JOURNAL FOR IRANIAN STUDIES Specialized Studies
A Peer-Reviewed Quarterly Periodical Journal
Year 1, issue 1- Dec. 2016
Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies
www.arabiangcis.org
JOURNAL FOR IRANIAN STUDIES
A Peer-Reviewed Scientific Periodical Journal Issued in both Arabic and English Languages Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, Sahafah NBHD, Al-Takhassusi St. P.O. Box: 12275 | Zip code: 11473 For (JIS) Journal annual subscription, contact the Journal Email at: JIS@arabiangcis.com Individuals inside Saudi Arabia: 120 SR Individuals outside Saudi Arabia: 300 SR Institutes inside Saudi Arabia and Abroad: 600 SR or equivalent in US Dollar
ISSN: 1658-757X
Publishing Terms and Conditions •All submitted materials should be related to the Journal’s specialty. •All materials should not have been published previously or is not under consideration for publication elsewhere. •Margins and sources should be listed at the end of the submitted material. •Acknowledgments, margins and sources are to be listed carefully with special focus on names and concepts.
Advisory Board Prof. Abdulhameed Alansari Prof. Ahmad Alshatheli Prof. Mohammed Alsaeed
•Citing all sources in the alphabetical order by author’s last name.
Prof. Mohannad Almobaideen
•All materials are preferred to be submitted electronically.
Prof. Radwan Assayed
•All submitted materials should be original; not copies.
Prof. Saleh Alkhathlan Prof. Yahia Ibn Junaid
•All submitted materials are not be returned back to their authors either accepted for publication or rejected. •Reproduction of any of the materials of this Journal is prohibited without written authorization from the Journal’s editor-in-Chief. •All materials are subject to extensive editing and refereeing before being considered for publication.
Abdulkarim Jaradat (PH.D.) Sultan Alnu’aimi (PH.D.)
Editor in Chief
Mohammed Alsulami (PH.D.) Editorial Board
Fathi Almaraghy (PH.D.) Mutasim abdalla (PH.D.) Abd Elraouf Elghonemi Ahmed Leila Editorial Director Mahmoud Abu Alqasim Editorial Secretary Mahmoud Jumaa Art Direction Hani Yassin
CONTENTS • The GCC and Iran: Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation Ashraf Kishk (PH.D.) ................................................................................ 8 • The Shiite Geopolitics: Present and Future Mohammed Alsulami (PH.D.) Abd Elraouf Elghonemi......................................................................... 30
• The Joint Nuclear Ambitions: Determinants of Iran-North Korea Relations and their Dangers Abd Elraouf Elghonemi................................................................................. 60 • Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region Mohammed Hassan Husseinbor (PH.D.) ................................................ 82 • The Economic Importance of Chabahar port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan Ahmed Leila ........................................................................................100 • Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization A comparison between the position of IRGCs and Army in the Iranian regime’s infrastructure Mutasim abdalla (PH.D.)...................................................................... 112 • The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century Manal Almreitib (PH.D.) ..................................................................... 130
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation Ashraf Kishk (PH.D.) Manager of Strategic Studies Program - Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies
INTRODUCTION
R
elations between the Iranian regime and the Gulf states are currently witnessing a worsening of the state of chronic conflict, which has in reality lasted since the Iranian revolution in 1979 until the present since a primary goal of the regime is to export its “Islamic Revolution” regionally and internationally, with the Gulf states being the first target of this expansionism.
While the Gulf states had previously able to manage the conflict with Iran, preventing it from expanding beyond its own boundaries, recent regional transformations, particularly in countries such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen, have provided another opportunity for Iran to extend its regional influence through its regional proxies, primarily non-state groups, which have sought to demolish and dismantle formerly unified nation-states, posing a direct threat to the Gulf states’ security. This has led to a new phase of the Gulf-Iranian conflict, especially in light of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) member states’ military intervention in Yemen in support of the legitimate government there, and the GCC’s and Arab League’s decision to brand Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, along with the stiff sentences imposed by the courts in some Gulf states against Hezbollah- and Tehran-linked individuals involved in espionage.
Journal for Iranian Studies
8
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
Based on these factors, this study aims to answer three primary questions: 1. What are the nature of and issues involved in the conflict between the Gulf States and Iran? 2.How has the Gulf managed the conflict with Iran? 3.What are the future scenarios for this conflict? First: The concept and determinants of the regional conflict between the GCC and Iran: Like other social phenomena, there are multiple possible definitions for the concept of conflict, with regional conflicts differing from international conflicts in a number of important ways; the main difference is that regional conflicts are geographically limited to and, to some degree, defined by the regions where they take place – the issues involved are specific to the region in question, whether these involve border disputes, struggles for regional influence, or disputes over water or other natural resources. Generally regional conflicts are directly associated with the national security of the states involved, and are of an existential nature, with the primary factors of the conflict being the elements and pillars of the state’s very existence, which lead such conflicts to be permanent and confrontational in nature unless and until they are decisively resolved in favor of one or the other of the states involved. In addition, in each stage of such a conflict, the strength of the adversaries will derive directly from the progress made in the previous stages, with the ultimate aim of all involved being the elimination of the adversary state. (1) With such conflicts having so many objectives, the need to maintain security during all the stages is one of the primary requirements and goals. Proceeding from these points, one must recognize that the current regional conflict is taking place in a chaotic and uniquely insecure era, with no stable world order and no single power having the authority or ability to provide the aforementioned essential security. Thus, efforts by one of the parties involved to safeguard its own security will lead to concerns amongst its adversaries for their own security, resulting in both parties preparing themselves for a worst-case scenario, especially since attaining total security is an elusive objective. The competition between these adversaries, even in periods of calm, is inevitable and leads ultimately to a permanent and mutual state of chronic insecurity, with each step by each party being considered a direct threat requiring military retaliation by the other. (2)
Journal for Iranian Studies
9
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
The primary determinants of regional conflicts are generally geographical location and population, which are reflected in the power of the state, as well as the nature of the political system and the orientations of the ruling elite. Applying the above to the Gulf-Iranian conflict, we find that the essence of the conflict is the Iranian regime’s lack of interest in living harmoniously with its neighboring states in a positive regional environment as provided for in international treaties on good neighborliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of states and respect for their sovereignty. The Iranian regime’s militaristic adversarial politics clash with the conservative policies of the Gulf States, with Iran depending in its conflict with the Gulf states on what this researcher would define as “tripartite military strength, geographical location, and sectarian factors.” 1.1. At the level of military force, there is an imbalance in the balance of power between the Gulf states and Iran. In accordance with the relevant political literature, the balance of power is achieved when any state or group of states lacks sufficient strength to dominate the region and force the other regional nations into submission to its will. In the absence of such a balance, the dominant state will use its abilities to exercise the coercion and subjugation of its adversaries, whose peoples are then driven to defy that rogue antagonistic power. (3) This formula can be applied to the Gulf states and Iran; we find that there is an imbalance between them, according to the annual report of the International Institute for Strategic Studies for 2015, which stated that the Gulf States’ military forces totaled 368,100 troops, as follows: Saudi Arabia 227 000, Oman 42, 600 United Arab Emirates 63 000, Kuwait 15 500, Qatar 11,800, and Bahrain 8,200. Iran’s armed forces, meanwhile, total 475,000, including 350,000 active military serving troops and 125,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards. (4) Some Gulf States may have superiority over Iran for certain types of weapons, such as the UAE’s Air Force. The previous figures, however, demonstrate the massive gap in the number of serving soldiers, a natural reflection of the vast difference in population sizes; Iran’s population of 80 million is more than twice the populations of all the Gulf States combined, (5) which currently stands at 47.4 million, though this figure includes both citizens and expatriate residents. (6) The absence of a balance of power further reinforces Iran’s concept of itself as a “leader state “, which seeks to dominate the Gulf region to achieve the status of a so-called “Gulf Policeman”. This pushes the Gulf States into confronting this attempt
Journal for Iranian Studies
10
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
to dominate the region in order to maintain the regional balance of powers which lasted throughout the 80-plus years between the fall the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 that led to a current massive imbalance in the regional balance of power. (7) 1.2. In terms of geographical location, the Gulf region represents the heart of the Middle East geographically; crossing it overland or via the Euphrates River, one can reach Syria and the Mediterranean Sea or Turkey and the Black Sea through the Tigris River or to Iran and the Caspian Sea and from there to Russia through natural crossings, or even to Afghanistan. Within this region, Iran enjoys strategic advantages as a continental bridge linking the Arabian Peninsula, China, India, Southeast Asia and the area around the Hormuz Strait, through which Gulf oil is exported to the countries of the world. (8) The quantity of oil that passes through the Hormuz Strait daily is generally estimated at around 17 million barrels per day, equivalent to 30% of the total amount of oil transported nautically (9) and controlled by Iran from the north and east and from the south by the Sultanate of Oman. More especially in light of the continued Iranian occupation of the three UAE islands, the Iranian regime now controls the Hormuz Strait completely. 1.3. In the context of the sectarian dimension, meanwhile, given the theocratic nature of the political system and the orientations of the ruling elite, directly reflected in the State’s foreign policy, Iran’s regime is witnessing an internal struggle between the concepts of state and revolution for dominance. By analyzing Gulf-Iranian relations from 1979 up to 2016, we find that the issue of Iran’s selfidentification was strongly framed within the Iranian vision of itself in terms of its neighbors and of the Gulf States. Iran considers itself the ‘Shiite Island’ amid the ‘Sunni ocean’, an ‘ocean’, which has never been an asset to it in its modern incarnation, a point underlined by the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war on the one hand and by the longstanding conflict between the regime and the West on the other. Concerning its theoretical conflict with the West, Iran believes that the Gulf States are currently at their weakest, enabling the Iranian regime to impact the regional interests of Western nations through pressuring the Arab Gulf. To this end, Iran is pursuing a dual policy, adopting a strategy of “cooperative security” towards Asian countries through trade agreements and economic relations, in stark contrast to its “hard security” policy
Journal for Iranian Studies
11
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
shown towards Gulf nations through continuous interference in their internal affairs, and through occupying three UAE islands and threatening to close the Hormuz Strait. The regime is also introducing initiatives aimed not at achieving the security of Arab Gulf but rather at achieving Iran’s expansionist project of regional domination. (10) It should be emphasized that Iranian policy in this regard is not temporary, but is part of the nature and identity of the Iranian political system, embodied by the drafters of the Iranian constitution, who wanted to institutionalize the concept of “Islamic Revolution” itself; as a result, “Exporting the Revolution” is a core concept within the constitution. Initially, a struggle raged between Khomeini, who embraced the concept of institutionalizing the creed of the Jurist Leadership (a heavily fundamentalist Guardianship/Rule of the Jurists (Mullas) and Mahdi Bazargan, whose wide support base included both liberals and Islamists, who wished to model the Iranian constitution along the lines of the French Constitution of Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic so that Iran would be “Islamic” in terms of its name and democratic in terms of content. However, the majority supported Khomeini’s version when a fateful referendum on the constitution was held, with 99% of the voters choosing his form of the Iranian Republic. It should be noted that 20 million voters out of a total electorate of 21 million participated in that referendum. (11) Iran has never stopped its efforts to export its (heavily sectarian) revolution to the Gulf States, via different methods at different historical stages, including the attempted assassination of the Emir of Kuwait in the 1980s by a member of the Tehran-backed Iraqi Dawa Party. While Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani’s opinion was that the revolution would be exported forcibly only be exported by force, in the era of President Mohammad Khatami the export of the revolution was repackaged and garnished with concepts such as dialogue and good neighborliness. Under President Ahmadinejad, the Iranian regime began marketing itself as the defender of the oppressed peoples of the earth. Only in the wake of the election of Obama’s “moderate reformist” favorite, President Hassan Rouhani did Iranian intervention in the affairs of neighboring countries Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon become explicit and brutal; along with the military interventions and support of proxies in those countries, many Hezbollah and Iranian regime espionage cells have been uncovered in some Gulf States. (12)
Journal for Iranian Studies
12
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
Second: Gulf-Iranian conflict issues: 2.1. The borders: At the forefront of border issues in the Gulf region is Iran’s occupation of three islands - Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs - belonging to the UAE. All of the legal and historical evidence confirms that these islands are owned by the United Arab Emirates with no counter-argument based on legal valid principles and convincing, compelling evidence presented by the Iranian occupiers; this lack of any convincing argument to support its claims explains Iran’s refusal to refer the case to an international court for arbitration. Despite the islands’ small size, they have massive strategic importance, given their position in the narrow stretch of the Arabian Gulf leading to the Hormuz Strait and then towards the Gulf of Oman, with most of the Gulf’s oil exports and non-oil imports passing through this route. There are also ongoing disputes over ownership of the sites of a number of offshore oil and gas fields in the Arabian Gulf, including a dispute between Kuwait and Iran over the Dura oilfield, a roughly triangular area of the Gulf, most of which is located in the coastal area between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Whilst Iran. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia reached a supposedly binding agreement on their maritime borders in 2000, the Iranian regime has escalated the dispute with Kuwait over the Dura field by introducing two projects for foreign companies to develop the oilfield for Iran, ignoring Kuwait’s objections, the oilfield’s location and the delineation of the continental shelf in the waters of the Gulf between the two countries. Tehran’s actions prompted the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs to summon the Iranian Charge d’Affaires in Kuwait and deliver a letter of protest concerning these moves. (13)
While noting that Iran has been the instigator of these problems, Kuwait is keen
on the peaceful resolution of such disputes. In this context, we should also note the announcement by the spokesperson of the Iranian Shura Council’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Nowzar Shafiei, in which he announced “the end of the problems relating to the demarcation of the maritime border with the Sultanate of Oman.” The Iranian regime aims to use the Sultanate of Oman as a transit point in the Gulf for Iranian companies targeting the African and Asian markets after the lifting of international sanctions. (14)
Journal for Iranian Studies
13
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
2.2. Regional Role: According to the standard geopolitical model put forward by David Myers, the inability of the major powers to exert full control over the world’s regions has provided an opportunity for regional countries to exercise hegemonic aspirations, which formerly remained within the geographical boundaries. According to Myers’ model, these powers fall into three categories, first, there is the prominent regional state, which dominates or aspires to dominate and which has or is in the process of acquiring sufficient power to control the region – in this case, this is Iran. The second power in this model is the compromising or interventionist forces, in this case, “all the Western powers that have substantial interests in the Gulf region,” and which possess both sufficient force to make the dominant or would-be hegemonic power’s expansionist efforts prohibitively costly to it, and the power both to bargain and to exert the same or greater military force than that of the dominant force. The third category in this model is the balancing power such as the Gulf States, powerful existing forces within the regional system that are often co-opted by one or both of the other two aforementioned powers, therefore holding the balance in the regional system largely on the strength of their abilities. (15) While it should be acknowledged that this theory has formulated regional and international interactions across different historical periods, following the signing of the nuclear agreement in July 2015 and the consequent accord between the US and Iran, Washington chose to overlook the Iranian regime’s hostile policies toward the Gulf states. This meant that there is a change in the criteria of this geopolitical theory model, with the objectives of both the dominant and interventionist powers dovetailing, posing existential challenges for the Arab Gulf States, with Iran seeking to exercise a regional role far beyond the basic principles stipulated by international conventions. It should be emphasized that the Gulf States do not oppose Iran playing a regional role, but feel that such a role should be based on trust and measures between the two sides, particularly through ending the gap between words and deeds, and more importantly introducing real Iranian initiatives to end the outstanding issues with the Gulf States. (16) Iran has been able to exploit regional developments to enhance its regional influence through two separate phases: The first phase, after 1990, saw regional security become a primary determinant in the structure of global security in a manner markedly different to previous
Journal for Iranian Studies
14
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
historical epochs, thus Iran has been able to achieve the first of three objectives, namely continuing to intervene in the affairs of regional neighboring countries to such an extent that Iran has become both a key part of the problem and part of the solution simultaneously. The second is in Iran’s learning from the experience of Iraq with the international community in disputes over weapons of mass destruction, with Iran not reaching the edge of the abyss as Saddam did, either with the International Atomic Energy Agency or with the United States. Thirdly, Iran has deployed its oil and gas resources to build and enhance excellent relations with Asian countries, including Russia, despite international sanctions previously imposed by the international community. (17) The second phase, post-2011 with the transformations and various developments of the Arab Spring and the aftermath, marked a fundamental shift in the rules of the game and the regional balance of power, both in changing regimes in some Arab countries or in the emergence of armed groups without the state seeking to break up the unified national state sovereignty and igniting large-scale conflict in Arab countries. This has paved the way for Iran to develop political strategies to fill the regional void, whether relying on soft power through “attempts to influence the Shiites” in the Gulf States, or “hard power” in relying on the Revolutionary Guards in promoting Iran’s regional role by open and systematic forms of support for the Syrian regime. These Iranian policies, however, including the incitement of sectarianism and raising the possible spectra of dividing or breaking up Syria, will ultimately lead to major domestic problems and pose a grave threat to Iran’s own national security in light of the enforced homogeneity of Iranian society itself, with Iran being comprised of different ethnic groups. (18) Iran’s massively destructive regional policies have led not only to tension at the official and diplomatic level but also to the emergence of a popular backlash against the Iranian regime amongst the Gulf and wider Arab public. This was reflected in a 2015 survey of 860 prominent individuals representing the Arab intellectual elite in 21 Arab countries, including the Gulf States. Conducted during a period following the signing of the nuclear deal between September 30 and November 30, 2015 , the survey found that 89 percent of respondents rated Arab-Iranian political relations as generally bad, with 28 percent of this number categorizing relations as ‘Very Bad’ and 61 percent as simply ‘Bad’, while only eight percent of respondents categorized them as good and a measly one percent rated relations as ‘Very Good’. Only three percent of those surveyed gave no answer to this question. On the
Journal for Iranian Studies
15
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
subject of regional security, 87 percent of respondents rated current levels as ‘Bad’ (with 43 percent categorizing the situation as ‘Very Bad’ and 44 percent as simply ‘Bad’), with 10 percent rating regional security as ‘Good’ (and one percent amongst this number as ‘Very Good’), while a further four percent gave no response. (19) 2.3. Conventional armament and the Iranian nuclear program The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a turning point, not only for Iraq but also for the regional security of the Gulf, with the invasion inflicting a massive imbalance in the balance of power as the United States erroneously conflated the hostility of the Iraqi regime with that of the Iraqi state itself. With Iraq out of the regional balance equation and Iran’s role massively strengthened, the Iranian regime nevertheless feared that it would probably be the next target after the overthrow of the former Iraqi regime. (20) It should be noted, however, that, even before this, the regime always believed that the development of conventional arms is a strategic necessity to maintain its theocratic rule: A. Traditional Armament: In this context, we find that Iran attaches and devotes great importance to developing the traditional military forces; however, that has not meant absolute superiority over the Gulf. At a time when Iran occupies twenty-third place globally in terms of military power, we find that Saudi Arabia stands at number 28. Considering the total number of personnel in Iran’s armed forces, however, it is unquestionable that Iran is militarily superior to all the other GCC countries combined. Iran also has a massively superior weapons arsenal, as well as possessing the fourth largest naval fleet in the world with 440 vessels. Iran also possesses the fourth largest submarine fleet globally, with 32, while the Gulf States have no submarines at all. On the other hand, however, the Gulf States are clearly superior to Iran in military air power, especially in possessing fourth generation American and British-made fighter aircraft. At a time when Iran is classified as the fourth most powerful country in the world in terms of missile development after the United States, Russia and China, we find that the Gulf States possess American missile batteries, which could repel ballistic missiles at a range between 50 and 100 km. (21) It should also be noted that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE have gained the ability to design and modernize military vehicles, communications, and electrical systems and to carry out maintenance of its military arsenal, as well as implementing so-called “start” programs, which include the transfer of
Journal for Iranian Studies
16
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
defense technology, with both countries expected to occupy a privileged position among the top twenty global market for these programs by the beginning of the next decade. (22) B. Conventional armament: given the murkiness and uncertainty surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, the Gulf countries have justifiably raised fears and concerns for many reasons on this issue. As noted in a report from the US’ Security and International Science Institute, prepared by David Albright, president of the Center for Science and Security, who has previously worked with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Andrea Striker, a researcher who specializes in nuclear research, the United States has allowed secret loopholes and exemptions for Iran in the nuclear deal, with one of those gaps allowing Iran to keep some 300 km of low-enriched uranium at 20% in the form of solid waste, liquid waste and flammable waste without determining the amount exempted from that waste, (23) taking into account the case of the Iran –America agreement which were expected to continue until after the results of the 2016 US presidential election. In addition to its entanglement in the complexity of regional developments, the nuclear deal goes beyond being a technical matter but is part of a regional system currently being shaped internationally to marginalize the role of the Gulf States, with Iran and the global powers battling to restructure the region. (24) In addition, the Gulf States justifiably fear Iran’s commitment to the implementation of the deal according to the agreed terms, especially given the possibility of changes within the domestic Iranian political environment, which could see the rise of more fundamentalist hard-liners in Iran. These fears are further magnified by the current debate over a successor to the present Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in light of his failing health, with the transfer of power within the Iranian political system a complex equation with potentially massive impact on crucial decisions, or in terms of the continuing regional instability which pushes Iran to rethink the strategic value of nuclear weapons in terms of deterrence in the face of Iran’s current or future perceptions of threat. (25) Third, the Gulf States and managing conflict with Iran 3.1. Features of the regional and international geopolitical environment on Gulf-Iranian conflict: On the level of the regional geopolitical environment, in the wake of the transformations shaking the Arab world since 2011 Iran began to exploit these
Journal for Iranian Studies
17
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
transformations to serve its expansionist agenda, whether by trying to fill the regional void or through the support of its regional armed militias in neighboring countries under the pretext of the ‘War on Terror’. This regional expansionism has now reached an extent that the deputy representing Tehran city on the Iranian Shura Council, speaking about the regime’s regional interventions, said, “Three Arab capitals are now in Iran’s hands and affiliated to the Iranian revolution,” (26) adding that “Sanaa is the fourth capital which is on its way to join the Iranian revolution.” The catastrophic situation in Syria is perhaps the most obvious demonstration of Iranian intervention, with the leadership in Iran believing that supporting Assad’s regime is politically and ideologically crucial for Tehran. Iran also views Syria as the only Arab country that supported the Tehran regime during the Iran-Iraq war, with various estimates of the number of Revolutionary Guard troops deployed in Syria up Until April 2016, ranging between 6,500 and 9,200 troops with a monthly salary of between $500 to $1,000. (27) On the level of the international geopolitical environment, meanwhile, it is difficult to separate the content and direction of the Gulf-Iran conflict from Washington’s vision of regional security issues generally. The United States still considers Iran to be a key regional player, while Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states see Iran as playing a wholly negative and subversive role, not only in wider regional issues but also within the depth of the Gulf itself, including through its extremist influence on the Shiite community in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The concerns of the Gulf countries were further increased by the United States’ failure to impose sanctions on Iran as a result of its ballistic missile tests in October 2015, just three months after the signing of the nuclear deal, despite such tests being a clear violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 on the nuclear deal itself and of the ban on Iran of undertaking such action of missile experiments of this kind. Rather than allay these fears, White House spokesman Josh Earnest gave further reason for them, saying, “The United States will not be subject to pressure from any country to impose economic sanctions on Iran,” and adding, “We know that this type of financial sanctions have an impact in facing Iran’s ballistic missile program, but we will impose the sanctions at a time we choose.” (28) Concerns have been raised about the possible existence of a secret agreement between the United States and Iran, which would allow Iran to operate outside the
Journal for Iranian Studies
18
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
control of IAEA as this agency has been permitted only to examining soil samples in Iran to assess Iran’s nuclear efforts. Among the terms of the nuclear agreement, the United States also released massive sums of money, amounting to $US 400 billion, which has been delivered to Iran in Euros as cash. This deal also included the release of a number of the American prisoners detained in Iran. A core question that arises, if the nuclear deal was as strong as the White House claimed, why did the US administration resort to secret side deals? The answer is straightforward; Iran threatened to cancel the agreement if the economic sanctions were not immediately lifted, which was impossible to achieve within that time frame. (29) Despite the eagerness of President Barack Obama to hold a submit with the Gulf States in Riyadh in April 2016 in the wake of the Camp David summit of 2015, with the intention of both summits being to reassure the Gulf states on the nuclear deal and its implications for the security of the Arabian Gulf, neither the 2015 or 2016 summit produced tangible results, either for the security of the Gulf in general or in terms of US commitments to deter Iran. It is also difficult to confidently predict any change in American politics in the wake of the 2016 presidential elections; if Hillary Clinton had won, the US would probably not have adopted any strict measures towards Iran, and even with Trump’s victory his negative comments against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia confirm the absence of radical change in future US policies toward the Kingdom or the Gulf region generally states. Complaints about an “alliance” between the United States and the Gulf countries have been raised and used repeatedly by all the American elites and are a favorite trope of US media, both mainstream and ‘alternative’, more especially given the importance of the Gulf’s relations with the US. However, the evidence actually confirms that the US’ partnerships and alliances in the Middle East are founded with Turkey, Israel and NATO rather than Arab Gulf states. Genuine alliances should be based on a mutual defense treaty binding to all parties concerned, something, which the US has never realized or achieved with the Gulf States. This means that the precise characterization of that relationship is a temporary “partnership” rather than an “alliance” or “coalition”, with the international intervention to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991 unlikely to be repeated , and relations unlikely to return to that high point again, given the changing sources of risk and the lack of a defense pact committing the United States to intervene. (30)
Journal for Iranian Studies
19
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
All these factors mean that the United States must reconsider its relations with the Gulf countries by considering the introduction of new multilateral defense initiatives rather than a bilateral formula, i.e. Drawing up initiatives between the United States and the Gulf states collectively rather than as individual entities. Washington should also realize the critical importance of supporting the defense capabilities of the Gulf in the presence of international competitors in the region, including France and Russia. (31) On the other hand, whilst it may not be correct to claim that the age of hostilities between the United States and Iran has fully ended, the Iranian regime’s regional expansion continues unabated, as the sanctions mechanism alone will be insufficient to deter Iran, given the leadership’s eagerness to develop its economic relations with both China and Russia. These considerations mean that the USA needs to consider strategies to counteract this and to consider other mechanisms, placing an emphasis on the importance of rebuilding US-Saudi relations. (32) While it’s possible that the Trump administration won’t resort to the use of military force in dealing with regional crises, especially while there is still public concern in the United States on US military interventions abroad, the United States should play a key role in achieving a regional balance of power; the greater the United States’ desire to reduce the impact of the Iranian regime’s regional activities the more partners it will have, not only in containing Iran’s expansionism, but in dealing with terrorist groups, which are themselves often affiliated overtly or covertly with Tehran. (33) On a related issue, Russia’s entry into regional interactions in the wake of its military intervention in Syria in 2014 is an important variable within the overall regional conflict, whereby Iran may be seeking to instigate US-Russian conflict within the so-called “new Cold War” to strengthen its regional role. However, the extent of Iran’s ability to take advantage of this new situation remains contingent on the vision of both the United States and Russia regarding the regional role of Iran; it is difficult to say that there is a shared Russo-American understanding of that role because there is a possibility that such a role would turn Iran into a regional power which threatens the strategic interests of both superpowers. It’s possible, however, that both the United States and Russia will ultimately deal with the realities of the current situation concerning Iran by deeming the Iranian regime both part of the problem and part of the solution simultaneously, and agreeing on an optimum level for Iran’s regional role so as not to threaten their own regional or international
Journal for Iranian Studies
20
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
interests. This new equation confirms the declining interest in the United States political establishment in the idea of overthrowing the Iranian regime, suggesting that the Obama administration’s insistence on the signing of the nuclear agreement is consistent with Russia’s vision of security in the Arabian Gulf region in general, with the USA’s new stance based on several principles, including the need to resolve problems peacefully as well as resolving the regional security problems starting with the most crucial components, including the nuclear proliferation. The bottom line is that in assessing how Iran has benefited from the opportunities offered by the regional and international geopolitical climate, one must take into account that the Gulf region is only part of other overlapping circles of interest which converge and intersect with US-Russian interests, in addition to other issues between the two countries including the disarmament of conventional arms. Meanwhile, any potential US-Russian conflict in the region is always described as a disciplined conflict with neither prepared to sacrifice any of their own or the other’s interests and ignite wider conflict for the sake of Iran. (34) 3.2. Gulf strategy for managing the conflict with Iran: The Gulf States have pursued an integrated strategy for the management of the conflict with Iran, incorporating three mechanisms, namely: The first mechanism, to strengthen domestic security and pursue self-sufficiency in security, this deals decisively with Iranian interference in regional nations’ internal affairs through the imposition of punitive judicial verdicts against those accused of spying and linked to Hezbollah in both Kuwait and the UAE. In terms of pursuing self-sufficiency in security, Gulf nations have already made clear progress in this field, with the GCC’s joint defense agreement of 2000 leading to the establishment of the Peninsula Shield forces, which have undergone continuous development and attained experience in several stages, along with the establishment of the GCC unified military command. The announcement of the establishment of the Gulf States Maritime Security Group 81 was an important step, not only to confront the Iranian naval threat but as a means of strengthening the defensive capabilities of the proposed Gulf Union. (35) In addition to this, work is already underway on creating a Gulf-wide missile shield. This was mentioned recently by Maj. Gen. Khalifa Hamad Al Kaabi, the Assistant Secretary-General for Military Affairs in the GCC, who said, “There is a competent
Journal for Iranian Studies
21
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
and specialized Gulf committee studying sophisticated means to protect the security of the Gulf that is though the missile shield project, but the Council may need help from allies and friendly countries in this regard, since (the project) is still in the early stages.” (36) In this context, some estimates indicate that Gulf states may need to deploy 55 Patriot missile batteries, with the possibility of six batteries of the “Thad” system and a merger between the two systems to increase efficiency in order to confront any risks posed by an Iranian missile system, with the range of Iran’s stockpile of ballistic missiles being between 200-300 kilometers for the Shahab 1 and 2,while the regime’s estimated 100 Shahab 3 missiles have a range of 1,300 to 1,600 kilometers and its Fateh 500 missile system has a range of 200 kilometers. (37) In addition to the joint military exercises between the Gulf countries, which began with the ‘Northern Thunder’ maneuvers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and have continued through joint naval exercises between the Gulf Cooperation Council (Union 18) with the participation of the Royal Bahraini Navy and Marine weapons of the Gulf Cooperation Council and that the territorial waters of the Kingdom of Bahrain and ending with the joint exercises of (Arabian Gulf Security 1). It is worth mentioning that the total defense spending of the Gulf Cooperation Council for the year 2015 totaled $ 115 billion as follows: Saudi Arabia 81.9, Bahrain 1.53, 1.3 Kuwait, Oman, 3.8, 11, Qatar, the UAE and 15.8 in return Iran is spending between $ 16 and $ 25 billion in the same year. (38) The second mechanism, the establishment and diversification of regional and international partnerships, where Saudi Arabia announced the establishment of the Saudi – Turkish Strategic Coordination Council, and held a ministerial joint meeting for Turkish- Gulf Dialogue in Riyadh in October 2016 after a four-year break, maybe the Saudi Kingdom and the Gulf States felt that in light of plummeting confidence in the United States as a traditional partner and the weakening of the Arab regional system, they needed to partner with a regional ally with significant geopolitical weight such as Turkey to curb Iran’s growing influence in the absence of the ability of the traditional “Egypt-Syria-Iraq” triangle which would have dealt with this in the past. Turkey has been an important source of support for the Kingdom, not least because the Turkish army is the second strongest military power in NATO. In light of Turkey’s reliance on Russia and Iran to meet 80% of its energy requirements, Saudi Arabia could be an important substitute.
