote hope for a better future.”5 Similarly, in a statement during a meeting with members of the Supreme Council concerning the reformist blocs’ political policies, former Iranian president Khatami warned that the failure to re-elect Rouhani would increase the possibility of the return of international isolation and sanctions against Iran.6 Along with the reformists, a number of conservatives announced their support for Rouhani, stating that they view him as the right person to lead Iran in the coming period. The most prominent of these conservatives, described as moderates, are the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Ali Larijani; the former foreign minister and adviser to the supreme leader, Ali Akbar Velayati; and the former Speaker of Parliament, Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri.7 In opposition to this, however, the hardliners launched a fierce campaign against Rouhani to influence his supporters and convince them that it would be impossible for him to continue for a second term. The fundamentalists accused the Rouhani movement of failing to implement the conditions of the nuclear agreement and of failing to improve the economic situation in Iran despite the lifting of the sanctions imposed on the country. Nevertheless, fundamentalist legislators could not agree on a particular candidate or candidates to represent them. Many hardliners announced their intention to run in the presidential elections, with the decision on a single candidate to represent them undecided until the final days preceding the election itself. The evidence suggests that the two major political losses suffered by the hardliners, in the presidential elections in 2013 and the parliamentary elections in 2016, had a significant impact on the critical delay in deciding their candidate.

To escape this state of confusion and disunity among the mainstream hardliners, the Popular Front for the Forces of the Iranian Revolution, a political bloc founded on December 25, 2016, comprising a large number of fundamentalist factions, held a series of meetings aimed at selecting one candidate to represent the fundamentalists in the presidential elections.8 The result was a

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victory for five of the nominees put forward: Ibrahim Raisi, who received 2,147 votes; Ali Reza Zakani, with 1,546 votes; Mhradd Bazrpash, who obtained 1,404 votes; Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf, with 1,373 votes; and Parvez Fattah, who received 994 votes. At the end of the second meeting of the Assembly and by a majority of the votes of the members, the Central Council of the Front was authorized to elect the final candidate from these five candidates for the presidential elections.9 Raisi, who was eager to gather the most support possible from the fundamentalist movement before formally announcing his candidacy, postponed the official announcement until after the decisive meeting of the Popular Front for the Forces of the Iranian Revolution. However, the 'Islamic Alliance Party,' one of the oldest groups of political conservatives, announced early on that they nominate Mustafa Mir Salim, minister of culture and guidance in Hashemi Rafsanjani’s government from 1993 to 1997, as their representative in the presidential elections, and that they would not wait for the rest of the conservative factions to agree on one candidate for them.10 Just three weeks before the presidential election, the Front announced that Raisi and Qalibaf were the main candidates for the Front. In a statement, the Front said that it did not have a primary and secondary candidate to run in the presidential elections, a reference to the agreement made within the reformist movement to choose an alternative candidate to strengthen support for Rouhani.11 The days leading up to the election proved this claim to be false, with the fundamentalists following in the reformists’ footsteps after Qalibaf withdrew from the presidential race in support of Raisi.

»»Opening the door to candidacy and the decisions of the Guardian Council Assessing the political environment surrounding the election in Iran was easier after the formal launch of the registration process on April 11, 2017, when a total of 1,634 people nominated themselves to run for the presidency, including Iranian President Rouhani and Raisi, who was supported by Khamenei and the governor of Tehran, Qalibaf. Another controversial nominee was former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose appearance on the list of candidates was a shock to most Iranians, with his candidacy rumored to be in defiance of the orders of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who reportedly urged Ahmadinejad the previous September not to run in the elections. Ahmadinejad denied that his candidacy was a challenge to Khamenei or that he would disobey the supreme leader’s orders, asserting that Khamenei’s request was merely advisory to avoid division in Iranian society. Ahmadinejad further attempted to justify his candidacy by claiming that he came to support his former ally and vice-president Hamid Bagai, who also submitted his candidacy application. Nevertheless, anyone with even the most basic understanding of the Iranian regime recognizes that the ruling political elite in Iran deals with the demands and directives of the supreme leader of the Iranian regime as orders which cannot be refused.

Ahmadinejad continues to have a robust and influential presence in Iran, especially in rural and impoverished areas, which are his most significant demographic and electoral base. This reality has led to the rise of what is known, in an abbreviation of his name, as the “Nejad movement” at the expense of the traditionalist (fundamentalist and reformist) streams.

After the end of the 2017 electoral registration period, the Guardian Council whittled down the 1,634 nominees who submitted their names to only six candidates for the election, with the council rejecting all the proposals put forward by the Iranian Parliament to establish preliminary conditions to ensure the seriousness of each applicant’s candidacy, and even rejecting a proposal to register candidacy online. The Guardian Council explained its decision by stating that it wished to preserve the right of every citizen to run and to maintain the strength and public acceptance of the current electoral process.

The Guardian Council approved the candidacies of Raisi and Qalibaf as representatives of the fundamentalist movement and agreed to nominate President Rouhani and Jahangiri, supported

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Results of the meeting of the Popular Front of the Islamic Revolution Forces

Parvez Fattah

Mohammed Qalibaf

Mhradd Bazrpash

Ali Reza Zakani

Ibrahim Raisi

votes

votes

votes

votes

votes

by reformists and moderates, along with two independent candidates—fundamentalist Salim and reformist Mustapha Hashemi Taba. Former president Ahmadinejad, however, failed, unsurprisingly, to make the final shortlist of candidates.

It was evident from the outset that the Guardian Council, which consists of six clerics and six jurists, all radical fundamentalists, and is one of the supreme leader’s most valuable tools in dominating Iran‘s political life, would not allow Ahmadinejad to run in the elections. While Ahmadinejad possibly predicted this outcome, he may have expected the Guardian Council to at least accept the nomination of his ally Bagai, the representative of the Nejad movement, in the presidential elections; yet Bagai was also unanimously rejected by the council, sending a clear message to Ahmadinejad that he and his followers would not be allowed any political leverage within the regime power structure or institutions.

» TV debates revealed the depth of the reformist–fundamentalist rifts The 2017 election campaigns and televised debates highlighted, for the first time, real tensions between the candidates. These events were characterized by heated exchanges of accusations of corruption from all sides, which saw the worst levels of hostility in the history of the Iranian regime’s elections. The issues of the political and economic crisis in Iran and the nuclear agreement overshadowed all others in the three televised debates, with all six candidates focusing on these matters, but with an especially clear line drawn between the candidates of the fundamentalist movement, Raisi and Qalibaf, on one side and reformist candidates and moderates, Rouhani and Jahangiri, on the other.

The first debate revealed several surprises and discussions on political and corruption issues, as well as revelations over who had been involved in and responsible for storming the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Tehran. There were numerous mutual accusations of lying and mismanagement between Rouhani and Jahangiri’s camp and Qalibaf and Raisi’s camp.

The candidates exchanged heated allegations and exposed shocking statistics on corruption, embezzlement, theft, unemployment, and the economic crisis in Iran, with much of the debate focusing on the social crises afflicting the country. Other issues included the effect of the crises on suburban residents, social justice, housing, youth marriage, administrative bureaucracy, and the environment.12

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The second debate focused largely on domestic politics, cultural issues, and the performance of Rouhani’s government in recent years, with the issues again provoking heated exchanges between the candidates. Other issues under discussion in this debate were related to Iran’s foreign policy, including the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group of nations, and Iranian intervention in Syria13 The third and final debate was dominated by corruption allegations, with the incumbent president, Rouhani, and his deputy, Jahangiri, facing charges of involvement in economic corruption and large-scale financial and administrative excesses. Rouhani and Jahangiri responded in turn with similar accusations against their fundamentalist opponents Raisi and Qalibaf14 The staging of the debates revealed that the Iranian regime seeks to underline its supposedly democratic nature by imitating Western countries’ televised pre-election debates to make the audience forget that the presidency in Iran is, in reality, no more than a decision of possible candidates chosen by the executive authority and operating under the absolute rule of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who controls the country with an iron fist.15 Although these debates were accompanied by an unprecedented level of recriminations and slander between the candidates, they ultimately contributed to a greater understanding between the fundamentalist and reformist blocs, given the likelihood of one dominating the other in governance of the country’s institutions.

While these debates, which Iranians followed with great interest, helped voters to determine their choices and to assess the candidates’ identities and policies, this does not necessarily mean that they contributed to Rouhani’s victory in the first round. Furthermore, reformist leaders accused Raisi and Qalibaf of failure in the debates, arguing that they did not provide any program to manage the country during the upcoming period, and alleging that their behavior was offensive and immoral.16 Some Iranian media outlets, especially those supportive of Rouhani’s government, also saw Rouhani’s position during the debates as weak and accused Qalibaf of repeating Ahmadinejad’s hyperbolic style of populist rhetoric, after he said “96 percent of Iranians [are] poor.” Moreover, the media saw Raisi’s performance as unconvincing, criticizing his failure to provide a convincing political program for the electorate, which was widely attributed to his lack of experience in executive positions. In contrast, Jahangiri and Rouhani were viewed as providing convincing answers, while the media accused Qalibaf of ignoring the valuable work of the Rouhani administration in recent years, alleging that he had effectively declared war on the government with unreasonable slogans in the hope of increasing his share of votes.17 After the debate ended, many Iranians expressed their surprise that the candidates had not addressed the most important social issues that concern a large number of citizens such as matters related to citizens’ rights and civil and political freedoms. This confusion and the mutual recriminations between the election candidates during the televised debates were widely condemned by senior figures within the Iranian regime, including the former speaker of parliament, Nateq Nuri, who expressed his regret at what he described as the lack of discipline and the “moral turbulence” that accompanied the televised debates.18 After the conclusion of the election debates, Qalibaf announced his withdrawal from the presidential election race in favor of the cleric Raisi, calling on all his supporters to vote for Raisi in the context of coordination between the candidates of the fundamentalist movement to contest the presidential elections in Iran and avoid dispersion of the votes. Some news reports suggested that Qalibaf had received promises from the conservative blocs that he would be appointed as vicepresident in the event of Raisi’s winning if he withdrew from the presidential race.19 In a similar move, Iranian Vice President Jahangiri, one of the six candidates in the presidential election, in a speech in Shiraz, announced his withdrawal from Iran’s presidential race in favor of Rouhani. Jahangiri’s announcement came hours after a request by the Supreme Committee for Reformist Policy for Jahangiri to withdraw in Rouhani’s favor.20

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»»The election results and the factors that contributed to Rouhani’s victory for his second presidential term

The elections were held on Friday, May 19, 2017, in an atmosphere of fierce competition between the four candidates, especially between the two main candidates, namely Rouhani, the representative of the reformists and moderates, and Raisi, the representative of the fundamentalist movement.

According to the announcement by the Iranian Election Commission, about 41 million of Iran’s 56 million-plus voters eligible to vote in the election voted, which accounts for around 73 percent of the electorate. The ballot boxes were closed at 12:00 pm, after the Interior Ministry extended the polling period by six hours on three separate occasions. The next day, the Interior Ministry announced the results, confirming the victory of Rouhani for a second presidential term with 23,549,616 million votes, or 57 percent of the total, while Raisi, the candidate of the fundamentalists, ranked second with 15,786,449 million votes or 38 percent. The other candidates, Salim and Taba, obtained 478,215 and 215,450 votes respectively.21 In his first press conference following the announcement of the election results, the returning president, Rouhani, thanked the voters for their confidence in his election program, asserting that his win was a victory for national sovereignty and a defeat for fundamentalism.22 Rouhani faced many pressures and obstacles in the election for the second term of his presidency, the most important of which was his failure to improve the economic situation, a subject of frequent criticism by Khamenei, as well as a source of indirect support by some of the regime’s institutions for his opponent, Raisi.

Despite these pressures, however, Rouhani obtained a larger percentage of the electorate vote than he did in the 2013 elections.

According to observers, several factors contributed to Rouhani’s victory, including the following: 1. Rouhani reached an agreement with the six major powers on Iran’s nuclear program.

2. Rouhani increased Iranian openness to the world during his first term.

3. Rouhani’s supporters see him as presiding over a period of greater economic stability than his predecessor, Ahmadinejad.

4. Rouhani managed to cajole the reformist forces, even those opposed to the Iranian regime, and wooed Iranians abroad.23 5. The criticisms from the conservative movement directed at Rouhani during the election campaign did not rise to a level that convinced most of the Iranian people that the fundamentalists would be able to offer a workable alternative to address the crises faced by the country.

6. The conservative movement failed to convince the people that the Rouhani government, especially the diplomatic team that managed to conclude the nuclear agreement with the six-party international group, has not yet succeeded in lifting the sanctions imposed on Iran in full. This factor tipped the scales in the reformist movement’s favor, with voters eager for reformists to retain power to provide another opportunity for possibly ridding the country of the international sanctions. Voters were disenchanted by the inflexibility of the conservative movement, which many believe to be incapable of accomplishing this task due to its dogmatic political stance and flat refusal to engage in negotiations that would affect these issues.24 7. The pressure exerted on President Rouhani ahead of the elections, and the support of several institutions, led by the Revolutionary Guards and the media, of Raisi, ultimately pushed the grassroots supporters of the reformist movement and the moderate wing to vote heavily for Rouhani, not only to enable him to renew his term in office until 2021 but also to prevent fundamentalist conservatives from regaining power and excluding their political opponents.25 8. The desire of many Iranians to open the country to the world further contributed to Rouhani’s victory. He confirmed this in his first speech after the announcement of the election results, when he

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said that his victory was the result of Iranians’ desire to engage with the world, renounce extremism, and live in friendship and peace with the world.

9. Although the way out of isolation and the unfavorable economic situation remain fraught with difficulties and the obstacles of US and European sanctions against Iran, as well as strained ties within its regional environment, a number of Rouhani’s supporters see him as the right man to take over the presidency in the coming period.

»»Rouhani’s second presidential term: policies and challenges Rouhani’s victory in a presidential race that saw a huge turnout will determine his future policies.

He is likely to be faced with numerous difficulties and priorities, such as 1. Improving the economic situation, which all Iranians agree is a critical and sensitive issue, including addressing economic stagnation and an unemployment level that exceeds 12.5% of the total working-age population and is at 27% among young people due to the country’s low GDP, which has been affected by plummeting oil prices.

2. Lifting economic sanctions. Rouhani will begin his second presidential term faced by popular demands for a quick breakthrough in economic issues. The US Trump Administration appears to have already started to implement its threats to pursue a tough policy on Iran after imposing a series of sanctions on Tehran recently. Therefore, the people see a need for a change in the country’s foreign policy to mitigate the potential impact of international and regional alliances to besiege and isolate Iran.

3. Solving the problems of ethnic and religious minorities experiencing inequality. These minorities, such as Arabs, Baluchis, and Kurds, continue with their activism to demand equality and justice, and to end the injustice and marginalization imposed by the Iranian regime. Furthermore, they are calling for greater respect for religious and sectarian diversity in the country.

4. Lifting the house arrest imposed on the leaders of the 2009 Green Revolution, including Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi and his wife, Zahra Rahnavard.

5. Fulfilling his obligations related to easing the security measures imposed on citizens, implementing the Charter of the Rights of Citizenship, and expanding political participation.

6. The need for the next government to represent all Iran’s social and political groups rather than limiting inclusivity to a certain political wing. This is viewed as being especially important considering the results of the presidential elections, which revealed many factors that should be taken into account, primary among the revelation that many voters distributed their votes among more than one candidate. In other words, many voters want to see action on issues that were not included in Rouhani’s electoral program, especially in terms of social and cultural matters.

Rouhani may pursue numerous other strategies to implement his goals and programs during his second term. The most urgent questions still remain unanswered: How will Rouhani deal with the challenges facing him, and what changes will occur over the next four years, both domestically and externally?

»»The economy and presidential election widened the gap between Rouhani and the IRGC Rouhani’s plans to develop the Iranian economy and address the economic crises dogging the country are likely to collide with the economic interests of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC), given mounting Western pressure and sanctions due primarily to the IRGC’s regional activities.

After winning the election, Rouhani is increasingly under pressure due to these sanctions, which the United States has again renewed recently due to the IRGC’s activities, particularly its involvement in money laundering as a means of supporting terrorist activity. Two former US senators called for

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implementing new sanctions against Iran due to its participation in these activities, with the move coming in conjunction with the meeting of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in Spain.26 The activities of the IRGC, which seeks to implement Khamenei’s agenda by maintaining its uncompromising stance and continuing contempt for the West, could seriously obstruct President Rouhani’s projects and plans to attract foreign investment. The Guard’s control over the Iranian economy grew considerably under former president Ahmadinejad, with the number of commercial projects assigned to the IRGC reaching around 10,000 between 2006 and 2013. One example of this is the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction firm, one of the largest and most influential of the IRGCcontrolled companies, which has been awarded numerous lucrative construction contracts by the regime through its favored status under Khamenei.

When the supreme leader issued a decree in 2006 to privatize 80 percent of Iran’s public sector, the IRGC saw and seized the opportunity to expand its economic role. Some estimates suggest that only 13.5 percent of government companies sold between 2006 and 2010 found their way into the private sector, with the rest seized by the IRGC to serve as its cash cows. The IRGC’s monopolistic control over the Iranian economy is one of the points of tension with President Rouhani, who wishes to focus on improving the economy, considering it the field in which he can succeed in achieving the aspirations of the people. One of his principal hopes for the nuclear deal is that it would lead to an influx of investments into the country after lifting sanctions, a hope which did not come to fruition, largely because of the IRGC’s activities.27 In a recent speech addressed to a gathering of Iranian economists, Rouhani lambasted the armed forces‘ interference in Iran’s economy, complaining that the country’s economy, weapons, and media are now in the military’s grip, with nobody else having the capacity to compete with this monopoly.

He accused the IRGC of completely controlling the Iranian economy, saying the Guards had initiated investments, counting on the government’s privatization plans. These remarks angered IRGC chief Mohammad Ali Jafari, who lashed out at Rouhani, saying that these projects are aimed at protecting the country from the “forces of arrogance,” a favorite term for the United States.

This was not the first time President Rouhani attacked the IRGC over its economic role. On this occasion, however, Rouhani accused the IRGC of controlling a “parallel government,” wondering rhetorically how investors could deal with a separate government that possesses weapons and controls a considerable part of the economy. In response to this accusation, Jafari asserted that the IRGC possesses guns and missiles, and Iran needs missiles more than ever, but he failed to address the critical issue of its acting as a parallel government. On the anniversary of the so-called Al-Quds

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Day, an event held annually by the IRGC on the last Friday of Ramadan, a number of demonstrators chanted anti-Rouhani slogans, forcing the president to leave the demonstration.28 Since its inception, the IRGC has undoubtedly controlled much of Iran’s economy. Some domestic sources estimate the powerful apparatus controls as much as 40 percent of the country’s resources, seizing the property of the Iranian people under the pretext of requiring the funds for the work of “exporting the revolution.” Observers say that any economic projects instituted by the government will ultimately become entangled with the ambitions of the IRGC, which will impede the flow of foreign investments. Moreover, during a recent visit to Kurdistan, Rouhani claimed that he had failed to make some decisions and implement various promised reform plans due to the intransigence of the judiciary, asserting that the judiciary had blocked decisions taken in favor of the people, and attributing this failure to what he said was the meddling of the IRGC. According to Rouhani, the IRGC is monitoring investors and merchants, some of whom are summoned to its headquarters for interrogation and even tried in courts, with a number languishing behind bars on no clear charges.

Rouhani’s concern over possible electoral fraud in favor of a conservative candidate was another reason for the tensions between him and the IRGC, which is strongly supported by the supreme leader and which favored fundamentalist Raisi in the presidential race. As Iran’s presidential election approached, the concerns of the reformist camp about the IRGC’s meddling in the election grew deeper. This concern was justified in the streets of Iran, as it is believed that the IRGC is the body responsible for rigging the disputed 2009 elections won by former president Ahmadinejad.

In the run-up to the 2017 election, Khamenei tried to allay public suspicions about possible election fixing. In a speech to mark the Iranian New Year, Khamenei vowed that he would personally oppose any attempt to fix the results of the presidential elections, while IRGC chief Jafari demanded in a widely published letter to commanding officers that they should refrain from any meddling in favor of any election candidates.29 Nevertheless, Khamenei’s comments and Jafari’s call did not allay Rouhani’s fears, especially after conservative figures and media began to mobilize for what were seen as possible efforts to unfairly influence the outcome of the elections. A few days before the election, Rouhani issued several warnings over what he described as “attempts by the IRGC and the state-run television to engineer the presidential elections.” In a meeting with executive bodies working on the presidential elections, Rouhani said that people should make a stand against the attempts of military bodies to meddle in the elections, claiming that the IRGC and Basij were planning to commit violations. Furthermore, he strongly criticized the state-run media, accusing them of explicitly backing one of the wings of the regime, a reference to the conservatives and their candidate Raisi.30 These warnings were considered the most outspoken of their kind against the IRGC’s suspicious meddling, revealing the depth of the concerns of Rouhani and his camp about possible attempts to repeat the scenario of the controversial 2009 elections.

»»Implications of Rouhani’s warnings about the IRGC These warnings about the IRGC’s possible role in efforts to rig the elections and the way they focused the electorate’s interest on this issue played a significant part in foiling attempts to rig the elections in conservatives’ favor. It seems that after this, the regime was eager not to block Rouhani’s victory, making every effort to prevent anything from hindering Rouhani’s win to avoid protests like those that occurred in 2009, the specter of which still hangs over the regime. Iran’s leadership was aware that any irregularities in the conservatives’ favor could raise the ire of the reformists, and avoiding the bloody scenario of 2009 is of utmost importance for the regime for two reasons: 1. The pressure world powers put on the regime did not allow it sufficient room to maneuver. Under these conditions, the regime is not able to bring the candidate it favors to power. In addition to these

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pressures come others exerted by the US administration over the Iranian regime’s support of terror and suspicious nuclear activities.

2. Rouhani’s ascent to power does not represent a significant problem for the regime. It is widely known that any attempt by Rouhani to implement changes will not come to fruition without Khamenei’s express approval. Rouhani has also asserted on several occasions that any step taken by his government to suspend the nuclear agreement would be blessed by Khamenei.31

»»The future of the IRGC–Rouhani relationship Ever since he won the 2013 presidential election, Rouhani has been at loggerheads with the IRGC. The main bones of contention between the two are the IRGC’s attempts to block a nuclear deal with the West and its increasing role in controlling Iran’s economy. Due to these tensions, the political rhetoric made it apparent that there are effectively two governments, one overt and the other covert, within the same regime. Rouhani recently admitted this when he said that the “government that possesses guns” had hijacked the economy from his government.

This position may give us a glimpse into the future relationship between Rouhani and the IRGC, and the impact of this relationship on the regime. First, despite Rouhani’s strong popular support, he cannot curb the activities and policies of the Khamenei-backed IRGC. Additionally, state bodies, especially those loyal to the supreme leader will do their best to impede any move by Rouhani to reduce or limit the IRGC’s powers. Second, Rouhani’s projects may fail or stumble. While he seeks to improve the economy and forge stronger ties with the West, the IRGC insists on implementing Khamenei’s policies, especially his “Resistance Economy” plans, and it is resolutely opposed to any cooperation with the West. Third, while it will not be easy for Rouhani to change the regime’s attitude, he may be able to impede the ambitions of the IRGC, given his previous experience in a number of senior security posts and his deep-rooted ties with senior figures within the regime. The nature of the relationship between the IRGC and Rouhani will determine the future of the regime, at least for the next four years.

»»Impact of Rafsanjani’s death on Rouhani Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the pillars of the Iranian regime, died on January 8, 2017, aged 82. His departure overshadowed the presidential elections and significantly affected all aspects of the political equation.

Rafsanjani, a prominent reformist figure widely known in Iran as “the Wolf” or “the Black Box,” was involved in all facets of Iran’s political life since the Shah’s era. Elected twice as president, he helped figures such as Khatami to ascend to power. As a leader, he was the driver of the regime’s “openness“ policy, although an attitude distinguished by considerations of realpolitik was his political hallmark, especially in the later years of his career.

Observers saw that Rafsanjani’s death dealt a severe blow to Rouhani and asserted that he would find it more difficult to be reelected in the wake of Rafsanjani’s demise. Furthermore, analysts cited the military achievements the conservatives claimed had been achieved by Iran in Syria and Iraq and their eagerness to retake the presidency, especially given the deteriorating health of Khamenei, who is reportedly suffering from terminal cancer.

Supporters of the reformists similarly feared that Rafsanjani’s death might cause problems for Rouhani’s reelection, with Rafsanjani also serving, up to his demise, as chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council. Many suggested that this, along with Rouhani’s failure to improve the ailing economy, represented a high-stakes gamble.32 After Rafsanjani’s death, some prominent pro-government figures and institutions called on Rouhani to continue his career and not yield to pressure from his opponents. Rafsanjani described Rouhani as “wronged“ shortly before his death and called for voters to support Rouhani in the elections.

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»»Ramifications of Rafsanjani’s death for Rouhani before and after the 2017 election In the run-up to the 2017 election, observers inside and outside Iran saw Rafsanjani’s absence as representing a severe loss to Rouhani, as he had been the main supporter of the reformist candidate. Others argued, however, that Rouhani would assert himself as Rafsanjani’s successor, appealing to the sentiments of the newly-bereaved electorate who largely viewed Rafsanjani’s political legacy in a positive light. A third group proclaimed that the only real effect of Rafsanjani’s death would be a boost for Rouhani’s public support, citing the sizeable public participation in the reformist icon’s funeral cortege. According to this group, many Iranians still support Rafsanjani’s policies, which are similar to those of Rouhani.33 One of the staunchest supporters of this view was Professor Sadeq Ziba Kalam, who argued that Rouhani’s popularity would increase the number of Rouhani supporters, adding that Rouhani won the 2013 election after Rafsanjani was disqualified from the presidential race.34 Many commentators believe that Rafsanjani’s demise presents an opportunity for Rouhani to fill the resulting political vacuum, suggesting that the time would be ripe for Rouhani to lead the reformists, especially since the other leaders of the reformist movement, Mahdi Karroubi and Mir Hussein Mousavi, remain under house arrest.35 After Rouhani won the elections, many contended that the regime needs to pursue the Rafsanjani-style policies at home and abroad in addressing crises.

»»The Iranian regime’s post-Rafsanjani future Rafsanjani’s death has become a significant issue dividing analysts, who differ on how his absence will affect the political equation in Iran. According to many observers, Rafsanjani’s demise will not only affect the reformists but also may extend to affecting some of the regime’s major institutions, given his status as a key player used by the regime to mediate between and unite different sides in Iran’s often polarized political landscape, and his contributions to shaping the regime’s foreign policy. This explains the regime’s reluctance to pension off Rafsanjani even in his later years, despite—or possibly in reaction to—the differences that surfaced in the wake of 2005.36 Some commentators suggest that Rafsanjani’s death may adversely affect Rouhani given Rafsanjani’s considerable influence in Khamenei’s decision-making process, arguing that Rouhani could face greater pressure than before. To support this assertion, they cite Khamenei’s threats that the reformist president may face the same fate as Bani Sadr, the first post-revolution president, who was rapidly deposed from power.37 Other analysts argue that Rafsanjani’s demise may allow Rouhani to fill the vacuum left by him and become the leader of Iran’s reformists.

Rafsanjani’s absence is further apparent in the lack of a similarly conciliatory figure to take his place in bridging the gap between the reformists and the conservatives, with his rare talent for uniting the two sides unlikely to be replicated anytime soon.

This is even more of a loss while Iran is seeing increasing numbers of military leaders gaining growing political power, particularly figures such as the head of the regime’s Quds Force Qassem Suleimani and others. The lack of an expert mediator and peacemaker such as Rafsanjani to lead Iran’s reformists means that any popular movement will be without his able leadership, with any attempt by the reformists to institute major change possibly facing grave consequences and leading to infighting in their ranks.38

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Moreover, Rafsanjani’s death may open the floodgate to cutthroat competition for the supreme leader’s position between candidates from the regime’s different factions as Khamenei’s health continues to deteriorate. Maryam Rajavi, the head of the People’s Mujahidin Organization of Iran (PMOI), widely viewed as Iran’s opposition in exile, asserted that the prominent reformist leader’s death would deal a severe blow to the regime, given his status as one of its pillars. She further suggested that his demise would hasten the downfall of the regime.39 Observers asserted that the language used by Khamenei in his formal statement of condolences on Rafsanjani’s death was proof of deep rifts between the two. Khamenei’s use of the honorific ‘Hojatoleslam’ (‘Authority on Islam’) rather than the higher-level ‘Ayatollah’ to describe the deceased dignitary provoked much debate on social media, with many suggesting that this was an indirect expression of disdain. Tensions first emerged between Khamenei and Rafsanjani following a statement by Rafsanjani in February 2015, in which he suggested that the Jurist Leadership establishment should be administered by a council instead of an individual, a major breach with the regime’s traditions. Furthermore, Rafsanjani asserted that the Jurist Leadership [Wilayat al-Faqih] had made some mistakes since the outbreak of the Khomeinist revolution in the 1970s, another red line for Khamenei. This disagreement reached its peak when Rafsanjani issued a statement on Twitter that read, “Tomorrow is a venue for dialog, not missiles.” In response to this message, Khamenei accused Rafsanjani of treason.40 Therefore, Rafsanjani’s death represents a loss to one of the most important tools to influence the Iranian regime in policymaking. Rafsanjani’s death is undoubtedly a severe blow to Iran’s reformists, as he maintained strong ties, even during periods of disagreement, with all the regime’s branches, representing one of the ‘centers of powers’ in the reformists’ political battle against the conservatives, who dominate the Council of Experts and the IRGC. The Iranian regime’s structure is autocratic rather than civic in nature, which already makes the introduction of reform, let alone radical reform, a challenging proposition. While the reformists have attained some gains in their rivalry with their conservative counterparts, these are limited in effect, more especially given the conservatives’ substantially greater political and social influence and power.41

»»Rouhani and the Judiciary: a renewed spat and exacerbating disagreement Based on the provisions of the Constitution, the judiciary in Iran is an independent authority whose head is appointed by the supreme leader, with his choice as the head of the judicial authority in turn selecting the heads of both the Supreme Court and the General Prosecution Service. The Iranian justice ministry wields authority over the Supreme Court and controls the provisional, domestic, and revolutionary courts.

The staunch support the head of the judiciary receives from Khamenei gives him leeway to make independent decisions, even if these rulings represent a blatant infringement of Iranian law. This is routinely apparent in rulings related to protecting the regime’s interests. The judiciary’s power and ties to the supreme leader and IRGC enable it to meddle in the affairs of the country’s other governing authorities, especially the executive authority chaired by the president.

The relationship between Rouhani and the judiciary has always been tense. These tensions surfaced when reformist lawmakers accused the judicial authority of using 63 personal bank accounts to illicitly launder billions of dollars, along with massive sums of bail money gathered from litigants at the country’s courts. In November 2016, the head of the judicial authority, Larijani, lashed out at Rouhani, accusing him of being “contradictory” after Rouhani demanded greater freedom of expression and an end to the muzzling of media outlets. Rouhani blasted the arrests of media figures in Iran. In response, Larijani said, “Speaking in Khamenei’s presence, Rouhani calls for standing up to the media, but when he addresses the people, he calls for more freedom of speech.”

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In the aftermath of this row, the two sides traded accusations of corruption, including one case involving the embezzlement of $335 million to which Larijani himself has been linked. Conversely, Larijani’s team accused the head of Rouhani’s presidential campaign, Mohammed Reza Neamat, of involvement in a $1 billion graft case related to campaign finances. The spokesman for the judiciary, Mohsen Ejei, supported Larijani’s accusations, saying that discussion of transparency and corruption in Iran always precedes the election, accusing the political parties of using the issue of transparency and fighting corruption for political gain. Addressing Rouhani, he said, “If we want to talk about transparency, we should forsake deceit, and the issues should be disclosed transparently to assess public opinion. However, when it comes to elections, things go differently.”42 Another advisor to Rouhani, Ali Akbar Turkan, rejected the accusations of corruption related to campaign funding, indicating that the bank account details for the campaign are not secret. He added that presidential campaign funding was monitored by the campaign team’s accountants and a financial department, with all the money paid for the campaign registered by the electoral body headed by Neamat. Turkan added that Rouhani’s presidential campaign remains prepared to disclose its budget, provided that all the candidates do the same, rejecting allegations that the campaign received money from Babek Morteza Zanjani, and calling for the return of funds embezzled before executions, as these monies are the property of the Iranian people.43 In January 2017, the dispute between the judicial and executive authorities once again came to a head, quickly escalating into an open confrontation, after the Ministry of Intelligence declared that it had seized a shipment of computers and other equipment. Judicial authorities accused Rouhani’s office of intending to use these computers to spy on the judiciary and senior officials opposed to Rouhani, allegations which were hotly denied by Rouhani’s office.

The case of the Iranian businessman Babek Bahrami, who was arrested in 2013, further ratcheted up tensions between Rouhani and the judiciary after the businessman was sentenced to death in 2016 for allegedly embezzling $3 billion. Concerning Bahrami’s case, Rouhani was skeptical of the conviction, asking, “Could an individual be able to siphon off $3 billion? Where are the rest of the perpetrators?” He added, “The man was sentenced to death. However, where is the money?” The president further suggested that Bahrami should have been turned in to the Ministry of Intelligence.

The judiciary rejected Rouhani’s statements, calling them a direct criticism aimed at the institution.44 Furthermore, while addressing supporters during his presidential campaign, Rouhani vowed that if elected he would end the house arrest of reformist leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi, his wife Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karroubi. These remarks angered Larijani, who responded, “Who are you to end house arrest?” Larijani further accused “some parties” of provoking public anger against the rulings of the country’s legal institutions and stated that the decision to place the reformist figures under house arrest had been taken by the Supreme National Security Council and could only be canceled by the same body. Although the Council is nominally headed by the president and includes senior political and military leaders in the country, its decisions must be approved by the supreme leader before they can be implemented.45 The reformists considered Larijani’s accusations to be an early targeting of Rouhani.

Conservatives, meanwhile, threw their weight behind Larijani, accusing Rouhani of attempting to mobilize voters against the judiciary to distract attention from his own mediocre performance during his first presidential term, using the argument to once again blast the nuclear deal.46 The row between Rouhani and Larijani was also the subject of heated debate in the streets of Iran and on social media. Although Khamenei himself did not comment on the issue, some senior figures within the regime leveled harsh criticism at Rouhani and Larijani, emphasizing the need to settle such disputes privately rather than allowing them to spill out into the public domain and adversely affect the regime’s public image. Among the officials issuing this type of condemnation was Hussein Nouri Hamedani, an extremely influential figure within Khamenei’s inner circle, who called on both

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the executive and judicial authorities to meet behind closed doors and hold discussions to end the standoff. He expressed anger at regime officials for dragging the public into the issue and using media in their standoff 47. Another influential cleric, Mohammed Taqi Rahbar, suggested that raising these differences in the press would tarnish the regime’s public image and give Western media a pretext to attack the regime, expressing regret that the heads of the two authorities had failed to heed this fact.48

»»Rouhani and the Judiciary: scenarios of conflict The current Iranian regime’s record tells us that tensions and confrontations are the hallmark of all Iranian presidents’ second terms, a time when they are likely to clash with institutions such as the IRGC and the judiciary, whose heads are appointed by the supreme leader rather than being elected. These conflicts are fueled by the feeling of many presidents in their second term that, with fewer constraints on them since they can only serve two terms according to the constitutional rules, they can set out to fulfill the promises they fell short of attaining in the first term.

While it is likely, therefore, that Rouhani will genuinely do his best to secure the release of the leaders of the Green Movement, his efforts are likely to be impeded by the judiciary, which is opposed to any intervention in this issue by the president.

Other possible sources of tensions between Rouhani and the judiciary during his second term are efforts to fulfill his promises to alleviate the restrictive security measures imposed on citizens; to implement the charter of citizenship rights, civil, and personal liberties; and to open up political participation. The regime’s hardline institutions will oppose any such intervention or reform, most especially the judicial authority, which gives security concerns precedence over any matters of morality or principle. Analysts have suggested that Rouhani may work to bring an end to human rights violations in Iran. Tallies released by watchdogs reveal that execution rates in Iran have reached record levels, with the regime’s prisons full of activists, including women, and politicians.

Observers say that Rouhani’s attempt to address this issue will renew the standoff with the judiciary.

Some parties have tried to conceal the contradictions and differences within the regime, arguing that such differences are similar to those happening among the members of any family. However, even a cursory examination of the political landscape in Iran makes it clear that such claims are a desperate effort to normalize serious and growing political rifts.48

»»Disagreement between Khamenei and Rouhani: from criticism to threat During the last two years of President Rouhani’s first term, the tensions between him and Khamenei became too obvious to ignore. The supreme leader publicly castigated Rouhani for his mediocre performance, especially regarding the Iranian economy, despite the fact that this is largely controlled and dominated by the IRGC and other institutions and figures close to Khamenei himself. Another issue of dispute between the president and supreme leader was the area of Iran’s foreign policy.

Because of Khamenei’s criticisms and the widening divergence in views between the president and supreme leader on various issues, Rouhani has also faced fierce attacks by the fundamentalists and the IRGC. These continued throughout the first half of 2017, with Khamenei in February strongly condemning the country’s recession, high unemployment rates, and deteriorating economic situation, urging Rouhani to do more to improve the country’s economy.49 Moreover, the struggle between Rouhani and the IRGC, which is closely aligned with Khamenei, reached new heights after the reformist leader won the elections with the supreme leader stepping up criticism of the president, to the extent of insulting him publicly. During a meeting of top regime officials, Khamenei aimed at the Rouhani administration over the deterioration of the Iranian economy and its failure to implement economic policies promised earlier.50 In response, speaking

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during the Ramadan period at an Iftar ceremony attended by a group of university professors in Tehran, Rouhani said that a religious leader’s political legitimacy is determined by the will of the people, a thinly veiled attack on the supreme leader himself. As an example, the president cited the rule of Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib, whom Rouhani said had accepted leadership only after being chosen by the majority of Muslims.

Rouhani’s remarks were widely condemned by many politicians and religious leaders, who accused him of questioning the legitimacy of the Jurist Leadership system, the foundation of Iran’s theocratic state. Those hardliners voiced outrage at the president’s statements, asserting that it showed insubordination and disobedience to the supreme leader and exhibited a tendency on Rouhani’s part to confront him. Some major clerics in Qum Seminary similarly criticized the remarks, saying they defy the interpretations of the Twelver Shiite doctrine on Jurist Leadership theory.

Consequently, during Iran’s International Al-Quds Day, held annually on the last Friday of Ramadan, fundamentalist protesters chanted anti-Rouhani slogans during a march he participated in, forcing him to leave.51 The religious establishments that have engaged in the Khamenei–Rouhani spat favor the supreme leader, condemning Rouhani’s comments as dangerously insurrectionary and suggesting that he is “challenging the authorities of the supreme leader.” A group of clerics in Qom and the Assembly of Experts issued statements slamming Rouhani, with the Assembly asserting that “prophets and infallible clericss are chosen by God and endorsed by the people, meaning that those people should be loyal to them, not elect them.” The two statements also accused Rouhani of distorting the words of the venerated figure 'Imam Ali,' asserting that doing so even in part sows the seeds of sedition among Muslims and questions the very principles of religion, and insisting that they should be dealt with gravely in light of this misconduct.52 Khamenei’s criticism of Rouhani has continued to this day, with the supreme leader condemning the Iranian government’s signature of and support for the United Nations’ 2030 Sustainable Development Goals Convention drafted by UNESCO. The supreme leader rejected the decision, stressing that Iran will not abide by agreements drafted under the influence of “imperialist powers.” Rouhani defended the agreement in a speech to a youth conference in Tehran, where he said that that the UNESCO 2010 agreement would be enforced within the framework of Iranian laws, stating that “some parties” explain issues to the people in a dishonest and ignorant way. The 2030 agreement, rejected by the Iranian leader, is a nonbinding plan proposed by UNESCO, which aims to raise educational standards in Iran and to emphasize the importance of the principle of full equality between males and females in access to education and training opportunities.53 The war of words between the two men continues to worsen, with Khamenei accusing the government of being unable to deal with cultural issues, while issuing a thinly veiled threat: “When the central apparatus malfunctions, revolutionary forces have the right to open fire.” Khamenei

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deliberately used this martial language to express his strong displeasure with Rouhani’s policies and to subtly undermine some of Rouhani’s executive powers. The supreme leader’s statements may also be understood by his supporters as giving tacit approval to oppose any effort by Rouhani to keep his promises on pursuing greater civil liberties.54 In June of 2017, Khamenei accelerated the conflict with Rouhani to a new and potentially dangerous degree, implicitly threatening to unseat Rouhani if his policies were to divide Iranians into supporters and opponents of the regime. Khamenei cited the case of Sadr, the first elected Iranian president, who was deposed after only 18 months after being subjected to a harsh interrogation by the parliament in June 1981. Bani-Sadr’s 18-month tenure in office witnessed tensions and clashes between his supporters and members of the PMOI, which spiraled into deadly battles that also involved clerics and security personnel. Many people died in the resulting turmoil.

»»Khamenei–Rouhani spat: possible implications Despite the unprecedented tensions in the relationship between Rouhani and Khamenei, many observers are doubtful of any possibility that Rouhani will meet the same fate as Bani Sadr. They agree, however, that if the situation continues to deteriorate in this way with tensions between the two men, it may have grave consequences not only for Khamenei and Rouhani but also for the regime as a whole. Senior officials within the regime are so concerned about the continuing war of words between the two that they have warned that it may imperil the unity of the country, especially given the volatile regional situation.55 For Khamenei, ousting Rouhani is within the realm of possibility, as the supreme leader wields absolute power from the pinnacle of the totalitarian theocratic regime. Nevertheless, analysts suggest that the current criticism is intended to curb Rouhani’s public popularity, especially after his sweeping victory in the elections, which he won by a massive margin of five million votes against his Khameneibacked rival. In addition, the social, political, regional, and international context is massively different from that of the Khomeini era, so it would be difficult to repeat the same action.

Khomeini, the initial supreme leader and founder of the Iranian Republic, was a deeply charismatic individual, while Khamenei lacks that magnetic personality which could endear him on a personal level to the Iranian people and allow him a similar degree of support to that enjoyed by Khomeini. Another problem for Khamenei is that his support base has dwindled due to the country’s deteriorating economy, massive domestic oppression, and political deadlock in 1989.56 It seems, therefore, that Khamenei’s thinly-veiled threat to Rouhani that he could meet the same fate as Bani Sadr is aimed more at forcing the president into toeing the line than at actually threatening to depose him. Yet the reformists view the supreme leader’s attacks as part of a plot to oust Rouhani, arguing that the slogans chanted against the president by Khamenei’s supporters during the Al-Quds Day march are similar to those used before unseating Bani Sadr. Others believe that Rouhani is maneuvering to make as many political gains as possible on divisive issues, asserting that he is politically astute enough not to tamper with Khamenei’s red lines, which could pave the way for ousting him as it did with Bani Sadr.

The continuation of the standoff could potentially allow deeper splits to surface in the future.

Rouhani, who is seeking to strengthen Iran’s economy, end the country’s isolation, and lift Western sanctions, is still engaged in a cutthroat contest with the great establishments loyal to Khamenei.

The foremost of these institutions is the IRGC, which is not only a military institution but also an industrial and economic empire with mounting and crucial political influence. This means that the IRGC may hinder Rouhani’s plans to implement policies that could enhance Iran’s openness to the world.57 Tightening the political noose around Rouhani’s neck and attempting to impede his efforts at reform will perpetuate the current economic crisis, meaning that the Iranian public is likely to turn on Rouhani and his reformist supporters, holding them responsible, however unfairly, for the situation

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MILITARY AFFAIRS » Military exercises After the end of the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War, particularly since the early 1990s, military exercises have become a crucial part of Iran’s most frequent military activities. Observers subscribe to the opinion that these maneuvers are used by the regime to intimidate its enemies. Analysts further suggest that such drills are carried out both to test the will of external enemies, forcing them to reconsider their options, and to deter domestic opposition and dissent, especially before and after the presidential and parliamentary elections, and during the periods of internal crisis facing the country. Military exercises conducted by states are often interpreted as part of normal military activity to develop their forces’ capabilities to protect the state, but in the Iranian regime’s case, the matter goes beyond such objectives.

Iran’s regime, which insists on carrying out numerous military exercises, has been sending mixed messages that hide the real objectives of these maneuvers. These messages are explained in the following points: » Iran sometimes declares that the aim of its military exercises is to respond to threats from its supposed enemies, especially the United States and its regional allies, and to prove that the Iranian regime is fully aware of the warnings and sanctions imposed by Washington on Tehran. » As US rhetoric intensifies against Iran, with Washington threatening to impose more sanctions against the regime, Tehran argues that these exercises are defensive security measures to test

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the readiness of its forces to confront the perceived external threats to Iran, to verify the strength of the Iranian army, and to repel terrorist groups infiltrating Iranian through the borders of neighboring countries. »»Over the past six months, various Iranian military units have conducted a series of maneuvers, in addition to joint military drills with the Sultanate of Oman in the northern part of the Indian Ocean.

»»‘Velayat 95’ military exercise This joint exercise was conducted by the naval forces of the Iranian army and the IRGC in the Strait of Hormuz, the Sea of Oman, the Indian Ocean, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, extending across an area of two million square meters. In the drills, several types of vessels were used, including submarines, destroyers, rocket launchers, and naval hovercrafts, as well as various classes of warplanes, rockets, and combat units.58 The objectives of the exercise, according to Admiral Habibullah Siyyari, commander of the Iranian naval forces, were to enhance security, boost defensive capabilities, and combat terror and piracy.59

»»Ground forces maneuvers The second exercise was carried out by the ground troops of the Iranian army in May 2016 in the Nasrabad area of the Isfahan province, central Iran, in honor of the anniversary of Iran’s “liberation” of the Ahwazi Arab city of Muhammarah, which was the emirate of the last Arab ruler of Al-Ahwaz until 1925—its name was subsequently changed to a Persian one, Khoramshahr—from the Iraqi forces during the war with Iran.

Several Iranian army infantry units, armored vehicles, rapid response forces, the 65th Special Forces brigade, drones, and helicopters participated in these military drills, which included many defensive exercises, the deployment of forces, repelling airborne enemy forces, carrying out overnight and daytime attacks, and “combatting terror.”60 The drills aimed to test the new weapons and equipment produced recently by the regime army’s “Self-Sufficiency Jihad” unit.

»»'Imam Ali' maneuver The third recent large-scale military exercise by Iranian forces was codenamed the “Imam Ali” exercise. This exercise by IRGC ground forces took place over a four-day period at the Najaf alAshraf base in the Qasr-e Shirin region of western Iran. The commander of the IRGC’s ground forces, Brigadier General Mohammed Pakpour, said the aim of the military exercise was to improve the forces’ combat capability and enhance their intelligence readiness.61 The commander of the IRGC’s al-Najaf al-Ashraf base, Brigadier General Mohammad Nadh Azimi, confirmed that the exercise was carried out successfully, adding that it came at the directive of the supreme leader, after he called for upgrading the units of Iran’s armed forces.62

»»'Annabi Alazam' 11 Military Exercise The IRGC ground forces conducted the fourth Annabi Alazam 11 military exercise for three days in Central and North Iran and other defense exercises in Kawi and Barzan in Taibad in Khorasan Razavi, Eastern Iran.63 It consisted of testing new missiles, drones (UAV), and long-range artillery demonstrations. It also unveiled the state-of-the-art anti-chopper mines called Assaiqah. According to Iranian officials, this Jumper mine could deliver a significant number of smaller mines up to a height of 300 meters.64 Joint military drills were also conducted among the Iranian Special Forces, armored units, and the IRGC Air Force.65 According to the spokesperson of the exercise and assistant chief of cooperation in the IRGC ground forces, Gen. Ali Akbar Boar Jamshedian, these forces launched the new prepping weapons systems “Mithaq” and advanced artillery provided recently to the ground troops. These drills intend to assess these forces and their readiness and capabilities to confront any threat against the country.66

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» A Series of Military Exercises between Iran and Oman Iran expanded its military exercises outside its borders. It conducted joint military exercises with the Sultanate of Oman in the Southern Oman Sea near Iran and the Omani territorial waters for one week. This included naval rescue, rapid reaction drills in cases of emergency, rescue operations of submarines, casualty drills, tactical maneuvers of forces mobilization in the targeted area, escorting of merchant vessels and oil tankers, offshore refueling, and communications.67 Simultaneously, a number of Iranian ships from the Northern Fleet headed to Kazakhstan for the first time across the Caspian Sea. Over the past months, this fleet visited Russia, Dagestan, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan.

This exercise aimed to ensure the security and safety of the Iranian and Omani ships in terms of supplies and rescue in emergency cases,68 ensure a safe navigation of ships in this strategic region—the passage of commercial ships and oil tankers, enhance security readiness, and train on naval rescuing operations.

» Future Directions of the Iranian Military Exercises The Iranian president Hassan Rouhani is keen to open up to the world during his second term of presidency. However, the IRGC—supported by Khamenei and the other hardliners—opposes Rouhani’s attempts to diminish the IRGC harassment to the US administration and regional countries.

Sometimes, military exercises are directed to the Iranian interior to suppress any potential internal tension and uprising. The Iranian Army and the IRGC might continue these military exercises as a demonstration of force and a message to militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen that it can protect and support them. The strategy of military exercises might have an interim impact on the regional, political, and security scenes but do not mean to succeed in the long run. This strategy, especially for exercises carrying messages against the United States, could be a last resort to lessen the US sanctions on Iran and preserve the nuclear deal that the US president Donald Trump threatened to rip up.

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»»Military Industry Before the Khomeini revolution in 1979, Tehran mainly relied on Western Arms from the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany. However, the sanctions imposed on Iran after the revolution and the Iraqi-Iran war depleted Iran’s stockpile of Western weapons and obliged Tehran to turn toward former Soviet Union, China, Brazil, and North Korea to meet its demands. In addition, Tehran developed its domestic military industries in the recent years with immense support from Russia, China, and North Korea.

Despite Iran releasing the news about its military industries, the accuracy and destructive power of Iran’s missiles are doubted because Iran still does not possess the model of the Western state-ofthe-art technology. Most of Iran’s technologies from Russia and China did not match the American and European technologies. During the second half of 2017, the Iranian army and IRGC announced some new military projects and industries. According to the Iranian minister of defense Brig. Gen. Hussein Dehghan, during the commencement ceremonies of five new production lines of arms to meet the Iranian armed forces demands and to strengthen the country’s defense structure, Iran has produced 115 new models of arms in three years.

The Iranian Defense Industries Establishment plays a major role in designing and making arms for the Iranian armed forces. This establishment produced 69% of the total Iranian military production over the past three years.69

»»Unveiling two new models of weapons, such as personal arms Kalashnikov 113, at the request of the IRGC

Deputy chief of staff of the armed forces Brig. Gen. Abdurrahim Mosavi commented on this machine gun, saying it was of high quality and accuracy. Moreover, the sniper’s gun 12.7 mm was designed at the request of the IRGC ground forces; it also has high accuracy and significant capabilities.

Ground forces project to build four production lines of strategic military equipment in 2017.

Based on Iran’s strategic armament plan, the Iranian ministry of defense intends to commence four production lines for strategic defense equipment this year, 2017, as announced by Iran’s ground forces commander Brig. Gen. Keomarth Haidary. These are spare parts for tanks and troop carriers, armed equipment, spare parts for vehicles used in the production process, and spare parts for the Iranian army ground forces vehicles.

Haidary added that the Iranian ground forces had turned some of their units into offensive mobile units to be able to move as quickly as possible to threat areas in the country.70

»»Unveiling the sniper rifle Haidar and the two tactical vehicles Haidar-5 and Haidar-6.

In military ceremonies attended by the Iranian army ground forces commander Keomerth Haidary, the semi-automatic 50 mm sniper rifle was unveiled under the name “Haidar” with the following specifications: 11.057 kg weight alone (17.5 kg with the magazine and the other accessories), 81.28 cm barrel, 33.6 cm stock, and 114.86 cm total length. The speed of the rifle bullet is about 1,734 meters per second. The life cycle of the barrel is firing five thousand bullets, 1,600 meters effective range, 2,000 meters useful range, and 3,000 meters maximum range.

During the ceremonies, the two amphibious mine-layers Haidar-5 and Haidar-6 were also launched with the following specifications: consist of manual and automatic doors, have the ability to lay mines while moving, hide the mine-layer while moving, lay mines at a 45-degree angle, and carry 144 mines simultaneously (according to Jam-e Jam news agency).

In addition to the same capabilities of Haidar-5, Haidar-6 has the following additional equipment: new Turret, 73 mm cannon with a firing rate of 8–10 shells per minute, 20–30 cm breakout strength,

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self-loading system, anti-tanks guided missiles, the ability to carry military personnel with enough supporting fire, and the ability to maneuver at high speed both in water and on the ground.71

»»Submarine Improvement Plans Iran gives importance to its naval forces. It has ambitious plans to improve its naval combat’s capabilities aligned with the wide dispersal area of the Iranian navy. However, the international sanctions on Iran prevented it from developing its naval forces, which obliged Tehran to turn to its domestic limited technical potentials.

The Iranian navy has three Russian-made “kilo” submarines 8 of 7,000 miles range with limited capabilities concentrated on controlling and securing of coasts.72 On the same issue, the US Naval Intelligence released a report about Iran’s ambitious plans to buy and build a number of submarines. The report said that Iran intends to produce more of Iranian’s latest submarine “Baath” that is equipped with destructive anti-ship missiles to confront the US warships at Hormuz Strait.

Earlier, the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani visited the Iranian destroyer Jamaran and the submarine Tariq and gave his orders to the naval forces to build the nuclear engine, which provoked the international community because of its violation of the nuclear deal.73

»»Unveiling the guided missile, Fatih-313 and Saba-248 helicopter After Fatih-110 missile, the Iranian Ministry of Defense Airspace Establishment unveiled the new version of the most accurate Iranian short-range missiles family Fatih-313 with the following specifications: has a 500-km range,74 is lighter in weight than Fatih-110, works on solid fuel, and has state-of-the-art stoppers.

Moreover, Iran’s ministry of defense unveiled the Iranian-made chopper, Saba-248. This helicopter was designed by the Air Industries Establishment Banha Company in the Iranian ministry of defense with the research centers of the Iranian universities to enhance the capabilities of the IRGC air force choppers.75 Within the IRGC strategy to develop its military equipment on all levels, commander of the IRGC ground forces Gen. Mohammed Bakbor announced the beginning of the IRGC choppers and warplanes development project on the model of the IRGC Shahid-285 warplane.76 The IRGC received the new anti-ships cruise missile Nasir. During the ceremonies of the Iranian Ministry of Defense Air Industries Organization, the IRGC received the new anti-ship cruise missile system Nasir to enhance the Iranian ground-to-ground cruise missiles launched from coasts and seas. Nasir has many specifications, such as rapid intervention capabilities, ability to fly at low levels, high accuracy, high destructive power, and anti-jamming capabilities against state-of-theart radars.77

»»Future of Iran’s Military Industries Based on the Iranian strategy “Self Sufficiency of Armament,” Iran is most likely to continue its policy of arms manufacture and release of new military industries to face any interruption of technologies supplies of military industries from its supporters, especially Russia and China; and enhance the ability to counter any further sanctions, especially in the arms field. Moreover, the military industries use it as psychological warfare against the GCC countries, Turkey, and the nuclear Pakistan that represents economic and security depth for Iran. The announcements of new achievements and military industries as palliatives against the Iranian interior that suffers from repression, tyranny, and oppression were used against religious and ethnic minorities and support Bashar Assad’s regime and the Iranian militias in Syria, Houthis in Yemen, and the public mobilization forces in Iraq with these domestically made arms.

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» The Iranian Vessels’ Harassment to the US Ships The US Navy in the Arabian Gulf does not tolerate the IRGC boats’ harassment. Since the inauguration of Pres. Donald Trump, the US Navy adopted a new strategy by firing warning shots whenever the Iranian boats approach the US ships. However, the IRGC continued to harass the US ships in the Arabian Gulf and at Hormuz Strait.

The US CBS News released a report about the latest Iranian boats’ harassments, saying, “USNS invincible ship, which is an American intelligence gathering ship, was harassed by an Iranian naval ship came close to 150 yards in the Gulf of Oman to the south of Hormuz Strait.”78 Spokesperson of the US ministry of defense confirmed this information, saying that an Iranian boat unsafely and unprofessionally approached the US ship and three other British ships and forced them to change their route.79 However, spokesperson of the Iranian armed forces general staff Brig. Gen. Masoud Jazairi denied this information and said that the US had to control the movement of its ships in the Arabian Gulf and that these claims were untrue and driven by hidden agenda. Jazairi asserted that the Americans would be responsible for any tension and uprising in the Arabian Gulf and that the US army had to change its behavior.80

Iran expanded its military exercises outside its borders.

It conducted joint military exercises with the Sultanate of Oman in the Southern Oman Sea near Iran and the Omani territorial waters for one week. This included naval rescue, rapid reaction drills in cases of emergency, rescue operations of submarines, casualty drills, tactical maneuvers of forces mobilization in the targeted area, escorting of merchant vessels and oil tankers, offshore refueling, and communications.

After the harassment, chief of central command of the US army Gen. Joseph Votel said that Iran is a long-term threat to regional stability more than Al-Qaida, ISIS, and other terrorist groups. He also said that after the nuclear deal, Iran had become a destabilizing factor in the region because of its attempts to control the Middle East.81 In response to the harassment, two US officials in the Pentagon said that an American destroyer fired warning shots on four Iranian boats that were approaching the US ships after the USS Mahan asked them on radio to slow down. They added that the ship sent many warning signals, and the five ships gave the international signals of danger and sirens, but got no response from the Iranian boats, which made the US ship fire warning shots followed by a smoke bomb by a USN chopper.82 The spokesperson of the White House said, “The Iranian boats’ intentions were unclear. These behaviors are unacceptable.” He added that continuation of the Iranian practices in the Arabian Gulf might escalate tension between the regional countries. The US president Donald Trump warned Iran again and said that Washington would never tolerate such harassment by the Iranian navy.83 Accordingly, some observers compared the US strategies during the Obama presidency and the current president, Donald Trump. During the Obama administration, the IRGC navy forced the US navy to withdraw back from different areas many times and detained some US soldiers in one of these harassments. However, the Obama administration skipped this incident to accomplish the nuclear deal. The Trump Administration adopted a tougher strategy toward the Iranian ships’ harassment and took decisive actions to stop these practices

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In

the first half of 2017, Iran witnessed the biggest terrorist attack on both the parliament and the Khomeini tomb in Tehran.

Years earlier, all Middle Eastern countries were exposed to terrorist operations except Iran. In fact, Iran was immune against such attacks despite its geographic location near ISIS-controlled territories in Iraq, involvement in the Syrian civil war, and intervention in Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda and the Taliban territories.

This raised many questions about Iran’s role in these events and its security from terrorist attacks that spread all over the Middle East.

SECURITY FILE

» Iran and ISIS According to most observers, there are two factors behind the ISIS emergence in Iraq and Syria:Repression, killing, oppression, regional instability, and the creative chaos strategy and the negative foreign intervention in creating and supporting the extremist groups to achieve certain strategic policies.

Some observers in several countries believe that Iran’s continuous support to the governments of Syria and Iraq and involvement in the sectarian wars in the two countries resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and causalities, which paved the way for the emergence of these terrorist groups.

ISIS took control of most Sunni territories in Iraq and targeted the Free Army in Syria. Many experts and strategic analysts linked ISIS and the Iranian projects because of ISIS’s strategies and Iran’s gains in Syria and Iraq. Other observers also talked about a strategic project between Iran and ISIS to control the Arab and Muslim worlds despite their doctrinal differences.84 Others believe that Iran used the spread of ISIS in Iraq and Syria to justify its intervention in these two countries because it will have the most advantage from ISIS’s defeat and expand its influence in the territories taken from this organization.85

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Iran antagonizes ISIS and denies its relation to this organization. Until recently, Tehran had flaunted its success in preventing ISIS from breaking into the Iranian territories. Head of IRGC Public Relations Ramadan Sharif once said, “ISIS has never succeeded to carry out any attacks in Iran despite its success in several countries of the world. This organization hit in many European countries, especially in France where people believed no one could harm their security after WWII.” Sharif also considered his country as a model for securing its territories that all countries must follow.86 However, Iranian officials started to talk about ISIS attempts to break into the Iranian territories and carry out terrorist attacks. The IRGC and other security services frequently announced the clashes occurred with some ISIS fighters in many areas in the country and the breakdown of a number of terrorist cells in several bordering areas. Some Iranian security officials handled these events over the past six years as listed hereinafter: 1. The Iranian minister of defense Mahmoud Alavi stated that the Iranian security forces discovered secret ISIS networks in Tehran and other provinces. Alavi said that the Iranian security agencies arrested eight fighters who were planning to carry out terrorist attacks in Tehran during the celebrations of the Iranian revolution anniversary.87 2. Deputy Chief of the IRGC Intelligence Gen. Hussein Najat said that the Iranian security forces arrested fifteen armed individuals who were planning to launch terrorist attacks in Iran. He also criticized some officials who say that stability in Iran resulted from the nuclear deal and claimed it came about because of the readiness and alertness of the Iranian security agencies.88 3. Commander of the Iranian ground forces air support said that ISIS controlled several Iraqi territories in 2014 and reached up to Khanqeen area to break into the Iranian lands but was obstructed by the alert Iranian ground forces near the western Iranian borders and launched intense bombardment on ISIS elements and forced them to withdraw away from borders.89 4. In an interview with Bait Alomah, the social committee member in the Iranian Parliament Rasoul Khudhari said that, in 2016, the Iranian border guards in western province of Azerbaijan arrested about 43,000 foreigners intended to join ISIS via Iran illegally but did not refer to the home countries of these elements, their destinations, nor how they interred Iran. Nevertheless, this big number mentioned by Khudari was not confirmed by the official Iranian authorities.90 Last March, ISIS broadcasted a video titled “Persia between the Present and the Past” and threatened Iran because of the Iranian regime practices and oppression against Sunni Muslims. ISIS also broadcasted some scenes for one of its military units called “Salman Alfarisi Battalions” during training drills on shooting in Diyala province eastern Iraq. Indeed, ISIS announced that its war on Iran had just started and would rely on suicide operations in the first place.

In this video, three Iranian ISIS elements—Abu Alfarouq Alfarisi, Abu Mjahid Albloushi, and Abu Saad Alahwazi—went over the history of Persia and asked people in Tehran, Isfahan, and other areas to attack Hawzas.91 In response, Iran threatened to punish ISIS if this organization carries out any attacks on Iran’s interests internally or externally. Head of the Iranian Expediency Council Mohsen Rezai also responded to ISIS’s message, saying, “ISIS is being defeated everywhere. If it launches any attacks on Iran or its interests abroad, Tehran will hunt its elements everywhere and punish them severely.”92 In an attempt to beat all charges about Iran’s relation with ISIS, the Iranian regime’s media used the ISIS video to prove the opposite. The Iranian officials said that this organization directed its speeches to other countries in their mother tongues; for example, ISIS used American or British English when it sends messages to an English-speaking country and French when delivering messages to French-speaking countries, which applies to Turkey and the Arab world. Nevertheless, this video shows that ISIS does not have any Iranian who masters Persian to speak to Iranians.

Furthermore, this media said that ISIS always had precise information about the targeted countries, except for Iran, and added that the information on Iran in this video was incorrect.

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Observers who said that this video was just an Iranian propaganda to legalize the Iranian intervention in Iraq and Syria explained these frequent statements by the Iranian officials about the detection of ISIS cells and the Iranian media views on this video. Iran still supports Assad’s regime and the Iraqi government. It also helped establish and train the sectarian militias in Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to support its proxy regimes in Syrian and Iraqi. Hence, by making such statements about the breakdown of terrorist cells, Iran conveys a message about its capabilities to defend the Iranian interests and prevent terrorist organizations from breaking into Iran’s territories and convinces the international powers to establish a security partnership with Iran to counterterrorism.

In other words, Iran is keen to enhance its role in reshaping security and strategic arrangements in the region after signing the nuclear deal with the P5+1 group, using the pretext of counterterrorism that is a point of interest to the international powers in recent years.93 Iran succeeded in using the ISIS practices in Syria and Iraq for its own interests to prove to the world that it is exposed to these threats and be ready to confront and eliminate this organization.

» Deaths and Injuries in the Twin Attacks on the Iranian Parliament and Khomeini Tomb While terrorists attack many countries of the world, Iran was immune to such operations by ISIS or by any other internal opposition group. This raised many questions about Iran’s role and collaboration with this organization despite the big doctrinal and intellectual gap between both sides.

On June 7, 2017, Tehran witnessed the twin attacks on the Parliament and the Khomeini tomb, resulting in twelve deaths and a number of injuries.

These attacks shocked the Iranians and raised many questions about the Tehran’s ability to deal with such threats in the future and the success of these two groups in avoiding highly efficient and alert Iranian security agencies as claimed by the Iranian authorities.94

» Scenarios of the Twin attacks in Tehran 1. The official Iranian statement blamed ISIS for the attacks based on the organization’s declaration of responsibility few hours after the operation. Tehran said that the attackers were Iranians hired by ISIS to carry out a series of terrorist attacks in Tehran and other cities.

However, some analysts call this view into question. If ISIS were responsible, it would be more influential if the attacks were carried out during the visits of the supreme leader, the regime military, and security figures who frequently visit the Khomeini tomb. Furthermore, ISIS would have carried out the attack on MPs gathering hall rather than the upper stories of the parliaments building.

Iran also is professional in creating events to use them for its own interests. ISIS was created by intelligence agencies, including the Iranian intelligence agency. Through these attacks, Iran aimed at delivering a message to the world about being exposed to terrorism and its position on the side of the international moderation against terrorism. If ISIS were responsible for the attacks, it means that this organization punished Tehran for submitting to the Russian pressure to cut ties with ISIS. Iran used these events as a pretext to accuse the United States, Israel, and some Arab countries of creating ISIS to destabilize Iran through an international conspiracy.

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2. The Iranian regime involvement. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks in Tehran. However, some observers in and outside Iran did not take this for granted or precluded the Iranian regime from being involved in these attacks or a certain current from inside the regime to hit another.

The timing of the twin attacks raised many questions on the possibility of the conservative current—in control of the security decision-making in Iran—involvement in these attacks to corner Rouhani’s government in front of the Iranian public opinion. Conservatives aimed at conveying a message to the Iranian people that this government was weak and Iranians should have elected the conservative Ibrahim Raisi to protect the Republic and the Iranian people.

3. The resolutions to confront the Iranian threat in the region reached in the three summits held in Saudi Arabia on May 20–21, 2017, represented an unprecedented international unanimous position against the Iranian hostilities in the region. These events motivated Iran to hold the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia responsible for the attacks in Tehran based on intended purposes when the secretary general of the Expediency Council and former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezai said that Tehran would accuse Saudi Arabia in case of any terrorist attacks in Iran.

4. Other observers held some ethnic and Iranian opposition groups responsible for the twin attacks because of the techniques used in the operation. These observers said that the attacks bore undeniable imprints of the opposition when one of the attackers committed suicide by poison and a woman participated in the attacks. These techniques referred to the Iranian opponent group Mojahedin Khalq that is concentrated outside Iran.

»»Collapse of Plasco Tower and Its Security and Political Consequences On January 19, 2017, one of the most important trade centers in Tehran, Plasco Tower, collapsed in a fire, killing and wounding tens of people, mostly firefighters. The building consisted of seventeen stories and specialized in garment trade that complicated the task of firefighters. The fire erupted in three stories of the tower, leading to its collapse.

The security forces denied any sabotage operations behind the incident, while others said the building collapsed because it was too old; however, the former could not be verified since the tower was built in 1962 during the Shah dynasty. In fact, Iran suffers low constructional standards, which was confirmed by the spokesperson of the Civil Defense Services Jalal Maliki who said they frequently warned this tower’s managers from the possibility of tower collapse, but these warnings were not taken seriously.

The Jewish businessman Habibollah Elqanian, who was executed months after the eruption of the Iranian revolution in 1979 for charges of committing corruption, spying for Israel, assisting in the killing of Palestinian people, and fighting Allah and his worshippers, built the Plasco tower. Elqanian was chief of the Iranian Jews Association. His family played a major role in the improvement of the Iranian industries and non-oil products. This family also established tens of updated factories and markets in Iran.95 The collapse destroyed 676 shops,96 and the financial losses amounted to 150 billion Tomans that equal to 43 million USD.97 This incident raised many questions about the future of the old buildings near Plasco tower.

Statistics registered more than three thousand endangered buildings in Tehran that exceeded their life expectancy and lacked any safety measures.98

»»Political Consequences This incident contributed to considerable public acrimony and negatively reflected on Rouhani’s government and the Tehran’s mayor Mohammed Baqir Qalibaf. Qalibaf’s statement about bearing responsibility for the incident was made fun of and provoked Iranian outrage. Some Iranian

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observers said that the lack of constructional laws, the inefficiency of the Iranian civil defense, and the recent corruption scandals in Tehran’s municipality represented by the astronomical ownerships reflected the weakness of Qalibaf in running the municipality of Tehran.

This incident also increased pressure on Pres. Hassan Rouhani and the Iranian people’s demands to spend the Iranian funds on basic services and infrastructures instead of wasting them on expanding outside the Iranian borders.

The collapse of the tower continued to overshadow Iranian politics through mutual recriminations between all regime currents. Conservatives accused the reformers and moderates— headed by President Rouhani—of negligence and inability to run the crises in the country, while reformers accused conservatives of trying to defame President Rouhani before the presidential elections that were held on May 19, 2017.

The Iranian people also accused all regime components, including the supreme leader Ali Khamenei of negligence. In fact, the tower was under control of [Almustadafin], the oppressed establishment administration, headed by Khamenei and supervised by a number of the IRGC commanders who were supposed to conduct maintenance works for the tower. People’s outrage increased when an expert in the construction engineering department said that he submitted a report to the establishment headed by Khamenei in 1991 about the lack of safety measures in the building.

In addition, some journalists and activists reported that firefighters had old and simple equipment when they rushed to extinguish the fire erupted in the building, which increased the Iranian people’s dissatisfaction. Hand-to-hand quarrels also erupted among members of the Tehran’s Municipal Council when one member said he had sent many letters to Almustadafin Establishment and Tehran’s municipal mayor Mohammed Baqir Qalibaf about the rundown of the tower, but Qalibaf ignored these letters.99

»»Armed Attacks, Explosions, and Fires Since the Shah overthrow in 1979, Iran has drowned in violence and assassinations. The currents participating in the revolution fought one other until Khomeini eliminated all his opponents except Mojahedin Khalq Organization located outside Iran and some other groups from the ethnic and religious minorities in the country.

These groups oppose the Iranian governmental practices against these minorities and, sometimes, target Iranian critical economic, military, security, and governmental facilities in the provinces of Kurdistan, Ahwaz, Sistan, and Baluchistan. The most prominent attack in Iran during the first half of this year 2017 was an explosion in one of the power stations in Ali Abad in the province of Jilstan, killing nine people100 and two police officers in a shooting on Basij way in Tehran.101 The Ministry of Intelligence announced thwarting about thirty terrorist operations and arrest of a number of individuals who were planning to carry out terrorist attacks in several areas in Iran.102 The following are also attacks in Iran during the first half of the year: 1. Killing a police officer in a shooting by unknown person, twenty kilometers away from Jask City in the province of Hormozgan in South Iran.103 2. Killing two border guard officers in Taibad, the bordering city in the province of Khorasan in east Iran.104 3. Killing an Iranian soldier in the bordering area of Sen Hanc in the province of Kurdistan while clashing with unknown armed individuals.105 4. Killing two IRGC soldiers and four injuries in armed confrontations with individuals from the Kurdish Bijak party that claimed responsibility for the attack in Oromia area in northeast Iran.106

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A number of Kurdish university students influenced by the Kurdish leader, Abdullah Ocalan established the Kurdish Alhayah Alhurra Party Bijak. Since its commencement by Abdurrahman Haji Ahmadi on April 4, 2004, the party was announced independent regarding economics and manpower, while other observers believe it is an extension of the Kurdish Labor Party in Turkey. This party’s headquarter is stationed in northwestern Iran at Qandeel high mountains, and its activities extend deep into the Iranian territories.

Bijak calls for Confederacy in Iran (on the model of the Iraqi Kurdistan headed by Masoud Barazani) to materialize peaceful coexistence and genuine democracy in the country. This party carries out operations and clashes with the IRGC alongside the Iraqi-Iranian borders, in northeastern Iran—especially in Sardasht, Biranshehr, and Ashnoyah—and others.107 A huge fire erupted in the Iranian oil depot in Khark, Bushehr, in the northeastern of Arabian Gulf, leading to significant financial losses.108 A large fire in Mashehr Petrochemical Complex erupted when a detonator exploded and resulted in nine injuries, three of them in serious situations.109 A fire broke out in the first refinery in Southern Pars Field and led to substantial financial losses. After considerable efforts, firefighters extinguished this fire.110 A security individual was killed in Ahwaz while hunting a wanted criminal in the city where the security forces had launched regular campaigns under the pretext of cleansing the city from crime. The security forces also announced that a wanted criminal hit Capt. Saeed Tarfi from the fifteenth security division by car and escaped but was captured by the Iranian security forces.111

» Oppression of Non-Persian People The Iranian nationality is characterized by integrating both the sect and nationality. The geographic extension of Iran also incurred other regional dimensions that complicated the situation in this country.

Most ethnic minorities in Iran live in bordering areas: Arabs in the south and southwest, Baloch in the south and southeast, Turkmen in the north and northeast, Azeri in the north and northwest and parts of central Iran, and Kurds in the west.

These ethnicities have extensions in the neighboring Iranian countries. The Arabs extend to Iraq and the Gulf States in the south, the Balochs extend to Baluchistan province in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Turkmen are neighboring Turkmenistan, the Azeris live to the south of Azerbaijan, and the Kurds are considered part of the great Kurdish dream in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.

Tehran adopted a tough policy toward ethnic and religious minorities and their demands for freedom and equality. Indeed, the Iranian regime eliminated these minorities’ ambitions by hunting and cornering the activists of these ethnic groups.

The Non-Persian ethnicities suffer from exclusion, inequity, and discrimination in all cultural, social, and economic sectors in Iran. In fact, the Persian ethnicity controls the regime and draws its policies away from the other ethnicities.

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Since the victory of the Iranian revolution in 1979, the demands of these minorities have been purposely excluded from the programs of the Iranian consecutive presidents, which reflect an Iranian regime policy of suppressing the identities of ethnic minorities through promoting the idea of “One People” created by Riza Shah Bahlawi during the first half of the last century.

Although these minorities have the Iranian citizenship, they are deprived of the equal rights of ordinary citizens protected by the Iranian constitution. In fact, obvious discrimination is practiced by the state against these minorities. The regime describes them as third-class citizens and excludes them from all types of development. Indeed, these minorities suffer from poverty, limited freedoms, deprivation from all civil rights, and nonstop executions since the 1979 revolution until today.112 The Iranian regime’s practices against the Non-Persian ethnicities paved the way for the emergence of armed groups to defend the rights of these minorities in the provinces of Sistan, Baluchistan, Kurdistan, and Ahwaz. The following are some of the latest developments and events resulted from the Iranian tyranny in these territories:

»»Sistan and Baluchistan This province is located on the borders between three countries: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.

The size of this province is 70,000 square miles and a population of one million Sunni Muslims.

Throughout history, the Baloch established a number of independent kingdoms starting from the fourth century up to modern colonial times when Britain occupied significant parts of the province in 1839 after the first Afghani war. This colony assisted Britain to make a geographic barrier between India—Britain’s most important colony—and Russia, the first British imperialist rival. After India took independence, Baluchistan was divided between three countries: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.113 Since then, Balochis struggled to gain independence, establish self-government, and preserve their suppressed identity, especially in Iran that strove to integrate them into the Persian culture.114 Indeed, Balochis struggled to achieve four essential requirements: economic development in the province that is neglected by the Iranian consecutive governments, equality and justice in distributing of wealth and income, more Sunni mosques, and the end of the Iranian government’s hunt and killing of the Sunni Baloch scholars.

The Iranian authorities aimed at suppressing the Baloch identity and culture by imposing the Persian language on critical jobs and governmental libraries and the Persian culture on all province territories. However, these Iranian attempts were rejected by the Baloch who insisted on preserving their language and identity.115 After the 1979 revolution, things went worse in this province. According to domestic and international organizations, this province has the highest rate of illiteracy, lack of potable water, and high mortality of children. Despite the tremendous amounts of natural resources such as natural gas, gold, copper, oil, and uranium, 80% of the population in this province live below poverty line and have the lowest average per capita income. For years, this province had been a theater for armed clashes between the opposition in this province on one side and drug smugglers and police forces on the other because of its location near Pakistan and Afghanistan.

During the last six months, Sistan and Baluchistan provinces witnessed some events and security developments. Many armed clashes occurred between the armed groups on one side and the IRGC and security forces on the other. The Iranian security forces announced eliminating drug smuggling networks and death of ten Iranian border guards in an attack launched by Balch individuals coming from Pakistan.

Indeed, this province witnessed many clashes and events, such as one Iranian border guard being killed and three injured in an exchange of fire with unknown militants in Jakigor in West Sistan and Baluchistan province.116 Three smugglers were arrested, and 402 kg of drugs were seized

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after clashes with the police forces.117 One soldier from the Iranian army ground forces was killed in Dilijan in a drive by shooting.118 The Iranian police forces eliminated two drug smuggling cells in an ambush in Sarwan and Iranshehr, and 688 kg of weed and one ton and fifty grams of opium were seized.119 Baloch demonstrations in front of the parliament asked for Iranian paper trail. Protesters expressed their outrage against the Iranian government because of classifying them as non-Iranians despite being born in Iran and living there for long years.120 Thirty-eight opposition elements were arrested in different areas in the province.121 These arrests usually lie under various pretexts, such as confronting the regime enemies, communism, Wahhabism, spying cells, drug control, and smuggling from Pakistan and Afghanistan into the Iranian territories. Two tons and 980 kg of opium, 20 kilograms of morphine, 126 ammunition rounds, eight 40 mm shells, and 15 pistols were seized.122 Rouhallah Aali, the commander of Koren battalion of the IRGC Brigade 110, was killed in an attack on Zahadan-Khoah road. Two militants were also killed, another two were arrested, and vast amounts of arms and ammunitions were seized.123 Immense quantities of drugs were seized, and two trafficking gangs were eliminated in two separate operations.

In the first operation, smugglers broke into the Iranian borders in a car loaded with drugs, but the Iranian security forces stopped them, killing two, arresting another two, and seizing 1,000 kilograms of opium. In the second operation, security forces in the cities of Khash and Zahadan announced killing a number of drug smugglers and seizure of 1,000 kilograms of opium and 617 kg of weed.124 The Iranian security forces also announced eliminating two cells of drug smugglers and seizure of two tons of opium in Samsor desert in the city of Iranshahr. In this operation, two drug smugglers were killed, another two were arrested, and a number of cars loaded with 600 kg of opium and arms were seized.125 Ten Iranian border guards were killed in Sistan and Baluchistan. In this incident, Iran suffered significant losses when militants attacked the Iranian border guards in Mir Jawah, a town in the province of Sistan and Baluchistan in Southeastern Iran near the Iranian-Pakistani borders.

According to the Iranian media, militants used long-range arms from inside the Pakistani borders, killing three officers and six soldiers. These militants also captured another soldier and later killed him as stated by the Iranian authorities.

The Iranian government accused the Jaish ul-Adl group for carrying out these attacks. This group engaged with the IRGC and security forces on several occasions and claimed responsibility for many armed attacks on the borders in Southeastern Iran. In addition, other Sunni armed groups are also active in this predominantly Sunni province.126

The Impact of Killing Ten Iranian Soldiers on Relations between Tehran and Islamabad This event incurred significant consequences on relations between Iran and Pakistan. Tehran held the Pakistani government responsible for this incident and accused it of inability to control its own borders.

Iran warned Islamabad more than once of hosting Iranian Sunni militants from the province of Sistan and Baluchistan like Jaish Aladl that succeeded Jundollah Organization as claimed. However, differences on this issue did not prevent the two countries from building strong relations despite the periodical cold relations between both sides. Iran also sought to maintain strong relations with Pakistan, one of Iranian’s most important neighbors and economic partners.127 After this incident, the Iranian chief of staff Mohammed Hussein Baqiri warned of launching destructive strikes against the militants inside Pakistan, which he described as a safe haven for militants and a training center for Saudi and US-supported terrorists; however, he never proved his claims by documents.128

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After these statements, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry recalled the Iranian ambassador in Pakistan to protest Baqiri’s statements. It announced that the declaration of the Iranian official contradicted the brotherly relations between both sides and urged Iran to avoid releasing such statements that can sever ties between the two countries.129 Consequently, Iran dispatched its foreign minister, Mohammed Jawad Zarif, to Pakistan to discuss the means of securing borders, cut the way for armed groups, and contain the crisis between the two countries resulted from the incident in Mir Jawah.130 According to Iranian officials, Zarif’s visit to Islamabad was fruitful for both sides. Border guards’ commander Brigadier Qassem Rezai, who accompanied Zarif, also appraised the visit and said that he expressed his country’s concerns about the borders issues to the Pakistani authorities.131

» Conditions in Ahwaz For years, Ahwaz has experienced public protests, secretly and publicly, against the harsh situation of the Arab ethnicity in this province. The Arab Ahwaz suffered from oppression, limited liberties, and attempts to suppress the Arab identity, the settlement and displacement policies, environmental offenses in the province, severe living conditions, and high unemployment rates.

Last February, Ahwaz and other Arabic cities witnessed severe dust storms, which cut off water, electricity, and communications in the province. These conditions were severe, and five electrical units went out of service, cutting off electricity for eleven hours in Ahwaz, Abadan, Mohammerah, Mashor, Falahiah, and Hweizah, closing down all governmental organizations.

These storms and authorities carelessness toward this harsh situation escalated tension and broke out protests for several days in the province with the participation of thousands of people. Protesters accused the government of draining and contaminating water resources after transporting this water to other cities.132 In response, the Iranian police forces opened fire on protesters, killing a young man named Hassan Boghbeish from the city of Falahiah, where protesters burned fire in a number of police departments.

The Iranian regime met these protests violently with severe security measures against political opponents, defectors, chiefs of Arabic tribes, and religious scholars. The regime also warned them from gathering and protesting and blockaded some cities to thwart any new uprising in the province.133 President Rouhani visited Ahwaz to appease people’s outrage and prevent protests from spreading into other cities. His government presented some excuses for water, electricity, and communications cut off in the province and blamed dust storms, thick fog, and high humidity that reached up to 97% in some districts for these malfunctions.

Nevertheless, people and observers rejected these claims and listed the reasons for this crisis, draining water bodies by the Iranian government in search for oil in Bseitin and Khafajiah districts.

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Confiscation of substantial lands to plant sugar cane increased salinity of these lands. Draining Karon River turned it into a nonpotable water source.134 Discrimination against the Arab ethnicity in Iran changed the population structure in Ahwaz by forcing Arabs to migrate to other districts.

On February 11, 2017, the Ahwaz MP in the Iranian parliament confirmed this information when he said that water in Ahwaz was being transported to other cities such as Esfahan and Qum that suffer severe water shortage. According to domestic and international organizations, the Iranian government is draining Ahwaz by transporting water to other districts, which would turn these lands into appropriate source of dust storms.

Ahwaz harsh conditions and continuation of protests and demonstrations forced some Iranian officials to shed light on this province. Sixty-eight Iranian MPs criticized Pres. Hassan Rouhani because of “governmental carelessness” about the conditions in the province. They warned from public resentment because of neglecting the Arab districts in Ahwaz, asking the government to establish a crisis cell and declare this province a disaster area. Senior officials in the province also deprecate the Iranian government for neglecting their province.135 The Ahwaz representative in the Expediency Council, Abbas Alkabi, said that people in Ahwaz had not seen any of Rouhani’s promises and contributed the crises in the province to governmental mismanagement.136 Other leaders also criticized Rouhani government’s negligence for the harsh living conditions in Ahwaz, saying that 40% of Ahwaz towns suffer shortage of services, continuation of electricity cut-off, and lack of appropriate water drainage.137 In addition, the Iranian MP Qassem Saeed said that Rouhani’s visit to Ahwaz did not solve the problem in this province and disparaged Rouhani’s statements when he said, “No one can confront nature,” referring to the dust storms in Ahwaz. Saeed added that draining rivers, but not the nature, and transporting water into other districts destroyed fertile lands and caused these disasters, asking, “Isn’t transporting water from the streams of Karon and Khakhah considered war against nature?”138 Observers also accused the Iranian government concerning the harsh conditions in Ahwaz.

They said that Iran increased its oil production from this province but was only concerned about protecting the huge oil and gas and neglected the severe environmental contamination resulted from oil extraction. Indeed, this province ranked first on the list of most contaminated cities in the world.139

» The Ahwaz Arab Struggling Movement Bears Responsibility for Exploding Two Oil Pipelines in Ahwaz

The Ahwaz Arab Struggling Movement was established in 1999 with significant public support inside and outside Ahwaz. It initiated its first armed operations by its military wing Ashahid Muhieaddin Al Nasir Battalions in June 2005 and targeted Iranian civilian, military, and economic facilities.140

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In response to the Iranian regime’s oppressive practices against the Arab minority in this province, the Arab Struggling Movement for Liberation of Ahwaz announced that Ashahid Muhieaddin Al Nasir Battalions targeted two oil pipelines in two coincided operations in Alamidiah and Addalmon districts in north and central Ahwaz. It caused them significant losses within the strategy of targeting the vital economic facilities that finance the hostile Iranian projects in Ahwaz.

In the first operation, the movement targeted the Iranian Aghajri pipeline that transports oil and gas from Maron field in Alamidiah in east Ahwaz and destroyed it. In the second operation, the movement destroyed the oil pipeline that extends from Bahrkan field located between the ports of Janabi and Addalmon in Central Ahwaz to Kharkh Island.141

»»Conditions in Kurdistan The Kurdish question in Iran is an extension of the Kurdish conditions in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria.

However, the Kurdish case differs in Iran from other countries for being a national and sectarian “Sunni-Shiite” conflict, which the Iranian regime limited the space for Sunnis and held them by the throat. Indeed, the consecutive Iranian governments kept reinforcing the Persian identity represented by the Persian language, history, culture, and the Shiite doctrine on the Kurds, same as other minorities, especially after the 1979 revolution.

»»Clerics’ Court Summons the Sunni Mufti in Kurdistan The clerics’ court in Hamadan, West Iran, summoned the Sunni Mufti in Kurdistan province, Sheikh Kak Hassan Amini, and invoked three charges against him: inciting public opinion against the regime, spreading propaganda against the regime, and conducting sedition between Sunnis and Shiites. Amini rejected these accusations supported by the chief of the doctrinal assembly in Kurdistan who also condemned these charges against the Mufti, describing them as fabricated and untrue.142 Amini was arrested in October 2016 after criticizing the Shiite scholars for excluding Sunnis from succeeding to governmental positions. In his response to a letter sent to President Rouhani by the Sunni MPs in the Iranian parliament, asking him to set aside governmental positions for Sunnis after the resignation of the three ministers, Amini said, “Solving minorities problems is none of Rouhani’s business and achieving Sunnis’s demands cannot come about through letters.” Amini also wondered how Sunnis represent 20%–25% in Iran but do not have one single governor position in the country, calling for a minister or governor position to Sunnis in Iran.143 The Kurdish military operations against the Iranian regime resulted from inequity and religious, linguistic, cultural, and literary oppression. Kurds cannot learn the Kurdish language in governmental schools nor can they spread the Kurdish literature unless supervised by the Iranian intelligence.

These practices violate article fifteen of the second section of the Iranian constitution that protects minorities’ rights of using their native languages in the educational and cultural fields. However, Iran has prevented the non-Persian people from using their mother tongues in education since 1925, which threatens the social and cultural identities of those people.

These events provoked 88 political activists, journalists, and educated people to sign a petition, asking for the application of article fifteen of the Iranian constitution and allowing them to use the Kurdish language in their schools and domestic media alongside the Persian language.

Article fifteen of the Iranian constitution says, “Persian is the official language in Iran. It is the language of reading, writing, official documents, statements, and school textbooks. However, the other domestic languages can be used in press and public media; minorities also can teach their own literature in schools alongside the Persian language.”144

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According to those activists, implementation of article fifteen of the Iranian constitution is a crucial step toward granting ethnic and religious minorities their rights and equity like the other citizens in the country. They also warned of excluding the Kurds from using their mother language and urged Kurdish people to continue asking for their demands protected by the Iranian constitution. All consecutive Iranian governments promised these ethnic groups to permit them to use their native languages. The latest was in 2016 by Ali Younisi, Rouhani’s deputy for ethnicities, religious minorities, and sects’ affairs, who said that the government gave its orders to allow minorities to use their native languages in their districts. He also claimed that some schools had really started to teach in their mother languages in the province of Kurdistan in West Iran, asserting that this procedure would be implemented in other provinces after accomplishing the infrastructures in these territories.145 According to Kurdish officials, Younisi made his statement more than a year ago, but nothing has been implemented so far.

»»Kurdistan Representative in the Iranian Council of Experts for the Leadership Criticizes the Harsh Conditions in the Province

The Iranian Kurdistan is like all other provinces that inhabit ethnic and religious minorities.

It suffers from high unemployment rates despite great capabilities and efficient manpower.

Although people demand fair and equal treatment, the government has done nothing to solve the unemployment problem that prevails all over the province.

This situation also provoked the Kurdistan representative in the Council of Experts for the Leadership, Mamousta Rustumi, who called the Iranian government to bear its responsibilities and create jobs for young people in this province. He also expressed his sorrow for the government’s failure to carry out the directives of the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who ordered to solve the unemployment problem in Kurdistan.

The projects recently commenced by the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani in Kurdistan did not satisfy the province’s people nor did they lessen the criticisms to the Iranian government for unemployment and harsh living conditions in the province, asserting that these projects were commenced before by Ahmadinejad’s government.146

»»The Possible Future Scenarios for the Non-Persian Ethnic Minorities’ Crises in Iran 1. Some Arab and Kurdish minorities took the necessary procedures to preserve their identities by calling the Iranian authorities to implement the constitution that guarantees equality between all ethnicities and allows them to use their native languages.

2. Iran always claims it equates between its people despite their nationality, language, color, or sect.

It contributes suspension of some articles of the constitution concerning freedoms and minorities’ rights to national security issues and regional instability, which incur more tight security procedures and intentional exclusion of minorities.

3. Exclusion of minorities from senior positions in Iran might last long unless the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani keeps his word and includes these minorities in his new government.

4. The Iranian Sunnis put President Rouhani in a difficult political situation and wait for him to keep his promises after supporting him in the latest presidential elections. In his campaign, Rouhani pledged to include Sunnis in his government by giving them ministerial and senior positions in the country after being excluded by the consecutive Iranian governments that hindered any development in these territories and severed poverty, unemployment, violence, and drug dealing in the Sunni provinces.

5. Article nineteen of section three of the Iranian constitution states that all Iranians are equal despite their ethnicities. However, article twelve excludes ethnic diversity and religious freedom. It

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states that the Shiite Jafari Twelver is the official doctrine of the country, while article 121 obliges the president to protect this ideology by all means. The Constitution also requires the Iranian president to be of Iranian origin, has its citizenship, believes in Khomeini revolution principles, and believes in the official doctrine of the country—the Shiite doctrine—which deprives the rights of the Kurdish, Turkmen, and Arab Sunnis in addition to the other minorities in Iran.

6. For sure, the extremist positions of the regime figures—clerics, commanders of the URGC, and prominent members of the fundamental current and even reformers—will obstruct Rouhani’s promises to include religious and ethnic minorities in the state’s administration.

7. Recently, new militants were trained and graduated by the armed groups in Sistan and Baluchistan. This raised fears of the Iranian regime from the potential uprising in the predominantly Sunni province that suffers tyranny, oppression, and harsh living conditions on the hands of the IRGC. This development provoked the Iranian Minister of Interior Abdurriza Rahmani Fadhly who expressed his worries from the expansion of the Baloch armed activities against the IRGC members.

8. High unemployment rates, discrimination, and lack of governmental services contributed to enrage Arab, Baloch, and Kurdish minorities who call the Iranian regime as “enemy, invader, and racist.” This negative view about the Iranian regime resulted in more violence by the armed groups in the provinces and might create new-armed movements to defend the rights of minorities.

9. The Iranian regime is used to describe the violent events in the country as foreign conspiracies designed by Western Israeli and Regional Intelligence to exert pressure on Iran and break its will.

Hence, the Iranian regime is expected to expand its hostilities against other countries, especially the Arab countries as a pretext to oppress the religious and ethnic minorities related to these rival countries, which might tighten the IRGC and police forces strict security procedures in the provinces of minorities in Iran.

»»Executions According to human rights organizations’ estimates and evaluations, Iran is considered the second country in the world, after China, where most people are punished with the death penalty.

Considering that, domestic organizations and observers of the Iranian affairs usually estimate the numbers to be much higher than those reported. They usually point out that Iran would be the number 1 country in the world applying the death penalty. The following reasons account for this: 1. The Iranian government’s ideology and particular conservatism. Opposition to the government is considered moral and ethical corruption on the part of the dissenter. Opposition to the government is considered opposition to Islam itself and therefore heresy and unbelief. When someone is charged with corruption and/or moral decadence, the appropriate legal penalty would be execution.

2. Iran’s specific internal isolation from the rest of the world regarding human rights standards and human rights practices.

3. The high number of opposition activists and organizations in the country against the government.

4. Those particular inherent idiosyncrasies to the Iranian people and their interpretation of Islam.

5. The prevalence of the drug trade, as well as other socioeconomic ills, which fosters crime, which demands execution as punishment.

6. The use of executions as a tool to instill fear in the population and deter opposition.

7. Current tensions between Iran and its neighbors have elevated the index of executions in the country. The execution of Sunnis in Iran has also become a method of redress for the government vis-à-vis its Sunni neighbors.147 The proof of this is the letter addressed by 60 Sunnis in Rajai

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prison in Karaj City. Most of them were students of religion and preachers. Sunni scholars worldwide, as well as Sunni countries in general, called attention to their case. They pointed out that Iran’s execution of these prisoners was understood as a form of retaliation against the Sunni world. Iran’s government perceived that the execution of the Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr, along with the execution of other 46 Sunni prisoners, was because of sectarianism on their part.148 In the past six months, Iranian authorities have widely implemented the death penalty as the result of questionable judicial prosecutions. Most of the people executed under the death penalty were charged with drug trafficking in the country, not people who have participated in the most serious offenses as described by contemporary standards of human rights.

Indeed, the highest judicial body in the country had ruled that those people sentenced to the death penalty because of drugtrafficking offenses had the right to appeal lower judicial decisions before the implementation of the 2015 criminal procedure code. These prisoners, however, were not informed of this development, and others were executed because of murder-related offenses or others related to hiraba or brigandage.149 The Iran Human Rights March 2017 annual report contains a detailed explanation of the death penalty cases during that year, which reached 530 capita. This organization requested different countries to increase the pressure on the Iranian government to stop implementing the death penalty and to subsume those cases under various provisions in their judicial and legal system.

The report focused on the role of the “revolutionary courts” as the core judicial institutions, established in early 1979 revolution, tasked with most implementations of the death penalty from then on.

For drug-trafficking-related crimes in 2016, the same organization dealt with the “emergency plan,” which was drawn in the Iranian parliament and calls for death penalty abolition in some drug-trafficking-related offenses, and 150 representatives signed on it. The report also points out that despite the initiatives to eliminate the death penalty or to reduce its application, it reached 57% of execution sentences.

In all cases, the accused of drug-trafficking-related crimes were prosecuted through the revolutionary courts and were prohibited from employing attorneys on their behalf.

All Iranian human rights organizations’ indexes indicate that the number of executions has risen since the inauguration of Hassan Rouhani as president compared to the two-term presidency of previous incumbent Ahmadinejad.150 Despite the calls to lower the index of the death penalty, Iran persists in topping the list of countries that implement this sentence.

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Looking to the fact that the country’s judicial institutions have executed a number of people in the first six months of the current year, the following cases stand out: »»In January, the Iranian judicial authorities executed 87 people. Six of those people were executed in public. Two of them were less than 18 years old. The indexes show that most of the people executed in that month were charged with drug-trafficking-related offenses.151 »»According to Iranian human rights activists, the 12 prisoners who were sentenced to the death penalty from Rajai prison in Gohardasht, after being transferred to solitary confinement, were charged with murder.152 In a joint statement, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International called on the Iranian government to not execute these prisoners, but as always, those calls fell on deaf ears, and these prisoners,153 were executed in Iran’s central prison, as well as in Rajai prison, in Karaj City.154 Although Iran does not allow human rights organizations to determine exactly the executed persons and that most of those executions are carried out in shadows, the indexes of the Iranian Human Rights point out that death penalties in the first half of 2017 were 239 cases, and 12 of them have been carried out in public.

Of that number, 129 people have been imprisoned for drug-trafficking-related offenses and one case execution for a murder committed by a young man when he was 16 years old.

The elevated number of executions prompted 265 members of the European Parliament to draft a statement expressing their concern at the rising death penalties in Iran, which reached more than 3,000 in the first term of Pres. Hassan Rouhani.155 The Law Restricting Death Penalty Applications in Drug-Trafficking-Related Crimes—Between Being Implemented or Rejected

»»The death penalty is used as a primary tool in “the war on drugs” in many countries where people have been executed for drug-trafficking-related offenses, including Iran.

International law restricts the death penalty to the “most severe offenses under the law” as in the case of murder; however, a number of states permit the execution of people charged with drug-trafficking offenses as a means to curb and deter people willing to engage in this type of trade. These states usually ignore the arguments in favor of a no-death-penalty policy in regard to those types of crimes. They overlook the fact that taking measures and instilling policies that still respect human rights and human dignity curb that trade and allows for a proliferation of drug trade to be addressed effectively more than drug trade it self.156 In 2016, Iran executed hundreds of people charged with drug-trafficking-related offenses.

In addition, more than 5,000 people tried for similar offenses, their ages oscillating between 20 and 30.

Iranian law penalizes with the death penalty any trade with, possession of, or selling more than 30 grams of artificially manufactured drugs, such as heroin, morphine, cocaine, or its chemical derivatives.

The rising numbers of death penalty provisions in Iran, second in rank, prompted members of the Iranian parliament to demand amendments to the death penalty law regarding those engaging in drug-trafficking-related activities. After much deliberation, the consensus was reached that the punishment for these types of offenses is life imprisonment, except in the case of a smuggler who uses arms against the nation’s security forces in a particular smuggling operation.

After the amendments to the law were passed, certain news outlets announced the execution of 32 prisoners behind closed doors in Shiraz, Chabahar, Kirman, and Birjand. Observers indicate

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an attempt by judicial authorities in Iran to outmaneuver the new law that abolishes the death penalty in practically all these cases interpreted as executions.157 In fact, a human rights organization in Iran discovered, based on legitimate sources, that the head of judicial authorities in the country, Sadiq Larijani, ordered prison directors to apply the death penalty for people sentenced for drug-smuggling offenses, thus impeding the application of current amendments to the law.158 These reports produced concern within minority representatives in the country and among those tied in some measure to people charged with drug-trafficking-related crimes. In those circumstances, the highest representative of the Sunni community in Iran Sheikh Mawluvi Abdul Hamid beseeched Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei to stop the implementation of Larijani’s orders upon those Sunni prisoners condemned under drug-smuggling charges.

Mawluvi publicly expressed deep concern against Larijani’s directions to all prison directors to carry out death sentences of all condemned Sunnis before Iran’s parliament had voted on this matter.

Mawluvi also expressed that he had sent an official letter to the supreme leader asking him to intervene with the arrest orders by Larijani to execute those condemned under drug-smuggling charges. He specifically requested Khamenei to impede the implementation of the death penalty on Sunni prisoners. He also officially manifested that the latest round of executions of Sunni prisoners in various cities of the country and of those specifically condemned under drugsmuggling charges indicates the existence of those secret directions given by supreme judicial authority Larijani to implement those abrogated death sentences.159

»»Reactions to the Amended Death Sentence Provisions in Cases of Drug Smuggling After the Iranian parliament announced the project for the amendment of the law regarding death sentence provisions for those charged with drug-trafficking-related offenses, very intense debates occurred, out of which three major tendencies or factions can be identified.

First: That comprising the members of the judicial committee in Iran’s parliament as well as organizations for the defense of human rights in the country plus a significant number of citizens.

They aim at the abolishment of the death sentence provisions and calling for their amendment and for all judicial bodies and representatives to be bound by them.

Second: A conservative faction that underscores the necessity for the death sentence provisions to be kept intact and further expanded in regard to the most serious crimes contemplated in the law. It is composed of a number of security force functionaries, the general prosecutor, and the committee tasked with combating drug use in the country.

Third: It calls for a comprehensive understanding of the purpose that the death sentence in these cases is supposed to fulfill; therefore, it calls for a progressive weakening of those provisions and a gradual implementation of their amendments, leaving provisions for death penalty sentences only for the highest and gravest crimes.

On July 16, the Iranian parliament passed the amendments to the law, with 182 votes in favor against 36 votes and 6 abstentions. According to those amendments, the death penalty will be applied in the cases of people involved in the cultivation and production of illegal substances and their distribution. In addition, it will also be implemented in people smuggling drugs in quantities of 100 kilos or more in the case of traditional illegal drugs and 2 kilos in the case artificially manufactured illegal substances. The death penalty was also restricted to particular cases of “corruption on the land” like an armed operation with the aim of drug smuggling or the use and exploitation of minors in operations of drug smuggling or trafficking.160

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It is important to mention, though, that any motion that is approved as law by the Iranian parliament still needs a final revision and signing by the Guardian Council of the Constitution for it to become binding on judicial authorities in the country.161 Although the amendments were passed by the Iranian parliament and were welcomed by human rights organizations, as well as by a number of Iranian high functionaries, because it expectedly will lower the indexes of execution cases under the death penalty provisions of the law and is seen as a step forward in improving the state of human rights in the country, there is still heated discussion regarding those amendments, dividing most public officials.

One of the most prominent supporters of the death penalty provisions of the law without amendments is the current attorney general Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, who claims that in the past nine months, there has been a significant decrease in drug-trafficking indexes in a number of regions in the country, especially in comparison to the same indexes and regions last year. He points out that many legal experts perceive the law that prosecutes people for drug-traffickingrelated offenses indeed needs amendments, as well as some particular provisions, dealing with the application of the death sentence, but the complete abolishment of the death penalty thus cannot be concurred with. He accused unnamed “foreign quarters” of supporting the expansion of drug-smuggling operations into Iran so as to “spread corruption and advancing in terms of a cultural onslaught against the country.”162 The head of police anti-drug operations in the country Mohammad Masoud Zahedian believes that lowering the implementation of the death penalty in drug-trafficking-related offenses would actually incite drug smugglers to increment their operations, and drug use in the country would rise. He called for rescinding the amendments to the current law that prosecutes drug-trafficking-related offenses.163 The deputy director of the anti-drug agency linked to the presidency of the Iranian Republic Ali Moayidi stated that if those amendments were passed in the parliament, it would definitely lead to an increment in the smuggled drugs indexes, as well as in drug-smuggling activities in general.

He added that the anti-drug agency welcomed any amendments to the drug laws and drug addiction in the country, but he called for these amendments not to affect the rights of the thousands of young people whose “blood has been spilled because of the evil ambitions of drug smugglers and traffickers in the country.164” Parliament member Mohammad Rida Sabaghin is also against the proposed amendments to the death penalty provisions. He argues that drugs destroy a significant number of Iranian families and are incidental in a high number of divorce cases, as well as theft cases and other social ills. He considers the amendments a tacit recognition of failure on the par t of the government and society to deter drug smugglers.

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On the other hand, other members of the parliament have come out in support of the amendments based on the argument that the fundamental purpose of the legislation providing for the death penalty in drug-trafficking-related offenses is to target the driving force behind the vast illegal profits made from drug trafficking. Others opine that while there is no country fighting their internal drug trade as Iran does, the toll on Iranian families whose members are sentenced under these legal provisions is very high, leading to the necessity of thinking about giving all these people a second chance to reincorporate themselves into society and contribute instead of being agents propagating harm 165

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his section of the strategic report will analyze the most important indicators and issues faced by the Iranian economy in the first half of 2017, with a careful look at the tendencies of those indicators into the near future and the development of the issues pointed out. We will look into overall economic indicators and the most important issues touching the energy sector as well as the banking sector and, finally, study the influence of the QatarGulf countries crisis on Iran.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Iran’s economic situation can be analyzed through four important dimensions. The first one would be a look at the development of the most important indicators of the performance of Iran’s economy during the first half of the year and their expected tendencies. The second one is a look at the energy sector, as well as its expected tendencies. The third one, however, comprises a look into the reality of bankruptcy of Iranian banks and the development of the banking sector in the first half of the year. In regard to the fourth and final dimension, it studies how Iran has exploited the Gulf-Qatar crisis to pursue its economic and strategic interests.

» The First Dimension Developments in the Main Indicators of the Iranian Economy through the First Half of the Year and Its Expected Tendencies To understand the future tendencies of the Iranian economy, we first have to look at its general indicators in the past six months , in addition to official indicators published by the Iranian government as well as those published in international reports specialized in the Iranian economy. Those general indicators comprise major indexes like GDP growth, as well as inflation, unemployment, foreign exchange rates, and others.

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»»Development in Overall General Indicators Growth in Iran’s GDP, which was of around 400 billion during the first half of 2017, was significant, given that the economic year 2016/2017 witnessed an increase in oil exports.

It reached 6.6% according to the IMF. According to other reports published by the Iranian government, growth was significantly higher for the first half of 2017. In any case, the growth of GDP was significant because of oil exports beginning from the current year when a deal was reached with the members of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) at the end of November 2016 to increase oil production on the part of Iran to pre-oil embargo levels (3.8 million barrels a day). This led to a net growth in the trade balance of 6.5% of GDP for Iran in 2016.166 However, would the current rate of GDP growth maintain itself? Alternatively, does this indicate rather an ephemeral phenomenon? In addition, did this increase also transfer into the palpable expansion of the economy in other sectors? Or was it restricted to this one sector only?

We shall endeavor to answer this as follows: Could the current rate of growth in the Iranian economy sustain itself?

Usually, growth in an economy that is sustaining is the result of phenomena that alter the structural basis of that particular economy. This, in turn, leads to an increment in production in different sectors of the economy in the long term without interruption or decrease. It is also accompanied by an increase in the overall employment rate fostering a favorable climate for domestic investment and attracting foreign investment in the process through an improvement in taxing regimens, the curbing of corruption, improvements in the banking sector, and easing restrictions on overall business investments. The expansion of any economy in the world is fundamentally dependent on a sustained increase in overall growth indexes and GDP that surpass at the very least population growth.

There are two fundamental types of growth. The first one is constituted by real growth, which evidences tangible returns on the economy. The second one is constituted by a deceiving type of growth, which does not transfer into tangible returns on the economy. The first one is the result of expansion in production rates and investments within the fundamental sectors of the economy like the manufacturing, agricultural, services, communications, and technology sectors. This evidently represents real tangible growth in the economy since the expansion of the key areas of the economy provides for the creation of direct employment opportunities in the affecting sectors and indirect employment in the rest. In regard to the second type of growth, even though growth rates in the economy indeed show an increase, they are usually underpinned by dynamics that do not affect the economy and its sectors like previously mentioned; rather, the opposite may happen, where these dynamics might result in undesired operations like an increase in imports, which negatively affects the balance of trade. Another example is the increase in exports of natural products like oil and gas when it is not accompanied by the imposition of aggregated values or the creation of new projects designed to foster employment and expand sustainment of new operations, where new economic ventures and business opportunities are not pursued.

It is important to point out that the second type of growth described, which does not necessarily affect the fundamental sectors of the economy that command the most in terms of expansion of overall employment, does not lead to the creation of jobs and does not lead to an expansion of production, which ought to be a counterpart to the growth in demand—a natural result of population growth. This implies that the indexes of unemployment do not decrease, and neither do prices. The opposite, in fact, is what happens. They both increase, although there is some growth being indexed in the economy. In this situation, there is no tangible effective creation of returns on the economy, and therefore, there is no real positive effect on the life of the average citizen.

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Specifically, in the Iranian case, the average citizen does not perceive a significant improvement in his or her daily life despite the many government declarations that there has been sustained growth in the economy of the country. They are growth rates affected by an increase in net exports and, consequently, in income but not a growth that transfers into an increase of production in other sectors of the economy that would lead to an increase in overall employment. In fact, inflation in the country was around 9% until November 2016, and it rose by the first half of 2017, registering 10.9% in February. Meanwhile, by March 2017, unemployment increased by 1.5% to register 12.3%, and then again, it rose after having a decline in the first years of Rouhani’s administration when the government declared it to be 11.1%, that being 13.4% unemployment in urban areas compared to 10% in rural areas.

EXPECTED TENDENCIES

Âť The First Scenario

Mapping expected tendencies within a first possible scenario allows for the Iranian economy registering acceptable growth rates midterm at approximately 4%, being a decrease from above 6%, which was the result of an increase in oil exports and the energy sector of approximately 65%. This scenario depends on the success of the government in attracting foreign investment to the country, focusing on the largest multinational oil and gas sector companies, which would lead to an increase in investor confidence in the Iranian economy and to more investments in the rest of sectors in the economy. This would result in an expected growth of around 4.1% as projected by the IMF from 2017 to 2019 coming years.

The success of this scenario also depends on jump-starting the other sectors in the economy and them being subject to structural improvements. It also demands that the Iranian currency be stabilized further, as well as the bank sector, and there be an ease in payment and investment operations. It also requires that corruption is curbed and that human resources be optimized in terms of education and technical training and that there be successful creation of job opportunities in high indexes that would allow for more income and would stimulate consumption, as well as jump-starting industrial operations. If these all are realized, there is no doubt that overall growth indexes would definitely increase.

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FIRST SCENARIO

SECOND SCENARIO

Growth rate would be less than previously but at an acceptable least of 4%.

On a mid-term basis, rate of growth would not exceed 3%.

For this scenario to be realized, it would need

Iran would face many risks and challenges, including.

the fostering of a proper climate for investors to invest in the nonoil sectors of the economy.

prolonged tension between Iran and the international community.

stability in the currency and a recuperation of the banking system.

obstacles when practically seeking to implement the nuclear deal.

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Iran seeking to promote peace and decrease the level of conflict involved.

slow recovery for Iran’s balance of trade.

structural improvements to the society in general and a curbing of corruption.

increased dependence on oil exports;

the attraction of foreign investments specifically to the oil sector.

stagnation in other sectors of the economy, especially in the manufacturing sector.

developments in human resources and education in general.

financial corruption and monopolization.

» The Second Scenario In this scenario, a number of risk factors and challenges would lead to a decrease in the growth rates projected in the first one. The first of those risk factors would be the state of tension and conflict between Iran and the international community and, specifically, with its neighbors, this being underpinned by a less than complete implementation of the nuclear deal signed by Iran, the United States, and other Western countries and the occurrence of situations that would hinder its implementation. We suppose that under this scenario, the United States would further penalize Iran and its companies as well as Iranians whom in their vision are involved in funding terrorism in the region and the world. This would lead to an interruption of foreign investment in Iran’s economy, affecting significantly development in the energy and manufacturing sectors.

The projected growth rate for the Iranian economy under this scenario would be less than 3%. The fast recovery experienced by the economy in 2016 would be uncertainty sustained until the end of 2017. In 2016, Iran’s trade balance witnessed a surplus of 6.5% of GDP after an increment of just 2.7% in 2015. It would still continue to its peak during the recent pre-sanction period of 10% growth in GDP in 2011. The World Bank projects that it would fall to 5.5% in 2018 and 4.6% in 2019 on an increased value of imports and a decrease in oil and other exports.

Furthermore, increased dependence on oil would leave other sources of income in a state of uncertain dependency in a situation of a general decrease in oil prices in the near future on a continuous rise in world supply, which would lead to a straining of the national budget and a lowering of general spending. This implies that the state would have to accommodate to the conditions of a contracted economy. It is only natural that growth indicators would suffer in such conditions, given that the high rates of growth registered by the Iranian economy during 2016/2017 (Persian calendar) were indeed affected by an expansion in the oil sector of 65.5%. All of this during a time in which other sectors like manufacturing and mining did not expand, except a minimal 0.3%, according to the Central Iranian Planner,167 which publicly stated that without that growth rate in the oil sector, the economy would have been able to grow only 1.9%.

» An Expected Scenario The number of challenges currently facing the Iranian economy would make the second scenario preponderant in the short term if the Iranian government does not develop a winning strategy vis-à-vis those challenges, for, aside from the aforementioned difficulties and risks, there is another set of complications facing the nonoil sectors in the Iranian economy. For instance, the manufacturing sector has still not recovered in the wake of the sanctions being lifted after the signing of the nuclear deal. It is even a possibility that technology is going to have to be

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imported, including advanced machinery, the manufacturing sector needing modernization.

The international banking sector and its relationship to Iran’s banks and financial institutions is still not very smooth, it still being plagued with internal debt and many of their assets being frozen while being possessed by non-Iranian banks. Furthermore, there is the current climate of unfavorable exchange rates in regard to the Iranian currency vis-à-vis other currencies and further hindering the possibility of acquiring foreign technology whether for the public or the private sector. Moreover, there is also the fact that some sectors of the economy are monopolized by “revolutionary” institutions like in manufacturing or trade or others. In an environment like that, corruption increases if there is no transparency brought into place or legal and institutional deterrents and correctives.

»»The Inflation Rate It is expected that in the second half of the current year, inflation would increase continuously given that the government has been printing large amounts of currency. Iranian reports ascertain that the monetary liquidity rate is 28%, which indicates a continuous effort on the part of the central bank to print currency without an accompanying increase in production rates.168 This obviously leads to an increase in the supply of money in the economy and an increase in demand for different products and services. Without an accompanying growth in supply for those products and services, inflation increases at an accelerated rate. Aside from the increase in the supply of currency, the World Bank estimates that inflation rates would increase during the 2017/2018 period to around 11.2% because of the effect of the instability in the value of the Iranian currency compared to other currencies and the rising prices of food and housing in Iran.

»»The Unemployment Rate Given the assimilation rate into the workforce every month of new workers, without an accompanying creation of job opportunities for them, the level of unemployment would undoubtedly increase. In the past 12 months, and until March 2017, the number of new workers entering the workforce was 1.07 million, whereas the new job opportunities created in the same period were of 766,292, leaving more than 300,000 seekers without a job.

In addition, the unemployment rate among the youth is approximately 30%, and the highest rate of unemployed in Iran from among higher educated individuals is approximately 1 of 3 or around 35% of graduates from higher education institutions.196 This particular group is of course the most capable and vocal opposition and protest group in society if the economic situation is not to improve in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the gap between unemployed men and unemployed women is becoming wider, given that men face many more challenges and hurdles to find employment than women do in Iran. In one of its reports, the World Bank also pointed out that the gap between the sexes in regard to employment in Iran is wider than in any other country in the region.

»»The Second Dimension Issues in the Energy Sector and Expected Tendencies Although the Iranian economy is quite diverse and can create interesting sources of income as it does in the manufacturing, agricultural, and tourism sectors, the energy sector in the economy takes the lion’s share of the country’s GDP. It is, in fact, equivalent to all the rest put together. It is the pillar of the Iranian economy and its main artery in terms of the nation’s annual budget and its main public revenue source of income, superseding taxes and customs revenue. How was then its performance in the first half of 2017? How does its expected performance look like in the coming period? We shall consider the following issues related to Iran’s energy sector:

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1. Iran’s intention to increase oil production despite OPEC’s members latest agreement to freeze production rates.

2. Iran’s intention to increase gas production within the areas where it possesses gas reserves that are shared with Qatar. Would they soon be ready for development and exportation?

3. How do Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries exploit Iran’s weaknesses in the petrochemical sector?

4. Does the “oil for weapons exchange” constitute an infringement of the economic sanctions imposed on the country?

Iran’s Intention to Increase Oil Production against OPEC’s Consensus on Freezing Levels of Production Iran announced their plan to increment oil production to 4 million barrels a day by the end of March of the current year. Moreover, they plan on a midterm basis to pump even more quantities of oil into the world market of 4.7 million barrels a day according to their “sixth growth plan.”170 This announcement was considered an explicit violation on the part of Iran’s national oil company agreed by OPEC nations in November 2016 in Algeria, of which Iran is a member, where it was accorded that only Iran, Nigeria, and Libya were allowed to produce not more than 3.8 million barrels a day for a period of 6 months. The amount produced before the embargo on Iran was enforced was 3.8 million barrels per day. The agreement aimed to decrease oil production by most oil-producing nations to allow the oil price to stabilize at 60 dollars a barrel after a reduction in world supply. In fact, the price of oil rose as soon as OPEC’s agreement was announced to reach 57 dollars per barrel, almost reaching OPEC’s stated aim. No sooner had the agreement been announced, the price of oil dropped once more to 53 dollars per barrel in March 2017, afterward dropping even more to 50 dollars per barrel in June of the same year because a number of factors of which an increment in world supply, as well as the abandonment of the aforementioned OPEC agreement, played a crucial part. As a result, OPEC was forced to extend its agreement on reducing oil production for a further 6 months.

»»Iran’s Oil Production in the Near Future Iran is in pressing need of incrementing its sources of income to eliminate the deficits in its budget, to be able to meet increasing military expenses, and to stave off mounting economic challenges on a short- and medium-term basis. This necessarily leads to Iran being incapable of fulfilling the aforementioned OPEC agreement. On the other hand, it would give rise to all of OPEC being harmed as a result of Iran pursuing an increment in its income sources to fulfill individual aims. It is only natural that on an increment in supply caused by Iran or any other country, not in practical agreement with OPEC, prices will fall. Studies by the Platz Foundation showed a 3% increase in net oil production by Iran in January 2017 compared to the previous month that reached 2.162 million barrels per day (the rest of production being consumed domestically) from 2.102 million barrels per day produced in December 2016.171 At a time when OPEC states with Saudi Arabia in the lead aim at decreasing world supply of oil in the coming years to stabilize oil prices at an appropriate rate vis-à-vis their national budgets, Iran’s aim, on the contrary, is to increase production at corresponding levels. It actually aims at incrementing production by 3 million barrels per day in the next 10 years to make their production total of 7 million barrels per day.

To that effect came declarations by the vice president of Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company Ghulam Rida Monotshahri’s during the 22nd International Oil and Gas Fair held in Tehran in May 2017, where representatives from many international oil companies like China, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada gathered. He stated that he had signed 24

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memorandums of understanding with different oil companies, 20 of them being international oil companies and four domestic ones. He stressed that according to those memoranda, daily production of oil in Iran would increase by 3 million barrels per day and that the projects necessary to reach that level of production required approximately 10 years to be realized.172 Three million barrels a day added to the international oil market already saturated with not only conventional oil but also newly produced shale oil coming in large quantities from the United States will probably make the price decrease to a level not seen since the 1980s. It could actually bring certain economies over the brink toward an increasing possibility of bankruptcy.

There is no doubt that Iran will press forward with its plan of increasing net oil production and exports. However, the announced quantities that constitute its aim will damage Iran’s interests first before those of other nations if its national budget depends fundamentally on the sale of crude oil. This as long as it is not capable of gaining a surplus of no less than 100 billion dollars to better exploit current oil fields and develop new fields in the coming years.

Iran’s Aim of Exploiting Gas Reserves in Areas Shared with Qatar: Can It Begin Exporting from Them Soon?

Iran is currently seeking to expand gas production to levels adequately meant to exploit and export from its considerable reserves. These gas reserves possessed by Iran are indeed among the most voluminous in the world and among the least developed in terms of their size. During the first half of the current year, Iran has increased natural gas production, especially from reserves that are located within shared areas between Iran and Qatar within the Arabian Gulf. These areas are known in Iran as the South Pars or fields, which are considered among the greatest not only in the region but also the world. Iran aims at rivaling the levels of production of its neighbor Qatar after increasing production in the area. However, as soon as Iran announced its goal of matching Qatari production, it had to be postponed, for Qatar was able to extract more than 2,000 million cubic meters a day from the South Pars gas fields,173 while Iran was able to extract around 1,000 million only,174 even under increased gas production measures up to April 2017. It should be noted that operations to develop the South Pars fields started in the mid-1970s and became operable by the early 1980s with Iran and Qatar producing near equal quantities of gas. Yet after some time, Iran’s production capacity decreased, while Qatar’s reached approximately the double of what Iran currently produces.

Under any circumstance, however, although the increased gas production levels aimed at matching those of Qatar was postponed because of unavailable investment possibilities, or a shortage of the necessary technology, or even because of a lack of available funds, there’s a clear indication of Iran’s aim of exploiting those shared gas fields with Qatar, especially after Qatar’s rapprochement with Iran as a result of the Saudi-led boycott, along with the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, enforced on Qatar. Now in regard to the possibility of producing and exporting large quantities of gas from that specific region, we do not believe it could be realized on a short-term basis. To achieve this, Iran would have to resume pumping on a new production level, need years to alter domestic consumption indexes, as well as to attract a large quantity of foreign investment for it to be realized. This is because domestic gas consumption grows at a proportional level compared to production level. It also requires substantial foreign investments. All of this to cope with various internal as well as external challenges. Internal challenges would be such as amendments in legislation, designing strategies to combat corruption, monopolies, and stabilizing their currency. External challenges would be such as improving political as well as economic relations with international partners. We shall treat in more detail this possibility of Iran exploiting those reserves under areas shared with Qatar in the next section.

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»»How Does Iran Exploit the Current Crisis between Qatar and Other Gulf Countries?

Development in petrochemicals is an issue of supreme importance to Iran to diversify its sources of income, and it is something they currently are determined to pursue. This certainly lies within the realm of possibilities for Iran, except that it needs certain investments, as well as the acquiring of advanced techniques, and funds in excess of 55 billion USD to be obtained in the next 10 years. While there are other developments being carried out in Iran in this area, they have not been completed, however, except at a 30%.175 On this issue, Gulf countries should exploit well the advantage they possess over Iran.

Currently, Gulf countries surpass Iran in terms of their overall level of petrochemical industry, experience, technique, funds, and technology. They also are currently more advanced in terms of the competitivity of their products by way of research and development, their prices and quality, as well as the impact that they have on the world market. In this regard, specifically, the most advanced centers for research in petrochemicals are in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Weak points in Iran’s development strategy in their petrochemical industry should be identified. For instance, if Iran currently lacks availability of funds to invest in its development, it could well perhaps attain to them in the form of investments by international oil companies, even if it might take a few years for an appropriate investment climate to generate inside Iran. However, if Iran were able to attain to this, it could seriously begin competing with the Gulf countries in terms of influencing the market and could even be able to achieve this at a lesser cost. Whereas if the Gulf countries were to concentrate on superseding Iran’s potential in terms of lowering costs as well as through investing in research, that would deliver more advanced techniques of production. If Iran’s production were able to surge, the Gulf countries would be prepared to face Iran’s challenge and to attain a bigger market share even if Iran were to have succeeded in attaining to the foreign investment needed to sophisticate the possibilities of its industry.

»»Strengths on the Side of the Gulf Countries From among all the countries in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is the most advanced in terms of its petrochemical industry state. Saudi Aramco, in specific, has long years of experience and vast possibilities of investment in research concentrated in its three research centers in Saudi Arabia as well as eight others and accompanying offices in the cities of Detroit, Houston, and Boston in the United States.176 Additionally, there are a number of large petrochemical companies like SABIC that operate large and advanced research centers. There is no doubt that all these assets will play a major role in facing the competition coming from Iran if they focus on their comparative strengths and on superseding where the competition is weak in the coming years.

It should also be considered that the Saudi petrochemical industry has grown 250% in the last 10 years and that it aims to increase production by a 10% annually to become the third largest producer in the world with investments in petrochemicals reaching 150 billion USD.177 It is possible to ascertain then that it is quite attainable for Gulf countries to obtain a distinct advantage over the competition coming from Iran if they manage to supersede Iran by achieving lower prices for their products as well as better quality and a larger quantity of production.

»»The Oil Industry Seems to Be Doomed to Extinction in the Near Future Even if it is impossible to ascertain at this point the exact moment in which the industry will become obsolete in regard to being a fundamental mover of the dynamics of the world economy, and despite the existence of favorable and unfavorable possible future scenarios for the industry, it is an established fact that its days are nonetheless numbered. Either because of a progressive decrease in demand owing to the rise in the exploitation of alternative sources of energy or because of depletion of world reserves, oil is, in the end, a nonrenewable resource that is available to exploitation in limited quantities in the lower regions of Earth’s surface. We

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are indeed witnessing an unprecedented drive to develop alternative and renewable sources of energy as much in the United States as in Europe and even in some Middle East countries.

However, what will happen to the oil reserves available in the Middle East if demand decreases to an unsustainable level due to a rise in the development of alternative sources of energy?

Would they then lose all their economic value? Without a doubt, they would not. Rather, on the contrary, it is possible that they acquire even more valuable than the one represented by them being mere oil reserves. This would happen if they were to be exploited through processing them and harnessing them to develop the petrochemical industry. Therefore, investing in research in this area becomes of primary importance. This points to an outstanding opportunity not to be missed by Gulf countries in general, especially by Saudi Arabia, being that it is currently the world’s number 1 oil producer possessing the largest oil reserves in the world and one of its prime producers of petrochemical products. The returns in this industry would supersede those of oil exports and would occasion the downfall of Iran’s competition, being that they do not waste efforts or time in not trying to counter the interests of the rest of the countries in the region while intervening in their economic, political, and security affairs.

»»The Strategy of Outrunning Iran in Quality and Quantity Production Is Superior to Military Confrontation

We shall not discuss in this section the increase in petrochemical production by Gulf countries, although it is a topic that ought to be covered here; however, we shall discuss a particular type of growth in production, which if applied would render null the possibility of competing against it in high-end production of petrochemicals. It means focusing the efforts of research centers toward realizing the possibility of producing products that when compared to those produced

by Iran render their competition against them null and can easily take over their market share. In effect, this would lead to a “drying up” of a fundamental source of income for Iran, which, in turn, is a way of combating Iran’s designs for expansion at the expense of its neighbors and the region’s security and stability.

The foreign policy of the Gulf countries is one of nonaggression and characterized by evading conflict, except when vital interests are threatened. Iran’s foreign economic policy, besides its political and military strategy in the region, threatens the interests of its Gulf neighbors. Iran’s noncommittal stance in regard to OPEC’s latest agreement of freezing production levels because of its need to increase its sources of income (among other reasons) is a good example. It could also be arrogance vis-à-vis the Gulf countries or a particular belief that Iran should never submit to decisions by the Gulf countries even though Iran is itself part of OPEC, and OPEC’s decisions are taken with regard to shared interests by all members. Iran would comply with OPEC decisions only to go against them shortly after. Considering the impact of this selfish and unstable Iranian policy on Gulf countries, it is entirely possible, however, that they feel moved to react in kind to Iran similar to what happened during the time of King Fahd in the 1980s. It happened that patience was exhausted at some OPEC members who refused to follow up on the collective decision to freeze production levels to bring up the price of oil. Then the market was purposefully flooded with cheap oil to the point where oil-producing countries begged for negotiations to restart on freezing production levels so that the price of oil might be stabilized at a value benefiting all of OPEC’s members collectively. It is entirely possible that Saudi Arabia might take a similar decision if the disregard for OPEC decisions to raise the price of oil becomes numerous and abundant.

»»Expectations Regarding Iran’s Petrochemical Industry In regard to expectations vis-à-vis Iran’s petrochemical industry in the near future, it is clear that Iran is determined to push up petrochemical production and exports in the coming years

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by investment enterprises together with foreign companies with that particular goal in mind. Its aim is to diversify its exports, to add aggregated value, and to increment its possible sources of income instead of solely depending on crude oil exports at a decreasing price.

In fact, Iran moved quickly to secure contracts with investment companies to that effect soon after the nuclear deal was signed. For instance, the National Iranian Oil Company signed a deal with South Korean Hyundai to build the second stage of its Kangan project at a value of 300 million Euros in exchange for a million yearly tons of ethylene and 400,000 tons of light polyethylene. Kangan is located at Iran’s Western Bushehr in the Arabian Gulf region.

The “Oil for Weapons” Exchange: Does It Constitute an Infringement of the Economic Sanctions Imposed on the Country?

After the nuclear deal was signed, the economic sanctions restricting the Iranian government’s sources of income, especially oil exports, was lifted along with renewed access to the international payment network SWIFT after a four-year long restriction period in January 2016.

Despite this, certain currency exchange restrictions in regard to the dollar are still in place, a matter that affects Iran significantly, given that the dollar constitutes the “international currency” par excellence in the world today, and oil is valued and exchanged primarily in dollars. This means that Iran’s resulting income from oil exports has, to a great extent, to be received in dollars. Faced with this, Iran has no resulting choice, except to barter its oil for particular products, specific merchandise, or spare engineering parts.

Iran began by exchanging oil for particular Russian products, especially manufactured products, and capital goods, although that commercial relations between Russia and Iran are not as strong as they are with China, which is Iran’s greatest trading partner and the world’s biggest importer of Iranian oil. Russia, despite this, is one of the world’s greatest exporters of oil and is in no need to obtain Iranian oil. However, the agreement was carried on probably as a manifestation of the recent convergence of Russian and Iranian interests and as a step to further deepen their parallel perspectives because of shared political and strategic aims. Furthermore, Russia also desires to participate in the consortium of investors ready to invest in Iran’s undeveloped or underdeveloped oil and gas fields. This all indicates a growing climate of cooperation between the two countries, which could definitely lead to expanding those exchange agreements between the two countries in the future.

Those types of oil for item exchanges by Iran are not bereft of a pursuit to realize particular political goals whether internal or external to Iran. Internally refers to the need to keep a particular balance between government companies and enterprises and those corporations and enterprises that ultimately belong to the Revolutionary Guards. Externally, however, refers to realizing particular strategic goals vis-à-vis particular countries whether the relations between those countries and Iran are strong or weak, for instance, with Russia, where relations between them have changed or might change while considering their ongoing cooperation in regard to the Syrian crisis. On the other hand, the effects of European Union policy on Iran while simultaneously considering U.S. relations to the EU and the fact that the United States is the EU’s greatest trading partner.

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Iran selected Russia particularly to attain from them the fulfillment of pressing Iranian needs like certain consumer products, technical equipment, and replacement parts in exchange for Iran’s most precious commodity: oil. Iran’s President Hasan Rouhani traveled to Russia in March 2017 and met his counterpart Vladimir Putin to settle the exchange during other trade deals. The final terms of that exchange were settled, and the agreement was signed in May 2017. Thus, Russia agreed to purchase 100,000 barrels of oil daily from Iran or 5 million tons a year, delivering half the price directly in Tehran and the other half being received in the form of Russian products for a total value of 45 billion dollars a year.178 These products include infrastructure, heavy machinery, buses, and aircraft equipment.

After this, and on the same model of exchange between Russia and Iran, Ukraine offered Iran a particular strategic exchange between them of products for oil. It was announced by Ukraine’s ambassador to Iran’s Srhyborid Yalyak within the framework of standing cooperation agreements between Ukraine and Iran specifically in regard to the exchange of heavy machinery in May 2017.

It includes the intention to strengthen cooperation between them regarding energy production.

Ukraine’s president clarified that the exchange commits the Republic of Ukraine to provide Iran with products it needs in return for the commitment on the part of Iran to provide for Ukraine’s energy needs.

Even though the dimension of the future benefit of those exchanges at this point is uncertain, it is certain, however, that the exchange saw the light of day at time when Iranian exports to Ukraine grew by 30% during the past year according to Iran’s ambassador to Ukraine, and the obstacles to direct purchasing of oil from Iran have not been removed.179 Thus, it appears that Iran is leaning heavily toward bartering its oil for benefits to escape from the restrictions that the United States has imposed on exchanging dollars to and from Iran.

The agreement with Russia implies an exchange of 45 billion dollars yearly to Iran, but what is really interesting about it is the amount for which the exchange is to take place in terms of Russian products delivered to Iran. The amount is not reasonable because of two reasons. First, Iran’s total imports from China is 40 billion dollars in the past three years, while Iran’s total net imports last year alone was 43 billion dollars based on figures reported by Iranian customs.180 How can it be then that just from Russia, Iran is receiving 45 billion dollars a year? Second, the agreement between Russia and Iran is based on barter between both. Now in bartering, the exchange value must be reciprocal or near reciprocal. Iran’s net worth of exchange within the agreement with Russia does not exceed a billion and 800,000 dollars (100,000 barrels a day for a year’s time priced at 50 dollars a barrel). How then can such a modest quantity of oil be exchanged for 45 billion dollars a year?

We deduce from this that the announced details of the exchange imply significant exaggeration. It is not possible that Russia would export to Iran products for such an enormous total value. Those exports would probably be of a parallel net worth to what Iran is sending of oil to Russia, or perhaps somewhat higher. Unless, of course, there be undisclosed exchange agreements between Russia and Iran in which Iran would receive from Russia weapons as part of the “oil for Russian products” exchange. All of this does not preclude that Iran may determine to agree on other exchanges like this one with other nations to trade more of its oil at a time when exchanging freely in dollars in regard to its imports is precarious and at a time right after the nuclear deal between them and the United States and other Western nations was signed.

»»The Third Dimension What’s the Truth behind Iran’s Banks Have Gone Bankrupt? What Developments Have There Been in Iran’s Banking Sector in the First Half of the Year?

The third dimension deals with the issue of the bankruptcy of Iran’s banks, which occurred, and

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still continues, during the first half of the current year and the future repercussions of this critical issue. It also looks into the most important developments in Iran’s banking sector during the first six months of the year and their implications.