Journal for Iranian Studies
22
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
In addition to the Syrian crisis and the prospects for this spiraling into further chaos, with the worst scenarios representing a common challenge for both the Saudi Kingdom and Turkey. (39) At the level of international alliances despite the efforts of the Gulf states to head east, “China-India-Japan”, the Gulf states also have excellent relations with Russia and could benefit from the Russian presence in the region, which has seen the establishment of a Russian military fulcrum in Syria through its naval and air bases in Tartus. The third mechanism, deterring Iran via the “military intervention model in Yemen,” the GCC realizes the strategic importance of Yemen, given its strategic depth for Gulf security in general and the security of the Kingdom of Saudi in particular. The Houthis declaration in September 2014 that they had entered the capital Sanaa and seized power without facing any resistance, followed by their capture of the strategic port of Hodeida later the same year posed massive challenges to the Gulf States’ national and regional security. This was underlined by the Houthis’ alliance with the Iranian regime, which has provided assistance and support on both the military and political levels, with the Houthis and Iran signing an agreement on February 28, 2015, which saw Iran, add 28 new weekly flights from Iran to Yemen. Saudi Arabia immediately realized the risks of direct Iranian presence on its southern border with Yemen and the possibility of reproducing another hostile Hezbollah-type Iranian proxy there, with the sectarian incitement having major negative repercussions on security. Yemen has massive strategic importance, given its position overlooking the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, a vital conduit for energy and trade, with 25,000 ships passing through this channel annually, equivalent to seven percent of the total global maritime traffic and around 40% of total world oil supply. In the event of Iran controlling the entire Strait of Hormuz from its northernmost to its southernmost point, the Gulf states would be left entirely powerless and dependent on Tehran. In the light of the collapse of the Yemeni state institutions and their inability to deal with the Houthi group following the takeover, Saudi Arabia announced the formation of an Arab coalition consisting of nine countries, namely Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan, to support the legitimacy of the elected Yemeni government, with Saudi Arabia playing the biggest role in the air operations against the Houthis. These actions took place at the direct request of the Yemeni President, who asked the other Gulf States to intervene, with action supported by UN Security Council Resolution 2216, issued in April 2014 in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter
Journal for Iranian Studies
23
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
of the United Nations. (40) Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, which is around 1900 km long in total, is an important smuggling destination for Iranian weapons for the Houthis where Iran has rented several islands in Eritrea as fulcrums and the starting point to support the Houthis which prompted Saudi Arabia to announce its efforts of signing a military agreement with Djibouti that includes the establishment of a Saudi military base in Djibouti for the transfer the lines of defense of the national security of the Kingdom and the Gulf states outside the scope of the Yemeni crisis. (41) Djibouti’s ambassador confirmed this to the Kingdom by saying “that his country is looking forward to signing a Saudi agreement to create a Saudi military base on the territory of Djibouti.” (42) Fourth: The future of the GCC-Iran conflict: Proceeding from the complexity that characterizes the contents and paths of GCC-Iran conflict, as well as being not an instantaneous conflict but it extends across many historical periods, all the data confirm beyond any doubt that no signs of the possibility of harmony by Iran with the regional environment in accordance with the provisions of the international conventions, and therefore can talk about the three scenarios of that conflict are as follow: 4.1. Confrontational scenario (the outbreak of military confrontation) With the intensification of the conflict in the Gulf-Iranian Currently sometimes raised the idea of direct military confrontation but that it seems unlikely, at least in the near term for several reasons: First: Gulf states in general and Saudi Arabia does not seek military confrontation and in this context it should be noted of the Saudi Crown statement and the defense minister, Prince Mohammad Ibn Salman said, “the war between Saudi Arabia and Iran means the beginning of a major disaster in the region and it will be reflected strongly on the rest of the world. And we certainly will not allow that to happen.” (43) Second: through the analysis of the previous Iranian strategies in dealing with regional conflicts we find that they still maintain their forces and capabilities for the last moment and rely on “ deterrence with skepticism or deterring with doubt strategy”, meaning that as long as the other party casts doubt on nature of Iran’s conventional and non-conventional military capabilities, that in itself would be enough to achieve deterrence, according to the view of Iran in this regard. Third: the outbreak of military confrontation in the Gulf region will not only be developed regionally under the containment the region on the strategic interests
Journal for Iranian Studies
24
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
of major powers, but it may require intervention on the part of those forces, and then the fundamental question is interfering with those major powers will be with or against whom? On the other hand, the interests and positions of regional countries towards the Arabian Gulf region must take into consideration and as such the confirmation of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi who stated, “The Arab national security and the Gulf are an integral part of Egypt’s national security”. (44) “As well as Pakistan’s army chief said, “Islamabad will respond to any conspirator and any territorial threat posing to Saudi Arabia.” (45) 4.2. The conciliatory scenario (dialogue) By analyzing Gulf official discourse, we find that the Gulf states did not oppose dialogue with Iran but Iran’s hostile policies towards the Gulf states, which have led to strained relations between the two sides has been limited to those countries to put conditions or rather the requirements for such a dialogue, which for Iran to respect the sovereignty of its neighbors and non-interference in its internal affairs. If there is one possibility of a Gulf-Iranian dialogue, it must determine five key issues to have fruition. First: The foundations of the dialogue, as the Gulf region was and still one of the most strategically important regions in the world has witnessed crises with international dimensions and the disregarding of some of the UN resolutions concerning these, including a crucial UN Security Council resolutions, No. 598, on ending the Iran-Iraq war, and another resolution, No. 2231, on the nuclear deal between Iran and the countries of the 5 + 1, with a question arising from this, viz. are these resolutions sufficient to serve as the foundations of the proposed dialogue, or is there a need for new UN resolutions that would oblige Iran to respect and follow the outcome of any such dialogue? Second: Determining the parties to that dialogue. Although the dialogue will be bilateral between the GCC countries and Iran, it will not be separated from the overall regional issues “Yemen, Lebanon-Syria-Iraq” will be a part of this dialogue, as the Gulf States, along with the three countries of Iran, Iraq, and Yemen, pose the principal parties to regional security. Third: Determining the objectives of the dialogue so as not to be a repeat of Iran’s paradoxical rhetoric, since Iran must declare its real objective and make a paradigm shift away from the concept of “revolution” to the concept of “the state”, which would mark a radical change in its policy towards the GCC countries by resolving outstanding issues.
Journal for Iranian Studies
25
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
Fourth: The timeframe for any such dialogue, whereas we find that Iran has always followed a “buying time” strategy, claiming that it needs more time to “achieve the desired results”, with this tactic giving the regime the ability to procrastinate endlessly about its nuclear programs ever since the Iranian opposition revealed details of the regime’s nuclear programs in 2002 and 2015. Iran has used its massive experience of negotiations to extend any dialogue across years if necessary, even in light of a rapidly changing regional environment, deploying this strategy as a means to promote itself as interacting positively whilst actually continuing with its regional expansionist policies and intensifying a regional cold war. Fifth: A mandatory mechanism for implementing the dialogue outcomes. Assuming that the Gulf States and Iran will reach understandings on controversial and regional issues, there are questions over which mechanism would be used to ensure Iran’s compliance with its obligations, and over what the Gulf States’ options would be if Iran reneged on its commitments. (46) 4.3. The continuation of the current situation “the case of push and pull.” Where each party has been working on deploying both soft and hard power in pursuit of their objectives and to counter the adversaries’ efforts, the effectiveness of these tools is based on three factors. These are: First: The extent of continuation of the current regional crises and how these might be reflected in any Gulf-Iranian conflict. Second: Developments inside Iran demonstrate the close link between the Iranian foreign policy and domestic conditions, with the regime attempting to export the crisis and fabricating external crises in an effort to further complicate the situation rather than resolving these problems. Third: The US-Russian conflict and the extent of the related implicit opportunities presented or the diktats of the restrictions imposed in the face of Iran’s regional policies show that this is the most likely scenario ahead. Conclusion: Study results and recommendations: Results: 1. The fundamental dilemma for Iran in its relations with the Gulf States remains the struggle between the concepts of “revolution” and “the state” with the first concept (revolution) prevailing. Amongst other consequences, this means that Iran does not comply (as it is now, nominally doing) with international conventions
Journal for Iranian Studies
26
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
which provide for state sovereignty, independence and non-interference in internal affairs of regional countries. 2. The seismic regional transformations currently taking place in neighboring countries since 2011 to date were not the sources of Iranian -Gulf tensions but simply an overt demonstration of the inevitable results of this confrontational policy, showing that Iran has not stopped and will not stop its principle of exporting the revolution, with this policy assuming a variety of forms since 1979 until now. 3. Gulf-Iranian conflict is closely linked to regional and international circles including the two superpowers, which have an influence on the content of the paths that conflict. 4. Despite the gap in the balance of power between the Gulf States and Iran, the Gulf States have been able to curb Iran’s regional expansionism to some degree to date. 5. The GCC-Iran conflict reflects the fact that the Gulf region is still far from attaining full cooperative security requirements, but what is seen in the hard security indicators omits the establishment of the good neighborly relations between the countries. Recommendations: 1. In a state of chronic aggravation taking place in neighboring countries, as well as the implications of the new US foreign policy, including the relative decline of the regional crises, there is a need for the Gulf States to accelerate the implementation of the defensive aspects of the proposed Gulf Union to achieve a regional balance of power. 2. The Gulf States must confront the Iranian regime’s policies on both the regional and international scale, particularly bearing in mind the presence of a strong and active Iranian regime lobby in the USA, which has been working for several years to tarnish the image of the Gulf Arab nations and to pressurize US decision-making bodies to undermine Gulf interests. 3. There is a need to emphasize and prioritize the Gulf’s central role in resolving regional crises, all of which Iran is a key player and primary aggressor in, viewing all regional conflicts as proxy confrontations with the Gulf countries. The Gulf’s and the region’s security and power depend on the strength of the component bodies created and maintained to defend them.
Journal for Iranian Studies
27
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
REFERENCES (1) Ghazi Dahman: Al-Sira’ Al-Iqleemi: Waqi’ho wa Mustaqbaloh, February 2, 2009, has been restituted from Aljazeera Net: https://goo.gl/KF1EhS 18/2/2009 (2) Martin Griffith and Terry O’Callaghan: Key Concepts in International Relations, Dubai, Gulf Research Center, 2002, pp. 391-389. (3) Paul Robinson: Dictionary of International Security, Abu Dhabi, Emirates Center for Strategic Researches and Studies, 2009, p. 40 (4) The Military Balance (2015, New York: International Institute for Strategic Studies pp. 321, 326, 337, 345, 347, 349, 355. (5) Salih Hmeid: Sukkan Iran Balagu 80 million Tanfeedan Likhitat Khameini, December 27, 2016, has been restituted from Al-Arabiya Net, 27/12/2014, httpa://www.alarabiya.net/a.net/ar/iran (6) Dwal Majlis Al-Ta’awon...Lamhah Ihsa’iah, March 1, 2014, has been restituted from the GCC: https://goo.gl/LI7uCQ (7) Ashraf Mohammad Kishk: Al-Dawr Al-Irani fi Adem Istiqrar Mantiqat Al-Khaleej, Ara’ Hawl Al-Khaleej, Februari 1, 2016, pp. 75-76 (8) Mohammad Sa’eed Idrees: Al-Nizam Al-Iqleemi Lil-Khaleej Al-Arabi, Beirut, Arab Unity Studies Center, 2000, p. 20. (9) Al-Toroq Al-Bahriah Lil-Naft wa Al-Ghas Bil-Sharq Al-Awsat wa Al-Masarat Al-Badeelah, March 27, 2015, has been restituted from Al-Jazeera: http://goo.gl/YY6PNh, 27/3/2015 (10) Ashraf Mohammad Kishk: Al-Dawr Al-Irani fi Adem Istiqrar Mantiqat Al-Khaleej, Ara’ Hawl Al-Khaleej, Februari 1, 2016, pp. 75-76 (11) Arund Ibrahimian wa Majdi Subhi “translated” Tareekh Iran Al-Hadeethah, Kuwait: National Council for Culture and Arts, 2014, pp. 222-223 (12) Ashraf Mohammad Kishk: Al-Alaqat Al-Khaleejiah- Al-Iraniah: Al-Waqi’ wa Afaq Al-Mustaqbal, Manama, Bahrain Center for Strategic, International, and Energy Studies, 2014, p. 16 (13) Kuwait Yahtajj Ala Mashroo’ Irani Litatweer Haql Al-Dorah Al-Nafti, August 26, 2015, has been restituted from The Arab world News: https://arabic.rt.com/news (14) Iran Tahul Mushkilat Al-Hudood Al-Bahriah Ma’ Saltanat Oman wa tu’amiqan sadaqatuhuma, May 24, 2016, has been restituted from Gulf News: https://goo.gl/5wN2A2 (15) Mohammad Al-Sa’eed Idrees: Dirasah fi Osool Al-Alaqat Al-Dawliah Al-Iqleemiah, Cairo, Political and Strategic Studies Center, Al-Ihram Establishment, 2001, p. 59 (16) Ashraf Mohammad Kishk: Amn Al-Khaleej fi Al-Ro’ya Al-Iraniah, Al-Siasah Al-Dawliah April 1, 2014, p. 43 (17) Ashraf Mohammad Kishk: Alaqat Iran Al-Dawliah,2014, Mohammad Mjahid Al-Zaiyat wa Nevin Abdulmin’im Mus’ad (Editors): Islamic Republic of Iran: Survey Study, Cairo, Arab Research and Studies Institute, Arab League, p. 311 (18) Emanuel Karagiannis: The Rise of Iran as a Regional Power: Shia Empowerment and its limits, 2016, reinstituted from NATO Magazine: https://goo.gl/u1QzSK (19) Fatimah Smadi: Survey, Iran fi Mizan Al-Nukbah Al-Arabia, January 20, 2016, https://goo.gl/DGIw72, date of arrival October 22, 2016 (20) Kishk, A. M. (2014). Iraq and the security Situation in The Gulf Region. Cambridge: Gulf Research Center p. 43 (21) Zafir Mohammad Al-Ajami: Al-Tawazon Al-Askari Baina Dwal Al-Khaleej wa Iran, Ara’ Hawl Al-Khaleej, September 1, 2015, p. 10 (22) Y.Saab, B. (2014). The Gulf Industrialization In Saudi Arabia. New York: Atlantic Council (23) Wathiqah Sirryah Hawl Al-Malaf Al-Nawawi Al-Irani Turbic Al-Mujtama’ Al-Dawli, July 10, 2016, has been reinstituted from Middle East newspaper: 693711, https://goo.gl/hy8n3F
Journal for Iranian Studies
28
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The GCC and Iran Conflicts and Strategies of Confrontation
(24) Ashraf Mohammad Kishk: Khayarat Majlis Al-Ta’awon Al-Khaleeji Tijah Al-Siasah Al-Iraniah, Al-siasah Al-Dawliah, July1, 2016, p. 74 (25) Ellen Laipson: The Iranian Nuclear Deal: Analysis and Evaluation, Hasanein Tawfiq (editor) Jeddah, The Gulf Research Center, 2016, p. 174 (26) Mas’ool Irani: San’a Rabi’ Asma Arabia Tabi’a lana, September 22, 2014, has been reinstituted from Arabi21, https://www.arabi21.com/:21 (27) Pantucci, A. B. (2016). Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict. London: Royal United Services Institute.pp. 4-5 (28) Osamah Abu Rashid: Alkilaf Al-Ameriki Al-Saudi wa Alalaqah Ma’ Iran, Doha, Arabian Center for Researches and Political Studies, 2016, p. 4 (29) A.Thiessen, M. (2016). Another secret Iran deal exposed. Washington Dc: American Enterprise Institute. (30) Saab, B. (2016, April 12). The United States Has No Gulf Allies. Retrieved from foreign Affairs https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2016-04-12/united-states-has-no-gulf-allies (31) Jeffrey Martini, B. W. (2016). The Outlook for Arab Gulf Cooperation. Retrieved from Rand: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1429.html (32) Pantucci, A. B. (2016). Understanding Iran’s Role in the Syrian Conflict. London: Royal United Services Institute pp. 6-7. (33) Denis Ross, November 1, 2016, Balance of Power in the Middle East, has been reinstituted from the Middle East: http://aawsat.com/home/article/774546 (34) Ashraf Mohammad Kishk: Darorat Altaqarub Al-Irani Al-Rossi wa Ta’theeroh ala Amn Al-Khaleej, Ara’ Hawl Al-Khaleej, January 1, 2016, pp. 90-91 (35) Obeid Al-Suhaimi: Dwal Al-Khaleej Tabda’ fi Tashkeel Qwah Bahria ala Ghirar Der’ Al-Jazeera, October 16, 2014, has been reinstituted from the Middle East: https://goo.gl/vrQlu5 (36) Fahad Alta’awon, February 25, 2016, has been reinstituted from the Middle East in November 2016: https://aawsat.com/home/article (37) Obeid Al-Suhaimi: Taqreer Istrateegi Yarsum Khayarat Dwal Al-Khaleej Limwajahat Khatar Alzawareek Al-Iraniah, October 27, 2016, has been reinstituted from the Middle East: http://aawsat.com/home/article (38) Cordesman, A. H. (2016). Saudi Arabia and the United: Common Interests and Continuing Sources of Tension. Washington DC: Center For Strategic and International Studies.p. 9 (39) Altaqarub Alsaudi- Alturkey: Alkhalfyat wa Aldawafi’ wa Alafaq, Doha, Arabian Center for Researches and Political Studies, 2016, p. 6 (40) Ali Aldeen Hilal: Asifat Alhazm: Altadaworat wa Altada’iat, Hassanein Tawfiq (editor), 2016, Al-Khaleej fi Aam 2015-2016, Riyadh, Al-Khaleej Research Center, pp. 192-200 (41) Ashraf Mohammad Kishk: Madheeq Bab Al-Mandeb: Nuqtat Tamas Istrateegia Lil’amn Al-Khaleeji, Ara’ Hawl Al-Khaleej, October 1, 2016, pp. 90-92 (42) Fahad Al-Diabi: Djibouti Turahib Bi’insha’ Qaedah Askaryah Saudiah ala Aradeeha, March 8, 2016, has been reinstituted from the Middle East: http://aawsat.com/home/article (43) Deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Prince Mohammad Ibn Selman: Alharb ma’ Iran Karithah walan Nasmah Biha, January 9 2016, has been reinstituted from Al-Arabiya net: http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/saudi-today/2016/01/08 (44) Al-Sisi: Alamn Alqawmi Al-Arabi wa Al-Khaleej Joz’ la Yatajaza’ min Alamn Alqawmi Al-Masri, September 8, 2016, has been reinstituted from Al-Haya: http://www.alhayat.com/Articles/17275647 (45) Pakistani Army Leader: Ai Muta’amir ala Al-Saudia Yajib an Yahsib Hisab Alrad Al-Pakistani, January 1, 2016, has been reinstituted from the Middle East: http://aawsat.com/home/article/ (46) Ashraf Mohammad Kishk, Iran’s regional role and its effect on the security of the Arabian Gulf countries, Cambridge: Gulf Research Center, 2016,pp. 41-44.
Journal for Iranian Studies
29
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future Mohammed Alsulami (PH.D.) Head of the Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies
Abd Elraouf Elghonemi Political Researcher at the (AGCIS)
INTRODUCTION
H
istorical and contemporary studies have shown that expansionist and imperialist powers follow certain interim procedures and policies to extend their power and influence within their dynamic regional and international domains to achieve their expected goals.
Nevertheless, the case is different for Iran as an expansionist power. The victory of the Iranian revolution in 1979 on the basis of Shiite doctrine was a turning point in Iranian foreign policy. The new, post-revolutionary Iranian leaders aimed at politicizing Shiite ideology and shaped Shiite geopolitics as a tool to carry out the supreme Iranian strategy of rebuilding its supposed historic empire. This study presents an analysis of the present and future of the Shiite geopolitical strategy as a tool in achieving the Iranian regime’s expansionist objectives since 1979. It focuses on the emergence of the expansionist Shiite geopolitical strategy since the fall of Iraq in 2003 as a turning point in the concept of ‘exporting the revolution’ and how the theory of Umm Al-Qura has been transformed into a geopolitical doctrine deployed by the regime in its pursuit of regional and international hegemony, especially over the Arab region.
Journal for Iranian Studies
30
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
Specifically, this study aims to answer the following questions: 1. What are the future of Shiite geopolitics in light of the current regional events, widespread crises, and newly established alliances in the Middle East region? 2. Will new conflicting Shiite Geopoliticss emerge in the Sunni and Arab countries as a result of the expansion of Shiite geopolitics? 3. Is Iran able to accomplish the successful transformation of the ill-fated and already devastated region into an area ruled by Shiite geopolitical doctrine? 4. How have the targeted countries changed as a result of Iranian geopolitics? 5. In the case of emergence of new regional and international alliances, will this force the Iranian regime to end its expansionist ambitions or is Iran now a superpower that can proceed within its aggressive policies toward the targeted countries? Methodology The methodology of this study has been based on analysis of the “Iranian State.” It focuses on current events and the regime’s practices through analyzing its philosophy and component parts and evaluating the information obtained in order to identify the points of strength and weakness and explore the future of the Shiite geopolitical doctrine. In light of its methodology, this study is divided into six parts: 1. A general theoretical approach defining geopolitics, analyzing the difference between Political Geography and Geopolitics, if there is any, or to assess whether they refer to the same feature, as well as examining other geopolitical concepts such as Lebensraum, Dynamic Domain, and geographic barriers. 2. Definition and foundations of Shiite geopolitics 3. The dynamic domain of Shiite geopolitics 4. The motivations of the Iranian regime’s strategy shift toward utilizing Shiite geopolitics after the failure to successfully export the revolution and implement the Umm Al-Qura theory. 5. Analyzing the tools and techniques of the shift toward the Shiite geopolitics in the Iranian strategy such as Soft Shiism, Hard Shiism, and merging the Shiite militias within the regimes of the targeted countries. 6. An unbiased assessment of the Shiite geopolitics.
Journal for Iranian Studies
31
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
I. Theoretical Approach of Geopolitics Geopolitics aims to study the impact of the political behavior of a country’s decision-makers in efforts to expand beyond its natural geographic boundaries, promote the nation’s interests, and meet its needs for development. By the use of geopolitical strategy, countries seek to expand their influence and, in Iran’s case, to take control over strategically important land areas and fulfill the leadership’s desire to become major players across an extensive region within the framework of their goals and ambitions (1). According to some literature, there is no difference between Geopolitics and Political Geography, with the authors suggesting that both terms refer to the same concept, reflecting a mutual relationship between Geography and Politics. Other analysts argue that the two are completely contrasting concepts: according to this analysis, Political Geography focuses on studying geographic data - size and natural resources such as oil, gas, uranium, waterways, passages, and straits - available in any country and their impact on foreign policy. In other words, it is the way at which the geographic realities affect the position and influence of countries domestically and externally, playing a major role in the balance of power within the nations in question. For example, historically the political geography of Athens allowed it to become a maritime empire and Sparta to become a military power, while political geography has involved other nations in long-term wars and conflicts over history up to the present day, more particularly in the Middle East, a region already fractious, unstable and rife with conflicts (2). Meanwhile, according to this analysis of political geography and geopolitics, geopolitics focuses on the impact of politics on geography. In other words, political geography focuses on reality and facts, while geopolitics is concerned with the abstract academic analysis, primarily devoted to assessing future objectives. In this model, political geographers and decision-makers look at their country as a static unit with internationally recognized borders; most believe in defending and protecting their borders without intervening in or offending their neighboring countries (3). In contrast to this, geopolitical analysts believe in expanding beyond their country’s natural borders, taking control over strategically important land areas, and fulfilling their desire to become major players in a widely spread area within their dynamic domain. In Iran’s case and others, they are driven by sectarian, imperial, pragmatic, or nationalist aspirations to enhance their country’s power and achieve its strategic
Journal for Iranian Studies
32
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
goals of building a superpower regionally and internationally or at least building geographic barriers against any future threat. Because of the geopolitical views of decision-makers, empires and superpowers emerged and wars and conflicts erupted, leading ultimately to the breakdown of the subsequent enlarged empires and unions due to their wars for expansion and strategic depth and the major losses they suffered in lives and material. Based on that assumption, geopolitics is concerned in the following factors: (4) 1. Lebensraum 2. Dynamic Domain 3. External Expansion 4. Geographic Barriers Lebensraum External Expansion
Geopolitical Concerns
Geographical Barriers
Dynamic Domain
The following table explains the differences between Geopolitics and Political Geography Political Geography
Geopolitics
Studies geographical facts and their impact on politics
Studies politics and political decisions and their impact on geography
Analyses a country’s environment objectively
Concerned with the country’s goals and requirements on the international political level
Studies the country as it is
Aims to study the country as it should be
The origin of Geopolitics
Concerned with the country’s position on the international level
Journal for Iranian Studies
33
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
Geopolitics also presents a significant explanation for the twenty-first century’s conflicts of geographic expansion and domination of resources, which is the role played by countries like Russia and Iran in the Middle East region (5). In fact, there are three major sources of regional and international conflict resulting from the Shiite geopolitics: 1. Domination of geographic territories 2. Domination of natural resources 3. Sectarian and ideological hegemony Domination of geographic territories
The Theory of the Conflict according to the Shiite Geopolitics Sectarianand ideological hegemony
Domination of natural resources
In most cases, the shiite geopolitics might come about from ideological, sectarian, or discriminatory motivations, such as Nazism, Fascism, and Zionism, or colonial motivations such as capitalism. Consequently, wars and conflicts break out due to these expansionist ambitions; taking control over strategically important land areas; the attempts of certain countries to occupy others via imperial conquest; the reaction of countries to defend their homeland security, interests, and dynamic domain; and other activities related to shiite geopoliticss (6). II. Definition and Foundations of Shiite Geopolitics 1. Definition of Shiite Geopolitics The term Shiite geopolitics refers to the Iranian regime’s Shiite expansionist political doctrine by which the regime seeks to expand into territory beyond Iran’s natural boundaries within its dynamic domain. Through employing this doctrine, the regime aims to take control over strategically important land areas of interest to Iran and to establish new territorial boundaries to achieve its ultimate goal of expansion, which is the core of the regime’s Shiite geopolitical project since the Iranian revolution in 1979 (7).
Journal for Iranian Studies
34
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
Moreover, the Shiite geopolitical doctrine is a core feature of the general strategic policies drawn up by the Iranian regime’s decision makers, who are fully aware of the sectarian, historical, and pragmatic dimensions within this area. The Iranian leadership adopts the principle of Lebensraum for geographic expansion to promote Iranian interests in the targeted countries and to shape the so-called Shiite Crescent. This can be achieved through ‘Soft Shiism’, which entails strengthening the morale and confidence of the Shiites in countries where they represent a minority, and encouraging Shiite peoples there to politicize, militarize, and integrate into the regimes of countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen where they represent a majority of the leadership to strive towards changing the political formula of these nations to benefit Shia. As a result of implementing these policies, the Iranian regime aims to expand its sphere of influence across the region, stretching from the Syrian and Lebanese coasts on the Mediterranean Sea all the way to the western bank of the Arabian Gulf and heading south to the Arabian Sea, largely under the control of militias that report to and follow the directives of the Iranian regime in these territories (8). The concept of Lebensraum, best known for its use by Hitler in WW2, refers to the land or territory, which a government believes that the nation needs to grow, flourish, and promote its interests in another independent nation in order to have complete control over its components and destiny. Some contemporary examples of Lebensraum are the Iranian presence in Latin America and Africa, the Russian and Chinese role in Syria, and the American presence in Central and East Asia. In addition to that, the American Congress’ discussion of human rights and women’s rights in other countries can arguably be viewed as another form of Lebensraum (9). By analyzing the Iranian regime’s literature concerning the Shiite geopolitical doctrine, it appears that the Iranians differentiate between Shiite geopolitics and the Shiite Crescent. The regime supports the first concept and rejects the second, which it considers -
Journal for Iranian Studies
Helal Alzubaidy, Shiite Crescent, Where to? Source: Iraq News Network
35
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
according to the same literature – to be devilry propagated by the so-called enemies of the Iranian revolution, a theory strengthened by the analysis presented by Professor of Iranian international relations Diako Husseini in an article published in 2014. In his analysis of the regime’s Shiite geopolitical doctrine, Husseini reached two conclusions: the first was that the concept of the Shiite crescent does not conform to Iranian foreign policy and - according to the Iranian regime’s beliefs - contradicts the regime’s oft-cited doctrine of Islamic Unity, with Professor Husseini suggesting that the idea of the Shiite Crescent was devised by enemies of the Iranian Revolution, especially the United States, writing, “Iran is the center of Shiites and [the U.S.] began to incite all Shiite people in the region to use them as a tool to form the Shiite Crescent that extends - according to the Iranian literature - from Amil mountain south Lebanon up to the coasts of the Arabian Gulf, especially the oil-rich territories eastern Saudi Arabia and the Iranian plateau up to the Great Mountains of Khurasan” (10).In other words, the Shiite crescent extends- according to U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski 1977-1981 and King of Jordan Abdullah II - from Lebanon dominated by Hezbollah the Iranian Shiite proxy, via Syria ruled by an Iranian Alawi regime ally acting as an Iranian regime agent, to Iraq ruled by Haider Al-Abadi the Iranian puppet, and to the Arabian Gulf. Based on that assumption, Shiite geopolitics is another term for the Shiite crescent, which has been transformed, under Tehran’s management and direction, into a vital area of power redistribution in the region. In reality, this directly pits Shiites against Sunnis, who reject the reemergence of Shiite theocratic rule and primacy in Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain. In essence, the Iranian regime’s practices reflect its desire to spread antagonism towards Iran since the Shiite crescent is - according to the Iranian regime literature - far from the regime’s thoughts. Husseini’s second conclusion is that this concept aligns with regime policies because, in his words, “Shiites are influenced by the circumstances and concepts that accompanied the Iranian revolution in 1979 to restore their identity and citizenship rights, and reshape the neighboring countries’ regimes in compliance with the Shiite concepts of justice and struggle against oppression of tyrants, which align with the international values and democratic principles.” In fact, the principle of Shiite geopolitical supremacy targets all Muslim countries, aiming nominally to unify the entire world’s Muslims, thus validating the regime’s support of Hamas, the Sunni Palestinian group that resists Israeli oppression and struggles for retrieval of the occupied lands. Hence, the Shiite Geopolitics targets the sectarian identity but not the country, which differs from the first definition presented by the so-called enemies of the Iranian revolution (11).
Journal for Iranian Studies
36
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
The Shiite geopolitical doctrine - according to Iranian regime literature - has gone through three fundamental stages: A.The stage of weakness - from the nineteenth century until the Iranian revolution in 1979 B.The stage of revival - from the Iranian revolution in 1979 until the fall of Iraq in 2003 C.The stage of emergence - from 2003 until now. Shiites represent two-thirds of the Iraqi population. After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, they took control of Iraq, assuming a far greater influence over all Shiites in the region and paving the way for Iran to expand its influence as the nexus of the world’s Shiite population. Furthermore, Shiites in the GCC countries increased their demands, influenced by the situation in Iraq (12). Based on the Iranian regime’s view, the Shiite geopolitical doctrine is now a geographic reality, while the Shiite crescent is a false concept devised by the regime’s rivals and regional Sunni rulers in order to preserve their rule, and as an American tool to maintain US influence and presence in the Middle East region (13) . Consequently, the Shiite geopolitical doctrine has again, - according to Iranian regime literature - afforded Iran the following advantages: A. Increased Iranian interference in Arab Affairs B. Increased Iranian influence toward Palestinian groups C. Increased Iranian power and influence against the American policies in the region D. Supporting the oppressed peoples of the region. (14) The same literature also criticizes the concept of the Shiite crescent by reporting a speech by King Abdullah II, in which he supposedly referred to a “Shiite crescent that controls the biggest fossil fuel sources in the world [the area stretching from the Hormuz Strait up to the Caspian Sea], which aims to destroy Israel through Iranian expansion and support of extending field operations of Hamas and Hezbollah”. The article suggests that this is an unrealistic statement, which aims at enhancing rapprochement between the Arab countries, the United States and Europe in order to exert pressure on the Iranian regime on one side, and to oppose the demands for freedom in the Arab world on the other (15). According to the Iranian regime’s literature on the subject, the concept of the Shiite Crescent has resulted in the following: A. Increased sectarian dissent between Shiites and Sunnis B. Deviation of the so-called The Arab Spring Uprisings at the hands of the Sunni rulers in the region C. Deteriorating relations between Iran and some regional countries
Journal for Iranian Studies
37
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
D. Promoting the concepts of ‘Iran-phobia‘ and ‘Shiite-phobia’ in the region E. Increased an arms race in the Arab countries F. Severed national ties between Shiites and Sunnis of Iran The concept of the Shiite crescent - according to the Iranian regime’s literature - is a pretext used by the United States and its allies to achieve their goals in the region, market their military industry in Arab countries, reduce regional pressure on Israel, and exert pressure on the Iranian regime through sanctions, while the Iranian regime (according to itself) regards the Muslim World questions within the framework of the Islamic unity. In an attempt to identify the differences between the Shiite geopolitical concept and the Shiite Crescent in the eyes of the regime, we arrive at the following points: A. Shiite geopolitics is realistic for the Shiite countries in the Middle East region, while the Shiite Crescent is an ideological and intellectual concept created by the West and its regional allies B. Shiite geopolitics would bring harmony and stability, while the Shiite crescent is a temporary issue C. Rapprochement in Shiite geopolitics is realistic, while in the Shiite Crescent it can only be an abstract concept. (16) Theoretically, the Shiite Geopolitics relies on the concept of Lebensraum. The attempts of the Iranian regime’s literature to obscure fact that the Shiite geopolitical doctrine will lead directly to the creation of the so-called Shiite crescent are unreasonable in light of the fact that the Iranian regime has prioritized the concepts of exporting the revolution and (supposedly) supporting the oppressed peoples since the 1979 Iranian revolution. Furthermore, Iran is attempting to obscure the reality of its project and to legitimize its illegitimate practices through concepts like its supposed objectives to build an “Islamic Nation” and to confront Zionist-American tyranny, while in reality it is using these ideas to exploit the region’s Shiite minority in order to fulfill its real expansionist ambitions. 2. Foundations of the Shiite Geopolitics Iranian regime decision makers need certain Shiite geopolitical foundations to implement the regime’s geopolitical strategy and achieve their expansionist ambitions.
Journal for Iranian Studies
38
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
Foundations of Shiite Geopolitics The relative weight Availability of the of the central state sectarian element in the targeted (Iran) countries
Absence of the American role
Emergence of new active Iranian international allies
Awareness of the Iranian decision makers
A.The relative weight of the Central State, Iran has a significant material and non-material power. As well as having a strategic location, vast land mass, extensive coastal areas along the Arabian Gulf and Sea of Oman, and complete control of the Hormuz Strait. Iran has huge oil reserves (158,400 million barrels according to OPEC reports), ranking fourth in the world after Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Canada. It also has significant traditional and non-traditional military power and soft power. These factors are considered major foundations in enhancing the Iranian regime’s ideological expansion in the Sunni sphere and achieving the Iranian goals, borrowing elements of both American capitalism and Russian socialism (17). Iran is a major player in the regional and international political sphere based on the theories formulated by the US ‘Heartland Institute’ think tank, which stated in an article on this subject, “He who takes control of the coasts takes control of Al-Zahir territory and eventually, controls the heart of the world - the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea”(18). Iran also has full control of the Hormuz Strait, the southern passageway to the Arabian Gulf, with the regime harboring ambitions to take control of Shat-Al-Arab, the northern waterway that runs for between 200 and 204 kilometers from its origin at Alqarneh to its estuary in the Arabian Gulf at Ras Albishah south of Fao. In width, the Shat- Al- Arab varies from two kilometers at its widest point to one kilometer near Basra (19). B. Concerning the ideological structure of the targeted regional countries housing Shiite communities, which either follow Iranian scholars’ teachings or are sympathetic to them, followers of the ‘Twelver’ sect make up the largest number of Shia, followed by the Ishmaelite and a small number of Zaidiyyah. The number of Shiites in the world amount is believed to total around 150-200 million representing between ten and 13 percent of the total number of all Muslims worldwide Between 115 million and 135 million of these, around 75 percent of the total, live in Asia, with a further 35-40 million in North Africa representing the
Journal for Iranian Studies
39
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
other 25 percent (20). Most Shiites (68-80%) are concentrated in four countries: Iran, with 60-70 million and Pakistan, India, and Iraq, which collectively host around 90 million. Most Twelver Shiites are concentrated in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain, with significant numbers in Kuwait and Lebanon. They are also concentrated in Katif, Ihssa’, and Medina Monawara in Saudi Arabia, as well as inhabiting other GCC countries, and Pakistan, India, and Central Asian countries. Followers of the Ishmaelite sect are located primarily in Najran in Saudi Arabia and in India, while Zaidiyyah is concentrated in Yemen (21). C.The absence of an American role, The Americans’ regional role declined, allowing the rise of Iran and its allies both regionally and internationally during the tenure of US President Barak Obama from 2009-2016. During this period, America’s international hegemony diminished in the Middle East and in other parts of the world, particularly in comparison to the USA’s major role after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. In fact, the United States is no longer the only major player that can settle regional conflicts and enforce international law. Meanwhile, some Iranian allies have emerged seeking a larger role in the international arena generally and in the Middle East in particular. Russia, the strongest Iranian ally and the largest country on Earth, is located in Eastern Europe on the fringes of the Asian continent and has a large population and long history. It has huge amounts of gas and oil and, most importantly, inherited the legacy of the former Soviet Union and its military and nuclear capabilities. Iran’s second major ally is the Chinese giant, with China now the world’s second-largest economy followed by France and Turkey. Unsurprisingly, the aforementioned factors have positively influenced Iranian geopolitics (22). D.The Iranian decision makers’ perception of the state’s material and nonmaterial capabilities, the sphere of Iranian influence, and the impact of regional and international conditions have paved the way for Iran to become a major player and expand its influence at the expense of the other regional and international nations. The Arab States have tremendous amounts of oil and other natural resources, as well as possessing a rich, millennia-old history and cultural heritage; nevertheless, some Arab decision makers are unaware of the Iranian threat and expansionist ambitions, which reflects the absence of insightful leadership and lack of desire to design an efficient foreign policy, leading to a vacuum which has allowed Iranian influence to grow and intensify in the Arab World (23).
Journal for Iranian Studies
40
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
III. Dynamic Domain of Shiite Geopolitics Geopolitical theories are based on the dynamic domains determined by decision makers based on geopolitical analysis and awareness of their regional and international environment. The Shiite geopolitical strategy resulted from the Iranian leadership’s Fifth Improvement Plan for the year 2003 within the framework of the twenty-year pact, which aims to establish Iran as the major regional power by the year 2025. Precisely, there are three Iranian dynamic domains: 1.The most important dynamic Shiite full-moon map in the Arabian Gulf domain for Iran is its neighboring Source: Al-Tahrir Website countries, communities sharing the same ideology such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Arabian Gulf. According to the Iranian political dictionary, these countries are called the Shiite Badr (Full Moon) (24), which is evident in the speech of Khamenei’s International Affairs Advisor, Ali Akbar Velayati, who said, “The Southern costs of Iran, the Gulf, Hormuz Strait, and Ajman are our strategic borders and of great importance to shape the Shiite Badr (Full Moon).” Specifically, these countries represent the first Shiite geopolitical dynamic domain for the following reasons: A. The ideological structure of these countries inhabiting Shiite groups that swear religious and political allegiance to the Iranian Supreme Leader. Statistics show that Shiites represent 55-60% in Iraq, 20% in Syria, 30% in Yemen, 25-35% in Lebanon, and 55-60% in Bahrain (25). B.The close geographic proximity of these countries facilitates the implementation of the Iranian geopolitical project and expansionist ambitions due to its low cost and freedom of movement. It provides Iran with a variety of choices to respond swiftly in case of any unexpected developments to achieve its goals. C.The absence of a Sunni project to counterbalance the Shiite one has paved the way for Iran to expand its influence in the Arab countries. The Sunni countries are unable or unwilling to react and take decisive action against the Iranian regime’s expansionist ambitions. Their positions vary between those who confront the Iranian
Journal for Iranian Studies
41
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
project discreetly and those who actively support it in one way or another (26). D.There is a notable absence of any central Arab power or Arab project to counter the Iranian regime’s ambitions and other sovereignty projects in the region such as those of Israel and Turkey. The Arab countries are seemingly unaware of the Iranian threat and the regime’s regional ambitions (except for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is exerting efforts and moving within the framework of the Arab and Islamic coalition). On the contrary, since the beginning of the Arab Spring Revolts in 2011, the Middle East has been in a state of turmoil and turned into a fractious, unstable region rife with conflicts, leading to the deterioration of most Arab economies and the decline of their political structure. The Arab region has become fertile soil and shelter for terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, effectively a theater of nonstop violence and hostility. Because of this, the Arab countries have miserably failed to create their own project and enhance their position against the three other regional projects (27). 2. The second Iranian dynamic domain includes Caucasia, Central Asia, Northwest Asia, and the Caucasian Sea. These territories are considered barriers against Russia’s historical expansionist ambitions, as well as serving as ideological supply lines in favor of the Iranian project with their vast amounts of natural resources and economic revenues. However, this domain is a secondary priority for Iran due to its location within the Russian sphere of influence. Iran has subdued its ambitions in these countries due to its alliance with Russia on Middle East issues, especially the Syrian crisis. Three decades ago, Iran used the soft power technique to infiltrate these territories during the time of the Muslim Sunni uprising in the Islamic Republics of the former Soviet Union following its defeat by Afghanistan which is, according to the Iranian regime, part of Iran’s history. In fact, Iran has allied itself with Russia in the confrontation with the Sunni Muslims in the former Soviet Union Republics. 3.The third dynamic domain includes countries hosting Shiite minorities such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and other Third World countries, which are employed as levers of pressure on the international community, more particularly on African nations, China, the United States, and the West where Shiites exploit the open and democratic environment to establish lobbies in favor of the Iranian regime and its ambitions (28).
Journal for Iranian Studies
42
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
Iranian Strategy Since 1979
Exporting the Revolution
The Theory of Umm AlQura and The Shiite Geopolitics Revitalization
The Emergence of Shiite Geopolitics
IV. Factors behind the Emergence of Shiite Geopolitics in Iranian Regime Strategy There are many factors behind the shift in the Iranian strategies from expansionism and ‘exporting of the revolution’ since the victory of the Iranian revolution in 1979 to achieving Iranian superiority and rebuilding the Persian Empire toward the emergence of Shiite geopolitical strategy: 1.Failure of the principle of Exporting the Revolution: theoretically, the principal of exporting the revolution is one of the major principles that accompanied the Iranian revolution in 1979 and has remained a basis of Iranian foreign policy since then. Furthermore, there are other pragmatic and historical determiners used in spreading Shiite ideology outside the Iranian borders and encouraging the outbreak of other revolutions based on the Iranian model. The “Islamic Republic’s” regime also believes in fighting Muslims who maintain relations with the ‘Great Satan’, as it refers to the United States, and, it claims, to supporting oppressed people against the imperialist nations of the world. This hostile foreign policy was expressed in the speech of former Supreme Leader Khomeini on February 11, 1980, when he said, “We will export our revolution to the world,” encouraging other Muslim countries to rebel against their rulers on the Iranian model and unite with Iran as one country. Moreover, Article 154 of the Iranian constitution states, “Iran is committed to establishing a righteous government in the world and protecting the legitimate struggle of the oppressed people everywhere” (29). After the victory of the Iranian revolution in 1979, the new Iranian leaders benefited from the widespread anger among Iranians over the strong relations between Israel and the Iranian Shah. They rejected Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlavi’s foreign policy and adopted an anti-superpower strategy, severing relations with Israel and its supporters. Based on that assumption, Iran was dedicated toward
Journal for Iranian Studies
43
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
promoting its new values in the targeted countries within its dynamic domain but faced many obstacles leading to its failure such as: A. The Iraqi-Iranian war 1980-1988. This war hindered the principle of Export of the Revolution and made Iran look for new allies, proxies, and organizations rather than countries as barriers to defend the new regime. B. The state of distrust between Iran and most Arab regimes at that time. Most Arab countries believed that the new trend of Iran threatens the whole region and its future. They were aware of Khomeini’s goals of either converting Sunni Muslims into Shiite or eliminating the whole sect on one side, and destabilize the Arabian Gulf due to the Iraqi-Iranian war on the other, which provoked the GCC countries to support Iraq in its war with Iran (30). C. The growing Western role in the region following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Decisive Storm Operation. These developments raised the Iranian fears and diminished the concept of Exporting the Revolution. Consequently, the Iranian decision makers became aware of the difficulty of the implementation of this concept. They were convinced that they would bog down into the same swamp of France when it tried to export the French revolution and suffered big losses in its wars in Europe. According to the Iranian leadership, the concept of Export of the Revolution became old-fashioned and would never accomplish, which made it look for new strategies to achieve its expansionist ambitions (31). 2.Failure of the Theory of Um Al-Qura: Because of the failure of the concept of exporting the revolution in the Iranian strategy, the theory of Um Al-Qura or Dar Al-Islam emerged in the eighties of the last century on the hands of Mohammad Javad Larijani (32). This theory was published in Larijani’s book titled; “Sayings in the National Strategy” and was based on: A. Turning Qum city- one of the Iranian most important religious cities with its scholastic Hawza as a religious center for Shiites after Najaf- into a holy capital city for the Muslim world instead of Makkah. B. Establish one universal Islamic government for the Arab and Muslim world with Iran is its center. C.The Jurist leader has the authority over the whole Muslim nation after taking its lead (33). In fact, this theory was a total failure. Iran could not implement any of its unreasonable terms because of its ill intentions and dishonesty of its goals. It
Journal for Iranian Studies
44
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
was completely rejected by the regional countries and alliances that oppose the Iranian expansionist ambitions. In addition to that, in the attempts to implement its project, Iran did not present an accepted model for development and lacked the sufficient and adequate capabilities. Based on that failure, Iran has interfered in four Arab countries; Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon; and created division and chaos in the whole region. It escalated the sectarian conflict through supporting the Shiite Militias over the Sunni population, so as to enable these militias from taking over these countries and achieve the Iranian ambitions. 3. The American Invasion of Iraq in 2003: The American invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein in May 2003 has paved the way for Iran to implement its sectarian strategy in this country and resulted in the emergence of the Shiite Geopolitics. The Iranian leadership used the American involvement in the war as a direct occupation force and expanded its influence to the inside of Iraq. Consequently, the Iranian influence in Iraq has exceeded that of the invader forces. Indeed, Iran has become the major player in Iraq through two main factors: the first is using the mistakes of the American administration in the Iraqi transition of power by reinforcing the sectarian division system; the second is the Iraqi electoral process when Iran used one of its most serious tools in Iraq, which is mobilizing the Iraqi Shiite Armed Militias. Moreover, Iran benefited from the long experience of the Iranian Intelligence services in the Iraqi political environment and sectarian divisions they acquired from the Iraqi-Iranian war in the eighties of the last century. The Iranian biggest achievement in Iraq was legalizing the Iraqi Shiite Public Mobilization Forces by the Iraqi government and officially merging them with the Iraqi army (34). 4. The Arab Spring Revolutions 2011: The Arab Spring revolutions broke out in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria in 2011 and paved the way for the Iranian expansion in the Arab World. Iran used the involvement of most Arab countries in their internal affairs and the involvement of the most international and regional influential players in the impact of these revolts on their interests. Iran provided support to these revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen as an Islamic Awakening inspired by the Iranian revolution in 1979 and its concepts. However, the true face of the Iranian regime appeared following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution against the Iranian proxy Bashar Assad. It dispatched its Generals and military equipment to prevent the fall of its strategic ally (35), which is a true evidence of the Iranian ill intentions and double standards in the region.
Journal for Iranian Studies
45
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
Syria- as will be explained in the next part of this study- occupies a strategic location for Tehran. It is the vital link between Tehran and Hezbollah the Iranian proxy in Lebanon and an outcome of the Iranian revolution, and an important leg of the Axis of Resistance against Israel and the Western ambitions in the region. In fact, Syria secures passage of the Iranian weaponry supplies to Hezbollah on one hand and stands- according to the Iranian strategy- against the Arab Regional Axis that aims to contain the Iranian growing Geopolitical power on the other. This is evident in the statements of the Iranian cleric Mahdi Taieb in 2014 about the importance of Syria in the Iranian strategy when he said, “If our enemies attack us to take either Syria or Arabistan (Khuzestan) province, the priority would be defending Syria because if we do so, we can easily take Khuzestan back, but if we lose Syria, then we will not be able to defend Tehran.” (36) v.Techniques and Tools of the Emergence of Shiite Geopolitics in Iranian Regime Strategy: Both the export of the revolution and the Um Al-Qura strategies were complete failures, leading to the emergence of the so-called Shiite expansionist strategy, which is divided into four stages, which are respectively: Soft Shiism; Politicized Shiism; Hard Shiism, and Merging Shiism with the regimes of countries already containing Shiite communities. These tools have been used by Iranian decision-makers since the Iranian revolution in 1979, with the leadership taking into consideration the time and conditions in each targeted country; some nations are still in the early stage of promoting Shiism while others, such as Iraq, are at stage four. Stages of Shiite Expansionism 1st Stage
2nd Stage
3rd Stage
4th Stage
Soft Shiism
Hard Shiism
Politicizing Shiism
Merging Shiism
1. Soft Shiism (Proselytizing for Shiism): This refers to the concept of ‘soft power’ developed by the American Professor of Political Science Joseph Nyein in the 1990s to describe the ability of a country to use economic or cultural influence to achieve its objectives peacefully without military force. Soft Shiism refers specifically to the promotion of the Iranian regime’s hardline ‘Twelver’ Shiite ideology in the targeted
Journal for Iranian Studies
46
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
countries through economic or cultural influence. This strategy is separate to the use of military power, being pursued by means such as: A.Establishing centers and conducting conferences to eliminate psychological barriers and eradicate hostility from Sunnis toward Shiites B.Establishing charitable organizations under the pretext of assisting the needy through building schools and hospitals where this can be used to promote Shiite ideology C.Offering scholarships to attract students to Qum city and its 300 religious institutes run and financed by the Universal Islamic Center, which is controlled by the Iranian regime’s intelligence service. More than 50,000 students from 70 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas are educated or, more correctly, indoctrinated in these institutes on an annual basis, before being sent back to their countries to proselytize on behalf of the regime. D.Producing heavily sectarian movies and TV series using state-of-the-art technology targeting the beliefs of the audience in an effort to eradicate Sunni hostility toward Shiites and convince the audience to embrace Shiite ideology and concepts (37). E.Launching dozens of satellite propaganda channels and websites such as Al-Alam channel to promote false and fabricated ‘news’ reports in support of the Iranian project. F. Organizing religious tourism groups in the targeted countries to influence other people and make them accept Shiite ideology. For example, religious tourism has enabled Shiites to establish a presence in predominantly Sunni Syria. Around 1.5 million Iranians visit Syria every year, particularly the Sayeda Zainab shrine in Damascus, which has been ranked the third holiest Shiite shrine in the world after Najaf and Qum, giving the Shiite clergy a pretext for a permanent presence in Syria. G. Using the relatively free environment in some countries such as those in Europe and the Americas to preach Shiite ideology and convert Sunni Muslims in these countries to Shiism, particularly targeting those who face financial problems. The Shiite centers in the Netherland, Belgium, Italy, and America play a major role in this field, using financial inducements to attract people to the Shiite ideology, despite the massive poverty in Iran itself (38). 2. Politicized Shiism (changing political loyalties): This refers to the politicization of the Shiite doctrine, which takes place after Shiite
Journal for Iranian Studies
47
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
communities have been established in the targeted countries, with Shiite minorities in these nations being used to achieve Iran’s ambitions. With Shiites indoctrinated to regard Iran as their spiritual homeland and the center of their religion, they are induced to betray their original countries and act as agents for Iran and its expansionist ambitions. In other words, the Iranian regime has adopted a strategy of isolating Shiite communities in other nations from their wider societies and changing their loyalties to be primarily to Iran rather than to their original homelands. These Shiite communities have adopted hostile behavior toward their own nations and compatriots who hold other ideologies. The Iranian regime’s strategy of politicizing Shiism in the targeted countries is achieved by use of the following techniques: (39) A. Establishing loyalist political parties and movements in the targeted countries to change the domestic political landscape in favor of the Iranian project; consequently, a significant number of Shiite parties and movements have emerged in many countries of the world, especially in the Arab world, including Amal movement and Hezbollah in Lebanon; the Higher Council, Da’wa Party, Al-Sadr current and others in Iraq; the Islamic Labor and Da’wa Party, and the Shiite Reconciliation Association in Bahrain; the National Islamic Coalition and Peace and Justice Gathering in Kuwait; Al-Haq and Umma Party, the Believer Youth Movement (now Ansarollah) in Yemen; the Unity Party in Tunisia; Al-Sabireen Movement in Palestine; the Islamic Unity Party in Afghanistan; Applying Al-Ja’fari’s Beliefs Movement in Pakistan; the Shiite Islamic Movement in Nigeria; and the National Iranian-American Council (NIAC) in the United States. The aforementioned parties and movements are dedicated to promoting the Iranian regime’s interests in their own countries either by exerting pressure on their governments as with the Lebanese Hezbollah or by bringing down any political movements which challenge Tehran’s interests like the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who, backed by Iran, have frustrated the GCC countries’ initiative for a political solution in Yemen since occupying the capital Sana’a in 2014. (40) B. Establishing alliances with other Shiite sects in the country, more particularly in predominantly Sunni nations, despite their differences, in order to form a homogenous Shiite core group loyal to the regime under the false pretext of protecting Shiite communities in these nations. In fact, these groups are part of the Iranian regime’s effort to acquire new spheres of influence and to establish proxies to promote its interests in these countries, such as the group formed to call for the “Restoration of the Alawi branch to its Ja’fari Shiite origin” in Syria.