First: The Bankruptcy and Its Future Repercussions During the first six months of 2017, it was reported by most media outlets that a number of Iranian banks had, in fact, gone bankrupt. What is the truth behind those reports? Was the bankruptcy truly of certain Iranian banks? Alternatively, was it rather of other financial institutions working currently in Iran? What are the implications of said bankruptcy on the stability of the financial system in Iran and its ramifications?

The crisis began when two financial organizations announced that it could not return capital to their investors during the next few months. The Caspian and Arman financial institutions caused great distress among their clients with behavior usually seen from institutions on the verge of bankruptcy, especially Arman after struggling with a deficit of around 1.2 billion dollars and an incapacity to pay its obligations. After this, another financial institution called Saman al-Hojaj caused another wave of panic when they closed their branches in a number of Iranian provinces as a result of incapacity to return deposits to their customers. The angry customers had no choice but to crowd the main branch of the company in Tehran, proceeding to angrily demand the return of their deposits. Fearing the loss of their savings and fearing to wait until the institution definitely bankrupts, the people decided to continue protesting outside the offices of the main branch until the police arrived, and scuffles ensued.181 Aside from this, and despite the nationwide commotion caused by the news media, Iranian officials denied that some banks had gone bankrupt and that they were not completely informed of the situation of those banks or financial institutions. Iran’s financial superintendent at Iran’s central bank Abbas Kamrai denied explicitly that “bankruptcy was spreading throughout the financial system” and said, “People should rest assured that the financial superintendents in the country are well aware of the current situation of banks and insurance institutions.” He clarified that some banks were indeed suffering from issues not yet the size of full bankruptcy, like lack of specific investment funds and excess in holding assets that did not produce returns.”

BANKRUPTCY IN IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS Latest institutions to financially fail

Caspian, Arman, Saman al-Hojaj, Jousar, Samin al-Aimah

Rates paid by non-governmental financial institutions

35%

Number of customers in nonsanctioned financial institutions

450,000

Number of bankrupt financial institutions undisclosed by government

financial Institutions 12

Institution owned by Basij since 1993 still not sanctioned by Iran’s central bank

Iqtsaad Mihr Bank

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»»Why Are Iranian Consumers Attracted to Nonsanctioned Financial Institutions?

In Iran, there are certain financial institutions that are widespread that are not banks. What they do is similar to what investment companies do. Specifically, they receive deposits from customers, which come to be in total billions of dollars, and give customers high periodic returns on those deposits, which surpass what banks usually offer. For instance, Caspian, which usually gives returns to their customers at a 35% rate, is capable of attracting a large section of society on the hope that they receive very high returns on their deposits, which surpass what banks could give them by a 10%, given that bank returns to customers in Iran oscillate between 18 and 22%.

There are around 3,500 financial institutions in Iran that operate in parallel to banks. Around 900 of them operate under official license from the government, while the rest operate without any supervision from the central bank, which is the main superintendent of the financial system and plays the fundamental role of safe keeping the rights of the bank and financial institution customers in the country. The license that the government grants, however, is not granted by this financial institution but by other ministries that have no relation to the financial system and its operation. One of the biggest banks in Iran is the bank called Iqtsaad Mihr. This bank is owned by people belonging to Basij and other Revolutionary Guards. It was started in 1993 and is an illustrating case of a bank that is not officially sanctioned by the Iranian central bank until now.182

»»Economic Repercussions and the Future of Financial Institutions in the Country The existence of financial institutions that are not supervised by Iran’s central bank is a phenomenon that threatens the stability of the country’s financial system as a whole. If instances of bankruptcy repeat themselves, leading to a general incapacity by customers of retrieving their funds from these institutions, consumer confidence in the financial system as a whole will cease to exist throughout the country. Then the malady would probably spread to the other types of financial institutions like banks, and then a general bank run would occur. It is clear that a crisis like this is fundamentally unmanageable because most banks do not keep their assets in liquid form but rather in diversified investments. If there is a general collapse of the banking and financial system, the economy as a whole would be stunted for projects that would not be able to be financed, production will come to a standstill, and unemployment could ensue, terminating the possibility of growth.

The number of unlicensed financial institutions is quite large and is, in fact, capable of siphoning to itself an enormous quantity of liquid assets owned by customers in exchange for financial returns that are extremely high. These returns are complicated to pay when conditions are not running ideally in the economy. This situation provokes crucial questions surrounding the possibility and conditions under which these institutions work when the Iranian economy and the country has not recovered successfully from years of the boycott imposed on it. Now in regard to the size of deposits in these institutions, it cannot be precisely known, except that declarations by Iranian officials and by the central bank place the size of those deposits in a range between 15 and 20% of the entirety of liquidity available in the country at the time. This means that necessarily, they must comprise tens of billions of dollars. The number of customers of these institutions is greater than 450,000, of which 400,000 of them have deposits that are less than 10 million Tomans (3,000 dollars). This means that most customers are not big savers but rather people of modest means, and a minority of 50,000 customers have savings that surpass 3,000 dollars.

According to declarations by spokespeople of Mihr in Iran, the extent of the crisis was not revealed to the public. If the extent of the crisis were revealed, it would have been possible that the crisis would spread to all financial institutions in the country (particularly banks), and the economy as a whole would have come to a standstill because of a collapse of the banking sector.

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Iran’s government also maintained undisclosed during 2016 the bankruptcy of 12 banks because of the high returns they had to pay to their customers and because of mismanagement.183 Nonetheless, Iran’s government was not able to maintain secret the extent of the latest financial crisis once the media started to report it. In fact, one research center in Iranian affairs, the Iranian Research Center, revealed the names of five institutions that closed after going bankrupt. Those institutions were Caspian, Arman, Saman al-Hojaj, Jousar, and Samin al-Aimah.

»»Issues That Could Lead to More Cases of Bankruptcy There are a number of issues that could lead many unlicensed financial institutions to collapse further. This would lead to customers encountering tremendous loss after having lost their savings. These problems are institutions offering loans that are not sufficiently backed by assets owned by those institutions, absence of transparency in the conducting of business transactions and an infirm and lenient application of the law, and absence of scrutiny and supervision of these establishments by the Iranian central bank, which imposes on them that they have reserve funds and that they deposit a 10% of their capital in the central bank as a guarantee on depositors’ capital and as an emergency liquidity reserve.

Aside from these issues, there is another factor of enormous importance that should be considered. This factor is the prevalence of risky investments, which threaten the integrity of the institutions as well as the safety of customers’ deposits. The Iranian central bank, in fact, has pointed out the lack of expertise plaguing these institutions. There is a lack of diversity in sources of investment also widespread in these institutions. Their investments usually take the form of acquisitions in real estate or in particular industries, where if a sudden need for liquidity arises, they would find themselves in very straightened circumstances to repay deposits to customers efficiently. This explains the crisis faced by Iranian institutions like Caspian, Arman, and Samin al- Hojaj.

Second: Important Developments in Iran’s Banking Sector The High Level of Return Rates in Iran Constitutes a Double-Edged Sword The high rates of return paid by Iranian financial institutions have engendered a great deal of discussion among observers during the past six months. The state needs that rates of return be lower so that loans may be easier to obtain while investment can be encouraged and the creation of jobs be made easier. The existence of high rates of return decreases the amount of cash available in the market, which keeps inflation in check. In this regard, inflation has kept rising after being comparatively lower at the end of Ahmadinejad’s administration and the beginning of Rouhani’s.

Despite this, though, banks currently are not able to lower the rates of return on loans because of what the whole banking sector is suffering from at the moment, the financial problems threatening some institutions with bankruptcy. A significant part of the assets of these banks is, in fact, capital that is frozen in foreign financial institutions. Another part of these assets is obligations gone late on behalf of the Iranian government with a value of approximately 30 billion dollars, aside from the fact that the government itself is currently competing with the banking sector in that it is paying a 9% return rate on government bonds.184 This does not leave any practical choice in the hands of banks, except raising the rates of return and engaging in other particular forms of business. These, in turn, constitute a deviation from the main role banks are supposed to fulfill, like that of financing housing options for people, which raise the price of accommodation, as well as other trading activities that keep bankruptcy at bay and allow them to face financial crises effectively.

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»»Iranian Financial Assets Currently Frozen in Foreign Financial Institutions The total value of Iran’s assets currently frozen in foreign financial institutions is not known with precision; however, it approximates 100 billion dollars, of which Iran has managed to retrieve approximately a fourth of after the signing of the nuclear deal, this at a time when the banking sector is literally starving for that money to be able to meet its obligations that, if unchecked, could lead to full-blown bankruptcy as well as other real and imagined crises it could face. In fact, in the past two years,the instances of the bankruptcy of companies have doubled to eight,in a development that could be termed “bankruptcy in form,” for it is the companies that have, in fact, refused to pay their debts to banks.185 It is this issue that could, in turn, cause bank losses and them to face financial crises and to engage for instance in loaning without sufficient assets to back those loans.

Billions of dollars owned by Iran were released by China and the Sultanate of Oman soon after the nucleardealwassigned;however,theyhavenotyetreturnedtoIran,andtheirwhereaboutsareunknown.

Despite the robustness of Iran-Oman relations,there are still around 5 billion dollars owned by Iran that reached Oman after the signing of the nuclear deal but have not returned to Iran.This prompted Iranian members of the parliament to blame those responsible for demanding the return of the money. Now if this is the situation with a country that enjoys good diplomatic relations with Iran like the Sultanate of Oman, how does the situation fare with the rest of the countries in the world?

In the course of the first six months of this year,specifically in March,a court in Luxemburg delivered another blow to Iran’s bank sector when it ruled that 1.6 billion dollars in assets owned by the Iranian central bank currently in Luxemburg should be frozen after a court in the United States five years ago had also ruled that 2 billion dollars in Iranian assets should be frozen as a result of accusations leveled at Tehran that it was involved in the September 11 attacks of 2001 as a compensation to families of the deceased. Based on this, Luxemburg thus froze those Iranian assets and announced that they would remain frozen in Luxemburg until the legal procedures resulting in that money reaching the families of the deceased as a consequence of the September 11 attacks are completely reviewed. This greatly stirred public opinion in Iran and prompted the Iranian parliament to demand from Iranian president Rouhani to take all possible measures to return that money to the Iranian people. In fact, some Iranian banks raised the issue to the European Court of Justice, demanding that Iran is compensated for losses incurred once their bank accounts were frozen and sanctions had been imposed.The EU responded to some of those claims made by Iranian Export Bank and the PLC bank for exports.186 Most Iranian assets abroad still remain frozen after the signing of the nuclear deal, of which Iran has not managed to repossess,except very few partially because of procrastination on the part of some institutions and also because of restrictions aimed at Iran accessing international transfer means are still in place. This, in turn, has pushed Iran toward finding alternative solutions to this problem and to engage in transactions that fundamentally exchange its oil for what it needs from other countries as it has done, for instance, with Russia and could do with Ukraine.

»»Conclusion »»Customers of unlicensed Iranian financial institutions seek high rates of return as they make their deposits in these institutions that can reach up to 35% in some institutions like Caspian. »»There are around 3,500 financial institutions in Iran that operate in parallel to banks. Around 900 of them operate under official license from the government,while the rest operate without anysupervision from the central bank. Deposits in these institutions are said to total between 15 and 20% of effective liquidity available in the country.

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»»Many Iranian financial institutions went bankrupt recently like Caspian,Arman,Samin al-Hojaj,Jousar, and Samin al-Aimah. The government tried to keep this issue undisclosed so that the crisis would not spread to the rest of institutions, but the issue was revealed when these institutions were not capable of meeting their obligations to their customers. »»It is possible that more bankruptcy instances ensue if Iran’s government does not lay down stern measures to regulate these institutions and if they do not allow themselves to be supervised by the government.Also, if these institutions keep loaning under irresponsible assessments of the fruition of those loans, and financial corruption is not curbed, while the engagement by these institutions in risky investments is not decreased,customers would highlyrisk losing their deposits when these institutions find that their debts and losses are too many.

»»The Fourth Dimension How Is Iran Exploiting the Current Standoff between Gulf Countries and Qatar?

First: Economic Relations before the Boycott on Qatar Was Imposed Iran understands very well the potential there is in cultivating Qatar as a trade partner. This is because even though Qatar is not a very large country in terms of its population,it is a very high-income country, which depends fundamentally on fresh food product imports. Besides this, their geographical proximity is an important asset because it implies minimal transportation costs. There is, however, a type of proximity between the two countries, which is perhaps of greater importance than mere geographical proximity. This type of proximity translates into close political and even military ties between the two countries. This is the opposite to what exists currently between Iran and other Gulf countries of tensioned relations. The most important of these countries is Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while of non-Gulf countries, the most important of which is Egypt.

The boycott created a propensity for Iran to strengthen its trade relationship with and seek investments from its rich Qatari neighbor.In fact,Iran has been seeking for some time stronger economic relations with Qatar as well as the opportunity to engage in joint investment projects, of which the agreement in 2014 to establish a free trade zone in Iran’s Bushehr stands out.This city is just 148 miles from Qatar. Besides this, there is the project to set up a joint financial committee between the two countries as well as various other shared industrial investment ventures.

As a result of economic rapprochement between the two countries in the last few years, in 2015, trade volume between them doubled after the establishment of the mentioned free trade zone.In 2015, 108.5 million dollars were traded between them, whereas in 2014, 58 million dollars were traded.

There is no doubt, however, that the most benefiting partner in this relationship is Iran, who managed to export to Qatar in 2015 goods for a total worth of 104 million dollars (out of 108.5 million in total trade between them).

The success in Qatar-Iranian trade relations led to a proliferation of calls to make Qatar a center for Iranian exports,especially to other Gulf countries,during economic sanctions being imposed on Iran.187 Among those restricted Iranian products, many of them were fresh food products like vegetables, fruit, beef of different types, among others.

Second: Iranian-Qatar Relations after the Imposition of the Boycott on Qatar Three different Gulf countries plus Egypt cut economic as well as diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5 of the current year.These countries are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. Here, Iran found a golden opportunity to exploit the crisis and occupy the place that products from these nations would have on the Qatari market. This is the reason why Iranian president Hasan Rouhani promptly called Qatar’s emir to assure him that “Iran seeks to strengthen relations with its neighbors, especially Qatar when opportunities arise in which to foster political as well as economic cooperation between them.”

Qatar’s emir also assured Rouhani that his country’s relations with Qatar were “historic, deeply rooted,

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and precious.” He also said that he would promptly order any lingering obstacles to be removed that may hamper deepening Qatari-Iranian cooperation in the coming period.Without a doubt,there are no better circumstances than those obtaining at present for relations between Iran and Qatar to prosper.

Currently, Iran can easily portray itself as Qatar’s number 1 savior during the boycott currently being imposed on Qatar.For this reason,Iran quicklymoved to send more than 1,100 dailytons of food products to Qatar through its closest ports to Qatari shores at Bushehr.188 Iran’s airspace was also opened to Qatar, increasing activity on Iran’s airspace by 17%, with newly opened flights from Iran to and from Qatar,while also providing viable routes for Qatar Airways,avoiding airspace by nations imposing their boycott on Qatar. This was reported by Iran’s Tasneem News Agency.189 Third: The Future of Qatari-Iranian Relations during the Current Crisis There is no doubt that Iran would pursue any possible path to ameliorate Qatar’s situation during this crisis. In other words, Iran would seek by any means possible to occupy as larger a share as it can of the Qatari market for its products.The opportunity, in fact, is wide open for Iran to practically transform Qatar into a most dependable client, which cannot find easily an alternative to cheap Iranian products even when the crisis eventually subsides. We see also that Iranian foreign policy in regard to Qatar seeks to increasingly deepen cooperation.It is worth remembering that usually,economic cooperation frequently leads to political and even military and security cooperation between countries.

From another angle, Iran has a particular strategic goal from which it is not willing to serve in its pursuance thereof. This goal is the joint exploitation of its shared gas fields with Qatar of South Pars.

These areas possess some of the greatest gas reserves in the world, of which around a third of them lies under Iranian sovereignty. Nonetheless, Qatari exploitation of these resources far supersedes that of Iran and has done so for a number of decades. This is because Qatar possesses comfortably the technology needed to exploit these resources and to export them as well as hosting the investment climate necessary to have brought to itself the foreign investment needed to have placed Qatar as the most prominent liquid gas producer in the world.

Iran also seeks to export gas in competition to Qatar, especially because Iran possesses around 18% of world gas reserves. Nonetheless, several questions need to be answered in regard to that.

Can Iran match in any regard Qatar’s gas production and exportation? Is it possible for Qatar to offer Iran specific assistance in this vital regard to strengthening relations between them? To be able to answer the first question,it is important to recognize certain facts.Iran has a population of around 80 million people. It is also a country that consumes large quantities of natural gas, either for a private citizen or industrial consumption. 50% of Iran’s production is used domestically for heat during the winter, 21% is used in electricity production, and 18% is used in industrial as well as the production of petrochemicals. Iran consumed in 2016 approximately 200.8 billion square meters of gas out of 202.4 billion produced in the same year.190 This means that it consumed domestically 99.2% of its total production of gas for that year.

The rate of Iran’s growth in gas production seems to correspond totally with the increasing rate of consumption because of the increase in population.Therefore, before Iran is capable of exporting gas, it should be able to satisfy completely its domestic gas consumption needs.

Once it reaches this point, however, Iran seems to be completely determined to compete in gas exportation. In fact, Iran has in previous years signed agreements of exportation to other countries, of which the most prominent is Turkey. However, Iranian gas exports to Turkey are minimal and even sometimes cut completely, even smaller than what is stipulated in the agreements between Turkey and Iran, which explains why Turkey sued Iran’s national oil company before international courts on the matter. Iran has also signed agreements for joint production and exportation with other countries; however, this has not been realized yet.

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In regard to Iran being able to join production with Qatar on the South Pars fields, at this point, Iran will not be able to join production with Qatar on a short-term basis because of the existence of certain obstacles in the financing of the project on the part of Iran, the absence of acquisition of the necessary technology to be able to do it on their part, as well as the presence of anxiety on the part of international investors in regard to the political tensions that surface every now and then with the United States and the West in general in regard to Iran’s development of ballistic weapons. Besides this, the possibility of the collapse of the nuclear deal under those tensions and what that might imply in regard to sanctions on energy companies investing in Iran’s oil or gas fields is also a consideration that is taken very seriously.

Based on this,we observe that various international companies announced their interest in investing in the development of Iran’s gas fields but have not yet begun anything serious practically in that regard.

Meanwhile, however, other international companies have pulled out of that venture completely, while yet others seem to be closely following developments regarding from a distance. Chinese companies, for instance, had been contracted to develop the South Pars fields years ago and did not move in that regard one step because of apprehension regarding sanctions until Iran canceled the agreement in 2014.

In regard to the other set of questions,those touching specifically with Qatar,we firmly believe that it is not possible for the Qatar-Iran rapprochement to lead Qatar to sacrifice as much for Iran to make Iran eventually able to surpass Qatar in terms of gas production, consequently losing its privileged position as today’s most prominent gas producer in the world market. However, it is possible, though, that Iran can take as much advantage as possible of the provision it is facilitating Qatar with of essential food products in exchange for Qatari support in technology and funds to be able to develop those gas fields.

In fact, Reuters reported that Qatari officials had declared that “after the signature of the nuclear deal

by Iran, the door is now open for us to be able to help the Iranians in their exploitation of the South Pars gas reserves. The plan is to help them with technology, exploration and other particularities in regard to the geology of the region.”191 If Qatar were to indeed extend cooperation to the Iranians, it would not be to an extent detrimental to Qatar’s own interests and benefits.

We thereby conclude that Iran will continue to provide Qatar with as much as it can in the way of food products and raw materials, hoping to benefit as much as it can from the Qataris, especially under the circumstances of the boycott on Qatar.

»»Conclusion »»After the Gulf and Egypt severed ties with Qatar, Iran still seeks increased investment and trade with its neighbor Qatar. This economic cooperation will further political, security and military rapprochement as the boycott continues. »»Enhancing Iranian–Qatari relations is convenient, as these relations are based on trade agreements closed before the boycott. »»The mutual trade balance between Qatar and Iran encouraged Iran to make Qatar a base to export Iranian products to the GCC countries. »»Iran seems like the key supporter for Qatar after the boycott, as it provided goods and raw materials daily through ports in Bushehr. Iran also opened its airspace for 100 Qatari air trips per day. »»Iran is trying to exploit the Gulf crisis and gain a more permanent trade share in the Qatari market. »»Iran aims to address exploration in the South Pars gas field it owns jointly with Qatar, but Iran lacks financial and technical resources and faces high domestic gas consumption. »»Iran hopes to earn Qatar’s support in terms of gas exploration and financial aid. Qatar may provide the support required, but it will not do so at the cost of its share of the global gas market. »»The Gulf states and Egypt may keep the door open for Qatar to restore its trade relations to save Qatar from the Iranian desire for dominance and for achieving rapprochement with Qatar at the expense of Qatar’s relations with its Arab neighbors who share the same culture, language, fate, and geography

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A

report presented by Internal Affairs Minister Rahmani Fazli in 2016 to the Iranian Parliament clarified the considerable social problems that threaten to topple the Iranian regime. Internal problems include drug addiction, the high divorce rate, and the prevalence of slums and depravity.

SOCIAL AFFAIRS According to official sources, 15 million Iranians live in slums, with 30% suffering hunger and 150,000 children affected by malnutrition. In addition, the country is home to an estimated 1.35 million drug addicts, and the divorce rate reached 36% in 2016. Generally, the social problems developed over time due to domestic political, economic, and social instability inside the state; thus, Iranian optimism about the ability of the nuclear deal to reform the social situation was exaggerated, despite the potential economic improvements the deal would yield. In the first half of 2017, the media widely reported the high rates of crime, unemployment, drug addiction, and violation of social rights.

According to the Internal Affairs Ministry in Iran, 3.5 million Iranians are unemployed. However, some reports indicate that this is a low estimate, depending on how unemployment is defined.

For example, the Ahmadinejad government considered the two-hour workday full employment.

The unemployment rate reached 60% in some areas, with 11 million people living in marginalized and disadvantaged areas. In addition, 600,000 Iranians are serving prison sentences each year. These issues made Khamenei call on the government to find radical solutions to these (according to the Iranian press) catastrophic social indicators.192

» The effects of breaking social norms on Iranian society Breaching the social norms governed by the religious and doctrinal ideology adopted by the jurist leadership, or “Wilayat al-Faqih,” and official Iranian discourse, which set the standards that

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rule people’s lives and clarify their goals, was seldom a problem in Iranian society. Nevertheless, a plague of immorality has hit society, causing people to lose their way, and leading to social chaos characterized by high crime and suicide rates.193 Iranian society faces many tensions and challenges due to the psychological pressure that results from accepting responsibility for the conflict between the Iranian regime and global powers. In addition, the jurist leadership is imposing a revolutionary ideology that exceeds the Iranian people’s ability to bear revolutionary intensification and which is inconsistent with Iranians’ desire to live normal lives far removed from ideological and political conflicts.

Moreover, numerous gaps exist in Iranian society, between generations, between the people and the government, and between the lofty expectations of Iran and its limited capabilities. The thought of globalization dominated all layers of Iranian society, leading to a rejection of “Islamic” culture. Aspects of traditional culture no longer have any legitimacy, so people will continue to breach social norms and the state of instability will persist.

High suicide, crime, drug addiction, and divorce rates are all manifestations of breaches of social norms, and successive Iranian governments played a key role in shaping these behaviors.

These social problems indicate a significant disorder in Iranian society, and they can be monitored by examining the health sector, the environmental sector, and addiction and drug abuse.

»»Health Sector Rouhani’s first government was proud of its main health sector achievement—implementing the Safety Insurance project for therapeutic and medical services—and considered it the starting point for an efficient social welfare system. Despite this, Iranian Health Minister Hassan Hashemi stated that “there is no way but to privatize [the] health sector in Iran… and [the health sector] must be defined economically.” This indicates that the government is unable to invest in this sector, let alone address the deteriorating conditions in existing hospitals, which will definitely raise the costs of medical services after privatization.194 It seems that Iran suffers serious problems in the health sector, as 40,000 of the available 80,000 doctors work outside of their profession, a phenomenon that has caused a staff shortage in this sector. Eighty thousand doctors will meet the public demand, and the Iranian government spent millions of dollars to train these doctors. However, these training expenditures were made in vain.195 Furthermore, from 2015 to 2016, medical errors in Iran increased by 9.7%.196 These cases were referred to the Verbal Punishment Institution, and they include investigations of about 5,600 additional cases of medical violations, including the cases of medical error and mass deaths ascribed to Abbas Kiarostumi, director of Sina Hospital in the city of Karoun in Ahwaz.197 In addition, the age at which heart disease begins to appear shifted from 40 to the 30 to 35 age range,198 and 22,000 children die from preventable causes in Iran each year.199 Medical problems can be monitored by reviewing information on cancer, AIDS, depression and mental illness, and suicide in Iran.

1. Cancer According to the World Health Organization (WHO), it is expected that cancer diagnoses will reach 24 million by 2035. Iranians constitute a significant share of this statistic, with official Iranian health reports indicating that cancer diagnoses increased six fold in the 20 years from 1979 to 2009, with almost 90,000 people diagnosed annually and with 35,000 deaths. Subsequently, the health ministry reported that around half a million people have been diagnosed with cancer, and the ministry staff who participated in the 2016 Cancer Conference expect this number to double in the next 20 years. Furthermore, ISNA news agency reported that

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cancer is the third leading cause of death in Iran after cardiac arrest and traffic accidents. For specialists, cancer ranks second after cardiac arrest, as traffic accidents can be controlled.

Despite technological advancements that allow early and accurate diagnosis of cancer, medical experts believe cancer cases are underreported. Ali Yaqoubi Joiabari, a member of the scientific committee at Medical Behshti University, said that some people who have cancer, such as residents of remote villages, die without the disease ever being identified. Thus, the official statistics are inaccurate, as data collection centers do not have access to all the relevant information.

Hashemi, the Iranian Health Minister, stated that 100,000 people are diagnosed with cancer each year in Iran, which costs the country about 10 billion toman. Hashemi also pointed out that the most common types of cancer are bladder, skin, stomach, and breast cancer. The minister added that the most prominent causes of cancer and other diseases in Iran is air pollution.200 Nevertheless, the same factors cause cancer in Iran as in the rest of the world, including pollution, smoking, lifestyle-related stress, and economic factors.201 Iranian officials allocate $2.6 billion annually for cancer treatment, and although all Iranians are covered by health insurance, this coverage varies from place to place. Between 5% to 20% of those with advanced stomach cancer can survive the disease and continue treatment for five years, but this drops to 0% in remote villages, and mortality rates are high. Thus, treatment methods vary from place to place. This raises questions about why the disease cannot be controlled consistently. The Iranian government has difficulty providing health insurance and to appropriate funding for sophisticated treatment methods, although the country keeps abreast of global treatment methods and imports medicines and equipment for cancer treatment. Iran ranks fourth globally in terms of the spread of cancer, with the disease being the third most common cause of death, with over 400,000 people infected, and with 90,000 new cases emerging annually.

2. AIDS The first official announcement of an AIDS case in Iran dates back to 1986, and casualties began to increase significantly after 1991. Despite the global downward trend in infection rates— from 38,000 in 2009 to 35,000 in 2013—the annual infection rate in Iran increased, reaching 10%

by DATE. The causes of this disease vary. Drug use is the most significant cause, followed by unsafe sexual practices. Official statistics from the Ministry of Health indicated that 30,000 people are infected with AIDS in Iran, with 15% of them being women, but this number is thought to be one-third of the actual number.202 In addition, physical and cultural poverty plays a leading role in spreading infectious diseases and in developing non-communicable diseases such as mental illness. According to official statistics, 25% of the total population in Iran lives in poverty.203 The spread of AIDS is considered the greatest threat to health in Iran after addiction.

Therefore, several institutions in cooperation with medical universities deployed medically equipped buses in Tehran’s streets to provide AIDS tests to determine the actual infection rate in light of the limitations of government statistics.204 Moreover, the spokesperson of the Department of Drug Control, Parviz Afshar, has expressed concerns about a third wave of AIDS infections due to increased drug abuse. He stressed that drug abuse has a negative economic and family impact on addicts. Afshar added that addiction rates have doubled worldwide, and the United Nations reported last year that 470 types of drugs available globally have negative psychological and physical effects.205 The head of the International Conference on Immunodeficiency Diseases (AIDS), Asghar Agha Mohammadi, said that European statistics have indicated that one of five people has HIV. These numbers may be higher in Iran due to the prevalence of marriages between relatives.

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Mohammadi added that, unfortunately, they do not have accurate statistics on the number of people infected with HIV and HIV resistance related to genetic mutations, polymorphism, and genetic diversity. He further stressed that these 300 species of the disease have a higher likelihood of spreading in Iran, where marriages between relatives reached 47%.206

Government plans to address the AIDS pandemic The Iranian government has announced that it has budgeted for HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention programs with the aim of curbing infection rates. The head of the HIV/AIDS control department at the Social Welfare Foundation in Tehran, Qambiz Mohzari, stressed that historically the most significant cause of HIV infections was sharing needles during intravenous drug use, with infections from unsafe sexual practices due to ignorance increasing recently. Mohzari added that new Ministry of Health statistics consistently indicate a decline in infection rates from drug abuse, while the infection rate increased from unsafe sexual practices, with a significant rise in infection rates in children, which exceeded the common rate of 1%. Therefore, the government initiative will focus on educating people about these two common causes of infection.

Iranian academic and sociologist Hussein Bahir described AIDS as more dangerous than a nuclear bomb because it spreads in places such as prisons and street children and addicts, making the treatment process difficult and accelerating the proliferation of the disease due to lack of hope in these sectors of society. Bahir advocated transforming AIDS from a social scandal into a purely medical issue and implementing strict laws that would make HIV testing mandatory for marriage or for obtaining a tourist visa for Iran, especially for visitors from countries with high HIV infection rates. He added that it is important to strengthen awareness campaigns with strict laws to win the fight against AIDS.207 A. Depression and mental illness According to the WHO, Iran ranks second in the world for depression and psychological diseases. Depression is the most common global cause of disability related to mental illness, with more than 300 million people suffering from the condition. Diagnoses of depression have risen by more than 18% since 2005, but the lack of mental health treatment options and a common fear of stigma related to depression prevents many people from receiving the treatment they need.

Depression is a common psychological symptom, and it involves a feeling of constant sadness and a loss of interest in and lack of ability to engage in daily activities and work. Worldwide, 322 million people suffer from depression. Depression also increases the risk of many serious diseases and disorders, including addiction, suicidal behavior, heart disease, and diabetes, which are considered the most common causes of death in the world.

The WHO is concerned about countries that have little or no support for psychiatric patients, and half of people with depression are receiving treatment only in rich countries.208 Iran ranks second in the world in terms of depression rate,209 and one person in four in Iran suffers from depression.210 Some reports from Iran show a worsening health situation, with 30% of women and 19% of men suffering from psychological illnesses.211 Other statistics indicate that 23.6% of 15- to 26-year-olds suffer from psychiatric disorders that have led to drug abuse.212 In contrast, the Iranian minister of health, Hashemi, noted that Iranian hospitals lack the ability to accommodate psychiatric patients, with an estimated deficit of 40,000 beds. Mental health facilities in Iran, some of which date back a century and require updating, can handle only 8,000 patients. Hashemi added that around 450 million patients suffer from neurological and psychological disorders worldwide and that Iran accounts for 23% of this figure, further highlighting the lack of beds.213 The general director of mental health at the Iranian Ministry of Health revealed that the rate of depression reached 12.7% among the elderly, 16.5% among women, and 10.7% among men 214.

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Iran remain elusive. Farhad Taramian, a specialist in clinical psychology and a member of the Psychology Society, supported this view, but indicated that some statistics from specialists in this field show a prevalence of 1% of psychological disorders and more than 800,000 Iranians suffering from these disorders.215 A senior health ministry official said that more than 6 million Iranians are suffering from depression. The official added that depression is the most prevalent mental illness in the country, with half of people who suffer from mental illness having depression.

B. Suicide The high rates of depression and accompanying mental illnesses in various difficult social conditions have led to the disintegration of the Iranian social fabric, and the rate of suicide has increased markedly. Although the suicide rate in Iran is considered average among the countries of the world, recent statistics indicate that this rate is increasing. Moreover, children are committing suicide, with a 10-year-old boy recently committing suicide in Sanandaj city and a 13-year-old teenager committing suicide in Tehran. The latter received a great deal of media coverage, and it highlighted that social pressures contributed to the increasing suicide rate.

The head of the forensic medicine authority in Iran noted that the country’s suicide rate is lower than in European countries, and it ranks third among Islamic countries. He added that according to statistics, there are 13 suicides in Iran every day, with more cases being reported in the 15–35 year age group. According to the WHO, Iran ranks 108th in terms of the number of suicides worldwide. In 2014 and 2015, 4,020 and 4,049 suicides were recorded in Iran, while 2016 was the worst in terms of social damage in general and suicides in particular among adolescents.

The head of Iran’s forensic medicine authority indicated that 52% of suicides occurred by hanging, 17% by poisoning, 7% by overdosing, 6% by (non-firearm) weapons, 5.6% by burning, and 4% by jumping from high places. He further confirmed that 25% of people who committed suicide were between 30 and 39 years of age, 9.21% were between the ages of 12 and 24, and 5.7% were adolescents under the age of 18.216 Hashmi said during his World Health Day statement that suicide rates in Iran had decreased over the past five years. He added that the region of Ilam, southern and northern Khorasan, Azerbaijan, and Zanjan had recorded high suicide rates and stressed that the suicides rates for women are higher than for men.217

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»»Environmental Sector Air pollution, with its attendant health risks, is the most significant environmental problem in Iran. A scientific study revealed that the number of people who die from air pollution exceeds the number of those who die from AIDS, and that more than 3 million people die from complications related to pollution, a number that will double by 2050 if no preventive action is taken to address this crisis. Three main factors influence air quality in Iran, namely, “natural” air pollution, thermal reflection, and the topography.

“Natural” air pollution results from overcrowding, population density, and dust and vapors in arid areas. This kind of contamination causes the deaths of 81% of Iranians who die from complications related to air pollution. According to the Guardian Daily, the vapors emitted by about 5 million cars cause 80% of the air pollution in Tehran, and the number of cars is increasing, as 60% of Iranians use their own cars and only 40% use public transportation. Moreover, thermal reflection disrupts air currents, worsening the effects of air pollution. Thermal reflection refers to a sudden change in the temperature gradient of the atmosphere, creating a layer of hot air that is in direct contact with a layer of cold air close to the ground, thus disrupting the movement of air.

In addition, Iran lies between natural mountain ranges, which reduces the rate of rainfall and the movement of wind for long periods, consequently preventing the movement of polluted atoms in the air and keeping the gases from car exhausts and factories trapped in the atmosphere of Tehran.

These factors combined lead to high air pollution levels, as measured using the Air Quality Index (AQI). The WHO believes fresh air ranges from 0 to 50 (green zone), but levels are slightly higher than this in the Iranian capital, especially in winter, and can become very high, resulting in hazardous air quality, especially for children, the elderly, and people with heart and lung disease.

By December 27, 2016, the value reached 137 (the orange zone, which ranges from 101 to 150), and sometimes air pollution reaches 238, for example, on New Year’s Eve, reaching the purple zone of between 201 and 300 on the AQI scale.218 It has been reported that the high levels of air pollution contribute to an increase in the number of deaths in Tehran. Iran leads the world in this regard, with 80% of deaths related to pollution caused by exhaust fumes.219 Moreover, pollution has economic consequences and causes human damage, with Iran’s annual loss due to pollution estimated to be $30 billion.220 Pollution affects nearly 38 million people in Iran, where one-third of the Iranian population lives in only eight major cities, all of which suffer significant air pollution. Pollution also has reached the point that the government has been forced to close institutions and schools on many occasions.221 Pollution thus results in points of tension between the various political forces, specifically on the most effective means of addressing pollution, and rationalizing the use of energy and mechanisms of green energy.222 Furthermore, the urban population of Iran faces an environmental crisis of water scarcity.

The capacity of the country’s water sources is not commensurate with the number of its inhabitants, especially the millions of people living in unplanned informal housing. This led to the government establishing a wastewater distillation project, which is currently undergoing testing in Tehran, a city that expands rapidly, to produce distilled water that is safe for consumption.223 Generally, the latest statistics indicate a rise in the rates of disease in Iran, which can be ascribed largely to increased air pollution, water scarcity, and other environmental problems. The Ministry of Health further reported that 40% of Iranians have high blood cholesterol, 25% have diabetes, and 35% are at risk of heart disease and stroke.224 Moreover, cases of poisoning caused by the contamination of air, food, water, and medicine are common. For example, 40 students from Marvah Tabeh village were taken to hospital after being poisoned, displaying symptoms such as headaches and vomiting. The students responded well to treatment, although the supervising

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doctor, Rajab Khasravi, added that they were still investigating whether the students were poisoned by food or gas. Similarly, the Iranian media revealed the poisoning of five people from al-Salihiya town, or the so-called Andimshk city of the province of Ahwaz, who were hospitalized.

The poisoning resulted from drinking contaminated water from a farm in the province of Ahwaz, and despite demands to investigate the cause of the contamination, the cause remains unknown.225

»»Addiction and Drug Abuse Iran has been associated with the large drug production areas in Afghanistan and Central Asia, and drugs are cultivated within its territory, making it one of the most important drug crossings in the world. The exact figures related to the number of drug users and addicts in Iran vary, and the Iranian government does not have accurate statistics regarding drug use. In fact, the statistics prepared by official bodies are often contradictory; for example, 2005 statistics indicated that the number of addicts in Iran was about 4.5 million, while the statistics for 2007 and 2011 indicated that there were 1.5 million addicts.226 Yet it is consistently reported that younger people use drugs.227 Drug and alcohol consumption and addiction cause hundreds of deaths per year in Iran.

A survey conducted by the Iranian Department of Drug Control revealed that the number of drug abusers in the country has more than doubled over the past six years, with the number of drug addicts in Iran reaching 2.8 million, compared to 1.3 million in 2010. Afshar of the Department of Drug Control noted in a statement to the French Press Agency that 66.8% of addicts use opium, 11.9% marijuana, and 8.1% methamphetamine. Moreover, according to the head of Iran’s Institute of Psychiatry, the number of addicts has tripled in the past decade, and this rate is considered the worst ever.228 Interestingly, the rate of female drug addicts has increased from 2% to 6.9% of the total population.

The substantial increase in addict numbers may be explained, according to the Iranian media, by the significant increase in opium production in Afghanistan, and the prevalence of smuggling and the low drug prices in the Iranian markets. Afshar also said that during the first three months of the Iranian year, which begins on March 21, security forces seized 200 tons of drugs.229 ISNA news agency reported Afshar’s comment that opium is still the most prevalent, while the use of methamphetamine (psychotropic drugs) has dropped significantly. However, Saeed Saftian warned, in a report produced by the Board of Expediency of the regime in Iran, that the total number of drug users may actually be higher. Iran ascribes its high levels of addiction to its neighboring countries that produce substantial amounts of heroin and opium, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Opium production has increased dramatically in Afghanistan since US military intervention in 2001 to topple the Taliban regime. Thus, Iran’s location neighboring Afghanistan is a major contributor to the increase in drug abuse, as the country lies on the main trafficking route to Western Europe. Nevertheless, drugs are being produced at home, as many marijuana fields and drug laboratories have been discovered.230 Iran receives international aid from the United Nations and a number of European countries to support its anti-drug efforts, although funding has shrunk since 2011 due to the increase in

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executions in the country, which reached 1,000 in 2011. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that Iran has the highest prevalence of heroin and opium abuse in the world, with 1.2 million abusers.231 Iran’s Department of Drug Control works hard to curb drug trafficking into Iranian territory. According to the latest reports, 75% of the opium, 61% of the morphine, and 17% of the heroin passing through Iran to world markets have been confiscated.232 This indicates that smugglers tend to produce drugs domestically, and many official sources have reported that marijuana is grown indoors in Iran, complicating detection.

Perhaps the most prominent event in terms of the drugs issue in Iran is the study currently being prepared by the Judicial Affairs Committee of Parliament to remove the death penalty for drug crimes. The number of drug-related executions in Iran has increased to an unprecedented level because of the growing number of drug traffickers. According to the latest statistics, the minister of interior affairs stated that over three years, 992,000 people were arrested for and involved in drug crimes.233 This necessitated the intervention of international human rights organizations to stop executions, although interventions have not been successful. Perhaps the Parliamentary study will produce results that improve the image of Iran in the West in terms of human rights. However, if the laws related to capital punishment remain unchanged, we will witness a rise in executions for drug crimes, which contribute to half the executions in the country, over the upcoming months and years in Iran.

Finally, Afshar pointed out that means of drug abuse had changed in the last two years in Iran, after drug addicts switched to marijuana and its compounds. The high prices of methamphetamine have led to a decline in its popularity, and Afshar warned about using this substance and called for additional study to identify the risks of its use and its impact on the human mind.234 The Iranian authorities were upset with rate of women’s addiction significantly since 2013 until now. The Assistant of the Iranian President for Women Affairs, Sheindakht Mulavardi said that the rate of women’s addiction was declining from 2007 to 2012, but then increased since 2013 to reach 9% out of the total number of addicts in Iran. Adding that this increase poses a great threat to Iranian society and the rate of married women has decreased by 10.5%.235 The Iranian government tried to find solutions for this problem by opening shelters for addicted women. The Executive Director of the Social Services Authority in Tehran said that a new center will be opened for women addicts in Iran. He added that this center is not affiliated with the secretariat of Tehran, but is part of the Department of Drug Control, while the Secretariat is responsible about establishing such centers and secure their places. He also revealed that this center accommodates in the first phase about 80 women.236 In an interview, the head of social welfare Anoushirvan Mohseni said that five centers had been set up to combat women’s addiction due to large numbers of women addicted in several regions. Moreover, according to studies and statistics recorded during this year, there are more than 150 addicts under the 17 age, where more than 70% of parents of these teenagers addicted, these centers also includes sections for custody children of women addicted.237 The Government has tried to combat addiction and drugs in general for both genders and has focused more on women. Iran’s deputy head of Department of Drug Control, Ali Muayadi, said that there is a campaign to bring in addicts displaced from the Iranian capital streets and 70% had already been collected, leaving only a few. He also called on citizens to report any homeless addicts in the streets of the Iranian capital. He mentioned that 40 thousand addicts held in care centers during the past year. Moreover, in the past two years, security forces have made significant efforts to clean up the streets of the Iranian capital from homeless addicts, resulting in fewer numbers of them.238 On the other hand, security forces gave priority to drying up smuggling and increase monitoring on border. The commander of the security forces in Sistan and Baluchistan provinces

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revealed that the security forces managed to thwart the smuggling of 2.5 tons of narcotics into Iran during two separate operations, where two cars have been detected loaded with huge amounts of drugs and being ambushed. This operation resulted the killing of the smuggling two leaders, two other people were killed from this international gang, the arrest of two others, and 1000 cloves of opium have been seized. “The security forces in Khash and Zahedan also succeeded in ousting the drug smugglers, who were carrying their charge on four cars. The charge weighed 1000 kilos of opium and 617 kilograms of hashish,” said Major General Hussein Rahimi.239

»»Iranian female addicts sell their children Deputy head of Iran’s top anti-drug body Ali Moayidi asserted that women on drugs in the country engage in sale and purchase transactions for their own children. Trafficking in children has caused much controversy across the society over the past two years. This issue embarrassed the public opinion. It was first raised by a member of Tehran domestic council. Then reactions came from police officials and sociology experts. Despite the efforts exerted to eradicate this phenomenon in part, there are no measures aimed at wiping it out. The sale and purchase of newborns still exist in part. But reports speak of a mob controlling these fishy transactions.

Two years ago, the head of the social committee in the municipal council, Fatima Daneshur, announced newborns’ transactions are being carried out next to some hospitals south of Tehran.

This problem existed before the announcement, but until then no one had exposed it. Raising this issue in the media sounded the alarm for officials who were in complete heedlessness.

According to Fatima Daneshur, reports indicate that displaced women and prostitutes visit some hospitals in south and central Tehran during childbirth. After giving birth, the baby is sold at 100 to 200 thousand tomans, which is between $ 25 and $ 50 per child. The tragedy does not end there since some of those children are infected with HIV, which exacerbates the problem.240 She noted that these newborns and those born to addicted mothers and displaced women are bought by gangs and beggars because of the many diseases they are contracting and lack of proper care for these children. So they do succumb to their diseases.

The sale of newborns in Iran is currently a lucrative business, as the pockets of beneficiaries of this business are filled with money. It was necessary to find solutions, especially since the number of addicted women was increasing and that the issue had many consequences, including the birth of addicted children and the subsequent trade of newborns.241

»»Addiction’s death toll Drugs and addiction are the most common cause of death in Iran. Iran’s forensic body has reported statistics on the number of deaths caused by drugs, with 3190 deaths due to drug abuse in Iran over the past year.

The report also said the deaths were caused by an overdose of drugs or by far-reaching symptoms caused by drugs. These tallies upped from the previous year with 2847 deaths posted in 2015. Statistics show that 112 tons of opium have been produced in Afghanistan over the past 30 years and have been smuggled into Iran, and only 10% have been seized, indicating that there is a flaw in the efforts aimed to control drug running there. As for the clashes with the smugglers, figures indicate that there were 30,000 armed clashes between the security forces and the smugglers. During the clashes, 4,000 security personnel died and 15000 others were injured.

Unofficial tallies indicate that more than 1,500 tons of drugs are smuggled into Iran.242 A total of 2,361 people died due to drug abuse in Iran. This figure increased compared to the same period last year. This increase is estimated at 3.8%. Tehran ranked first when it comes to 569 deaths of drug abuse. Fars province comes second, ahead of the province of Khorasan Razavi.243

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It is normal that deaths caused by addiction, and the number of addicted children and adolescents see an unprecedented surge. Chief of the judiciary in Erdebil “Mohammed Ali Qasdi said alcohol abuse is cutting across youth aged 18. He said criminals smuggle up to 60 to 80 million liters of liquor per year into Iran. He pointed out that in 2016, 27 thousand bottles of wine were seized. The reasons behind the rising demand for drugs among adolescents include the overlapping and complicated social factors running deep within the Iranian society,244 but the cheap price of drugs is also one of the drives. The official expressed concern about the increasing abuse of alcohol in the province, especially among adolescents. A domestic councilor in Iran said:”The price of drugs in this region - and in many areas - is cheaper than the price of milk, and the night robberies are commonplace.”245 One of the proofs that the government’s measures to fight addiction are not based on scientific grounds and methods is that 95 percent of the addicts suffer a relapse after they recover.

“Only 5% to 10% of addicts do not get back to drugs after recovering, while about 95% of them continue to be drug addicts even after receiving treatment,” said Mohammad Hadi Izzi, an assistant to Iran’s health minister. He added that the problem is not in the lack of treatment centers, but the lack of social support for them after they abandon of addiction, noting that these addicts cannot return to their normal lives after they ditch drugs.246

» Poverty and unemployment Poverty and unemployment are major problems weighing heavily on the Iranian society, which causes a series of other crises. An Iranian lawmaker described the economic situation in the country as “very worrying” and said “we are going through the worst economic downturn we have seen in the past years” and called on the authorities to intervene quickly to end the crisis in the country. “The unemployment rate among young people aged 20 to 24 is very high, while these are the new potentials in the labor market, and ignoring them is a waste of one of the country’s greatest resources,” the lawmaker said, as she spoke to Tasnim News Agency. According to MP Chenarani, the spread of unemployment will lead to an increase in the number of unmarried

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people in the country and will result in other social problems. “Rouhani’s government has not done anything to the different social strata in its quest to overcome this economic downturn in Iran,” political science professor Sadiq Ziba wrote. He added Rouhani team was unable to reduce the unemployment rate. “It is clear that the presidential election will be the most important event in 2017. Therefore, Hassan Rouhani will be obliged to focus part of his campaign on the economy issue because this issue will be the most important thing that will be put forward for debate,” Zibakalam said in his article published in the Persian-language newspaper of Arman. This issue is described Tehran University’s professor Gholam Read Zarifian as the biggest disaster.247 The number of unemployed or jobseekers is increasing by one person every 14 minutes, according to Ali Rabei, Iran’s current labor minister. This means that the number of unemployed people in Iran is increasing by 20,000 each day, a total of 605,000 every month. According to figures released by the Iranian Statistics Agency in March 2017, the Hassan Rouhani government managed to provide 600,000 jobs last year. The same tallies show a rate of unemployment in Iran in 2016 for young people aged between 15-24 years to rose 29.2%. Ameed Ali Barsa, head of the Iranian Statistics Center revealed that more than half of the active population in Iran were unemployed in the period between 2011 and 2016. “The unemployment rate in 2016 increased by 1.4% compared to 2015 to reach 12.4% and the number of unemployed exceeded 3.2 million.”Bloomberg said:” Although Iran’s inflation rate may rise, the Rouhani government has said it has managed to reduce inflation to below 10 percent for the first time in a quarter of a century.” According to the government’s announcement, the rate of inflation was 9%, while it reached 35% early in 2013, but experts believe that the decline in inflation was temporary and will rise next year. A poll conducted by the economic paper of Doniai Iqtisad where 66 experts participated showed that inflation will rise to reach 12 percent. On its part, top labor committee said that the average monthly salary of workers is equivalent to 251 US dollars, while experts believe that each family whose income is less than 730 dollars live below the poverty line. Parvez Fattah, head of the Khomeini Foundation for Relief, said that more than 11 million Iranians live below the poverty line. According to Tasnim news agency, the Central Bank of Iran announced that the prices of 10 basic food commodities in Iran rose by 5 to 31% last year.248 The toll of poverty and unemployment can be seen in most of the social aspects in Iran. There are 11 million unemployed in the country, according to the official estimates released by the Statistics Center of Iran. Also, Tehran is ranked low in terms of unemployment rates worldwide. In 2016, it was ranked 22nd as it occupied the 25th place a year before.249 According to tallies released by the agency, Iran’s unemployment rates hit 12.8 in 2016. Tehran was not even able to stay at the rates it hit before those three years, as unemployment rates then stood at 10.4 percent. Such soaring unemployment rates indicate Rouhani government did not succeed in curbing the crisis.

And instead of solving the problem, the government started to cook the books, playing down the enormity of the disaster, whose toll is taking on every single household in Iran ahead of the presidential elections. The government’s policies seem to have only increased unemployment by 1.4% over the same period last year.250 But some officials in the Iranian parliament rejected these statistics because they differ greatly from the real rates. Unemployment rates reached 70 and 80% in some cities.251 Over one million graduates enter the job market annually. About 150,000 youth find no opportunity at home, so they prefer leaving Iran in search of a better life.252 The Governor of Hormuzgan Jassim Jadri estimated that the unemployment rate will reach about 6% and the per capita production rate will increase. And inflation will go down noticeably. According to the Iranians, unemployment is a major cause of many other negative social phenomena, including the poverty that is currently running through the Iranian society. Poverty has led to an increase in the rates of the internal migration to the capital Tehran. The main reason for migration is job seeking, which included young people in their 20s and 30s.253

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In February, a senior official within the Iranian Ministry of Labor said that the rate of unemployed graduates has reached 18%. Alaeddin Azouji added that these unemployed are university graduates only. He noted that jobs are provided annually to about 700,000 graduates who graduated from Iranian scientific institutes and universities, while 200,000 are left unemployed.254 As to women, the unemployment rate has risen more than that of men, the president’s assistant for women’s affairs said the unemployment rate for women in 2016 was the highest in 20 years. Statistics released in 2016 show that the number of girls in Iran has reached 10 million, or 27% of the country’s total population. In 2012, the percentage of unemployed girls was 60% in many regions such as Kermanshah, Ahwaz and Laurstan.255 However, the government has raised hopes for jobs after the lifting of economic sanctions, the governor of Caspian said:”we were able to provide about 15,000 jobs and retitle more than 4,000 employees after the signing of the nuclear agreement. The International Labor Organization (ILO) in Iran predicted that unemployment rates in Iran in 2017 would range from 13 to 17 percent and that unemployment rates in the world would be at 5.8 percent. According to statistics released by the Iranian Statistics Center, unemployment rates in Iran have increased by 8.1% over the past year. The head of the body on administration and planning in the city of Tehran, Nematollah Turki, said that population in the city of Tehran has grown by 1.4%. Statistics indicate that the number of workers in the city of Tehran has reached 4.4 million workers out of 7 million people of working age. “Last year 175,000 people were employed in the region and this is a good figure,” said Nematollah Turki.256 There are several manifestations for poverty in Iran such as:

»»Shantytowns This phenomenon is on the rise in Tehran, and it is bringing about concomitant negative phenomena to the Iranian society, including the informal housing. Slums have become rampant in Iran recently. The reports issued by the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development show 30% of urban dwellers live in unsafe squatter houses (19 million people).257 Although this phenomenon is not new to Iranian society, it is increasing and deepening day by day. “This means that nearly a quarter of Iran’s population lives in informal housing,” said Iran’s deputy health minister. “Thirty percent of the Iranian people suffer from hunger and to the extent that they cannot even scrape by.”258 “It is true that this statement was denied by the Assistant Minister of Social Affairs, saying that many of the Iranian people have a source of income and that the rate of extreme poverty in Iran is very low.259 But this does not negate the fact that extreme poverty in Iran is high. If we consider that the Assistant Minister of Social Affairs did not provide statistics explaining what he does mean by “many people in Iran.”

»»Surrogacy Surrogacy is one of the by-products of poverty in Iran. Poor mothers rent their wombs to rich families who are biologically unable to have children. “One of Iran’s best-known lawyers, Ahmed Reza Wanki, said the main reason for the phenomenon was extreme poverty. He added legislators should take the due measures to curb it.260 The lawyer noted that this phenomenon is more palatable than selling newborns, which has become commonplace in light of the soaring rates of addiction and divorce, which pushed the ministry of interior to intervene.261 Poverty is cutting across the Iranian society, hindering thousands of going ahead with their education, giving rise to illiteracy, which engenders addiction, divorce, moral and social degradation. Here we cannot point in detail of all byproducts of poverty in the Iranian society.

These phenomena include those children who are apprenticed in hard labor in major cities, especially Tehran. In the capital city of Tehran, there are 7,000 children working on the streets, while only 500 of them are cared for in the city’s social and accommodation centers, and are serviced on a daily basis.262 But many are heedless of the fact that these children are deprived of

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their very basic rights, such as education and healthcare. And addiction is on the rise among them.

In the end, the acuteness of the status quo lies in the fact that there are no solutions to the rising rates of crime. Head of the judiciary Gholam Hussein Mohseni said that social problems hitting Iran are caused by the youth’s distrust in the Iranian regime.

» Divorce Iran is seeing a large rise in divorce rates. Some estimates indicate that there is a case of divorce every three minutes in Iran,263 and the authorities are trying to curb this phenomenon by imposing laws and legislation that contribute to reducing them. In addition to official guidance to reduce this phenomenon. Officials have given directives ‘to find a way to end this phenomenon as it devastates the Iranian society. Also, divorce ceremonies have surged in recent months.

Studies published by Iranian newspapers, the Statistics Center and the Civil Registry Authority, indicate that the divorce rate went up by 2.4% while marriages declined by 3.4% over the last period. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed his regret over the high rates of divorce and the number of prisoners in the country, calling on the judiciary and the Family Court to seek mediation and resolve outstanding issues between couples before issuing a divorce ruling, which takes between nine months and two years. Earlier, a human rights expert at the University of Beheshti warned of a threat to Iran due to high divorce rates and the spread of “divorce ceremonies” in the Iranian society, sparking anger among Iran’s religious and government circles.

There are many reasons behind divorce in Iran, like other countries, some of which include economic problems, drug addiction, physical violence, and infidelity. But experts say their high rates point to a dramatic change in Iranian society. According to Iranian social websites, infertility is the third leading cause of divorce, noting that “the issue of infertility is sensitive and varies according to cultural circumstances from one society to another. A new report revealed that out-of-wedlock relationships among Iranian teenagers had increased dramatically, citing a recent book titled “Women and Ocean’s Safety.” “Many teenagers under the age of 18 enter into pre-marital relationships, 52 percent of girls live with their boyfriends, and 10 percent of them

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have illegal relationships. It is difficult to find a precise census of such phenomena in the Iranian society governed by a strict theocracy. In 2014, the Iranian judiciary blocked a magazine as it encouraged relations outside the marriage system according to what is called ‘white marriage’.

Officials of the ministry of youth and sports blamed media outlets for raising such issues.

According to the Mehr news agency, the statistics bureau said divorce is common among men aged from 30 to 34 and women aged between 25 and 29 years old.264 Day after day there are increasing divorce cases in Iran. Daily reports in the press show shocking and conflicted new statistics. Figures suggest that 14% of divorce cases occur during the first year of marriage and 50% occur during the first five years.265 These staggering figures represented a nightmare for the Iranian officials so that they suggested ceasing the release of tallies relating to divorce temporarily. The director general of statistics in the Iranian Civil Status Department said that the department will stop announcing these statistics, noting that the announcement is not a proper solution.266 Some observers considered the step as a disregard for this social phenomenon by some officials. And sociologists confirmed that providing accurate statistics on divorce was the first step to face this crisis. This led the Civil Status Department to reverse the decision.267 In addition to the increase in divorces, marriages fell by 2.2 percent during the first four months of 2017,268 and thus the government’s policies to increase the population did not prove unsuccessful. On the contrary, the birth rate declined during the second half of this year, (0.6%).269 The tough economic conditions of Iranian families forced women to seek work, which led to a decline in the desire of these families to have children, or that they had only one child, and that 22,000 Iranian children die annually.270 Other reports indicate that the divorce rate has increased significantly in Iran. According to these reports, divorce cases have increased to 64% of the Iranian provinces.271 Recently, officials have been optimistic about reducing the divorce rate by 25% during the Sixth Development Plan, but this is not possible with 19 divorce cases per hour, or 164,160 divorce cases per year.272 About18 cases were registered every hour during the past year, which confirms the increase of this phenomenon is unremitting. Studies and statistics suggest that the divorce spreads in Iran significantly. And has grave cultural, economic, social, psychological and moral consequences for women. In the Iranian society, as it is the case in other societies, there are many reasons for divorce, on top of them come early marriage, adverse economic conditions, and cyberspace which dashed opportunities of dialog among the Iranian families. Tallies suggest a conversation within a single Iranian family takes no more than 17 minutes across an entire day. And this led problems to exacerbate. In the capital, there are 2.2 marriages for each divorce case. In towns and villages, a divorce transpires for each six marriages.273 There are serious warnings about the rise in the number of divorced women, especially those under the age of 18. Today in Iran, there are 36,000 divorced girls.274 This is because it is permissible in the Iranian law for these children to marry, in a bid to escape poverty or coercion. Laws in Iran stipulate it is permissible for girls to marry at the age of 9, and males at the age of 15. This amendment was made to the law after the revolution, before which the 18-year old marked the age of adulthood. Iran is high on the global rankings in terms of the divorce. This phenomenon is deepening within the Iranian society as it is the case with the other phenomena. Officials are heedless of the fact that poverty and unemployment are the foremost reasons behind the decline of marriages.275 Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that the social structure in Iran is not enviable. And most indicators point to the deterioration of the social aspects in Iran. It is impossible to forecast a reverse in the status quo in the nearfuture. The society is saturated when it comes to the theoretical aspects in solving such problems, but the situation on the ground is totally different. The Iranian government and experts seek solutions to the rampant divorce and its social consequences, the disintegration of families, and the displacement of children which give rise to crime, unemployment, street children, and

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poverty. The government tried to curb this phenomenon through a series of axes such as: 1- Changing age of marriage: this comes through amending laws to change the age of marriage.

The Director-General of the Judicial Authority, Ali Kazemi, speaking of the negative consequences of child marriage, indicated that reaching adulthood is not enough for marriage. Kazemi warned that some men seeking to marry minors may have psychological disorders or love sexual exploitation of children. Kazemi considered that changing the age of marriage is a necessity, emphasizing the need for jurisprudential studies and verifying to what extent we are open on this matter within the framework of Islamic Sharia.276 2- Pre-Marriage consultation: Resalah paper has prepared a report on divorce rates in Iran, which are cited as the most acute dilemma facing Iranian society. Many divorce cases have been posted in Iran in recent years. In order to avert this phenomenon, a couple should consult before marriage, and there should be neither coercion nor duress. The couple must take a course on the skills of marital life. Many specialists say that the high rate of divorce is due to the couple’s lack of understanding of the meaning of what marriage is. Tehran, followed by Albarz and then Qom, according to reports, occupied the lion’s share in terms of divorce rates by the end of the past year and the beginning of this year. According to the Social Welfare Assistant, one divorce was registered for every 4 marriages, and the divorce rate in the first year of marriage nears 47%. In a study conducted by the Ministry of Youth and Sports, 40% of marriages over the last four years ended in divorce.277 3-Increasing awareness and social education: A social expert said many cases of divorce in the country occurred for vain and ridiculous reasons, which threatens the security of Iranian society.

Said Hosseini called for the need to develop programs by the Iranian government to raise awareness of the risks of divorce to society and increase awareness among couples. He that the most-affected bracket of this phenomenon is children who bear the brunt of their parents’ acts.278 4- Averting delay of marriage age: the age of marriage in Iran has increased in recent years. Ali Akbar, the Director-General of the Office of Statistics and Social Information in the Civil Status Authority, has announced the age of marriage, for males and females, in Iran is so high. Men and women reach the age of 35 and 30 without marriage. According to Nahid Khadakrami, head of the health and women’s affairs group in the presidency, the high age of marriage in Iran is because of the loathness to marry early since there are a lot of illegal relations held before marriage, and because of the social and financial problems and the soaring unemployment rates in the: country.279

»»Domestic violence One of the indicators of mounting domestic violence is that the criminal lawsuits being filed are on the rise, which was palpable in the capital Tehran over the past months.

Over the past year alone, 15 million lawsuits were filed. And this is the average annual rate. But courts are only able to adjudicate between 500,000 to 600,000 cases, including 300, 000 on drugs.280 These figures indicate that there is a defect in society. If we look at the statistics indicating that 23% of Iranians suffer from psychological disorders and 12% suffer from depression,281 we will discover that domestic violence is a natural result. Iranian society is plagued with the persecution of religious, sectarian and nationalist minorities. More violations have occurred in recent months, and certain minorities have been sentenced to death.282 These executions come at a time in which Iran was ranked the number one in the world in the terms of executions with 1,000 executions in 2015.

In the aftermath of these executions, international humanitarian organizations demanded that Iran comply with the international treaties it had signed. Among the religious violations is the arrest of 11 Christians in Isfahan, as well as the kidnapping of followers of the Baha’i sect and students of Sunni seminaries, which, of course, contravenes the United Nations Charter of Human Rights and

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is a flagrant violation of religious and sectarian freedoms and freedom of expression. In a move aimed at gaining the satisfaction of the minority, Iran added Turkish, Azerbaijani and Kurdish to language and literature majors in Iranian universities at the undergraduate stage.283 This step may have come amid the regime’s sense of growing discontent among these minorities. It was included on the electoral program of Hassan Rouhani. Article 15 of the Iranian Constitution grants minorities the right to use their languages ​​in the media and publications and to teach their ethics in schools and universities. And this step was delayed 37 years and included only the major minorities in Iran.

Reports indicate the recent rise in the rate of community-based violence in Iran, with victims of killings, various incidents and suicides, all signaling a major imbalance in the structure of society.

Killings by melee weaponry spread in Iran, pushing the parliament to convene a session and issue legislation prohibiting people from carrying these weapons. And security apparatuses were forced to increase the visits of secret police to public places to reduce domestic violence’s manifestations.

Also, traffic collisions claim the lives of a lot of Iranians.284 It can be said that the Iranian so c iety is going through an economic squeeze, with poverty and unemployment on a continuous rise. Coinciding with these pressures, the domestic violence is heightening. And the spread of firearms and melee weapons is a case in point. Many domestic violence crimes are connected mainly with drugs. Tallies say 60 percent of the crimes in the states are related to this phenomenon.285 Also, suicide cases have surged noticeably in recent years. They are caused by unemployment, economic insecurity, mental illness, and cultural repression, etc. The Iranian media has taken great interest in this phenomenon.286 It seems that this concern was aimed at drawing the attention of officials who were engaged in the electoral race. They pointed out that this would pave the way for the spread of new forms of suicide.287 What is worth noting is that the s e curity services have been targeting the youth of different ethnic minorities, which is a dangerous development. Given the security situation in Iranian society, it is unlikely that we will witness an improvement in the situation of ethnic and sectarian minorities there, especially with the escalation of the Iranian regime against Kurds and Arabs beyond borders.

According to official statistics, 600,000 people are jailed each year because of addiction, theft, and violence against society. The situation in the capital Tehran is the worst among the provinces. The violence in both the family and society is seen very clearly. This indicates that people do not even have the slightest degree of toler a nce. Some compliments for which the Iranians are known no longer exist. Violence and using melee weapons have become a commonplace there. The security authorities continued to harass th e Sunnis in Iran. They summoned scholars participated in the fourth meeting of the Sunni Jurists Complex, which was held in the Kurdish city of Sanandaj, west of Iran. The Sunni scholars were interrogated and threatened to be sent to jail for conspiring against the national security of Iran. They were also threatened to stand trial at the court assigned to trying clergymen, where they shall be han d ed long sentences. Yet the scholars were threatened to be barred from leading prayers in mosques in case of partaking in this meeting again.288 The security authorities also force some Christians to leave Iran by practicing various kinds of pressure, such as direct threats a n d intentional harm. Recent reports indicate that some of them were threatened to be jailed for 5 to 10 years if they did not leave Iran. They are summoned on a daily basis. Authorities yet confiscate their personal papers under false pretenses, which impedes their business based mainly on sal e and purchase. The government is adopting a new policy to force them to leave. In the past, they have been depriving their children of education. Today, they are squeezing them economically. S e veral shops owned by Baha’i merchants have been closed in various Iranian cities, includi n g the cities of Sari, Qaimshahr and Bandar Abbas. Some say the number of the shops closed nears 100.289 Iran is stepping up its practices which contravene terms of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on which it signed. Article 2 and 26 of this treaty protect minorities of being subject to racism. Article 18 of the treaty guarantees freedom

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of thought and doctrine for those minorities. Iran exploits the current thaw in relations with some European countries to step up its repression against those minorities. The EU’s strategic analysis of the relationship with Iran in July did not raise any human rights issue, which gave the Iranian government the incentive to go ahead with its abuses without hesitation.

»»Conclusion If we want to take a look at the future, it looks better for Iran than in the past years for the health sector. Iran could not import some radiological devices for cancer patients because of the sanctions. It now has access to these devices as well as other embargo-era prohibitions.

The influx of many international companies to invest in the oil, automobile, gas and other sectors will improve Iran’s service and infrastructure sectors, including hospitals, schools, addiction treatment, and the development of programs and action plans. This will give government and regime a greater chance to heal the rift, contain high rates of unemployment, reduce poverty and unemployment if these funds are invested properly within the law, away from the corrupt institutions and apparatuses and the inflated Iranian bureaucracy.