Journal for Iranian Studies
48
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
The work of the prominent Iraqi Twelver Shiite cleric, Hassan Shirazi, in the 1960s played a major role in building Iranian links with the Syrian Alawis and encouraging their talented sons to study in the Iranian city of Qum. In addition, Shirazi succeeded in making the Sayeda Zainab shrine in Damascus the third holiest shrine in Shiism after Najaf and Qum. Other Shiite clerics such as Mousa Al-Sadr, Muhsin Al-Hakim, and Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah followed in Shirazi’s footsteps and established the Al-Khusaibi movement among Nusairi people in Syria. These figures argued that the only theological differences between Twelvers and Nusairis are minor issues and don’t touch the essence of Shiism. Consequently, a decision was taken in 1980 in the Syrian city of Qardaha, the center of the Nusayri sect and hometown of the Assads, to dispatch 500 young Alawi students to study at the holy sites in Qum to become experts in the Ja’fari sect (41). Hence, a long-term strategic alliance was established between the Nusayri regime in Syria and Khomeini’s clerical followers in the wake of the 1979 revolution. This relationship turned into effective Iranian hegemony over Syria after the inauguration of Bashar Assad president of Syria in 2000, which recently turned into complete control following the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring Revolutions in 2011 and Assad’s brutal efforts to maintain power in which he soon became completely reliant on Iran. 3. Hard Shiism (Militarizing Shiites): This means to militarize the Shiite communities in the targeted countries and back them with enlistment, training, and arms, and transform them into military and paramilitary organizations. The objective of this strategy is to grab power in these countries or at least bog them down in internal conflicts to be easily invaded and impotent to counter the Iranian interference. In fact, Iran implements this strategy applying all political, social, diplomatic, media, and economic techniques (42). Militarizing Shiism is the essence of the revolutionary guards’ scheme of action since the Iranian revolution in 1979 to accomplish its ultimate goal of reviving the Persian Empire. This ambition according to the Iranian strategic plans is stretching to not only the neighboring countries but also to the world. For instance, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen are genuine examples of Militarizing Shiism to establish the so-called Shiite Crescent based upon the sectarian structures and existence of Shiite communities in these countries. These communities view Iran as the hub of the Shiite world. They report to its religious references, subject,
Journal for Iranian Studies
49
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
and undergo to their directives. Because of the Arab Spring Revolts in 2011, two of these countries [Syria and Yemen] have engulfed into extreme violence and high volatility. These blood-soaked events have simply paved the way for regional and international forces such as Iran and Russia to plant their feet in the region on the expense of stability and security of the regional countries. Although the historical differences between both countries, the interests of Russia and Iran have met in the Arab region and this is as a consequence of the sheer absence of influential Arab players against the Iranian ambitions and lessening of an American efficient role during the reign of president Obama. The following are the most important indicators for militarizing Shiism in the aforementioned four countries: A. Enlistment and training: Al-Quds Division, commanded by General Qassem Suleimani – the military organization assigned to undertake military duties outside Iran- provides military training for the Syrian, Iraqi, Yemeni, Lebanese, and Afghani Shiite militants either at home or in Iran in Imam Ali Military Camp northern Tehran, Amir Al-Mo’mineen Western Tehran, or in Mirsad in Shiraz, one of the most important training centers for foreign militants. B. Supply and armament: Iran has given millions of USDs and weapons to the Iraqi armed militias such as Asa’ib Ahl Alhaq that receive about $1.5 million monthly payment to fund 5-10 thousand militants in Iraq; in Lebanon Iran supplies Hezbollah with large amounts of arms for millions of USDs coming through Syria to be a thorn in the Lebanese side and leverage on the Lebanese political regime to subjugate to the Iranian demands; in Yemen Houthi rebels are entirely supported by Tehran and receive nonstop military supplies coming from Iran; in Syria Iran has and is still granting millions of USDs to Bashar Assad and the Shiite militias fighting on his side (43). C. Dispatch of Militants: Iran has deployed professional military and paramilitary militants to aid its proxies so as to take control of their countries and expand its influence in these countries, which is indisputable through the following events: • Arab and foreign media have published series of photos for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Commanders while participating in battles in these countries under the directives of the Jurist Leader, particularly, the photos of Qassem Suleimani that have been taken in Fallujah, Mosel, and Aleppo.
Journal for Iranian Studies
50
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
• Senior Iranian Generals such as Mohammad Ali Jafari, the Revolutionary Guards Commander acknowledged, in September 2012, the presence and availability of senior Iranian officers participating in the war in Syria to provide support to the Assad regime. In January 2016 he also acknowledged the presence of about 200 thousand Iranian Revolutionary Guards soldiers in five countries; Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (44). In May 2014 another Revolutionary Guards Commander, Ahmad Hussein Hamdani - Killed in Aleppo in October 2015- affirming that his country is in direct combat in war Syria and will dispatch more Basij militants to this country (45). In 2015, the defense committee in the Iraqi parliament announced having compelling and official documents that prove the availability of 30 thousand Iranian militants in Iraq. • About 700 Iranian military commanders have been killed in Iraq and Syria since 2011 such as General Hamid Taqavi who was killed in Iraq in December 2014 (46). Chief of the Iranian Higher Council for National Security Ali Shamkhani offered his condolences to Taqawi saying, “Had the blood of people like Taqavi not spilled in Samarra, our blood would have been shed in Iran” (47). In February 2016, Khamenei praised and hailed those Taqavi and his companions saying, “They have sacrificed their lives there in order to prevent the enemies from arriving Iran, without them, we would have obliged to encounter those enemies in Kermanshah and Hamadan” (48). Establishing Armed Militias: Iran has consolidated tens of thousands of foreign militants with the Shiite militias to fight in Iraq and Syria. In fact, there are more than 50 Iranian-backed militias fighting in these two countries: In Iraq: The Popular Mobilization Forces, Nujaba Movement, Asa’ib Ahlilhaq, Abu Al-Fadlilabbas Brigade, Imam Mahdi Army, Shabab Al-Risali Battalions, Ashura Companies, Al-Sama’ Companies, Al-Khurasani Companies, Saied Al-Shuhada Battalions, Zo-Alfaqar Brigade, Alsadiqeen Brigade, Imam Ali Brigade, Imam Hussein Brigade, Al-Wa’d Al-Sadiq division, and others. In Syria: In August 2016 Iran established the Shiite Free Army in Syria under the leadership of Al-Quds Division Commander, Qasem Suleimani that consists of Fatimyioun Brigade of the Afghani Shiites, Zainabyioun Brigade of the Pakistani Shiites, Haidarioon Brigade of the Iraqi Shiites, and Hezbollah Brigade that consists of two branches, the first includes the Lebanese Shiites and the other the Syrian Shiites who descend from the Shiites of Damascus. Furthermore, Iran has established the National Defense Militia of more than 80 thousand elements loyal to Bashar Assad,
Journal for Iranian Studies
51
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
notably from the Alawi Shiite sect as a duplicate copy of the popular Mobilization Forces “Basij”; the Public Defense Companies; the Syrian Asa’ib Ahlilhaq; and the Syrian Abolfadl al-Abbas Brigades (49). 4. Merging militias in the regional regimes: This stage aims to produce a legal and official status to these militias and cover up their movements and activities to implement the Iranian strategies under the orders of the Iranian Supreme Leader; as a result, Iran has exercised massive pressure on the Iraqi government to consolidate the Popular Mobilization Forces into the Iraqi army. This was evident through Tehran’s warning letters to the Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Al-Abadi to settle down the Popular Mobilization Forces status before the end of Mosel battle, leading to the official annexation of these militias to the Iraqi army after the approval of the Iraqi parliament on 11/26/2016. The law took 170 votes majority out of 208 representatives attended the session and stipulated: “The Popular Mobilization Forces is an independent military unit and is considered part of the Iraqi Armed Forces. It has its own leadership, staff commission, and Fighter Brigades and (50). The annexation of the PMF has resulted in adverse consequences on the Iraqi internal and external affairs and has given the Iraqi army a sectarian character. This was apparent in the statement of one of the PMF leaders, commander of Badr Militias Hadi Al-Amiri in August 2016 when he acknowledged that the PMF had become stronger than the Iraqi army had. In essence, the PMF law has legalized and empowered the Iranian influence in Iraq, which will become a significant factor in escalating tension in the region. This official status under the cover of the Iraqi army will considerably facilitate and enable these militias from moving to Syria under the guise of hunting the ISIS, but at the same time, provoke the other regional countries to consider them as cross-border forces fighting on behalf of Iran. In fact, the most critical point of the PMF law is that the Iraqi military institution, driven by sectarian considerations, has become part of the Shiite-Sunni disagreement far away from its essential duty of defending all Iraqi people and their homeland security (51). VI. Unbiased Evaluation of the Shiite Geopolitics List of strengths and weaknesses of the Shiite Geopolitics: 1. Points of strength: A. The relative weight of the central state (Iran), total power, Geopolitics and Geostrategic capabilities, and its expansionist experience.
Journal for Iranian Studies
52
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
B. The ideological structure of the countries located within its primary dynamic domain including Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and the GCC countries. C. Unawareness of the Shiites threat and state of weakness and disagreement in the targeted countries. D. The absence of an Arab/Sunni project against the so-called Farsi/Shiite project and the absence of the central Arab or Sunni countries to bear the responsibility of their future ambitions- except the role of Saudi Arabia, leader of the Arab-Islamic coalition. This fragmented state of the Arab World resulted from their differences on interests and their views toward Iran. Some Arab countries see Iran as a source of threat motivated by its Shiite ideology, others see it as a regional power of balance, and others see it as a strategic ally. E. Deterioration of the American role in the region, especially during the reign of President Obama and emergence of new efficient international players of Iran’s allies such as Russia and China. F. The awareness of the Iranian decision makers of the materialist and immaterialist national capabilities and the fractious regional environment has paved the way for Iran to expand its influence in the region. 2. Points of weakness: Although the Shiite Geopolitics has succeeded in certain points, it has many deficiencies and points of weaknesses. Some of these weaknesses resulted from the theory itself and others from Iran as the central state that sponsors and supports the Shiite project. Following are weaknesses of the Shiite Geopolitics: A. The noticeable sectarian nature of the Shiite Geopolitics will eventually lead to the emergence of an opponent Sunni Geopolitics, taking into consideration that the Farsi Plateau is surrounded by Non-Farsi peoples inside the so-called Iran’s Geography, and the outsider Non-Farsi nations of Central Asian, Pakistan, Turkey, and Afghanistan. B. Using of the Shiite communities in the targeted countries needs big and constant support. Any crisis faces the central state (Iran) as a result of its intervention in the neighboring countries; it will end up in the same destiny of the former Soviet Union. C. The Shiite Geopolitics does not represent any cultural needs for the Iranian people. On the contrary, military spending and support of the subversive elements in the neighboring countries hurts the Iranian economy, drains its resources, and negatively impact people’s living conditions. Furthermore, the breakout of the Iranian
Journal for Iranian Studies
53
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
revolution itself came as a rejection of the Shah’s Megalomania of expansion that led to the prevalence of corruption and rise of poverty and unemployment through the drain of the country’s resources. D. The central state (Iran) is facing several internal and external problems that result from: d.1. The state of rivalry and ethnic conflicts between the Persian and the other ethnicities in the Iranian social structure such as The Arab, Azeri, Kurdish, Baluch, Lures, Turkmen, Bakhtaran Tribes, Qashqai’s, and many others. In fact, Iran consists of diverse ethnic groups, sects, and religions. The Persians represents 48% of the Iranian population and inhabits central Iran; the Turk Azeri dwell in the North West and is considered the biggest ethnic minority in Iran with 24% of the Iranian population; 10% Kurds and 8% Lures in Western Iran; 4% Arabs in the West and South West; 2% Baluch in the South East, 2% Turkmen in the Northeast and 2% others, taking into consideration the differences in rates from one report to another due to the lack of precise statistics in this regard. In reference to the aforementioned statistics, it is noticeable that most Iranian minorities are concentrated on the borders on all sides of the Iran, which represents a big challenge for the Iranian leadership due to separatist trends of some of these minorities. The biggest problem for Iran is the lack of any ethnic group related to the Persian ethnicity in the middle of the country; the Arabs are in the South and Southwest of Iran and extend to the GCC countries; The Baluch are in the South and the Southeast and extend to Pakistan and Afghanistan; the Turkmen dwell in the North and Northeast on the borders with Turkmenistan; the Azeri inhabit the North and Northwest and extend to Azerbaijan; the Kurds are in the West and have an ethnic extension in Turkey and Kurdistan. Each of these ethnic groups has a dream of establishing its own independent country incited by their national armed wings, and religious and ethnic oppression practiced by the Iranian regime, especially the Sunni people, leading to a state of hostility against Iran by all other ethnic groups. d.2. Iran relies on a mono-product economy (gas and oil) in its national income although the diversity of its economic activities. This form of economy resulted from the tough desert environment of Iran and shortage of drinking and irrigation water due to the salty nature of its lakes and lack of fertile lands, which have serious negative implications on Iran’s security and stability and provoke People
Journal for Iranian Studies
54
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
to go on protests due to their harsh living conditions in these areas. In fact, the Iranian expansionist ambitions have added insult to injury and made things worse for the Iranian people.
Conclusion: 1. In its broad definition, Geopolitics refers to the expansion of countries to get to the state of lebensraum within their dynamic domains. They aim to expand their spheres of influence and achieve their strategic goals through imperializing other nations. However, The Shiite Geopolitics refers to the Iranian expansionist ambitions in the regional countries. The concepts of export of the revolution and assist of the oppressed people against tyranny and imperialism - as pretended- will eventually lead to the emergence of the so-called Shiite Crescent in a clear violation of the Iranian literature that rejects this concept. 2. Iran does not have sufficient and adequate tools and capabilities to implement the Shiite Geopolitics including internal economic capabilities, military capabilities, intellectual capabilities, and political capabilities to solve its internal crises and induce its regional and international strategies required for the success of the Geopolitical project. In fact, Iran suffers an internal economic crisis although lifting of the economic sanctions after the nuclear deal in July 2015, which is evident in the following consequences: A. Deterioration of the Iranian currency exchange rate against foreign currencies B. Decline of the standards of living beyond limits and prevalence of people sleeping in cemeteries phenomenon C. Increase of unemployment rates D. The reluctance of some foreign companies to make business with Iran. E. Insufficient military power to enforce security and stability and make balance in the deployment of troops at home, restrain of the regime’s opponent minorities, and deployment of troops in Syria and Iraq. In fact, Iran has neither the ability to impose its strategies and maintain the balance of power to promote the Shiite Geopolitics nor does it have a model accepted by people, regimes, and the world, leading to the failure of the Shiite Geopolitics. 3. The Shiite Geopolitics usually provokes people in the targeted countries to defend their homeland countries. This might result in the failure of the expansionist
Journal for Iranian Studies
55
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
nations to achieve their strategic goals and ambitions. In fact, the Iranian Shiite Geopolitics has provoked the Arab/Gulf countries’ feelings to stand against the Iranian expansionist ambitions. This position of the Arab countries has been commenced by Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through the establishment of the Arab coalition to confront the Iranian expansionist project in Yemen both politically and militarily. 4. The real goals of countries with Geopolitical views and expansionist ambitions are usually devastating to the targeted countries through targeting their unity, wealth, pioneers and thinkers; and expulsion of people through unorganized mass exodus. The Geopolitical view of the Iranian leaders has been disastrous in the targeted countries within its primary dynamic domain- Syria, Iraq, and Yemen- and their future. They have failed as countries and turned into battlegrounds for fighting between brothers in the same country through the Iranian use of a sectarian factor that is hijacking the entire region. In fact, the Iranian practices have toppled these countries down and severed their humanitarian crises. Instead of freedom and development, Iran has turned them into blood-soaked fractious territories and safe shelters for terrorists and extremist groups. Finally, in light of the Iranian Shiite Geopolitics and expansionist ambitions- at least in the Shiite Crescent countries; nonstop crises and complicated questions in several regional countries after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003; the eruption of the Arab Spring revolts in 2011; emergence of new Iranian regional and international alliances with Turkey and Russia, the Shiite Geopolitics is expected to expand and prevail. On the other hand, the Shiite Geopolitics would decline under the following conditions: A. The appearance of new Arab and Islamic coalitions under the leadership of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia B. The possibility of the new US president, Donald Trump to adopt a new foreign policy that differs from his precedent’s toward the Iranian expansion in the region, especially after his statements concerning this issue C. The Iranian severe economic conditions and military capabilities to expand and supply its forces and proxies fighting in the targeted countries D. The possibility of the Iranian people to protest and reject their government’s practices that negatively impact their standards of living
Journal for Iranian Studies
56
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
Indeed, Iran is a multi-ethnic country with diverse religions and ideologies. In addition to the Persian ethnicity, Iran comprises other ethnic groups from Arab, Turkish, Azeri, Baluch, and Kurdish origins that by no means can tolerate the Persian racist project, which is clear evidence that the Iranian regime is digging in the wrong place and does not meet its people’s ambitions of freedom, equality, and prosperous life.
REFERENCES (1) Walter Russell Mead, The Return of Geopolitics, foreign affairs, May/June 2014 Issue, available at http://cutt.us/WjRyR, and what is “geopolitics”? - Debate on the term Geopolitics, available at http://cutt.us/MtwJm. (2) Mohammad Abdulghani Saudi: Dirasat Aljagrafia Walalagat Alsiasiah Aldawliah, Cairo, Egyptian Library of Anglo, 2015, pp. 54-56 (3) Mohammad Riyadh: Alosul Alamah fi Aljagrafia Alsiasiah: Dirasah Tadbeegiah ala Alsharq Alawsat, Cairo, Mu’asasat Hindawi Lilta’lim, 1st edition, 2014, p. 55. (4) Peter Tailor and Colin Flint: Political Geography of Today’s World, translated: Abdulsalam Radwan wa Ishaq Obeid, Kuwait, National Council for Culture and Arts, Kuwait, 1st edition, 2002, p. 46, available at the link: http://cutt.us/aOTTS (5) Mackinder, H.J. “The geographical pivot of history”. The Geographical Journal, 1904, 23, pp. 421-37. Available online as Mackinder, H.J. “The Geographical Pivot of History”, in Democratic Ideals and Reality, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996, pp. 175-194. (6) Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson: Political Geography in 100 years: Evolution of the World Geopolitics, this reference was mentioned before, p. 82 (7) Hamdi Obeid (PH.D.): Qira’a fi Istratigiat Nashr Altashaio’ waldawr Alwadeefi li-Iran filistratigiah Alamericia, Dirasah, Electronic Strategic Think Tank, 16/11/16, available at the link: http://cutt.us/9noLh (8) Dakheel Hussein (PH.D.): Aljagrafiah Alsiasiah: Dirasat Alaqaleem Albariah walbahriah waldwal Wa’athar Alnizam Alalami fi Mutagaieratiha, Beirut, Dar Almanhal Allibnani Liltiba’ah Walnashr, 1st edition, 2008, p. 125 (9) Ibid, p. 132 (10) The Iranian International Relations Professor, Diako Husseini, Ferda Website, Za’oilitic- Shiite- Waqi’eitKhawermianeh, 23, Adr, 1393, http://cutt.us/mZeFz (11) Ibid. (12) Barzeen Dhirgami, Saied Mohammad Jawad Shoshatri, Salman Ansarizadeh, Za’oilitic Shiite Ya Hilal Shiite (Mabani, Ahdaf, Waroikardha) Bezohshahai Gagrafiai Insani, Dawrah 46, Shamarah1, Bahar 1393, pp. 204205, available at the link: http://cutt.us/NYOg5 (13) Ibid, pp. 199-200. (14) Ibid, p. 207 (15) Ibid, p. 210 (16) Ibid, p. 212 (17) Waleed Abdulhai (PH.D.): Buniat Alqwah Al-Irania Wa’afaqiha, Maqal, Aljareeda Research Center, files, 6/4/2013, available at the link: http://cutt.us/OJ89T
Journal for Iranian Studies
57
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
(18) Bhimasen Hantal.Mackinder’s Heartland Theory - Explained, your article library. http://cutt.us/3ydQO (19) Khioon Ali’keili (PH.D.): Tadahwor Naw’iat Miah Shat Al-Arab: Almushkilah Walhal, September 8, 2015, New Sabah Website, available at the Link: http://cutt.us/yRMAs (20) Nasir Alamrah (PH.D.) and . Mohammad Alabdih (PH.D.) and Ahmad Alsoyan: Kharitat Alshiite fi Alalam: Dirasah Aqadiah, Tareekhiah, Demografiah, Istrategiah, Cairo, Alresalah Center for Humanitarian Researches and Studies, 1st edition, 2012, p. 144 (21) Atif Mu’tamad Abdulhamid (PH.D.): Al-Shiite fi Almashriq Al-Islami: Tathweer Almathahab Watafkeek Alkhreetah, 2008, Cairo, Nahdat Misr Liltiba’ah Walnashr, 1st edition, p. 108 (22) Ahmad Alkatib: Alqaid Al-Amreeki: Ihtimalat Boroz Qiadat Iqlimiah fi Alsharq Alawsat, Cairo, International Politics Journal, Tahawolat Istratejiah Appendix, available at the Link: http://cutt.us/RjTI (23) Ahmad Yosuf Ahmad (PH.D.): Al-Arab Waltahddi Al-Irani, Alitihad Al-Emaratiah, February 10, 2009 (24) Fadi Eid: Albadr Alshi’i Biliqleem, Bawabat Ifreeqia Alikbariah, 21/1/2015, Altaiyar Alhur for Political and Strategic Studies, available at the Link: http://cutt.us/BYq0O (25) Nasir Alamrah (PH.D.) and . Mohammad Alabdah (PH.D.)and Ahmad Alsoyan: Kharitat Al-Shiite fi Alalam, this reference was mentioned before, pp. 146-166 (26) Hamdi Obeid (PH.D.): Qira’ah fi Istratejiat Nashr Altashaiyo’ Waldawr Alwadeefi Li-Iran fi Alistratejiah Al-Amreekiah , this reference was mentioned before (27) Ibid (28) Ibid (29) Sabah Almwaswas (PH.D.) and . Mohammad Alsa’eed Idrees (PH.D.) (participants) and . Abdullah Fahad Alnufeisi (PH.D.) and Mr. Abdullah Altentewi (editors): Almashro’ Al-Irani fi Almantiqah Al-Arabiah Wal-Islamiah, 2015, Cairo, Abasheer Publishers, 1st edition, p. 102 (30) Bozaidi Yahia: Hal Takhalat Iran An Mabda’ Tasdeer Althawrah? Alrasid Electronic Journal, issue 96, 4/5/2011, available at the Link: http://cutt.us/hpY3Khttp://cutt.us/hpY3K (31) Almalamih Ala’amah Lilsiasah Alkharijiah Al-Iraniah, Alrasid electronic Journal, issue 2, 11/9/2006, available at the link: http://cutt.us/476d (32) One of the three brothers of Larijani’s family who heads the human rights committee in the Judicial Authority that is run by his brother Sadiq Larijani, and his other brother is Ali Larijani Speaker of the Iranian Parliament that headed the Iranian nuclear file internationally. Larijani’s family enjoys strong influence inside the Iranian regime, hold high governmental offices, and have close relations to other powerful Iranian families inside the regime. (33) Mohammad Jawad Larijani: Maqoolat filistratejiah Alwataniah, Tehran: Al-Asr Center for Strategic and Future Studies, 2013, 1st edition, p. 46 (34) Reports of the Iranian Expansion in the Arab Countries: The Iranian Expansion and the Nonstop conflicts in Iraq, The Arabian Center for Iranian Studies, issued on 22/6/2016, available at the link: http://cutt.us/7fr1D (35) Mohammad Alsulami (PH.D.): Istratejiat Iran Tijah Althawrat Al-Arabia: Takteek Jadeed Yastathni Syria and Yemen, Al-Arabiya, 12/4/2015, available at the link: http://cutt.us/7m0q9 , and: Athar Thawrat Alrabee’ Al-Arabi ala Almashro’ Al-Irani 3/3, Almizmah Center for Researches and Studies: available at the link: http://cutt.us/teiYy (36) Mohammad Abbas Naji: Alinkimash: Mustaqbal Aldawr Al-Irani Ba’d Althawrat Al-Arabia, Alsiasah aldawliah, available at the link: http://cutt.us/vPVba (37) Seerah Aldawod: Altanwee’ fi Tasdeer Althawrah, Alhayat Newspaper, London, 18/10/2010, quoted from
Journal for Iranian Studies
58
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Shiite Geopolitics Present and Future
Shahatah Mohammad Nasir: Aljagrafia Wa’atharoha ala Alaqat Iran Al-Arabia, Alfasl Alsadis Minaljomhoriah Alislamiah, Survey Study, Arab Research Institute- Arab League, Cairo, 1436/2014 (38) Ro’yat Alimam Al-Khamenei Neho Alharb Alna’imah, Qaiem Center for Studies, Islamic Cultural Knowledge Association, 2011, available at the link: http://cutt.us/3irrp (39) Hamdi Obeid (PH.D.): Qira’a fi Istrategiat Nashr Altashaio’ Waldawr Alwadeefi Li-Iran fi Alistrategiah AlAmreekiah, this reference was mentioned before (40) . Mohammad Sa’eed Abdulmo’min (PH.D.): Aljamhoriah Althalitha fi Iran, Cairo, Egyptian General Commission for Books, 2012, 1st edition, p. 18 (41) Mohammad Abu Romman: Altashaio’ fi Alordon, Zahira Yogathiha Hezbollah, The Jordanian Al-Ghad Newspaper, 4/10/2016, quoted from Alba’th Alshi’i fi Sorya, pp. 58-59 (42) Talat Rmeih: Askarat Altashaio’, the Electronic Alrasid, issue 51, 10/1/2016, available at the link: http://cutt.us/jgbkY (43) Silsilat Altawagol Al-Irani fi Aldowal Al-Arabia: Altawagol Al-Irani Walsira’at Allamutanahia fi Al-Iraq wa Sorya wa Al-Yaman, available at the link: http://cutt.us/7fr1D (44) Was revealed in January 2016 in the memory of Hameed Riza Assad Allahi, a Revolutionary Guard Commander that was killed in Aleppo in 2015, 200 thousand Iranian Soldiers are deployed in Five Countries, Available at the link: http://cutt.us/OYJX9 (45) Algeneral Al-Irani Allathi Anqath Al-Assad wa Assas Hezbollah Al-Sory Qutil, The Lebanese Al-Nahar Newspaper, available at the link: http://cutt.us/YZ77A (46) Mutaba’at Khasa’ir Almuhtal Al-Irani fi Sorya, Alsharq Al-Arabi Center for Cultural and Strategic StudiesLondon, 12/5/2016, available at the link: http://cutt.us/O821 (47) Tehran’s Arming of the Iraqi Forces… a Professor in New York University Writes about Iran Founder of Al-Fallujah Battle, Huffington Post Arabic, 2/6/2016, available at the link: http://cutt.us/7Othv (48) Khamenei Yodafi’ An Altadakhol Al-Irani fi Sorya, February 5, 2016, Al-Arabiya, available at the link: http://cutt.us/eq2hu (49) According to a press interview with General Mohammad Ali Falaki, a Revolutionary Guards Commander in Syria, the Iranian Mashriq News Website in 12/8/2016, Falaki announced forming Cross-Border Shiite Military Forces, under the title “The Shiite Free Army” led by General Qasem Sulaimani (50) The Iraqi Parliament passes the Public Mobilization Forces Law in the absence of Sunnis, Aljazeera Net, 16/11/2016, available at the link: http://cutt.us/ulUaL (51) Ahmad Adli: Ma’sat Alta’ifiah: Tada’iat Idmaj Alhashd fi Aljaish Al-Iraqi, Future Studies Center, 29/11/2016, available at the link: http://cutt.us/ms6WC
Journal for Iranian Studies
59
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations Determinants and Risks Abd Elraouf Elghonemi Political Researcher at the (AGCIS)
INTRODUCTION
R
ecent years have witnessed significant growth and expansion in the scope, range, and content of Iranian-North Korean relations in every field, with an increase in the number of visits, both overt and covert, by officials of the already closely allied nations to one another’s countries. Iran and North Korea are also closely coordinating their political stance on regional and international issues, with their bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear energy policies worthy of close study and analysis, given the alarming ramifications of the two rogue states’ cooperation on regional and international peace. Both states possess the theoretical and practical wherewithal to deploy nuclear weapons, with both having aspirations to becoming fully nuclear states. In Iran’s case, its objectives are even more alarming, given its regional ambitions and expansionist designs on its Arab and Gulf neighbors, while North Korea’s aims are more concerned with protecting the Kims’ hereditary regime.
This study looks into the effects of the recent nuclear deal and the regional and international implications of growing closeness in Iranian-North Korean relations in the fields of nuclear energy, which the Iranian regime wants to use to tip the strategic Middle East balance in its favor, and help in implementing its expansionist plan, particularly in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
Journal for Iranian Studies
60
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
Internationally, meanwhile, Iran wants to create a new international balance and a more multipolar world order shifting away from the unipolar United States as the main superpower. The regime is intent on the completion of its nuclear program, despite signing the 2015 nuclear agreement with the (5+1) Group, giving it more control in regional security issues and of the Gulf region. Research indicates that if the Iranian regime is not stopped, it will continue to threaten the people, sovereignty, and security. The evidence also indicates that the Iranian and North Korean leadership are both implementing their nuclear programs with the knowledge of the US, with several credible documents revealing this collusion, despite both of these nations signing treaties agreeing to end their nuclear programs. The study focuses on the analysis of evidence demonstrating the US role in facilitating Iran’s nuclear program, and the implications of this for Middle East security, and what might change for the nuclear deal with the arrival of a new US president in January 2017. Given the massive significance and complexity of the issue of Iranian-North Korean relations, the study is divided into four parts: the first section analyses the extent and character of the relations between the two nations; the second section deals with the factors affecting the relationship, particularly given the similarities between the political systems of the two totalitarian regimes, including a shared antipathy towards the US, their joint recognition of the strategic advantage of possessing nuclear weapons as a deterrent force, and their shared interest in forming an ‘Anti-US-Coalition Alliance’ ranged against Washington-Seoul and Tokyo. The third part touches on the dangers to the Arab and Gulf region’s regional security of Iranian-North Korean military cooperation, while the fourth and final section focus on the Iranian nuclear deal and the possible changes wrought by the arrival of a new US President in the White House, before delivering the conclusion and recommendations of the study. First: The size and scope of the Iranian-North Korean relations: According to the literature of strategic international relations, the Iranian-North Korean relationship is classified as a “strategic international partnership of a military nature,” one based on mutual cooperation in building an arms system built around sophisticated missile and nuclear capabilities (atomic bombs, neutron bombs, hydrogen bombs) and on the transfer of expertise necessary for the production of uranium materials and nuclear materials, as well as on individually and jointly resisting the threats posed by regional and international powers seeking
Journal for Iranian Studies
61
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
to abort the two nations’ nuclear programs. Another feature of this partnership is convergence between the states themselves, between the states and their allies, and between their allies, with a tacit agreement to remain steadfast in their joint opposition to their adversaries and to resume the depth of relations enjoyed by the two countries during the era of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) through pursuit of Pyongyang’s ‘sanctions-busting’ sale of arms to Tehran at the time. During the war period, North Korea equipped Iran with large amounts of essential military equipment, especially specialist gear designed for countering and deterring Iraqi missile attack. Indeed, North Korea first became Iran’s principal source of equipment for missile manufacturing at this time, as well as providing Tehran with the specialist equipment required for the nuclear program, including materials for uranium production and centrifuges. (1) After the Iran-Iraq war ended, Iran adopted a “self-reliance ”policy, intent on maintaining an independent missile development and production capability, going on to construct a massive industrial infrastructure dedicated to weapons design and manufacture, both to avoid future Iraqi missile strikes and to ensure possession of an advanced anti-missile system as a deterrent to anyone planning attacks. North Korea was eager to help Tehran build an advanced missile system to counter possible regional threats and challenges and to intensify the strategic partnership between the two nations by sending military advisers and missile-production equipment and by transferring expertise. The North Korean regime’s enthusiastic support for their Iranian counterparts is demonstrated by some of the following items provided by North Korea to Iran in this period: (2) 1: Construction of underground storage depots for missile warfare system reinforced to protect against airstrikes. 2: Assistance in developing the capabilities of Iran’s large quantities of ballistic missiles and anti-ballistic missiles. 3: Help with production of the ‘Scud B’ ballistic missile system (known as ‘Shahab 1’ and ‘Shahab 2’ in Farsi), as well as assistance with the development of the ‘Shahab 3’ and ‘Shahab 4’ missiles, both of which have a range of over 1,500 miles. The first decade of the new millennium, which saw tensions between Iran and the West over the regime’s nuclear program, saw relations between Iran and North Korea grow closer. When the Iranian authorities initially expressed dissatisfaction
Journal for Iranian Studies
62
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
with the capabilities of the missile systems given them by North Korea, seeking more powerful, long-range missiles, Pyongyang immediately supplied Iranian authorities with 19 advanced 25” ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometers, as well as an advanced version of their C-802 naval missiles. (3) During the second decade of the new millennium, amid rising tensions between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear program, Israel threatened a preemptive military strike to thwart the program. Ignoring all the international resolutions against it and the demands from its P5+1 allies that it halt its uranium enrichment activities in pursuit of materials for a nuclear weapon, Iran spent the first half of the decade developing its nuclear capabilities in partnership with North Korea, blithely disregarding all the warnings to discontinue its nuclear activities, reflecting the strong relationship between the two countries. In meetings held on the margins of a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran in September 2012, the two countries signed a scientific cooperation agreement and pledged to jointly present a unified front against the United States and Israel, with former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stating, “Just like the case with North Korea, the imperialists also impose political pressure on Iran because they don’t want these nations to remain powerful and independent.” (4) This raised concerns in Washington over the possibility that the Iranian-North Korean agreement included cooperation in nuclear and ballistic missile development that would enhance Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities, enabling it to build a nuclear bomb. This was reminiscent of Pyongyang’s help for the Syrian regime in building a reactor in eastern Syria in 2002 to covertly produce plutonium. (5) The 2012 agreement did not concern the development of a missile system and the transfer of essential nuclear materials for uranium production from North Korea to Iran but extended to offering training to Iranian military experts in conducting nuclear tests and in missile and nuclear weapon production. In February 2013, Iranian nuclear experts attended a “third nuclear test” in North Korea to benefit from the North Koreans’ experience in testing of nuclear weapons as a self-defense against external threats. (6) In conjunction with the signing of the P5+1 initial nuclear agreement at the end April 2015 and prior to the signing of the final agreement on July 30 the same year, Pyongyang continued to offer support to Tehran’s nuclear program, with regular transfers of materials and visits by delegations of North Korean officials clearly
Journal for Iranian Studies
63
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
demonstrating Tehran’s lack of seriousness or commitment to the principles of the agreement which it was supposedly committed to. Among these indicators were: A seven-man delegation of Korean scientists involved in a nuclear warhead and ballistic missile testing and development visited Iran three times between January and April 2015 alone. North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-soo visited Iran in mid-June 2015 to sign an agreement on the construction of joint scientific research facilities and on scientific and technological exchanges between the two nations.(7) According to a report in the Washington Free Beacon, Washington received notification on July 14, 2016, that Iran had violated UN resolutions with the P5+1 group, receiving two shipments of missile components from North Korea. Although detailed reports on this were delivered to president Obama, however, the report said, he declined to inform the UN committee tasked with monitoring breaches of the agreement. Speaking about the two countries’ “strategic partnership” for 2013 and the possibility of pre-emptive US strikes on either, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Brigadier General Massoud Jazayeri said that Iran “will stand by Pyongyang and defended in its standoff with Washington,” adding, “America and its allies would suffer countless casualties if they attacked North Korea, with the number of their victims reaching thousands.” Pyongyang also stressed that it would stand alongside Tehran in the event of any US-Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program. (8) The strategic relationship between the two countries has also extended to include Iran’s regional allies, with the stronger Iranian-North Korean alliance leading to deteriorating relations between Pyongyang and Arab states over Iran’s regional intervention and its expansionist policy at the expense of their own security. As a result of this, only five Arab nations now have embassies in North Korea. These are Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Palestine, and Algeria. (9) In Syria, North Korea supported Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to construct a nuclear reactor in 2003 in the east of the country : North Korea supported the Syrian President “Bashar al-Assad” to build a nuclear reactor in 2003 near Deir el Zour in eastern Syria, with Washington claiming that the Israeli bombing of the Syrian reactor in 2007 and the resulting death of the North Korean experts there revealed the North Korean role in Assad’s nuclear program.
Journal for Iranian Studies
64
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
For Hezbollah, meanwhile, North Korea has provided military training for Hezbollah, as well as assisting in the construction of underground networks and shelters. The Second Lebanon War in 2006 showed that the underground networks and other North Korean assistance played a major role in Hezbollah’s combat against Israel, with Pyongyang also helping the party with manufacturing missiles and launching them against Israeli targets. (10) Second: Factors Affecting Iranian-North Korean Relations A number of variable issues affect relations between the two regimes, with fluctuating international factors affecting the political behavior of the two states and their interactions, both with one another, with their allies and with the international community. The prevailing geopolitical conditions at any given moment can have an impact, along with which powers wield the greatest influence, with these and other factors influencing Tehran’s and Pyongyang’s foreign policy. The interaction and complexity of these variables ultimately shape the relations between Iran and North Korea. In light of the above, we can analyze the primary determinants influencing relations between Iran and North Korea according to analysis of the available data as follows: (11) 1-The nature of the ruling political regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang Despite the differing character of the two nations’ governing systems – theocratic for Iran and communist in North Korea – both have important shared characteristics that bind them together, being totalitarian states based on autocratic rule by a single, “divinely appointed” supreme ruler of regimes whose form is fundamentally oligarchic in nature. Given the Iranian and North Korean rulers’ nominally divine status, they are deemed infallible and may not be opposed or criticized, commanding absolute obedience and amending laws according to their personal wishes, and issuing statements or edicts to media only on subjects which they consider merit a pronouncement. The autocratic nature of the regimes means that the leader wields absolute power and is deemed the sole and unquestionable official source of truth for the entire state. All media, including the press, radio, and TV, exist primarily for the purpose of disseminating the leader’s statements and are absolutely controlled with no expression of opinion contrary to the leader’s or party’s allowed. In both cases, the state’s economic activities and its production facilities are also subject to the leader’s control and are considered his assets. This authoritarian
Journal for Iranian Studies
65
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
mindset also governs the formulation of state foreign policy, although this is considered of secondary importance. (12) In Iran, the Jurist Leader system first implemented under Khomeini controls every aspect of the political system, as well as being the basis of constitutional and religious law. Once elected, the designated Supreme Ruler, currently Ali Khamenei, holds office for life and dominates Iran completely, controlling the political system directly and indirectly. As well as having ultimate control of all constitutional and religious issues, the Supreme Leader also sets or guides public opinion, decides on the membership of the Council of Guardians, the Council of Expediency, the Council of Experts, and the National Security Council, with all these bodies subject to his control. His powers also extend to cover all security institutions, including the Revolutionary Guards, as well as cultural and religious institutions and authorities based both in and outside Iran. (13) Being invested with all these multiple powers gives the Supreme Leader the ability to wholly control the Iranian economy since he also chairs the ‘ Executive Headquarters of Imam’s Directive’, a body originally established to supervise the sale and management of all real estate and property abandoned by its owners following the 1979 revolution, which has since expanded to become a massive economic entity which owns stakes in all sectors of the Iranian economy, ranging from the oil sector to industry and the production of medicines. With the Supreme Leader given even greater powers in recent years, it is now impossible in Iran to criticize him or hold him accountable for any wrongdoing. In addition to his political and economic power, he also enjoys vast religious influence both in and outside Iran, being the supreme authority of Shiites in Iran and worldwide. (14) In North Korea, Kim Jong Un, has absolute constitutional power, like Iran’s Jurist Leadership authorities, albeit from a different ideological orientation, controlling the state, its ministries and all organs of the armed forces, and monopolizing the means of production and distribution, despite the Korean Constitution stipulating state ownership of natural and manmade resources such as railways, transport, aviation, communications,media, factories, institutions, and facilities, including banks. Theoretically, ownership of personal property in North Korea arises from socialist distribution according to the work performed by individuals. According to Article 37 of the Constitution, Korean private and foreign investments rely on the establishment of a joint management, investment and economic body to oversee such projects run by the state and any investors, a factor which discourages any such investment in the country.(15)
Journal for Iranian Studies
66
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
2-The realization of the strategic advantage of nuclear weapons as a deterrent force Both countries have realized the comparative advantage of possessing nuclear weapons as a “deterrent force” in providing more benefits and autonomy in making decisions without external intervention. Both see nuclear weapons as ensuring that their desire to improve their states’ position and rank cannot be bypassed or ignored in regional and international equations, viewing nuclear weapons as a means to efficiently and effectively achieve its foreign policy goals and guarantee their survival since other countries will think twice before attacking any nuclear power. The decision by any state to launch a military nuclear program is based on a number of factors: • The absence of effective security guarantees. • The need to assert national identity. • Providing expertise and substantial capital. • An existing threat or the perception of a serious threat to the country. • The wish to play a greater role in the regional and international arena.(16) Both North Korea and Iran recognize the extent to which nuclear weapons can act as a “deterrent force” to protect their sovereignty, as defined in terms of national security. Henry Kissinger, the prominent American diplomat and political scientist and former US Secretary of State, called nuclear weapons a “deterrent force”, offering a state the ability to prevent or neutralize threats or certain risks and avert direct action in order to face threats or imminent dangers. This deterrent force is considered a manifestation of the threat-confrontation strategy when rapid changes in advanced military technology mean that conventional strategic weapons are unable to cope with intercontinental ballistic missiles. When other powers possess deadly nuclear weapons, this threat can only be countered by possessing similar weapons in order to achieve a military balance between the two conflicting sides, a concept referred to by some researchers in strategic studies as the ‘balance of terror’.(17) North Korea’s desire “to boost its nuclear capabilities” is consistent with the above strategy, with the leadership viewing the nuclear program as a top priority in light of the growing threats posed to it by America and its allies in East Asia, Japan, and South Korea, which have threatened pre-emptive strike on North Korea’s nuclear program. The US’s ability to easily destroy the Iraqi army during the 2003 invasion of Iraq proved to North Korea’s decision-makers that no matter how powerful their conventional military forces, without nuclear weapons the country would be vulnerable and the regime could be easily defeated.
Journal for Iranian Studies
67
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
Since then, the North Korean leader has asserted that “Those who don’t possess nuclear weapons will have the fate of Saddam Hussein.” It is believed that North Korea currently possesses sufficient fissile materials to produce more than 10 nuclear bombs. Iranian decision-makers, meanwhile, concluded that only the possession of weapons of mass destruction would give the regime the necessary deterrent force to prevent the implementation of US-Israeli threats against it and allow it to achieve territorial gains regionally at the expense of its Arab neighbors without being attacked by the US. North Korea has continuously assisted Iran in its relentless pursuit to acquire nuclear weapons, which bases its drive to attain them on the following: From the Iranian perspective, the US military buildup in surrounding nations leads to a “beleaguered and surrounded Iran”, with the regime viewing this military presence as a direct threat to its strategic interests within the immediate region, including Iraq and the Gulf States, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and with the Central Asian states, especially those bordering on the Caspian Sea. The Iranian leadership believes that Iran’s historic role in Western Asia and the Middle East necessitates a correction in the current “balance of power”, by which three regional powers (India, Pakistan, and Israel) possess nuclear weapons (18). The regime wishes to benefit from the lessons of the US war on Iraq, which was classified among the countries defined by the US as belonging to an ‘Axis of Evil’, theorizing that if Iraq had possessed nuclear weapons, the US would have been reluctant to attack it. North Korea arguably provides some evidence to substantiate this hypothesis, with Washington failing to attack it due to the belief that it possesses a deterrent force, including nuclear weapons. Iran believes that the possession of nuclear weapons constitutes a “new regional equation”, by which it can change the rules of the game in the security of the Gulf and Southwest Asia (19). It seems that both North Korea and Iran have realized the effectiveness of the balance of terror equation, whereby any power wishing to attack or invade another will be forced to refrain from doing so by that state’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, instead of resorting to diplomatic negotiations and political talks, or bilateral or multilateral mechanisms to resolve any crises. (20)
Journal for Iranian Studies
68
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
3- The American Policy of Encirclement against Iran and North Korea The end of cold war and the collapse of Soviet Union in1991 resulted in a new unipolar international system, allowing the U.S. to act relatively freely in establishing a new world order. The U.S. became the single most important player in the international system and the world’s lone superpower. The most notable progress to the U.S policy was the desire to act as world police, guardian of the international legitimacy, and benevolently act to spread democracy. The United States has always placed its security and interests above everything else. In the aftermath of 9/11, it has become increasingly evident that tenets of the new imperialism are observable. The United States foreign policy has contained imperialist ambitions, attributing those ambitions to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. In fact, the United States is ruled by a liberal imperialist regime that considers expansion on the expense of other countries as the best way to dominate the world, which was evident in the containment, and aggressive policies through the use of extensive power, which were codified in the National Security Strategy of the United States in September 2002, and classified countries in terms of threats to the American interests as follows; (21) Friendly Countries
Evil Countries
Repent countries
The United States count on these countries in countering terrorism such Egypt and the GCC.
Countries accused by the United States of launching terrorist attacks by themselves or support them against the American interests such as Syria and Iraq that was classified by the United States as Axis of Evil, side by side with Iran and North Korea.
Countries that were blockaded by the United States before 11/9 for being involved in terrorism or supporting it, but later changed its policies and helped in countering terrorism after 11/9 such as Sudan, Yamen and Libya(22).
This view formed the new world order after 9/11. Countering terrorism became the first priority for the U.S. followed by overthrowing dictatorships that support
Journal for Iranian Studies
69
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
terrorism in the world. As a result, the US firmly established its strategy of “Superiority in East Asia and the Middle East, in addition to the importance of maintaining a military presence to maintain the political economic framework of the two regions for the U.S. benefit.” Proceeding from that view, President Obama criticized the presidential candidate, Donald Trump in April 2016 when he said; “It is time for Japan and South Korea to defend themselves by themselves and help them get nuclear weapons.” He added, “We will withdraw the American troops from Japan and South Korea unless they provide more support to the U.S. troops on their lands.” (23). Based on that assumption, the United States had imposed economic sanctions on Iran to bring the regime to its knees and force it to stop its nuclear activities (1). The U.S. sanctions initially targeted investments in oil and business dealings with Iran’s Central Bank. This encompassed banking transactions and freezing the accounts of financial organizations dealing with Iran. Over years, sanctions have taken a serious toll on Iran’s economy and people. The U.S. had led international efforts to use sanctions to influence Iran’s policies, including Iran’s uranium enrichment program; nevertheless, Iran had never stopped its program, claiming that this program is for civilian purposes. To counter Iran’s threats and protect the Western interests, the American support to Israel continued and achieved an Israeli superiority over its neighbors. It also signed armistice agreements with its Arab allies and maintained a military presence in the Gulf States. To complete the blockade on Iran before the nuclear deal, The United States had expanded the NATO operations to Central Asia to isolate Iran from Russia and China. As for North Korea, the Western economic sanctions severed the already bad economic situation of the country. According to the international resolutions, the international community, except China and Russia, were banned from dealing with North Korea or providing the necessary technologies for producing nuclear weapons. To counter the North Korean threats, the United States maintained its military presence in Southeast Asia; 47 thousand American soldiers in Japan; and 27 thousand soldiers in South Korea. It also displayed a ballistic missile shield and held annual military training with Tokyo and Seoul to counter any missile strikes and blockade China, the major ally of North Korea (24). The belief that the United States position in the world was to be the good force acting against the antagonistic, “Axis of evil” of Iran and North Korea because of their
Journal for Iranian Studies
70
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
nuclear ambitions became widespread. Nevertheless, the American passing over of the Israeli nuclear capabilities made the two countries recognize the importance of joint work to counter the growing American influence in East Asia, Central Asian Republics, and the Middle East. Iran and North Korea felt that they share the same destiny in countering the international pressure led by the U.S. and its allies, especially Israel, and rejecting the United States hegemony of the world. Since the revolution of 1979, Iran sees Washington as an imperialist force seeks domination of the Middle East and its natural resources in cooperation with its regional allies. In addition to that, there is a long history of rivalry between Iran and the U.S. such as the crisis of the American hostages in Iran that lasted for 444 days and the Western sanctions imposed on Iran because of its nuclear ambitions. On the other hand, North Korea is the only true communist country in values and rejection of the Western capitalist imperialism of the world. The historical rivalry between capitalism and communism is well known through differences in economic, political, and social issues. Communism aims to fight the Western Imperialism and eliminate capitalism everywhere; meanwhile, capitalist countries were dedicated to limit the spread of communism by all means. Hence, The American-North Korean hostility stems from ideological differences and the North Korean view of the United States as an imperialist nation aims to dominate the world. (25) 4. The Strategy of “Counter Alliance” against the Washington-Seoul-Tokyo alliance The American alliance with Tokyo and Seoul resulted in the creation of a counter-alliance between North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran. The four countries share strong economic and political ties. On the political level, they stand firmly against the Western resolutions and support each other such as the Hexagonal Table negotiations concerning the North Korean nuclear program in 2003 that ended with the North Korean withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty because of the support of Russia and china that played the same role during Iran’s nuclear deal negotiations. The most prominent issue that upsets the West is the nuclear and military cooperation between these countries that resulted in economic sanctions imposed on them; Iran and North Korea face the same economic sanctions because of their nuclear programs; Russia faces Western sanctions because of its position toward Ukraine and support of the separatist groups in eastern former Soviet Union countries; and China is facing the same destiny because of its regional and international presence through the soft expansion policy. (26)
Journal for Iranian Studies
71
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
The United States is dominating the oil-rich West Bank of the Arab Gulf to secure oil importation from the region. China, Russia, and North Korea sought to achieve balance in East Bank to bring the American ambitions in the region down and deter the American attempts to impose oil sanctions on other countries. On the other hand, In the case of any American-Chinese military confrontation over Taiwan, the U.S. will be incapable of closing down the Chinese supplies of oil because of the alliance in the East Bank of the Arab Gulf. In 2001 China adopted the strategic view of creating the “Shanghai Organization for cooperation” that paved the way for an Iranian-Russian-Chinese Axis to confront the growing American Imperialism. North Korea and Iran couldn’t face the United States and its allies, South Korea and Japan; politically and economically. As a result, they aimed to dedicate the military dimension to serve the other two dimensions they are missing and confront the American sanctions across the table of negotiations and through the support of their allies, Russia and China. (27) Third: Dangers of Growing Iran-Korea Military Cooperation 1- The Strategy of Regional and International Nuclear Extortion First Danger
Second Danger
Breakdown Nuclear Extortion regional balance
Third Danger
Fourth Danger
Fifth Danger
Disastrous nuclear incidents because of the absence of nuclear security.
A hydrogen bomb armed Iran by Korean Expertise
Threat to the International peace and security and break the rules of World Order.