Looking at these figures and statistics of the unemployed, sick, poor and divorced, one fact can be easily concluded: the Iranian society is fragmented and unideologized. These tallies are a testament to the public dissatisfaction with the policies of the regime at home and abroad.

The government spends billions of dollars on gambles beyond borders at the expense of the Iranian people. Despite the veneer of outward cohesion of the regime, unstable society makes it vulnerable to unexpected shocks

.

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‫‪Endnotes‬‬

‫‪ 1‬عبدالجليل معالي‪ ،‬االنتخابات الرئاسية اإليرانية‪ ..‬ديمقراطية المرشد‪ 19 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/vZhc2 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 2‬وقائع اتفاقيه‪ ،‬براي حفظ منافع ملي‪ ،‬دولت حسن روحاني بايد تداوم پيدا كند‪ 26 ،‬اسفند ‪ ،1395‬ص‪http://cutt.us/i3xAd 2‬‬ ‫‪ 3‬وجود نامزد احتياطی در کنار روحانی نياز است‪ ،‬ايلنا‪ 13 ،‬فرردين ‪https://goo.gl/frMtAv 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 4‬إيران أونالين‪ ،‬نمايندگان ادوار مجلس ستاد حمايت از روحانی شکل دادند‪ 8 ،‬فروردين ‪http://cutt.us/wloCt 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 5‬بي بي سي فارسي‪ ،‬محمد خاتمی‪ :‬رای به روحانی را تکرار کنيد‪ 14 ،‬مايو ‪http://soo.gd/EuWE 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 6‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬محمد خاتمی‪ :‬انتخاب نشدن روحانی يعنی قوت گرفتن احتمال بازگشت تحريمها‪ 13 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/wXKC2 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 7‬نسل فردا‪ ،‬کدام يک ازاصوگرايان حامی روحانی هستند‪http://soo.gd/VSrs .‬‬ ‫‪ 8‬زمان نامنويسی نامزدهای رياستجمهورين شرق‪https://goo.gl/y5LLIK ،‬‬ ‫‪ 9‬الجبهة الشعبية لقوى الثورة» تختار ‪ 5‬مرشحين لالنتخابات الرئاسية في إيران‪ 6 ،‬ابريل ‪http://cutt.us/GsmI 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 10‬بيوگرافی مصطفی ميرسليم‪ ،‬باشگاه خبرنگاران جوان‪http://cutt.us/h8cpk ،‬‬ ‫‪ 11‬رئيسي وقاليباف مرشحا الجبهة الشعبية لقوى الثورة االسالمية «جمنا» ‪http://cutt.us/i2Bid‬‬ ‫‪ 12‬محمد سباعي‪ ،‬المناظرة األولى لمرشحي الرئاسة اإليرانية‪ ..‬نقاش حاد واتهامات تكشف مقتحمي سفارة المملكة‪ 28 ،‬ابريل ‪http://cutt.us/VyafZ 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 13‬محجوب الزويري‪ ،‬السياسة الخارجية اإليرانية في مناظرات االنتخابات الرئاسية‪ 10 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/ZIf5M 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 14‬فضائح «فساد» تطغى على آخر المناظرات الرئاسية اإليرانية ‪/924816/https://aawsat.com/home/article‬‬ ‫‪ 15‬المزماة‪ ،‬عدة حقائق تكشفها مناظرة مرشحي الرئاسة‪ 30 ،‬ابريل ‪1u3ZG/http://cutt.us 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 16‬ارمان امروز‪ ،‬نوع برخورد رقبای دولت‪ ،‬غيراخالقی بود‪ 25 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/PvCH9 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 17‬آرمان امروز‪ ،‬چه جريانی ‪۴‬درصدی است‪ 11 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://soo.gd/gbwR 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬اعتماد‪ ،‬بد اخالقيها و بيانضباطي را در مناظرات شاهد بوديم‪ 25 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/wrwUa 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 19‬انسحاب قاليباف من انتخابات الرئاسة اإليرانية‪ 15 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/ZjDkO 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 20‬الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬احتدام الصراع الرئاسي بين روحاني ورئيسي بانسحاب جهانغيري ‪ 11‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/eIBYe 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 21‬صوت العراق‪ ،‬نتائج االنتخابات اإليرانية وداللتها‪ 27 ،‬مايو ‪9C8o/http://cutt.us 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 22‬بي بي سي‪ :‬روحاني في خطاب فوزه‪ :‬اإليرانيون رفضوا التشدد‪ 20 ،‬مايو ‪3mfDz/http://cutt.us 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 23‬الرأي الجديد‪ ،‬لماذا فاز روحاني باالنتخابات الرئاسية في إيران‪ 20 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/zS0O2 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 24‬لماذا فاز روحاني‪ 30 ،‬يوليو ‪5wHVx/http://cutt.us 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 25‬المستقبل‪ ،‬لماذا نجح روحاني في تجديد واليته الرئاسية‪ 21 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/ojEFc 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 26‬اإلقتصاد يشعل الخالف بين روحاني والحرس الثوري اإليراني‪ 23 ،‬يونيو ‪2oZvo/http://cutt.us 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 27‬ساسة بوست‪ ،‬الحرس الثوري‪« :‬الغول» االقتصادي الذي توحش‪ 19 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/BA9BW 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 28‬هتافات معادية لـ«روحاني» إثر خالفات مع «خامنئي» والحرس الثوري‪ 24 ،‬يونيو ‪http://cutt.us/wbJFQ 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 29‬أر أف أى فارسي‪ ،‬نگرانی از دخالت سپاه پاسداران در انتخابات باال گرفته است‪ 22 ،‬مارس ‪http://cutt.us/uBD4U 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 30‬روحاني يحذر من تدخل الحرس الثوري في االنتخابات الرئاسية‪ 27 ،‬فبراير ‪http://cutt.us/IUMzq 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬المستقبل‪ ،‬لماذا نجح روحاني في تجديد واليته الرئاسية‪ 21 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/iJvJh 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 32‬الجزيرة‪ ،‬إيران بال رفسنجاني‪ ..‬غياب االعتدال هل يؤذن بأزمة‪ 9 ،‬يناير ‪http://cutt.us/YCaPJ 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 33‬انتخاب‪ ،‬آيا در نبود آيت اهلل هاشمی‪ ،‬روزهای سختی در انتخابات ‪ 96‬در انتظار روحانی است‪ 29 ،‬دي ‪317806/http://entekhab.ir/fa/news 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 34‬آرمان امروز‪ ،‬راي روحاني افزايش خواهد داشت‪ 1 ،‬اسفند ‪68Uz2p/https://goo.gl 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 35‬ايران واير‪ ،‬زلزله مرگ هاشمی رفسنجانی‪ 9 ،‬يناير ‪http://cutt.us/sj7ho 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 36‬مركز البيان للدراسات‪ ،‬إيران واالنتخابات القادمة في ظل غياب رفسنجاني‪ 26 ،‬مارس ‪http://cutt.us/hGzJa 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 37‬العربية نت‪ ،‬رفسنجاني‪« ..‬الصندوق األسود» للنظام اإليراني‪ 9 ،‬يناير ‪http://cutt.us/sIqWW 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 38‬جنوبية‪ ،‬بعد رفسنجاني هل أصبحت ايران في خطر‪ 9 ،‬يناير ‪http://cutt.us/xkVAS 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 39‬رئيسة المعارضة اإليرانية تتوقع سقوط نظام إيران بعد رحيل رفسنجاني‪ 9 ،‬يناير ‪7ZCG/http://cutt.us 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 40‬وفاة هاشمي رفسنجاني تربك توازنات إيران الداخلية‪ 10 ،‬يناير ‪http://cutt.us/RPwXM 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 41‬ساسة بوست‪ :‬بعد وفاة رفسنجاني‪ ..‬هل بات اإلصالح في إيران ضربًا من الماضي‪ 9 ،‬يناير ‪2atNo/http://cutt.us 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 42‬الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬تغريدة من روحاني تشعل الخالفات مع الريجاني‪ 5 ،‬يناير ‪http://cutt.us/fQtW2 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 43‬آرمان امروز‪ ،‬کمک زنجانی به ستاد روحانی کذب اس‪ 15 ،‬دي ‪https://goo.gl/q80aDr 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 44‬موقع ‪ ،24‬توتر بين روحاني والسلطة القضائية مع اقتراب االنتخابات الرئاسية‪ 8 ،‬يناير ‪http://cutt.us/fDsVO 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 45‬ايالف‪ ،‬رئيس السلطة القضائية في إيران ينتقد الرئيس روحاني‪ 29 ،‬مايو ‪2017http://cutt.us/BUHq‬‬ ‫‪ 46‬موقع ‪ ،24‬توتر بين روحاني والسلطة القضائية مع اقتراب االنتخابات الرئاسية‪ 8 ،‬يناير ‪/312100/ae/article.24//:http 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 47‬خبر اونالين‪ ،‬انتقاد آيت اهلل نوری همدانی از علنی شدن اختالف بين سران قوا ‪ 15‬دي ‪69OSS/http://cutt.us 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 48‬خبر اونالين‪ ،‬انتقاد آيت اهلل نوری همدانی از علنی شدن اختالف بين سران قوا ‪ 15‬دي ‪69OSS/http://cutt.us 1395‬‬ ‫‪« 49‬خالف نادر» بين خامنئي وروحاني‪ 15 ،‬فبراير ‪http://cutt.us/a3yuL 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 50‬الجارديان‪ :‬الخالف يتسع بين خامنئى وروحانى‪ 22 ،‬يونيو ‪http://cutt.us/gSjqq 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 51‬الصراع بين روحاني وخامنئي إلى أين‪ 17 ،‬يوليو ‪http://cutt.us/RZ7pt 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 52‬إسراء أحمد فؤاد‪ ،‬سجال روحانى وخامنئى يمتد إلى خالف فقهى يقلب رجال الدين على الرئيس اإليراني‪ 22 ،‬يونيو‪http://cutt.us/OQ6rR 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 53‬نقطة خالف بين روحاني وخامنئي تطفو على السطح‪ 15 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/xknj 2017‬‬

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‫‪ 54‬الصراع بين روحاني وخامنئي إلى أين‪ 17 ،‬يوليو ‪http://cutt.us/bswUB 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 55‬هل يعزل الرئيس اإليراني روحاني على غرار بني صدر‪ 24 ،‬يونيو ‪http://cutt.us/XzhJG 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 56‬الصراع بين روحاني وخامنئي إلى أين‪ 17 ،‬يوليو ‪http://cutt.us/bswUB 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 57‬حملة تحريض علنية لخامنئي على روحاني‪ ..‬وهذه أسبابها‪ 13 ،‬يونيو ‪http://cutt.us/EQW97 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 58‬جدیدترین اژدر ایرانی با نام «والفجر» شلیک شد‪ 10 ،‬اسفند ‪)5DFGzs/https://goo.gl( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 59‬تسنيم‪ ،‬بهره گیری از «تاکتیک نبردهای نوین» در رزمایش والیت ‪ 18 ،۹۵‬دي ‪)https://goo.gl/o2xmR4( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 60‬نادي الصحفيين الشباب‪ ،‬رزمایش بیت‌المقدس ‪ 29‬نیروی زمینی ارتش آغاز شد‪ 3 ،‬خرداد ‪)https://goo.gl/yCCswI( 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 61‬موقع برس تي في‪ ،‬سردار پاکپور‪ :‬آغاز رزمایش أمام علی (ع) درغرب کشور‪ 4 ،‬بهمن ‪)http://cutt.us/E1THT( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 62‬موقع برس تي في‪ ،‬سردار پاکپور‪ :‬آغاز رزمایش أمام علی (ع) درغرب کشور‪ 4 ،‬بهمن ‪)http://cutt.us/E1THT( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 63‬العالم‪ ،‬مناورات األمام علي (ع) نفذت بنجاح تام في منطقة قصر شيرسن‪ 26 ،‬فبراير ‪)32QD75/https://goo.gl( 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 64‬جام جم‪ ،‬انجام موفقیت آمیز مرحله دوم رزمایش پیامبراعظم‪ 3 ،‬اسفند ‪)https://goo.gl/ZO5qGU( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 65‬تسنيم‪ ،‬جدیدترین مین ضدبالگرد سپاه با نام «صاعقه» رونمایی شد‪ 4 ،‬اسفند ‪)https://goo.gl/JXdZHr( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 66‬وطن امروز‪ ،‬آغاز رزمايش پیامبر اعطم ‪ 2 ،11‬اسفند ‪)https://goo.gl/MtyP6r( 1395‬‬ ‫وعمان‪ 14 ،‬ابريل ‪)http://cutt.us/umV1Q( 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 67‬آسيا نيوز‪ ،‬أهداف وانعكاسات المناورات البحرية المشتركة بين إيران ُ‬ ‫‪ 68‬جام جم‪ ،‬پیام رزمایش پیامبر اعظم(ص)‪ ،‬ایستادگی در برابر هر تهدیدی است‪ 2 ،‬اسفند ‪)https://goo.gl/dao7jf( 1395‬‬ ‫وعمان‪ 14 ،‬ابريل ‪)http://cutt.us/umV1Q( 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 69‬آسيا نيوز‪ ،‬أهداف وانعكاسات المناورات البحرية المشتركة بين إيران ُ‬ ‫‪ 70‬إيران‪ ،‬رزمايش مشترك دريايي در اقيانوس هند‪ 20 ،‬فروردين ‪ ،1396‬ص‪)http://cutt.us/uZJrB( 2‬‬ ‫‪ 71‬فارس‪ ،‬ایران طی ‪3‬سال اخیر بیش از ‪ 115‬نوع تسلیحات جدید طراحی وتولید کرده است‪ 18 ،‬بهمن ‪)https://goo.gl/HcwLS1( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 72‬تسنيم‪ ،‬راه‌اندازی ‪ ۴‬خط تولید تجهیزات راهبردی دفاعی در سال ‪ 23 ،۹۶‬فروردين ‪)http://cutt.us/OJouG( 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 73‬جام جم‪« ،‬حیدر» رونمایی شد‪ 27 ،‬فروردين ‪)0LmJq/http://cutt.us( 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 74‬جام جم‪ ،‬موشک نقطه زن فاتح ‪ 14 ،۳۱۳‬اسفند ‪)http://cutt.us/d4ugY( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 75‬ساسة بوست‪ ،‬الدول التي تملك أكبر أسطول للغواصات حول العالم (‪)http://cutt.us/xyYgC‬‬ ‫‪ 76‬گزارش یک نهاد آمریکایی‪ :‬ایران زیردریایی با موشک کروز ضد کشتی برای تنگه هرمز می سازد‪ 13 ،‬اسفند ‪)6JVq5/http://cutt.us( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 77‬جام جم‪ ،‬موشک نقطه زن فاتح ‪ 14 ،۳۱۳‬اسفند ‪)http://cutt.us/d4ugY( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 78‬جمهوري إسالمي‪ ،‬بالگرد ملی «صبا ‪ »248‬امروز رونمایی می‌شود‪ 17 ،‬اسفند ‪)https://goo.gl/rTSNkg( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 79‬تسنيم‪ ،‬افزایش توان بالگردی هوانیروز سپاه‪ 4 ،‬بهمن ‪)https://goo.gl/m7rrdG( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 80‬جوان انالين‪ ،‬تحويل جديدترين موشك كروز ايراني به نيروهاي مسلح ‪ 26‬فروردين ‪)http://cutt.us/MHCLv( 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 81‬رويش ملت‪ ،‬رويارويي نيروي دريايي ايران با كشتي جاسوسي امريكايي‪ 15 ،‬اسفند ‪ ،1395‬ص‪)http://cutt.us/ocfe( 2‬‬ ‫‪ 82‬فارس‪ ،‬شلیک تیر هشدار نیروی دریایی آمریکا به قایق های ایرانی‪ 20 ،‬دي ‪)https://goo.gl/X9pKxj( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 83‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬واکنش پنتاگون به نزدیک‌شدن شناورهای سپاه به ناو رهگیر آمریکا‪ 17 ،‬اسفند ‪)http://cutt.us/UWys( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 84‬فارس‪ ،‬شلیک تیر هشدار نیروی دریایی آمریکا به قایق های ایرانی‪ 20 ،‬دي ‪)https://goo.gl/X9pKxj( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 85‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬واکنش کاخ سفید پس از نزدیک شدن شناورهای ایرانی واخطار ناوشکن آمریکایی‪ 21 ،‬دي ‪)https://goo.gl/csmXQT( 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 86‬إيران وداعش‪ ..‬و»العشق الممنوع”‪http://cutt.us/WsURx ،‬‬ ‫‪ 87‬عصر إيران‪ ،‬تایمز اسراییل‪ :‬شکست داعش پهن کردن فرش قرمز برای ابرقدرتی ایران است‪ 30 ،‬اسفند ‪https://goo.gl/NwcY7q 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 88‬تسنيم‪ ،‬داعش تمام تهدیدات را علیه ایران انجام داد‪/‬آنها نتوانستند یک ترقه در کشور منفجر کنند‪ 30 ،‬دي ‪1301192/http://tn.ai 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 89‬جام جام‪ ،‬دستگیری ‪ ۸‬عنصر اصلی تروریستی در اطراف تهران‪ 23 ،‬بهمن ‪http://cutt.us/luWaM 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 90‬دستگيري ‪ ۱۵‬تروريست توسط سپاه كه قصد انفجار در ايران را داشتند‪ ،‬ص‪ 7 ،3‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/LJd8 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 91‬خبر اونالين‪ ،‬فرمانده هوانیروز ارتش‪ :‬سال ‪ ۹۳‬مانع ورود داعش به ایران شدیم‪ 26 ،‬فروردين ‪904gF/http://cutt.us 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 92‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬یک نماینده مجلس میگوید ‪ ۴۳‬هزار خارجی قصد داشتند با عبور از ایران ب ‌ه «داعش» بپیوندند‪ 223 ،‬فروردين ‪http://cutt.us/Bd8i 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 93‬روسيا اليوم‪ ،‬ألول مرة‪« ..‬داعش» يهدد إيران باللغة الفارسية‪ 27 ،‬مارس ‪0a628/http://cutt.us 2017‬‬ ‫بشدة‪ 30 ،‬مارس ‪http://cutt.us/LAIKC 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 94‬طهران تتوعد «داعش»‪ :‬سنعاقبكم ّ‬ ‫‪ 95‬المستقبل للدراسات واألبحاث‪ ،‬كيف تبرر إيران تدخالتها المستمرة في المنطقة ‪http://cutt.us/wB6m3‬‬ ‫‪ 96‬ايسنا‪ ،‬خسارت ‪ 1500‬میلیاردی حادثه پالسکو‪/‬بیشترین خسارت برای پیراهن دوزها‪ 2 ،‬بهمن ‪http://cutt.us/BaNFv 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 97‬المصدر‪ :‬كريستيان ساينس مونيتور ‪http://cutt.us/iCq2m‬‬ ‫‪ 98‬العربية نت‪ ،‬برج طهران المنهار بناه يهودي أعدمته إيران رميًا بالرصاص‪ 19 ،‬يناير ‪http://cutt.us/hrN77 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 99‬قطره‪ ،‬خسارت ‪ 150‬میلیارد تومانی پوشاک در پی حادثه پالسکو‪ 30 ،‬دي ‪http://cutt.us/z9NZV 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 100‬ايسنا‪ ،‬خسارت ‪ 1500‬میلیاردی حادثه پالسکو‪/‬بیشترین خسارت برای پیراهن دوزها‪ 2 ،‬بهمن ‪http://cutt.us/BaNFv 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 101‬تسنيم‪ ،‬وجود ‪ ۳‬هزار بمب بالقوه در تهران‪/‬تشکیل کمیته وعده های پالسکویی‪ 27 ،‬بهمن ‪http://cutt.us/GTJLg 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 102‬تحرير نيوز‪ ،‬برج «بالسكو» يزيد الصراع السياسي في إيران‪ 27 ،‬يناير ‪http://cutt.us/uTau 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 103‬سبوتنيك فارسي‪ ،‬در پی انفجار درنیروگاه برق علی آباددر شمال ایران هفت نفر مجروح‪ 3 ،‬مارس ‪http://cutt.us/mc1rF 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 104‬ايلنا‪ ،‬دو مامور نیروی انتظامی در تعقیب وگریز با یک خودرو مشکوک کشته شدند‪ 12 ،‬فروردين ‪9n5lFw/https://goo.gl 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 105‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬وزیر اطالعات ایران از خنثی‌سازی ‪ ۳۰‬برنامه بمب‌گذاری در کشور خبر داد‪ 2 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/j4Sy2 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 106‬ايسنا‪ ،‬تیراندازی به مأمور پلیس راه هرمزگان‪ 6 ،‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/TaAWa 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 107‬جام جم‪ ،‬هالکت عوامل شهادت ‪ ۲‬مرزبان در کمتر از ‪ ۷۲‬ساعت‪ 13 ،‬دي ‪https://goo.gl/rQidcn 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 108‬اطالعات‪ ،‬مهار آتش سوزی مخزن ذخیره سازی پایانه نفتی خارک‪ 15 ،‬دي ‪http://cutt.us/cQzPu 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 109‬آرمان‪ ،‬شهادت مامور پلیس در درگیری با اشرار‪ 21،‬ارديبهشت ‪( 1396‬ص‪5nNiq/http://cutt.us )5‬‬ ‫‪ 110‬مقتل عنصرين من حرس الحدود االيراني في اشتباكات مع مسلحين‪ 27 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/vArj 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 111‬حزب «بيجاك» سيف األكراد لمواجهة إيران من أجل استقالل كردستان‪ 14 ،‬يونيو ‪http://cutt.us/ijlUI 2016‬‬ ‫‪ 112‬اطالعات‪ ،‬مهار آتش سوزی مخزن ذخیره سازی پایانه نفتی خارک‪ 15 ،‬دي ‪http://cutt.us/cQzPu 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 113‬اعتماد‪ ٩ ،‬نفر در آتش‌سوزي پتروشيمي ماهشهر سوختند‪ 17 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/kM6F4 1396‬‬

‫‪The second Biannual Strategic Report - June.2017‬‬

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‫‪ 114‬شهروند‪،‬مهار آتش سوزی در پارس جنوبی‪ 3 ،‬خرداد ‪ ،1396‬ص‪http://cutt.us/dYWzE 15‬‬ ‫‪ 115‬اطالعات‪ ،‬شهادت يك مامور انتظامي هنگام ماموريت در اهواز‪ 2 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪( 1396‬ص‪http://cutt.us/J3Agc )13‬‬ ‫‪ - 116‬االنتخابات اإليرانية وتجاهل مطالب األقليات‪ 20 ،‬مايو ‪6Iz5/http://cutt.us 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 117‬مكتبة قطر الوطنية‪ ،‬نبذة عن بلوتشستان ومكران البريطانية ‪1sNf9/http://cutt.us‬‬ ‫‪ 118‬المزماة‪ ،‬القوميات واألقليات في ايران‪ 3 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/OruxA 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 119‬مركز الروابط‪ ،‬أوجاع إيران في الداخل‪ :‬بلوشستان نموذجا‪ 2 ،‬أغسطس ‪7DsyY/http://cutt.us 2015‬‬ ‫‪ 120‬روزنامه ايران‪ ،‬درگیری اشرار با با نیروهای مرز بانی در جکیگور‪( ،‬ص‪ 19 )2‬دي ‪9q6dR/http://cutt.us 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 121‬تسنيم‪ ،‬جزئیات درگیری ماموران انتظامی سیستان و بلوچستان با قاچاقچیان مواد مخدر‪ 22 ،‬دي ‪1293533/http://tn.ai 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 122‬تابناك‪ ،‬شهادت یک مأمور ناجا در سیستان و بلوچستان‪ 17 ،‬بهمن ‪http://cutt.us/phYgi 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 123‬تسنيم‪ ،‬انهدام ‪ ۲‬باند بزرگ مواد مخدر در سیستان و بلوچستان‪ 26 ،‬بهمن ‪1328004/http://tn.ai 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 124‬عصر ايران‪ ،‬تجمعی برای شناسنامه مقابل مجلس‪ 16 ،‬دي ‪http://cutt.us/dJws6 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 125‬جام جم‪ ،‬دستگیری ‪ ۳۸‬نفر از اعضای گروهک‌های معاند‪ 6 ،‬فروردين ‪1395http://cutt.us/LTjC‬‬ ‫‪ 126‬فارس‪ ،‬کشف محموله ‪ 3‬تنی مواد افیونی در سیستان وبلوچستان‪ 29 ،‬اسفند ‪http://fna.ir/E8JF2 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 127‬ايسنا‪ ،‬شهادت یک فرمانده سپاه در سیستان و بلوچستان‪/‬عوامل شهادت به هالکت رسیدند‪ 22 ،‬فروردين ‪http://cutt.us/WLcfl 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 128‬تسنيم‪ ،‬کشف ‪ ۲.۵‬تن انواع مواد مخدر وانهدام ‪ ۲‬باند بین‌المللی در عملیات پلیس‪ 5 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪1389181/http://tn.ai 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 129‬آفتاب نيوز‪ ،‬انهدام دو باند بین‌المللی مواد مخدر ‪ 5 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪https://goo.gl/cPmquk 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 130‬بي بيسي فارسي‪ ،‬دست‌کم ‪ ۹‬مرزبان ایرانی در سیستان و بلوچستان کشته شدند‪ 6 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/jqe5W 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 131‬إيران وباكستان‪ ..‬أزمة جديدة أم مجرد سحابة صيف عابرة؟ ‪7V9Z/http://cutt.us‬‬ ‫‪ 132‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬رئیس ستادکل نیروهای مسلح ایران به پاکستان هشدار داد‪ 18 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/BSDJh 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 133‬العربية‪ ،‬عودة التوتر على الحدود بعد مقتل باكستاني بنيران إيرانية‪ 27 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/QSc0g 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 134‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬ظریف به منظور پیگیری حادثه میرجاوه به پاکستان می رود‪ 12 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/tJMT 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 135‬ايرنا‪ ،‬فرمانده مرزبانی ناجا‪ :‬خواستار اقدام ارتش پاکستان برای آزادی مرزبان کشورمان هستیم‪ 14 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://soo.gd/NGM7 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 136‬إيران‪ :‬روحاني في األحواز المتصاص االنتفاضة الشعبية العربية وقمع التمرد‪ 23 ،‬فبراير ‪/325959/ae/article.24//:http 2017‬‬ ‫السو ِر ّي‪ ،‬احتجاجات واسعة في األحواز العربية ضد سياسة إيران العنصرية‪ 15 ،‬فبراير ‪/https://syrianpc.com 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 137‬المركز الصحفي ُّ‬ ‫عطشا لتروي أصفهان وقم‪ 22 ،‬فبراير ‪http://cutt.us/JplUt 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 138‬العرب‪ ،‬إيران تقتل األحواز ً‬ ‫‪ 139‬الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬األحواز مدينة منكوبة وبرلمانيون ينتقدون إهمال حكومة روحاني‪ 13 ،‬فبراير ‪http://cutt.us/FJ3nK 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 140‬فارس‪ ،‬خوزستانی ها تدبیر و امیدی از دولت ندیده اند‪http://cutt.us/tktwW 1395/11/24 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 141‬مشرق نيوز‪ ،‬بذرپاش‪ :‬دولت باید خدمتگزار باشد نه منت‌گذار‪ 10 ،‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/h7Yd2 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 142‬مشرق‪ ،‬ساعدی‪ :‬آقای روحانی! با آمدنتان به خوزستان جز یأس وناامیدی چیزی عاید مردم نشد‪ 22 ،‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/WDWMP 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 143‬وكالة أنباء األناضول‪« ،‬اهواز در جایگاه اول آلوده‌ترین شهر دنیا قرار گرفت»‪ 19 ،‬مارس ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪ 144‬المعرفة‪ ،‬حركة النضال العربي لتحرير األحواز ‪http://cutt.us/zcFzE‬‬ ‫‪ 145‬اليوم السابع‪ ،‬بالفيديو‪ ..‬حركة إيرانية معارضة تعلن تفجير أنبوبين لنقل النفط في األحواز‪ 3 ،‬يناير ‪http://cutt.us/OyrDr 2017‬‬ ‫السنّة في كردستان‪ 25 ،‬مارس ‪http://cutt.us/qytv 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 146‬محكمة رجال الدين في إيران تستدعي مفتي ُّ‬ ‫‪ - 147‬محمود الشوري‪ ،‬أسباب انتشار «اإلعدامات» في إيران‪ 19 ،‬ابريل ‪http://cutt.us/rESJn 2017‬‬ ‫‪ - 148‬اليمن العربي‪ ،‬اإلعدامات في إيران‪« .‬الصرخة األخيرة» تفضح طائفية نظام الماللي‪ 1 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/qUYsM 2017‬‬ ‫‪ - 149‬العفو الدولية‪ :‬قمع إيران للمجتمع المدني واألقليات مستمر‪ 21 ،‬فبراير ‪2017http://cutt.us/GcQx1‬‬ ‫‪ 150‬خالصه گزارش ساالنه اعدام در ایران‪ -‬سال ‪ 18 ،۲۰۱۶‬اسفند ‪1395http://cutt.us/VPtIT‬‬ ‫‪ 151‬راديو زمانه‪ ،‬ایران‪ ۸۷ :‬نفر در اولین ماه سال میالدی اعدام شدند‪-‬هر ‪ ۹‬ساعت یک اعدام‪ 16 ،‬دي ‪http://cutt.us/qAaHi 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 152‬راديو زمانه‪ ،‬اعدام قریب‌الوقوع ‪ ۱۴‬زندانی محکوم به مرگ در زندان رجایی‌شهر‪ 29 ،‬فروردين ‪5ly3v/http://cutt.us 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 153‬راديو زمانه‪ ،‬عفو بین الملل ودید بان حقوق بشر خواستار توقف روند اعدام ‪ ۱۲‬زندانی در ایران شدند‪ 24 ،‬دي ‪1395http://cutt.us/QcMuh‬‬ ‫‪ 154‬هرانا‪ ،‬دستکم ‪ ۱۶‬زندانی در رجایی شهر و ندامتگاه کرج اعدام شدند‪ 25 ،‬دي ‪1395http://cutt.us/mHjLb‬‬ ‫‪ 155‬اعدام ‪ 239‬نفر در ایران در ‪ 6‬ماهه نخست سال ‪ 2017‬میالدی‪ 1 ،‬يوليو ‪2017http://cutt.us/FPRhR‬‬ ‫‪ 156‬منظمة العفو الدولية‪ ،‬عقوبة اإلعدام هي أحد عوارض ثقافة العنف‪ ،‬وليس حال لها‪http://cutt.us/DgUQ7.‬‬ ‫‪ 157‬إيران تنفذ حكم اإلعدام سرا بحق ‪ 32‬من أهل السنة وتستعجل آخرين‪ 19 ،‬فبراير ‪2017http://cutt.us/kypWj‬‬ ‫السنَّة في إيران يطالب خامنئي بوقف إعدام سجناء سنة‪ 2 ،‬فبراير ‪2017http://cutt.us/LyGS0‬‬ ‫‪ 158‬إرم نيوز‪ ،‬زعيم أهل ُّ‬ ‫‪ 159‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬اظهار نگرانی مولوی عبد الحمید درباره احتمال دستور «تسریع اعدام زندانیان أهل سنت‪ 3 ،‬بهمن ‪https://goo.gl/qqtpxM 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 160‬دویچه وله فارسی‪ ،‬تصویب کلیات طرح تخفیف مجازات اعدام قاچاقچیان مواد مخدر در مجلس‪ 16 ،‬يوليو ‪http://cutt.us/tHCb3 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 161‬دویچه وله فارسی‪ ،‬مجازات اعدام حاملین مواد مخدر در ایران حذف می شود‪ 12 ،‬مارس ‪http://cutt.us/ZRbFH 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 162‬ايسنا‪ ،‬دادستان کل کشور‪ :‬حذف کامل اعدام در پرونده های مواد مخدر قابل پذیرش نیست‪ 14 ،‬دي ‪http://cutt.us/myTRM 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 163‬اطالعات‪ ،‬سردار زاهدیان‪ :‬کاهش مجازات جرائم مواد مخدر‪ ،‬قاچاقچیان را جری تر می کند ‪ 28‬بهمن ‪http://cutt.us/TORXt 1395‬‬ ‫السنّة في «كردستان»‪ 23 ،‬مارس ‪48tTU/http://cutt.us 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 164‬إيران تحقق مع مفتي أهل ُّ‬ ‫‪ 165‬دویچه وله فارسی‪ ،‬تصویب کلیات طرح تخفیف مجازات اعدام قاچاقچیان مواد مخدر در مجلس‪ 16 ،‬يوليو ‪http://cutt.us/tHCb3 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 166‬زيتون‪ ،‬درخواست فعاالن کرد برای اجرای اصل ‪ ۱۵‬قانون أساسی‪ 30 ،‬بهمن ‪http://cutt.us/ECdGo 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 167‬المسار أون الين‪ ،‬أكراد إيران يطالبون بتدريس لغتهم في المدارس‪ 20 ،‬فبراير ‪http://cutt.us/pyzqX 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 168‬محمود الشوري‪ ،‬أسباب انتشار «اإلعدامات» في إيران‪ 19 ،‬ابريل ‪http://cutt.us/rESJn 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 169‬اليمن العربي‪ ،‬اإلعدامات في إيران‪« .‬الصرخة األخيرة» تفضح طائفية نظام الماللي‪ 1 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/qUYsM 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 170‬العفو الدولية‪ :‬قمع إيران للمجتمع المدني واألقليات مستمر‪ 21 ،‬فبراير ‪http://cutt.us/GcQx1 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 171‬خالصه گزارش ساالنه اعدام در ایران‪ -‬سال ‪ 18 ،۲۰۱۶‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/VPtIT 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 172‬راديو زمانه‪ ،‬ایران‪ ۸۷ :‬نفر در اولین ماه سال میالدی اعدام شدند‪-‬هر ‪ ۹‬ساعت یک اعدام‪ 16 ،‬دي ‪http://cutt.us/qAaHi 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 173‬راديو زمانه‪ ،‬اعدام قریب‌الوقوع ‪ ۱۴‬زندانی محکوم به مرگ در زندان رجایی‌شهر‪ 29 ،‬فروردين ‪5ly3v/http://cutt.us 1396‬‬

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‫‪The second Biannual Strategic Report - June.2017‬‬

‫‪ 174‬راديو زمانه‪ ،‬عفو بین الملل ودید بان حقوق بشر خواستار توقف روند اعدام ‪ ۱۲‬زندانی در ایران شدند‪ 24 ،‬دي ‪http://cutt.us/QcMuh 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 175‬هرانا‪ ،‬دستکم ‪ ۱۶‬زندانی در رجایی شهر و ندامتگاه کرج اعدام شدند‪ 25 ،‬دي ‪http://cutt.us/mHjLb 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 176‬اعدام ‪ 239‬نفر در ایران در ‪ 6‬ماهه نخست سال ‪ 2017‬میالدی‪ 1 ،‬يوليو ‪http://cutt.us/FPRhR 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 177‬منظمة العفو الدولية‪ ،‬عقوبة اإلعدام هي أحد عوارض ثقافة العنف‪ ،‬وليس حال لها‪http://cutt.us/DgUQ7 .‬‬ ‫‪ 178‬إيران تنفذ حكم اإلعدام سرا بحق ‪ 32‬من أهل السنة وتستعجل آخرين‪ 19 ،‬فبراير ‪http://cutt.us/kypWj 2017‬‬ ‫السنَّة في إيران يطالب خامنئي بوقف إعدام سجناء سنة‪ 2 ،‬فبراير ‪http://cutt.us/LyGS0 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 179‬إرم نيوز‪ ،‬زعيم أهل ُّ‬ ‫‪ 180‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬اظهار نگرانی مولوی عبد الحمید درباره احتمال دستور «تسریع اعدام زندانیان أهل سنت‪ 3 ،‬بهمن ‪https://goo.gl/qqtpxM 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 181‬دویچه وله فارسی‪ ،‬تصویب کلیات طرح تخفیف مجازات اعدام قاچاقچیان مواد مخدر در مجلس‪ 16 ،‬يوليو ‪http://cutt.us/tHCb3 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 182‬دویچه وله فارسی‪ ،‬مجازات اعدام حاملین مواد مخدر در ایران حذف می شود‪ 12 ،‬مارس ‪http://cutt.us/ZRbFH 2017‬‬ ‫‪ 183‬ايسنا‪ ،‬دادستان کل کشور‪ :‬حذف کامل اعدام در پرونده های مواد مخدر قابل پذیرش نیست‪ 14 ،‬دي ‪http://cutt.us/myTRM 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 184‬اطالعات‪ ،‬سردار زاهدیان‪ :‬کاهش مجازات جرائم مواد مخدر‪ ،‬قاچاقچیان را جری تر می کند ‪ 28‬بهمن ‪http://cutt.us/TORXt 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 185‬رويكرد ‪ ،24‬واکنش ستاد مبارزه با موادمخدر به تصویب طرح کمیسیون قضایی‪ 4 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/QpUiC 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 186‬دویچه وله فارسی‪ ،‬تصویب کلیات طرح تخفیف مجازات اعدام قاچاقچیان مواد مخدر در مجلس‪ 16 ،‬يوليو ‪http://cutt.us/tHCb3 2017‬‬ ‫‪Oil-Driven Recovery. Washington, DC. © World Bank. https://openknowledge. :2017 Iran Economic Monitor, Spring .2017 .World Bank“ 187‬‬ ‫‪”.IGO 3.0 License: CC BY 27556/10986/worldbank.org/handle‬‬ ‫‪ 188‬صحيفة ابراراالقتصادية‪ 24 ،‬اسفند ‪https://goo.gl/fiIqGz،1395‬‬ ‫‪ 189‬اقتصاد نيوز‪ ،‬تحلیل گزارش صندوق بین المللی پول در مورد اقتصاد ایران ‪ +‬اینفوگرافی‪6SFpF/http://cutt.us،1395/10/18 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 190‬صحيفة جوان‪ ،‬بيكاري يك نفر از هر ‪ 3‬تحصيل كرده إيراني‪،‬ص‪ 16 ،3‬فروردين ‪https://goo.gl/XALHkv ،1396‬‬ ‫‪ 191‬ابرار اقتصادي‪ ،‬مدير عامل شركت ملى نفط‪ :‬توليد نفط تا فروردين ماه به ‪ 4‬ميليون بشكه در روز مىرسد‪ 1 ،‬اسفند ‪6TScvR/https://goo.gl ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ 192‬ارمان‪ ،‬افزايش صادرات نفط ايران‪ ،‬ص‪ 23 ،2‬بهمن ‪https://goo.gl/zln7Y0،1395‬‬ ‫‪ 193‬صحيفة تجارت‪،‬افزايش‪۳‬ميليون بشکهاي توليد نفت‪19 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪ ،1396‬ص‪https://goo.gl/RnFAeR ،9‬‬ ‫‪ 194‬تفاهم‪ ،‬صادرات ‪10‬میلیارد داریپتروشیمی‪ ،‬ص ‪ 22 ،4‬دي ماه ‪https://goo.gl/eBeCM7 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 195‬موقع شركة أرامكو السعودية على شبكة االنترنت‪ ،‬مراكز البحوث‪ ،‬متاح على الرابط‪https://goo.gl/jAQmKg :‬‬ ‫‪ 196‬صحيفة الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬شجاع البقمي‪« ،‬صناعة البتروكيماويات السعودية محرك رئيسي لالقتصاد»‪ 25 ،‬نوفمبر ‪https://goo.gl/hooJKi ،2016‬‬ ‫‪ 197‬روسيا اليوم‪« ،‬روسيا وإيران توقعان اتفاقية تجارة النفط مقابل السلع”‪ 25 ،‬مايو ‪https://goo.gl/KsfkZX ،2005‬‬ ‫‪ 198‬أوكرانيا برس‪ ،‬السفير اإليراني في كييف‪ :‬الصادرات اإليرانية ألوكرانيا سجلت نمواً بنسبة ‪ 8 ،%30‬مايو ‪https://goo.gl/nbgZ5M ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 199‬موقع مشرق نيوز‪ ،‬دولت روحانی ‪ 111‬هزار میلیارد تومان کاال از چین وارد کرده است ‪+‬نمودار‪ 10 ،‬فروردين ‪http://cutt.us/zZYqZ، 1396‬‬ ‫‪ 200‬تقرير قناة الجزيرة‪ ،‬نور الدين الدغير‪« ،‬األالف يخسرون أموالهم المودعة بمؤسسات مالية بإيران»‪ 17 ،‬يونيو ‪https://goo.gl/FjCxos ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 201‬الجزيرة‪ ،‬نور الدين الدغير‪ ،‬مرجع سابق‪.‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/U1Mcwy .2017 ,27 TRACK PERSA, Kamil Alboshoka, “Impacts of Iranian banks’ bankruptcy on citizens”, June 202‬‬ ‫‪.TRACK PERSA, Previous Reference 203‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/zKmrGa ,2016 October 10 ,ALMONITOR, Alireza Ramezani, Why Iran’s central bank can’t control money markets 204‬‬ ‫‪ 205‬وفقا لتصريح محافظ البنك المركزي اإليراني «ولي اهلل سيف» الصادر في شهر مايو‬ ‫‪ 206‬وفقا للنائب بمجلس النواب اإليراني «عزت اهلل يوسفيان مال»‬ ‫‪ 207‬مركز المزماة للدراسات والبحوث‪« ،‬طبيعة التقارب القطري اإليراني»‪ 7 ،‬يونيه ‪https://goo.gl/N8iQUQ ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 208‬صحيفة ابرار اقتصادي‪ ،‬درآمد ‪ 1000‬میلیارد تومانی مناطق آزاد از عوارض واردات کاال‪ ،‬ص‪ 28 ،6‬خرداد ‪https://goo.gl/s8ty4W ،1396‬‬ ‫‪ 209‬وكالة أنباء تسنيم‪ ،‬الرابط‪1433372/http://tn.ai :‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/cWSxd3 ,2017 June ,”2017 British Petroleum, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 210‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/T9FxWz ,2017 June 5 ,”Radio Farda, Mardo Soghom, “The economic incentive behind Qatar’s Iran ties 211‬‬ ‫‪ 212‬افتاب پایگاه خبری‪ ,‬گزارش تکان‌‌دهنده وزیر کشور از آسیب‌های اجتماعی در صحن علنی مجلس‪http://cutt.us/n03ku ,‬‬ ‫‪ 213‬صحيفة مردم نو‪ ،‬آیا وضعیت اجتماعی ایران "آنومیک" است؟‪http://soo.gd/U3ja ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 214‬موقع قطره‪ ،‬بزرگترین دستآورد دولت روحانی در خطر‪http://soo.gd/RWsp ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 215‬صحيفة آرمان‪ 40 ،‬هزار پزشک عمومی طبابت نمی کنند‪http://soo.gd/COmi ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 216‬صحيفة إيران‪ ،‬وجود ‪ 7‬هزار پرونده خطای پزشکی در کشور‪0KUd/http://soo.gd ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 217‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬افزايش تعداد فوتى هاى بيمارستان سينا‪http://soo.gd/a8VN ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 218‬صحيفة جوان‪ ،‬سن ابتال به بيمارى هاى قلبى در إيران به زير ‪ 40‬سال رسيد‪http://soo.gd/AaSc ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 219‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬مرگ ساالنه ‪ 22‬هزار کودک در ایران‪4D8P/http://soo.gd ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 220‬السرطان الخبيث نصيب اإليرانيين منه كبير‪ ،‬العربي الجديد‪.http://cutt.us/IxS39 .‬‬ ‫‪ 221‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة آرمان (ص‪6Akd/http://cutt.us .)4‬‬ ‫‪ 222‬موقع سالمت نيوز‪ ،‬دیگر زمان پنهانکاری درباره ایدز نیست‪http://soo.gd/QJPW ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 223‬صحيفة خراسان‪ ،‬آمار ‪ 25‬درصدى بيمارى هاى روحى وروانى در كشور‪http://soo.gd/Ez6O ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 224‬إذاعة زمانه‪ ،‬اتوبوس هاى ايدز در خيابان هاى تهران‪22yh/http://soo.gd .،‬‬ ‫‪ 225‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة آرمان (ص‪http://cutt.us/bmCqf .)4‬‬ ‫‪ 226‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة ابتكار (ص‪http://cutt.us/g5u9X .)3‬‬ ‫‪ 227‬الجزيرة نت‪ :‬اإليدز بإيران أرقام صادمة وإكراهات اجتماعية‪.http://cutt.us/wSL3D ،‬‬ ‫‪ 228‬الشرق األوسط‪ :‬ارتفاع معدالت االكتئاب‪.http://cutt.us/HGxL4 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 229‬إرم نيوز‪ :‬إيران األكثر اكتئابا في العالم بعد العراق‪.http://cutt.us/GKaC7 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 230‬المزماة‪ :‬في إيران مريض نفسي واحد من بين كل أربعة‪.http://cutt.us/rlLn2 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 231‬صحيفة آرمان‪ 30 ،‬درصد زنان اختالل روانى دارند‪http://soo.gd/cLVf .،‬‬ ‫‪ 232‬وكالة أنباء مهرنيوز‪ ،‬وزارت كشور رسما از دى ماه وارد جريان اجرايى انتخابات خواهد شد‪http://soo.gd/Nn2f ، ،‬‬

‫‪The second Biannual Strategic Report - June.2017‬‬

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‫‪ 233‬وكالة أنباء مهرنيوز‪ ،‬وزارت كشور رسما از دى ماه وارد جريان اجرايى انتخابات خواهد شد‪http://soo.gd/Nn2f ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 234‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة آرمان (ص‪2ezJj/http://cutt.us .)4‬‬ ‫‪ 235‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة آرمان (ص‪http://cutt.us/TCbYg .)5‬‬ ‫‪ 236‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة آرمان (ص‪http://cutt.us/QT9WA .)4‬‬ ‫‪ 237‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة آفتاب (ص‪http://cutt.us/AGjVR .)4‬‬ ‫‪ 238‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة آرمان (ص‪http://cutt.us/zPp0z .)5‬‬ ‫‪ 239‬المصدر‪ :‬وكالة أنباء تسنيم‪1389181/http://tn.ai .‬‬ ‫‪ 240‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة آرمان (ص‪http://cutt.us/nIOY ،)4‬‬ ‫‪ 241‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة آرمان (ص‪http://cutt.us/dhELm )4‬‬ ‫‪ 242‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة ارمان (ص‪http://cutt.us/KVg26 .)4‬‬ ‫‪ 243‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة ارمان (ص‪http://cutt.us/LsIHS )4‬‬ ‫‪ 244‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة ارمان (ص‪4waJu/http://cutt.us )5‬‬ ‫‪ 245‬العربية نت‪ ،‬عدد العاطلين عن العمل يزداد ‪ 20‬ألف كل يوم‪ 4 ،‬أبريل ‪.http://cutt.us/Uwac ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 246‬العربية نت‪ ،‬عدد العاطلين عن العمل يزداد ‪ 20‬ألف كل يوم‪ 4 ،‬أبريل ‪.http://cutt.us/Uwac ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 247‬وكالة فارس‪ ،‬وضعيت بيكارى ايران بدتر شد‪ 14 ،‬مهر ‪http://soo.gd/R1hl ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ 248‬صحيفة جهان صنعت‪ ،‬نرخ بيكارى ‪ 12.2‬در صد شد‪http://soo.gd/Co7D ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 249‬صحيفة أبرار‪ ،‬بيكارى در برخى شهرها به ‪ 80‬در صد رسيده است‪http://soo.gd/QXih ،،‬‬ ‫‪ 250‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬بيكارى ‪1‬مليون فارغ التحصيل در سال جارى‪5Rfm/http://soo.gd ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 251‬روزنامه اطالعات‪ ،‬نگرانی از افزایش ‪ 25‬در صدی مهاجرت به پایتخت ‪http://soo.gd/p0lm :17.7.2016‬‬ ‫‪ 252‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة كيهان (ص‪ .http://cutt.us/hfmBt ،)4‬وراجع‪ :‬العربية نت‪ ،‬مسئول إيراني‪ :‬لدينا ‪ 11‬مليون تحت خط الفقر‪.http://cutt.us/jnLa .‬‬ ‫‪ 253‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة جوان (ص‪https://goo.gl/u9WcJ7 )9‬‬ ‫‪ 254‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة آرمان (ص‪http://cutt.us/djmIc )7‬‬ ‫‪ 255‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة جهان صنعت (ص‪http://cutt.us/dDoGG )7‬‬ ‫‪ 256‬المصدر‪ :‬وكالة أنباء ايسنا ‪http://cutt.us/SMlQI‬‬ ‫‪ 257‬صحيفة قدس‪ ،‬سكونت ‪ 19‬ميليون إيرانى زير سقف هاى ناامن‪http://soo.gd/p8qJ ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 258‬برترين ها‪ ،‬وزارت بهداشت‪ 30 :‬درصد مردم إيران گرسنه اند‪http://soo.gd/NyTF ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 259‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬گرسنگی ‪ 30‬درصد مردم درست نيست‪http://soo.gd/Lon9 ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 260‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬رحم اجاره اى وفقر شديد‪http://soo.gd/dix5 ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 261‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬ورود وزارت كشور به كودك فروشى‪9TJ9/http://soo.gd ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 262‬صحيفة ابتكار‪ ،‬وجود ‪ 7‬هزار كودك كار در تهران‪http://soo.gd/gY9V ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 263‬الحياة‪ :‬الطالق في إيران ظاهرة تؤرق السلطات‪ .2k7mw/http://cutt.us ،‬لكن بعض التقارير األخرى تؤكد أن هناك ‪ 19‬حالة طالق كل ساعة في إيران‪،‬‬ ‫الجزيرة نت‪ 19 :‬حالة طالق كل ساعة في إيران‪ .http://cutt.us/GUqft ،‬وإذ تضاربت التقارير الرسمية إال أنها جميعها تؤكد النسبة العالية لمعدالت الطالق‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 264‬الحياة‪ :‬الطالق في إيران ظاهرة تؤرق السلطات‪ ،‬سابق‪ .‬وراجع‪ :‬العربي الجديد‪ :‬الطالق في إيران ارتفاع الظاهرة يفاقم مشكلة المجتمع‪.http://cutt.us/wRe6d ،‬‬ ‫‪ 265‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬گسترش طالق های سال أولی‪http://soo.gd/exvM ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 266‬وكالة أنباء إيسنا‪ ،‬توقف اعالم آمار طالق از سوى سازمان ثبت أحوال‪http://soo.gd/ZRcl ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 267‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬آمار طالق اعالم مى شود‪59wD/http://soo.gd ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 268‬صحيفة خراسان‪ ،‬آمار چهارماهه ازدواج‪ 2.2 ،‬درصد کاهش‪http://soo.gd/uF5l ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 269‬صحيفة خراسان‪ ،‬رشد مواليد در كشور منفى شد‪http://soo.gd/uF5l ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 270‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬مرگ ساالنه ‪ 22‬هزار کودک در ایران‪http://soo.gd/Tb2U ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 271‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬رشد مثبت طالق در ‪ 64‬درصد استان ها‪http://soo.gd/wMjA ،1 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 272‬صحيفة ابتكار‪ ،‬انباشت فقر در جامعه‪http://soo.gd/udZp ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 273‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬يک طالق به ازای ‪ 2/2‬ازدواج‪http://soo.gd/hk4M ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 274‬صحيفة آرمان‪ 36 ،‬هزار کودک مطلقه در کشور‪http://soo.gd/Haw2 ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 275‬روزنامه آرمان‪ ،‬هر ساعت ‪ 19‬طالق ‪http://soo.gd/ZMSs 18.7.2016‬‬ ‫‪ 276‬المصدر‪ :‬دويتشه فيله‪http://cutt.us/aDP1p ،‬‬ ‫‪ 277‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة رسالت (ص‪http://cutt.us/ExB7T )9‬‬ ‫‪ 278‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة آرمان (ص‪http://cutt.us/Ozm5z )4‬‬ ‫‪ 279‬المصدر‪ :‬صحيفة أفكار (ص‪1vNHz/http://cutt.us )4‬‬ ‫‪ 280‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬تشكيل سالى ‪ 15‬ميليون پرونده قضائى‪7gCC/http://soo.gd ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 281‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬نگرانی از افزایش آمار ورودى هاى زندان‪http://soo.gd/LaZU ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 282‬موقع «كانون مدافعان حقوق بشر كردستان»‪ ،‬زندانيان اهل سنت قبل از إعدام شكنجه شده اند‪http://soo.gd/s2Dq ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 283‬إذاعة فردا‪ ،‬زبان ترکی وکردی از امسال به عنوان رشته تحصیلی در دانشگاه ها تدریس می شود‪http://soo.gd/NPkt ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 284‬صحيفة آرمان‪ ،‬افزایش پلیس نامحسوس جاده ها‪http://soo.gd/A8Bu ، ،‬‬ ‫‪ 285‬صحيفة جوان‪ 60 ،‬در صد جائم با مواد مخدر مرتبط است‪ 15 ،‬مهر ‪http://soo.gd/o7p0 ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ 286‬المصدر السابق‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 287‬وكالة هرانا‪ ،‬احضار وتهىديد شرکت کنندگان در نشست مجمع فقهی اهل سنت‪http://soo.gd/XS3e .،‬‬ ‫‪ 288‬وكالة هرانا‪ ،‬بيانيه مشترک ‪ 19‬سازمان مدافع حقوق بشر در‪http://soo.gd/AoLE .،....‬‬ ‫‪ 289‬وكالة هرانا‪ ،‬جامعه بين المللي بهايى از پلمپ محل کسب بهاییان ایران خبر داد‪http://soo.gd/dI9n .،‬‬

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When the new US president, Donald Trump, came to power in early 2017, his administration created new policies that required the forging of new regional and global alliances.

The Gulf countries also formed new military coalitions and established think tanks aimed at fighting terror and extremism in all its manifestations, especially terror and extremism perpetrated by Iran in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. A new chapter has started to besiege Iran and foil its schemes after its expansionism threatened the region’s security

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First Axis The future of Iran-Gulf ties in light of new alliances and transformations reality is that The political countries in a certain region will head towards conict and complicated crises if one of them does not respect the legal principles governing the countries’ sovereignty, independence and integrity of territories.

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Here in the Arab region, there are many disputes and crises of high acuteness. There are several indications that Iran is adopting an expansionist strategy based on the principle of ‘transparent borders’ and its violation of the principles of neighborliness and non-meddling which have been endangering the stability of Gulf nations and the Arab region since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This meddling has overshadowed Iran’s ties to the Gulf, where relations between the two sides have fluctuated based on the shift in international policies and determinants.

Recently, indications of worrying Iranian behavior towards the GCC have emerged. Such behavior arose primarily at the end of the second term of former US president Barack Obama.

When the new US president, Donald Trump, came to power in early 2017, his administration created new policies that required the forging of new regional and global alliances. The Gulf countries also formed new military coalitions and established think tanks aimed at fighting terror and extremism in all its manifestations, especially terror and extremism perpetrated by Iran in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. A new chapter has started to besiege Iran and foil its schemes after its expansionism threatened the region’s security. This siege befuddled policymakers in Iran after they saw the formation of new alliances aimed at thwarting Iranian schemes in Syria, Yemen and Iraq. In this context, the analysis will discuss: » First: The transformation of Iran’s strategy towards the Gulf; phases and motives Any scholarly political analysis of the trajectory of Iranian-Gulf ties in the first half of 2017 requires a flashback to the nature of these relations before and after the Khomeini revolution in 1979. Iran-Gulf ties in this period shall be analyzed and linked to the semi-annual strategic report. During this period, the region witnessed a palpable surge in ongoing conflicts, the forging of new coalitions, the existence of regional and international movements to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and Russian-Iranian aggression against Aleppo using excessive force to shift balances of power there as well as to force the opposition to accept what had become a fait accompli. During the period of this report’s preparation, the most important variable was President Trump’s ascent to power. He brought about a new vision completely different from that of his predecessor, Barack Obama. Also, this period saw Saudi Arabia establishing think tanks tasked primarily with fighting terror ideologies and forging military alliances for the same purpose. Thus, the trajectory of GulfIran relations shall be divided into two main phases: Pre-Khomeini revolution of 1979: During this period, relations between the two sides fluctuated. Tensions emerged from time to time on account of Iranian acts of aggression against Bahrain and the UAE and, most importantly, the annexation of the Ahwazi capital in 1925.

Post-Khomeini revolution: Tensions heightened due to Iran’s embracing of an ideology based primarily on ‘exporting’ the revolution. Article 154 of the Iranian Constitution stipulates that the government is obliged to establish the ‘rule of the truth across the globe and protect the oppressed everywhere’. The outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war exacerbated the fears of Gulf States.

After failing to export the revolution, the regime adopted the ‘Umm al Qura’ theory, claiming that Iran is the epicenter of the Islamic world.1 Under Rafsanjani, Iran pursued somewhat moderate policies. This streak of moderateness continued to the end of reformist president Hassan Rouhani’s tenure in office in 2003. He adopted policies based on non-meddling, which halted efforts aimed at exporting the revolution. When Khatami came to office in 1997, Iran became more open to cooperation with GCC states, and leaders of both sides started to exchange visits.2 The Iraq invasion in 2003: Since the downfall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, tensions returned to overshadow relations between the two sides. The Iranian government started implementing its schemes based on the enforcement of geopolitical changes in favor of the Shiites in spheres of vital interest, such as Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. These hotspots are important

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for their geographic proximity to Iran as well as for the heavy presence of Shiite communities there. Yet, the regime revitalized its plots aimed at exporting the revolution, helping the oppressed, and fighting the Great Satan and the Small Satan. Several factors have led to the drastic transformation that gave rise to the unprecedented tension between the two sides, including: First: The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 The regime of the late president Saddam Hussein represented an insurmountable obstacle that impeded Iranian plots in the region. He waged an eight-year war against Tehran during which its military and defensive capabilities dwindled, as did its economy. After his demise in 2003, Iran became a main actor on the Iraqi scene. It seized the opportunity presented by the fact that the Iraqis were busy resisting the US as their main occupier. Gulf countries are extremely concerned about the Iranian expansionism, which began after the US invasion in 2003. Tehran capitalized on the vacuum created by the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime and spread chaos in the country. It did this so that it could establish a foothold. The Gulf’s obsessions increased along with the Iranian role in undermining Baghdad’s instability by providing certain parties with arms and money. Those countries are concerned about Tehran’s schemes aimed at spreading sectarianism in the region, which may shake the security situation there.3 Second: The outbreak of the so-called “Arab spring revolutions” in early 2011 The revolutions of Arab Spring, which broke out in early 2011 in five Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria) created an opportune time for Iran to proceed with its plots. Many Arab countries had been busy tackling internal affairs. World powers were also busy with the revolutionary wave and its impact on their interests. Iran was quick to meddle in the region under the guise of supporting the revolutions, especially in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, considering it an “Islamic awakening” inspired by the political movement of the revolution. However, when such an uprising broke out against its ally Assad, Iran rushed to intervene with its military to forestall his downfall.4 Syria is a key hotspot to Iran, as it serves the purpose of Iranian expansionism in the region. It links Tehran with Hezbollah. Yet Syria defends passages where weapons are delivered to the Lebanon-based group. Damascus is another important actor standing up to the Arab alliance and seeking to contain Iran’s mounting geopolitical influence in the region.5 Third: The sinking of the nuclear deal with p 5+1 in 2015. The first variable, Saddam’s fall, erased the garrison that barred Tehran from implementing its plots. The second variable gave it the opportunity to meddle in violence-torn countries with relatively large Shiite communities.

The third variable gave Tehran a strong economic status as a result of the lifting of sanctions imposed by the West. These penalties had helped curb Iran’s expansionist schemes. This deal gave the regime international recognition concomitant to a pledge not to aid the Iranian opposition. It also recognized Tehran as a major power in the Middle East. Thus, the aforesaid variables provided Iran with money, international recognition and an arena in which to carry out its expansionism in the region in a way that undermined security and exacerbated regional tensions, especially with the GCC.6 When President Hassan Rouhani assumed office in 2013, many in the region and the GCC in particular pinned their hopes on him for the establishment of good ties with Iran based on the principle of neighborliness. He said that he sought to improve ties with all neighboring countries, including Saudi Arabia, with which he said Iran wanted to end animosity and instead foster mutual respect. Rouhani said Saudi Arabia is a brotherly neighbor with which Tehran had historic, cultural and geographic bonds. However, these remarks do not reflect a substantial transformation in relation to the bones of contention between Iran and the GCC.7 These issues include:

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A. Transparency and goodwill with respect to Iran’s nuclear deal.

B. Iranian threats to block navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

C. Iran’s meddling in the internal affairs of GCC states.

D. Gulf-Iran divergence with respect to the Arabian Gulf’s security.

E. The Iranian nuclear program.

F. Iranian annexation of the three UAE islands.

While Saudi Arabia’s role and influence are important in enhancing regional and global security, Iran’s relations with the Gulf cannot be reduced to Iran’s relations with the Kingdom. Five other countries still have problems with Iran, including Iran’s interference in Bahrain’s affairs and its annexation of the UAE’s three islands (Lesser Tunb, Greater Tunb and Abu Musa). Tehran refuses to settle the dispute through international arbitration.8 Rouhani’s comments about Iran’s meddling with the Gulf do not add anything new to the discussion. Perhaps the remarks of Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Danaei, have outlined Iranian foreign policy towards the neighboring countries under Rouhani. He said, “The foreign policy of Iran towards the Gulf is principled and irreversible. It has been already outlined.

Moreover, it will see no substantial changes.”9 These remarks do not lack veracity, given the increasing meddling of the Iranian regime in the Gulf as well as: »»The continuation and exacerbation of differences between Iran and the Gulf. »»Increasing Iranian encroachment in the Gulf, which amounts to annexation. »»The attacking of the headquarters of diplomatic missions of Saudi Arabia in Tehran, prompting Riyadh to cut ties with Iran.

Riyadh-Tehran ties have ebbed and flowed since Rouhani came to power. However, Iranian behaviors became more aggressive, especially after it embarked on nuclear deal negotiations with the world powers, inking a historic agreement in July 2015.

This aggressive conduct could be clearly seen through the remarks in recent months of senior Iranian politicians and military commanders with respect to the Gulf States. This noticeable change demonstrates the fact that Iranian policymakers are aware of the role their country could play in the region. Most observers link this conduct towards the Gulf countries to Iran’s engagement in negotiations with the world superpowers, which, according to them, has given it a sense of superiority.10 Remarks that Iranian officials have made provide sufficient proof of this theorem. General Yahiya Rahim Safavi, the military advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and former commander of the IRGC, said that Iran’s borders do not end at Chalmaja on the Iraqi border west of Ahwaz. Rather, they extend to southern Lebanon. Moreover, “this is the third time where our influence reaches the Mediterranean.”11 Some Gulf analysts have considered the notion that the Arab countries in general, and the GCC countries in particular, will pay the price of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the six world powers. They argued that the Iranian regime ratchet up its rhetoric against the GCC, although it has long maintained harmonious relations with the GCC for decades, adding that such policies became aggressive acts on the ground. They also cited Iran’s giving the ‘go-ahead’ to domestic oil firms to expand operations in the search for oil in alDurrah field, in which Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have shares, which may trigger disputes over the field, especially with Kuwait.12 Recently, there have been some indications of Iran’s increasing meddling in the affairs of the GCC states, which reflects the notion that Iran’s rhetoric is not reflected in its behaviors on the ground. Bahraini foreign minister Sheikh Khalid Ibn Ahmed Al Khalifa, said that his country seized

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quantities of explosives smuggled through boats coming from Iran in July 2015: “[They] were enough to remove the city of Manama.13 [The] Kuwaiti judiciary accused [a] 14-member terror cell of espionage. The case is known as [the] al-Abdali terror cell.” The cell has been charged with colluding with Iran and Hezbollah to carry out hostile acts against Kuwait through the possession of explosives, machine guns, firearms and ammunition with the purpose of perpetrating acts of terror.14 GCC-Iran tensions have been on the rise since 2016. Each side’s political behavior, movements and remarks have reflected this standoff, which includes issues related to Iran’s annexation of the UAE isles as well as attacks on the headquarters of diplomatic missions in Tehran. This period has witnessed a mounting row between Riyadh and Tehran, as well as growing threats from Iran against Bahrain. » Second: Iran-GCC relations in the first half of 2017 This period witnessed major developments in the international arena, foremost of which was President Trump’s ascent to power with an agenda considerably different from that of his predecessor, Barack Obama. His presidency witnessed a US-Saudi rapprochement with respect to Iranian regional threats. Trump called for a besieging of Iran. He visited the Saudi kingdom on May 20 and 21. During the US Arab Islamic summit in Riyadh, Trump said Iran’s terrorism should be uprooted. Also, Iran and Russia diverged in Syria, with Russian jets targeting Iranian militias, especially Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia and Turkey strengthened ties, with top officials of both countries exchanging visits. On the other hand, tensions between Tehran and Ankara heightened.

Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan accused Iran of seeking to establish a Persian empire. » New alliances affecting GCC-Iran ties The Saudi-US rapprochement: Obama’s tenure in office was marked by a focus on a policy known as ‘leadership from the back’, which focused on two axes. These axes were, heightened attention on the US home front, which created the momentum necessary to promote Obama’s agenda based on the notion that the US’s might lay in its cohesion, not in its rising international influence; and an attempt to contain rogue regimes such as those of Russia and Iran, which were focusing on expansionist activities. Iran’s expansionism in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen within schemes aimed at empowering Shiites in the region is a case in point.15 President Donald Trump came to office adopting a strategy based on ‘leadership from the front’. This policy is based on engagement directly with the crises of the Middle East so as to achieve US interests. Therefore, the US adopted a strong position that was opposed to the Iranian plots in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Since Trump was declared President of the US, most of his remarks have focused on the Middle East and Iran in particular. He described the nuclear deal with Iran as stupid. The Democratic president branded Iran as the ‘world’s number one sponsor of terror which seeks to undermine regional security’. He also vowed to stand up to the Shiite militias and Lebanon-based Hezbollah. In addition, he called for additional sanctions on Iran and the freezing of its assets. His rhetoric reached its peak when he threatened to use military force against Iran, citing its provocative behaviors against the US navy in the Gulf.16 This rapprochement culminated in President Trump’s choosing of Riyadh as his first stop for the US-Islamic summit on May 20 and 21. The move was significant, as US presidents typically visit European or Latin American nations during their early days in office. Trump’s move signaled the importance of the Kingdom’s role in the region with respect to fighting terror, boosting regional cooperation on development projects in neighboring and Muslim countries, facing regional threats (especially those posed by Iran) and enhancing security in the region.