This is a form of nuclear strategy in which an aggressor uses the threat of use of nuclear weapons to force the international community to perform some actions or make some concessions. North Korea pioneered in this strategy through conducting nuclear experiments and then negotiating the breakdown of these weapons in exchange for food, oil, and crude materials; when the West, including the U.S., Japan, and South Korea fulfill their commitments, the Korean president backs off and proceeds on conducting new nuclear experiments, and offering new deals to the West. North Korea used this strategy many times in the nineties of last century during negotiations of the hexagonal table and signing the framework of the 1994 deal, and repeated in 2006, 2009, and 2013; even though, the U.S. disregards the Korean strategy to continue maintaining a military and political presence in East Asia. (28)
Journal for Iranian Studies
72
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
Iran had before it the example of North Korea’s successful nuclear extortion. It is a theocratic state ruled by a big camp of clergy headed by the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. The Leader sees the nuclear deal as a submission that must be terminated as soon as possible. In fact, Iran cannot be isolated from the world like Korea, but the West is not working effectively to stop Iran’s blackmailing nuclear program. President Rouhani is trying to convince the West of lifting sanctions, which might be a carbon copy of North Korea’s case. This is evident in Iran’s constant attempts to develop its ballistic missiles and nuclear program although signing the nuclear deal in 2015, which is once again disregarded by the United States such as; On 7/17/2016 two unknown diplomats revealed a document to the American Associated press (a) that allows Iran to resume its nuclear program immediately after President Obama leaves office. The Associated press reported that this document is a confidential appendix to the nuclear deal between Iran and the six major countries. Based on that document, Tehran can exchange its five thousand old centrifuges with 3500 states of the art ones after 11-15 years of the nuclear deal, reducing the time for Iran to produce nuclear weapons from one year to six months. (29) The American Senator, Tom Coton stated by the end of March 2015 that Iran can break the nuclear deal in the next ten years (b) and gain nuclear weapons, but at the same time, it can stick to the deal and then gain nuclear weapons after ten years same as North Korea that needed 12 years to produce nuclear weapons in 2006 after signing a deal in 1994. (30) 2- Break regional balance Foreign policy literature explains regional balance as the case when all political, economic, and military powers are equal in a country or a group of countries that share common factors. The balance of power enables countries to respond to any dangers that might emerge and swiftly move to regain stability and balance when needed. However, when any country seeks military superiority over its neighbors and threatens their stability, it represents a distortion of the regional balance. (31) Based on that assumption, the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea will break the regional strategic balance in East Asia and in the Middle East with one difference; Korea is trying to defend itself; meanwhile, Iran is a sectarian expansionist regional country on the American-European-Israeli model through its claimed Shiite Crescent that extends from Iraq ruled by Haider Al-Abadi, the Iranian puppet; through Syria ruled by an Alawi regime, Iran’s proxy; to Lebanon that is
Journal for Iranian Studies
73
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
controlled by the Shiite Hezbollah under the command of Iran; up to the Arab Gulf. The growing Iranian threat to the regional security has gone too far and became a reality. Iran has officially taken over Iraq through the Iraqi prime minister’s declaration of combining the Public Mobilization Forces with the Iraqi army, which means that they took control of the army and its capabilities for Iran’s benefit and rising threats against the Iraqi Sunnis. In addition to that, Iran supports its proxies inside some Arab countries in Lebanon and Yemen through foiling the Yemeni peace talks in Kuwait and the declarations of its loyalists Houthis-Saleh the creation of a command council to run the country, which coincides with Al-Abadi’s decree to combine the Public Mobilization forces with the Iraqi army. In fact, Iran sees its ability to disturb its neighbors as a point of strength and presents its self as a super regional power that enables it to negotiate with the U.S. standing on a solid ground, which in reality threatens the Arab region’s security. Growing threats to the security of the Gulf States: First of all, Iran can do this through enhancing the distortion of the balance of power and expansion in the Arab countries. The geopolitical (b) realities show that Iran cannot expand east because of the nuclear powers of China, Pakistan, and India, nor north because of the Russian superpower, which forces it to expand west in the Arab region. Secondly, Iran can target oil fields in the Gulf region and change the course of regional and international developments because of the proximity of these fields and refineries from Iran by surface to surface missiles that can hit all targeted areas, which is unlikely to happen because of regional and international considerations. (32) 3- Potential nuclear accidents due to lack of a “nuclear safety” mechanism The Iranian-North Korean nuclear cooperation may be willing to take extreme risks in the possession of nuclear weapons, whether in East Asia or the Middle East, due to the lack of any nuclear safety mechanisms to prevent potentially catastrophic nuclear accidents and other dangers, which pose an extra dimension of hazard, as follows: A- Political Risks: Related to tensions and political pressure, led by anxiety about prospects of nuclear proliferation by nuclear powers, creating a permanent state of regional tensions and mutual suspicions. B- Military Risks: Related to the nuclear facilities’ status as primary targets, with increased prospects of their coming under serious attack in the event of wars and confrontations. There are also heightened risks of these powers weaponising
Journal for Iranian Studies
74
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
radioactive nuclear waste for use against adversaries leading to the creation of radiological and radiation-based weapons, which are latent threats in nuclear regions, including the Middle East.(33) C- Environmental Risks: Related to problems with or accidents at nuclear facilities which could potentially have severe consequences for a widespread surrounding area, such as radiation leaks, or unsafe transportation of fissile materials. The effects of such incidents would not be a limited to the nuclear power itself but would extend over a considerable distance to neighboring countries. D- Other Risks: Related to the potential for the theft or smuggling of nuclear materials in unusual circumstances, such as during periods of political instability within states, as during the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, which saw widespread problems with controlling nuclear materials and equipment. This leads to further potential dangers such as the sale of such materials on the black market and their acquisition by terrorist groups. In regards to all the above, the Arab Gulf states are the worst affected and placed at the greatest risk of the growth in Iran’s nuclear capabilities, since the Bushehr reactor, considered the most important Iranian nuclear facility, is located on the western coast of the Arabian Gulf. The reactor relies mainly on imported equipment from North Korea, which has no “nuclear safety” production guarantees in place. With the Western ban on nuclear equipment, Iran may seek to accomplish its nuclear armament by less secure equipment, exposing the Gulf States to the danger of radiation leaks. (34) 4- Iran offered capability to acquire hydrogen bomb by North Korean expertise: Within the next year or two, it’s highly possible that North Korea will manage to successfully mount a hydrogen bomb on a ballistic missile, following the success of its tests of an H-bomb at the end of June 2016 in the presence of Iranian experts. Given the strategic military partnership between Iran and North Korea, this would invariably lead to the transfer of this technology to Iran within a short period. There is, understandably, grave concern over the possible deployment of these weapons, which each have many times the power of a conventional nuclear bomb, with the explosive power of around twenty million tons of (TNT). Only five other countries in the world have succeeded in making the hydrogen bomb to date: these are the United States, Russia, Britain, China, and France. (35) The probability of North Korea attaining hydrogen bomb technology and passing
Journal for Iranian Studies
75
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
this to Tehran, which now has the financial ability to invest in this technology following the nuclear deal and the ending of sanctions, would have a number of repercussion, including disrupting the regional and international balance in favor of Iran, allowing it to dominate the region and to enter the ‘nuclear nations club’ 5- The threat to international peace and security and The departure from the current global system’s rules: Iran and North Korea are both aggressive states which would invariably use their nuclear technology against other members of the international community, with this implicit threat forcing others to acquire the same weapons of massive destruction. Moreover, Iran would use its capabilities against other states in the same region where it is already engaging in acts of sabotage by using armed forces of soldiers, irregulars, and mercenaries, threatening international peace and security, and departing from the rules of the current global system which are based on developing friendly relations among nations and cooperation in solving international crises by peaceful means. North Korea and Iran have not hesitated to import the necessary materials to construct nuclear reactors such as Uranium and Plutonium, or to build sophisticated missile weapons systems. The two countries have not stopped threatening the use of armed force in East Asia and the Middle East. North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests, the first in 2006, the second in 2009, and the third in 2013, as well as conducting its first hydrogen bomb test on June 1, 2016, a serious development for international security. This gives a clear example of the falsity of both states’ promises to abide by international conventions, with both openly declaring their hostility and threatening the security of regional and international systems. Both are intent on breaching all global rules and destroying the regional balance, with the resulting complications increased by the brutally totalitarian and dictatorial nature of the two states. (36) The Iranian Republic of Iran has threatened repeatedly to use armed force to close the Strait of Hormuz, an international shipping route for transporting Gulf oil to the West and the United States, as well as to other nations. Iran is also inflicting devastating damage on neighboring countries, particularly Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, through sectarianism, war, and acts of espionage. Moreover, Iran also sends military and non-military forces to incite sectarian strife. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime works tirelessly on building nuclear reactors, which pose a direct
Journal for Iranian Studies
76
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
threat to international security and peace, despite the signing of the nuclear deal in June 2015. Fourth: The future of the nuclear deal with the new American president Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was one of the architects of the nuclear deal implemented in June 2015 between Iran and the West (the P5 +1 group), is one of the deal’s strongest supporters and considers the deal to be a major step towards preventing Iran from enriching uranium, and thus to obtaining a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, Clinton announced that a primary principle of the P5+1 group’s policies toward the nuclear deal is to monitor Iran’s compliance with the deal’s terms, and, in the case of Tehran’s violation of any of these terms, to re-impose sanctions against it. In this case, she has said, all the options would be on the table to deal with Iran, including military options. In contrast, the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump rejects the nuclear deal with Iran, which he views as a threat to the US and Israeli security. Trump has vowed that if elected he will renegotiate the deal since his primary objective is the destruction of Iran’s nuclear ambitions “by any means”. Trump has also demanded increased economic sanctions on Tehran.Concerning the Iranian nuclear file, Clinton has sought to reassure allies in the Gulf region, that the United States will not abandon them, and will remain committed to the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and protect them from Iranian threats, stressing that the Gulf region is an important partner for Washington in terms of security, trade, and defense. Again in contrast and continuing his confrontational stance, Trump has announced that he would stop importing oil from Saudi Arabia if the latter did not participate in fighting against ISIS or compensate the United States for its efforts in fighting against the terrorist group. The Republican candidate has also called on Gulf countries to bear the cost of establishing safe zones in Syria. The future of the nuclear deal is clearly a priority in one way or another for both candidates, with Hillary Clinton currently leading the presidential race by a small margin, according to the fluctuating opinion polls. The foreign policy announced by Clinton is largely a continuation of Obama’s, reducing direct US intervention in regional issues and conflicts and preferring to rely on the United States’ allies. Clinton makes the use of diplomatic rather than military tools a governing principle in this context to achieve a balance between protecting US security interests in the region without direct military intervention and maintaining the image of the United States as a
Journal for Iranian Studies
77
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
state sponsor of democracy and human rights, which is accepted among American youth. Fifth: The results of the study 1- Since Iran largely replicates the North Korean model in form if not in doctrine, the two do not differ in any appreciable way given a large number of common features and the nature of their relations, mutual nuclear ambitions and shared antipathy towards the US, which also expresses hostility towards their nuclear programs. 2- Iran believes that by implementing a nuclear program, it will be able to change the regional distribution and balance of power in the Middle East in its own favor, enabling it to change the prevailing status quo. It is likely that the regional structure of the Middle East will change from one of a nuclear unipolar system, by which Israel is the only nuclear power, to one of nuclear bipolarity, with both Israel and Iran being nuclear powers, leading to a state of nuclear cold war in the future. 3- The United States does not want to fully remove the nuclear programs of the two countries since doing so would be contrary to its regional interests and presence in both regions. The US plays a critical role in regional security, which it has maintained by signing the framework agreement with North Korea in 1994, and the ‘legacy deal’ with Iran in 2015. The two agreements were signed very deliberately, despite the warnings of many observers and analysts. By signing the agreements, on the one hand, the United States makes itself indispensable essential in defending its regional allies in East Asia (South Korea and Japan) and the Middle East (the Gulf States) from the surrounding threats (which it has guaranteed) and assisting them in achieving security and stability. On the other hand, Washington is leaving the scene of the two countries without letting Iran rise to “Regional Hegemony” to continue their nuclear programs secretly, as revealed in recently leaked documents concerning the Iranian nuclear program and the Pyongyang’s hydrogen bomb test in June 2016. The solution to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear problems means achieving security in the two regions, meaning that there is no need for Washington to evacuate its military bases in the two regions and to further reduce its role, which is contrary to its interests in the two regions. 4- While Western nations, including the United States, claim to be working to prevent other nations’ development of nuclear weapons programs, their deep involvement in protecting the leadership of the Iranian and North Korean regimes in order to maintain their own status as supposed regional defenders of other states will ultimately be uncovered. The eventual and inevitable outbreak of chaos resulting from the Iranian and North Korean
Journal for Iranian Studies
78
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
regimes’ attaining nuclear weapons could cause genuine and intense harm to regional and international security since neither regime can be trusted or relied upon. This is all the more obvious given the Iranian regime’s current continued savage aggression against neighboring Arab nations, while the Western states protect Iran’s theocratic regime even as it calls for their death and downfall. Arab Gulf states will ultimate face a similar fate to that of North Korea, becoming a hostage of US protectionism. In light of the clear and obvious American position against the Arab and Gulf states and its failures in East Asia and the Middle East to constrain North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs, Iran will continue its disruptive expansionist policy towards regional states such as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and other Arab nations. Finally, history repeatedly demonstrates that totalitarian regimes inevitably undermine states and societies with no support to maintain them but that of brute force and authority; these characteristics increase until they become the totalitarian regime’s sole identity and source of continuity. Moreover because such authoritarianism deliberately eliminates any form of social engagement other than coercion, it is fully reliant on top-down totalitarian First Result Reborn for another North-Korea
Second Result
Third Result
American policy Tending to prefer not to nuclear-regional demolish the dual bi-polar system nuclear programs completely for country’s interests and resources.
Fourth Result
Fifth Result
West countries, ironically, will be included in protecting the Jurist Leadership and Kim Oni indirectly.
Iran will continue its expansion and sabotage policy toward neighboring countries and threatening the GCC.
order imposed by the leadership in the person of the president or Supreme Leader, with the resulting inertia impeding any progress and creating massive and ineffectual security and administrative organs to protect the leader which eventually collapse under their own weight. When totalitarian systems ultimately arrive at this inevitable conclusion, they begin their final disintegration, which takes the form of needing to borrow leadership techniques and strategies from outside the ruling system in order to ensure survival. The advent of these policies to treat the crises inflicted by totalitarian rule introduce new techniques and mechanisms which ensure modernization and development, allowing societies to change,
Journal for Iranian Studies
79
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
evolve and move forward. These changes, in turn, ensure the rise of a new, modernizing, technocratic mentality isolated from the previous solely ideological worldview propagated by the regime and with no reverence for the regime’s authority and character, which is interested solely in advancing society. In the words of Chinese revolutionary and political leader Deng Xiaoping, the founder of modern-day China’s economic model, “It doesn’t matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice.” With the introduction of such a system, a totalitarian regime will ultimately fall since this system makes it impossible for it to continue indefinitely.
REFERENCES (1) Kenneth Walter: Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability, Foreign Affairs Journal, issue of July 2012, p. 45 (2) Peter Brookes, Could North Korea Secretly Build an Iranian Bomb? the National Institute, May 10, 2016, available at: https://goo.gl/i2YOSk (3) Wiki Leaks that were reported, New York Times Newspaper, 2010, for more information at, the military analyst Gordon Chang, Shall North Korea Open Back Door for the Iranian Nuclear Program? Translated: Mai Khalaf, Alkhaleej online, 2/4/2015, available at the link: http://alkhaleejonline.net/articles (4) Scientific Cooperation between Iran and North Korea, Associated Press, Washington Post, New York Times, The Guardian, The Middle East, Alquds Al-Arabi, Al-Hayat, 11/9/2012 (5) Larry Niksch, The hidden North Korea-Iran strategic Relationship Washington times March 30, 2016, available at:https://goo.gl/4QLNYD (6) Rep. Ted Poe, North Korea and Iran: Dangerous bedfellows with one common enemy the US March 23, 2016, available at:https://goo.gl/AsdVb0 (7) Christina Lin,China and the North Korea-Iran Nuclear Axis, The Washington Institute, July-August 2010, p. 13, available at: https://goo.gl/gn8Krj (8) Seoul Seeks Iran’s Help on North Korea Sanctions، THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, available at: https://goo.gl/14bFSA (9) Mas’oud Jaza’iri’s statement: “We will defend North Korea Against America” Al-Arabiya Net 8/4/2013, available at the link: http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and (10) Bothainah Shteiwi: Maza Ta’rif ‘An Alalaqat Alnawawiyah Bain Korea Alshamaliyah wa Iran? Sassa Net Electronic Journal, published on 1/6/2015, available at the link: https://goo.gl/63QlfW (11) Huda Al-Husseini: Korea Alshamaliya Todawir Alsawareekh Al-Irania, The Middle East, issue 13407, 13/8/2015, available at the link: https://goo.gl/YHjgOQ (12) Mohammad Alsaied Saleem: Tahleel Alsiasah Alkharijiah, Cairo, Alnahda Egyptian Library,1st edition, p. 46 (13) Abdulghani Basioni Abdullah: Alnuzom Alsiasiah, Aljam’ah Aljadeedah Publishers, Alexandria, 2006, p. 112, also, Osama Alghazali Harb: Alahzab Alsiasiah fi Alsharq Alawsat (14) Mustafah Allabbad: Hada’iq Alahzan: Iran wa Welayat Alfaqih, Cairo, Dar Alshoroq, 2007, p. 41, also, article 57 section 5, Constitution of the Iranian Republic
Journal for Iranian Studies
80
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Joint Nuclear Ambitions Iran-North Korea Relations: Determinants and Risks
(15) Al-Imam Al-Khomeini: The Islamic Government, Tehran, Establishment of Organizing and Spreading the Legacy of Imam Khomeini, 1996, p. 49 (16) Alsaied Sidqi Abdeen: Alnizam Alsiasi Alkori Alshamali, Abdulaziz Shadi and Mohammad Ayob (editors), Altahwolat Alsiasiah fi Korea, Cairo, Asian Studies Center, 2002, p. 24 (17) Qudurat Iran wa Alseen Alsarokhiah Haq Mubarar Dhimn Istrategiat Alradi’ wa Biahdaf Difa’iah, Al-Ra’i International News Agency, 15/9/2015, available at the link: http://www.alrai-iq.com/2015/09/15/156795/, Also: Tawfiq Hamil: Altabi’at Alistrategiah Lilbarnamij Alnawawi Al-Irani, Aljazeera Studies Center, link: http://kitabatnews.com/wordpress-test/. (18) Nizar Abdulqadir: Aldawafi’ Alnawawiyah Al-Irania wa Aljohood Aldawliah Liihtiwa’, National Defense Journal, issue 24, October 2005, available at the link: https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/ar/content/%D. (19) Agreement in Iran Nuclear Talks, BBC News, 11 July 2004 http://news.bbc. co.uk/go/pr/fr (20) Anthony H. Cordesman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,” Arleigh A. Burkle chair for Strategy، Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., June 2001. (21) Mustafa Alawi: Albuniah Aldawliah wa Khasa’is Alnizam Alalami: Almakhatir Walfuras, in “a number of researchers”: Aldawr Aliqleemi Li-Misr fi Mowajahat Altahadiyat Alrahinah, p. 43. (22) Buniat wa Tawajohat Alnizam Aldawli Aljadeed Ba’d Ahdath September 2001, Almasdar Online, Special File, 25/9/2009, available at the link: http://almasdaronline.com/article/2351 (23) Jawad Alhamad: Alwilayat Almutahidah wa Alnizam Alalami Ba’d Infijarat September 11, 2001, Mediterranean Studies Journal, issue 17, Fall 2001. (24) HosseinSeifzadeh, “Iranian Nuclear Issue: An Academic of Iran’s Official Positions.” a paper presented at UCLA Conference, Dead Sea, Jordan, 9-12 September 2004. (25) In the Memory of Marx Declaration… Get to Know the Current Communist Nations, available at the link: http://www.dotmsr.com/details/%D. (26) Russia, Iran, and North Korea… The Western Headache, available at the link: http://www.dotmsr.com/details/%. (27) Abdullah Yusuf Sahar: Korea Alshamaliyah wa Alwaraqa Al-Irania wa Shalal Aldiplomasia Al-Arabia, The Middle East, issue 8092, 23/1/2001, available at the link: https://goo.gl/UU0Jiy (28) Ron Ibn Yishai (Military Analyst in the Hebrew Newspaper, Yediot Ahronot): Iran Learns from Russia How to Blackmail the World and Continues Development of its Nuclear Program and Ballistic Missiles, available at the link: https://goo.gl/HH20M3. (29) Associated Press, 16/7/2016. (30) The American Congress Position Toward the Iranian Nuclear Deal, Alnahrein Center for Strategic Studies, 7/5/2015, available at the link: http://www.alnahrain.iq/?p=1935. (31) . Mjahid Alzaiyat (PH.D.): Altawazon Alistrategi fi Mantiqat Alkhaleej: Almutagaierat wa Alholol, Advisor of the Regional Center for Strategic Studies, issue 102, Ara’ Hawl Al-Khaleej, available at the link: https://goo.gl/3Cu0q2. (32) Ashraf Kishk: Ro’yat Dowal Majlis Alta’awon Alkhaleeji Lilbarnamij Alnawawi Al-Irani, September 2005, Iranian Selections, Cairo, Political and Strategic Studies Center, issue 63, p. 20. (33) . Rania Mohammad Tahir (PH.D.): Alsilah Alnawawi Bain Mabadi’ Alshar’iah Aldawliah wa Katmiyat Alqwah, A Comparative Study of the Nuclear Policies of both Iran and North Korea, The Arabian Bureau for Knowledge, available at the link: https://goo.gl/WV6xCT (34) Jamal Sanad Alsueidi: Alnashatat Alnawawiah Al-Irania: Qadhaya wa Inikasat, in: Jamal Sand Alsueidi (editor), The Iranian Nuclear Program Seminar: Alwaqa’ii wa Altada’iat, Abu Dhabi, Studies Center for Strategic Research and Studies, 2007, p. 9. (35) Alhaidrojeniah… Qunbulah Tafoq Alnawawiah, Aljazeera Net 6/1/2016 (36) Aiman Al-Hammad: Iran ala Kuta Korea Alshamaliyah, Riyadh, issue 17363, 7/1/2016, Also: http://www.alriyadh.com/1117128.
Journal for Iranian Studies
81
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region Mohammed Hassan Husseinbor (PH.D.) Iranian Political Researcher
INTRODUCTION
T
he Chabahar Agreement signed between the Indian Prime Minister Modi and Iranian President Rouhani in May of this year will enable India to develop the Chabahar Port in Iranian Baluchistan as a major economic and strategic corridor linking India to Afghanistan andCentral Asian markets. The Agreement is seen as India’s strategic response to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under which China will invest about $47 billion to link Western China via overland roads, pipelines, and railways to Gwadar Port in Eastern Baluchistan. The Indo-Chinese rivalry underscores the geopolitical significance of Baluchistan as a focal point in the New Great Game played by the US, China, and India in Asia. This paper addresses the domestic, regional, and international implications of the two emerging strategic seaports and their impact on the Arabian Gulf and the Baluch movement in Iran.
Chabahar is India’s response to China’s move in Gwadar. Both ports are part of Baluchistan, on the Arabian Sea coast within 70 kilometers of each other. Therefore, an understanding of Chabahar will be difficult without reference to Gwadar and vice versa. This paper is divided into three parts. The first covers the historical background and geopolitical significance of Baluchistan and its two strategic seaports. The second deals with the regional implications reflecting the role of regional actors namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The third
Journal for Iranian Studies
82
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
treats the international implications of the Indo-Chinese rivalry over Chabahar and Gwadar, respectively, as well as the US-China competition in the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and beyond. PART I Baluchistan and Its Geostrategic Location: the Importance of Chabahar The ports of Chabahar and Gwadar are located on Baluchistan’s Arabian Sea coast stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to Karachi. The geostrategic location of Baluchistan underscores the importance of the two ports. Therefore, the historical background and the geostrategic importance of Baluchistan are presented first to provide the context to better understand Chabahar and Gwadar’s significance. Until the advent of British Colonialism in the mid-19th century, Baluchistan maintained its independence, for the most part, from the surrounding empires. This is reflected in the fact that the pre-division period is known by the Baluch as the Baluch Doura or the Baluch era, a historical concept used by the Baluch to refer to the state of affairs in Baluchistan prior to its division and occupation by Iran and Pakistan. The Baluch Doura survived the British colonial rule (1858-1947) because the British did not replace the Baluch political rule and institutions, but simply created its own parallel system of administration to control the defense and external affairs of an otherwise an independent Baluchi state(1). Under the British Empire, Baluchistan was divided into three parts. The Goldsmid Line, drawn in 1871 and demarcated in 1896, gave western Baluchistan to Persia. The Baluch in Iran, however, maintained their independence until 1928 when, with British approval, Reza Shah Pahlavi occupied and forcefully annexed western Baluchistan into Iran. The Durand Line, drawn also by the British in 1894, further divided eastern Baluchistan between British India and Afghanistan. Upon the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1948, Baluchistan regained its independence for a short time but was invaded and annexed by Pakistan the same year. These events have led to the rise of Baluch nationalism, which is the driving force behind the Baluch quest for independence.
Journal for Iranian Studies
83
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
The Geostrategic Importance of Baluchistan: the New Great Game Baluchistan – meaning the Baluch homeland – covers about 240,000 square miles with a coastline stretching nearly 1000 miles from the Strait of Hormuz to Karachi in Pakistan. It occupies one of the most strategic locations in the world, linking the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. It is also one of the richest lands in terms of natural resources including oil, gas, uranium, coal, gold, iron ore, and immense seabed resources along its long coastline, including its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Baluchistan has an estimated population of around 35 million including 7 million in Iranian-occupied western Baluchistan; 25 million in Pakistani-occupied eastern Baluchistan, Sind, and Punjab; and around 3 million in Afghanistan. In addition, there is a large Baluchi population numbering more than a million in the neighboring Arabian Gulf states. There are also significant numbers of Baluch living in India, East Africa, and Turkilometersenistan, as well as in diaspora in Europe, US, and Australia. Baluchs, like Kurds, are one of the largest nations in the Middle East and South Asia without a state of their own. Baluchistan borders the Indus River and Punjab in the East, the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman in the West, the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean in the South, and the Iranian provinces of Kerman and Khorasan as well as Afghanistan in the North(2). The strategic location of Baluchistan places Chabahar and Gwadar ports at the center of the growing rivalry among the US, China, and India in the Indian Ocean, South Asia, and Central Asia. Baluchistan’s geopolitical significance is based on this strategic location and its tremendous reserves of natural resources summarized as follows: 1. Located directly at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz on a coastline stretching nearly 1000 miles to Karachi, Baluchistan occupies a strategic position with a commanding view of the shipping lines carrying 40 percent of world oil supplies. The world economy depends on these supplies and securing the shipping lines passing through the Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Sea is of vital importance to the world economy. 2. Baluchistan connects the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia via sea, land, and air and can serve as a major hub for trade, energy, transportation, and communication links among the countries of these regions. 3. Baluchistan holds large reserves of natural resources including silver, uranium, aluminum, and oil, gas, gold, copper, and platinum. As we know, the competition
Journal for Iranian Studies
84
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
for natural resources is intensifying among the major economic and military powers, attracting them to Baluchistan. 4. Baluchistan is the most viable economic route for overland roads, railways, and pipelines from Central Asia, China, and Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea and from the Middle East and South Asia to China and Central Asia. If connected, the land-locked Afghanistan and energy-rich Central Asian countries will gain access to international markets for their energy exports. 5. With a coastline of about 1000 miles, Baluchistan would have jurisdiction and ownership of the sea and seabed resources along its coast for two hundred miles under Exclusive Economic Zone provisions of the Law of the Sea, a major factor in the Baluch drive for independence. The energy resources in Baluchistan’s coastal seabed are reported to be the largest in the world. PART II The Chabahar Agreement and Its Regional Implications: the Role of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Arabian Gulf States The Chabahar Agreement between India and Iran is part of 12 pacts signed by the Indian Prime Minister Modi and Iranian President Rouhani during a summit in early May of this year. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani also joined Modi and Rouhani for the signing of a trilateral trade agreement facilitating the transit of goods among these countries and providing India with access to Afghanistan via the Chabahar port. Under this Agreement, India will invest $500 million in expanding and operating Chabahar port in Iranian Baluchistan and transforming it into India’s gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India will undertake several other major projects worth $20 billion including setting up an LNG plant and a gas cracker unit in the Chabahar free trade zone.(3) The Chabahar Agreement has been described as a “strategic game changer”(4) not only for Iran, India, and Afghanistan, but also for Pakistan, Arabian Gulf states, China, and Central Asia. It has wide-ranging strategic, economic, diplomatic, and political implications benefiting Iran, India, and Afghanistan at the expense of their rivals(5). Iran Coming in the aftermath of the nuclear deal and lifting of Western sanctions, the Agreement provides Iran with far-reaching economic and trade opportunities, which could be as important as the lifting of economic sanctions by the West. To sweeten the deal during the Summit, Prime Minister Modi returned part of the $6.4 billion owned by the Indian refiners to Iran and pledged to quickly transfer the rest(6). First, the deal
Journal for Iranian Studies
85
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
helps Iran secure and expand a greater market share for its energy products in India at the expense of Saudi Arabia. Second, it serves as a catalyst for attracting substantial international investments needed for developing Chabahar and its infrastructure. In addition to India, Iran has granted land and facilities to Afghanistan, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and China for investments in the Chabahar Free Trade Zone. Iran has also built a 600-kilometer highway linking Chabahar to Zahedan, the capital of Iranian Baluchistan, and 240 kilometers away from Malik on the Iran-Afghanistan border. Work is underway to connect it to Malik and then to the Zaranj-Delaram highway completed by India in Nimroz province in Afghanistan. Iran has also started constructing a railway linking Chabahar to Zahedan where it will connect with the Iranian rail network and to Central Asia and CIS countries. Third, the deal serves as a major source of revenue from duties and tariffs imposed on goods passing through Chabahar as well as from transit and transportation fees generated from the use of Iranian roads, railways, and pipelines linking Chabahar to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran is expected to levy sizable duties on imports coming from India and the Gulf region and exports originating from Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. Fourth, Iran sees Chabahar as an alternative to Bandar Abbas located inside the Arabian Gulf west of the Strait of Hormuz. Any blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would cripple Iran’s trade and commerce and would render Bandar Abbas unusable. Unlike Bandar Abbas, Chabahar is Iran’s only deep water port, giving it access to the Indian Ocean. Geopolitically, Iran also considers the Chabahar Agreement as a strategic victory for boosting its political influence in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Southwest Asia; for strengthening its position in the Arabian Gulf against Saudi Arabia; and for projecting its power in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The expanded political, economic, trade, and investment ties between India and Iran could lead to a strategic alliance paving the way for stronger naval cooperation in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Similarly, growing trade and commerce among Iran, Afghanistan, and CIS countries could lead to greater political influence by Iran in those countries at the expense of Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The roads, railways, and pipelines linking Chabahar to Afghanistan and CIS countries provide Iran with major political and diplomatic leverages for influencing those countries at the expense of its rivals. With a view to counter its regional rival Saudi Arabia, Iran is set to use Chabahar and energy agreements with India to further strengthen its strategic interests in
Journal for Iranian Studies
86
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea for regional dominance and greater market share for its energy products. It is using Chabahar as a major land-air-naval base to project power in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The port is a launching pad for Iran’s arms shipments to Houthi rebels in Yemen. Iran’s fleet of submarines is based in Chabahar. Referring to Saudi-Iranian competition, Lindsay Hughes, a research analyst at the Indian Ocean Research Programme, states that: “Iran, as is commonly known, has been and remains locked in a rivalry with Saudi Arabia for regional pre-eminence and market share for its energy products. It is aware that it can increase its regional influence, and thus achieve its strategic goals, only if its economy develops. It is the acute rivalry that it has with Saudi Arabia that saw it forgo the opportunity to attend the recent summit on oil in Doha on April 7. Iran refused to attend the meeting, which was called by major oil-producing countries in an effort to boost the current low oil prices by freezing production. Iran insisted that it would continue to increase its production in order to regain the market share it had lost to Saudi Arabia and other oil producers due to the sanctions, despite threats by Saudi Arabia to do likewise, which could keep prices low and possibly force Iran to capitulate. Tehran will no doubt be banking on the fact that while it has prodigious amounts of proven oil and gas reserves, Riyadh has only oil reserves, albeit being the largest oil producer in the world. Tehran knows that Saudi oil exports and market share can only decrease as long as US crude oil supplies remain at very high levels... Given those factors, it is critical that Iran increases its market share of energy products, which makes its growing relationship with India that much more important.”(7) Tehran’s refusal to attend the Doha oil summit was a clear signal to OPEC and other oil producing countries that “Saudi influence over oil production and exports is, if not waning, not as salient as was previously thought.”(8) Pakistan The Chabahar port, along with the Afghan-Iran-India trilateral agreement, is bound to affect the regional dynamics of the Iran-Pakistan relationship. It has created a direct economic contest with Gwadar, less than 70 kilometers east of Chabahar, in Pakistani Baluchistan. Like Chabahar, Gwadar is a deep sea port located on vital maritime lines and overland routes connecting China and Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Iran’s use of Chabahar undermines Pakistan’s plans for linking Gwadar to Central Asia and Afghanistan via railways, pipelines, and overland routes, thus reducing the prospects for increased trade and commerce with and
Journal for Iranian Studies
87
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
access to major energy resources in those countries. More immediately, access to Chabahar frees Afghanistan from using Gwadar and Karachi ports in Pakistan, thus threatening stable sources of revenue, which are the tariffs and transition fees Islamabad charges for the use of those ports. Politically, Iran stands to gain in competing with Pakistan over influence in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Middle East, an objective shared by Pakistan’s archenemy India. Due to its dependence on the Pakistani ports, Afghanistan has had to “comply to a degree with Pakistan’s Afghan policy, which is formulated to a very large extent by the Pakistani Army. The maritime access that Chabahar now gives to Afghanistan means that Kabul can formulate its policies independent of its concerns about Pakistan.”(9) Similarly, the Chabahar-Gwadar rivalry is seen by Tehran as a means to counter the Saudi-Pakistan alliance in order to strengthen Iran’s position in the Arabian Gulf region. With the presence of India in Chabahar on its Western borders and the loss of its influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan can ill-afford to divert its attention and resources from its main fronts with India in the East, thus giving Iran a freer hand to maneuver in the Middle East. Strategically, Pakistan feels encircled and is alarmed by the Indian presence in Chabahar. Pakistani military fears that the port can be used by India to eavesdrop on Pakistan and to gather intelligence on its naval moves in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. This perception is further boosted by Prime Minister Modi’s statement that “We have also agreed to enhance interaction between our defense and security institutions on regional and maritime security.”(10) As a result, PakistanIran competition in the Arabian Sea is expected to intensify with far reaching consequences for Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Afghanistan The Chabahar Agreement is considered a key victory for Afghanistan. In the words of Michael Kugelman, a South Asia specialist at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, “this Chabahar project is more important to Afghanistan than to anybody else. It could be an economic bonanza for an economically troubled country…”(11). Afghanistan will be able to ship its goods, including its vast natural resources with an estimated value of $700 billion, via Chabahar to key markets in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. It could import more easily key goods it needs. In addition to trade and commerce, Afghanistan can serve as a transit route for roads, railways, and pipelines linking Central Asian countries via
Journal for Iranian Studies
88
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
Afghanistan to Chabahar, a vital source of transit revenues for that country. Politically, use of Chabahar could eliminate Afghanistan’s dependency on Pakistani ports, thus allowing Kabul to pursue its own independent foreign policy as mentioned before. Saudi Arabia The presence of China and India in Gwadar and Chabahar, respectively, has brought the emerging Asian giants to the doorsteps of Arabia with far-reaching ramifications for the regional balance of power in the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East; for the security of shipping lines through the Strait of Hormuz; and for the intensifying naval competition between the two Asian powers in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Iran’s strategy of using Chabahar as its main strategic base for projecting power in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean poses a direct threat to the Arab Gulf States making them conduct immediate counter-measures to protect their interests. Given the close Arab-Pakistan ties, the Saudis are certain to support their ally in the competition between Chabahar and Gwadar. Iran-Pakistan cooperation has been shaken by major tensions in their relations emanating from their competing interests in Chabahar and Gwadar and their alliances with opposing powers, namely India and China as mentioned before. Saudis could benefit from this friction. In addition, Iran-Pakistan relations could come under further stress due to the intensifying Arab-Iranian rivalry in the Arabian Gulf and the pressure it creates on Pakistan to take a side. However, given Pakistan’s weak position vis à vis India, it can hardly afford to take the Arab side against Iran as shown by Islamabad’s refusal to enter the Yemen conflict as expected by the Saudis. These developments could pave the way for an opening toward Arab support for the Baluch struggle against Iran. Saudis could persuade Pakistan to soften its opposition to any potential Saudi support for the Iranian Baluch. There are compelling geopolitical reasons for such a Saudi policy. After all, Arabs, Persians, and Baluch are the three main actors in the Gulf. In this equation, Arab support for the Iranian Baluch is a matter of strategic necessity in confronting the Iranian hegemony in the region, a policy that can benefit Pakistan as well. The Arab-Baluch alliance is deeply rooted in the history of the Gulf region and their opposition to Persian domination. Anyway, Saudis are acting decisively to protect their interests as demonstrated in Yemen and will not defer to an outside power when their vital interests are threatened.
Journal for Iranian Studies
89
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
The Baluch Factor: The Major Hurdle The major hurdle in developing Chabahar is fierce opposition by the Baluch nationalists fighting for independence. There are active and growing insurgencies in both Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan that could threaten Chabahar and Gwadar corridors. The hinterland to the East, West, and North of Chabahar is inhabited by Sunni Baluch opposed to Iranian rule and designs in Baluchistan. The distance from Chabahar to Zahedan, Baluchistan’s provincial capital, is more than 600 kilometers and to the Iran-Afghan border is 840 kilometers. Both sides of the border are inhabited by the Baluch. From the North, the distance between Chabahar and the nearest Iranian cities of Bandar Abbas and Kerman is 871 kilometers and 1100 kilometers, respectively. The space between these distances constitutes the heartland of Baluchistan. It would be a formidable challenge, if not impossible, for the Iranian government to protect such long distances and secure Chabahar in the face of widespread Baluch opposition, particularly if this opposition is supported by Iran’s regional adversaries and world powers. The projected roads, railways, pipelines, and Free Trade Zone facilities will be inviting targets for Baluch insurgents. Historically, Iran and Pakistan have benefited from the division of Baluchistan and are united in maintaining the status quo by suppressing any demand for Baluch autonomy. They cooperated against the Dadshah revolt in Iranian Baluchistan in the 1950s when Pakistan arrested and extradited Dadshah’s brother and his companions to Iran. More recently, Pakistan arrested brothers of Jundallah leader Abdul Malik Riggi and returned them to be executed by Iran in 2011. The policy of suppressing Baluch is certain to continue for as long as it can be maintained by both governments. The issue of the two ports has reinvigorated Baluch nationalism in both Iran and Pakistan, giving a new impetus to their quest for independence. They see their national movement as a direct response to the division and occupation of their homeland by Pakistan and Iran and these countries’ oppressive, exploitative, and discriminatory policies toward the Baluch. They consider Iran and Pakistan as occupiers whose decisions on Chabahar and Gwadar are self-serving and against Baluch interests. Therefore, they are vehemently opposed to Indian and Chinese moves in Chabahar and Gwadar, respectively, on the ground that the Baluch are the rightful owners and that they were not consulted about nor consented to Delhi’s and Beijing’s involvements.
Journal for Iranian Studies
90
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
Baluch nationalists also point to the fact that they have never accepted nor recognized the Goldsmid Line dividing the Baluch between Iran and Pakistan nor the Durand Line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have struggled relentlessly to regain their lost freedom and to reassert their sovereignty over their homeland. This is evidenced by several major insurrections by the Baluch against Pakistan in 1948, 1958, 1962, 1973, and the current insurgency which has been growing in strength and gaining momentum since its eruption in 2005. Similarly, there have been continued uprisings among the Baluch against Iran ever since its forceful annexation of western Baluchistan in 1928, including the tribal revolts in Sarhad in the 1930s and 1940s, Mir Dadshah’s revolt in the 1950s, the insurrection by the Baluch Liberation Front in the 1960s and 1970s, and the ongoing Baluch insurgency against the Iranian clerical regime. The Chabahar and Gwadar issue has intensified the Baluch struggle against Iran and Pakistan, providing Baluch nationalists with a stronger momentum internally and internationally. As mentioned earlier, Baluch insurgents are active against both Iranian and Pakistani governments in their respective parts of Baluchistan. Although the insurgency in Pakistan is much stronger, the Baluch insurgency in Iran is spreading fast and wide and is slowly evolving into a mass movement against Iran and its plans in Chabahar. Externally, Baluch nationalists have launched a major campaign in opposition to the Chabahar Agreement and are calling for independence from Iran. Due to their efforts, the international media has seen a much wider coverage of events in Iranian Baluchistan than ever before. Similarly, the human rights violations in Iranian Baluchistan are documented and reported more frequently by international human rights organizations. The plight of the Baluch and Baluchistan is receiving greater exposure in the halls of Western governments and international organizations. The campaign for independence has alarmed the governments of both Iran and Pakistan. Iranian officials regularly and publicly denounce the US and Saudi Arabia for their alleged support of the Baluch insurgency in Iranian Baluchistan. Similarly, Pakistan has officially accused India of assisting Baluch rebels in its territory. Neither government, however, has produced any evidence to back its claims and there is no independent evidence to this effect.
Journal for Iranian Studies
91
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
PART III Chabahar, Gwadar, and the Great Powers: the International Implications The geopolitical implications of the Chabahar and Gwadar seaports are enormous for the Indo-Chinese and the American-Chinese rivalries in Asia and the Indian Ocean. All three great powers are showing renewed interests in Baluchistan for its strategic ports and geopolitical location. This has, in turn, given a new impetus to the Baluch national movement and its quest for independence. After all, Baluchistan lost its independence during the nineteenth-century Anglo-Russian rivalry referred to by historians as the “Great Game.” That competition of great powers brought Baluchistan under the hegemony of Britain as her forward base to prevent Russian advances toward British India and the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf. The division of Baluchistan is another legacy of the Great Game that left the Baluch at the mercy of Britain’s client states, namely Pakistan and Iran. Today, there is a New Great Game played out in Asia and the Indian Ocean by the US, China, and India. The dynamics of the New Game are the same as before: projection of power, competition for resources, the search for spheres of influence, and the pursuit of their interests. In this context, the strategic ports of Chabahar and Gwadar are emerging as major focal points in this rivalry for the same main reason that attracted the great powers to Baluchistan in the 19th century: its geostrategic importance. It can be said with confidence that Baluchistan is one of the most strategic lands in the world, and the Baluch nationalists are ready to advance their cause by capitalizing on the opportunities created by these great power rivalries in the region. India India’s initiative in Chabahar is intended primarily at countering its archrival China, securing its energy supplies, encircling its enemy Pakistan, and expanding its influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Symbolically, the move is seen as a bold assertion of India’s role as a major player and successor of the British Empire in the subcontinent. Strategically, Chabahar will enable India to directly challenge the Chinese moves in Gwadar in Pakistani Baluchistan. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a $47 billion project linking Western China via roads, railways and pipelines to Gwadar, provides China with direct access to the Indian Ocean. Delhi sees China’s buildup of a naval base and listening post in Gwadar as a threat to India’s navy in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, and the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the CPEC
Journal for Iranian Studies
92
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
is seen as a strategic move by China and its proxy Pakistan to encircle India in West Asia. Access to Chabahar is part of the Indian strategy to check the Chinese moves in the Arabian Seas, Strait of Hormuz, and West Asia. In addition, access to Afghanistan through Chabahar solidifies the Afghan-Indian alliance against Pakistan and paves the way for India’s access to Central Asia. Equally important are Indian plans to transform Chabahar into a major economic, trade, and industrial hub in the Middle East and a spring board for access to Afghanistan and Central Asian markets. The port will enable Delhi to better secure energy supplies from Iran, the Middle East, and Central Asia and expand the market share for Indian trade and commerce in these regions. India ranks second after China in oil imports from Iran. Chabahar serves to solidify India-Iran energy ties and provide Delhi with access to new energy sources in Central Asia through Afghanistan. As the third largest and fastest growing economy in Asia, energy security is paramount in India’s move in Chabahar and its long-term plans for linking the port via overland pipelines to Central Asia and via undersea pipeline to India. Access to Chabahar has created a new momentum for India’s energy drive in Central Asia and its strategy to counter the growing Chinese influence in that region. Chabahar provides Delhi with a viable option to sideline the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-PakistanIndia Pipeline (TAPIP) in favor of a sub-sea gas pipeline from Oman and Iran to India. This plan was first discussed by the foreign ministers of the three countries in February 2014, but was not pursued due to the US opposition and Western sanctions on Iran. With the lifting of the sanctions, this plan has become feasible and high on the Indian agenda. This is particularly the case due to India’s serious reservations about TAPIP passing through Pakistan and risks associated with it(12). Therefore, it is anticipated that India would expedite its plans for connecting Central Asia via pipeline to Chabahar where Delhi can link it to the Oman-Iran-India under-sea pipeline currently under consideration. With this in mind, Indian Prime Minister Modi and Turkmenistan President Berdimuhamedov met and signed seven agreements regarding natural gas, defense, and petrochemicals in mid-July 2015. As noted by Future Directions International: “Turkmenistan’s support for India’s desire to join Ashgabat Agreement on trade and transit, which includes Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Oman, can only add to India’s need to make this pipeline a reality.”(13) If implemented, the pipeline connecting Central Asia to India via Chabahar would have profound geopolitical implications. It would greatly enhance India’s energy security and its access to Central Asia’s vast energy resources. It would boost India’s political
Journal for Iranian Studies
93
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
and economic standing in Central Asia and strengthen its position in countering China’s growing influence in the region. It would provide CIS countries an alternative for exporting their oil and gas to Asia and Europe through Chabahar, thus lessening their dependency on Russia. Given the historically close Indo-Russian ties, Russia would be less alarmed by India than China competing in CIS, a Russian sphere of influence. India and Russia could join forces in countering the Chinese influence in the region. Russia could also join India in using the same pipeline for exporting its oil and gas to Asia. China Gwadar-Chabahar contest is a reflection of the broader rivalry between China and India for hegemony in Asia. As such, the strategic importance of the two emerging ports is better understood in the context of the Indo-Chinese rivalry in the Indian Ocean, Afghanistan, and Central Asia; China’s alliance with and support of Pakistan; Indo-China border disputes; and the two powers’ never-ending thirst for natural resources. While India’s plans for Chabahar are in the early stages of implementation, China’s plans to develop Gwadar as a major deep seaport – equipped with an airport as well as industrial, commercial, and naval facilities – have proceeded for more than a decade and are in an advanced stage. The next phase is to connect the port to Western China through a network of roads, railways, and pipelines planned under the massive $47 billion CPEC project. Although it has not officially reacted, China, like its proxy Pakistan, considers the Chabahar Agreement as a direct challenge to CPEC and China’s naval facilities in Gwadar. Gwadar is the ultimate strategic prize for such massive Chinese investment in Pakistan under CPEC. It will give China a major beachhead on the Indian Ocean close to the Strait of Hormuz, “effectively making (China) a two-ocean power,” in the words of Claude Rakisits, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.(14) Once finished, it will have dual-use civilian-military facilities including a naval base for Chinese warships and submarines as well as a listening post to monitor the US and Indian naval moves in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Given its commanding view of the Strait of Hormuz, Gwadar can be used by the Chinese navy to threaten or blockade that narrow waterway should hostilities erupt with the US or India. Through direct overland pipeline access to the Indian Ocean, the Chinese Navy can bypass the Indian and US navies in the Indian Ocean and avoid the Strait of Malacca in case of any potential blockade by the US Navy. In short, access to Gwadar will further strengthen the China-Pakistan position against India.
Journal for Iranian Studies
94
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
The economic advantage of Gwadar for China and Pakistan could equal its strategic importance. Gwadar is developed with a view to transform it into a major commerce hub, especially for exports of Chinese goods to the Middle East, Europe, and Africa and for imports of goods and energy supplies needed to fuel the growing Chinese economy. Most of the oil imported by China and Pakistan comes from the Middle East in close proximity to Gwadar. Upon its completion, the Gwadar port is expected to serve as the key conduit for energy shipments via pipelines to Western China, thus ensuring greater energy security. China’s plans and activities in Gwadar have alarmed India and are of concern to Washington as well. In a report on Pakistan published by the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis in Delhi, India sees a direct threat from the Chinese presence in Gwadar. It states that the “Gwadar port being so close to the Strait of Hormuz also has implications for India as it would enable Pakistan to exercise control over energy routes. It is believed that Gwadar will provide Beijing with a facility to monitor US and Indian naval activity in the Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea, respectively, as well as any future maritime cooperation between India and US.”(15) Given such perceptions, the Chabahar-Gwadar contest will continue for the foreseeable future because there is no end in sight for the Indo-Chinese rivalry in Asia. Like India’s plans in Chabahar, China’s designs in Gwadar also face a major hurdle in the widespread Baluch insurgency in Pakistani Baluchistan. Referring to the GwadarChabahar contest and security situation in Pakistani Baluchistan, an unclassified diplomatic cable to the US Department of State, dated December 31, 2015, reported: “Gwadar would serve to check India’s own strategic ambitions, as Islamabad leverages Beijing against New Delhi. The problem is that these are all long-range plans — and dreams. They conflict with messy ground-level realities. Visiting Gwadar for a week in 2008, I was struck not only by how isolated it was, between pounding sea and bleak desert, but how unstable was the region of Baluchistan, which lies immediately beyond the port in all landward directions. Ethnic Baluchi rebel leaders told me that they would never permit roads and pipelines to be built there, until their grievances with the Pakistani government in faraway Islamabad were settled. The security situation is indeed fraught with peril. The Chinese know this. They know that a pipeline network from Gwadar into Central Asia and China must await the political stabilization of Afghanistan — and Pakistan, too. Until such a day, Gwadar, while a potentially useful coaling station for a budding Chinese navy, constitutes, in essence, a road to nowhere.”(16)
Journal for Iranian Studies
95
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
United States The US broadly shares India’s concerns over Chinese naval presence and activities in Gwadar and the threat it could pose to the Strait of Hormuz and shipping lines in the Arabian Sea. But unlike Delhi which sees an immediate threat, Washington looks at China’s actions in Gwadar as a long-term threat. As noted in the unclassified diplomatic cable mentioned earlier, “Indeed, Gwadar is important: not for what it is today, but for what it will indicate about Beijing’s intentions in the coming years and decades.”(17) The main US concern is that Gwadar, when and if connected to China, could give it potential strategic and economic advantage in the region. Washington’s threat perception reflects its position as a superpower with overwhelming naval superiority over China for the foreseeable future. The US also supports the Chabahar Agreement with some reservation about India’s investment in Iran. As the only counterweight to China in Asia, a huge emerging market, and the largest democracy in the world, India is seen by the US as a natural strategic ally in countering China’s ambitions in Asia. Pakistan’s alliance with China and its destabilizing role in Afghanistan are other major factors shifting US policies toward closer ties with India. In this context, the Chabahar corridor is seen as beneficial to the US interests for offsetting China’s $47 billion Gwadar Corridor and for opening a new trade route to Afghanistan whose economic and political stability is important to the US. In the words of Adam V. Larkey, a South Asia expert, “The massive Gwadar project reveals China’s regional power play. There is no comparison in scale and intent between China’s role in Gwadar and India’s in Chabahar, but the Americans are pleased that India is pushing back against the Chinese expansionist mindset…”(18) The Obama administration has expressed support for India in spite of strong objections by some US senators who are critical about Indian investments in Iran under the Chabahar accord. As testified earlier this month by the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Nisha Desai Biswal before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “For India to be able to contribute to the economic development of Afghanistan, it needs access that it does not readily have across its land boundary. And India is seeking to deepen its energy relationship with the Central Asian countries and looking for roads that would facilitate that…” Biswal, however, assured the senators that the US administration has taken up their concerns and has been “very clear with the Indians what our security concerns have been…”(19)
Journal for Iranian Studies
96
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
The Baluchistan Card Consequently, the Indo-Chinese competition over Chabahar and Gwadar, respectively, is expected to intensify further after their completion. The major factors driving the competition are the growing Indo-Chinese and American-Chinese rivalries in Asia and the Indian Ocean and the rising tensions in the South China Sea between the US and China. It is this geopolitical dynamic that has forced Baluchistan and its two ports into their strategic calculations. The three powers see Baluchistan and its geostrategic significance as an important part of the balance of power equations in Asia and the Indian Ocean. They are playing the Baluchistan card to safeguard their interests and to advance their plans against their rivals. The US and India find themselves, more or less, on the same side that is supporting the Chabahar corridor and countering the Chinese moves in Gwadar. None of the three powers, however, has taken an official stand on Baluchistan, at least not in their public pronouncements. But their actions on the ground in Chabahar and Gwadar reveal a different story, as described before. Behind the scenes, their strategists are busy planning their next moves and that is where Baluchistan’s future is debated. So far the status quo is preferred, but events on the ground and the dynamics of their rivalries may change and dictate a different course of action that may eventually lead to independence for Baluchistan. The Baluch International Campaign The Chabahar Agreement, along with the Gwadar Corridor, has boosted the drive by Baluch nationalists to internationalize the Baluchistan case in an effort to attract regional and international support for an independent state. The issue of the two ports has elevated the profile of Baluchistan among Arabian Gulf states, Western capitals, and certainly India and Afghanistan. As an example, there is an increasing awareness in the US about the Baluch and Baluchistan as well as growing calls for an independent Baluchistan in some influential circles in Washington. The issue of Chabahar and Gwadar was one of the main concerns raised during The Baluchistan Hearings held for the first time by the United States Congress in February 2012. This historical event (in which the author testified) played a key role in publicizing and internationalizing the Baluch cause. Equally important is a Resolution pending in the US Congress recognizing the rights of the Baluch and calling for an independent Baluchistan. Although opposed by the US Department of State, the Resolution, if approved, carries great moral and political weight in promoting the Baluch cause in the US and would set a precedent for other Western powers to follow.
Journal for Iranian Studies
97
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
As part of their international campaign against Iran and Pakistan, Baluch nationalists have expressed a strong desire to provide the US Navy with access and bases in Chabahar and Gwadar in exchange for US support for an independent Baluchistan. Accordingly, they have tried to make the case that the Baluch interests coincide with those of the U.S. at this juncture of history for several reasons. First, the US has reservations about Indian investment in Chabahar and is opposed to Chinese naval bases in Gwadar, issues that are of major concern to the Baluch as well. Second, the security of shipping lines through the Strait of Hormuz could be endangered by Iranian militarization of Chabahar and coastal Baluchistan, a major preoccupation of the Iranian Baluch as well. Third, the Baluch oppose the gas pipeline project for carrying Iranian gas to Pakistan, a position in line with US policies and economic sanctions imposed on Iran. Fourth, the Baluch also support the US policies against the growing Iranian hegemony in the Arabian Gulf and the threat it poses to US allies in the region. Finally, Baluchistan and Afghanistan are used by the Iranian and Pakistani military and intelligence services to shelter and support Afghan Taliban and other jihadist groups in their continuing attacks against American, NATO, and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. To counter this threat as the US prepares to withdraw from Afghanistan, it may be necessary at some point for the U.S. and Afghan governments to support Baluch nationalists who espouse secular values. The Baluch perspective and position on Chabahar and Gwadar ports is certain to affect the development of the two ports as major economic and strategic corridors by India and China, respectively. After all, the Baluch are the rightful owners of the ports. As mentioned, restoring Baluch control and sovereignty over these strategic ports is one of the main demands of Baluch nationalists in both Iran and Pakistan. Conclusion: Prospects The Indo-Iranian project in Chabahar is considered a win-win for India, Iran, and Afghanistan. But its implementation faces serious challenges and its success is far from assured. The first impediment is the rising insurgency in Iranian Baluchistan. The Sunni Baluch have repeatedly attacked Iranian forces and installations in and around Chabahar. The second challenge is the chronic instability in Afghanistan which is a party to the Chabahar Agreement. The prospect that the Chabahar corridor could free Afghanistan from dependency on Gwadar and Karachi could prompt Pakistan to restore the Taliban to stop the project. Third, there is a possibility that the US and other Western countries could re-impose their sanctions in case Iran violates its obligation under the nuclear deal signed last year. Such a scenario would change Indian calculations and participation in the project. Fourth, given the rising tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, any Arab-Iranian conflict in the Arabian Gulf is bound to affect the project negatively. Journal for Iranian Studies
98
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Chabahar and Gwadar Agreements and Rivalry among Competitors in Baluchistan Region
REFERENCES (1) Hosseinbor, M. H. (1984). IranandItsNationalities: theCaseofBaluchNationalism. Karachi: PakistaniAdabPublications, 40-42. (2) Curzon, G. N. (1966). Persia and the Persian Question. London: Frank Gass & Co, 225. (3) Gupta, R. (2016, June 13). Iran, India, and Chabahar: Recalling the Broader Context. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 5060. Retrieved from http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/spotlight-west-asia-iran-india-and-chabahar-recalling- the-broader-5060.html (4) Ibid. (5) Gulati, Monish. (2016, June 11). India-Iran Agreement on Chabahar is a Strategic Opportunity - Analysis. Eurasia Review. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/k50K0X (6) Bearak, M. & Murphy, B. (2016, May 24). To Sidestep Pakistan, India Embraces an Iranian Port. Washington Post. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/Ae5BLL (7) Hughes, Lindsay. (2016, April 26). Bypassing Pakistan: Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Chabahar. Future Directions International. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/nLbXPn (8) Ibid. (9) Ibid. (10) Gupta, R. (2016, June 13). Iran, India, and Chabahar: Recalling the Broader Context. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 5060. Retrieved from http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/spotlight-west-asia-iran-india-and-chabahar-recalling- the-broader-5060.html (11) Kugelman, Michael. (2015, August 5). Examining the Implications of the Indo-Iranian Chabahar Port Deal. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/about-dw/profile/s-30688 (12) Hughes, Lindsay. (2016, April 26). Bypassing Pakistan: Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Chabahar. Future Directions International. Retrieved from http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/bypassing-pakistan-afghanistan-india- iran-chabahar/ (13) Ibid. (14) Rakisits, Claude. (Fall 2015). A Path to the Sea: China’s Pakistan Plan. World Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/path-sea-china%E2%80%99s-pakistan-plan (15) Jaffrelot, Christophe. (2011, Jan. 7). A Tale of Two Ports: Gwadar and Chabahar Display Chinese- Indian Rivalry in the Arabian Sea. YaleGlobal Online. Retrieved from http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/tale-two-ports (16) UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05785443 Date: 12/31/2015. Retrieved from https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/emailid/6383Sent (17) Ibid. (18) Choudhury, Uttara. (2016, May 26). US Backs India-Iran Chabahar Port Deal as It Outflanks China-Pakistan Gwadar Project. First Post. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/p6wCbw (19) Ibid.
Journal for Iranian Studies
99
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan Ahmed Leila Economic Researcher in the AGCIS
INTRODUCTION
C
habahar port is an old Iranian-Indian project that was delayed for many years due to the international sanctions against Iran. It has recently revived after signing a several-million-dollar agreement between Iran, India, and Afghanistan to jointly develop transportation links to Afghanistan. India agreed to implement the biggest part of this project and lay a railroad track from the port of Chabahar to Afghanistan to achieve major strategic and economic gains for both India and Iran.
In essence, the port serves the interests of Iran. It helps to enhance the Iranian oil and non-oil exports and obtain direct access to central Asia in addition to other gains that will be explained in this study. Chabahar seems to serve the Indian interests more in the longer term. It gives India access to Afghanistan and enables it to bypass Pakistan- its bitter rival- and compete with china through expanding its influence to Central Asian countries; consequently, after slackening the Western sanctions on Iran, India hastened to sign the Chabahar agreement in May 2016 and invested hundreds of millions of USDs in completing the project before any of its regional rivals, especially china, takes an alike step.