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Although Iran was not invited to participate in the summit, it was a present absentee in Trump’s speeches. Trump said that Iran is the principal sponsor of terror worldwide, adding that the nation foments hatred in the region, especially Syria. The US leader asserted that Iran is responsible for the crises hitting the region, as it trains and arms militias and adopts slogans hostile to the US and Israel. Trump called for the isolation of Iran as it spreads chaos, citing Syria as an example.17 In this context, the US administration took steps against the regime in Tehran, including:18 »»Targeting the al-Shayrat base controlled by the Assad regime after dozens of civilians were killed during a horrendous chemical attack in Khan Shaykhoun in April 2017. The US military dropped 59 cruise missiles on the base. »»Targeting al-Tanf base, where US jets conducted aerial attacks against Iranian militia convoys on May 17. Those militias were pushing on the base located on the Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian borders.19 To counter the Iranian geopolitical project, 55 Arab and Muslim countries, as well as the US, reached a consensus on Iranian terrorism. They agreed that all those who carry out, and even finance, all forms of terror (including the militias of Syria, Iraq and Lebanon) represent an international terror threat that should be countered. The countries which partook in the summit agreed to allocate, if necessary, 34,000 reserve troopers for the fight against terror groups in Iraq and Syria. Also, an international think tank named Etidal, tasked primarily with fighting terror ideologies, especially those of Tehran, was created on May 21.20 After the summit, Iran realized how much it was being besieged due to its policies of terror and recognized the fact that Saudi Arabia was enjoying an unrivaled ability to mobilize the international community in the face of its terror. Tehran’s cognizance of its precarious situation was reflected in the comments of officials who attempted to downplay the impact of the siege, distracting attention by questioning the $460 billion deals signed between Washington and Riyadh.21 Secretary General of the Expediency Discernment System Mohsen Rezai said the US-Saudi arms deals aims to fan the flames of sedition and instability in the region.22 Also, Abdellahian, special assistant to the parliament speaker for international affairs, said that Saudi Arabia has sought to win Washington’s support as a means of giving itself legitimacy, restoring its influence and confronting Iran under the guise of fighting terror.23 Yet Ahmed Dostmalchian, former chargé d’affaires in Saudi Arabia, said that Trump’s visit renewed support for Saudi Arabia in light of the failure of its plans in Syria, Yemen and Iraq. This illegitimate intervention of Saudi Arabia is indicative of an utter violation of international treaties and conventions.24 All these remarks defy the realities on the ground. Iran’s expansion in Syria, Iraq and Yemen in the form of providing Shiite groups with money, militiamen and weaponry for use against the Sunnis, reflects its fear of the Kingdom’s ability to mobilize and assert its position as the leader of the Islamic world. The latter position became apparent when the leaders of 55 Muslim nations accepted Riyadh’s invitation and when the leader of the most powerful nation on the planet made Saudi Arabia his first foreign trip. This is indicative of the Kingdom’s growing role in resolving regional issues, especially those related to fighting terror and enhancing cooperation to maintain stability and security regionally and internationally. The visit also testifies to Saudi Arabia’s ability to stand up to schemes aimed at spreading chaos and unrest in the region and across the Islamic world, especially the Iranian movements that pose a grave threat to security in the region.

Saudi-Turkish rapprochement: Although relations between the two countries underwent significant transformations triggered by the high-paced variables in the region (such as the uprisings that broke out in the Arab region), the nations put their differences aside and sought a common ground so they could stand up to regional threats. This policy culminated in President Erdogan’s visit to Riyadh in February 2017. During his trip to Bahrain, Erdogan described the Iranian schemes in Syria and Iraq as Persian racism that must be halted. In March 2017, the

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Turkish foreign minister said that Hezbollah and the other Shiite militias should pull out of Syria. On February 20, 2017, he said that Tehran seeks to create Shiite states in Iraq and Syria. In addition, the Turkish defense minister paid a visit to the UAE, as did his US counterpart, within the framework of efforts aimed at forming an Arab NATO to face Iranian meddling in the region.25 Several drives lay behind this rapprochement. Saudi Arabia has been prompted to forge stronger ties with Turkey to face Iranian threats, while Ankara must stem Russian-backed Kurdish threats. Also, Saudi Arabia needs a powerful regional ally, and Turkey has the second most powerful military in NATO. The nation possesses tremendous economic resources and is a considerable soft power. Turkey imports 80 percent of its energy from Russia and Iran, which represents a predicament with respect to its security, and the Kingdom can play a role in easing Turkey’s dependence on those two nations.

This rapprochement represented a turning point in the region and a deterrent force that will restore the regional and international balance due to several factors. Both countries are endowed with strategic geographic positions and enjoy membership in landmark gatherings such as the G20 and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). In addition, Turkey maintains NATO membership, with its army ranked as the second-strongest military in the top global military alliance. Additionally, the two countries have a joint agenda related to fighting attempts to divide the region. The Saudi-Turkish rapprochement is what Tehran fears most, as this alliance could easily thwart its efforts to divide the region on sectarian grounds.

The two nations have identical views on a number of regional and international issues, which has helped shape a common vision of the situation in the region, especially when it comes to fighting terror and the Iranian spillovers in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Throughout history, rivalry and contests have been the hallmarks of Turkish-Iranian relations. The Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Dynasty had bad blood due to the dispute over the Fertile Crescent. Iranian presence in Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad bothers Turkey, which seeks to introduce itself as a model for the region and a regional power. Ankara knows that it will not attain this status as long as Iran tirelessly aims to dominate the region based on the same sectarian motives that triggered wars between the Ottomans and Safavids. » The nature of Iran-Gulf relations at the time of this report’s preparation The relationship between two countries, whether it is an alliance or accord, is affected by internal, regional and international transformations. Before Obama’s initiative, specifically in 2016, Iran-GCC tensions reached a new apex in terms of rhetoric and movements on the ground regarding all the moot points between the two sides. This included the annexation of the UAE isles, the meddling in Bahrain, the intervention in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and the assaulting of the Saudi diplomatic headquarters in Tehran, which prompted Riyadh to cut ties with Tehran. Since then, relations between the two nations have soared. When President Trump entered office with his new agenda, which rectified the mistakes of his predecessor, Tehran realized how much it was being besieged. Therefore, this period witnessed: » Attempts to divide the GCC 1- Rouhani’s visit to Kuwait and Oman: In its bid to ease the choking siege imposed by regional and international powers, Tehran sought to divide the Gulf, with President Hassan Rouhani visiting Oman and Kuwait on February 14. Before the visit, he made comments in which he said that Tehran pursues relations based on respecting neighbors, the safety of the Gulf, refraining from meddling in neighbors’ internal affairs and not attempting to impose its political and religious ideology on its neighbors. On the eve of the visit, Tehran seized the opportunity, inviting Gulf States to improve ties with Tehran and providing warnings about the consequences of

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passing up such an opportunity. Hamid Abu Talbi, director of Rouhani’s office, said in a Twitter post that Rouhani’s acceptance of the invitations of Oman and Kuwait indicates the need to establish relations between Muslim countries and to restore ties in the region. He added: “Our friends in the region should seize this opportunity as it may not occur again. Jump at this good opportunity.”26 In the same context, Iranian policymakers adopted a conciliatory rhetoric towards Saudi Arabia to face the new shifts in alliances in the region. Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif said that his country was ready to cooperate with Saudi Arabia.27 Also, Amir Hussien Abdellahian, advisor to the parliament speaker, said that is keeping the door ajar with Saudi Arabia when it comes to restoring ties, adding that Tehran’s vision of its relations with neighbors, especially the Gulf states, is based on neighborliness and the comprehensive boosting of relations. He believed that Iranian policies towards Arab nations, especially Saudi Arabia, were positive.

However, Rouhani’s Gulf trip and the comments of the Iranian policy makers reflect the mounting pressure of the US under Trump, who strengthened ties with the Gulf, and its concessions have come to dog US sanctions, which may develop into a US-GCC alliance against Iranian influence in the region. Therefore, Tehran’s attempts to preemptively abort this alliance could be detrimental to its regional spillovers and its search for a means to end this siege. Still, it seeks the reaction of the Gulf states towards the US pressures on Tehran. Tehran also wants to divide the Gulf’s unified position regarding its expansionist agenda in the region.

Iran fears the Saudi-Turkish rapprochement in light of Erdogan’s visit to Riyadh and his focus on forging a Saudi-Turkish alliance to establish safe zones in Syria. Iran is facing major problems related to its expansionist ambitions in the region. These problems have always been costly for Iran, especially in Syria and Yemen. In Syria, Russia and Iran have interlocking interests and divergent views on the fate of Assad and the future of Shiite militias and Hezbollah. In Yemen, the developments resulted in outcomes that were the opposite of what Iran had been planning.

Iranian militias lost key areas to the Saudi-backed pro-legitimacy forces. In this respect, insiders say that Tehran will be forced to offer more concessions so that it can extricate itself from the Yemeni morass.28 This trip also reflects pragmatic and realpolitik policies that could change at any time based on the situation on the international arena. Such behaviors calling for rapprochement are of a tactical, not strategic, nature. The record tells us that Iran yields to pressures in times of crisis. This is one of the main features of Tehran’s policy and it has clearly been reflected in its behaviors in the region. Iran bets on breaking up the GCC unity through overtures to Oman as its longstanding ally. Oman mediated with Washington in favor of Iran on several occasions. However, Oman is no longer able to play the same role, as it must build stronger ties with the new US administration.

Since the outbreak of Khomeini’s uprising in 1979, Saudi Arabia has been well aware of the fact that Tehran’s concessions do not stem from its genuine goodwill with respect to establishing neighborliness-based ties with the Gulf countries. Coinciding with Rouhani’s assertion that negotiations and understanding are the only means to settle the region’s disputes, the commander of the IRGC’s ground troops, Brigadier General Mohammed Pakpour, asserted that Iran would send ground troops to Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, reiterating that this support had been offered to those countries previously and that it was still being offered. On February 13, 2017, a day before Rohani’s Gulf tour, the Iranian National Council of Resistance (NCRI) revealed that training centers for foreign militias are spreading across different parts of Iran (approximately 14 camps). Those militias, coming from Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, are being trained by the IRGC’s Quads Force.29 Therefore, on several occasions Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir asserted that there would be no mediation with Iran as long as it continued its spillovers in the region. In his speech at the Munich conference on February 18, 2017, he reiterated the assertion that his country

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refused Iran’s invitation, extended to GCC countries, for joint cooperation to reduce tensions in the region, describing Tehran as the main sponsor of terror in the world and a destabilizing force in the Middle East. Al-Jubeir said that a change in hostile behaviors should be seen in actions, not just words. The Saudi kingdom establishes ties with regional countries based on neighborliness.

According to the Saudi vision, Iran should meet some of the Kingdom’s demands, which include:30 » Halting its expansionist activities and sectarian meddling in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon. » Refraining from sending militiamen and military advisors to Syria, Iraq and Yemen. » Halting the formation of terror cells and the planting of moles in Arab embassies » Dropping principles related to the exporting of the revolution to neighboring countries. » Closing down all Shiite militia camps.

It has been ruled out that Iran will take such steps, given its insistence on going ahead with its colonial expansionist project to revive the Persian Empire. It benefits from the weakness of the Arab countries due to the prolonged crises in the Middle East.

2- Offering concessions on the pilgrimage issue In March 2017, Iran’s organization in charge of Hajj affairs announced that it would be pulling out all the stops regarding the ceremonies of Kamil prayer and the Day of Innocence for about 85,000 Iranian pilgrims. It added that those pilgrims would perform Hajj this year.31 Ali Qadi Askar, Khamenei’s representative for Hajj affairs, said that if the Saudi side had taken these steps in the previous year, the Iranian pilgrims would have performed Hajj. He added: “Such ceremonials will be carried out at the residences of the Iranian pilgrims.” He also said, “At the directives of King Salman bin Abdel-Aziz, the Guardian of the Two Holy Mosques, Riyadh has pondered paying recompenses for the Iranian pilgrims killed in the crane collapse incident. [The] Bin Laden firm will pay the money for those affected.”32 3-The Iranian foreign minister’s visit to Qatar Months before visiting Kuwait, the Iranian foreign minister visited Qatar on March 9, 2017. He met the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, in Doha. The following day, he sent a handwritten message to the emir of Kuwait. This is proof that his trip to Oman and Kuwait had not succeeded in dividing the Gulf. Such schemes stumbled in the face of a unified GCC position against Iran’s policies in the region, especially his [Iranian FM] comments in Kuwait, where he said that Iran desires to boost cooperation with its GCC neighbors, adding that the differences between the two sides merely misunderstandings. These GCC trips, including Qatar’s visit, proved that Iran seeks a channel through which to correspond with US President Donald Trump. It also seeks a strategy, through a GCC mediator, to restore the balance between Tehran and Washington in the Gulf.33 GCC CONDITIONS FOR RESTORING TIES WITH IRAN

Refraining from meddling in the internal affairs of the GCC states.

The Iranian revolution is an internal affair.

It must not be exported to Arab countries.

Enhancing citizenship principles, based on loyalty to homeland, not sects.

However, Tehran does not seek in earnest to improve ties with the GCC. The GCC laid out realistic principles to deal with Iran, with three main demands. First: Iran should accept the notion that a positive relationship is based on non-interference in internal affairs. Second: It should also be convinced that its revolution is an internal affair and that exporting it to Arab countries is

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not permissible. Third: Tehran should accept homeland-based citizenship, not a sect-based one.

However, Iran has been attempting to foment divisions in the GCC and to convince the outside world that it is earnest in its efforts to improve ties with the Gulf. It is trying to infiltrate the Gulf through Qatar and its media, which attempts to portray Iran as a friend to the Arabs, and states that it is open to cooperation with the GCC. Through its movements, Tehran seeks to contain any US pressure in light of President Trump’s pledges to apply more sanctions and hold it accountable for its role in sponsoring terror worldwide.34 » Enhancing Saudi and regional movements aimed at besieging Iran In the first half of 2017, Saudi leadership intensified its movements at the regional and international levels, which raised Iranian concerns in this respect.

PRINCIPLES OF SAUDI DIPLOMACY AMID A SHIFT TOWARDS EASTERN ASIA

Diversifying ties and partnerships with a focus on East Asia.

Supporting investment firms within the 2030 vision.

Turning strategic partnerships into executive programs on the ground.

Discussing political developments and the issues of Arab and Muslim nations.

Bringing about just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

Penning bilateral deals to boost the base of cooperation.

Combating terrorism and boosting cooperation on security.

1- The Saudi shift towards eastern Asia King Salman Ibn Abdul-Aziz visited seven Asian countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, China, the Maldives, the Republic of Brunei and Jordan), where he signed multi-billion-dollar trade and investment agreements in various sectors, especially the oil sector. Malaysia, which has significant economic ties with Saudi Arabia, has a trade exchange volume of about $32 billion over the past ten years. Saudi Arabia is Malaysia’s No. 19 partner globally. It is ranked 23rd on the list of countries receiving Malaysia’s exports. Indonesia, whose trade exchange with Riyadh reached $5.4 billion in 2015, signed investment agreements worth $7 billion.

As Saudi Arabia has set a target to become a leading investor worldwide, King Salman’s visits to China and Japan (the second and third biggest world economies) and the inked agreements demonstrate a genuine translation in the role the Saudis seek to assume worldwide when it comes to investments. The Kingdom seeks bulk and diversified investment portfolios at home and overseas, especially in technology coming from Japan. The volume of trade between the Kingdom and Japan reached $32 billion in 2015, while the trade exchange between the Kingdom and China hit $69.1 billion in 2014. Knowing that China is working on a project to revive the land and sea silk route as a trade route connecting the East with the West, Saudi Arabia is introducing itself, through its strategic position between the world’s continents, as a country that can be the

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focal point of three continents, thereby pushing trade, transport and investment to a wider and more positive perspective for itself and the world.

Saudi Arabia is a country well-known for its extensive relations with the world and it has a unique network of communications. This is one of its strengths. King Salman has introduced these relations within the broader and more global vision of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This approach was embodied in the 2030 vision.

Since its foundation, Saudi leadership has been keen to lay the groundwork for the development of Saudi-Asian strategic relations and partnerships. The aforesaid visits established a new era of Saudi-Asian cooperation and emphasized the importance of enhancing communication, rapprochement and an Asian-Saudi dialogue. Such rapprochement is in support of this vision of wise Saudi leadership, which has always called for the Kingdom to build diversified and balanced international economic relations through the forging of strategic partnerships that will allow the Kingdom to play the role of a bridge between the countries with which the Kingdom enjoys strong relations, such as the Asian region, the United States and the European Union.

The development of relations with the countries of South-East Asia is of strategic importance to the Kingdom, since these countries have been adopting – and continue to adopt – positions consistent with those of Saudi Arabia on many regional and international issues. Boosting cooperation between Saudi Arabia and eastern Asia will represent a milestone. Such a boom would start a new chapter in relations between the two sides. The Kingdom enjoys a heightened spiritual, civilizational and economic status. Meanwhile, the Asian countries have massive economic, technical, cultural and human capabilities.

Iran seemed to be unable to conceal its ‘concerns’ about the Asian trips of King Salman.

This prompted Tehran to lash out at Malaysia, as the concluding statement of King Salman’s visit accused Iran of stirring disputes and sectarianism in the region. Kuala Lumpur expressed extreme concern about Tehran’s meddling in the internal affairs of the region’s countries. It also asserted the need to abide by neighborliness and respect for the sovereignty of these countries. This seemed to be an attempt by Tehran to pick a fight with Kuala Lumpur. Behram Qassemi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, said that raising such issues by Malaysia is unacceptable, describing his country as “a fosterer and sponsor of peace, and it is still based on mutual respect and refraining from interfering in affairs of all countries.” This incident signals Tehran’s rising concerns, given that the statement stressed the importance of boosting cooperation between the two sides in the political, economic, cultural and military arenas. The statement also highlights the necessity of enhancing military collaboration represented in joint drills. The two nations agreed to intensify and collaborate on the Islamic world’s efforts to stand up to extremism and sectarianism and also to intensify efforts aimed at combating terror and eliminating its sources.35 2- Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir paid a surprise visit to Iraq This trip befuddled Iranian policymakers, and the Iranian media analyzed the reasons behind the visit, quoting remarks from the minister. The Iranian position on the visit is reminiscent of Saudi Arabia’s move to open its embassy in Baghdad a year ago in an attempt to bring Iraq back to its Arab sphere. This decision represented a severe blow to Iran’s schemes, as it has been working there since 2003 to isolate Baghdad from its Arab sphere. The movements of Ambassador Tamer al-Sabhan inside Iraq were aimed to strengthen ties with the main factions on the Iraqi landscape – Shiites and Sunnis, Arabs and Kurds. Iran was bothered by the move, so it prodded its militias in Iraq to target him [al-Sabhan]. History and geography dictate that sooner or later Iraq will return to the Arab world’s racial and cultural origins. Arab nations, primary among them Saudi Arabia, are working to strengthen ties with Baghdad.36

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3- The ugly face of Iran: Disintegration and spillovers continue Movements on the ground are clear proof that Iran’s policies have not changed. Looking at Iranian conduct in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, it is clear that Tehran’s claims about its desire to end rifts within the Gulf are nothing more than a ‘change in tone, not in conduct’. It is still showering militias with personnel, money and weaponry. The Iranian movements are corroborated by statements of officials where Shiite militias are deployed. They assert that Iran is still supporting the militias.

When it comes to changing behaviors and giving up on terror, Iran’s lies could be explained as follows: » Dismantling an Iran-backed terror cell in Bahrain The Bahraini Interior Ministry, on March 4, 2017 dismantled a terrorist cell consisting of 14 members (six of them trained in camps under the supervision of the IRGC, five in the Iraqi Hezbollah camps and three inside Bahrain). The cell was tasked with assassinating police personnel, thereby creating chaos in different parts of the country. The Bahraini media affairs minister, Issa Bin Abdul Rahman Al Hammadi, said the cell received funding, weapons and instructions from Iran. He added: “Manama has already withdrawn its ambassador to Iran in 2015, because Iran has not changed the intrusive behavior toward Bahrain since 2011.” He noted that “If Iran is serious about reforming its relations and building good neighborly relations, its statements must match its actions… Among the evidence confirming their links with Iran is that security forces found documents confirming that they carried out 66 trips to Iran in recent years [and that these] have been used centrally in training to carry out terrorist acts in Bahrain.”37 DATE

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TERROR ACTS

1981

Aborting a bloody coup attempted by the Shiite Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain.

1984

Bahrain dismantled the Shiite party of Da’awa and arrested its cadres involved in clandestine activities undermining public security.

1996

Exposing a terror organization named Hezbollah, which plotted to overthrow the regime. The perpetrators had received training in Tehran.

2011

Mounting terror by Iran backers, capitalizing on the sectarian dimension to achieve its expansionist ambitions in the Sunni kingdom.

2013

A depot of explosives coming from Iran and Iraq was seized. About 1.5 tons of explosives were reported to have been confiscated. Reports said the weapons seized were sufficient to destroy a city as large as Manama.

2016

In June, authorities thwarted a prison break attempt by convicts in terror-related cases.

Bahrain accomplished investigations with 37 terrorists in a terrorrelated case perpetrated in 2014 and 2015. Such crimes had been carried out by Iran-trained terror cells.

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January 2017

The Ministry of Interior declared that a five-member terror cell had carried out an armed attack on a rehabilitating center in Hu. A police officer was killed and another injured while repelling the attack.

Iranian interference in Bahrain and the formation of terrorist cells to destabilize the security and stability of Bahrain are not new things; they started in 1979 when mullahs came to power through an action plan. Through this plan, Iran worked to fan the flames of sedition in Bahrain and to disseminate the ideology of Wilayat al-Faqih to weaken Bahrain and fragment its society.

This plot was carried out through terror cells and sectarian parties backed by clerics believing in this doctrine, including the now-dismantled Wefaq Society in Bahrain, which was chaired by Issa Qassim. This polarizing body launched a program aimed at exhausting the economy and bringing the state to its knees. On direct orders from the IRGC in 1979, the Iranian regime formed terror networks throughout the region in general and in Bahrain in particular.

In his May 3, 2017 televised interview about political connotations of great importance, timing, purpose, content and essence, Saudi Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Prince Mohammed Ibn Salman said that Iran is a state of words, not acts, that it is an expansionist state and not cooperative. He stated that it supports evil, terrorism and instability. “There is no common point between Iran and Saudi Arabia,” he said. “How can you understand the Iranians, especially since Iran’s logic is to pave the way for the Mahdi’s resurrection, and this will be achieved through domination.” He noted the atmosphere for the Mahdi’s coming, and that this will be achieved through control. “The main goal of the Iranian regime is to reach the Muslim Qiblah (Mecca) and we will not wait for Saudi Arabia to become a battlefield for war, but we will make Iran the field of war, because Iran’s extremist ideology is an obstacle to dialogue.”38 The Crown Prince’s remarks came a few days before President Trump’s first foreign visit to Saudi Arabia on May 20 and 21, 2017. This means that Saudi positions are a clear message to the new US administration that the most effective way forward is to adopt a tough policy towards Iran. “There is no way to stop the recklessness of this state, and the time of diplomatic rhetoric is gone.”39 These statements revealed the extent of the falsity of Iran’s moves and its claims that it seeks rapprochement, calm and a resolving of outstanding differences. This was made clear in Iran’s reactions. As soon as the Crown Prince made his statements, which strongly reflected the Saudi discourse, Iran made statements and adopted positions showing the extent of its befuddlement. To the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council,40 the Iranian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ghulam Ali Khoshro, sent a letter of protest against Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s statements. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Hussein Dehqan said, “If the Saudis commit any act [of aggression] we will only allow a safe place for Mecca and Medina.”41 In addition, an Iranian lawmaker said, “Saudi Arabia will only bear two hours of war if it counters the Iranian forces.”42 Foreign Minister Mohammad Jawad Zarif said, “The Saudi authorities are seeking tension, and it is clear that the Saudi government is not in a position and stature to threaten the Iranian Republic.”43 However, Iran soon backed down on its statements as it became aware that the policy of patience was gone forever. Saudi Arabia is at harmony at home, as well as regionally and internationally, and this is one of the strengths that could turn the table against Iran and its revolution. Also, Arab and Islamic support exists for Saudi measures against the mullahs who sabotaged the region. This reflects the Saudi insistence on – after having given Iran the opportunity to back down on its subversive policies – besieging Iran and moving the battle inside Iran through a mobilization of the region and the whole world against the Iranian state and its revolution. This comes after the world powers, especially the US under Obama, allowed Iran to build its regional power over the dead bodies of the region’s peoples.

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» The Iranian position on the Gulf crisis with Iran The Qatari crisis remains stalled more than a month and a half after Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain decided to take economic and political measures against the Qatari regime. About 59 people and various charities in Qatar had been placed on the terror list in response to Doha’s support of terrorism and its meddling in the affairs of countries in the region, as well as its undermining of security therein. The move also came as the Qatari regime refused the 13 demands brought forth by the four boycotting nations. Such demands complied with the agreements signed with Riyadh in 2013 and 2014.

While the four nations tackled the crisis by giving Qatar an opportunity to distance itself from Iran, which threatens the security of the region and the GCC, the Doha regime continued to defy the four nations, threatening to internationalize the issue, victimizing itself and relying on regional allies like Iran, thereby capitalizing on the divergence of views on the crisis. So as not to cause harm to the interests of the Qatari people, the four boycotting nations did not escalate their efforts after the negative response from Qatar.

Promptly, Iran seized the opportunity, providing Qatar with foodstuffs. On June 19, Ali Hemati, head of the industry and minerals trade in the Fars province, said that exports from the Fars province to Qatar rose after the crisis, with hundreds of tons having been exported.44 Iran also opened its airspace for about 100 flights from Qatar per day, which increased the movement of the Iranian airspace by 17 percent.45 On the political level, the Doha regime was exposed as a principal sponsor and backer of terror given its links to Tehran. This will increase its international isolation in light of the international policy aimed at fighting terror, especially that of Iran. The international community will take harsh measures against countries sponsoring terror. This includes Iran’s backing of Shiite militias in Syria, Iraq and Yemen against the Sunnis. This policy appeared clearly at the US-Islamic summit hosted

by Mecca in 2017.

The strengthening relations between Tehran and Doha raised fears among the Arab nations seeking to curtail Iranian influence and to curb its expansionism. At the time, Doha pushed itself closer to Iran, retaining official diplomatic ties at the highest level, with Doha making its media platforms an open arena for Iranian politicians. After a war of words heightened between Tehran and the Gulf states over Iran’s destructive policies in the region, which led the GCC states to cut their ties with Iran after the attacking of Saudi embassies in Tehran and Mashhad, Doha kept strong relations with Tehran.

The Qatari media tried to burnish Iran by publishing articles for Iranian policymakers hours before the US-Islamic summit on May 20 and 21. The summit condemned Iranian policies, considering Iranian acts to be one form of global terror that should be crushed. A Qatar-financed website published a report from Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Jawad Zarif that attacked the Gulf states and the Riyadh policy in the region, in addition to his call for the start of a dialog. Days after the summit that denounced the Iranian terror, the emir of Qatar and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had a telephone conversation during which they discussed methods of furthering and strengthening Qatari-Iranian cooperation.46 Cooperation between the two countries dates back to 1992, when the border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar contributed to the normalization of bilateral relations between Tehran and Doha after former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani exploited the dispute and announced his support for Qatar. Qatari Emir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, the grandfather of the current emir, sent a message of thanks to Rafsanjani for his support of Qatar. In 1995, the Iranian government offered Qatar an ambitious project to provide fresh water through a pipeline network that starts from the Karun River, southwest of Iran, in the Ahwaz area, and that passes beneath the Iranian coastline to Qatar, with the aim of helping Doha solve its water problem.47

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Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami paid an important visit to Doha in 1999 and witnessed the signing of several agreements in various fields and with respect to a number of regional and international issues. One of the important implications of that visit was the coordination of efforts between the two parties to support the Palestinian movement of Hamas.

This became one of the strongest points of rapprochement between the two countries thereafter.

In 2000, the former emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, paid a visit to Tehran. This was the first visit by a Gulf state ruler to Iran since the revolution and the overthrow of the Shah. In 2006, the Qatari emir visited Iran. In July of the same year, Qatar was the only member, among the 15 members of the Security Council, that voted against Council Resolution No. 1696, which called on Iran to halt its nuclear program. Doha then called on Qatar to resolve all issues and disputes among countries by peaceful means, saying that Iran had the right to own a peaceful nuclear program and that, at the same time, the region had the right to live in security and stability.48 In May 2017, after Hassan Rouhani won a second presidential term in Iran, Prince Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani was keen to congratulate him, stressing “the need to expand bilateral relations, given there is no impediment to their development.” Meanwhile, President Rouhani said that all conditions are conducive to the expansion of the spheres of cooperation between the two countries in the political and economic fields; he stressed the need for this.

With respect to economic ties, they are not confined to trade exchange, but also involve the coordination of the joint investment of the gaseous wealth of the continental shelf, which maintains several large gas fields, the most important of which is the North Gas Field. Reports say it is the largest in the world, with 50.97 trillion cubic meters of gas and an area of 9,700 square kilometers, of which 6,000 are located in Qatar’s territorial waters and 3,700 in Iranian waters.

The two sides signed an agreement to organize work in the joint field in 2015.49 From the perspective of gain and loss, Qatar should not lose its Arab neighbors for the sympathy of the superpowers. It is in Qatar’s interest to have normal ties with its neighbors politically, economically and commercially, since it is not an influential state in the world order.

If Doha chooses defiance, the results will be costly. The superpowers that have ties with the four boycotting nations will not ditch them in favor of an alliance with Qatar.

Therefore, Qatar should realize that reliance on Iran is a bad bet. Qatar’s positive stance on Iran was not sufficient for Tehran, whose media outlets described Doha as the top terror sponsor.

The Qatari emir was not able to improve the tarnished image of his country by making positive remarks or spending billions of dollars for Iran’s sake. The Shiite state did not heed the cables of congratulations the emir of Qatar sent on different occasions to the supreme leader in Tehran.

Over the past months, Iranian websites have criticized the Qatar’s financing of the Iranian film “The Salesman.” Iranian political circles have warned the Iranian director to not deal with Qatar.

“Farhadi should have been aware of the fact that he is collaborating with a regime that deals with anything with money. According to media outlets, the Iranian director was expected to say nay to the Qatari government, which finances terrorists, and not extend his hand to the terrorists’ godfather in the region,” as quoted by Kayhan newspaper, noting that Qatar has funded terror groups such as ISIS and Nusra Front. » Results during the period when the strategic report was prepared By reviewing the history of Iran-Gulf relations in general and relations between Doha and Tehran during the semi-annual strategic reporting period in particular, the following conclusions can be reached: »»There are regional and international movements to besiege Iran because of the escalating interventionist behavior against some of the Gulf states and neighboring countries, such as Iraq and countries that affect Gulf security indirectly, such as Syria and Lebanon. The impact on

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the security of the entire region takes an upward trend in light of the changes that occurred in the region and enhanced the Iranian presence, namely, the fall of Iraq in 2003, the Arab Spring revolutions of 2011 and the nuclear agreement signed by Tehran in July 2015. The West’s sitting at the negotiating table with Tehran has stimulated – or, rather, exposed – Iran’s sense of superiority fueled by its possession of power. »»Despite talk of a new policy brought about by President Trump, who entered office with an agenda reversing that of his predecessor, Obama, the situation did not differ when it came to expansionist policies as of the time of the preparation of this current strategic report and the time of the preparation of the previous strategic report during the second half of 2016. Despite the tough regional and international siege imposed on Iran, Iranian expansionist schemes are still proceeding in Iraq, Syria and Bahrain. Iranian officials have changed their remarks, but the state is still adopting the same agenda reflecting its ugly face. Since 1979, Iran has been seeking to become a regional power, whether ruled by conservatives or reformists. For Iran, the core aim of this ambition is to become a dominating power in the region. Thus, it is correct to say that the Iranian policy is plagued by tensions, even if it witnesses some intervals of calm, especially towards the GCC states. This did not change the core tenets of its policy, which is aimed at playing a regional role that pays no heed to principles of good-neighborliness. Under Rouhani, Iran’s influence in the Gulf reached its apex. Also, the Hezbollah militia was established during the era of Rafsanjani. The supreme leader in Iran has the final say when it comes to governance policies. »»The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, adopted tougher policies towards Iran after a long period of patience, adherence to the principle of good-neighborly relations and attempts to contain Iran to foster stability in the region. This appears clearly in the comments of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman when he said that there is no way to stop the recklessness of this state, and that the time of soft rhetoric is gone. If Iran wants to improve ties with the GCC states, it must change its behaviors, not just its words. At the time of Rouhani’s visit to Kuwait and Oman, Iran sent money and weaponry to Houthis, and Bahrain declared that it had dismantled an Iranbacked terror cell. »»In light of Tehran’s insistence on continuing to pursue the same policies towards the Gulf states, if a consensus is reached that Gulf-Iran relations are unstable and escalating in tension, the Gulf states should have alternatives and options for dealing with Iran in the coming days. This appeared clearly in some policies, acts and even crises created by Iran. Such crises and areas of tension dominating Gulf-Iran ties lead to one conclusion: Iran is the principal responsible for devastating these ties through its insistence on adopting interventionist policies towards the GCC states. »»The expected change in Iranian policy towards the GCC countries is linked to a settling of the outstanding issues between the two sides, which represent a genuine obstacle to the development of these relations. These obstacles include: Iran’s annexation of the three UAE islands; Gulf-Iranian differences with respect to the security of the Arabian Gulf; Iranian threats to obstruct navigation in the Strait of Hormuz; Iranian interference in the affairs of the GCC; and Iranian meddling in neighboring Gulf states. » How will Gulf-Iran ties proceed in the future?

In light of the previous results, the rapid regional and international developments and the new US policy, and considering the multiplicity and complexity of the issues of cooperation and conflict between the GCC countries and Iran, it is difficult to accurately predict the course of these relations. However, there are three expected scenarios when it comes to the shape of Gulf-Iranian relations in the foreseeable future:

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The first scenario: This scenario could happen through the establishment of a dialogue between the two sides through official channels of correspondence on the aforesaid main issues of disagreement – a dialogue conducted through actions, not just words. This scenario is the most favorable from the Gulf states’ perspective despite the tough policy Saudi Arabia is pursuing towards Iran. Achievement of this scenario hinges on Iran’s genuine desire to let good-neighborly relations prevail over hegemony, regional domination and expansionist projects depending on the mindset of arrogance and power. However, in light of Iranian expansionist projects, ongoing movements in the region and the new US policy, this scenario will not be in the cards until the end of this year.

The second scenario: This scenario may be fuelled by the possibility of escalating tensions between the two sides. Tensions may exceed the point of balance and result in some sort of direct military confrontation, though the scope of conflict is expected to be limited given the Iranian belief that the Gulf states cannot stand up to its ambitions and expansions because of Iran’s military superiority and its control over Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon, as well as because of its loyalist militias and religious influence in Gulf societies. The odds are high that this will not occur since the Gulf states do not adopt the use of force as a means of settling disputes with the outside world. Additionally, the international community has imposed a host of restraints designed to deter any irrational behavior on the part of Iran, foremost of which are maintaining safe passage in maritime lanes, strengthening the military capabilities of the Gulf states, the creation of the new US policy under President Trump, the alliances forged by Saudi Arabia (including the Arab and Muslim coalitions) and Trump’s commitment to protecting the Gulf.

The third scenario: This scenario suggests the continuation of tensions between the two sides throughout the period of this report’s preparation, given the remarks made by the senior officials of the GCC states and Saudi Arabia in particular, in addition to the continuation of Iranian expansionism. On the ground, odds that this scenario will come to fruition are low given the regional developments, with many problems still unresolved, especially in Syria, Yemen and Iraq.

In general, there are controls that should govern the future course of Iran-Gulf relations, achieving the interests of both parties and enhancing the safety and security of the Gulf. The ball is in Iran’s court because it is Iran that is seeking to dominate the region, violating all norms and rules with respect to relationships among countries. Iran should adhere to the principles of mutual respect and non-meddling, respecting regional sovereignty and borders and abiding by the laws regulating maritime navigation, especially in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, as well as refraining from making provocative remarks that hint, implicitly or explicitly, at the possibility of the use of force against the countries of the region.

Second Axis » The future of Iran’s role in Syria after the fall of Aleppo In 2017, the regional and international arenas witnessed changes, including the fall of the historic city of Aleppo, the beginning of a new American administration with a new vision and strategy different from those of the previous administration, and the launch of Arab-American military and political alliances which overshadowed the sectarian and expansionist projects in the region. This country reconsidered its geopolitical plans in light of these alliances despite attempts to fan flames of conflict in the region. Iran is among those countries in the area that realized its schemes are being besieged regionally and internationally in northern and eastern Syria. Tehran seeks to push through its schemes to create a route passing through Baghdad and Damascus to the Mediterranean. These plots were deemed unsuccessful, as Tehran lacks the capabilities that would enable it to push forward. Also, the changes the region is witnessing, especially with respect to the US role in besieging Iran, are keeping the door open for a confrontation between the US military and the Iranian militias.

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Iran seeks to create more tension in Syria, especially in the desert area in the east, by impeding the international communiqués and conferences calling for the settling of the deadly dispute in Syria. In early 2017, it declared its refusal of the Turkish-Russian ceasefire deal, preferring the military option of making more gains on the ground, imposing policies of fait accompli and establishing control over the new Syrian equation. We shall focus on three main points from which we can foreshadow the results and scenarios of Iran’s role in Syria in the coming days. First, the new variables that arose during the Syrian conflict and its impact on Iran’s role in the first half of 2016, such as the new US strategy towards Iran, Russian-Iranian differences and RussianTurkish rapprochement. Second, Iran’s role in the global dispute over the Syrian Desert. Third, the impact of the Astana talks on the Iranian role in the Syrian crisis. » The new variables of the Syrian conflict and how they affected Iran’s role: Political literature refers to a set of internal and external variables that can ultimately constitute the external behavior of an international unit towards a crisis, conflict or tension.

Although a difference exists in terms of the classification and impact on the foreign policy options of that international unit, it gives a special character to that unit, especially in the area of foreign policy and its circles. The interaction and entanglement of these variables lead to the shaping of a certain type of external political behavior for that unit.

From this perspective, the determinants of the Iranian role in Syria vary. Internal determinants include those in the categories of geo-strategic, demographic, political, economic, military or cultural, while external determinants include regional determinants such as the Iranian Gulf crisis, the Turkish actor, the Israeli actor, regional alliances, etc. International determinants include the new US strategy under the Trump administration, the Russian actor, the European influence and the nature of the world order. All these determinants affect Iranian decision-making in areas of conflict, whether in northern Syria or eastern Syria.

We are not talking about all the previous determinants addressed in the first semi-annual strategic report issued by the Gulf Arab Center for Strategic Studies at the end of 2016. Instead, we will focus on the new determinants that surfaced during the preparation of this report during the first half of 2017 and that influenced the Iranian role in the aspects of expansion and decline, as follows: 1- The new US strategy on Iran The US administration under former president Obama steered the conflict, leading to the current outcome, with Iran dominating the scene. This occurred through an escalation of the conflict, which became a problem that besieged the region’s countries and that gave rise to infighting. In Syria in particular, the United States and the international community refused to intervene to stop the killing and displacement of the Syrian people and the destruction of Syria.

Therefore, the regime was allowed to resort to the Lebanese militia of Hezbollah as well as the Iraqi and Afghan Shiite militias. This led to a conflict that ended up as sectarian strife.50 When President Trump took office, the US foreign policy saw drastic changes that affected the Iranian role in Syria, in both the north and the east. President Trump brought about ‘leading from the front’, which means engaging directly to solve the crises in the region to achieve US aims.

In this context, the US refuses Iran’s unilateral moves, so it opposes the Iranian project in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The Middle East’s affairs in general and Iran’s in particular have been high on President Trump’s agenda since he came to power. He once described the nuclear deal with Iran as ‘stupid’.51 He also lashed out at Iran, describing it as the number one sponsor of terror in the world, one seeking to undermine regional security. Trump vowed to crack down on Iranian militias and the Lebanon-based, Iran-backed Hezbollah, calling for more sanctions on Iran and freezing its assets to undermine its influence in the region. He hinted at the possibility of the use of military

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force against Iran.52 The US’s anti-Iran strategy could be seen clearly in the Syrian conflict, as it curbed Iran’s role in northern and eastern Syria (the desert and peninsula). It appeared clear in the following stances and movements: » As to the positions: The position of the new US administration has been declared expressly on several occasions and in several forums. In his speech at the US-Islamic summit convened on May 21, President Trump said that the Iranian regime is the top sponsor of international terror. He added that it foments hatred in the Middle East, especially in Syria, in a way that fosters terror. He blamed Iran for the crises gripping the region, saying: “Iran trains and arms militias in the region, and has been adopting ‘Death to America’ and Israel slogans for years and interferes in Syria, emboldening Assad to go ahead with his crimes.” He called for isolating Iran internationally, as it trains, arms and finances terror militias and extremist groups in Syria, Iraq and Yemen to spread chaos and subversion.53 » As to the acts: The US did not simply speak of besieging Iran in Syria. Washington did it on the ground in line with the new strategy to maintain its interests and protect its allies by strengthening ties with them, as they were neglected under Obama because he opted to negotiate with the Iranians. In light of the new strategy, US circles took earnest steps to tighten the noose around Iran’s neck in northern and eastern Syria. These steps included: 2- Targeting the bases, areas and convoys controlled by Iran-backed militias:

Source: Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper

Three days after a chemical attack killed dozens of civilians in Khan Shaykhoun, the US fired 59 Tomahawk missiles on the Assad regime base of al-Shayrat, where Iranian forces were posted.54 US-led coalition aircraft conducted a raid on a military convoy of Iranian militia on May 17, 2017. It was advancing towards the Al-Tanf military base on the Iraqi-Jordanian-Syrian border triangle, as US Defense Secretary Jim Matisse announced on May 20, 2017. The US targeted a convoy of militants believed to be affiliated with Iran and the Syrian regime near the border triangle with Iraq and Jordan.55 Modernizing al-Tanf base: This is a training camp located at the point of convergence of the Syrian border with Iraq and Jordan. Its foremost mission is to train and arm the Free Syrian Army (FSA) forces. At the base, 150 US troopers help the FSA’s Guerillas of the Revolution Brigade’s fighters in addition to 50 UK troopers and dozens of European advisers. The Americans are seeking to upgrade this base for a few reasons. It is the gateway to the Abukamal area in the eastern countryside of Der el Zour. This is a key area when it comes to crushing ISIS. It is also the security belt of Jordan from the northern borders in the face of any threats posed by ISIS or Iranian militias.56 Establishing al-Zakf base: This base is a training camp based in the al-Zakf area, located 70 kilometers northeast of the al-Tanf international base. It is just 30 kilometers south of the city of Abu Kamal from the Deir ez -Zour countryside. There, troopers of the US-

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led coalition from different nationalities are deployed for training, advisory and logistic missions in collaboration with FSA’s Guerrillas of the Revolution. The mission of the coalition’s troopers is temporary. The US has set up this base to counter and besiege Iranian threats. The coalition chose this area because it is located at a rearguard in the Guerillas of the Revolution’s fight against ISIS. Also, it is a gateway to the provinces of Homs, Deir ez -Zour and Sweida and the city of Palmyra.

In addition, the area is a key staging area on the road to the besieged area of eastern Qalamoun and the countryside of Damascus. Yet the base allows the FSA fighters to move freely in the Syrian Desert towards the boundaries of Abu Kamal in the countryside of Deir ez -Zour without being obstructed by ISIS terrorists.57 However, there is still an urgent question: Can President Trump establish a special strategy to bar Iran from penetrating the region or will he accept the status quo, adopting the policy of brinksmanship enforced by his predecessors? This policy was first applied by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the mid-1950s. This strategy depends on escalating war in the media, depending on threats, portraying matters as if the catastrophe is looming to force the other party to sit at the negotiating table and offer concessions. However, this policy requires leaders of special capabilities as well as full readiness to go to war if it breaks out, lest there be grave consequences. A nation could be catapulted into the abyss. Obama was used to threatening Iran to the extent that one who listened to his speeches imagined that Iran would be razed to the ground overnight. On the ground, Obama sought to succor Iran, inking the nuclear agreement between the two sides.58 » Russian-Iranian differences: The alliance between the two countries can be described as one driven by necessity. Four centuries of historical hostility and decades of ideological differences cannot create a strategic partnership between any two nations. Instead, it is a unique partnership of necessity. Between Moscow and Tehran, there are differences in platforms, objectives and means.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of Washington’s most influential foreign policy veterans, has laid out one of the best-known theories of international relations. It is the theory of alliances and intersections. The crux of this theory is that the advantages are always snatched by those possessing more power, and that those who are less powerful make no gains.59 This theory can be applied to the Russian-Iranian alliance. Day by day, the platforms and means of both Russia and Iran started to intersect. Russia’s foremost objective is to protect its influence in the Mediterranean represented in the Tartus base, which has strategic importance due to its location.

It represents a strong launch pad towards both allies and foes in the region. It is considered one of the most important Russian naval bases in the world. It is a transit gateway to the region and a permanent foothold for Russia on the Mediterranean, allowing it to restore its glory in that region.

The Russians also hope to win concessions from the US on international issues such as Ukraine and the missile shield on its borders.60 Russia is aware that ceding Syria will result in heavy economic losses. Russia’s current investments in Syria amount to $19.4 billion. It has opportunities to export goods to Syria at an annual average of $1.1 billion and in 2011 it inked arms contracts worth $4 billion.61 If Syria gets a new regime that is hostile to Moscow, the latter will lose these arms deals.62 Moscow is also concerned about a new political equation in which Moscow is not an influential actor: Russian decision-makers consider Syria to be its last card in the region. Moscow lost many areas of influence, the last of which was Libya. Its presence in Syria makes it an influential player and actor in the new equation within Syria and the entire region. Once the region’s political map is fully rearranged to maximize its strategic advantages, Russia will continue implementing its old dream of restoring the glory of tsarist Russia in the region’s warm waters. Therefore, Russia is well

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aware of the fact that if it loses Syria, it will definitely lose for good its presence in the region, as the new map will be drawn up by Europe and the US, who will assign roles and distribute the spoils of war.63 Iran adopts ideology as a starting point to wrest control of the Shiite doctrine. If objectives are different, the means will diverge. On Syria, Russia sees the necessity of protecting the regime through the enhancement of its army’s capabilities, enabling it to retake the territories it lost so as to rebalance the conflict before sitting at the negotiating table. The political solution will then be based on keeping Assad, as well as the regime’s inner circle, in office. As to Iran, Russia aims to protect the regime through a decisive victory over the revolutionaries by enhancing (at the expense of the regular army) the role of militias and by establishing both Hezbollah-model militias and other militias that mimic those of Iraq.64 Russia-Iran differences were apparent after the Russian-Turkish deal concluded in late 2016 and earlier in 2017. This resulted in the evacuation of civilians and revolutionary factions from Aleppo’s liberated parts. The deal was concluded behind Iran’s back, as Russia sees itself as the main actor in Syria and believes that other ‘subordinates’ must toe its line. Iran tried to block the evacuation of the besieged civilians in Aleppo but Russia threatened to open fire on those attempting to obstruct the deal, including the Iranian militias and Assad regime forces. Russian jets targeted Iranian militias in the al-Rashedain area, sending the message that Iran must not disobey Russia. Finally, Iran was forced to comply with the Russian instructions, which caused it to appear as a secondary actor on the Syrian political and military arenas. This reveals the enormity of the pressures that Russia places on Iran. However, this seems to be inadmissible for Iran’s leaders, who see their role being dwarfed by the alliance between Russia and Turkey. This alliance quashes the plans Iran has been developing since it intervened in Syria with the aim of making Syria purely an area of influence for Iran.65 » The Russian-Turkish rapprochement Russia’s understanding with Turkey, especially after the Battle of Aleppo, revealed that Iran can easily work against the interests of Russia. Hence, Russia realized the importance of striking a balance through rapprochement with Turkey and barring Iran from having the final say on military decisions on the ground. In March 2017, Russia declared the formation of a new Syrian militia under the pretense of pumping new blood into the regime’s army. Despite declaring that these militias are loyal to Assad, they are, in fact, loyal to Russia, which finances them. The new militia is known as the Fifth Corps.66 Many factors pushed Russia and Turkey to seek rapprochement in the first half of 2017, primary among them economic ties, which declined after the downing of the Russian jet, the Turkish tourism sector, Turkish foodstuff exports and natural gas, multi-billion-dollar mega projects and the strengthening ties between Turkey and the West. The US is helping Kurdish factions in Syria and refuses to turn in Gulen. As to the EU, it is at loggerheads with Turkey due to the low-paced\ frozen EU admission talks, the issue of refugees, the passive stance towards the failed coup, the renouncing of its obligation to defend Turkey and the withdrawal of Patriot missiles when the Russian-Turkish spat flared. These tensions revived Turkey’s desire to adopt a new foreign policy that was less dependent on the West. Turkey also realized that Moscow is the main actor in the Syrian file politically and militarily after its remarkable presence, which gained the consent of the international community. World powers cooperated with Russia in Syria as if it were a mandate.67 However, do the aforesaid factors indicate that Turkish-Russian relations are strong and deepseated, and that the understandings between the two sides are for the long term, laying the groundwork for a strategic alliance? In fact, many factors impede this rapprochement. Foremost among them is that a change in Russian strategy is in the cards. Turkey managed to proceed with

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its understandings with Russia under the guise of reaching a political solution and cutting a ceasefire agreement. Repeating this scenario would be difficult if Russia imposed an Aleppo-style solution, using excessive force. This scenario could be read in the current political and military map of Syria. Multiple top politicians warned of this scenario, including the French foreign minister while he was at a joint press conference with Dimisitura in March 2017. Yet Turkey is still a NATO member, and this status puts restraints on its ties with Russia, especially in the event of crises. In addition, any thaw with the West may render Ankara less dependent on Moscow.68 » Second: The Iranian role in the global conflict over eastern Syria » Theoretical introduction to interpret Iran’s role in the conflict over the desert: In political terminology, a “conflict” refers to a contest between two or more parties, each with conflicting objectives. Each party seeks to snatch what the other party seeks to attain. This gives rise to the conflict, as if one party attains what he had been seeking, the other party will be stripped of the same. The conflict is among multiple parties over one thing. Also, developments in the environment of conflict foment them. This environment affects the conflict directly and indirectly. It is just like the issue of international relations. The situation before the Cold War differs entirely from the situation following it. Thus, the monopolar international conflict is different from the bipolar one.69 The Iranian role in the conflict over the Syrian Desert could be seen within the theoretical schools interpreting global conflicts as follows: Ideological: Those who adopt this school of thought say that contradicting ideological projects are the main reason for conflicts. They consider such a conflict as the acutest and most far-reaching among all other forms of conflict known in the past.

Geopolitical: Experts say that conflict arises from pressures that surface due to the struggle for survival, expansion and spillover. Each party’s outlook on borders is always a reason for conflict. If they are considered permanent, this will be an impediment to the state’s expansion and spillovers.

Psychological: Man’s inclination for conflict is an innate trait that can be seen in the tilt of some decision makers towards authoritarianism and control. It can also be seen in the desire for expansion, spilling over and creating high-stake gambles. Conflicts provide an ideal environment for satisfying such desires.70 Nature of government: This school depends on the notion that a relationship exists between theocratic and despotic governance and conflict. Supporters of this theory say that totalitarian regimes – including theocratic ones fueled by doctrine, motives and aims – are a primary reason why conflicts rage.

National interests: Supporters of this theory hypothesize that the main impetus pushing major nations towards conflicts is their desire to protect and develop their national interests by doubling their resources to be a regional superpower – or, as defined by the founder of classic realism theory, Hanz Murjenthaw, conflict is the drive which pushes man to attain power, since interest is synonymous with power.

Role of military commanders’ decision-making circles: According to this theory, regional and international issues that stir up conflicts and tensions are nothing more than pressure groups benefiting from such conflicts. There are considerable pressure groups in decision-making circles, represented primarily by military commanders.71 » The Iranian role in the conflict over the Syrian Desert Iran has been engaged in a conflict over Syria since March 2011, leading it to further complicate and quash any possibility for a political and peaceful settlement. This intervention

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has also led to the marginalizing of internal parties, thereby leading external parties to prevail, especially in the conflict in northern and eastern Syria. The seven phases of the conflict have witnessed a ubiquitous presence and expansionism from Iran to make gains on the ground. It established itself as an insurmountable impediment towards settlement. In the following chapter, we shall review these phases to obtain a full view and analysis of Iran’s role in the conflict: First phase Revolutions turning into armed strife.

Second phase

Third phase

Fourth phase

Fifth phase

Sixth phase

Seventh phase

The rise The prevalence The rise Russia and Iran Conflict Conflict of Shiite of external of ISIS. engage in direct over over eastern militias. parties, mainly confrontation. northern Syria, the Iran and Syria. desert Russia, in the and the conflict. peninsula.

By revising the theories of international disputes and interpretations relating to the ongoing conflicts in a certain country or region, we discover that such conflicts may drag on if the external parties engaged in these disputes have expansionist and colonial plans, with a balance of power preventing each party from achieving a decisive victory over the other parties. These theories also indicate that such conflict shall end if its parties are weak or of average strength, given an intervention by a global superpower or pressure placed upon those parties to cease at a certain stage. Such parties may cease the conflict for fear of their interests, as the latter may intersect with those of the superpowers as the conflict continues.

Based on this method, the conflict should be strictly defined and should identify the disputants, their drives and expansionist projects to judge the future of the Iranian role in the global conflict over eastern Syria. Also, the future of the Iranian project within the framework of the conflict over eastern Syria should be outlined, given the fact that the conflict is raging in sync with the enforcement of the de-escalation zones’ agreement and the direct engagement of the US and its ally Israel in the conflict under Trump. » The scale of the Iranian-global conflict over the Syrian Desert While the conflict rages in northern Syria, another spat is soaring east of Syria, especially in the desert,72 which spreads across several provinces in eastern and central Syria. It is the northeastern part of the provinces of Deraa and Hasaka. Aleppo is located in the southeastern part near the Syrian-Iraqi borders. Palmyra is home to those residing in the desert. According to the Assad regime’s strategy, media outlets there call it the useless Syria and aid no attention to this area throughout the years of conflict, as well as during the rule of the Baath party, using systematic marginalization. This marginalization included decades-long deprivation of development, rendering the region socially and economically backwards. In 2010, illiteracy in this area hit 30 percent, compared to a 15 percent average across Syria.73 Due to the deliberate marginalization by the Assad regime before and after the revolution, extremist forces grew in the oil-rich area. Additionally, the US has its own troops deployed at alTanf base east of the Syrian Desert. Likewise, opposition forces are wrestling for control of wide swathes of territory in eastern Ghouta Qualamoun, indicating that the Assad regime is seeking to maintain a grip on the useful Syria, a term referring to the areas along the Syrian coast as well as the area from Damascus to Aleppo. This area extends from the Lebanese borders in the south to the Turkish borders in the north. The regime used its full military capacity to defend these areas,

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to the extent that it resorted to Russia and Iran, showing no interest in preserving the other areas in the useless Syria. It fails to heed the strategic importance of this area, which foreign and western powers protected.74 The importance of the Syrian Desert can be summarized as follows: Geo-strategically: The Syrian Desert composes about 50 percent of Syrian’s 185,000 kilometers, which ranks it at 188th out of 194 UN member states. The population density in this area does not exceed one person for each kilometer. The area is home to many temples, garrisons, palaces and cities, including Palmyra, al-Rassafa, the Eastern Palace of al-Heir, Bin Wardan Palace, Sun Temple, Anradin and Mary Kingdom as well as several garrisons, such as Negm, Gabar, Nkhila, Saffin and al-Jazla. »»Economically: All oil fields are concentrated in this area. Syria’s oil reserves are estimated to comprise 0.2 percent of global oil reserves. In 2010, Syria’s daily oil production reached 385,000 barrels. It uses 45 percent thereof and exports the remainder. It also consumes one-third of its production of light oil and exports the rest. The oil fields are spread across the desert in Der el-Zor, el-Omr, al-Taim, Hriji, al-Milh, al-Qasabya, Lisyad, Rois, al-Habsa, Raqqa and Wadi Ebeid in eastern Homs.75 »»In addition, the desert area contains gas fields. Syria’s reserves of natural gas amounted to .03 percent of the global reserves. According to a report released by a top global agency, its reserves are concentrated in three main fields in Palmyra and the heart of the desert area. In 2007, as reported by the central agency for statistics, the desert area produced three million tons of phosphate, placing Syria fourth among Arab phosphate-exporting nations.76 »»Politically and strategically: Tribal diversity and the sprawling geography of the desert have made it a hotspot in the Syrian conflict. The area is the main corridor for oil and gas pipelines to other countries in the region, such as Iraq and Iran. Pipelines of gas produced in Egypt pass across Lebanon and Syria to Europe. Also, the pipelines of the Kirkuk gas field to Bani Yas port pass through the desert. In addition, Iran plans to carry its oil and gas exports through the Syrian Desert to the Syrian and Lebanese coast.77 » Iran’s sparking of conflict in Syria’s desert area Realities on the ground prove that Iran sparked the conflict over the Syrian Desert due to the repeated attempts of its militias to reach the al-Tanf crossing as well as Iran’s sending of militias to the Syrian-Iraqi borders in its push to control the Syria-Baghdad international road. This dream prompts Tehran to repeat its attempts, one after the other, from multiple axes. Despite the fact that the Iranian military strategy pays special attention to the key international roads and passages, the post-Raqqa and Der ez -Zor calculations pushed Iran to reconsider its priorities, taking advantage of the quiet battleground provided by the recently inked de-escalation agreement. It set about controlling the Syrian Desert. On May 29, the leader of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, said that the militias reached the Syrian-Iraqi borders after retaking a number of Yazidi villages in Sinjar, especially Kuju village. He asserted that PMU would continue fighting until it clears the entire borderline between Syria and Iraq.

PMU’s closeness to the Syrian border and its push for the desert area is a major step towards its full control of the Baghdad-Damascus road and the establishment of a purely Iranian corridor.78 Therefore, the Damascus-Baghdad road is witnessing a conflict between the US (aided by its allies) and Iran (aided by its militias), triggered by Iranian movements aimed at seizing control of the area so that it can carry out its colonial projects towards the Syrian Desert. With respect to these movements, the landmark step came when the US jets bombed gatherings of Syrian regime forces and Iranian militias three times in less than one month, thereby foiling attempts to dominate the Syrian Desert as follows:

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»»On May 18, US jets targeted a military convoy of Iranian militias after the latter paid no heed to warnings from the US-led coalition to not approach a military base set near the al-Tanf crossing.

The base includes opposition forces and advisors from the US, the UK and Norway. The militias did not respond to the warnings, which led the jets to bomb the convoy.79 »»On May 25, in their bid to sneak into al-Tanf, Iranian militias, along with regime forces, violated the de-escalation lines on the road linking al-Saba Biar and the Zaza checkpoint in the southeastern desert area of Homs. The military convoy consisted of a tank, a cannon, an armored vehicle and 60 troopers. The US issued warnings through the military hotline with Russia.

These warnings were met with no response, triggering a bombardment by the jets of the US-led coalition.80 »»On May 29, US-led coalition warplanes downed a drone flown by Iranian forces, who attacked troopers of the US-led coalition without causing any fatalities. »»Iranian movements towards the Syrian-Iraqi borders and al-Rabea crossing towards the Syrian Desert raised fears among the US, the UK and Jordan that the PMU militias, known for their sectarian practices, would fight along with Assad forces in the Syrian Desert. Such sectarian practices are a source of pride for these militias, with the militia leader [Abu-Azrael] being a case in point.81 Through these airstrikes, which came about in response to Iranian movements in the Syrian Desert, the US intended to send a message to the Syrian regime, Russia and Iran that a corridor starting at Tehran, continuing through Baghdad and Beirut, and ending in Damascus will not come to light. In addition, Washington will not let Iran revive its empire in the Middle East. It will also not allow Iran to seize areas that have been freed from the clutches of ISIS in Syria. These are areas of US-Western influence, and Russia must not expand beyond its exclusive area of influence in western Syria.82 » Iran and the Various Warring Parties on Syria’s Desert Regions Observers of the Syrian conflict seem to concentrate, at the time of writing, on the desert regions of Syria and those adjacent to the border with Iraq. Who will emerge victorious and impose its control on these areas? Will it be the forces of the United States and its coalition or Iran and its proxies?

These regions witness the maelstrom of a regional and international military confrontation between forces whose goals on the ground are as different as their broader geostrategic aims and foreign policies. These parties recognize the fundamental political and economic importance of the region in conflict, which represents the fulcrum from which to launch larger regional and strategic designs heavily determinant of obtaining a possible advantage over the other warring parties. The issue here is how has this region—which extends from the Jordanian–Syrian border to Sinjar in Iraq, and further covering the eastern regions of Syria—developed into this critical node within the conflict? » The Islamic Republic of Iran The long-term goal and strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the desert regions of Syria naturally conform to one of its fundamental foreign policy goals: to extend its influence as much as possible and control to the greatest extent possible the countries that constitute the “Shi’i Crescent,” that is, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and parts of the Arabian Gulf. Simultaneously, Iran pursues particular short-term goals in the desert regions of Syria that serve as building blocks for the implementation of its larger expansionist project. These short-term goals relate to the socalled “Iranian corridor,” Iran’s “Heart of the New Silk Road” project, and control of the Baghdad– Damascus road. They are discussed in the literature with a focus on the challenges they present

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and on the possibility of failure to attain them despite Iran’s considerable allocation of resources to their pursuit. » Syria’s desert regions and the Iranian corridor The “Iranian corridor” refers to a strategic road that connects Tehran with the Mediterranean shores 140 miles south. It begins at the border between Iraqi and Iran and passes through Ba’qoubah, the capital of the Diyala province in Iraq, which lies approximately 60 miles north of Baghdad. It continues to Shirqat in Iraq’s Salah al-Din province, where Iraqi Shi’i militias are active. Subsequently, it reaches Tal Afar—which explains this area’s recent prominence in the conflict—and then the Iraqi border city of Rabi’ah. It enters Syria through Qamshili and Kobane, which both presently are controlled by Syrian Kurds. Next, it passes through Aleppo, 83 which explains the importance of the battle of Aleppo for Iran. From there, according to The Observer, Iran seeks to extend the corridor to Lebanon and/or to the Mediterranean. Pursuing this goal explains the importance of the battles for Ghouta, Wadi Barda, and Zabadani, in which Iran was heavily involved, whether through the popular mobilization Iraqi Shiit militia, the Revolutionary Guards, other militias, or the Lebanese Hezbollah. 84 It is clear that the corridor has still not traversed through Syria’s desert region. However, in May 2017, the Iranian media reported that the trajectory of the corridor had to change to evade clashing with American forces in northeastern Syria and that efforts would proceed to dislodge ISIS from that area.

The trajectory then would shift to cross Mayadin, which is currently occupied by ISIS, to avoid having to pass through Syria’s northeastern Kurdish regions. To achieve this, ISIS must be dislodged from Mayadin and Deir ez-Zor before American arrive there. Herein lies the importance of Baiji as a route toward Mosul, which brings to the fore another aspect of why Mosul has played such an important part in the conflict.

Iraqi officials have in fact stated, “The new trajectory for the corridor extends from Deir ez-Zor to Sakhnah, and from there to Tadmir, and finally to Damascus and then the Lebanese border.

Thereon, [it extends] from Latakia to the Mediterranean.” 85 Several considerations leave no doubt regarding Iran’s grand strategy of establishing the Iranian corridor: The force that has carried the brunt of this mission has been the militia known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). During the past two years, but especially during the first half of 2017, the heads of the PMF have chosen to fight in areas far from where the central command of the Iraqi Army has planned to fight against ISIS. Moreover, the Badr Organization and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq—both members of the PMF and commanded by Iranians—have imposed their undisputed control over Diyala, the Iraqi province that borders on Iran, by force of arms, and it has been reported that they are shifting the majority population of Sunnis in that area to that of Shi’is.

In addition, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq and Hezbollah battalion (also a member of the PMF) have fought for a long time in the areas of Biji and in the northern Salah al-Din province to gain absolute control over these regions. Finally, the appearance of Iran’s supreme commander of the Quds Brigades, Qasim Suleimani, at the Iraq–Syria border can be interpreted as confirmation of Iran’s

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overarching designs rather than merely as supervision of PMF convoy to the area of Biaaj south of Mosul. Ultimately, their gaining control of the al-Waleed Syria–Iraq crossing and most of the border area between Iraq and Syria eloquently speaks about Iran’s larger plan of accessing Syria through Iraq. 86 »»The relationship between Syria’s desert regions and Iran’s Heart of the New Silk Road project Controlling Syria’s desert regions—the center of which is Deir ez-Zor—allows Iran to attain the strategic goal of keeping US forces far from the road from Mosul to al-Raqqa while maintaining enough room to implement its vision of setting up Iran as the “heart of the new Silk Road.” 87 Syria’s desert regions would constitute an important northern corridor in that project, which was initially conceived during the 1980s when Iran’s president Hashemi Rafsanjani suggested that Iran could become a major economic hub that would serve as a meeting point between East Asia, Africa, and Europe through the building of roads that would shape world trade routes. The project, which was largely out of Iran’s economic reach during the past decade, gained prominence once more when it was mentioned by Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2013. The contemporary Chinese project has a branch that links Iraq and Iran. From Iraq, it moves to Syria and then Lebanon, and perhaps Israel. It would have another branch linking Iraq and Turkey before moving on to Europe.

In contrast, in Iran’s project, Tehran would become the center of the route, spreading to Latakia and Beirut as its ports. In Syria specifically, the road would have to go through Tanf or Abu Kamal. »»Controlling the Baghdad–Damascus road Iran understands that controlling Syria’s desert regions allows it to regulate the road linking Baghdad and Damascus, and Iran seeks to attain to a road that would facilitate its transportation of oil and gas to the Syrian and Lebanese coastal region. That path, however, must pass through Syria’s southern desert regions, which are considered a bridge between Iraq and the coastal regions of Syria and Lebanon. Therefore, it is no surprise that military operations have increased in the regions of Qalamoun and western Ghouta, which are located on that road, and that clashes between Iranian-backed militias along with Assad’s forces and opposition forces have intensified in recent months. This also explains the intensity of clashes at Tanf—right in the heart of the Syria–Iraq border—with the Iranian-backed PMF, which aims to completely control access to the area. Nevertheless, the United States has set up a military base there precisely to cut Iran’s overland access through Iraq to the Mediterranean shores. Both parties consider Tanf the most important strategic point linking the sections of that potential corridor. 88 »»The likelihood of Iran establishing a corridor to the Mediterranean In light of recent events and developments in the region and the inauguration of Donald Trump as US president at the beginning of 2017, and considering the strategic goals and policies of regional players such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel and international players in the conflict and region—from China to the European Union—would it be possible for Iran to complete its aim of setting up its desired corridor to the Mediterranean? Does Iran possess the required economic and overall capacity to implement these policy aims that, as they are, go against international law and the sovereignty of states and integrity of their borders?

To answer this, we need to examine the futility of Iran’s aims in this regard while the country is being beset by a chain of difficulties and challenges that might overwhelm even the most powerful of states. Even if Iran were to raise an army the size of the population of Tehran to defend its project at all costs, the geographical and demographic situation in the contemporary Middle East by default would impede it. Furthermore, Iran is not the sole player in the region, and it cannot determine the contingencies of a region, which has been subject to long-term US strategy and presence, by its own designs and strength. This includes a partnership and strategic alliance with the Arabian Gulf countries whose interests are intertwined with those of the United

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States and greatly threatened by Iran’s expansionist designs. Therefore, the renewed presence of the United States in Syria and Iraq fostered by the new US administration amounts to more than a mere symbolic gesture that might depend on the strategy of regional players. Moreover, an important outcome of this is that Moscow’s operations in the region cannot be determined to hold final sway over its affairs. 89 In the meantime, the Sinjar Resistance Units and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party occupy the region west of the Sinjar Mountains to the Syrian border. In addition, Kurdish Peshmerga forces control sections of the Iraq–Syria border that extend from Sinuni to the north, passing through the Rabi’ah Pass and up to the border triangle of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. On the other side of the border where there is a PMF militia presence, popular resistance units aligned with the YPG or People’s Protection Unit operate. The latter control most of the Hasakah province, except some areas that contain Syrian government checkpoints and the city of al-Hasakah, the province’s capital, and the city of Qamishli, where the Qamishli airport is located. 90 What transpired a few weeks ago—especially in the al-Nataf region on the Syria–Iraq border, where the United States led an air assault against Iranian expansion operations in the area, and the recent buildup of American forces in northern and eastern Syria—clearly illustrates the caliber of the challenges to future Iranian policy. These challenges are especially relevant if Iran manages to advance in its corridor project, especially through the area that is devoid of vegetation, and to enlarge its presence in those volatile desert regions. Those areas are unlikely to stabilize anytime soon given that ISIS cannot easily move to occupy another more hospitable region. Even when overlooking ISIS’s strategy, assuming it is removed from Mosul and Raqqa, the Free Syrian Army continues to operate in those regions, and it is possible that it would play a more significant role than previously if further American logistical support reaches it. This would probably also lead to the filling of the expected vacuum left by ISIS pulling out of Mosul and Raqqa, which definitively aligns with US strategy there regarding its coalition, especially its Kurdish allies and others within Syria’s armed opposition.

Added to all of this is that Iraq’s internal politics will not be stable in the near future—in addition to the current internal struggle between the various Shi’i parties and factions in the country. All these factors probably amount to sufficient obstacles in the path of Iran’s expansionist agenda, consequently making the plan unfeasible and reducing the likelihood of success to zero. Iran’s capability to address these contingencies is weaker than its capability to carve its corridor to the Mediterranean. 91 » The Russian Federation After Russia gained access to the Syrian coast, it is in its interests to control the strategically crucial oil and gas production region as much as it can, as this enhances Russia’s position in relation to countries in the European Union due to their dependency on Russian gas. Russia is interested in economically rehabilitating Syria’s eastern regions and in rehabilitating the oil and gas fields located there, and its aim is that its oil and gas companies be granted exclusive operation in Syria’s desert regions. To this end, in 2017, Russia announced that it is building a military base at Khirbert Ra’s al-Wa’r near Bi’r al-Qasab to the east of Damascus—50 kilometers from Damascus and 85 kilometers from the Golan Heights. Similarly, Iran converted al-Sin Airport into a Revolutionary Guards base, the closest in its dominion to al-Tanf. 92 The location of the Russian base, according to observers, was in no way haphazardly chosen. If Russia completes it, it would mean that Russia could enforce its designs on the territory despite the strategy of Iran or the United States. Furthermore, for Jordan, it means Russia will monitor the approach of Iran or its proxies to its borders. Nonetheless, there is Iranian presence at Ra’s al-Wa’r, and it is obviously expected that Russia will place military assets where Iranian military

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developments will take place. The Russian base also will be located in an area surrounded

by Syrian government airports such as al-Sin, Damir, Khalkha, and Bali Airports. Overall, this development represents a significant advancement of the Russian presence in Syria becoming a contingency regarding Iranian and American strategy in Syria. 93 MILITARY BASES IN SYRIAN DESERT IRAN

Al-Sin Airport as a base for IRGC and Iranian military garrisons

RUSSIA

Khirbet Ras al-Waar

UNITED STATES

Tanf Camp, Zakf Base, and discussions about transforming al-Tabaka into the air base.

Evidence suggests that this is part of Russia’s advancement of its own interests in the region and not merely part of its plan to support the Syrian regime. It is one of the fastest changing regions in the conflict, which would warrant Russia wanting to have a rapid deployment military base nearby. Furthermore, US-backed Kurdish forces operate nearby, which serves Russia’s current plan of supporting the Syrian regime. This development hinges on the fact that the area is the focus of the proposed “de-escalation zones.”

» The United States Syria’s desert regions are nothing more than an extension of Iraq’s oil-rich regions. Were the United States to control the area, it would control access to those resources. This would allow the United States to control an important trade corridor between East and West, giving it more significant and further strategic advantage in the region. The United States would be better able to protect its interests, tilting the balance in its favor, especially regarding Russia’s influence on and occupation of the Syrian coast. In addition, it is expected that ISIS will soon be expelled from Raqqa—north of Syria’s desert region—by the Kurdish YPG, 94 opening the door to the possibility of its expulsion from Deir ez-Zor province, which lies east of the desert region. It would not be possible, though, to destroy ISIS’s remnants, as it has unrestricted access to Iraqi lands, except if the United States manages to take complete control of the area. Herein lies the importance of the cities of al-Qaim in Iraq and Abou Kamal in Syria. The latter is now under US control, which has allowed the United States to use it as an observation point that could enable US forces to deal with the remaining ISIS fighters fleeing Deir ez-Zor. In other words, gaining further military control of the area without at the same time blocking the retreat of its enemies would be useless for US forces. 95 The presence of Russian naval forces on the Syrian coast and the country’s aerial forces in Syria’s interior, coupled with a coordinated extension of Iranian capacities and the new US administration’s perception of Iranian expansion being a significant threat to its interests, constitute a new level of threat to US interests in the region. Three of the most important sea trade routes in the world, specifically related to oil production and resources—the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, through which approximately 4 million barrels of oil are transported daily; the Suez Canal, through which around 3.5 million barrels are transferred daily; and the Strait of Hormuz, by far the most important transit point for world oil commerce, through which 30% of the world’s oil, or 17 million barrels daily, with 6 million from Saudi Arabia alone, travels—now seem threatened.

It is only natural that the new US administration would move toward securing areas near these vital trade routes while maintaining the ability to rapidly deploy US forces. Furthermore, western Syria is mainly under Syrian government control and Lebanese Hezbollah forces have disengaged from the Syria–Lebanon border, while the north of Syria is under the control of the United States’ Kurdish allies together with Turkey. Hence, the new US administration believes Syria’s eastern regions bordering Iraq and Jordan ought to be under US control. 96

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In this context, the United States adopted the same strategy in Syria’s desert regions as in Syria’s eastern regions. This involves building numerous military bases of two basic types: central military facilities, with the main functions of training and support and that feature airstrips for takeoffs and landings, and protection bases, which allow for joint operations with allied ground forces and facilitates other operations in the area. The United States supports these facilities with complete provisions and operates them much like those of a regular army, as the United States refuses to work with militias and rogue or unorganized forces. The following map illustrates the presence of international forces in Syria. 97 » Turkey Turkey fears the possibility of Kurdish YPG forces setting up a unified Kurdish state northeast of Syria’s northern region that would extend along most or all of Turkey’s border with Syria.

Ankara considers this a threat to national security. Turkey intervened in Syria through its Euphrates Shield operation and by supporting Syrian opposition forces to take the city of Jarabuls, thereby effectively cutting Kurds west of the Euphrates off from Kurds east of it. Moreover, Kurds would become the caretakers of Syria’s desert region oil fields for the United States, and they would be able to exploit that any Iranian efforts to export oil and gas by land would have to traverse their territory, which would allow them to increase their wealth and which makes Ankara even more apprehensive. Furthermore, Qatar wishes to be able to export gas by land to Turkey by passing through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria’s desert regions. Any particular party controlling Syria’s eastern regions would probably spell doom for that project. 98 FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IN SYRIA

IRAN

A base at Damascus International Airport (Glass House), the military base in Aleppo, a base in Quneitra, and the Iranian military barracks in the desert.

RUSSIA

The base of Tartus, Latakia, Hama airport and a base in Khirbet Ras al-Waar in the desert.

UNITED STATES

Rumailan base in northeastern Syria, the Kubani base, the Mabrouka base, Ain Issa base, the Tal Baidar and Tal Abiadh on the Syrian-Turkish border.

US AND UK

Tanf and Zakf

smuggle weapons to them through the borders. The conflict, often in conjunction with other actors. 100

» Jordan Jordan feels its security would be jeopardized by the presence and activity of large Shi’a militias in parts of Syria’s desert regions. It views the increase in terrorism and military operations by Shi’a militias on its northern border with great trepidation, and their containment is at the center of Jordan’s foreign policy. 99 The implications of the conflict for Jordan are wide—its whole northern border has now become a source of instability and the location of continuous armed conflict between numerous different groups. It is a further source of concern that relationships between the conflicting parties and Jordan might focus on exploiting possibilities within the Jordanian frontier or even that these various groups might motivate and even mobilize the Jordanian population to join their cause and Jordanian Army has seen action in the

The intensification of the war on ISIS has increased Jordan’s concern. It has brought even more refugees to Jordan and has increased international pressure on Jordan to open its borders.

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This might prove to stem overwhelming from Syria’s internal situation, yet most observers tend to agree that it was necessary for Jordan to join the international coalition against ISIS and to intervene in Syria’s desert region. In light of this, Jordan needs to consider two key factors: the internal dynamics of extreme militant groups such as ISIS and the impact their existence and operations have on Jordan. These factors demand Jordanian military intervention as a member of the coalition opposed to these groups to secure Jordan’s long-term strategic survival within the current situation. 101 » Implications of the Astana Talks regarding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Crisis The Astana Talks took place in Astana, Kazakhstan, between representatives of the Assad government and representatives of various opposition factions within the Syrian conflict were called by Russia, the United States, Turkey, and Iran with the aim of implementing a general ceasefire and reaching a political solution to the conflict. Using UN Resolution 2254 as a platform, four rounds of talks took place. The first round of talks was attended by Russia and Turkey along with government and opposition representatives. Iran and then the United States joined subsequent talks. The first round was held on January 23 and 24, 2017; the second on February 6, 2017; the third on February 16, 2017; and the fourth on April 3 and 4, 2017. 102

THE RESULTS OF THE FOUR ASTANA TALKS Astana 1: to discuss the measures necessary to consolidate the cease-fire resolution agreed in Ankara 29 December 2016.

Astana-2: Russia, Iran, and Turkey agreed to establish a firm ceasefire monitoring mechanism.

Astana - 3: Agreement on the formation of a tripartite commission comprising of Russia, Turkey, and Iran to monitor the truce.

Astana 4: Agreement to discuss the terms of the Russian memorandum on the four areas of tension relief.

This led to the signing of an agreement on the April 5, 2017, based on the Russian proposal of de-escalating the conflict in four main Syrian regions. Those regions comprise the primary areas where the conflict developed between the Syrian government and its allies and the armed opposition groups. Spanning eight Syrian provinces, the region would extend from Aleppo in the north to Deraa in the south. The agreement stipulates that there would be an end to violence in all these areas and includes an allowance for aid to reach the areas without any hindrance and for the creation of overall conditions conducive to a near-term political solution to the conflict that could be implemented as soon as it was signed, with the cease-fire beginning at midnight on May 6, 2017. This would run for six months, to be renewed at its expiration if all parties agree. However, the clauses of the agreement require further examination. Additionally, how did it fare in light of Iran’s operations on the ground? » Clauses of the agreement regarding the stipulated peace zones The most important clause of the agreement is the one that stipulates the creation of four deescalation zones. The first such zone is the province of Idled, currently under opposition control.

The second comprises large parts of Hama, Homs, and Latakia; the third, eastern Ghouta in the vicinity of Damascus; and the fourth, large parts of Deraa province, near the Jordanian border.

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The agreement further stipulates the creation of a work group composed of the various negotiators, to be established several weeks after the signing of the agreement, to trace the dividing lines between the de-escalation zones. These dividing lines were to be included in all maps issued from April 7, 2017, for a period of six months as a “limited-time requirement,” with the option to be extended. The work group would be responsible for delimiting the areas where arms would be laid down and demarcating peace and “tension” zones. In addition, it would be responsible for studying the technical circumstances surrounding the possibilities of implementing the agreement and for setting up particular “peace zones” in the four regions for peaceful transition unhindered by clashes or military operations.

The countries supervising the implementation of the agreement would be in charge of administering the peace zones, setting their limits, and setting up check points to guarantee safe transit of noncombatants; would ensure that humanitarian aid reaches civilians in need, and would support economic activities. Finally, they would all agree to keep their military and other forces and their allies committed to combatting terrorism and to their struggle against ISIS and extremist groups such as the al-Nusra Front throughout all of the Syrian territory. 103 »»Purposes of and motives for the creation of peace zones Every state guaranteeing the agreement has its own goals and motives for supporting it.

However, the agreement must fulfil two main aims on Iran’s and Russia’s agendas. First, it must support the notion that there is an ongoing political process managed by Tehran and Moscow that could stop any intent to jeopardize their political influence over Syria and that maintains the possibility that the Syrian government’s alliance with Iran and Russia can overpower the opposition. Specifically, paragraph 5 of the agreement mentions the “continuity of efforts in order to combat ISIS and the Nusra Front in the de-escalation zones.” These zones, provided they are being held by Russia and Iran, can be used as a pretext that allows the allies to continue targeting the opposition to expel them from these areas. This happened in Wadi Barada following the “agreement of the four cities” of Kafariyah, al-Fouah, al-Zubdani, and Madayah on April 20, 2017; for two years, enforced displacement was practically complete in the areas northeast of Damascus.

Second, the agreement must prevent a change in US policy regarding the Syrian conflict, especially after Washington has shown willingness to use force against the Syrian regime and Iran. This became apparent after the Khan Shaykhoun incident and the US reaction to this incident. Furthermore, it is evident that Moscow seeks to make the United States party to the agreement, as was evident when Moscow’s Special Envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentiev called on the United States to support the agreement and to refrain from flying missions over the deescalation zones. This Iranian–Russian initiative culminated in the proposal at the UN Security Council of drafting a resolution supporting the agreement and these specific terms for it to gain international acceptance and to cement its conclusion between Iran, Turkey, and Russia. 104 Similarly, the United States sees advantages in the setting up of the peace zones, as this would help stem the flow of refugees to Europe, the United States, and neighboring countries.

In addition, it lessens the demand on the United States to provide humanitarian assistance and provides a “success story” for the United States and Russia that both can exploit at an appropriate time. Moreover, the new US administration has delineated the de-escalation zones according to which actors within the Syrian conflict inhabit them, and it does not see any of this as something that prevents communication and understanding in principle between the United States and Russia regarding the Syrian crisis. This includes the protection of Russian interests in Syria, which neither the new US administration not the previous one considers or considered problematic.

The United States does not believe involving itself in the Syrian quagmire is in its best interests, provided Russia does not affect the United States’ fundamental interests in the region.

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Specifically, The United States and Russia seem to agree on the need to fight extreme Islamist militants—the most important of which is ISIS—and on the need to safeguard Israel’s integrity, including Israel’s right to attack military targets in Syria it perceives as security threats. Further, the United States and Russian share the view that the Kurds and their integrity require support without forgetting the unspoken agreement between the two powers regarding the need to find a secular and civilian replacement for Assad who is not a member of any of the Islamist groups, whether militant or not. 105 Despite these points of agreement, the common ground between the United States and Russia is not particularly wide, as any potential area of cooperation and agreement is subject to numerous contingencies and dynamics. Nevertheless, what is certain is that between them they hold to a great extent the power to end and solve the Syrian crisis because the regional powers— especially Iran and Turkey—largely struggle to maintain control over as much as they can of the regions that have been divided by the United States and Russia. The drafting of a constitution would be favorable to Washington and Moscow, as the interests of both would be served if the constitution would avoid the Islamization of the legal and political systems, which also aligns with the interests of more than one regional power. Specifically, Iran would not tolerate the formation of any Sunni state in the Arab world, especially in Syria, and as long as the various Islamist parties in Syria strive against Iran’s interests. »»Iran’s incursion and the agreement’s chances of success Through its many proxies, the most important of which are the Quds Force, the National Defense Forces, the Coast Falcons, and the Baath Phalange in Syria, Iran pursues its aim of expanding within the region and intensifying its role by military means. This is because Iran is certain that its control over those proxies is firmer than perhaps its alliance with other international actors. Consequently, it refuses to withdraw Hezbollah and the Iraqi and Afghan militias under the control of the Revolutionary Guards from Syria. The implementation of its strategic aims depends on their existence, as was seen in the ceasefire agreement signed on December 29, 2016, which was backed by Turkey and Russia. In terms of this agreement, the towns of Wadi Barada and East Ghouta near Damascus. Russia saw that to implement its policy of keeping the gains it achieved after the fall of Aleppo, it had to curb the activities of those militias, because the Russian president knows that the presence of Iranian militias in Syria impedes him from announcing military success in the field. However, several obstacles must be removed, which depends largely on Iran, to ensure the success of the agreement stipulating peace zones. »»Iran’s preference for military operations Since the first day of the ceasefire agreed in January 2017, Iran has objected to political solutions to concentrate on military possibilities, as political compromises would inevitably impede the smooth advancement of its expansion strategy, which is fundamentally dependent on military gains. Thus, Iran objected to the idea of setting up peace zones, using the pretext of these zones constituting violations to Syrian sovereignty. In contrast, Iran vehemently supported the creation of no-fly zones in Iraq during the 1990s in support of UN Resolution 688 of 1991 and in several other instances. 106 »»The difficulty of expelling Iranian-backed militias Philip Smyth of the Washington Institute commented that “Iran is building alliances amongst its proxies so as to guarantee its existence.” He added that “the existence of Iranian-backed militias in Syria is not only a military strategy by Iran, but also an ideological one vis-à-vis Iran’s neighboring countries” because “Iran’s strategy in Syria is also based on a shared history as well as ideology.” Reporter Fras Dibah explained that “Russia cannot expel Iranian militias out of Syria because it needs to have client armies on the ground other than the regime’s because the

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regime’s army tends to disintegrate.” Moreover, according to Raghida Durgham, “Russia’s demand that Iran removes its militias [and Hezbollah] from Syria … [has been ignored by] Iran in practice and principle... This creates a crisis situation between [the two countries, but it has not led to] seriously [endangering] the relationship.” According to these observers, the militias hold a critical position in the conflict because they can play a particularly unpredictable role, as they constitute a liability on all sides. This is important because Iran needs to keep Russia and the United States on its side regarding developments related to its nuclear program. 107 »»Loose ends in the agreement How is it possible for Iran to play a part in the conflict and act as a guarantor of the agreement? Iran probably will redouble its military efforts to expand its goals in Syria within the peace zones on the pretext of fighting ISIS or al-Nosra. It should be noted as well that, increasingly, al-Nosra cooperates and integrates with other armed opposition groups with the aim of “liberating Syria” allowing for a wider pretext justifying Iran’s pursuit of its main policies within the peace zones under cover of the agreement. 108 »»Israel’s position regarding the agreement Israel has shifted its stance on the agreement. Initially, Israeli officials seemed to welcome the terms, especially after Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, declared that the agreement upholds Israel’s interests. However, Israel subsequently shifted its position completely when Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu stated that “the ceasefire strengthens Iran’s strategy,” especially concerning Israel’s northern border. 109 »»The Most Significant Implications of Iran’s Operations At the time of writing, several significant implications of Iran’s operations had become apparent.

First: Since the beginning of 2017, a shifting of challenges within the Syrian conflict have been detrimental to Iran’s interests The new US administration shifted its policy in relation to Iranian policy at the beginning of 2017. Trump declared that he would be curtailing Iran’s nuclear program and containing its strategy in Syria. This has been apparent not only at a number of international summits and events where the US administration has had the opportunity to reiterate this point, but also on the ground where the United States has targeted Iranian and Iranian-backed military facilities.

Furthermore, the United States has set up military installations and bases in pursuance of preserving its interests and those of its allies in the region, even rekindling relationships that had been quieted once the Obama administration began negotiating with the Iranians.

Second: Iran is a secondary player in the politics and military affairs of the Syrian conflict, and a weak party at that Russia is the strongest player and the strongest party in the conflict, able to influence Syrian affairs at its convenience. Iran, on the other hand, has to conform to Russia wishes despite their alliance. In these types of affairs, the one who benefits most is the strongest party, while the weaker one does not necessarily increase its strength, as the weaker party has to be conscious of its capabilities and its greater potential of overextending itself. If their respective interests were to clash, the weaker party cannot pursue its interests except with the agreement of the strongest party. In addition, when their interests clash, the strongest party can bury the weaker party’s designs. This is exactly what happened when during the siege of Aleppo, Iran went to great lengths to sabotage the evacuation of the besieged, while Russia supported it. The Russians later sent a letter to Tehran asking that comply with Russia’s decision. This forced the Iranians to play a secondary role defined by Moscow’s military and political decisions in the conflict.

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Third: Low tension regions under the agreement in the framework of the Astana talks Under the agreement, the desert regions of Syria do not fall under the framework of the talks despite that they comprise more than half the territory in the country. In fact, Syria’s geography allows for it to be divided into approximately five practical regions under a federal type of system and organization. Yet the desert regions seem to not necessarily fit under that scheme, and they are being fought for, which means they will be administered in the end by the winning party.

Under the agreement, Syria is currently partitioned in practice into four regions, with each one of those regions being managed by the regional power that is strongest there. The first region extends from Latakia to Damascus, and the controlling power of that region is Iran and the Syrian regime. The second region extends from northeast Syria to Manbij, and it is controlled by the United States. The third region extends from al-Swaidah to al-Qunaytarah, and it is controlled

by Russia. Turkey, however, controls the area from approximately 70 kilometers from its border to around 70 kilometers north of Aleppo.

Fourth: The Iranian struggle for the Syrian desert regions can subside or intensify The current situation in the eyes of observers regarding Iran is a struggle against regional and international parties whose goal is to redraw the Syrian map at the convenience of the strongest party. Furthermore, it is not going to end anytime soon, especially in Syria’s desert regions. A part of that struggle relates to defeating ISIS soon, but events seem to show that on a long-term basis the war could situate international and regional contenders more seriously against each other. For instance, the purpose of the recently built US military installations and bases in Syria’s desert regions is not only to be able to support US strategy with trained military assets but also apparently to prepare for a potential confrontation with Iran and resurgences of Islamist militant extremism. The United States fears that the vacuum left by the defeat of ISIS in the border regions between Iraq and Syria would be filled by the Popular Mobilization [Hashd al-Shaabi] militias supported by Iran.

Most of the International and regional actors in Syria are in one way or another involved in the defeat of ISIS in Raqqa, its stronghold. The level of standoff and confrontation between US forces and Iranian forces or proxies has increased since the establishment of the US base near Nakhbah, from where US soldiers and armed opposition groups draw their support. The location of these assets and the recent impact they have had—US aerial attacks on Iranian proxies—sends a strong message to Iran that the specific frontier region between Iraq and Syria is well considered regarding US long-term strategy, at least in a post-ISIS scenario, and that the United States does not approve the notion of not having a presence that can shape affairs in that determinant region of the conflict. It sends a definitive message that any proxy pursuing Iran’s interests related to controlling that frontier region would meet serious challenges. The Popular Mobilization seems to be realizing the difficulty of their position, as the conditions on the ground allow a clear advantage to the United States and its use of aerial power against them.

Western observers assert that the conflict that has ensued between the international coalition and the Iranian axis seems to be for influence and control of the Iraq–Syria border. They further contend that from Iran’s point of view, it appears to be necessary because of the intertwinement and the need to pursue their interests between and within the two countries. In the opinion of these observers, it seems evident that Iran is set on pursuing this policy although it sees that a Western and immediate response is inevitable. Observers of Iranian affairs confirm that Iran is ready to pursue a policy of brinkmanship regarding that territory and its interests related to the Trump Administration, as it definitively holds the key to the most effective attempt at expansion of its role in the region.

In light of all of this, it seems conflict between Iran and its proxies and the United States is inevitable, especially considering the opinion of those observers who point out that Washington’s

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position is the result of being a latecomer to the crisis to try to prevent the extension of Iran’s military arms, which previously seemed to be in their interest because it implied Iran’s militarily confronting extreme Islamists such as ISIS. It was during Abadi’s time that his government’s approval for the creation of the popular mobilization militias was granted and tacitly supported by the United States, as it was a strategic card to play in the fight against ISIS. The seemingly inevitable conflict between Iran and its proxies and the United States is, however, one of many possibilities. Some observers point out in this respect that conflict would bear considerable risk for Iran; for instance, its proxies move without air cover, which would necessitate their retreat behind border lines. Others opine that Iran would in any case stubbornly cling to the policy of advancing via its proxy militias, even if their advancement well into Syria is completely impossible. » The Future of Iran’s role in Iraq and Its Current Possibilities Developments have led observers to note that Iran’s role in the Syrian conflict has been recognized internationally and that it is a situation that demands to be curtailed. Curtailment will result in either halting Iran’s expansion or causing Iran to retreat. Consequently, certain regions in the Syrian conflict will transform into fault lines between Iran and the Coalition, and a fight will break out to deprive Iranian proxies of their gains. It is expected that Iran’s policy will probably move in that direction, as there is no public opinion to contend with in the Syrian scenario, unlike in Lebanon and Iraq. In addition, Iran’s policy will be extremely costly to the country’s economy in a situation where the economy is marked by less-than-stellar performance. Even so, Iran’s human resources capacity seems to be incapable of performing its role. Finally, it is probable that neither Russia nor Turkey would approve of that role, as they are well aware that Iran aims to conquer regions that are currently under dispute between Russian, Turkish, and American strategies and aims.

It is particularly evident that Russian, Turkish, and Iranian interests different in several important respects: »»Iran’s expansionist project and its purpose Iran definitively favors military options and advancement, which entails rejection of a possible ceasefire. This is because it allows Shi’i militias supported by Iran and the regime’s army to try to move into strategic areas. Their aim is of course to gain as much as possible in ultimate advantage for their political and ideological sect. »»Russia’s strategy and aims In contrast, Moscow favors political options and solutions. It called, for instance, for the talks in Astana. Russia favors a complete ceasefire throughout Syria, and it has previously pushed every party to comply with that option, conducting air raids on any party that failed to comply with an agreed ceasefire, even in the case of that party being a Shi’i militia. Russia is the biggest player in the conflict, and it can pressure any other party into complying to a greater extent with its aims and strategy. For instance, Russia can pressure Turkey regarding its leverage related to the Kurds in the conflict, and it can threaten the regime with the removal of its assistance, which would almost certainly lead to its collapse. Similarly, it can pressure Iran through overtures concerning the US Trump Administration, and even through overtures to Israel, Turkey, and the Arab countries in the Gulf. Russia’s overall goal seems to make Syria to a considerable extent the fulcrum of its military projection in the Middle East region. »»Turkey’s strategy and aims Turkey largely agrees with Russia in that it also favors political as opposed to military options

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and solutions, and it also favors a full ceasefire throughout Syria. Moreover, the formation of a transition government that seriously considers negotiation is on its agenda. Turkey’s disposition has been to moderate the discourse of certain opposition groups so that they do not firmly demand Assad’s removal. Probably the most important immediate Turkish concern is implementing a zone of almost exclusive influence along Syria’s northern border from approximately the north of Qubrus. Turkey claims it needs this to protect its inside borders from terrorism. The second most salient Turkish concern is preventing Kurdish coalition and the project of a federal Kurdish union in the north of Syria.

In addition, American policy should be considered, specifically declarations by Trump that America would never tolerate an expansionist Iranian policy in the region. He further declared American opposition to Iran’s influence in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria at the Arab Islamic Summit in Riyadh in May 2017, where he called on countries to unite against Iran’s designs. In practice, the United States has attacked the al-Shayrat air base and the al-Tanf base to stop Iran’s expansionist policies. In this respect, Hassan Nasrallah declared on May 13, 2017, that Hezbollah would remove certain bases from Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria. Before this, however, Iran’s Head of Strategic Affairs at the International Institute for Political and International Studies Mustafa Zahrani declared that Iran had begun considering the removal of its forces from Syrian territory, and that this is a foreseeable option and open to Syria.

Third Axis » The future role of Iran in Iraq—Between the battle of Mosul and the Kirkuk Crisis Usually, expansionist states use their proxies and exploit other states within their particular times of crises to advance their expansionist agendas, for example, when extremist Islamist militias are occupying territory within a particular state and deem the situation appropriate to proceed with their expansion within that country. They could try to use the powers of that state directly or they could infiltrate the state to advance their own particular agendas. Those agendas could be disputed by other contending states seeking supremacy in a particular region.

It is common that they use pretexts such as providing help for neighboring countries to pursue these operations. The targeted countries could disintegrate in the process and lose their political identity.

In this context, it is important to understand Iran’s project and its implications for Iraq. Iraq is one of the most important components of the so-called Shi’i Crescent, or Iran’s expansionist and colonizing endeavor—an endeavor that has been shown to be impossible to bring to fruition due to geographic and demographic factors Iran cannot overcome due to lack of resources. Similarly, this lack of resources means Iran would not be able to outmaneuver a much more powerful country. Iran aims to create new zones of influence in the path of its struggle against ISIS, which it has done in the wake of the Battle of Mosul and the Battle for Tal Afar. It is also evident in its reaction to the Kirkuk crisis and its implications for the future of the region of Kurdistan.

However, the most important question to contemplate in the context of these considerations is what are the motives that truly explain Iran’s behavior during its participation in the battles for Mosul and Tal Afar, cities in the west of Syria? » Iran’s role in the Battle of Mosul To properly identify Iran’s true motives and the future of Iran’s role in the wake of the Battle of Mosul, which began in October 2016, we need to examine Iran’s policies regarding and behavior during events in the recent past leading up to the battle, and certain implications of Trump’s ascent to power for Iran’s role in recent events in the region.

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» The run-up to the Battle of Mosul: Iranian militias and the Iraqi Army Iraq witnessed the implications of a shift in Iranian strategy and tactics during the second half of 2016 with the implementation of the Militarization of Shi’ism strategy. This followed the implementation of the previous three steps of this strategy: Expansion, Setting up, and Embedding Shi’ism. The latter refers to embedding Iranian policies, people, and strategy in Iraq, and linking the Shi’i people and policies in Iraq with Iran’s supreme leader and his decisions. Iran then pressured Iraq’s government and quickly moved to join the popular mobilization militias with the Iraqi Army. 110 By applying more pressure on Iraq, Iran pushed Iraq to begin the Battle of Mosul before the legal standing of the popular mobilization was entirely resolved to leave no space for it to be dissolved at the request of internal or external parties in Iraq or of the international parties in the conflict. This led al-Abadi to issue a decision regarding embedding the popular mobilization within the Iraqi Army, which was confirmed by the Iraqi Parliament on July 26, 2016. In this document, the popular mobilization was defined as a legal person yet an integral part of the Iraqi Army under the orders of the Iraqi Army’s high command. 111 This development has had several negative consequences for those who PMF consists of 42 militia, and includes more than pursued that policy. Because 100 thousand fighters according to estimates, while popular mobilization now the Iraqi army includes 250 thousand, most notably operates under cover of the Badr Organization led by Hadi al-Ameri, and the Iraqi Army, it must Components the Brigades of Hezbollah, and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, operate solely under legal The Ansar al-Hajjah Brigades, Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s frameworks. This implies, forces, the Tala’i al-Khorasani movement, the for instance, that popular Saraya Ashura, and the Jihad battalions. mobilization commanders can move up the army The committee is headed by Abu Mahdi ranks just as regular army al-Mohandes, a former commander of Badr, officers might. Furthermore, Leaders accused by US officials of blowing up the US the PMF can double the embassy in Kuwait in 1983 and affiliated directly to size of the Iraqi Army, and Qassem Suleimani. it reduces its capacity to identify itself as a purely ideologically driven force. In December 2016, militia leader Badr Hadi al-Amri declared that “the PMF now is stronger than the Iraqi Army.”

PMF

Although PMF was created to fight ISIS more effectively, the greater purpose of creating the PMF is evident in that it is an enormous force, completely legitimate within that country, but commanded from outside that country by the Revolutionary Guards in Iran with aims and missions mainly outside the borders of Iraq. It has become a valuable tool in the hands of the Iranians to pursue their foreign policy aims of expansion in the region. 112] » Reasons for gathering the various militias for the Battle of Mosul The various militias were gathered for battle at Mosul for three principal reasons.

• Mosul is one of the most important stations of Iran’s corridor project Iran wishes to establish a corridor linking the country with the Mediterranean coast to secure geopolitical and economic advantages, and The Observer suggested shortly before the battle was to begin that Iranian involvement at Mosul revolved around the completion of this project.

Carrying out the plan starts with controlling the Arab Sunni regions of central and eastern Iraq on the pretext of battling ISIS and then mounting a mission to liberate and end pockets of extreme

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Islamist resistance in the provinces of Salah al-Din and Diyala. The corridor goes through Mosul, and specifically through Tal Afar, Shinkal (to the west in the direction of Haskah), Raqqa, Aleppo, Latakia (or through Homs) and on to Tartus, moving parallel with the regime’s forces, the Kurds at Hasaka, and the Iraqi government. If completed, the project would allow Iran to move forces and material and buses filled with whatever it might need in Syria without requiring the Iraqi government’s authorization. It could send anything required either by Hezbollah in Lebanon or the PMF in Syria. It could even serve the purposes of an alternative strategy if for any reason in the future, the United States were to impose a no-fly zone over Syria. 113 • Iran hoped to influence the rules of the game by changing the demographic composition of the area The set rules of the political game in Iraq do not leave room for Iran to meddle or intervene; thus, Iran could seek to shift the demographics in Mosul from a Sunni majority to a Shi’i majority, which could affect the composition of Iraqi regional parliaments in 2017 and the elections for national representatives in 2018. Therefore, Iran could end up controlling the political process in Iraq, thereby serving its own interests within and outside Iraq.

• Iran would gain a specific advantage over Turkey Iran sees a specific advantage over Turkey if it gains control of Mosul. It seems that any advantage gained in Mosul would represent an advancement of its aims and a strategic loss for Turkey. Consequently, Iran might gain the ability to politically pressure Turkey. To that effect came declarations by US military commanders based at Mosul’s airport, which became the center for shared military operations in the area. Turkey rejected the participation of the popular mobilization fighters in the operations aiming to liberate Tal Afar. Specifically, once the popular mobilization neared the limits of Tal Afar, Turkey threatened the use of artillery. 114 The popular mobilization approach generated deep concern amongst the Turks at Tal Afar, especially because Erdogan had earlier said that their response would be very different were they to terrorize the Sunni population of Turkmen there. Turkey had also stated that Tal Afar would be considered a red line for them in Iraq. Turkish apprehension here stems from the indispensable future role Iran and its proxies would play in keeping the peace in eastern and northern Iraq once Tel Afar is liberated, as this translates to a disproportional increase of Iranian influence right on Turkey’s borders. If Iran secures a leading role in the liberation of Tal Afar, subsequently pushing through the borders into Syria, it would generate considerable sectarian tension in that entire region and radically shift the balance of power in the favor of the regime there. 115 » Iran’s policies and strategy to gain control on Mosul In the context of the considerations and motives discussed and the importance of Mosul and Tal Afar in terms of Iran’s grand strategy, Iran, the PMF, and the other armed militias have chosen to follow a set of policies concerning Mosul that led to the prolongment of the battle for more than eight months. In this time, they pursued the objectives of securing the total implementation of their immediate goals and advantage on the ground, the application of pressure on their partners in the battle while

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simultaneously exterminating their adversaries, and the removal of opposition to their grand strategy in the strategic areas gained by laying complete siege to ISIS, exerting pressure on their allies, focusing on areas that are valuable to their overall strategy, and gaining complete control over the border areas between Syria and Iraq.

• Laying siege to ISIS The general plan for the Battle of Mosul conceived by the Iraqi government and the Coalition was to lay siege to all except the western side of Mosul so that fleeing ISIS members would escape to Tal Afar and into Syria. In January of 2017, Iran tried to pressure the Iraqis into closing the western side of Mosul as well. Allowing ISIS to pass into Syria freely would contradict Iranian strategy in that it would prolong the battles inside Syria and make it difficult for the Syrian government to regain control of areas in the country it has lost. 116 • Iran’s pressure on its allies and the effects of this pressure on its adversaries Once Mosul’s left side was liberated, Iran began pressuring its allies into opening offices all over the conquered areas. The Badr Organization, the Supreme Council of Iraq, and the State of Law Coalition seem to have done so. Sources further confirm that the Quds Force opened numerous offices under the rubric of the popular mobilization in this part of Mosul to be able to apprehend many prominent Sunni inhabitants. In fact, the official spokesperson of the families [‘ashaair al-‘arabiyah] in Iraq the Sheikh Mazahim al-Huwait declared that “Nouri al-Maliki’’ succeeded in apprehending a number of prominent Sunni inhabitants [Sheikhs of the Ashar and other prominent people] from the left side of Mosul as well as from the south of the city. He currently is working undercover to form Ashari councils [for families] in Mosul that would support him with direct backing from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.” 117 • Iran’s clearing operations in particular areas within the scheme of its grand strategy Iran focused on clearing areas of strategic—and security-related—importance for its grand strategy. At the time of writing, the Battle of Mosul had intensified, and Iran endeavored to make available to its proxies the areas of Mosul with majority Sunni populations. After this, it moved to allow the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq Militia control and authority in those areas. This procedure will probably be repeated once Tal Afar is liberated. In fact, Iran requested that the Iraqi government allow the popular mobilization to liberate Tal Afar because

• Tal Afar falls squarely within the route of the projected Iranian corridor project.

Therefore, Iran seeks to keep that road open permanently, thus linking Iran and Syria through Iraq and assuring Iran can support its proxies in Syria. The Tal Afar region is also specific in that most of its population are Shi’is and that it lies directly between Mosul and Syria, as it is located only 65 kilometers from the center of Mosul. 118 • The intention is to bring Tal Afar into the fold of Shi’ism. Iran would have the capacity to expel the Sunni Turkoman tribes from Tal Afar but to allow the Shi’i Turkoman to remain. This would definitively decrease Turkey’s influence there and through the north of Iraq, instead empowering President Barzani in the Kurdistan region. This would freeze certain economic projects on the agenda with Turkey, specifically those regarding oil production and transport between Turkey and that specific region.

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• It would promote the popular mobilization internationally as a first-degree antiterrorism force. Given that Tal Afar would probably spell the end for ISIS in Iraq, the liberation would provide an interesting scenario for showcasing tested military techniques against Islamist extremists or others. In the region itself, it would cement the reputation of the mobilization as the force that ultimately won the battle against that type of extremists.

• It would ward off any other non-allied actors from that strategic area. Iran is apprehensive that any other actor in the conflict could occupy or gain strategic advantage in areas critical to the deployment of its own strategy and policy in Syria. It aims to provide the ultimate advantage possible to the Syrian regime on the ground. 119 • Gaining control of the border areas between Iraq and Syria The popular mobilization militias officially announced on May 28, 2017, their almost complete dominion over the border areas between Iraq and Syria. This is an important development in the struggle against ISIS, as their dominion is concentrated on in a few pockets in Iraq, one being a section of the city of Mosul. In this context, Qais al-Khazaly, the General Secretary of the Asai’b Ahl al-Haqq Militia (a group that became independent from Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia in 2004 and is firmly under Iran’s control), that “our way is Mosul, then Tal Afar, then Waraw, then Ana, then Qaim and we’ll reach the border [with Syria]. Then our brothers in Syria will link the border. People say, a Shi’i crescent? It’s rather a full moon!” He was referring to the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, Hezbollah in Iran, the Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen, and the Hashd alMuqaddas [holy mobilization] and Brothers of Zainab in Iraq, while speaking about Iran’s expansionist strategy. 120 These declarations amply support the fact that the involvement of the popular mobilization in the Battle of Mosul did not have the sole purpose of eradicating ISIS but rather was simply a stop on the way to paving the road for Iranian proxies to take control of northern Iraq and impose themselves there while infiltrating Syria. Moreover, it illustrates the need to question why, while the world was watching, ISIS conquered Mosul and other cities in northern Iraq with such speed and ease in 2014, and it raises questions about the ostensible declaration to have created the popular mobilization to help the Iraqi Army fight ISIS. In addition, why does the popular mobilization rarely publish pictures or videos showing the existence of ISIS where their military operations take place in Mosul or Tal Afar, while they publish pictures and videos celebrating their conquests of various other areas? » The role of Iran in the Kirkuk crisis The Kirkuk crisis occurred as a standoff between the region and the central government when the leadership in the Kurdistan region voiced their desire to organize a referendum to decide the fate of the region. The purpose of the referendum would be to decide to which degree the domestic population wishes to have more power over their resources and their affairs without having to delegate those decisions to a government highly influenced by Iran.

Iran prevents the distribution of any of the resources in this area in a way that may not align with its greater geopolitical plans for Iraq and the region. In this context, the Quds Force’s highest commander, Major General Qassem Suleimani, visited the city of Suleimaniyah in the Kurdistan region on March 4, 2017. He met there with various Kurdish leaders, including Masoud Barzani, the president of the Iraqi Kurdistan region; Nechirvan Barzani, the president of the regional government at Irbil, and the leadership of the National Kurdish Union, among them Jalal

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Talabani’s deputy Kausarat Rasul and the prominent representatives of the Political Office of the Kurdistan Union. In the sections that follow, we examine the main purposes of the visit, indicators of Iran’s real role in Kirkuk, and the limits of Iranian influence in the Kirkuk crisis. 121 »»Purposes of the visit The first purpose of Suleimani’s visit was to confound the intention to hold the referendum planned for September 25, 2017. Most Kurdish political parties, such as the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and the National Kurdistan Union, and the regional Kurdish government decided for it to go ahead after facing unfavorable economic policies from Baghdad and considerable structural problems in the provinces because of recent developments, the most important of which is the rise of ISIS in its environs. It is in essence a response to the sentiments of the Kurdish people who mostly favor being independent and being able to completely dominate their political and economic future. Masoud Barzani called for organizing the referendum throughout the province to give a voice to those sentiments, laying down the explicit choice for Kurdish people and other inhabitants of the region to decide whether they would remain in Iraq under a federal arrangement or whether they would rather be independent.

The Kurdish Democratic Party came to an agreement with the National Kurdistan Union to coordinate the practical implementation of the referendum in all its dimensions. Recently, relations between the Baghdad government and that of the province have become tense because of fundamental differences regarding several issues such as regarding areas that are in geographical dispute regarding whether the central government or Irbil is their administrator.

Despite the oil-rich Kirkuk province technically falling outside of the Kurdistan region, the National Kurdistan Union holds sway over most of it, as previously united forces lost ground to it following the rise of ISIS in 2014. Today, however, Kurds are still struggling to fully recover the region. About half the oil wells located in the north of the province are controlled by the Democratic Kurdistan Party led by the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, who since the rise of the Jihadist extremists gained control of areas in the north and west of the province. 122 Another purpose of Suleimani’s visit was to inquire about raising the Kurdistan flag in oil-rich Kirkuk when Kurdish representatives in the Kirkuk provincial parliament decided to do so while raising the Iraqi flag next to it, despite the disapproval of Arabs and Turkmen. This move raised the ire of Baghdad, which considered it unconstitutional.

The third purpose was to estrange the National Kurdistan Union from the Kurdistan Democratic Party, as they have recently become closer after meetings led by Barzani that have resulted in the issuing of joint decisions with important repercussions on the future of the province. 123 »»Indicators of Iran’s real role in Kirkuk It has been apparent that developments in Kirkuk, specifically the possibility of independence, displease Iran. Kurdish independence would open a door Iran could not close again because despite the policy of Persianization pursued by the government in its provinces with ethnic diversity and minorities, these ethnically diverse peoples inside Iran (among them Kurds) would probably react strongly to Kurdish independence in Iraq. Suleimani’s visit, in fact, was not, as was reported in Iranian media, an effort by Iran to decrease tension between Kurds and Baghdad but rather to allay doubts regarding Iran’s relations with the National Kurdistan Union and Shi’i parties in Baghdad, and to notify actors of Iran’s disapproval of the referendum on Kurdistan independence, as it would greatly affect Iranian interests and plans in the region. In addition, it was intended to convey support to the National Kurdistan Union, an Iranian ally that has seen a recent reversal in its fortunes, especially after Jalal Talibani became ill and a struggle ensued in the party to identify a successor. 124

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»»The limits of Iranian influence in the Kirkuk crisis Iran has enormous influence in regions controlled by the National Kurdistan Union. It has a variety of means of persuasion at its disposal to successfully influence events throughout the Kurdistan region. From an economic perspective, Iran’s border represents a veritable lifeline for the National Kurdistan Union. Furthermore, Iran has a pretext for intervening in the Kurdish regions of Iraq, as there are Kurdish groups in Iraq near the border with Iran that carry out attacks and operations inside Iran. Iran can also form an alliance with Turkey to put pressure on the Kurds. Finally, it is possible that the Revolutionary Guards in Iran could incite extremist Islamist Kurds against the regional Kurdish government. In fact, Iran did this at the beginning of the previous decade when the Revolutionary Guards supported the Ansar al-Islam group so it could obtain certain concessions from the regional Kurdish government. Nevertheless, despite this, Iranian influence in the Kurdish regions would remain limited if the Kurdish parties were to put their differences aside. The significant trade between the Kurdish region and the Turkish border could potentially benefit the entire Kurdish region. Additionally, much depends on the degree of cooperation between Iran and Turkey, as both hold considerable sway over the affairs of the entire Kurdish region. 125 » Challenges to Iran’s role in Iraq Although recent events during the first half of 2017 have witnessed a surge in the possibilities available to Iran with respect to Iraq, especially after the Battles of Mosul, Tal Afar, and Kirkuk, there are still significant challenges with respect to the role Iran seeks to play in Iraq. Among them: • Iran’s economy being in recession: Iran’s economy is still in a state of recession despite the fact that the multitude of obstacles and restrictions it had faced were recently lifted. The enormous cost of Iran’s policies and operations in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, which its government is pursuing while being of a conservative nature against a population which is mainly liberal in outlook, weighs heavily and restricts many of Iran’s possibilities regarding Iraq.

• A possible reaction to Iran’s policies in Iraq taking the form of opposition to sectarianism movements: Iran’s policies regarding the government of Iraq as well as the role its supported militias are playing there while being accused of human rights violations, committing serious crimes, and trying to change the demographics of primarily Sunni regions in the country, plus its differences with the Kurdish parties, could spawn a movement within the country against sectarian divisions and policies. This movement could comprise people from all tendencies, ethnicities, and sects. It could further gain momentum if it is supported by regional as well as international actors. It would probably affect a backlash against Arab Shi’a organizations in the country. This is something that could probably happen given the depth and size of Iran’s role in the country and how it uses this as a launching pad for its designs on the neighboring region.

• The possibility that Iranian proxies in Iraq will begin to struggle for power in the country: It is possible that the current situation in Iraq would develop into a full-blown struggle for power between Iraqi political forces and the armed militias supported by Iran, which has played a major role in the fight against ISIS, and their removal from areas they had conquered from the Iraqi state. This implies that they are very powerful through their control of the military means to pursue their objectives. This situation might prove to be very chaotic and would ultimately make Iraq’s overall political landscape gravitate further into Iran’s hands. It could even lead to the formation of radical movements and parties in opposition to the role of Iran in the country.

• Saudi Arabia’s aim to support coalitions seeking to roll back Iran’s role: King Salman ibn Abd al Aziz has led an effort to coalesce forces among major Muslim partner countries as well as the US, being willing to roll back Iran’s expansionist role and policies in the region. His deputy

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Muhammad ibn Salman is the leader of Saudi and other Arab partners’ efforts to counter Iran’s strategy of supporting the Houthi movement in Yemen. In fact, he has called for the creation of a Sunni axis to counter Iran’s policies and strategy.

• America’s shift of strategy is now trying to surround and roll back Iran: With Trump’s ascendance to the White House, US policy vis-à-vis Iran has dramatically shifted towards the goal of surrounding and rolling back Iran’s efforts in the region. Trump has been very explicit regarding his position vis-à-vis Iran. He has called the signed nuclear deal a bad idea, labelled Iran a terrorist state that endangers the security of the region, and promised to counter Iran’s militias, such as Hezbollah. He has asked the international community to lay as many obstacles in Iran’s path as it can and to freeze its assets. 126This has all seen the practical application in the way the US has made its presence known in the border area between Iraq and Syria and, through it, curbed Iran’s advancement there. This has been the result of Republican opposition in the US Congress, pressure by the Israeli lobby, and the US’s alliance the US with Arab Gulf countries. » Conclusions »»Iran’s role in Iraq is currently expanding. This is the opposite of what is happening to its role in Syria and Yemen, where it has been curbed. This expansive role, however, does not depend solely on Iran’s capacities and decisions. Numerous studies have shown that Iran’s role stems from more than this; it has been the result of the confluence of circumstances and developments in the region which have paved the way for its prominence. The situation cannot be better gauged than through an analysis of Iran’s presence in Iraq. It Is indeed a negative role in most cases, the greatest proof of which is the multiplication of instances of conflict. Iraq has become a cesspool and a breeding ground for extremism from all over the region. »»The reaction to developments nearing the completion of the liberation of Mosul – 80% liberated as of the time of this report’s preparation – has been to lay bare the question regarding the future role of those large Shi’a militias once ISIS is defeated. The first response to that question is that they could either be dissolved or submerged within the Iraqi army and its institutions, or transformed into civilian institutions. The second response and the most preponderant one is that they would further consolidate into independently legal institutions.

They currently inhabit a sort of parallel legal sphere where they are understood legally to be under those “legal ordinances concerning the popular mobilization and its sister organizations” which were issued in November 2016 despite their being contrary to Iraq’s 2005 constitution.

The constitution clearly warns against the creation of militias on a sectarian or ethnic basis.

That particular piece of legislation would serve to exonerate other sects and ethnicities in the country, enabling them to set up their own militias. The result of that would be the creation of states within a state, something to which Muqtada al-Sadr himself alluded when he called for the disbandment of the militias within the popular mobilization, which represent a danger for Iraq itself and the region. »»Events may well prove that Tal Afar would become the scenario for Iran and Turkey’s struggle to become truly apparent. That struggle would, at the same time, represent a great clash between the major backers of the sectarian and ethnic demographic fault-lines in the region. In other words, it could also represent an opportunity to settle old scores set by the pre-modern Ottoman and Safavid empires. By any account, it would not be easy for the popular mobilization to enter, for it is possible that another regional war would be ignited by that. This is why one can expect that the US would not allow the PMF to enter the city. Iran, on the other hand, would probably try everything in its attempt to allow the popular mobilization to enter the city. »»The forceful change in the demographics of Arab regions is not something that would easily occur. Even if it were forcefully tried at the hands of the Shi’a population in Iraq, it would not

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succeed because it would encounter enormous opposition – even military opposition – at the hands of the Sunni Arab majorities present in cities like Mosul, Baqoubah, and al-Shirqat. This would lead to a chaotic situation which would represent “going back to square one” for the region.

It is something the US would not allow in any case because it would be almost an instantiation of the same conditions that led to the formation of ISIS. »»It is expected that the struggle between Iran and the US for control of the Iraqi-Syrian border region will intensify after the Battle of Mosul. Each part in the conflict will make full use of its proxies. Iran will employ its proxies in Iraq, while the US – the strongest party in that contention – will employ its proxies. It appears that the struggle for that region will not be solely military. It will also be political. This is because Iran has been aiming to carve a connecting road between it and its proxies in Syria for years. The US, on the other hand, has been striving to deny this to Iran at any cost. This indicates that this particular conflict will likely be decided in the US’s favor to the detriment of Iran’s policy and strategy. » The future of Iran’s role in Iraq and expected tendencies It goes without saying that Iran will probably continue to exert the utmost efforts to extinguish ISIS’s control over Mosul and, after it, Tal Afar in Iraq, currently under its control. Iran’s role in Iraq will continue becoming more entrenched through the changing of the basic “rules of the game” of Iraqi politics in its favor. It will probably influence the outcome of the next elections in its favor. Iran will continue seeking a means to influence events and outcomes as much as possible so as to realize the aims of its grand strategy and policies. This implies the need for territorial expansion in the guises we have described above. It is possible, however, that Iran’s role in Iraq will show the following forms and tendencies: »»In the dimension of politics: Iran’s support for current Iraqi policies, politicians, and institutions will have a tendency to continue because its receptors would seek this so as to continue in the positions they currently occupy. In light of this, the future could probably exhibit the following: Iran could likely direct its Iraqi-supported militias, especially the PMF, to enter the next elections full force to cement its role politically, just as it is cemented militarily in Iraq’s legal system and constitution. It could and would probably portray itself as the only guarantor of the Iraqi Shi’a people’s political gains since 2003.

It is also expected that Iran will seek to influence Iraq’s government in a way which would make it exceedingly difficult for Iraq to become independent of it. This is in addition to its continuing efforts to align Iraq’s foreign policy towards the Arab world with Tehran’s foreign policies towards the Arab world. Iran’s continuing policy vis-à-vis Iraq seems to heed any possibility of joining Iraq’s interests to its own, and then habilitate that to find expression in any realm, whether religion, politics, or others. This requires that Iran exploit its location culturally and geographically as an essential part of the Arab world. The unexpected contingencies that may befall Iran’s plans – including its inability to claim divine assistance after the Battle of Aleppo and the differences that have arisen between Iran and Russia in regards to Syrian affairs or between it and Turkey – demand that Iran continue searching in its effort to render Iraq a vehicle of its policies. »»In the realm of security: Iraq’s security crisis and the stratagems laid down to deal with the rise of ISIS provides evidence about Iran’s role in Iraq from a security standpoint. Since ISIS first appeared, the role of Iran’s security services in Iraq could be understood and traced precisely.

Very early, the presence of Iran’s security forces in Iraq after the appearance of ISIS was justified in terms of securing Shi’a holy sites and providing assistance to Iraq’s security services so that they could deal with ISIS. From there, it is expected that the continuing presence of Iran’s security services in Iraq would be continually justified. It could be explained in terms of assisting with

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the restructuring of Iraq’s security services, or because the need to transfer intelligence between Iraq’s and Iran’s security services demands a continuing presence. The presence of Iran-supported militias in Iraq also allows Iran to have an indirect “security” presence in Iraq, one that is able to steer events towards their vision in the guise of “security” interests. »»The religious dimension: This manifests itself in Iran’s efforts to control Iraq’s Shi’a religious authorities, as well as their projection and discourse of “uruba” (Arab identity), especially those religious authorities who do not subscribe to the doctrine of Vilayat-e-Faqih (The Jurist Leadership). Conversely, it tries to consolidate the discourse and role of Iran’s Shi’a religious authorities. It also seeks to restrict the influence and role of the religious seminaries at Najaf while promoting Iran’s religious seminaries in Qom.

Fourth Axis » The future of Iran’s intervention in Yemen: Between regional alliances and international events Since the beginning of 2017, Iran’s expansionist policies have caused the fracturing of a state and its plunging into an unending cycle of internal and external crisis. Though this state was never large, it had been united for a prolonged period of time. This event points to the need to curtail the expansionist role of Iran in Yemen.

This necessitated a response from an Arab Islamic and American coalition which aims to do just that – curtail Iran’s sought-for expansion, which in Yemen has resulted in an alliance between Ali Abdullah Saleh, who supported the Houthis and their coup against Yemen’s legitimate political actors. This has shattered Yemen’s peace and stability (UN Resolution 2236).

Despite the multiple catastrophic dimensions which Iran’s interference and intervention in Yemen have caused, the latest events have witnessed a reversal of Iran’s policies and aims in Yemen. Yemen’s legitimate government has managed to gain control of approximately 80% to 85% of the country, while the Saleh-Houthi alliance controls less than 20% of Yemen’s territory (at the time of the preparation of the mid-annual strategic report from January to June 2017), in spite of Iran’s full support of the Houthis. The causes of this reversal in Iran’s aims and policy in Yemen can be found in the latest regional developments and in Houthi’s policy of creating obstacles to regional peace.

First: The outer implications of Iran’s support for the Saleh-Houthi alliance At the time of this writing, events seem to corroborate the truth of the narrative, which is opposite that propagated by Iran with respect to the stability of the Arabian Gulf as well as the Yemen and Syria situations. On 21 March 2017, Iran sent arms as well as military and nonmilitary personnel to the Houthi militias. An Iranian official (no name given) declared that Major General Qassem Suleimani had a very high-level meeting with the most important officials in the Revolutionary Guard around February 2017 to discuss avenues of support for the Houthis. They concluded that the best avenue of support included money, arms, and training for their forces.

In conjunction with this were declarations on 27 March 2017 by Masoud Jazayeri, deputy chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, that Iran was ready to send military advisors to Yemen to help the Houthis in their struggle and to balance the situation on the ground. 127 A report by organizations researching the use of weapons in conflicts was published on 23 March 201t; it discussed the use of Iranian technology in the Yemeni conflict. The report mentioned the use of Iranian planes, like the Qasif-1 plane, which was not operated by Iranians.

Those planes were being used to counter a missile defense system on the part of the Arab coalition in the Yemen conflict. The report stressed that the Iranians were not helping the Houthis solely through the transfer of technology but also in complex operational and structural ways. 128

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On 19 April 2007, Amnesty International provided more evidence of Iran’s support for the Houthis in the form of weapons, rockets, and airplanes without pilots. Iran’s goal was to shift the situation on the ground and guarantee the upper hand for the Houthis. Furthermore, there was a tacit obligation on the part of the Houthis to defer to Iran in any possible negotiation with respect to the conflict. Iran’s main strategy, according to some in Tehran, is to put Saudi Arabia, the main partner in the Arab coalition, on the defensive, specifically in this conflict. 129 In early June 2017, world media reported the transfer to Yemen of non-piloted airplanes and clarified that previous reports of Houthis building these types of planes were false, as they did not possess the infrastructure to build them. Experts in the field agreed that such claims were false while verifying that these planes were currently being built by Iran’s airplane building company.

In the same context, in May 2017 Mahdi Taib, the president of the strategic Ammarr base, an asset of the Revolutionary Guard, declared that Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, had with him a detailed map of the war in Yemen. According to this statement, Ali Khamenei knew beforehand of the Houthi operation to take Sana’a. This is probably why he ordered the Iranian navy to prepare heavy equipment to patrol and maintain control over the southern waters, including the Bab al-Mandab Straits. Some years before, Ali Khamenei had asked that the army replace all its unused so that it would be able to patrol Yemeni waters. For months, the navy did not know why they had been sent to the Bab al-Mandab Straights. Then, eight to 12 months later, they learned that they had been sent there in response to events in Yemen. If the Iranian navy had not been present at the time of these developments, it would have been a heavy loss for the Iranians in regards to the current conflict in Yemen. 130 Second: Indicators of the reversal of Iran’s role in Yemen Iranian operations and strategy have seen a wave of reversals coinciding with the inauguration of US President Donald Trump in mid-January and the beginning of the Arab Islamic American coalition campaign to fight terrorism in all its forms, including Iran’s. Russian and Iranian interests have also been shown to be in conflict in Syria, while the legitimate government in Yemen has seen significant advances and renewed its control of key cities which up to recently had fallen to the Houthi-Saleh alliance. Salient events illustrating the reversal of Iran’s role in Yemen are: » The distribution of the power location map in Yemen Observers and analysts of the Yemeni conflict constantly inquire about the distribution of power and control belonging to the different actors participating in the conflict in the country – that of the coalition, the government, and the popular resistance on the one hand, and that of the Houthi-Saleh alliance on the other. Closely following events on the ground, Houthi control of the country was at around 80% when the Arab Islamic American coalition began its response on 26 March 2015, yet shortly after it receded to its exact opposite. At the time, their control was the most widespread, especially in the southern and western provinces, where government control was approximately 0%. When operation Decisive Storm began to support the legitimate government in the country (and of the writing of this report), the number is now 80% to 85%. This operation went through four major steps, described as follows:

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FIRST PHASE

During the first six months, starting from the date of the launch of Decisive Storm (identified in October 2015), the Coalition forces recovered about 45% of the Yemeni land area.

SECOND PHASE

During the second six months (specifically in April 2016), about 20% of the revenues were recovered to become the recovered 65%, mainly Aden, where Aden represented the symbolic liberation of the Yemeni lands.

THIRD PHASE

During the third six months (in November 2016), about 10% was recovered to make recovery rate 75%, including the strategic Bab al-Mandab area.

FOURTH PHASE

During the fourth six months - most of the period of the strategic report - (specifically in May 2017), about 5-10% of the Yemeni land was recovered by 80-85%. The legitimate forces and coalition succeeded in recovering some cities in the fly zone and the Jabal al-Nar, which is the western key to Taiz, and then move towards Aiyari area near the town of Hajdh, west of Taiz.

This means that, in all, the Houthi-Saleh alliance controls a maximum of 20% of the country’s territory. Following is a description, province by province, of the ruling capacity of each part in the conflict and a description of the areas of Yemen currently under dispute: 131 LEGITIMATE FORCES AREAS OF CONTROL 80-85%

HOUTHI - SALEH MILITIAS AREAS OF CONTROL 15-20%

The following provinces and regions (Al-Mahara, Hadhramaut, Shabwa except for three directorates as they still face clashes, Jouf except for its outskirts which is witnessing battles, The entire of Marib except for the central market in Sarwah, Abyan, Aden,, Baida except for a small part as it is still at the hand of the coupists, Dali except for Damj region, two fronts in Sa’da on the Saudi-Yemeni borders, most of Taiz including Mokha strategic port except for a very small directorate which is still at the hands of the coupists, Lahj, a very large area of Hajjah especially the directorate of Midi although the population density is lower.

The control of the coup militias has declined to the northern and central provinces starting from the stronghold of Houthi group in the far north of Yemen in the province of Sa’da passing through Imran, Sana’a, Dhamar, Ibb and Al Hodeida provinces but their coastlines are heavily besieged by coalition and legitimate forces and also declined to some surrounding and coastal areas of the province of Taiz which has the largest population density.

AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT

Marib province in the directorate of Sarwah which is located west of the province, Taiz in 3 directorates westren and eastren of Taiz, the directorate of Naham northeast in rural areas of the capital city, the directorates of Thee Naem, Zaher and Qurashiyah in Baida province in central Yemen, Dumt and Qaatabah directorate northwest of Dali province in the middle of the country, Hardh and Midi in the province of Hijjah which is a border province with Saudi Arabia, Karsh region which belongs to Musaimeer directorste, Kahboob region in Almudharbah directorate in the Southern province of Lahj, Osailan and Baihan directorstes north the province of Shabwa east of yemen, Kattaf and Baqim which are border directorates in the province of Sadah and Raboah outh of Saudi Asir region.

Despite the apparent size of the areas under Houthi control, they do not represent more than 20% of the total territory of the country. They also do not control the country’s most important resource-rich locations (mostly oil and gas reserves), which account for 95% of the country’s total income. Government forces control the province of Marib west of Sana’a, where oil and

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gas deposits lie, as well as the provinces of Hadramawt and Shabwa in the west. There lies around 70% of Yemen’s oil-producing capacity. It is there where the main port in Yemen used for the exportation of liquefied gas is also located. Moreover, there – in Shabwa – is the heart of Yemen’s oil-producing sector. This is not to say anything about the province of Aden, currently occupied by government forces and where the seat of government had to be transferred. Yemen’s most important port is located there, as is an international airport. Additional airports – Malkaa and Sayyuun – are located in Hadramawt, as is Dabbah, Yemen’s most important port for the exportation of oil. 132 In this context came declarations on 27 March 2017 by Yemen’s prime minister, Ahmad Obaid ibn Daghr, who said: “The Arab coalition and its efforts to support Yemen’s legitimate government have pulverized Iran’s designs on Yemen. Hadi’s government has now reconquered around 80% of the country’s territory. They have brought back the glory of Arabism with a new cognition of the dangers and aims of Shi’ism which has aimed at getting a foothold on Yemen, seeking to act as a pincer causing the demise of Arab Gulf countries by targeting their security and stability. Through that, it can shake the international community as it always does by threatening the wellbeing of the Bab al-Mandab straits, one of the most important trade highways in the world.” 133 At the end of June 2017, there seems to be a new map on the horizon which might lead to a change in the balance of power in the ground battle. That will shift momentum back to legitimate government forces gaining control of areas currently under the control of the Houthi militia. Also occurring is a transfer of military units by Yemen’s armed forces from Aden into high-conflict areas in order to finish the operation of expulsing the Houthis from the areas they currently occupy.

This includes deploying military units into the areas of Hifan, Kirsh, and Qubaytah, in addition to Wazi’iah, Mawzi’, and Muqabbanah. Other units would be deployed in Maris in the Dali’ province and to Mikairas, Mount Thurrah in the province of Abin, to confront the Houthis there.

Military sources confirm that the size of these deployments is probably enough to wrest control of the rest of the provinces from the Houthis. Furthermore, the government’s ground forces seek to coordinate with these deployments within a particular operation they have been planning in order to launch an offensive that will re-conquer the province of Marib. Currently, government forces seem to be advancing up to central Madariyah, which is considered the last Houthi stronghold in the province. Government forces are following a strategy which aims to cut the Houthis’ supply lines into the province. Furthermore, the strategic location of Sarawah gives it ultimate importance when one considers the current conflict in Marib, given its proximity to Sana’a, currently under Houthi control. The government in Yemen must reconquer it, especially taking into account the possibility of doing so in coordination with coalition efforts to advance into Mudiriyah near the western entrance to the capital, Sana’a. Aside from this, in the south, the re-conquering of the center of Mudiriyah would yield its strategic port. 134 » Calls from Iranian leadership for talks between the warring Yemeni parties During his Arabian Gulf tour to Oman and Kuwait on 14 February 2016, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called for a truce in Yemen. He declared: “There should be a truce in Yemen and the setting up of talks exclusively between the warring Yemeni parties. This would definitively help to solve the crisis.” On the other hand, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif declared, in an interview with CNN on 18 February 2017, that imposing a cease-fire in Yemen was “necessary,” saying: “We are ready to work with whichever party in the region to stop the war in Yemen. That crisis has no solution except that it be political.” 135 In this context, Marc Valieri, director of the Center for Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter, understands this declaration to be a fundamental recognition of the implications that the latest developments have had on the future of the conflict, and a recognition that developments in

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Yemen have started diverging from the direction which the Iranians had expected. The strategic advantage is no longer in their hands and they must grant as many concessions as they can to exit the situation in the most favorable way. The Iranian media have themselves reproduced those declarations ad nauseam, and speculate that an Iranian retreat in Yemen could be a strategy to keep their gains in Syria and Iraq. » Houthi Obstacles for peace UN initiatives It has been customary for Iran’s proxies in various countries in the region to adamantly refuse peace overtures in order to maximize their expansionist efforts at the expense of the region’s security and stability. In the meantime, however, experts and observers confirm that Iran simply does not have the resources and manpower to carry out its overarching designs.

The Houthis and their ally, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, have refused any international efforts to achieve a peaceful solution to the Yemeni conflict. For the past two and a half years since their conquering of Sana’a, negotiation efforts, one after another, have failed to reach a breakthrough.

For instance, the negotiations between Yemeni warring parties that took place in Kuwait for months were declared to have failed by 6 August 2016 once the Houthis rejected all international proposals, as well as all requests from the government, by continuing to occupy Sana’a as well as by continuing to bear arms.

DEMANDS OF THE ARAB - BACKED LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT BEFORE 2017 » The evacuation of Houthis from Sana’a and the areas under their control. » Delivering heavy and ballistic weapons. » Implementing UN resolutions.

DEMANDS OF THE IRANIAN - BACKED HOUTHI - SALEH ALLIANCE BEFORE 2017 » Formation of a national unity government including Houthis. » Building a new ground for negotiation based on the demolition of UN resolutions and laying foundations for a new legitimacy.

Notwithstanding, international proposals according to UN resolutions as well as specific proposals from Arab countries to find a peaceful solution to the conflict are still being suggested.

From the beginning of 2017 until June of that year, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Ismail Ould Sheikh has been at the forefront of efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. All these efforts, however, have not borne any fruit – by Iranian decision – and the Houthis will not accede to any initiative, although their control over Yemen’s territory is now at approximately 20%, distributed thus: » The February 2017 initiative This was rejected by Yemen’s legitimate and internationally recognized government because it would do violence to UN Resolution 2216, other Arabian Gulf countries’ efforts to advance peace in the country, and settled ideas born out of national dialogue. In addition to this was the fact that new presidential elections on the horizon compromised the competence of President Hadi to support peace efforts. New elections would have set the following issues: • That the Houthis retreat from the capital, Sana’a, while giving up their ballistic weapons by handing them over to a neutral third party.

• The transfer of President Abdurabo Mansour Hadi’s competence to a new deputy president elected by common agreement.

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• The drafting of a new constitution with the scheduling of elections a year’s time after the signing of a peace agreement.

• The formation of a national unity government in which the Houthis would have participated. 136 » The March 2017 initiative On 9 March 2017, Ould Sheikh proposed a roadmap with modifications of the previous one rejected by Yemen’s government, which would have provided for the following: • The resignation of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar as vice-president and his retirement from politics, accompanied by President Abdurabo Mansour Hadi’s continuation up to the time when new elections would have been scheduled.

• The canceling of the appointment of a specific vice-president, but with confirmation of a president elected by common agreement with all powers confirmed, confirming the status quo militarily present in Hadramawt and cancelling all appointments to government offices and posts that occurred after the conquering of Sana’a in 2014. 137 » The June 2017 initiative specific to the port in al- Hodeida The port of al-Hodeida has become strategically important in regards to peace initiatives in the country. It is the largest Yemeni harbor located along the shores of the Red Sea. It is situated under circumstances that could make it the fulcrum of successful peace initiatives in the future, or that could transform it into the avenue for the opening of another front in the war, thereby deepening the state of conflict. This owes to the fact that the Houthis occupy most of that area. In early June 2017, Ould Sheikh proposed a new roadmap which had, as a central concept, the port of alHodeida under Houthi control since 2014. In that peace initiative, the UN accepted the continued occupation of Sana’a by the Houthis, instead demanding that al- Hodeida be freed of occupation.

Ould Sheikh considered this framing of the deal to be inclusive of the requirements and interests of both parties. To the Coalition, this would ensure that it would not be used to smuggle weapons and war materiel to Yemen or be used to threaten sea lanes and traffic. On the Houthi side, however, they would not be surrendering the port to their enemies, but rather the coalition: A military committee, non-party to the conflict: Agreed to by both parties in the conflict which would manage the port’s security as well as military affairs.

A non-partisan committee in charge of managing the economic utility of the port: This committee would manage the port while safeguarding the agreement, needs, and interests of both parties, being partial to none. It would manage the reception of humanitarian aid as well as merchandise, and it would defer to Yemen’s central bank to approve and certify all of the operations and their use not in war purposes or for the sole benefit of particular individuals.

This is all in accordance with the manner in which the UN envoy presented it to the UN Security Council. 138 However, according to the UN envoy itself, the Houthis rejected everything that could constitute a road to peace. As a consequence, the peace initiative by Sheikh was accepted in vexation by the other party. The Coalition, for their part, amply supported the initiative – with Saudi Arabia in the lead – because it guaranteed a key demand of theirs. This demand was that the UN would monitor the use of the port so that the Yemeni people could be spared the use of the port for smuggling weapons to fuel the war on the side of the Houthis, and so humanitarian aid could enter the country through that venue. After this, the Houthis criticized Ould Sheikh for being “biased.” When he was in Sana’a in June 2017, he survived an assassination attempt when the transport he was riding near Sana’a’s airport was shot at, after which he promptly left Sana’a.

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» Conclusions and future tendencies of Iran’s role in the Yemen crisis It is an undisputed fact that the greater part of Yemen’s territory – 80% to 85% – is currently in the hands of the internationally recognized government of Yemen. This has been the result of the Arab Islamic American coalition’s efforts to support that legitimate government’s struggle to repossess the country. Furthermore, it could lead in the near future to that legitimate government more fully joining international and regional efforts to curb Iran’s expansionist ambitions in the region, as represented in the activities of the Houthi militia.

Notwithstanding the above, the most salient points of divergence between the two sides are as follows: • Continuing Houthi refusal – by Iranian fiat – to accept any peace initiative while underpinned by the requirement to give up arms, retreat from Sana’a, and cease the occupation of the alHudaydah port which is currently still being used to smuggle weapons into the country and which threatens sea lane activity in that region of the Red Sea coast.

• The demand by the internationally recognized government that any peace initiative be subjected to the conditions of UN Resolution 2216. The resolution unequivocally condemns the coup by the Houthis against the government of Abdurabo Mansour Hadi, and establishes a retreat from Sana’a by the Houthis as an indispensable condition for talks to take place. Houthis, on the other hand, continues to assert that a national unity government be set in place as a condition for withdrawal from Sana’a.

• With a continuing refusal on the part of the Houthis – with Iranian support – to retreat from the al- Hodeida port, its position as a key issue in any future peace initiative is uncertain. It is most probable that a coalition that has seen itself impelled to wrest most of the country from Houthi control will not tolerate seeing the entry port to 70% of the country’s imports remaining indefinitely in the hands of the Houthis and bearing the failure of current peace initiatives. The Coalition greatly desires to cut the other side’s economic avenues for financing their war, with the port being a vital one. The coalition also sees a vital need to return to stability sea lanes and traffic through the Red Sea coast. Just a few months ago, Emirati ships were attacked near the port, an occurrence which must not be allowed again.

Lastly, the late and current economic crisis facing Iran – including the recent embargo, new international efforts to curb Iran’s expansion, the country’s internal crisis, and the new series of offensives obeying the ever-more-innovative strategies of the internationally recognized government of Yemen – seem to be encouraging the Houthi-Saleh alliance to regard as reasonable the possibility of giving up their arms, and retreating from Sana’a to facilitate a peace initiative and a further political solution even if it’s a costly one for them. If, however, the situation does not incline towards that option, the Arab Islamic American coalition will seek and advance militarily, confident in renewed US support for liberating Sana’a

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The second Biannual Strategic Report - June.2017

‫‪Endnotes‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬منصور حسن العتيبي‪ ،‬السياسة اإليرانية تجاه دول َم ْجلِس التعاون الخليجي (‪( ،)2000-1979‬جامعة القاهرة‪ :‬كلية االقتصاد والعلوم السياسية‪ ،‬رسالة‬ ‫دكتوراه)‪ ،2004 ،‬ص‪.66‬‬ ‫العالقات الخليجية اإليرانية بعد أزمة الخليج الثانية‪( ،‬جامعة الدول العربيَّة‪ :‬معهد البحوث والدراسات العربيَّة)‪ ،2004 ،‬ص‪،56‬‬ ‫‪ 2‬ماجد صالح الديحاني‪َ ،‬‬ ‫العالقات الخليجية اإليرانية إبان فترة حكم الرئيس محمد خاتمي‪ ،‬الكويت‪ ،‬مركز دراسات الخليج والجزيرة العربيَّة‪،1999 ،‬‬ ‫وصالح عبد الرحمن المانع‪َ ،‬‬ ‫ص‪.64‬‬ ‫التوغل اإليراني والصراعات الال متناهية في العراق‪ ،‬مركز الخليج العربي للدراسات اإليرانية‪ ،‬تاريخ‬ ‫التوغل اإليراني في الدول العربيَّة‪ُّ ،‬‬ ‫‪ 3‬سلسلة تقارير ُّ‬ ‫النشر‪ .2016/6/22 :‬متاح على الرابط‪http: //cutt.us/7fr1D :‬‬ ‫‪ 4‬د‪.‬محمد بن صقر السلمي‪ ،‬استراتيجية إيران تجاه الثورات العربيَّة‪ :‬تكتيك جديد يستثني سوريا واليمن‪ ،‬العربيَّة‪ ،2015/4/12 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http: :‬‬ ‫‪//cutt.us/7m0q9،‬‬ ‫‪ 5‬محمد عباس ناجي‪“ ،‬االنكماش‪ :‬مستقبل الدور اإلقليمي اإليراني بعد الثورات العربيَّة”‪ ،‬السياسية الدولية‪ :‬متاح على الرابط‪http: //cutt.us/vPVba :‬‬ ‫‪ 6‬د‪.‬أشرف كشك‪ ،‬االتفاق اإليراني الغربي‪ :‬المصالح تتصالح‪ ،‬موقع مركز البحرين للدراسات االستراتيجية والطاقة‪ ،‬بتاريخ ‪ 27‬نوفمبر ‪ ،2015‬على الرابط‬ ‫التالي‪analysisr/bh.org.der asat.w :‬‬ ‫العالقات الخليجية اإليرانية‪ :‬الواقع وآفاق المستقبل‪ ،‬مرجع سبق ذكره‪ ،‬ص‪.16‬‬ ‫‪ 7‬د‪.‬أشرف كشك‪َ ،‬‬ ‫‪ 8‬المرجع السابق‪ ،‬ص‪.17‬‬ ‫‪ 9‬عبد الوهاب بدرخان‪ ،‬دالالت فرصة روحاني وآفاقها في الداخل والخارج‪ ،‬صحيفة الحياة ‪ 23‬يونيو ‪.2013‬‬ ‫العالقات الخليجية‪-‬اإليرانية بعد االتفاق النووي‪ ،‬مركز الجزيرة للدراسات‪ ،2015/10/8 ،‬متاح على الرابط‬ ‫‪ 10‬محمد بدري عيد‪ ،‬مستقبل َ‬ ‫‪http: //cutt.us/I1uDZ‬‬ ‫‪ 11‬وكالة فارس لألنباء‪ 17 ،‬مايو ‪.2015‬‬ ‫‪ 12‬جهاد الخازن‪ ،‬نحن سندفع ثمن االتفاق مع إيران‪ ،‬صحيفة الحياة اللندنية‪ ،‬العدد ( ‪ 17 ،)19158‬سبتمبر ‪.2015‬‬ ‫‪ 13‬وزير خارجية البحرين‪ :‬المتفجرات المهرَّبة من إيران تكفي إلزالة المنامة‪ ،‬موقع دوت مصر اإللكتروني‪ 10 ،‬سبتمبر ‪ ،2015‬متاح على الرابط‪http: // :‬‬ ‫‪cutt.us/5xBJC‬‬ ‫‪ 14‬محكمة كويتية تؤيِّد إعدام متهم في قضية “خلية العبدلي”‪ ،‬الخليج أونالين‪ .2016/7/21 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http: //cutt.us/jE82e :‬‬ ‫‪ 15‬عقيدة أوباما أم استراتيجية الواليات المتحدة؟‪ ،‬نظرة في كتاب (عقيدة أوباما‪ ..‬اإلستراتيجية األميركية اليوم)‪ ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/ :‬‬ ‫‪.mSNsl‬‬ ‫‪ 16‬محمد أبو سعدة‪ ،‬سيناريوهات سياسة ترامب تجاه إيران‪ ،‬المعهد المصري للدراسات السياسية واالستراتيجية‪ 21 ،‬يناير ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪.http://cutt.us/rTzet‬‬ ‫‪ 17‬احمد عبدالرازق‪ ،‬هل تضعف قمم ترامب في السعودية نفوذ ايران في المنطقة‪ ،‬بي بي سي عربي‪ 21 ،‬مايو ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪.http://cutt.us/GJGFQ‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬عشرات الصواريخ االمريكية تستهدف قاعدة عسكرية بسوريا‪ ،‬سكاي نيوز‪ 7 ،‬ابريل ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪.http://cutt.us/Z3kxi :‬‬ ‫‪ 19‬واشنطن‪ :‬التنف خط احمر على النظام وإيران‪ ،‬المدن االليكترونية‪ ،‬بتاريخ ‪ ،2017/5/19‬متاح على الرابط‪.http://cutt.us/o9MKz :‬‬ ‫‪ 20‬تاريخ التحالفات العربية‪ ،‬جريدة الحياة اللندنية‪ 29 ،‬ديسمبر ‪ ،2015‬متاح على الرابط‪. http://cutt.us/1bWeF:‬‬ ‫‪ 21‬اطالعات‪ ،‬امضای قرارداد تسليحاتی ‪ ۴۶۰‬ميليارد دالری ميان عربستان و آمريکا‪ ۳۱،‬ارديبهشت ‪.http://cutt.us/gfC2 ،۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 22‬مشرق نيوز‪ ،‬واکنش محسن رضايی به قرارداد فروش سالح ميان آمريکا و عربستان‪ ۱ ،‬خرداد ‪.http://cutt.us/wl4l9 ،۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 23‬ايسنا‪ ،‬اميرعبد اللهيان بيان کرد‪ :‬استفاده عربستان از قدرت ترامپ برای مشروعيتبخشی به خودش‪ ۱ ،‬خرداد ‪.http://cutt.us/qecPc ،۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 24‬رمان امروز‪ ،‬هزينه و منفعتهای ترامپ در سفر به عربستان‪ /‬راهبرد واشنگتن در قبال رياض و شورای همکاری خليجفارس‪،۱/۳/۱۳۹۶ ،‬‬ ‫‪.http://cutt.us/EMrTH‬‬ ‫‪ 25‬صحيفة آرمان ص‪https://goo.gl/pPGKyv،2‬‬ ‫‪ 26‬صحيفة آرمان ص‪https://goo.gl/LCJQgs،2‬‬ ‫‪ 27‬موقع صحيفة اقتصاد أونالين‪ ،‬ظريف‪ :‬آماده همکاری با عربستان هستيم‪http://cutt.us/TYqrj ،۲۶/۱۲/۱۳۹۵ ،‬‬ ‫العالقات بين إيران ودول الخليج؟‪ ،‬الرابط‪http://cutt.us/tty3b :‬‬ ‫‪ 28‬صحيفة قرار‪ ،‬هل من الممكن تطبيع َ‬ ‫‪ 29‬فرمانده نيرزمينی سپاه‪ :‬اعزام مستشاران سپاه به کشورهای مقاومت ادامه دارد‪ ،‬دويچه وله فارسی‪http://cutt.us/bbNvF ،2017 /2/18 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 30‬وكالة أنباء فارس‪ ،‬عبد اللهيان‪ :‬به تصميمات پوتين میتوان اعتماد کرد‪ /‬راه برای بازگشت عربستان باز است‪ 14 ،‬اسفند ‪،139‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/2T2zc،‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬موقع بي بي سي فارسي‪ ،‬ايران‪ :‬موانع حضور در مراسم حج برطرف شد‪ 27،‬اسفند ‪ .http://cutt.us/icxym ،1395‬وللمزيد انظر وكالة إيسنا‪،‬‬ ‫انجام ‪ 3‬دور مذاکره بين ايران وعربستان برای حل مساله حج« ‪ 11‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/Lss3u ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ 32‬موقع ألف‪ ،‬قاضی عسکر‪ :‬ديه شهدا پرداخت خواهد شد‪ /‬تضمين امنيت حجاج از سوی عربستان‪ ۲۸ ،‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/WEmOp ،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪ 33‬صحيفة آرمان امروز‪ ،‬پيام کتبی روحانی به امير کويت‪ ۲۴ ،‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/kJotg ، ۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪ 34‬تسنيم‪ ،‬ظريف امروز به قطر میرود‪ 18 ،‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/5ZLBy،1395‬‬ ‫‪ 35‬وكالة فارس‪ ،‬واکنش سخنگوی وزارت خارجه ايران به بيانيه پايانی سفر پادشاه عربستان به مالزی‪ 12 ،‬اسفند ‪5ROCA/http://cutt.us ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ 36‬صحيفة صباح‪http://cutt.us/71scd ،28,2,201 ،»Suudi Arabistan Irak yakınlaşmasının perde arkası: ”İran ،‬‬ ‫‪ 37‬خبرگزاری آناتولی‪ ،‬بحرين‪ :‬يک شبکه تروريستی مرتبط با ايران بازداشت شد‪http://cutt.us/dbz2f ،2017/3/26 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 38‬موقع أفكار نيوز‪ ،‬ولیعهد عربستان‪ :‬ايران را ميدان جنگ خواهيم کرد‪.http://cutt.us/H687F ،۱۳/۰۲/۱۳۹۶ ،‬‬ ‫‪ 39‬تدبير‪ ،‬بازتاب اظهارات ضدايرانی وزير دفاع رياض عليه تهران‪ ۱۳ ،‬ارديبهشت ‪.http://cutt.us/G13DI ،۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 40‬تسنيم‪ ،‬نامه ايران به دبيرکل سازمان ملل‪ :‬اظهارات بنسلمان پذيرش همدستی عربستان با تروريستهاست‪ 14 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪.http://cutt.us/tCZir ،1396‬‬ ‫‪ 41‬جام جم‪ ،‬وزير دفاع‪ :‬سعودیها اگر جهالت کنند‪ ،‬جايی را غير از مکه و مدينه سالم نمیگذاريم‪ 17 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪.http://cutt.us/erN82 ،1396‬‬

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‫‪The second Biannual Strategic Report - June.2017‬‬

‫‪ 42‬بيت األمة‪ ،‬سلیمی با اشاره به تهدید وزیر دفاع عربستان‪ :‬عربستان تحمل دو ساعت جنگ با نیروهای عملیاتی ایران را ندارد‪ ۱۸ ،‬اردیبهشت‬ ‫‪.http://cutt.us/v0glp ،۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 43‬جهان صنعت‪ ،‬ص‪ ،2 :‬محمد جواد ظریف‪ :‬عربستان در شأني نیست که ما را تهديد کند‪ 396 ،‬اردیبهشت ‪.http://cutt.us/so8MR ،21‬‬ ‫‪ 44‬صحيفة عصر اقتصاد (ص‪ ،)12‬السوق القطري فرصة ذهبية للصادرات‪http://www.pishkhaan.net ،2017/6/19 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 45‬المصدر‪ :‬وكالة تسنيم‪ ،‬إيران ترسل ‪ 5‬طائرات حاملة لمواد غذائية إلى قطر‪http://tn.ai/1433372 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 46‬اتفاق قطري إيراني على تعزيز عالقات التعاون بينهما‪ ،‬سكاي نيوز عربية‪ .2017/5/27 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/1mX5:‬‬ ‫‪ 47‬المرجع السابق‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 48‬محمد يسري‪ ،‬العالقات اإليرانية القطرية‪ :‬تاريخ من المصالح المشتركة‪ ،2017/6/9 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪.http://cutt.us/GOCqo :‬‬ ‫‪ 49‬المرجع السابق‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 50‬صفاء عبد الوهاب علي‪ ،‬االستراتيجية األمريكية تجاه الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬مجلة شؤون عربية‪ ،‬العدد ‪ ،170‬الربع االول ‪ ،2017‬ص ‪ ،69‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/Fmi8‬‬ ‫‪ 51‬د‪.‬عبدالعزيز بن عثمان بن صقر‪ ،‬االستراتيجية االمريكية في الشرق األوسط‪ ..‬ثوابت ومتغيرات‪ ،‬الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬رقم العدد ‪ ،13237‬بتاريخ‬ ‫‪ ،2015/2/24‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/Fo7c2 :‬‬ ‫‪ 52‬محمد أبو سعدة‪ ،‬سيناريوهات سياسة ترامب تجاه إيران‪ ،‬المعهد المصري للدراسات السياسية واالستراتيجية‪ 21 ،‬يناير ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪.http://cutt.us/rTzet‬‬ ‫‪ 53‬احمد عبدالرازق‪ ،‬هل تضعف قمم ترامب في السعودية نفوذ ايران في المنطقة‪ ،‬بي بي سي عربي‪ 21 ،‬مايو ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪.http://cutt.us/GJGFQ‬‬ ‫‪ 54‬موقع جام نيوز‪ ،‬اعتراف کم‌سابقه و تلخ مقام ایرانی درباره سوریه‪/‬ادعای جنجالی درباره بشار اسد‪http://cutt.us/D2Q4M ،۱۱/۰۱/۱۳۹۶ ،‬‬ ‫‪ 55‬محمود سعيد‪ ،‬الصراع األمريكي ‪-‬اإليراني يحتدم في الجنوب السوري‪ ،‬شبكة رؤية اإلخبارية‪ 23 ،‬مايو ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/ :‬‬ ‫‪zLDD7‬‬ ‫‪ 56‬السر الحقيقي وراء التحرك األمريكي في التنف السورية‪ ،‬مجلة العالم العربي‪ ،2017/5/18 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/b8Ntw :‬‬ ‫‪ 57‬البادية السورية‪ :‬قاعدة الزكف األميركية الفشال المشروع اإليراني؟‪ ،‬جريدة المدن االليكترونية‪ ،2017/5/6 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/8k7f:‬‬ ‫‪ 58‬ماجد الدباغ‪ ،‬واشنطن وطهران وسياسة حافة الهاوية‪ ،‬روداو االليكترونية‪ ،2017/3/4 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/GojDP :‬‬ ‫‪ 59‬موقع بي بي سي فارسي‪ ،‬پیشنهاد ایران برای تشکیل کمیته حقیقت یاب برای حمالت اخیر در سوریه‪ 8 ،‬ابريل ‪http://cutt.us/B1YO ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 60‬موقع زيتون‪ ،‬روسیه تایید کرد‪ ،‬حمله دیروز به ادلب توسط دولت بشار اسد صورت گرفته است‪ ۱۶ ،‬فروردین ‪http://cutt.us/mtKLA ،۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 61‬د‪ .‬حمزة عماد الدين موسى‪ ،‬الموقف الروسي ضد الثورات العربية في ليبيا وسوريا‪ ،‬مصرس االليكترونية‪ ،2012/3/20 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http:// :‬‬ ‫‪.cutt.us/LNdJ‬‬ ‫‪ 62‬بينة الملحم‪ ،‬هل تغير الموقف الروسي من الثورة السورية؟ جريدة الرياض ‪ ،2013/2/3‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/9HFtr:‬‬ ‫‪ 63‬هاني شادي‪ ،‬روسيا والربيع العربي‪ .‬مصالح ومخاوف‪ ،‬مجلة الديمقراطية‪ ،2012/4/1 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/eolj :‬‬ ‫‪ 64‬امد نيوز‪ ،‬آمد نيوز موقع إيراني يؤكد ‪ :‬الحرس الثوري اإليراني متورط بمجزرة خان شيخون ‪ -‬كل الوطن‪ 8 ،‬ابريل ‪http://cutt.us/rMT9c ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 65‬تركي مصطفى‪ ،‬مظاهر وآليات ونتائج الصراع الروسي‪-‬اإليراني في سوريا‪ ،‬بالدي نيوز‪ ،2016/12/23 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/Yxcvm :‬‬ ‫‪ 66‬عمر كوش‪ ،‬معركة حلب‪ ...‬بين االندفاعة الروسية ‪ -‬اإليرانية والتخاذل األميركي‪ 17 ،‬فبراير ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/BYnYd :‬‬ ‫‪ 67‬د‪ .‬سعيد الحاج‪ ،‬هل التقارب التركي الروسي طويل المدى؟‪ ،‬المعهد المصري للدراسات والسياسات االستراتيجية‪ 32 ،‬ديسمبر ‪ ،2016‬متاح على‬ ‫الرابط‪http://cutt.us/NeKw7 :‬‬ ‫‪ 68‬عبد الهادي محفوظ‪ ،‬خريطة الطريق” األميركية – الروسية للحل السياسي في سوريا؟‪ 24 ،‬يونيو ‪ ،2016‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/d6MNw :‬‬ ‫‪ 69‬د منير بدوي‪ ،‬مفهوم الصراع‪ :‬دراسة في األصول النظرية لألسباب واألنواع‪ ،‬مجلة «دراسات مستقبلية»‪ ،‬العدد الثالث (يوليو ‪1997‬م)‪ ،‬مركز دراسات‬ ‫المستقبل ـ جامعة أسيوط‪ ،‬ص ‪ .25‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/YoNi :‬‬ ‫‪ 70‬مفهوم الصراع الدولي‪ ،‬موضوع دوت نت‪ 19 ،‬ديسمبر ‪ ،2016‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/owXc :‬‬ ‫‪ 71‬ايمان بومزبر‪ /‬وردة رزاق‪ ،‬المنطلقات النظرية لظاهرة الصراع الدولي‪ ،‬مجلة الرائد‪ ،‬متاح على الرابط‪ http://raed30.amuntada.com/72:‬البادية‬ ‫في اللغة منطقة أحيائية تتميز بأراضي خصبة تصلح للزراعة او هي أرض في الصحراء فيها المسكن والمرعى والماء ‪-‬تلك المنطقة الواقعة جنوب شرق‬ ‫سوريا وتضم شرق األردن وغرب العراق‪ ،‬تتميز البوادي بوجود مناطق للرعي نظراً لوجود نباتات عشبية وعدم وجود أشجار نتيجة قلة الهطول المطري‪.‬‬ ‫وتعيش فيها قبائل البدو الرحل التي تعتمد على الماشية واإلبل‬ ‫‪73 Fabrice Balanche, Assad Needs ‘Useless Syria’ Too, POLICY ANALYSIS, Washington institute, January 2017 ,4, available in: http://‬‬ ‫‪cutt.us/hkSMd‬‬ ‫‪ 74‬األهمية االستراتيجية لسوريا “غير المفيدة”‪ ،‬المنتدى االقتصاد السوري‪ ،2017/5/21 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/s3MG :‬‬ ‫‪ 75‬أسباب الصراع في البادية السورية‪ ،‬مركز أسبار للدراسات والبحوث دراسات سورية‪ ،2017-06-15 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/DMY3 :‬‬ ‫‪ 76‬البادية السورية‪ ...‬كنز طبيعي وتاريخي!!!‪ ،‬مجلة الثورة االليكترونية‪ ،2012-5-22 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/UeoDC :‬‬ ‫‪ 77‬األهمية االستراتيجية لسوريا “غير المفيدة” – الجزء األول‪ ،2017/07/05 ،‬المنتدى االقتصادي السوري‪ ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/mDEx2 :‬‬ ‫‪ 78‬قوات الحشد الشعبي تصل الحدود العراقية – السورية‪ ،‬موقع مصراوي‪ ،2017/5/29 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/bUIWx :‬‬ ‫‪ 79‬قائد‪ :‬غارة للتحالف الذي تقوده أمريكا حاولت منع تقدم صوب قاعدة التنف‪ .‬رويترز‪.2017-5-18 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 80‬أمريكا تشن هجوما جديدا على قوات مؤيدة للحكومة السورية بعد تحذيرات‪ .‬رويترز‪2017-6-7 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 81‬بالفيديو… أبو عزرائيل يصل إلى الحدود السورية ‪ ..‬ماذا قال؟‪ .‬أورينت نت‪.2017-5-30 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 82‬البادية السورية‪ ..‬صراع يرسم خارطة النفوذ اإلقليمي والدولي لمستقبل سوريا‪ ،‬صحيفة العرب اللندنية‪ ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/HUL7 :‬‬ ‫‪ 83‬إيران تسير قدما في إنشاء ممرها البري إلى البحر المتوسط‪ ،‬مصراوي‪ 1 ،‬يونيو ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/p25px :‬‬ ‫‪ 84‬عائشة المري‪ ،‬الكوريدور اإليراني‪ 5 ،‬مايو ‪ ،2017‬االتحاد اإلماراتية‪http://cutt.us/3fO1l،‬‬ ‫واقعا؟‪ ،‬مركز الروابط للبحوث والدراسات االستراتيجية‪ 14 ،‬يونيو‪ ،2017,‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/PJfUD :‬‬ ‫أمرا ً‬ ‫‪ 85‬الممر اإليراني… هل بات ً‬ ‫‪ 86‬باسل العودات‪ ،‬السيطرة على حلب ُتكمل ‹الكوريدور› الشيعي اإليراني‪ ،‬صحيفة العرب اللندنية‪ ،2017/5/12 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/SEi4f :‬‬ ‫صراعا على “معابر طريق الحرير” وحقول النفط والغاز‪ ،‬إرم نيوز‪ 31 ،‬مايو ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪ 87‬حرب البادية السورية تخفي ً‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/9kne6‬‬ ‫‪ 88‬كيفين لين‪ ،‬إيران بعينَي بكين‪ ،‬يونيو ‪ ،2015‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/u0FPC :‬‬

‫‪The second Biannual Strategic Report - June.2017‬‬

‫‪146‬‬

‫البري اإليراني‪ ،‬العربي الجديد‪ 26 ،‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/jIBwA ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 89‬عبثية “الكوريدور” ّ‬ ‫‪ 90‬المرجع السابق‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 91‬المرجع السابق‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 92‬البادية السورية ‪ ..‬األهمية االستراتيجية لسوريا غير المفيدة – الجزء الثاني‪ ،‬المنتدى االقتصادي السوري‪ 12 ،‬مايو ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪http:// :‬‬ ‫‪cutt.us/9ieP0‬‬ ‫‪ 93‬معارك البادية الصراع الدولي على الرمال السورية‪ ،‬اتحاد الديمقراطيين السوريين‪ ،‬بتاريخ ‪ ،2017/5/16‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/aJfE :‬‬ ‫‪ 94‬علي حسين باكير ‪ ،‬سيطرة الواليات المتحدة األمريكية على النفط العراقي‪ :‬الدوافع و األهداف‪ ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/EXxkm :‬‬ ‫‪ 95‬معارك البادية السورية‪ :‬خريطة الصراع الجديد‪ ،‬الرقة بوست‪ 27 ،‬مايو ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/EsZ2l :‬‬ ‫‪ 96‬محمود عبدالحكيم‪ ،‬منطلقات وأهداف المشروع األمريكي في البادية السورية‪ ،‬يوينو ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/5xV0 :‬‬ ‫‪ 97‬البادية السورية‪ :‬قاعدة الزكف «األميركية»الفشال المشروع اإليراني؟ المدن االليكترونية‪ ،66،2017 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/hYwUw :‬‬ ‫‪ 98‬من يسيطر على البادية السورية‪ ،‬يحكم المنطقة‪ ،2017/6/21 ،‬المنتدى االقتصادي السوري‪ ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/rK8Dr :‬‬ ‫‪99 Karim, Traboulsi. “Jordan accused of supporting Syrian rebels”. The New Arab. June 2015 ,14.‬‬ ‫‪100 Julien, Barnes-Dacey. “Syria: the View From Jordan”. European Council on Foreign Relations. June 2013 ,17.‬‬ ‫‪ 101‬د‪ .‬أمين المشاقبة‪ ،‬السياسة الخارجية األردنية واألزمة السورية‪ ،‬جريدة الدستور األردنية‪ ،2،2017/13 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/SuYAe :‬‬ ‫‪ 102‬صحيفة جهان صنعت‪ ،‬ص‪ ،2:‬المعارضة السورية تترك مفاوضات اآلستانة‪http://cutt.us/gJ3YD ،‬‬ ‫‪ 103‬جام جام‪ ،‬درخواست فرانسه از ایران وروسیه دربارۀ سوریه‪ 23 ،‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/gVGGH ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ 104‬اتفاق أستانة الثالثي‪ ..‬خلفياته وفرص نجاحه‪ ،‬المركز العربي لألبحاث ودراسة السياسات‪ ،2017/5/9،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/p0wH6 :‬‬ ‫‪ 105‬جام جام‪ ،‬درخواست فرانسه از ایران وروسیه دربارۀ سوریه‪ 23 ،‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/gVGGH ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ 106‬نيرمين عمر‪ ،‬هل تنجح روسيا في تحجيم الميليشيات اإليرانية في سوريا؟ بلدي نيوز‪ ،2017/1/9 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/7Hb0f:‬‬ ‫‪ 107‬روزنامه ايران‪ ،‬دستور كار ايران روسيه وتركيه درباره سوريه‪ 9 ،‬فروردين ‪http://cutt.us/57kpS،1396‬‬ ‫‪ 108‬لينا الخطيب‪ ،‬قراءة في اتفاق المناطق اآلمنة في سورية‪ 11 ،‬مايو ‪ .2017‬الحياة‪ ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/EI7EP :‬‬ ‫‪ 109‬موقع سبوتنيك فارسي‪ ،‬نتانیاهو در خصوص پایگاه دریایی ایران به روسیه شکایت کرد‪http://cutt.us/WL6fw ،2017/3/20 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 110‬منظمة مجاهدي خلق اإليرانية‪ :‬مدير استخبارات أميركا‪ :‬للنظام اإليراني ‪ 10‬آالف عنصر بهذه الدول‪ ،‬في ‪ 13‬مايو ‪http://cutt.us/GY38u :2017‬‬ ‫عربي‪ ،2016/11/16 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http: //cutt.us/ulUaL :‬‬ ‫ِر قانون الحشد الشعبي بغياب ُّ‬ ‫‪ 111‬برلمان العراق ُيق ّ‬ ‫السنَّة‪ ،‬األخبار‪ّ ،‬‬ ‫‪ 112‬أحمد عدلي‪ ،‬مأسسة الطائفية‪ ..‬تداعيات إدماج الحشد في الجيش العراقي‪ ،‬مركز دراسات المستقبل‪ ،2016/11/29 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪http: //cutt.us/ms6WC‬‬ ‫‪ 113‬ايسنا‪ ،‬سفیر عراق در ایران‪ :‬اگر ایران نبود منطقه سقوط می‌کرد‪۲۶ ،‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/3wA4A،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪ 114‬آرمان امروز‪ ،‬آزادی موصل نزدیک است‪ ۲۶ ،‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/6iMZi،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪ 115‬لماذا يصر الحشد الشعبي على لعب دور رئيسي في معركة تلعفر؟‪ ،‬مركز المستقبل لألبحاث والدراسات المتقدمة‪ ،‬السبت‪ 22 ,‬يوليه‪2017 ,‬‬ ‫‪ 116‬مهر‪ ،‬سخنگوی جنبش نجباء عراق‪ :‬سردار سلیمانی تحت حمایت دولت‪ ،‬ملت ومرجعیت عراق است‪ ۱۸ ،‬اسفند ‪http://cutt.us/cFzTE ،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪ 117‬منظمة مجاهدي خلق اإليرانية‪ :‬فيلق القدس للنظام اإليراني يفتتح عشرات المقرات في الموصل تحت إشراف المالكي‪ ،‬في ‪ 1‬مايو ‪http:// :2017‬‬ ‫‪cutt.us/n3YeQ‬‬ ‫‪ 118‬المرجع السابق نفسه‪.‬‬ ‫‪ 119‬لماذا يصر الحشد الشعبي على لعب دور رئيسي في معركة تلعفر؟‪ ،‬مركز المستقبل لألبحاث والدراسات المتقدمة‪ ،‬السبت‪ 22 ,‬يوليه‪2017 ,‬‬ ‫‪ 120‬وقايع اتفاقية‪ ،4‬گاردين‪ :‬ايران درپي تأسيس كريدور جديد در سوريه و عراق‪ 28 ،‬اردیبهشت ‪.http://cutt.us/ca2yp ،۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 121‬انتخاب‪ ،‬رسانه روسی خبر داد‪/‬سفر سردار سلیمانی به اقلیم کردستان عراق‪ ۲۳ ،‬فروردين ‪http://cutt.us/nkT0v ،۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 122‬مركز الروابط للدراسات‪ ،‬زيارة قاسم سليماني إلى كردستان‪ :‬األهداف والتوجهات‪ 17 ،‬ابريل ‪http://cutt.us/qQzzn ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 123‬تقرير الجزيرة‪ ،‬جدل بشأن رفع علم كردستان في كركوك‪http://cutt.us/r7Jt ،2017/4/1 ،‬‬ ‫‪124‬احمد إسماعيل‪ ،‬مصر العربية‪ ،‬لهذه األسباب‪ ..‬تخشى إيران استفتاء كردستان‪ 14 ،‬ابريل ‪http://cutt.us/uG4y1 ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 125‬حمدي مالك‪ ،‬المونيتور‪ ،‬هل يستطيع سليماني كبح جماح طموحات إقليم كردستان العراق؟‪ 20 ،‬أبريل ‪http://cutt.us/YyCYw ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 126‬محمد أبو سعدة‪ ،‬سيناريوهات سياسة ترامب تجاه إيران‪ ،‬المعهد المصري للدراسات السياسية واالستراتيجية‪ 21 ،‬يناير ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪.http://cutt.us/rTzet‬‬ ‫‪ 127‬سكاي نيوز عربية‪ ،‬هكذا كثفت إيران مساعيها “لتمكين” الحوثيين في اليمن‪ 22 ،‬مارس ‪http://cutt.us/3tyG،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 128‬تقارير دولية عن تهريب إيران أسلحة حديثة لميليشيا الحوثي‪ ،2017/3/23 ،‬متاح على ‪.https://goo.gl/fMeh5J ، :‬‬ ‫‪129‬إيران وير‪ ،‬پهپادهای انتحاری ایران در یمن‪ 2 ،‬ابريل ‪http://cutt.us/X8559 ،2017‬‬ ‫‪130‬جهاني كلمه‪ ،‬مهدی طائب ‪ ،‬برنامه سری رهبر ایران برای جنگ در یمن را فاش ساخت ‪http://cutt.us/0TrCp،۱۹/۱/۱۳۹۶ ،‬‬ ‫‪131‬خارطة السيطرة في اليمن مطلع ‪ ..2017‬من يسيطر على ماذا؟‪ ،‬إرم نيوز‪ ،2017/2/9 ،‬متاح على‪.https://goo.gl/LcsMXr :‬‬ ‫‪132‬خارطة السيطرة في اليمن مطلع ‪ ..2017‬من يسيطر على ماذا؟‪ ،‬إرم نيوز‪ ،2017/2/9 ،‬متاح على‪.https://goo.gl/LcsMXr :‬‬ ‫‪133‬سي إن إن عربية‪ ،‬بن دغر‪“ :‬عاصفة الحزم” سحقت المشروع اإليراني في اليمن‪ 27 ،‬مارس ‪http://cutt.us/Z1hO0 ،2017‬‬ ‫‪ 134‬خريطة عسكرية جديدة في اليمن‪ ،‬الثالثاء ‪ 27‬يونيو‪ ،2017 ,‬سكاي نيوز‪ ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/Bzeh :‬‬ ‫توحد اإليرانيين‪ ،‬صحيفة إعتماد‪http://etemadnewspaper.ir/?News_Id=68672،‬‬ ‫‪ 135‬ظريف‪ :‬التهديد واإلهانة الخارجية ِّ‬ ‫‪ 136‬خارطة النفوذ في اليمن‪ :‬من يسيطر على ماذا بعد عامين من الحرب؟‪ ،‬مونت كارلو الدولية‪ ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/OdD8 :‬‬ ‫‪ 137‬اليمن ‪ ..‬خارطة سالم معدلة تقضي بإبعاد الفريق األحمر عن المشهد السياسي‪ ،‬نافذة اليمن‪ ،‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/R01QD :‬‬ ‫‪ 138‬الحوثيون يتمسكون بميناء الحديدة خوفا من االنكسار السياسي‪ ،‬ميدل ايست اونالين‪ ،‬يونيو ‪ ،2017‬متاح على الرابط‪http://cutt.us/iIjO2 :‬‬

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Nevertheless, thus far, the Trump administration has not adopted any new measures concerning the Iranian nuclear deal. It will face significant opposition, both internally and externally, once it takes serious steps in this regard. The crucial question is about the United States’ alternatives in the event the agreement is cancelled and the Iranian nuclear program is resumed

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Continuity and change in US-Iran relations after Trump’s inauguration

T

rump’s succession to the United States presidency signaled a significant shift in the US strategy toward Iran, from accommodation – adopted by Obama throughout his two terms of presidency – to confrontation.

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During his presidential campaign, Trump criticized the Obama strategy with respect to Iran and declared that his top priority would be to renegotiate the terms of the Iranian nuclear deal, which he described as the worst ever for the United States. Trump also criticized the Obama administration’s transfer of money to Tehran for the release of US hostages, saying that this money would go to Iranian terrorist activities. At the same time, he warned Tehran about harassing the US navy in the Arabian Gulf. Trump’s political speech seems to be similar to that of former president and new conservative George W. Bush, who described Iran as one leg of the axis of evil and imposed political and economic sanctions on the country.

After Trump’s inauguration, the United States adopted a tougher strategy toward Tehran through constant hints of sanctions, became inclined toward direct political and military involvement in regional crises, and resumed relations with its traditional regional allies. However, there is controversy with respect to the American decision-making loop on Iran, especially compliance with the nuclear reversal that Trump had promised. This means that US policy is a coin with two faces, combining both the escalation and de-escalation of tension to defuse a destabilizing situation and resolve disputes away from a confrontation that would endanger the interests of all sides.

The shift in American foreign policy occurred for several reasons: the succession of the rightwing president Donald Trump, the Republican majority in Congress,1 a change in the regional balance of power due to Iran’s mounting role and interference with other countries in the region, and the resumption of the Russian role in the Middle East in cooperation with Tehran. In fact, this situation does not square with the strategies of the new US administration, which aspires to a senior position on the world stage and the resumption of its role as a world leader.2 I. US-Iran relations after Trump’s inauguration Donald Trump comes from outside the US political circuit. He does not have a coherent vision with respect to international issues and his attitude appears to deviate from the typical patterns of most former US Presidents. Trump’s attitude was reflected in his administration’s strategy toward Tehran as follows: 1. New tougher US administration toward Tehran: Soon after Trump’s inauguration and the formation of his administration, the US strategy toward Tehran went sideways and shifted from accommodation to confrontation. According to Iranian officials, Trump’s team is filled with hawks with respect to Tehran. The only common factor among members of the new US administration is their extreme hostility toward Tehran. In the position of Secretary of Defense, Trump appointed James Mattis, who was commander of US forces in the Middle East and proposed the mounting of a missile offensive on Iranian nuclear plants in 2011, when Iranian-backed militias increased their attacks on US forces in Iraq. Mattis maintained his position until the US government agreed to strike the militias and the Iranian elements supporting them in Iraq. His strategy throughout his time in office in the Middle East focused on three issues, as he said: “Iran, Iran, and Iran.”3 Trump appointed Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State. Tillerson’s view on Iran does not deviate from that of Mattis, despite his diplomatic statements concerning this issue. In a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the US Congress to discuss Tillerson’s eligibility for the position of the US government’s senior diplomat, Tillerson said that Iran and North Korea represent the world’s major threat. He also discussed the international crises on his agenda and asserted that the most important step in containing radical Islam was to defeat ISIS. Tillerson also highlighted the challenges in the Middle East and the surrounding area, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He said these are major priorities and that specific entities in Iran must be confronted after ISIS is defeated.4

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In the position of National S e c u r i t y A d v i s o r, Tr u m p appointed Michael Flynn, who expressed his dissatisfaction with Obama’s strategy on Iran, saying that this strategy opened the door for Iran to destabilize the Middle East and put the lives of the American people at risk.5 Flynn resigned and Trump appointed Herbert McMaster, who was more moderate although he raised fears of the Russia-Iran coalition.

Mike Pompeo was named director of the CIA. He believes that the Iranian regime is run by experts in fraud and falsification, stating, “They have to be monitored vigorously,” “Inspection of the Iranian nuclear plants is good but not enough,” and “The Iranian regime has turned into the most destructive and vandal player in the Middle East.”6 A week after his inauguration, Trump issued a travel ban preventing Syrian refugees from entering the United States until further notice and suspending visitors from six predominantly Muslim countries, including Iran, for three months. This demonstrated the new president’s view toward this country.7 2. Trump’s position toward the nuclear deal: During his presidential campaign, Trump vowed to rip up the nuclear deal when he became President of the United States. Nevertheless, many Americans and international observers advised him to preserve it because it prevents Iran from progressing in its nuclear program which, this time, would not be for civilian purposes.8 Despite his hard-line position on Iranian violations of the nuclear deal, Trump listened to those advisors and moderated his demands, from dismantling the agreement to reconsidering the JCPOA with Iran that included the terms of the nuclear deal to curb Iranian nuclear ambitions.9 During the Riyadh Summit on May 20, 2017, Trump reaffirmed his view on Iran when he said that some terms of the Iranian nuclear deal must be renegotiated. In fact, on the one hand, Trump used the nuclear deal to exert pressure on Tehran and, on the other hand, to lessen the fears of his allies.

Nevertheless, thus far, the Trump administration has not adopted any new measures concerning the Iranian nuclear deal. It will face significant opposition, both internally and externally, once it takes serious steps in this regard. The crucial question is about the United States’ alternatives in the event the agreement is cancelled and the Iranian nuclear program is resumed.

Accordingly, in April 2017 the US administration extended the sanction relief on the Iranian oil exports for another 120 days in compliance with the terms of the nuclear deal. In accordance with the “[l]aw of reviewing the Iranian nuclear deal,” the US Department of State informed Congress that it had not decided whether the sanctions relief had been vital for US interests. Some US officials said that the US administration would stick to its nuclear deal commitments until the entire situation became clear. As a result, sanctions relief was re-extended in July 2017.10

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3. Exerting more pressure on Iran: The new US administration adopted a new strategy on Tehran and tended to regain its leading role in the Middle East, which, according to the Trump administration, would not come about without declining the IRGC’s role in this region.11 Similarly, Paul Ryan, speaker of the US House of Representatives, called for the levying of more sanctions on Iran and classifying the IRGC as a terrorist group. Ryan criticized the Obama administration and described the nuclear deal as disastrous: “The United States paved the way for Tehran to gain billions of USDs and opened the world for the Iranian government after [the] lifting of sanctions. In contrast, Iran increased its support to terrorism and expanded its program of ballistic missiles.” On the IRGC, Ryan said, “The United States has to put the IRGC on the list of terrorist groups,” noting that the United States had to use all its capabilities to confront the Iranian threat.12 Support for the placement of the IRGC on the list of terrorist groups was not confined to the Republicans in Congress. A number of Democrats also believed in the necessity of restraining the IRGC and its militias. Accordingly, fourteen Democrat and Republican Senators introduced to the US Congress a draft law to extend non-nuclear sanctions against Tehran and to include individuals, organizations, and trade partners that have relations with the Iranian ballistic missile program. The law was passed in February 2017 by a majority vote of the US Congress.13 The US sanctions included other individuals and organizations from ten countries outside Iran. The US Department of State levied sanctions on thirty individuals and organizations that have relations with the Iranian, North Korean, and Syrian military programs in compliance with the Arms Non-Proliferation law. According to the US Department of State, those individuals and organizations were selling missile technologies to Iran or violating the international sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Syria.14 The Chinese communications company ZTE is about to sign an agreement with US authorities to pay a penalty for violating US sanctions on Iran. This company is the largest manufacturer of communications equipment, and its cell phones are ranked fourth in America. The company acknowledged these violations and will pay the fine to the United States.15 Sanctions were also levied on some US companies that dealt with Iran. According to the US Department of Treasury, an American dental equipment manufacturing company was fined $515,000 for selling medical equipment to Iran and violating US sanctions on this country fifty-six times from 2007-2009. The company acknowledged these charges and said that this equipment was transported to Iran via the UAE. Some of this equipment was used for dental radiology.16 Similarly, these charges were significant challenges for European companies that signed cooperation agreements with Iran in all economic fields and put their investments in Iran at stake. This served as a warning for countries and trade agents to be cautious about signing longterm agreements with Tehran.

On May 17, 2017, two days before the Iranian presidential elections, Washington announced new sanctions on Tehran related to the Iranian ballistic missile program. The US Department of Treasury made this decision independently out of fear of this program and included seven individuals and entities: two senior officers of the Iranian ministry of defense, a network for selling missile equipment located in China, another Iranian senior defense officer who was also charged with selling explosives to Syria, and two Iranian officials, Murtaza Firsatabor and Rahim Ahmedi.17 Firsatabor coordinated the selling and handing over of explosives and other materials to Syria, while Ahmedi was director of Ashahid Baqiri Industrial Group, which is responsible for the Iranian ballistic missiles working on solid fuel.18 The US Secretary of Treasury, Steven Minochin,

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also commented on the issue, saying, “This administration is committed to counter the Iranian destabilizing behavior represented by [the] development of ballistic missiles and supporting the Assad regime.”19 In addition, the biannual report of the US Department of State included signs of human rights violations in Iran and condemned the continuation of the imprisonment of Bahaai leaders and the denial of basic human rights to this minority.20 The Foreign Affairs Committee in the US Congress introduced a draft law to levy additional sanctions on Tehran.21 The US House of Representatives also created a plan for the release of American hostages in Iran and a draft law to find new methods for banning the activities of Mahan Er Group and other Iranian flying companies for transporting weapons to Syria.22 On May 26, 2017, Minochin announced that the Department of Treasury was studying requests from Boeing and Airbus for permission to sell aircraft to the Iranian regime. Minochin also informed legislators that his department would increase pressure on Iran, Syria, and North Korea. In a hearing before the Budgetary Committee in the House of Representatives on Trump’s draft budget, Minochin said, “We will do our best to expand sanctions on Iran, Syria, and North Korea to preserve the lives of Americans.”23 In addition, some indirect sanctions were levied on Iran through the inclusion of the Iranian proxy, Hezbollah, and its allies, Michelle Aon and Nabih Barri in Lebanon, in the sanctions.24 Furthermore, the United States called for the European Union in the Security Council to cooperate in the confrontation against Iran for destabilizing the Middle East.25 On June 15, 2017, the US Senate voted by an overwhelming majority to levy new sanctions on Iran and Russia. The draft law received eighty-nine votes against two objections, which reflects the tough position against Iran of both Republicans and Democrats in the US Congress. These sanctions were to be implemented within ninety days and included Iranian ballistic missiles and all individuals and companies related to this program. Furthermore, the US Senate imposed direct sanctions on the IRGC for the first time and froze the assets of all individuals and companies that sell or transport weapons to Iran.

The Foreign Affairs Committee in the US Senate levied a series of sanctions on Iran in addition to the previous international economic sanctions imposed before the signing of the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 group. These penalties concentrated on four issues: ballistic missiles, human rights violations, intervention in the affairs of regional countries, and supporting terrorism. Essentially, sanctions were imposed on IRGC elements and foreign agents and forces having connections with this organization, especially in relation to ballistic missiles.

On the sidelines of the US Secretary of State hearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee in the US Senate, some opponent activists belonging to the Organization of Iranian-American Communities in the United States demonstrated in front of Congress, asking for the classification of IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization.26 These demonstrations aligned with the US Secretary of State’s statement when he said, “The United States policy toward Iran has to concentrate on supporting elements inside of this country to bring about [a] peaceful transition of government.

Those elements are available and we have to work with them.” This outraged the Iranian regime.27 In fact, US sanctions prevent Iran from fully benefiting from sanctions relief the exportation of oil, the integration of the Iranian economy within the international market, and the attracting of new foreign investments. Chief of the Iranian Crackers Exporters Union, Mohammed Hassan Shams Fard, commented on this issue, saying, “The problems of transferring funds have not been solved yet. Exporters and businessmen are facing many difficulties in making business with Iran and some countries like the UAE and some European and Asian countries fear from America and close the Iranian accounts one after another; the transfer of money can be done only via private banks linked to Iran.”28

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Nevertheless, the United States’ tough policy against Tehran did not prevent the US private sector, especially the oil industry, from doing business with Iran after the signing of the nuclear deal with Iran. Accordingly, the US’s Pall Corporation participated in the twenty-second oil exhibition in Tehran and signed contracts in the Filtration Equipment Industry and Purification Systems for oil, gas, and petrochemicals, then signed another contract to operate the joint line of production, Safa Dasht.29 No doubt, the United States is keen to get a big piece of the Iranian pie and is not willing to give up Iran’s promising market to its rivals in China and Russia, which would weaken the US position in the confrontation with Tehran.

4. Intensification of military activities in the Arabian Gulf: After consultation with Republican lawmakers, Trump declared that Obama’s strategy toward Tehran was disastrous and that the United States had to seriously reconsider the military option against Iran. “By doing this, the United States will re-take the lead in the Middle East.” In addition, the idea that Obama frequently promoted – that Tehran would enhance its relations with the West upon receiving Western investments – had failed to come to fruition because those investments did not have any impact on the regime or drive ideological change in this country. On the contrary, “The more investments come to Iran, the wealthier and stronger the IRGC will be.”

To increase pressure on Tehran, the United States, Britain, and France conducted naval exercises – especially drills concentrating on offenses coming from Iran in the Arabian Gulf – as a demonstration of force by the Western powers.

On the other hand, the Western exercises were of interest to Iran because they were considered an official resumption of the British military base in Bahrain after a forty-year break in the Arabian Gulf. According to the Iranian officials, this will be the second after Portsmouth in the British Royal Navy. Likewise, France returned to the region through its military base in the UAE, 255 kilometers from the Iranian coast.30 In fact, the increasing US-Western military activities in the Arabian Gulf came about in response to the harassment of US ships by Iranian boats; thirty harassment operations were reported by US ships crossing the Hormuz Strait in 2016. The tension between Tehran and the West escalated when the IRGC naval forces detained American sailors in January 2016, but later the movement of Iranian boats noticeably decreased in the international waters of the Arabian Gulf. In January and February 2017, only one incident of harassment occurred, on January 9, 2017 when the US Navy fired warning shots on Iranian fast boats approaching American ships. The US Navy fired four shots at the IRGC boats, while two senior officials in the US Navy informed Reuters that, due to the Iranian boats’ failure to heed the warnings, the US Navy fired three warning shots on these vessels. The American officials added that the US ships contacted the Iranian boats on radio, asking them to retreat, while a US chopper fired smoke grenades to warn the Iranian boats, which retreated to where they had come from.31 As a result of the change in the US warships’ reaction to the harassment of the Iranian boats, hostile practices on the part of Iran diminished in the international waters of the Arabian Gulf.

Certainly, the United States is cautiously monitoring the growth of Iranian naval capabilities.

During the Obama era, the US Congress entrusted the Pentagon with monitoring the movement

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and activities of the Iranian Navy. US naval Intelligence released a report expressing the expectation that Iranian naval forces would significantly improve and acquire new warships after the lifting in 2020 of all international military sanctions related to the nuclear deal.32 The report also said that the Iranian military essentially relies on ballistic missiles and proxy militias in other countries.33 Nevertheless, on March 6, 2017, a spokesperson for the US Department of Defense announced that an Iranian frigate had approached the US ship “Invincible” by a distance of within 150 yards. Two days later, he added, an Iranian ship intercepted the same US ship and another three British warships within 350 yards, forcing them to change their route.34 Noticeably, US military strategy in the Middle East has changed from the accommodation practiced during the Obama era – when the former administration opened the door to Iran’s expansion and destabilization of security in the Gulf, changing the balance of power and threatening international shipping lanes and oil and trade flows – to confrontation and direct involvement to curb Iranian hostilities in the era of the current administration. In addition, Britain and France have returned to the region after a long break and rely on the United States to preserve regional stability.

5. Escalation of confrontation in Syria: Recently, Syria has been a theater for assessing the new US administration’s intentions to curb Iranian regional expansion.

The United States adopted a direct-involvement policy in Syria through direct military intervention, supporting active players like the Syrian Democratic Forces that were assigned to confront ISIS in east Syria, diplomatic and political efforts to direct the negotiations on Syria in Geneva and Astana, and rapprochement with Russia when Trump and Putin agreed to lessen tension in some areas of Syria and to draw a roadmap for political resolution during the G20 Summit in Hamburg in Germany, as reflected in the Geneva meeting in July 2017. These policies represented a new US strategy that disturbed Tehran and caused it to reject US participation in Astana 4 in Kazakhstan.35 Iranian fears of US participation stemmed from the Americans’ rejection of the proposition adopted in Astana 4 to establish four peaceful areas. According to the United States, this proposition gives Iran – Assad’s major supporter – a leading role in these regions. The United States expressed reservations about changing Iran’s status from that of being part of the conflict to that of being part of the settlement that might maximize Iran’s role in the future. The US Department of State commented on the Astana 4 final statement, saying, “The Iranian activities in Syria did not stop violence in this country, but fueled it; the full Iranian support [of] Assad’s regime increased the misery of the Syrian people.”36 Certainly, the US military strike on May 18, 2017 against Iranian-backed forces at the Tanaf border crossing in the Alshahmi district on the Baghdad highway demonstrated the new US strategy in Syria. The United States sought to create a balance of power with Russia, limit Iran’s role in Syria, and affirm US presence in the Syrian crisis, especially in the northeast and south Syria. The strike also conveyed a clear message to Russia and Iran, such as the one launched on Alsheirat airport in April 2017.

The United States’ goal with the latest strike on Tanaf was to prevent Assad’s regime from taking control of the suburbs of the city of Palmyra, progress toward the city of Deir Azzor, and connect the international highway between Syria and Iraq.

In his comment on the strike, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis said that this military convoy was an Iranian proxy, while Joseph Danford, chief of staff of the US Armed Forces, said, “The military strike against the military convoy was a preventive procedure. It will not happen again unless the US forces go under threat.”37

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On May 31, 2017, the US Department of Defense announced that the Iranian-backed militias near Tanaf in south Syria and the bordering area between Iraq and Jordan had put the international coalition against ISIS under threat. A day later, the Syrian Free Army launched a counterattack to drive the regime forces and Iranian militias out of the Syrian Badia and break into the defense lines in the Zaza barrier and Alsabi’ Biar in this area.38 In fact, this operation was launched to limit Iranian influence in Syria. On May 20, 2017, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson discussed this policy, saying, “America coordinates all efforts to confront the Iranian expansionist ambitions in Yemen and Syria.”39 In a policy contrary to the Kerry-Lavrov understanding of Syria, the new US administration exerted pressure on Russia to curb Iranian influence in Syria during the Tillerson-Lavrov meeting before the Astana 4 Summit and during the Trump-Lavrov meeting in Washington. On May 10, 2017, the White House announced that during this session the US President informed the Russian foreign minister of the necessity to restrain the Iranian regime in Syria.40 6. The US-Gulf joint confrontation against Iran: After his inauguration, President Trump’s first foreign trip was to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which demonstrated the significant change in US strategy toward Tehran.41 Iran antagonized the Kingdom while Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries were not satisfied with the former US administration’s policy, which opened the door to Iran’s expansion and played a major role in the region at the expense of the United States, especially after the signing of the Iranian nuclear deal. This position was revealed in the joint statement of the US Secretary of State and his Saudi counterpart, in which they talked about the joint confrontation against Iran and the coordination of efforts in regard to the nuclear deal.42 The formation of an American-Islamic coalition to counter terrorism, with the exclusion of Iran, drew the lines for an alliance against Tehran between the United States and its traditional allies in the Gulf and the region. In his speech in Riyadh in May 2017, the US President said, “Iran trains terrorists, supplies them with weapons, and destabilizes the Middle East.” Indeed, these positions isolate Tehran, which the US President indicated when he said, “As long as Iran is not a partner in peace, it has to be excluded by all people.”43 In this Summit, the US President drew the lines for the new US strategy toward Tehran in partnership with American regional allies. Trump described the Iranian people as victims of Iran’s hostile policies in the region when he said, “The Iranian people who tolerate hardships are frustrated because of their leaders’ recklessness through misleading them into conflicts and wars.” Trump added, “Bashar Assad, backed by Iran, is committing untold horrible crimes in Syria.

The Iranian regime is the model of international terrorism. It spreads destruction and chaos in the Middle East.” Trump also insisted on ending Iranian interference in Iraqi internal affairs. The US President and the Saudi King Salman Bin Abdul-Aziz agreed on the necessity of containing Iranian interference in the affairs of other countries, fueling sectarian wars, supporting terrorism and armed militants, and destabilizing security in the Middle East.

Both leaders described Iranian interference in the affairs of regional countries as a threat to regional and international security and insisted on the renegotiation of some terms of the Iranian nuclear deal. They also highlighted the point that the Iranian ballistic missile program threatens not only Iran’s neighboring countries, but also regional and international security and stability.44 In compliance with the confrontational roadmap drawn during Trump’s visit to Riyadh, the United States signed armament agreements with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to improve their defense capabilities. The United States also vowed to put all counterterrorism agencies and tools at the disposal of Riyadh, leading to a coalition of fifty-five countries that will confront terrorism and the Iranian threat. According to reports, the biggest arms deal ever was signed during this visit between the Kingdom and the United States, amounting to 300 billion USD,

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including a 100-billion-USD deal for the “Thad” anti-missile system, helicopters, tanks, guided bombs, and four warships and totaled 11.5 billion USD.45 II. Iran’s Reactions to Trump’s Positions Two Iranian currents from within the regime are racing to draw Iranian foreign policy, especially with regard to relations with the United States. The first current favors the avoidance of confrontation, a policy of openness, and the ability to benefit from all available opportunities.

The other current favors the rivalry and confrontation that Iran has embraced since the 1979 revolution.

1. Despite Trump’s hostile attitude toward Tehran, which is concentrated on sanctions, pressure, and isolation, the first current in Iran still believes the nuclear deal will achieve economic gains, attract foreign investments that will revive the Iranian economy, and normalize Iran’s political and economic relations with the world.

This point of view was especially apparent during the Iranian presidential elections, when the Reformer Hassan Rouhani promised that Iranians would reap benefits from the nuclear deal.46 At the same time, Rouhani criticized the military for the recommencement of some missile activities, saying that these activities were inconsistent with the nuclear deal and Iranian national interests.47 The results of the Iranian presidential election aligned with the view of the Reformers, who condoned the US President’s position toward Tehran and believed that all Trump’s statements were just propaganda and were far from implementation. According to this point of view, the nuclear deal is still valid and effective; the United States is abiding by its terms and sanctions relief on Iranian oil exports.

The results reflected the Iranian people’s desire to adopt the open-minded Reformers’ position as opposed to extremism and a closed-country policy, and enhanced the Western view that the nuclear deal was a tool to change Iran, not only on the level of foreign policy but also inside the country.48 2. The second current used US policy and President Trump’s hostile attitude toward Iran as pretexts to question negotiations with America and the viability of the nuclear deal. This current consists predominantly of extremists and the military, which favor escalation and conflicts so that they can remain in power and control internal and foreign policies, as the Iranian military oversees the political decisionmaking process in the country. This current was active during the latest presidential elections and criticized the internal conditions after the nuclear deal and the failure of the Reformers to achieve the meaningful progress they had promised.

Leaders of this current believe that rivalry with the United States is an ideological issue to deny the right of others to make their appropriate choice. This was evident in the speech of Mashahad Jumah cleric, Ahmed Alamollhuda when he said, “The person talking about reconciliation with America to solve problems, has a problem in Knowing Allah the superior to all powers, the belief in him, and the belief in the Day of Judgment.”49 This current also used the twin attacks on the Iranian parliament and the mausoleum of Khomeini in June 2017 to mobilize Iranian public opinion against the United States. Brigadier General Masoud Jazairi, the spokesperson for the Iranian armed forces,

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said that according to the information gathered, the attacks in Tehran that resulted in the deaths and injuries of a number of people were carried out by ISIS, the US-sponsored organization.50 Iranian internal division over the shape of relations with the United States can be seen in official Iranian reactions to American policies toward Tehran, as follows: 1. Nuclear activities and preservation of the gains of the nuclear deal: The United States is willing to preserve the Iranian nuclear deal despite disagreement between President Trump and the US departments in charge of relations with Iran. In addition, both Iranian currents – Reformers and Hardliners – are keen to preserve the deal and its gains.

The National Council Representative Bureau for the Iranian resistance revealed a new Iranian nuclear site with detailed information about the continuation of Iranian nuclear armament.

According to the bureau, Tehran called this new site “Research Academy” and used a military installation in Parshin to cover its activities and test highly explosive materials.51 Nevertheless, Iran has declared its compliance with the nuclear deal, especially the part concerning Iranian nuclear activities, which was quoted from Riza Najafi, Iran’s permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning the Agency’s report in 2017 on Iran: “Once again, the report states that all Iranian activities go within the framework of the nuclear deal (Barjam).”

He added, “This report aligned with former reports. After the report of March 2017, Iran added some technical developments.” Najafi added that Iranian reserves of heavy water amounted to 128.2 tons and that the heavy water factory is under annual maintenance, noting that the activities of research, uranium enrichment, and torque and centrifuge spare parts production were all within the framework of the nuclear deal.52 In July 2017, Abbas Araghchi, chief of the Iranian Commission for Monitoring Implementation of the nuclear deal, said that Congress’s decision concerning the extension of sanctions on Iran was a hostile breach of the nuclear deal: “If this is [a] final decision by Congress, we will take the suitable action in this concern.” Araghchi added, “Based on articles 26 and 29 of the nuclear deal, the United States has to comply with this agreement in good faith, constructive environment and refrain from making any decisions that might deter implementation of the nuclear deal.”53 One of Iran’s challenges is to normalize relations with the world’s economies. The economic sanctions related to the Iranian nuclear deal from 2011-2015 cut off many of Iran’s lines of communication with the world and drastically diminished world entrepreneurs’ confidence in doing business with Iran. However, the nuclear deal lifted sanctions related to the Iranian nuclear program. In other words, Iran faces no obstacles with respect to normalizing trade and economic relations with the world; rather, the most important factor for international companies seeking to do business with Iran is a lack of trust and confidence in the Iranian business environment due to international sanctions and the bleak future of relations between Iran and the United States. All in all, Iran remains a discouraging environment for big investments by economic partners.54 2. Iran’s economic options: The Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – head of the Hardliner current in Iran – adopted the idea of the “Resistant Economy” as an alternative to the Reformers’ strategy of openness to the world market. Khamenei’s idea revolves around certain economic policies that rely on “Economic Self-Sufficiency.”55 Indeed, Hardliners used US sanctions on Iran as a pretext to enhance their position. In this regard, Ali Akbar Vilayati, a member of the special committee for monitoring the nuclear deal, said that the United States Senate’s imposition of new sanctions on Iran violated the essence of the nuclear deal. He added that US sanctions would be less damaging in the face of the resistant economy that stands against any economic threats, asserting that the points of weakness had been resolved and that the country was headed toward self-sufficiency. He concluded, “Absolutely, the United States new sanctions will not have [a] big impact on the Iranian economy.”56

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3. Enhancement of military capabilities: Iran enhanced its military capacity and conducted a number of ballistic and cruise missile tests.57 On May 25, 2017, Iran unveiled an underground ballistic missile factory and asserted that it would continue developing its missile program.

According to Fars News Agency, Ali Haji Zadah, commander of the IRGC Air-Space power, commented on the same issue, saying, “During recent years, the IRGC built the third underground missile factory; we will continue our missile capabilities in full power.”58 Iran stated it would continue its missile program without permission from anyone, saying that international resolutions did not require the cessation of the traditional missile program that was denied by the United States. Some observers believe that Iran has gone too far in its missile tests to bring the United States to the table to negotiate Iran’s missile program and achieve certain gains or to use these negotiations as a gateway for cooperation with the United States.

In the same context, Iran launched the Iranian-made ballistic missile “Hormuz-2”, which can destroy naval targets. Amir Haji Ali Zadah, commander of the IRGC, said that this missile passed the test and hit its target within 250 kilometers and that it can hit other targets within 300 kilometers.59 In March 2017, the United States monitored two Iranian missile tests. Iran launched two short-range ballistic missiles from a military base in southeast Iran; one missile hit its target and destroyed a boat, while the other missed its target in the Sea of Oman.

Iran claimed that its missile program and military activities were part of its defense policies and represented a legitimate right to develop these military capabilities. Iran stated that these activities were not directed against anyone. However, Iranian regional interference and the military ideology that guides the work of IRGC and Iran’s militias spread throughout the region refute all Iranian claims.

4. Strengthening Iranian influence in Syria: Iran did not hold back on its destabilizing policies and interference in other countries in the region. On May 2, 2017, an IRGC commander said that Iran would continue dispatching advisors to Syria to support Assad’s regime against the Syrian opposition. Similarly, Brigadier General Mohammed Bakbor, commander of the IRGC ground forces, said, “The goal of dispatching Iranian advisors into Syria is to protect the front line of resistance.”60 On the other hand, due to its fears of the growing US military presence in northeast Syria, Iran has changed the route of the land corridor from Iran up to the Mediterranean Sea. The new route has been moved 140 kilometers to the south of the previous one so that it does not approach the positions of the US forces mobilized to confront ISIS in northeast Syria.61 5. Iran’s reactions to US sanctions: Iran is concerned about the continuance of US sanctions and their impact on the country. In this context, Iran’s ambassador to the former Soviet Union, Nasir Nobri, said that the US Senate’s resolution against Iran would have a negative impact on Iranian economic relations with the world because it conveyed a warning message that all countries that engaged in economic ties with Iran would be included in the US sanctions.62 6. Hussein Naghawi Husseini, spokesperson of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said that Iran had always been directly threatened by the United States, the Zionist entity, ISIS, and Al-Qaida. Naghavi also said that Iran would utilize all capabilities to confront terrorism, asserting that Tehran was on the front lines with respect to confronting this threat.

Sunni Piranshahr MP Rasoul Khudri said that Iran played a major and successful role in the axis of resistance and the confrontation of ISIS in Syria and Iraq.63 In response to US sanctions, Tehran launched a war of words against the United States as a demonstration of power in front of the Iranian people and a direct threat to the United States,

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citing the carelessness of US sanctions. Indeed, Iran relies on three important factors in the face of US sanctions: the armed forces, the Iranian geopolitical role in West Asia, and the Strait of Hormuz and regional islands in the Arabian Gulf.64 The Iranian threat to the United States concentrated on renouncing Washington in the confrontation with terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria and withdrawing from the war against ISIS and other terrorist groups. Based on the Iranian point of view, the United States will encounter five challenges in its confrontation with ISIS: eliminating the ISIS ideology; drying up ISIS financial resources; coordinating with the governments of Iran, Russia, Iraq, and Syria; directing US military interference; and Trump’s Islamophobia, which would make Muslim countries hesitant to cooperate with the President of the United States.65 As part of the Iranian reaction to US sanctions, Aladdin Brojardi, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in the Iranian parliament, called on the Iranian Parliament to cite the US Army and US Intelligence as terrorist organizations,66 while Isaac Jihangery, the first deputy of the Iranian president, said that the new US sanctions against Iran discredited the United States on the international stage and that the sanctions would face a strong reaction from Tehran.67 Likewise, Ali Larijani, speaker of the Iranian parliament, asked the National Security Committee to introduce a plan to stand against the latest US Senate decisions as soon as possible.68 In response, the Iranian parliament imposed sanctions on fifteen American companies that refrained from doing business with Tehran as a symbolic act. Iran cannot impose sanctions on countries that have relations with the American companies as the United States does with countries and corporations doing business with Iran and violating American laws. Iran listed the names of these companies based on their cooperation with Israel in making and exporting weapons and building settlements in Palestinian lands.69 In addition, Iran threatened to target US interests in the region, which was evident when Saied Yahya Safawi, senior advisor of the General Commander of the Iranian armed forces, said, “If America wants to start war with Iran, all American military installations in the region will be under threat; Iran can protect its borders up to 2000 kilometers by missiles.”70 III. Directions of US-Iran relations US-Iran relations witnessed a dramatic change after Trump’s inauguration as President of the United States. The new US administration exerted more pressure on Iran and threatened to renegotiate the terms of the nuclear deal that is now under discussion and that is a source of controversy in the American decision-making departments. The United States imposed more economic sanctions on Iran and threatened the country’s investment environment such that trade partners face several problems due to the growing tension between the two nations.

Iran believes in its ability to maneuver and escape sanctions and pressure by enhancing its relations with a number of economic partners, particularly Russia and China, in addition to its current alliance with Russia. In addition, Iran used its military expansion in the region and its ballistic missile program as leverage and a bargaining chip with all sides. It is also trying to introduce itself as a major player in countering terrorism, especially ISIS in Iraq and Syria, waiting for a suitable moment to resolve differences with the United States. In general, US-Iran relations are headed in one of the following directions due to a growing tension between the two countries: 1. Isolation: Iranian noncompliance with US requirements might lead to more sanctions and pressure on Tehran. Eventually, the situation might fall back to square one before the signing of the nuclear deal with the P5+1 group. This direction is driven by the Iranian extremist regime’s rivalry with the United States, uncertainty about its behavior, Iran’s unprecedented expansionist

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policy in a number of Middle Eastern countries, the continuation of its short- and long-range missile program, and the improbability that the regime will give up all its gains.

This tendency was crystallized after Trump’s inauguration and the Republicans’ winning of the majority of the seats in Congress. In addition to the Republicans, some Democrats have adopted a hard line against Tehran and show a preference to contain the growing Iranian threat.

The isolation option was also prompted by US uncertainty regarding Iran’s intentions to develop nuclear power for non-civilian purposes, pressure exerted on the United States by its regional allies to restrain Iranian practices, and American fears of a Russia-Iran strategic partnership and its impact on the American role in the Middle East, as well as Iran’s partnership with China and its impact on US companies’ share of the promising Iranian market, especially in the gas and oil sectors.

2. Negotiations and détente in US-Iran relations: This direction abides by two factors. The first depends on Iran’s submission to US demands and its flexibility in dealing with controversial issues, especially the Iranian ballistic missile program. Today, this issue is America’s top priority. Iran’s armament program changes the regional balance of power in favor of Tehran and threatens the interests of the United States and its regional allies. The second factor relies on Iran’s inclination toward changing its behavior and ceasing its destabilizing activities in the Middle East. The United States believes in the nuclear deal as an incentive for Iran to change and for Washington to stick to the deal, especially the part concerning sanctions relief and the normalizing of Iran’s relations with the region and the world. In fact, only Iran can make this scenario a reality. Tehran must give up the political ideology that drives its foreign policy. It must also give up its expansionist ambitions and normalize its relations with the United States, Iran’s neighbors, and the world.

3. Gradual escalation: The United States is keen to preserve the nuclear deal. This preference is made obvious through the fact that, since Trump’s inauguration, the United States has twice extended sanctions relief in regard to Iranian oil exports despite Trump’s vows during his presidential campaign to rip it up and renegotiate its terms. Indeed, it seems that the US administration is not willing to go back to square one in relations with Iran; however, at the same time, it is extending sanctions on Tehran as a means of changing its behavior. All in all, the United States uses sanctions to exert pressure on Tehran and the nuclear deal to compel it to stick to its commitments.

For the time being, the military option is excluded but not impossible. It is excluded because it would destabilize the entire region, which would endanger American interests, especially in the Gulf region. In addition, it might become an international confrontation in light of the conflict of interests between the region’s countries and throughout the world. On the other hand, this option remains possible if Iran continues to threaten US interests.

Iran must open itself up to world economies and attract foreign investments (which are the major factors in Iran’s preservation of the nuclear deal) and show some flexibility in the face of US pressure. In fact, internal conditions in Iran cannot return to square one, isolation, and further oil sanctions because it generates more than 50% of basic Iranian necessities. At the same time, it seems that Tehran is having difficulty abandoning its military investments in the region, submit to US demands, and give up its short-range and long-range missile program and the role of the IRGC and its militias in the region.

In light of these controversies and difficulties with respect to adopting serious options, between either an expensive military confrontation or a détente and negotiations, due to Iran’s rigid stance and hostile activities, the scenario of “above détente” and “below confrontation” will likely continue until Iran changes its behavior so that it is in compliance with the American view or moves toward direct confrontation – which is, as mentioned before, excluded but not impossible.

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RUSSIA-IRAN RELATIONS During the first half of 2017, Russia-Iran relations underwent serious changes at the regional and international levels after a period of strong relations since the inauguration of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in 2013. Iran relied on Russia to limit the consecutive international procedures against Tehran with respect to its nuclear program and to be its sole partner in accomplishing its civilian nuclear program to generate electricity at the Bushahr nuclear plant.

Tehran ignored European offers in this regard and to improve Iran’s torn-out economy, which resulted from international sanctions. With the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Russia and Iran formed a coalition to support their ally, Bashar Assad, and reached the level of strategic relations on all levels between both sides, especially Russian support for Iran in the face of US pressure.

Furthermore, Russia linked Iran with the Russian satellite nations and peaked its relations with Tehran in the Battle of Aleppo in Syria.

After the fall of Aleppo by the end of 2016, Russia-Iran relations witnessed a dramatic change at the regional and international levels. These relations deteriorated and entered a form of tactical relations throughout the first six months of 2017. These developments proved some analysts’ view that “Russia-Iran relations have never been strategic. They are influenced by regional and international conditions that turn the relations between the two countries into tactical rather than strategic.” » The Impact of Regional and International Changes on Russia-Iran Relations 1. Succession of Donald Trump to the US Presidency: The Iranian nuclear deal in 2015 positively reflected on Iran’s negotiating power with Russia due to sanctions relief and open avenues for international cooperation. However, with Trump’s inauguration in January 2017, the US strategy toward Tehran changed. The US President adopted a new strategy on Iran based on the following procedures: A. Imposition of economic sanctions on Iran due to its missile tests, IRGC support of terrorist groups, and involvement in Middle East conflicts with the survival of the nuclear deal and validity of its terms.

B. Resumption of the US role in the Syrian crisis through the missile strikes it launched in this country. The first strike was launched on the Syrian Shierat airport under the pretext of the use of chemical weapons by Bashar Assad’s forces against the Khan Shikhon district. The second US air strike was on a military convoy belonging to the Syrian regime and Iranian forces in Tanaf, and was launched to express US rejection of the Iranian project that links Iran with the Mediterranean Sea via Iraqi and Syrian lands. Both strikes shaped new rules for the Syrian crisis and conveyed two messages: “No leniency with the use of chemical weapons and no changes on the Middle East map without international agreement.”71 C. Enhancement of relations between the United States, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the GCC countries, and the other Arab and Muslim countries through President Trump’s historic visit to Riyadh on May 21, 2017. The goal of this visit was to strengthen relations among participants and curb Iranian interference in other countries in the region.

2. Change of the Syrian civil war map: The Syrian conflict witnessed significant changes that seemed, at the beginning of the fall of the city of Aleppo, to boost Iran’s role in Syria; however, the fall of Aleppo backfired and curbed Iran’s role through the following developments: A. The internationalization of the Syrian conflict and the growing US military presence in Syria complicated the situation for Iran. Running the Syrian crisis became a bigger task than Iran could handle, which obliged it to regroup under the Russian umbrella in this concern.

B. Russia launched multi-round peace talks known as Astana 1, 2, 3, 4. These discussions

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acknowledged the US role in Syria, recognized the Turkish military presence in this country, and showed the Syrian opposition’s rejection of Iran as a mediator in the Syrian crisis.

C. The United States demanded an end to all forms of Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah militia presence in Syria.

D. A growing Israeli presence was seen on the map of the Syrian civil war through Netanyahu’s consecutive visits to Moscow, Israeli rejection of Iran’s long-term presence in Syria, and the prevention of weapons from arriving in Hezbollah.

3. Turkey-Russia rapprochement: With the end of the crisis between Turkey and Russia over Turkey’s shooting down of the Russian Air fighter and the failure of the military coup against Turkish President Rajab Taieb Erdogan, Turkey and Russia resumed relations driven by US rejection of the handing over of the Turkish opponent Fathallah Golin to the Turkish government and US support of the Kurdish People Protecting Units, which Ankara classifies as terrorist groups due to their support of Kurdish insurgents in Turkey.72 At the beginning of the TurkeyRussia rapprochement, Iran was keen to form a tripartite alliance with Turkey and Russia, but soon it recognized that this alliance was against its own interests. Turkey moved independently and mobilized its forces inside the Syrian territories, establishing a buffer in the Albab district that separates the Kurds in the northeast and northwest Syria in Efrin. At the beginning of the Astana talks on Syria, Turkey was placed in a higher position than Iran. This situation deepened differences and the rivalry between the two countries despite changes in the Turkish position on the continuity of Bashar Assad and the safe areas in Syria. However, these shifts in the Turkish position enhanced Turkey-Russia relations rather than supporting the idea of a tripartite coalition between Iran, Turkey, and Russia. Unlike Iran, Turkey proved the superiority of its army and air force, which obliged Russia to seek cooperation with Ankara in Syria and to renounce Tehran.

Russia-Iran cooperation throughout the first six months of 2017 varied and covered Iranian activities on all economic and military levels as follows: » The state of the Russia-Iran coalition in Syria The first half of 2017 witnessed the biggest change in the Syrian civil war since Russia’s involvement in this crisis on September 30, 2015 through a formal request from Bashar Assad.

Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis reshaped the spheres of influence in Syria after the Battle of Aleppo; the fall of this city to Russian-Iranian forces opened the door for Bashar Assad’s

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forces to return to the city, prevent the Syrian regime from falling, and blockade the opposition forces in more than one position. These developments on the ground changed the political positions of a number of parties in the conflict. Turkey gave up its demands that Bashar Assad be overthrown and announced that the main goal of its interference in the Syrian crisis was to prevent Kurds from establishing an independent country in north Syria as well as to prevent the support and supplies that the Kurdistan Labor Party receives in Turkey from reaching the Kurdish People Protecting Units in north Syria.73 After celebrating victory in Aleppo in December 2016, Iran feared that a change in the Russian position would diminish Iran’s role in Syria. Indeed, Tehran feared that Russia would seek a rapprochement with the United States and Turkey in pursuit of gains at the expense of Iran and its proxy Hezbollah militias in Syria.

With the beginning of Astana talks, Turkey’s role in the Syrian crisis escalated as a guarantor and partner for the Syrian opposition forces. Iran’s diplomatic role in the Syrian crisis was held back. However, Iran exerted more pressure on Russia and regained its diplomatic role in the Syrian crisis. Tehran insisted on excluding the United States from the next rounds of talks to avoid the establishment of a 2+2 negotiations format, which would turn Iran into a minor player, like Turkey, in the Syrian crisis, but ranked in a second position after Russia and the United States.74 Russia did not renounce its military alliance with Iran in Syria despite its leading role and the fact that it was a major player in this crisis. Its reasons for not doing so included the fact that the United States did not introduce a convenient offer that would prompt Russia to renounce Iran, Russia achieved many gains from Iran and the Western nations during the period of sanctions, and Russia’s new strategy is based on the establishment of a Eurasian bloc, for which Russia needs Iranian support in the Middle East in the face of the European Union. However, Russia was keen to diminish Iran’s role in Syria and to strike a balance between Turkey and Iran. Russia moved toward this strategy through joint air strikes with Turkey on ISIS positions and on the Kurdish People Protecting Forces to limit their movement and satisfy Turkey – the partner who is actually capable of influencing the Syrian opposition.75 Russia adopted a different military strategy in the Syrian civil war than that of Iran. It did not seek significant victories on the ground immediately after the fall of Aleppo, nor was it keen to attack Hama, Hems, or Dara, relying on Iranian forces. Instead, Russia sought to eliminate the opposition in Kufria and Foah in the Damascus countryside, and in Zabadani in the Aleppo countryside. In fact, Russia rejected the idea of relying on the Iranian ground forces and proxy militias – Hezbollah and the Shiite militias from Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – so as to not maximize Iran’s role and to avoid international condemnation like that expressed after the Battle of Aleppo and the fall of the city. As a result, Russia focused on eliminating the opposition before expanding the fight to prevent the opposition from retaking cities from Iran and Bashar Assad.

On the other hand, the Iranian strategy relied on invading big cities and launching removal and displacement operations to establish the so-called “Beneficial Syria” and eliminate the Sunni territories in central Syria through wide ground confrontations backed by Russian and the Assad regime’s forces. However, the Russian government rejected Iran’s plans.

Russia continued its military strategy in Syria to eliminate the Syrian opposition that was spreading in areas surrounded by the regime forces through the signing of agreements to transport these forces to the city of Edlib and its countryside without engaging in large-scale confrontations.

Russia and Iran strove to legalize their presence in Syria at the international level through the Astana talks. To ease tension in Syria, they suggested a plan for four territories including a southern one in Dara, to be secured by Iranian forces, which was considered official acknowledgment of Iran’s presence near the Syrian-Israeli borders. The Syrian opposition

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delegate refused to participate in these talks and rejected Russia’s plan for four territories as well as any other agreements unless the opposition delegate’s six terms were adopted: the unity of Syrian lands and the elimination of any talk of dividing the country; the rejection of any role for Iran in the future of Syria or as a guarantor of the agreement; the scheduling of the exit of foreign forces – including Iranian forces – from Syria; a cease fire including all Syrian lands; insurance from the guarantor countries on any agreement; and insurance that all international resolutions would actually be implemented.76 Despite Russian hints about the response to US demands with respect to the end of the Lebanese Hezbollah presence in Syria, no decisions or steps have been taken in this regard. Iran announced that Russia would decline all American and Israeli demands to renounce Hezbollah because the exclusion of this organization from the Syrian peaceful solution was illogical and unacceptable.77 However, Russia has not made a final decision about ending the presence of the Lebanese Hezbollah in Syria. It discussed Hezbollah’s role in preparing for settlement and did not handle its presence in this country. In addition, Russia planned to use the paper of driving Hezbollah militias out of Syria at the beginning of its negotiations with the United States and Israel. Hence, the Russian position in this concern is undetermined and abides by international bargaining. All in all, Russia believes that in the case of a permanent truce in Syria, the driving of Iranian proxy forces from Syria can be negotiated.78 In fact, Iran is experiencing a state of political and military subordination to Russia in Syria.

Russia plans its strategies and specifies the role of each party in this country, while Tehran watches Russia bargain with all international, regional, and domestic players to achieve Russian interests in Syria. Iran expects that the achievement of Russian interests in Syria would allow Iran to achieve some of its own interests in this country and at the same time create common interests with Russia that would force it to preserve relations with Tehran and reject any US demands with respect to renouncing Iran. » Russian support for Iran in confrontation with the United States Iran relied heavily on Russian support in dealing with the United States before and after the nuclear deal. During the era of former US President Barack Obama, Iranian dependence on Russia in terms of declining international resolutions related to the Iranian nuclear program diminished because Iran was able to negotiate directly with the US administration. Obama vetoed Congress’s draft law concerning the extension of sanctions on Tehran, which deteriorated Russia-Iran cooperation. Due to the fact that Iran did not need Russia at that time, Tehran adopted a stingerto-stinger policy with Moscow.

Since Trump’s inauguration on January 20, 2017 Russia has adopted a position as mediator between Iran and the United States concerning the war of words between both sides of the nuclear deal. The new US administration believed the deal gave Iran more than it deserved in exchange for nothing, while Iran believed the United States had not stuck to its commitments in this agreement. Indeed, both sides threatened to rip up the nuclear deal and go back to square one before negotiations. On the other hand, Russia praised the agreement and considered its abolition to be a failure on the part of the international community.

Russia opposed the imposition of unilateral sanctions against Iran under the pretext of violating the nuclear deal. It believed that the deal was a multilateral agreement and that all nations that signed it must participate in negotiations before determining whether Iran complied with its terms. Russia revealed its position during the first half of 2017 when it opposed passage of an international resolution that condemned Tehran after the conducting of missile tests. The United States strove to pass this resolution in January 2017 after Iran conducted the 600-kilometer-range ballistic missile Khorramshahr tests. In its claim, the United States relied

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on the fact that the nuclear deal prevented Tehran from conducting ballistic missile tests, while Russia rejected this view, saying that the article mentioned in the nuclear deal banned ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads. Hence, the United States failed to pass these sanctions in an urgent meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 2017.79 Russia reiterated its position when the United States protested against Iran when the nation exceeded its permitted amount of heavy water produced domestically. Russia considered these surplus quantities of heavy water to be temporary until Iran could sell them to another party; thus, according to Moscow, this could not be considered a violation of the nuclear deal, as Iran sells this material or preserves it outside its borders.80 In reality, Iran stored quantities of this material in Oman. The US failure to impose international sanctions on the Iranian missile program motivated the Iranian regime to announce that the Iranian missile program was a consistent strategy for Tehran.

At the internal level, some Iranians opposed the Iranian missile program in their country and said that now was the time for negotiations, not missiles. However, these voices were silenced and accused of submitting to the United States and lacking an understanding of the reality of the conflict between Iran and the West.

Ultimately, Russia-Iran cooperation succeeded in thwarting US efforts to pass a resolution against Tehran. Russia, backed by the unanimous position of Europe, announced that Iran was in compliance with the nuclear deal and excluded the Iranian missile program from the terms of this agreement.

Nevertheless, in the mediating role it played between Iran and the United States during the first half of 2017, Russia failed to prevent the United States from issuing unilateral sanctions on Iran due to the US President’s hard-line against Tehran and his view of the threat it poses to regional and international peace and security. In addition, US lawmakers recognize the Iranian threat and are pushing toward a tough position against its regime and the new US administration’s desire to breakdown the Russia-Iran coalition that harms US interests in the Middle East in light of the substantial rapprochement between the United States and GCC countries headed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

In response to Russia’s support of Iran, the United States levied sanctions on eight Russian corporations working in the military sector, without mentioning the charges against these corporations. The penalties included the arms exporting company Russ Oberon Export, Afia Exports, the Designing Bureau for Manufacturing Machinery, Basalt Corporation, Ulyanovsk Institute for Civil Aviation, Ural Center for Flight Training, Jokovsky and Jajarin Academy for Warplane Training, and the Factory of Airplane Maintenance-150. The US Department of State affirmed that these sanctions were in compliance with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Syria, Iran, and North Korea and had no relationship to the economic sanctions imposed on Russia due to its annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to Russia in 2014.81 A glance at these companies reveals that the US sanctions targeted Russia-Iran cooperation in air industries. This is also considered a reflection of the reuse of the term Axis of Evil, which was first used by former US President George W. Bush. Hence, the US decision to impose more sanctions on Russian corporations for doing business with Iran motivated Russia to break up with the United States but not the opposite, knowing that if any sanctions did not have significant consequences, they would backfire on the model of the Western sanctions on Tehran until the international community banned the Iranian oil exportation that forced Tehran to change its behavior. Indeed, the US sanctions on Russia contributed to the Russia-Iran rapprochement.

Russia described the sanctions related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons against the Russian corporations linked to Iran, North Korea, and Syria as confusing and disappointing, stating that they would not create any problems for Russia, but would weaken the joint confrontation against international terrorism.82

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The Trump administration is not willing to escalate tension with Russia and is keen to diminish differences between the two countries. However, the current US Congress tends to impose consecutive sanctions on Russia, which is contrary to the situation during the Obama era, when many of the world’s issues were bound to the Russian decision to the exclusion of American politics. Today, the United States needs time and an active foreign policy to corner the Russian role in several conflicts throughout the world – especially in the Syrian crisis and with respect to Russia’s support of Iran. » Nuclear cooperation Russia won all contracts related to the Iranian nuclear program and ruled out its European rivals, especially Germany. Due to its cooperation with Syria, Iran preferred a continuity of cooperation with Russia despite Russian procrastination in handing over the first stage of the Bushahr nuclear plant – procrastination that lasted for more than twenty years. However, Iran could have developed its civilian nuclear program had it dealt with the advanced German corporations in this concern. Furthermore, the fear of US sanctions and the interruption of the accomplishment of the project was another reason for Iran to seek cooperation with Russia. More than once, Russia announced that it was the only partner that had continued dealing with Iran after the Europeans withdrew from the Iranian market one after another.

Russia won two contracts to build two electronuclear power stations within the Bushahr nuclear plant project; this amounted to ten billion USD to be made in four payments. According to the contract, Iran would make the first instalment to the Russian side; the second phase is to be accomplished in 2024, while the third plant is slated to be operational in 2026.83 Iran achieved some gains from signing long-term contracts with Russia and signing a roadmap for nuclear cooperation between the two countries. Iran also tried to benefit from its previous experiences and created a condition for Iranian payments due to Russia. Tehran linked the payments to the first agreement regarding the electronuclear plants and the improvement of Iranian capabilities for making nuclear fuel and selling Iran enriched uranium to operate the electronuclear stations. Iran received the first shipment of 1000 tons of uranium from Kazakhstan and is supposed to change 300 kilograms of this quantity into the UF6 gas (uranium hexafluoride) needed for uranium enrichment for the first time in Iran and then sell it back to Kazakhstan.84 In fact, Iran intends to store this vast amount of uranium in the event of the imposition of more sanctions that would complicate the process of buying the nuclear fuel necessary for the operation of the electronuclear plants in Bushahr. This makes Russia the only exporter of enriched uranium to Iran.

In addition, Russia supplied Iran with enriched uranium. Some sources said that the quantity amounted to 130 tons, known as “Yellow Pie,” while other sources said that the amount was 149 tons.85 » Russian supplies of arms to Iran Despite military cooperation between Iran and Russia in Syria, Russia still follows a careful policy in supplying Iran with weapons and is strictly committed to the Security Council resolutions concerning the ban on selling offensive weapons to Iran. This reflects mutual mistrust between the two sides. Russia maintains a lack of desire to increase the level of armament in Iran for many reasons: Iran needs the Russian forces in Syria, especially the air force; Iranian fears that extremist Muslim groups in Syria will get a hold of advanced Russian arms; Russian has an inclination to not anger the United States or even Israel in the event these weapons arrive in Hezbollah; and Russia wishes to take Iranian money through channels that are less risky than the sale of advanced arms.

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Russia handed over the S-300 air defense missile system to Iran. However, in February 2017, Iran announced that the system had not been put into operation because it was the old model of missile and Russia had terminated its line of production. In fact, Iran signed a contract to buy this system in 2007. Russian President Vladimir Putin halted the implementation of this contract in 2010, but resumed it in 2015 after the nuclear deal.86 Iran is now keen to exchange the PMU1 S-300 missile system for the latest PMU2 based on the same contract that amounted to one billion USD, knowing that Russia had sold the latest S-400 missile system to Turkey and Greece (NATO members) and India. Similarly, Russia declined a ten-year-old request from Iran to purchase the SU-30 warplane due to international resolution 2231, which bans the sale of offensive weapons to Iran without permission from the Security Council.87 The SU-30 is a bomber and intercepting fighter and is considered the major Russian warplane in Syria. It entered service in the Russian Air Force in 2012, can intercept fifteen targets at a time, can strike ground and air targets within a range of ten kilometers, is equipped with twentykilometer-range missiles, and is considered one of the most successful projects in the Russian aviation industry in recent years.88 For Iran, one of the most important features of this warplane is its ability to fly up to 3000 kilometers, which means it can travel from Tibriz to Damascus and back to Tibriz without refueling.

In addition, Iran presented an extensive list of arms it needed to buy from Russia; however, all it received during the first six months of 2017 was promises without implementation. Iran’s list included the following arms: 1. Sukhoi-SM warplane 2. Short-range Sukhoi Superjet-100 warplane 3. Modified Orion-20 warplane, which can take off from above water or ice and has a capability for high-altitude flying due to its large wings.

In addition, Iran signed a ten-billion USD contract to buy Russian arms, including defense, light, and medium arms. It also signed an agreement to build a helicopter domestically to make up for the shortfall in the fighter helicopters it needs to confront Kurdish insurgents in the rough mountainous areas of western Iran.

The Russian Helicopter Manufacturing Company and the Establishment of Improving the Iranian Industries signed a memorandum of understanding about the establishment of a joint company to assemble the Russian Kamov Ka-226 or Ansat in Iran.89 They also signed a contract to build a factory for assembling two types of helicopters and improving the Iranian helicopters.

The Russian Helicopter Manufacturing Company and the Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran (IDRO) intend to invest in the production of the Kamkov Ka-226 helicopters and the Ansat. In addition, Iran is planning to buy the Russian helicopters Mi-171, Mi-171E, Mi8MTV, and Mi-17V-5.

Andre Bojenski, director of the Russian Helicopter Manufacturing Company, and Mansour Mu’azami, director of the Iranian IDRO, signed a memorandum of understanding in this concern and announced that the goal of this memo was to enhance bilateral relations and improve Iranian helicopters.90 These helicopters entered service for the first time in 1997, in the Russian and Indian air forces, at a cost of four million USD each.

In 2006, Iran announced that it was building the Iranian helicopter Shahid. This helicopter relies on the reverse engineering of the US helicopter Bell-206. In fact, Iranian forces suffer from a significant shortfall in helicopters that goes back to the 1960s. Iranian-made helicopters like

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the Saba, Shahid, and Tofan rely on reverse engineering and were copies of old US helicopters in Iran since the time of the Shah.91 Hence, over the past two years, after signing the nuclear deal, Iran has failed to make any significant improvement in its armaments, either from the Western countries that are free of the international resolutions concerning the ban on selling traditional defense arms to Iran, and even from Russia, which has a significant military cooperation with Iran. Indeed, Iran must still improve many of its arms systems. Its air force is in miserable shape, although attempts to address this shortfall through domestic industry have not yet been tested.

A media storm surrounds the Iranian policy as a form of propaganda that hides a significant shortfall in all sectors except missile capabilities. » Russia-Iran economic cooperation Russia and Iran have maintained strong economic ties since the emergence of the Republic of Iran in 1979. This collaboration was enhanced by the Western economic sanctions on Iran until 2015. Iran complained about Russia’s use of the Western economic sanctions and the sale of low-quality goods to Iran at high prices. For thirty-six years, the Iranian customer was deprived of high-quality, luxury goods. With the signing of the nuclear deal in 2015, Iranian citizens had high expectations about changing the reality they had experienced for over three decades, but nothing changed due to the nature of the Iranian regime, which has become a prisoner of the sanctions and war economies that Khamenei announced under the so-called Resistant Economy. Khamenei still lives at the time when he was president of the Iranian Republic during the Iranian-Iraqi war. He declines foreign investments or partnerships with Western companies to transfer new technologies to Iran. In addition, he rejects the idea of a free economy or privatization, although he embarked on a fake program of privatization through which he transferred ownership of all public companies from the state into the IRGC. On the other hand, Rouhani tried to stand against these policies, though he failed. Iran could not escape the Russian mantle that paved the way to signing long-term economic contracts with Tehran as a result of the closed country policies. In reality, Russia achieved significant gains from its economic cooperation with Tehran in a manner similar to the tribute that Iran paid Russia in exchange for Russian support in the face of US pressure and military support in the Syrian civil war.

Over the past six months, Russia has focused on winning the largest possible number of oil contracts in Iran through either the development of oil fields, exploration, or the signing of mutual contracts for exchanging goods in the “goods for oil” program. The Russian-Iranian agreements throughout the past six months can be summarized as follows: 1. Russia signed the “goods for oil” agreement with Iran for up to forty-five billion USD per year.

According to this agreement, Iran pays 50% of the cost of goods in cash and the other 50% in the form of Iranian oil for Russian goods, including railroad equipment, heavy vehicles, shuttles, and airplane equipment.92 2. Recently, the Russian Gas Prom announced the signing of a contract with Iran to operate and develop the fields of Chenjolah and Chemeh-Khosh. Iran discovered fifteen billion barrels of oil reserves when the Iranian National Company for Oil announced that two billion barrels could be extracted from this field. In addition, Iran discovered one trillion and 870 billion cubic meters of gas and announced that 1.04 trillion cubic meters could be extracted from this site. All these Iranian reserves are owned by Russian investors.93 This tendency to control Iranian oil is part of Russia’s and the Governmental Oil Company’s “Russ Naft” strategy to increase its presence in the Middle East after signing several contracts to buy oil from Egypt, Libya, and Iraqi Kurdistan. This company will receive its first shipment by the beginning of 2018 via the Turkish Jihan port. Recently, Russ Naft took over Indian refineries

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in addition to those it owns in Germany.94 As a result, Russ Naft is seeking more convenient and closer oil resources to transport to these refineries more than the oil produced domestically in Russia and sold to Eastern Europe, South Korea, and Japan. Hence, Iranian oil is considered a convenient option for its refinery in India, and Libyan and Egyptian oil for the refinery in Germany.

Russia-Iran economic cooperation has not been confined to Russia’s gains from Iranian oil.

The “United” company for Russian Trailers (UWC) signed contracts with three Iranian trailer manufacturers to build six thousand train trailers for the Iranian railroad over the next three years. The Russian Company UWC and the Iranian companies Pars Trailers, Kawthar for Trailer Manufacturing, and Arak for Steel signed a contract in a meeting attended by the Iranian Minister of Industry, Mining, and Trade, Nimat Zadah.

Based on this agreement, the three Iranian companies will build 4,900 train trailers domestically with Russian financing. In exchange, Iran will import 1,100 train trailers (900 in the first year and 200 in the second) from Russia.95 The current Iranian railroad totals 10,293 kilometers. Most of these lines are one way except for 1,426 kilometers of two-way track, 146 kilometers of which is electrical lines; only 9,000 train trailers of the agreed-upon type operate on these lines.96 This agreement is too large. Once it is implemented, it will cause significant improvement in the Iranian railroad industry. Land transportation is preferable and prevalent for both individuals and goods in Iran.97 As for the automobile industry, for years France had taken over most cooperation contracts with Iran. Russia tried to gain a share of the truck manufacturing market in Iran through its car manufacturer Waz in the Russian Olianofisk province, announcing a plan to build a car assembly factory in Iran at the beginning of 2018. According to the announced schedule, three models of small trucks will be assembled in partnership with the company’s Iranian counterpart, Twan Khodar.98 » The future of Russia-Iran relations »» Strong ties between the two countries will continue in light of growing US pressure on Iran, the imposition of consecutive sanctions, and US and European pressure on Russia, which will enhance the Russia-Iran coalition in the face of US pressure and Russia’s full support of Iran in the United Nations. »» Russia will most likely preserve its military alliance with Iran in Syria. It will not exert pressure on Tehran to drive the Lebanese Hezbollah militias out of Syrian territories unless considerable gains are achieved from the Americans and Europeans, which will not happen unless Israel exerts pressure to meet this goal. In this case, Iran will not object to driving Hezbollah out of Syria if the Russians ensure the continuation of Iranian presence in Syria and the Bashar Assad will remain in power in this country. »» Iran will exert pressure on Russia to launch a widespread attack on the Syrian opposition in Edlib as an intimidation step to push the opposition to come to the table and discuss the final solution to the Syrian crisis from the perspective of “a Loser who wants to escape annihilation” unless the United States and Turkey declare Edlib a no-fly zone. »» Russia will strive to achieve greater control of the Iranian economy by signing direct contracts with the IRGC companies. This matter will have a negative political and economic impact on the Iranian interior, causing civil unrest due to the growing hegemony of the IRGC over all aspects of life in Iran.

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‫‪Endnotes‬‬ ‫‪ 1‬د‪ .‬محمود صدقي‪ :‬المركز العربي للبحوث والدراسات‪http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/35284 .‬‬ ‫‪ 2‬وكالة أنباء بيت األمة‪ :‬إعادة طرح ملف مؤسسة علوي في أمريكا تهدف لزيادة الضغط على إيران‪https://goo.gl/wWGBEL .‬‬ ‫‪ 3‬وزير دفاع ترامپ‪ :‬خواستار حمله موشکی به تاسيسات هسته ای ايران بود ‪https://goo.gl/ofHvbt‬‬ ‫‪ 4‬راديو فردا‪ :‬رکس تيلرسون توافق اتمی با ايران را مورد «بازنگری کامل» قرار می دهد‪http://cutt.us/iQwb ،‬‬ ‫‪ 5‬تسنيم‪ :‬تحليلی بر اظهارات مايکل فلين درباره ايران‪http://cutt.us/n66U3 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 6‬راديو فردا‪ :‬نامزد پيشنهادی ترامپ برای «سی آی ای»‪ :‬ايرانی ها در تقلب کردن‪ ،‬حرفه ای هستند‪http://cutt.us/dA38D ،‬‬ ‫‪ 7‬ايسنا‪ ،‬اقدام ترامپ برای ممنوعيت صدور ويزا برای ايرانيان تبعيض نﮋادی است‪http://cutt.us/uG5rN ،‬‬ ‫‪ 8‬وكالة سكاى برس‪ :‬المخابرات االمريكية لـ» ترامب»‪ :‬من الحماقة إلغاء االتفاق مع إيران ‪http://cutt.us/EQlwQ‬‬ ‫‪ 9‬أرت تي‪ :‬خطة ترامب الجديدة ضد إيران‪http://cutt.us/PTRiJ .‬‬ ‫‪ 10‬موقع راديو فردا‪ :‬ايران تشديد تحريمهای موشکی از سوی آمريکا را محکوم کرد‪/۲۹ ،‬ارديبهشت‪http://cutt.us/AvB9D :۱۳۹۶/‬‬ ‫‪11 Mark Dubowitz and Ray Takeyh, Labeling Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, http://cutt.us/FjpCa‬‬ ‫‪ 12‬من وتو‪ :‬رييس مجلس نمايندگان آمريکا‪ :‬بايد سپاه را در فهرست تروريستی قرار دهيم‪http://cutt.us/ZMvBG ،‬‬ ‫‪ 13‬راديو فردا‪ :‬طرح تشديد تحريم های غيرهستهای عليه ايران در سنای آمريکا مطرح شد‪http://cutt.us/zzWCO ،‬‬ ‫‪ 14‬راديو فردا‪ :‬وزارت خارجه آمريکا تحريمهايی عليه افراد و شرکتهای مرتبط با برنامههای نظامی ايران‪ ،‬کره شمالی و سوريه وضع کرد‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/BW1TC‬‬ ‫‪ 15‬رويترز‪ :‬يک شرکت عظيم چينی در آستانه توافق با آمريکا و پرداخت جريمه به خاطر نقض تحريمهای ايران است‪ ،‬راديو فردا‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/OCgPh‬‬ ‫‪ 16‬جريمه سنگين شرکت آمريکايی به جرم معامله با ايرانن عصر ايران‪http://cutt.us/snYLx ،‬‬ ‫‪ 17‬صحيفة جام جم‪ :‬آمريکا تحريم های جديدی عليه ايران اعمال کرد‪ 28 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/nV5Rw :1396‬‬ ‫‪ 18‬رويترز‪ :‬أمريكا تعاقب مسؤولين إيرانيين وشبكة صينية بسبب برنامج إيران الصاروخي‪ 17 ،‬مايو ‪https://goo.gl/FzLdqw :2017‬‬ ‫‪ 19‬الوسط‪ :‬أمريكا ترفع عقوبات عن إيران وتفرض عقوبات أخرى بسبب الصواريخ الباليستية‪ 18 ،‬مايو ‪https://goo.gl/smbFjw :2017‬‬ ‫‪ 20‬موقع راديو فردا‪ :‬آمريکا میگويد تداوم حبس رهبران بهايی‪ ،‬نقض آزادیهای بنيادين در ايران است‪/۲۶ ،‬ارديبهشت‪http://cutt.us/y4gO0 :۱۳۹۶/‬‬ ‫‪ 21‬صحيفة اسنا‪ :‬تالش سناتورهای آمريکايی برای افزودن تحريمهای روسيه به طرح تحريمهای ايران‪ ۱۳ ،‬ارديبهشت ‪:۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/pMV4kg‬‬ ‫‪ 22‬صحيفة شرق‪ :‬خطوط هوايی ايران هدف جديد کنگره آمريک‪ ۱۵ ،‬ارديبهشت ‪ ،۱۳۹۶‬ص ‪http://cutt.us/tDn6 :7‬‬ ‫‪ 23‬موقع ألف‪ :‬آمريکا خواستار همکاری اروپا برای فشار بر ايران شد‪ ۲۲ ،‬خرداد ‪http://cutt.us/eN2h8:۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 24‬بندر الدوشي‪ :‬أمريكا تراجع صفقة طائرات مدنية «بوينﻎ» و«إيرباص» مع إيران‪ ،‬صحيفة سبق‪ 26 ،‬مايو ‪https://sabq.org :2017‬‬ ‫‪ 25‬صحيفة آفرينش‪ :‬ليست تحريمهاي جديد آمريکا عليه حزباهلل شامل عون و نبيه بري هم ميشود‪http://cutt.us/7Agk :24/02/1396 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 26‬صداي آمريكا‪ :‬سازمان جوامع ايرانيان آمريکا‪ :‬سپاه را در ليست گروههای تروريستی بگذاريد‪http://cutt.us/vrcAF .‬‬ ‫‪ 27‬صحيفة جام جم‪ :‬ايران بخاطر اظهارات تيلرسون به دبيرکل سازمان ملل شکايت کرد‪https://goo.gl/LCF6uA .‬‬ ‫‪ 28‬صحيفة كيهان‪ :‬رئيس اتحاديه صادرکنندگان خشکبار‪ :‬هنوز مشکات بانکی بعد از برجام حل نشده و بدون تغيير مانده است‪ ،‬ص ‪.4‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/51GZ‬‬ ‫‪ 29‬صحيفة ابرار اقتصادي‪ :‬آغاز مشاركت نفتى ايران وآمريكا‪ 21 ،‬ارديبهشت‪ ،۱۳۹۶/‬ص‪http://cutt.us/C39Qm :4‬‬ ‫‪ 30‬سياست روز‪ :‬ماجراجويی های نظامی در دوران ترامپيسم‪http://cutt.us/EA8xS ،‬‬ ‫‪ 31‬إيران وأذرعها وتهديد المالحة البحرية‪http://cutt.us/kbMON ،‬‬ ‫‪ 32‬جام جم‪ :‬توان نيروی دريايی ايران پس از ‪ ۲۰۲۰‬به شدت افزايش میيابد‪http://cutt.us/5kgSF ،‬‬ ‫‪ 33‬صداي أمريكا‪ :‬گزارش يک نهاد آمريکايی‪ :‬ايران زيردريايی با موشک کروز ضد کشتی برای تنگه هرمز می سازد‪http://cutt.us/6JVq5،‬‬ ‫‪ 34‬راديو فردا‪ :‬واکنش پنتاگون به نزديکشدن شناورهای سپاه به ناو رهگير آمريکا‪« :‬ناامن و غيرحرفهای»‪http://cutt.us/UWys ،‬‬ ‫‪ 35‬صحيفة إيران‪ :‬ايران مخالف حضور امريکا در نشست آستانه‪ ۱۱ ،‬ارديهشت‪https://goo.gl/QKmrne :‬‬ ‫‪ 36‬بيير غانم‪ :‬روسيا تؤهل إيران‪ ..‬وواشنطن تقطع طريق طهران بدير الزور‪ ،‬العربية نت‪ 9 ،‬مايو ‪https://goo.gl/i9XiRq :2017‬‬ ‫رتال عسكري‪‬ا لميليشيات إيران قرب التنف‪ ،‬أورينت نت‪ 18 ،‬مايو ‪https://goo.gl/f7czei :2017‬‬ ‫‪ 37‬عامر شهدا‪ :‬في تطور خطير‪ ..‬التحالف يقصف ً‬ ‫‪ 38‬أورينت نت‪ :‬من جديد‪ ..‬واشنطن تح ّذر ميليشيات إيران في البادية السورية‪ 31 ،‬مايو ‪https://goo.gl/xmC9KH :2017‬‬ ‫‪ 39‬المدينة‪ :‬الجبير‪ :‬الشراكة بين السعودية وأمريكا تتصدى لﻺرهاب‪ 21 ،‬مايو ‪https://goo.gl/YKUsRF :2017‬‬ ‫‪ 40‬کاخ سفيد‪ :‬ترامپ در ديدار با الوروف بر لزوم کنترل ايران تأکيد کرد!‪ ،‬موقع عصر إيران‪ ۲۰ ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/pPGue :۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 41‬جهان صنعت‪ :‬روزنامه جهان صنعت تغيير راهبردهای خاورميانهای آمريکا‪http://soo.gd/AasR :01/03/1396 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 42‬المدينة‪ :‬الجبير‪ :‬الشراكة بين السعودية وأمريكا تتصدى لﻺرهاب‪ 21 ،‬مايو ‪https://goo.gl/gSTioT :2017‬‬ ‫‪ 43‬وكالة ايسنا‪ :‬موسويان‪ :‬ترامپ با ابزار اتهام به ايران به دنبال چاپيدن دالرهای نفتی شيوخ عرب است‪ ۱ ،‬خرداد ‪https://goo.gl/oEYNWo :۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 44‬وكالة األنباء السعودية‪ :‬عام‪ /‬صدور بيان مشترك بين المملكة العربية السعودية والواليات المتحدة األمريكية‪ 22 ،‬مايو ‪:2017‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/KDMm2D‬‬ ‫‪ 45‬تايمز‪ :‬آمريکا به دنبال توافق تسليحاتی ‪ ۳۰۰‬ميليارد دالری با عربستان است‪ ،‬صحيفة اطالعات‪ ۲۸ ،‬ارديبهشت ‪https://goo.gl/QiCcNy :۱۳۹۶‬‬

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‫‪The second Biannual Strategic Report - June.2017‬‬

‫‪46 Estados Unidos mantiene levantadas las sanciones nucleares a Irán: Elpais,17 May 2017: https://goo.gl/mkhGkt‬‬ ‫‪ 47‬صحيفة كيهان‪ :‬گستاخی آمريکا در تهديد ايران حاصل حمله به اقتدار و عزت ‪ 38‬ساله‪ ۲ ،‬خرداد ‪ ،۱۳۹‬ص ‪http://cutt.us/UHfSI :10‬‬ ‫‪48 Trump et l’Iran: une guerre froide, pas un retour à l’axe du mal de George Bush, atlantico, 23 Mai 2017: https://goo.gl/XGicoL‬‬ ‫‪ 49‬خبر آنالين‪ :‬علم الهدی‪ :‬معتقدان به سازش با آمريکا در شناخت خدا و معاد دچار مشکل هستند‪http://cutt.us/LCHV .‬‬ ‫‪ 50‬وكالة مهر‪ :‬سردار جزايری در واکنش به حادثه تروريستی تهران‪ :‬داعش با هدايت آمريکا و عربستان دست به اقدامات تروريستی می زند‪.‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/SPpTuc‬‬ ‫‪51 Trump must work to stop Iran’s secret nuclear program، TheHill, 1 may 2017: https://goo.gl/4TwPZX‬‬ ‫‪ 52‬موقع مشرق نيوز‪ :‬آژانس بار ديگر فعاليتهای هسته ای ايران را تاييد کرد‪http://cutt.us/jKO05 .‬‬ ‫‪ 53‬صحيفة جهان صنعت‪ ، :‬کميسيونمشترکبرجامدرتيرماهبرگزارمیشود‪ ،‬ص‪http://cutt.us/rAdAx .2 :‬‬ ‫‪ 54‬صحيفة جهان صنعت‪ :‬افزايش قيمت نفت‪ ،‬ص ‪http://cutt.us/qYGPo .13‬‬ ‫‪ 55‬وكالة مهر‪ :‬روحانی در شبکه خبر‪:‬آمريکا هنوز دست از شيطنت هايش برنداشته است‪ ۱۱ ،‬ارديبهشت ‪4o28nQ/https://goo.gl :۱۳۹۶‬‬ ‫‪ 56‬أرمان امروز‪ ،‬تحريم سنابرخالف روح وجسم رجام است‪ ،‬ص‪http://cutt.us/knDhQ .7‬‬ ‫‪ 57‬جام جم آنالين‪ :‬واشنگتن ادعا کرد‪ :‬پرتاب موشک کروز توسط زيردريايی ايرانی در تنگه هرمز‪ 14 ،‬ارديبهشت ‪http://cutt.us/IFmlb:1396‬‬ ‫‪ 58‬صحيفة كيهان‪ :‬گستاخی آمريکا در تهديد ايران حاصل حمله به اقتدار و عزت ‪ 38‬ساله‪ ۲ ،‬خرداد ‪ ،۱۳۹‬ص ‪http://cutt.us/UHfSI :10‬‬ ‫‪ 59‬سبوتنيك فارسي‪ :‬پرتاب موشک از سوی ايران‪http://cutt.us/rErdF،‬‬ ‫‪ 60‬ادعای جديد فاکس نيوز‪ :‬ايران دو موشک بالستيک پرتاب کرده است‪ ،‬ايسنا‪http://cutt.us/rErdF ،‬‬ ‫‪ 61‬سكاي نيوز عربية‪ :‬الحرس الثوري‪ :‬إيران مستمرة بإرسال مستشارين لسوريا‪ 2 ، ،‬مايو ‪https://goo.gl/PHmz9p :2017‬‬ ‫‪ 62‬وكالة العين‪ :‬مسار إيراني جديد نحو المتوسط خوًفا من القوات األمريكية‪ 16 ،‬مايو ‪https://goo.gl/tNQ2M1 :2017‬‬ ‫‪ 63‬وطن امروز‪ :‬مصوبه سنا تأثير عميق بر همکاری اقتصادی ايران دارد‪ ۱۳۹۶ ،‬يکشنبه ‪ ۸‬مرداد ‪http://cutt.us/8bC2K‬‬ ‫‪ 64‬وكالة فارس‪ :‬عزم ايران برای مقابله با تروريستها بيشتر شد ‪http://cutt.us/zFx7b‬‬ ‫‪ 65‬ميزان‪ :‬خسارت حمله به ايران براي أمريكا غير قابل تحمل است‪http://cutt.us/yqJEX ،‬‬ ‫‪ 66‬ايسنا‪ :‬پنج چالش ترامپ برای شکست داعش از نگاه موسويان‪http://cutt.us/QUylF ،‬‬ ‫‪ 67‬مهر‪ :‬طرح دوفوريتی مجلس برای تروريستی اعالم کردن ارتش آمريکا‪https://goo.gl/E1hrwm ،‬‬ ‫‪ 68‬خبر أونالين‪ :‬جهانگيری‪ :‬به تحريمهای جديد آمريکا عکسالعمل مناسب نشان میدهيم‪ /‬هيﭻ فشاری به ما وارد نخواهد شد‪http://cutt.us/5zQZh ،‬‬ ‫‪ 69‬آفرينش‪ :‬کميسيون امنيت ملي طرح «مقابله با اقدامات آمريکا» را ارائه کند‪http://cutt.us/x54c .1396-3-22 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 70‬اقتصاد أونالين‪ :‬ايران ‪ ۱۵‬شرکت آمريکايی را تحريم کرد ‪+‬اسامی ‪2lTEp/http://cutt.us ،‬‬ ‫‪ 71‬صحيفة وطن امروز‪ :‬اقدام آمريکا عليه ايران موجب ناامنی پايگاه هايش در منطقه می شود‪ ،‬ص ‪http://cutt.us/Fo0Jy .2‬‬ ‫‪ 72‬الضربة األمريكية بوابة الدخول لنهاية األزمة السورية‪ ،‬مركز فيريل للدراسات برلين‪http://cutt.us/TmFru ،‬‬ ‫‪ 73‬لمواقف الدولية تجاه محاولة االنقالب الفاشلة في تركيا‪ ،‬مركز برق لألبحاث والدراسات‪http://cutt.us/RGYDR ،‬‬ ‫‪ 74‬أسباب وتداعيات تغير الموقف التركي تجاه القضية السورية‪ ،‬أورينت نت‪http://cutt.us/55JpN ،‬‬ ‫‪ 75‬إيران تعارض مشاركة الواليات المتحدة في محادثات أستانه‪ ،‬الحرة‪http://cutt.us/xSwG3 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 76‬قوات روسية اعتقلت عناصر للنظام ومنعت اإليرانيين من دخول حلب‪ ،‬الشرق األوسط‪http://cutt.us/baotU ،‬‬ ‫‪ 77‬مقترح روسي بإنشاء أربع مناطق آمنة بسوريا‪ ،‬الجزيرة‪http://cutt.us/ZTkE4 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 78‬مسکو‪ :‬مشارکت ايران وحزب اهلل در حل بحران سوريه سازنده است‪ ،‬اطالعات‪http://cutt.us/Np4hr ،‬‬ ‫‪ 79‬روسيه آماده ميانجيگری بين ايران و آمريکا در سوريهن ابرار‪http://cutt.us/w6hpE ،‬‬ ‫السو ِريَّة‪http://cutt.us/on9VH ،‬‬ ‫انتهاكا‪،‬‬ ‫‪ 80‬بطلب أمريكي‪ ..‬صاروخ إيران الباليستي على طاولة مجلس األمن اليوم وإسرائيل تعتبره‬ ‫ُّ‬ ‫‪ 81‬سياست روز‪ :‬روابط ايران وروسيه چالشی برای امريکا« ‪ 24‬بهمن ‪https://goo.gl/HECCaY 1395‬‬ ‫‪ 82‬واشنطن تفرض عقوبات على ‪ 8‬شركات روسية‪ ،‬الوئام‪http://cutt.us/P4qmy ،‬‬ ‫‪ 83‬واکنش مسکو به تحريمهای ضد اشاعه آمريکا عليه نهادهای مرتبط با ايران‪ ،‬دانشجو‪http://cutt.us/jBar8 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 84‬وكالة أنباء مهر‪ :‬فاز دوم نيروگاه هسته ای بوشهر با همکاری روسيه آغاز شده است‪https://goo.gl/OWC2yI ،‬‬ ‫‪ 85‬اتفاق روسي إيراني على خارطة طريق نووية‪ ،‬روسيا اليوم‪http://cutt.us/MFEpo ،‬‬ ‫‪ 86‬وكالة أنباء فارس‪ :‬مسکو‪ :‬تحويل سامانه اس‪ ۳۰۰-‬به ايران تکميل شد‪/‬آماده مبادله اورانيوم با آب سنگين هستيم‪http://fna.ir/FE6JG2 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 87‬سرتيپ اسماعيلی‪ :‬هنوز اس ‪ ۳۰۰‬درهيﭻ نقطه کشور کار گذاشته نشده است‪https://goo.gl/vDXrb5‬‬ ‫‪ 88‬دويچه وله‪ :‬روسيه‪ :‬فروش تسليحات تهاجمی به ايران ممکن نيست‪http://cutt.us/vzWYY ،‬‬ ‫‪« 89‬سو‪ 30-‬إس إم» مقاتلة المهام المستحيلة في سوريا‪ ،‬سبوتنيك عربي‪http://cutt.us/mRj25 ،‬‬ ‫‪ 90‬تأسيس موسسه مشترک مونتاژ بالگردهای سبک روس در ايران‪ ،‬جام نيوز‪http://cutt.us/R2ie ،‬‬ ‫‪ 91‬ايران بالگردهای روسی مونتاژ میکند‪ ،‬عصر ايران‪http://cutt.us/RqnWy ،‬‬ ‫‪ 92‬فرزند جديد بالگرد های خانواده شاهد‪ ،‬نيروي هواي ارتش‬ ‫‪ 93‬ارزش قرارداد نفت در برابر كاال با روسيه ‪ 45‬ميليارد دالر‪ ،‬ايران‪http://cutt.us/KUOUE ،‬‬ ‫‪ 94‬پروژه های نفت وگاز ايران‪ ،‬سبوتنيك فارسي‪http://cutt.us/A58Cw ،‬‬ ‫‪« 95‬روسنفت» الروسية تغزو الشرق األوسط‪ ..‬وليبيا هدف‪ 218 ،‬تي في‪http://cutt.us/zaREJ ،‬‬ ‫‪ 96‬روسيه ‪ 6‬هزار واگن باری برای راه آهن ايران توليد می کند‪ ،‬سبوتنيك فارسي‪http://cutt.us/Jdb1C ،‬‬ ‫‪ 97‬راه اهن جمهوري إسالمي إيران‪ ،‬امار حمل ونقل ريلي كشور در سال ‪http://cutt.us/zavX ،1392‬‬ ‫‪ 98‬خودرو ساز روسي در ايران كارخانه مي زند‪ ،‬برترينها‪http://cutt.us/TTJjk ،‬‬

‫‪The second Biannual Strategic Report - June.2017‬‬

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» INTERNAL AFFAIRS

During the first half of 2017, Iran passed the presidential elections with fewer losses despite the prospects of eruption of an internal crisis in case of IRGC interference or rigging elections that were processed under the method of the many candidates running the elections to support one major candidate, which allowed significant participation in this political process and preventing scattering of votes that led to Rouhani’s winning of a second term of presidency in the first round of the elections.

The state of rivalry between Institution of the Presidency and Judicial authority continued in Iran during the presidential elections in May 2107 when Hassan Rouhani accused the judicial authority, as well as IRGC, of taking the side of the conservative candidate Ibrahim Ra’isi. Tension also escalated

between Rouhani and IRGC on the new oil contracts and the IRGC keenness to win these contracts to expand its economic empire at the expense of the states’ economic organizations.

Security Iran witnessed unprecedented intrusions represented by the twin attacks on the Parliament and Khomeini tomb. These attacks became subject to intense speculation about offenders and the level of breaking into the Iranian security services. Iran also witnessed an increase of military operations carried out by the Kurdish separatists in Western Iran similar to the Baluch armed groups’ activities in east Iran. These events reflected the weakness of the Iranian security forces and their inability to break into the main strongholds of the armed groups in the country.

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Military Iran preserved its forces in Syria and increased the number of Afghani, Pakistani, Iranian, and Lebanese Shiite militias in this country. However, Iran relied on the Russian air capabilities in protecting these forces. On the other hand, Iran felt the threat of the US strikes on its forces after the US missile strike on the Syrian Shayrat airport and Tanf base. Indeed, the US forces are aware of the Iranian plans to establish a land crossing that links between Iran and its forces in Syria via Iraq and the Syrian countryside. The Iranian forces in Syria felt the threat and possibility to be blockaded in case of change of balance of power on the ground. The consecutive sanctions on Iran during the first half of 2017 restricted the movement of the Iranian forces in Syria, which obliged Tehran to give up its national pride and its claims of independence from superpowers after its presence in Syria had been determined by the Russian government.

Iran failed to buy advanced offensive arms from Russia. Both countries signed a ten-billiondollar agreement confined to non-offensive arms and did not include any type of warplanes Iran needed.

Iran continued its successful domestic military industry that does not have destructive capabilities, which is evident that these arms are either of Chinese or North Korean origins improved in Iran that could not sell these arms to any countries not even to its friends.

The Iranian deployment of vessels in the Arabian Gulf decreased and its boats harassment to the US warships diminished after the new approach of the US warships toward these boats in the Gulf.

Economics The Iranian GDP registered significant growth rate (400 billion USD) during the first half of 2017.

According to the International Monetary Fund, the 2016-2017 fiscal year witnessed relatively high growth rate (6.6%) supported by oil exports. However, the Iranian citizen did not feel a significant improvement in his living conditions both quantitatively and qualitatively. According to the Iranian governmental promising statements about achieving high growth rates, this growth resulted from the increase in oil exports and imports as a result of sanctions relief but not increase of production in the non-oil products and run rates. Until November 2016, the inflation rate in Iran registered 9% but jumped to 10.9% during the first half of 2017. Unemployment increased 1.5% by the end of the Iranian year (in March 2017) to register 12.3% after registering 11.1% during the first three years of Rouhani’s first term of presidency. In urbanized districts, unemployment registered 13.4%, exceeding the countryside for 10%.

The Iranian oil policies Iran is in need for increasing its monetary revenues to make up the deficit, meet its increasing military expenses, and address its mounting problems, which make it difficult for Tehran to stick to the OPEC oil agreements. In order to achieve more revenues, Tehran will harm the other OPEC countries that are committed to freezing oil production by increasing its production of natural gas and petrochemicals.

Social Issues In the beginning of his first term of presidency, Rouhani attracted attention to the Iranian health sector and was proud because he felt he made big achievements in this sector. Rouhani’s government accomplished the “Guarantee the Safety” project to enable people to benefit from the medical services that he considered the beginning of social prosperity. However, the Iranian Minister of Health Hassan Hashemi contradicted Rouhani’s views when he said, “We have no way but to privatize Health sector” and added, “100 thousand people get cancer in Iran annually.”

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In fact, Iran is ranked fourth in the world in the prevalence of cancer. In addition, the number of people infected in AIDS has increased significantly since 1991. In 2009, AIDS registered 38 thousand cases but decreased to 35 thousand in 2013.

Iran also is ranked second in depression and psychiatric diseases in the world. The number of drug addicts also increased over the past six years to register 2.8 million people, according to Iranian media.

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Some of Iran’s internal successes were contributed to diminish the Iranian regional role as a result of the change from a major player in Syria to a follower of Russia in this crisis, the increase of the Turkish role, resumption of the US position in this conflict, the victories of the legitimate forces and Arab coalition in Yemen that augured well for the defeat of Houthi rebels, coming back of legitimacy to Yemen, and eliminating the Iranian proxy militias in this country. In addition, withholding Riyadh conference, the Arab-Islamic solidarity amplified to confront the Iranian regime’s ambitions, interferences, and intrusions in the regional countries.

Despite the decline of its regional role, Iran used its media to make up this step back and ensure that it has expanded its borders up to the Mediterranean Sea, claiming that this the third time in the Persian history Iran expands it borders to this district. In fact, these statements contradict reality. The Iranian expansion in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and supporting the Shiite militias with money, men and arms against Sunnis reflect Iranian confusion and fear of the capabilities of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to mobilize and lead the Muslim world, which was evident when fiftyfive leaders and representatives of Arab and Muslim countries in addition to the president of number one country in the world responded and attended Riyadh conference.

Iran failed to divide the GCC unity when Rouhani visited Kuwait and Oman. However, Rouhani’s tour to these countries and the calls of the Iranian decision-makers for de-escalation of tension came to appease the US pressure after Trump’s approach of the GCC countries and make concessions to the GCC countries to escape forward due to its fear from the US sanctions or, perhaps, a US-Gulf coalition against the Iranian expansion. As a result, Tehran was trying to get ahead of this and prevent such coalition that threatens its external influence, escape any potential sanctions, test the GCC countries position toward the new US administration pressure against Tehran, and break into the GCC countries position against the Iranian expansionist policies in the region.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia increased its diplomatic moves to corner Iran in Asia. King Salman Bin Abdul-Aziz (custodian of the two holy mosques) visited seven Asian countries- Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, China, Maldives, Brunei, and Jordan. In fact, these moves raised the Saudi stature in Asia and strengthened relations between the Kingdom and these countries.

Iran could not hide its fears from King Salman’s Asian tour. It offended the Malaysian government for accusing Tehran of interference in the affairs of other countries and fueling sectarian conflicts in the region in the final statement of the visit. In addition, Kuala Lumpur heightened the necessity for Iran to respect the principles of the good-neighborliness and sovereignty of other countries.

In the Syrian crisis, the Iranian role declined with the expansion of conflict in this country, the Russian-Turkish rapprochement, and resumption of the US role in the region. Despite the victories of Bashar Assad and his allies on the ground, the Syrian civil war became a crisis for Iran more than the expansion of its influence.

In Iraq, the national calls heightened after liberating Mosul and eliminating ISIS in this country to draw the approach to be adopted by the state- especially with the Kurdistan provinces

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announcement of conducting independence referendum. Most likely, these calls will reject the Iranian hegemony of Iraq after two decades of harsh living environment and deterioration of the security and economic conditions under the Iranian domination.

In Yemen, Houthi rebels stepped back due to the progress of the legitimate forces and Arab coalition that took control of 80% of Yemen, which indicates the beginning of the collapse of the Iranian ally in this country.

Âť INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The US-Iran Relations

The new US president, Donald Trump adopted the policy of sanctions against Tehran but did not repeal the Iranian nuclear deal. The US plan for sanctions did not confine to individuals and entities related to the Iranian missile program inside Iran but extended to include other sides outside this country. The US Department of State imposed sanctions against thirty individuals and organizations that have relation with military programs in Iran, North Korea, and Syria in compliance with the arms non-proliferation law. Based on the statement of the US Department of State, these individuals and organizations come from ten countries and provided Iran with missile technologies for its missile program or broke the restrictions on exports to Iran, North Korea, and Syria.

The new US administration adopted a hard line against the Iranian presence in Syria. The US involvement in the Syrian crisis increased by direct military mobilization and supporting the active parties like the Syrian Democratic forces charged with confronting ISIS in eastern Syria, political and diplomatic presence to influence Geneva and Astana talks on Syria, the US-Russia rapprochement that started with Trump-Putin agreement during the G20 Hamburg Summit in Germany to de-escalate tension in some Syrian districts.

Russia-Iran Relations After the fall of Aleppo at the end of 2016, Russia-Iran relations deteriorated on the regional and international levels. The balanced cooperation Iran tried to adopt after signing the nuclear deal declined and turned Russia-Iran relations into the tactical form of relations during the first half of 2017. These changes materialized the views of many analysts who believed that there were no strategic relations between Iran and Russia, but only relations of cooperation subject to change according to the regional and international developments. Indeed, Russia-Iran relations were highly influenced by the international and regional developments. Russia-Iran cooperation succeeded in declining the US attempts to impose more international sanctions on Iran assisted by the European unified position with Russia concerning the Iranian compliance with the terms of the nuclear deal and exclusion of the missile program from this agreement. However, Russia failed to prevent the United States from imposing unilateral sanctions on Iran when it adopted a mediation role between the two countries during the first half of 2017.

Despite military cooperation between Russia and Iran in Syria, Russia still has a cautious policy in supplying Iran with weapons. It is strictly committed to the Security Council resolutions concerning the ban of selling offensive weapons to Iran. This Russian strategy is enhanced by the lack of confidence between both sides and the Russian unwillingness to increase the level of armament of the Iranian forces for many reasons: continuity of the Iranian need for the Russian forces- especially air forces in the Syrian war, the Russian fears that these weapons might go to extremist Muslim elements inside Russia, and avoiding the US and perhaps the Israeli outrage in case these weapons get to the Lebanese Hezbollah. Furthermore, Russia has other channels to obtain the Iranian money rather than the risky channels of selling advanced arms to Iran.

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