Journal for Iranian Studies
100
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
Developing Chabahar port is also crucial for Afghanistan, which is a land-locked country and does not have access to sea ports. By signing this agreement, Afghanistan will have access to an oceanic port, bypass the Pakistani port of Karachi, and achieve many economic gains. Chabahar free zone is about 1800 Km away from Tehran, the Iranian capital. It is located in Sistan and Baluchistan province Southeast Iran nearby the Pakistani borders. It is the only Iranian port on the Indian Ocean and the first out of Hormuz Strait. The former Iranian government carried out part of the project and the current one will complete it with the financial and technical support of India. In this study, we will scrutinize the obligations and importance of Chabahar port for each of India, Iran, and Afghanistan, and will provide a broad reading for the prospect of the Iranian-Indian or Indian-Iranian project of Chabahar. The Indian-Iranian Partnership In 2003, Iran and India had broached the plan of developing the port of Chabahar giving India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia through an overland route that links the port in Southeastern Iran with the Afghani borders Northeastern Iran. Iran has partially developed part of the project from its side up to the Afghani borders, while India is committed to undertaking the other part inside Afghanistan. However, the increased Western sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program and India’s fears of facing international sanctions caused it difficult for both countries to make progress in advancing the project. In 2016 the Western sanctions were lifted opening up an opportunity for the two sides to sign a new contract to develop the Chabahar port on May 23, 2016, in Tehran with the presence of the presidents of Iran, Afghanistan, and the Indian Prime Minister. The former Iranian government invested about 150 billion Tomans ($42.8 Million) on developing the port (1). The current government will accomplish the rest of the project. It allocated 4500 Billion and 500 Million Real ($128.5 Million) (2) and accomplished 57% of the project. Upon completion of the port’s infrastructure agreed on by the end
Journal for Iranian Studies
Source: Google Maps
101
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
of 2018, the Iranian officials expect Chabahar port to handle about year 8 million tons of cargo every year (3). The Indian role in developing the port is bigger than the Iranian one due to the significant benefits and gains it seeks to achieve through utilizing of the port. The Iranian-Indian agreement is totaled $235 million as investments utilized to improve Chabahar port with other Indian commitments to increase its investments up to $2 billion in case the project needs more financing. The bilateral agreement between India and Iran gave India the right to invest $85 additional million to the previous $235 million in developing of two berths of Chabahar port that will refurbish a 640 meter long container handling facility in addition to three more berths for various purposes to transport goods and different energy resources, and a supplement of $150 million credit to Iran to provide the equipment and utilities needed for the port. The contract is valid for 10 years and is renewable. India has the right to utilize the port upon completion during this period then the working equipment ownership goes to Iran after the ten-year validity. According to the agreement, the berths will be developed in 18 months with a two-year grace period at which India does not guarantee the port to handle goods during this period. By the third year of operation, India guarantees handling of 30,000 TEUs and aims to handle 250,000 TEUs by the beginning of the tenth year (4). India is planning to lay a railroad track to transport containers from Chabahar northward until the Afghani borders for more than 500 Km through Zahedan the capital of Sistan and Baluchistan province that links Zahidan with the rest of the Iranian railroad lines. India also offered to supply $400 million worth of steel towards the construction of railroads in Iran (5). On the other hand, Iran granted 50 acres of the coastland in Makran province (South Iran on the Indian Ocean) and gave them significant facilities to invest in the free zone of Chabahar. 130 investment companies have been registered to invest in this free zone, which refers to the eagerness of the Afghani investors to achieve a bigger presence on the Iranian coasts on the Indian ocean and bypass the Pakistani port of Karachi; their only passage to the Indian Ocean. At the same time, Iran seeks to promote the project and attract investments to Chabahar from other countries like Japan that has shown interest in cooperating with India in developing the port and constructing Industrial complexes for exporting purposes. In fact, Japan is interested in turning this area into a trade center and the
Journal for Iranian Studies
102
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
port of Chabahar into a regional center to transport goods into Iran, Afghanistan, and the Central Asia countries. In addition to that, Germany also announced its interest in participating in a bid to develop the second stage of the port and offered cooperation between the German Company Siemens and Iran in developing the railway lines and other means of shipping and transportations. The Importance of Chabahar for India India has signed the trilateral agreement of Chabahar and invested millions of dollars in developing the port. It also announced its readiness to pay additional millions to fulfill its economic, political, strategic, and security ambitions. Although an Iranian project, we will first analyze the Importance of Chabahar port for India. Economically, India will achieve many strategic gains through utilizing the Iranian port of Chabahar such as: 1. India will bypass Pakistan and have direct access to the Afghani and Central Asian markets. It is planning to establish a trade route from the Indian ports on the Indian Ocean to Chabahar port southeastern Iran. Then the route will be extended through a railway and overland network to Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries such as Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and may be to Russia in the future. Due to the historical rivalry between Indian and Pakistan, India’s trade access to Afghanistan has been thwarted by Pakistan although the agreement between the two sides concerning transit and passage of goods; consequently, India found Chabahar as an alternative route to bypass Pakistan and ensure easy movement of goods between India and the Afghani and Central Asian markets. 2. India is the fourth largest energy consumer in the world. It seeks access to gas from Turkmenistan, which is made possible by Chabahar port. It also aims to establish oil and gas pipeline underneath the Indian Ocean that extends from the West Indian coasts to Chabahar port and the Omani coasts. When India gains access to Turkmenistan, it will have a trilateral shipping and support group (6) that includes Oman, Iran, and Turkmenistan to guarantee the flow of energy sources from different resources. At the same time, India can stop negotiating with Pakistan over extending the IndiaTurkmenistan pipeline that is rejected by Pakistan to pass through its lands. In fact, India took real steps to accomplish its plans and ambitions. Last year the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Iran, Oman, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to establish a ground base for a multilateral agreement to transport natural gas from these countries to the port of Chabahar and then to India through pipelines. India aims
Journal for Iranian Studies
103
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
to support its considerable productivity and maintain its 7.2% economic growth rate that is the highest in the world. It also announced exploiting more investments in the Iranian gas fields but this offer was rejected by Iran due to concession rights. Indeed, the visit of the Indian Prime Minister in July 2015 resulted in seven different agreements with three countries concerning natural gas and manufacturing of gas-based fertilizers. 3. Through its relationship with Turkmenistan, India has other goals such as gaining the Turkmen support to join Ishq Abad agreement (in reference to Turkmenistan’s capital) concerning trade, transportations, and transit. This agreement includes Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Oman or the so called The Northern-Southern Transportations Route (NSTC) that links Central and Southern Asia with Europe, giving India access to new markets in these countries and then in Russia and Europe. Through its long-term plans, India aims to start from the Iranian province of Mashhad (Northern Iran and near the Turkmen borders) up to Russia via the Central Asian countries, then to Europe via the Baltic countries because India does not have access to these territories except via this route (7). According to the studies of the profitability of the Northern passage (NSTC); this route not only saves 60% of the time and 50% of the cost in compare with the usual sea routes between India and Europe but also allows India to bypass its bitter rival Pakistan (8). On the political and strategic levels, India aims to bypass Pakistan and reduce the Pakistani political and economic influence in Afghanistan; the Indian trade and political ally. Due to the Afghani reliance on the Pakistani ports to get to the international waters, the Afghani foreign policies consent to the Pakistani policies to a certain extent. But with the availability of an alternative to the Pakistani ports, Afghanistan can be released from the Pakistani constraints, leading to strong relations between India and Afghanistan and reduction of the Pakistani-Chinese influence in the region. In a recent study, the Australian Research Center, Future Directions (9) revealed that India will soon be the Russian Strategic ally in the region. Russia seeks to acquire an Asian ally on the expense of China, and this ally shall be India. The study titled “Bypassing Pakistan: Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Chabahar” reveals that although the ChineseRussian cooperation known to everyone in relation to foreign policy and preserving the international balances against the American supremacy, Russia, and China distrust each other and each is trying to establish a sphere of influence in Asia. China wants to restore the ancient trade route called “The Silk Road” through the Asian countries up to the rich European markets, while Russia is still looking at the former Soviet Union
Journal for Iranian Studies
104
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
countries as its sphere of influence. In light of the rivalry between both countries over expanding their spheres of influence and rapprochement between Russia and India, Russia shall prefer India as an ally to reduce the Chinese influence in the region in exchange for a Russian assistance to India to achieve its economic goals and penetrate to the European markets, especially to Eastern Europe. On the security level, India is ranked the fourth largest energy consumer in the world and a growing industrial power that desperately needs huge resources of energy. The various energy resources guarantee the highest rate of energy and economic security in light of the frequent security and political unrests in the Middle East and in some other oil exporting countries. This ensures operation of its productive institutions in case of any energy supplies cuts for any reasons. In addition to that, the reliance on various energy resources gives it more independence in political and economic decision-making noncompliance with the energy-exporting countries policies and interests. The Importance of Chabahar for Iran The importance of Chabahar port to Iran lies in the privileges and gains it provides to this country. 1. On the trade level, Iran aims to be a transit area and passage of goods to the neighboring countries and those benefiting from the port through the overland roads and railways extended from Chabahar to Afghanistan and Central Asian countries up to Russia. Chabahar port saves time and cost of the final products and transporting goods between Iran and other countries. It can also be utilized in transporting the Iranian non-oil products and selling them in the Indian and Afghani markets, in addition to increasing the Iranian imports from India, especially the technological products needed to be used in the industrial complexes in the free zone of Chabahar. Moreover, the overland roads and railways are expected to contribute to the development Sistan and Baluchistan province that is deprived of many basic services available in the rest of the Iranian districts. This province is inhibited by Baluch minorities that share the Arab and Kurdish minorities in the state of deprivation of several services given to the rest of the Iranian people. 2. Iran is willing to achieve comprehensive economic development to solve its financial crises after loosening the international sanctions against it at the beginning of this year. The international trade embargo resulted in many economic and social problems such as inflation, unemployment, corruption, smuggling, deterioration of domestic industries, and severe decline of oil exports.
Journal for Iranian Studies
105
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
The energy sector is the heart of the Iranian economy. It is the most vital sector and makes the most of the Iranian revenues next to taxes. One of the Iranian major goals in developing Chabahar port is to improve the energy sector and increase its oil exports. Iran also aims to regain its market share in the oil market it lost to other producers during sanctions and increase exports in the future (10), especially to India. Last August the Iranian oil exports jumped to their highest level since 2012 (11) due to the amounts sold to India that totaled 576 thousand barrel per day, which is the highest amount sold to this country over the past 15 years (12). The importance of Chabahar port lies in receiving and reloading gas and oil on giant tankers to the rest of the world. Iran and India also have plans to establish a pipeline that extends from Chabahar port directly to the Indian coasts to transport the Iranian gas and oil to decrease transportations costs, which means that both sides will sign a long-term trade partnership in energy supplies to regain the high institutional costs of this pipeline. Although the abundant amounts of oil supplies in the international markets and the exporting countries trend toward decreasing production to increase prices, Iran is insisting on going against the current through increasing its exports of crude oil, and refusal of production freeze at the last two meetings of OPEC to raise prices under the leadership of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The first meeting was held on the seventeenth of April of this year in Doha when Iran refused a Saudi request for production freeze leading to the failure of OPEC meeting. The second time in the consultative meeting on the eighteenth of September of this year in Algeria at which the Iranian oil minister stated openly that Iran does not have the intention for production freeze before getting to the same levels of exports of that before the international sanctions against his country. Iran adopted this position although suffering big losses due to the decline in oil prices because of the negative impact of the international sanctions against it (13), and the need for higher prices to support its economy in light of the absence of financial reserves like those of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries. Some analysts believe that through this position, Iran aims to compete with Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Indian market and other markets in light of the political and regional rivalry between the two countries. 3. Iran is not only targeting the Indian market- the second biggest importer of the Iranian oil after China- but also aims to attract the greatest amounts of international investments- Indian and other- to build oil and nonoil industrial complexes and other investments in the Iranian oil and gas fields under Iranian terms and conditions.
Journal for Iranian Studies
106
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
The Iranian foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif frequently implied in his statements concerning investment in the energy sector to some Indian suggestions about developing the Iranian gas field Farzad B at the Arabian Gulf that was discovered by Indian specialists in 2008 but delayed due to the international sanctions against Iran. In addition to that, giving India the right to develop the field in exchange for some privileges was rejected inside Iran. In fact, the Indian investment amounted to $3 billion to develop the first phase to produce one billion cubic feet from this field, but negotiations are still running between the two countries concerning the trade privileges between both sides in addition to the joint investment on the favorable basis and avoiding tax duplication. 4. The strategic importance of the Chabahar. Chabahar is the first Iranian port outside Hormuz Strait (to the east of the Strait) that is crowded with heavy trade vessel traffic and oil tankers. It guarantees an easy and swift passage of goods and oil to and from the port. In addition to that, the location of the port outside Hormuz strait that is exposed to frequent political unrest gives it flexibility in the decision-making process on all levels, and allows it to continue its economic interests in case the strait is closed down due to an American-Iranian conflict in light of the periodic tensions between the two sides. Moreover, the project has many other strategic goals for Iran. Chabahar is another episode in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. What impairs Saudi Arabia and its major allies in the region is a significant gain for Iran. In fact, Pakistan is a strong political, economic, and military ally to Saudi Arabia. Upon completion of the port, Iran and its ally India will be able to bypass Pakistan and decrease its political and economic influence in the region, which will be a coin of two sides for both Iran and India, especially if they succeed- supported by Russia- in forming economic blocs and increase their influence in the Central Asian region and impose economic isolation on Pakistan, the Saudi ally (14). The importance of Chabahar for Afghanistan Afghanistan is a land-locked country that does not have access to sea ports except through the Pakistani port of Karachi. Chabahar is an alternative trade route for Afghanistan against the only available via Pakistan. For long, Afghanistan has relied on the Pakistani port of Karachi, which exposes the Afghani trade to dangers and the possibility to stop at any time due to the political and economic tension between the two countries. Chabahar will end the Afghani dependence on Pakistan and provides it with more
Journal for Iranian Studies
107
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
choices for any future political and economic movements. Afghanistan expects to increase its exports and imports although the port of Karachi is about 100 kilometers closer to get to the Indian Ocean than Chabahar, which is 900 kilometers away from the Afghani borders. Although the Afghani trade ministry announced readiness of about 150 Afghani businessmen to invest in the Iranian port of Chabahar because of the low cost of transporting containers to Chabahar of about 500-1000 USDs less than the port of Karachi. More importantly, Afghanistan can guarantee security and safety of its goods and maintain its trade freely without limitations and obstacles, or influenced by other countries tensions such as India and Pakistan (15). According to the trilateral agreement, India, Iran, and Afghanistan agreed to jointly develop transportation links between the Iranian port of Chabahar and Afghanistan and lay a railroad track along this route to expand trade to Central Asian countries. This agreement will allow the Indian goods to get to Afghanistan freely without obstacles. It will also provide a safe passage to transport the Afghani products abroad and will contribute to creating constructional development in the investment areas and trade routes of the project. Afghanistan will also have access to other Asian countries and transport crude materials and energy resources to these countries, especially in India after bypassing its rival Pakistan. Future of the project In case the three sides of the agreement are committed to their obligations, the port will definitely be a paradigm shift for these countries on the strategic and economic levels as stated hereinbefore; although, there are some threats that might jeopardize the expected goals and future of the project such as: 1. There are Indian fears from an Iranian-Chinese rapprochement that might put the Indian goals at risk since China comes within the Iranian priorities for being the biggest importer of the Iranian oil and is ranked before India. In addition to that, Iran did not openly object the Pakistani-Chinese cooperation in constructing the Pakistani port of Gwadar that aims to create a trade link with the Chinese Xinxiang for about $46 billion, and described it as the twin brother of Chabahar (16). Moreover, Iran has signed several trade and energy deals with Pakistan, the Indian rival, and signed another agreement to stop their trade exchange in the dollar and replace it with the domestic currency of both countries last October (17). Such steps are taken by countries that are eager to remove all obstacles and
Journal for Iranian Studies
108
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
enhance their trade and economic cooperation, meanwhile, India aims to reduce the Pakistani and Chinese influence in the region. In addition to that, Pakistan can use its strong relations with China as leverage on Iran to eliminate the Iranian Chabahar port’s competition to the Pakistani port of Gwadar and limit the influence and gains of India by using the Chinese paper as the biggest importer of the Iranian oil. To Iran, China is a strategic ally that cannot be bypassed, especially after lifting the international sanctions on Tehran (18). At the same time, Chabahar is one of many projects Iran is planning to develop in cooperation with major regional partners without losing one partner at the expense of another. On the other hand, India sought to increase its oil supplies to maintain its significant annual growth rate that amounts to 7.2%. It offered to develop some of the Iranian major oil fields but was rejected by Iran. Many experts in South Asia asserted that the growing relations between India and Iran will not be at the expense of the Indian relations and interests with the US and its allies (19) because the security and economic relations between India and the US are so strong unlike the periodic tense US-Iranian relations that might expose the project to cancellation in case new sanctions are imposed on Iran when it does not stick to its commitments toward its nuclear program. Based on that assumption, some Indian experts fear that relying on the Iranian commitments toward India might lead to an unexpected frustration of the Indian goals. As for Afghanistan, it is part of the trade route headed to Russia and Europe and a key member to achieve the Indian-Iranian goals but, at the same time, it could be the main obstacle toward completion of the project due to the chaotic and unstable conditions in this country, which might expose the whole project to constant dangers and layovers once targeted by the armed groups. Conclusion: In reference to the trilateral agreement between India, Iran, and Afghanistan, India agreed to invest $250 million in developing the Port of Chabahar in the form of infrastructure, docks, and operating equipment in addition to $400 million to build the railroad that extends from the port to Afghanistan. According to the Iranian authorities, 57% of the port has been completed. For Iran, Chabahar port will be a major facility to achieve its goals in increasing its oil and gas exports regardless of prices, which was evident in the Iranian previous positions during OPEC meetings in addition to its desire to compete
Journal for Iranian Studies
109
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
with Saudi Arabia over its oil market share. Chabahar port will also allow Iran to be a fast transit route for goods from the Indian Ocean to Central Asia by laying railroads from the port to Afghanistan. In addition to that, the strategic location of the port outside Hormuz Strait provides a faster transportation movement outside the narrow strait that is crowded with ships and constant operation of the Iranian businesses and interests in case of closing down the Hormuz Strait in the worst situations. For India, Chabahar port will enable it to end the Pakistani influence on its trade with Afghanistan and bypass the Pakistani port of Karachi. Chabahar also gives India access to Turkmenistan, the gas-rich country and allows it to gain the Turkmen support in joining the agreement of Ashq-Abad or the South-North passage (NSTC) to save time and cost of shipping and transportation of goods. Moreover, India will have access to the Central Asian markets and possible access to Russia and Europe through an overland route. Most importantly, India aims to reduce the Chinese trade and political influence in the region and increase rapprochement with Russia to achieve the joint goals between the two countries. For Afghanistan, it will have sea access to the rest of the world and bypass the only available choice via the Pakistani Port of Karachi. In fact, Chabahar would reduce the Pakistani influence and domination of the Afghani policies and increase its trade with India and Iran. The project will also contribute to the development of territories along the railroad inside Afghanistan, which will be a gateway for the Indian and Iranian trade to the Central Asian markets and vice versa. No project is free of challenges and possibility of incompletion. The positive achievements of the Iranian port of Chabahar for India and Afghanistan are accompanied by threats and risks such as the absence of trust between all sides in committing to the articles of the agreement and the security issue in some member countries such as Afghanistan. Moreover, the international changing situations toward Iran and its rivalry with the US and the West, and the influence of the Indian-Iranian rapprochement on the strong Indian relations with the US and the West jeopardize the goals of the trilateral agreement of Chabahar.
Journal for Iranian Studies
110
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Economic Importance of Chabahar Port and the Available Opportunities for Iran, India, and Pakistan
REFERENCES (1): Infrastructure issues in 2016. Completion of the first phase of the development plan of Chabahar port until the end of this current year. Source: Mizan Online News Agency. The date: 2016/09/5, https://goo.gl/XHepBp (2): smtnews.ir, Amir Mehrzad, 2015. Chabahar port development lies on the shoulders of the private sector. The date: 2016/10/24, http://goo.gl/RJs7Ug (4) AnirbanChowdhury. 2016. Five things about Chabahar Port and how India gains from it. The Economic Times. Accessed 2/10/2016 https://goo.gl/7U5hTK (5) Ibid, AnirbanChowdhury. 2016. (6) Lindsay Hughes. 2016. Bypassing Pakistan: Afghanistan, India, Iran and Chabahar. Future Directions International (independent, not-for-profit Research Institute based in Australia). Accessed 5/10/2016. https://goo.gl/P7HH4J (7) Ibid, Lindsay Hughes. 2016. (8) Shishir Gupta. 2016. Why the Chabahar Port agreement kills two birds with one stone. Hindustantimes. Accessed 15/9/2016. https://goo.gl/Kj1ItT (9) Ibid, Lindsay Hughes. 2016. (10): Iran has reached its exports before 2012 to 2.3 million barrels per day, but after implementing the sanctions it has been reduced to one million barrels per day in 2012. Currently, it is almost approaching the rate of exports that it had reached prior to the implementation of sanctions. (11): Florence Tan and Oosamutso Kimura: Iran’s oil exports rise to highest level in 5 years, Reuters, 2016, the date: 2016/09/17, https://goo.gl/rSRi2H (12): Trade and India’s oil imports from Iran broke the record of 15 years, the date: 2016/10/22, https://goo.gl/NEdSyy (13): In some sectors such as banks, insurance, and airline the sanction has been lifted in theory but it is still imposed on the practical side. (14) Ibid, Lindsay Hughes. 2016. (15): barriers of non-tariff commercials are those adopted barriers that intended to indirectly reduce the trade such as imposing regulations to deal with documents and papers for releasing many goods from customs points and the imposition of strict technical standards such as health standards and requirements of the specific quality and specific methods for packaging and packing and the rules of origin of the product and even writing in specific languages. (16) The Hindu. 2016. India’s Chabahar port plan is to counter our Gwadar port plan: Chinese media. Accessed 20/10/2016 https://goo.gl/O18ReA (17) Fars News Agency, Iran, and Pakistan agreed to end dollar dealings, the date: 2016/10/30, http://fna.ir/KW440B. (18) Ghazanfar Ali Garewal. 2016. Is the Chabahar Port agreement failing India? The Express Tribune Blogs. Accessed 15/10/2016. https://goo.gl/snOLM0 (19) Guy Taylor, 2016. India-Iran port deal reveals tense Asian rivalries. The Washington Time. Accessed 20/10/2016. https://goo.gl/Liuk0T
Journal for Iranian Studies
111
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization A comparison between the position of IRGCs and Army in the Iranian regime’s infrastructure Mutasim abdalla(PH.D.) Political Researcher at the (AGCIS)
INTRODUCTION
T
he Iranian revolution erupted in 1979 to overthrow the Pahlavi Dynasty and form a new government. The commanders of the Iranian regular army stood by
the Shah and supported his ultimately unsuccessful efforts to crush the revolution and preserve his reign. After deposing the Shah and taking over the country, the leaders of the new regime bore the army’s stance in mind and have, ever since, excluded it from political life and development.
As a result of their loss of trust in the army due to its neutral stance during the revolution and the allegiance of some of its commanders to the Shah, the regime sought to create a significant new forcefully committed to the principles and values of the revolution, to protect its gains, and strike a balance with the regular army which Khomeini had never trusted. All this led to the formation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which has been responsible for crushing various insurgencies domestically, as well as exporting the concepts of the Iranian revolution. Since then, the IRGC has become Iran’s premier military force and defender of the revolution and the nation. Over time, the Guards have been transformed into a leading economic and security actor in Iran. The IRGC’s central role has contributed massively to the decline of the regular army and its exclusion from the economic and political scenes in Iran since the revolution of 1979.
Journal for Iranian Studies
112
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
This study aims to analyze the goals of the IRGC at its foundation, its components, budget, economic potential, role in external intervention, and its role in the suppression of domestic anti-regime movements. It also examines the connotations of the IRGC’s major influence in Iran in light of the decline of the regular army, which represents the real military institution - being more sizeable in number and more deeply embedded in history. This study focuses on two questions related to the IRGC: Are the excessive attention paid by the Iranian leadership to the IRGC, and its penetration of the state structure deliberate or is the relationship between them a complimentary one? The study suggests that there is an intentional marginalization of the regular army by the regime and an undeclared policy to exclude it from the political decisionmaking process. In fact, the regime aims to keep the regular army in its garrisons and limit its role to defending the country and implementing some other minor tasks required by the regime. The importance of this study lies in analyzing the reasons behind the strong influence of the IRGC on most of the state bodies in Iran and the position of the military institution toward this influence. It also analyzes the future of the Iranian regular army under this regimen of deliberate negligence and the attempts to subdue most of its commanders to follow in the footsteps of the IRGC by devoting the institution to protecting the revolution and ensuring the survival of the theocratic regime and the Jurist Leadership. Emergence of the IRGC The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was created in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution. After Khomeini returned from his exile in France, he issued a decree to create a parallel force to the regular army – which had adopted a policy of neutrality during the revolution - to defend the gains of the revolution and crush any anti-revolutionary movements (1). Iran’s new leaders lost trust in the Iranian regular Army due to its neutrality and allegiance of some of its commanders to the Shah; consequently, they sought to create a major military force committed to the principles and values of the revolution, under a custodian charged with defending and protecting its gains (2). On that basis, the new regime passed a new law in 1981 that distinguished the IRGC from the regular army through commissioning the army with protecting the country
Journal for Iranian Studies
113
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
and preserving internal security, while assigning the IRGC as guardian and protector of the regime. Over time, the IRGC has expanded its influence and gone far beyond its original mandate. Today, the IRGC presides over a vast power structure with influence over almost every aspect of Iranian life. The Iranian regime’s expansion and interference in other countries, or maintaining its domestic security depend primarily on the situation and capabilities of this organization (3). In essence, the IRGC is much like any regular army but distinguished by its ideological nature, vast capabilities, and slavish loyalty to the Jurist Leadership doctrine. The role of the IRGC has expanded far beyond its original mandate to protect the country against external threats – turning the organization into a protector of the regime, exporter of its concepts and ideas, and oppressor of its opponents (4). The distinguished analyst Dr. Kenneth Katzman of the U.S. Congressional Research Service has noted that the IRGC differs from the army in its ideological nature, evolution and development, and its approach to running its economic and political activities, which makes it difficult to analyze it from the traditional perspective of politico-military science (5). The regular army is banned from involvement in politics, which means that it has no allegiance to the regime due to its national obligations, which contributed to its survival despite Khomeini’s attempts to thwart it and massively restrict its capabilities. Conversely, the political role of IRGC is now taken for granted and indeed is viewed as part of its strategy to protect the Revolution as stated by the principles of the Iranian Republic (6). The world has witnessed various revolutions throughout history. When we compare the Iranian revolution with others in countries like France and Russia, we find that the armies in these countries played major roles in forming the revolutionary armies in the aftermath of the revolutions there. In Iran’s case, however, there is a major difference, with the army losing most of the influence it had previously enjoyed following the revolution due to the Khomeinist policy of eradicating all vestiges of the Shahs’ rule. In the first couple of years following the IRGC’s establishment, there were frequent changes of leadership until Muhsin Riza’i was assigned as commander of the organization on September 1, 1981. Since 1988 until today, the IRGC has remained under a relatively stable leadership with one exception represented by the replacement of the Revolutionary Guards Minister Muhsin Rafeeq Dost by his deputy Ali Shamkhani in 1988.
Journal for Iranian Studies
114
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
The Revolutionary Guards Ministry was established in 1982. It was frequently accused of corruption due to its involvement in many weapons deals during the Iraqi-Iranian war, which led the parliament elected after Khomeini’s death to pass a law combining the Revolutionary Guards Ministry with the Defense Ministry to form a new body called the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) (7). At the outset, the IRGC began with a small number of soldiers and equipment, but during the Iraqi-Iranian war, the organization acquired far greater power and renown due to the significant support it received from the Iranian regime’s leaders. Today, the IRGC is Iran’s most powerful security and military organization and strike force with major influence on the decision-making process in Tehran and on governmental and civil society organizations. In fact, the IRGC receives it powers from the powers of the Supreme Leader, who enjoys absolute influence and full control of this organization. According to the IRGC’s worldview, its members believe they are the protectors of the current Iranian regime and the primary source of domestic security and stability. They do not recognize any other partner in enforcing domestic stability and protecting the country from enemies. Indeed, they attribute all military and security victories and achievements to themselves and do not allow any other competitor or partner to share this triumph with them (8). IRGC Financial and Military Capabilities The IRGC has been transformed into a leading economic actor heavily involved in many sectors of Iran’s economy. It is responsible for and profits from massive social and health projects, as well as lucrative interests in other sectors such as tourism, transportation, and energy. Militarily, the IRGC has a massive arsenal, including airplanes, tanks, and missiles. Most of these weapons are of Russian origin, although some are domestically manufactured (9). The Guards also dominate the construction industry through their company Khatam Alanbia, as well as having controlling interests in Iran’s gas and oil fields, and stocks in the country’s telecommunications provider. The International Institution for Strategic Studies in London estimates the total number of IRGC forces at 350,000, divided into land, navy and air forces, although there is some dispute over the real figure, with the Institute for Strategic and International Studies in Washington putting it at no more than 120 thousand members (10). Whatever the real numbers, the IRGC is beyond doubt Iran’s most
Journal for Iranian Studies
115
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
powerful force and the primary protector of the Jurist Leadership doctrine, reporting directly to the Iranian Supreme Leader. Over the past ten years, the Revolutionary Guards has accelerated its effort to develop its military capabilities, conducting several exercises to test its readiness and its military industries such as the Shihab 1, 2, 3 missiles, air defense systems, and electronic warfare. (11) IRGC Duties: 1. Assisting Iran’s security agencies in eliminating anti-regime opposition 2. Fighting counter-revolutionary elements 3. Defending Iran against any external attack 4. Cooperating with the Iranian armed forces 5. Training the IRGC members on moral, ideological and political issues 6. Supporting ‘liberation’ movements across the world 7. Utilizing all of its human resources and experiences in dealing with crises and disasters, and supporting the improvement plans of the Iranian regime (12) The IRGC Components 1- Basij Forces (Mobilization) The Basiji forces were established in 1980. They consist of volunteers and are supported by the IRGC. While initially formed for security purposes, they were later tasked with confronting any kind of domestic opposition movements and supporting Iran’s allies in war. The Mobilization Forces played the major role in eliminating the uprising that erupted in the late 1990s in Iran asking for political freedom, and supervised the brutal crushing of the mass protests that flared up following the disputed election of 2009, during which leaders of the green movement, Hussein Mousavi, and Mahdi Karroubi, accused the regime of rigging the elections in favor of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Some reports from insiders suggest that the Basij Forces consists of 2,500 battalions, each with 300 members, although the confidential policies and voluntary nature of these forces and their spread in schools and governmental and private organizations prevent the collation of accurate statistics on their numbers. 2. Al-Quds Division The regime’s elite Al-Quds force, which works as the spearhead of the regime’s efforts to “export the revolution” overseas, is the cream of the
Journal for Iranian Studies
116
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
IRGC and the strongest military and security force in Iran. The Al-Quds force, created to implement the ideology of exporting the revolution, has become a central pillar of the Iranian regime. Over time, Al-Quds force has also become the clandestine wing of Iran deployed outside its borders. It is in charge of confronting Iran’s enemies headed by the United States, its Arab allies, and Israel. This unit runs a war against those viewed as Iran’s enemies via its proxies to cover up the Iranian regime’s role outside the country. The most prominent activities of Al-Quds division in the region are training Hezbollah’s forces and supporting Shiite Militias in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Al-Quds Division Activities Al-Quds division undertakes a variety of secret missions and operations outside Iran’s borders as follows: 1. Monitoring any hostile movements by other countries against the Iranian regime and collecting intelligence information in the Middle East and worldwide 2. Enhancing the military power of the ‘Resistance Axis’ in the Middle East, consisting of Iran’s major ally Syria, in addition to Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. 3. Establishing sleeper cells all over the world in accordance with the strategic and intelligence considerations to gather intelligence on any potential military attack or hostile activity against Iran. 4. Assisting armed militias and political figures to undertake activities in countries and territories where Iran seeks to expand and to minimize Western influence there, especially in countries with a Shiite population, such as Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Yemen. 5. Pursuing the Iranian anti-regime opposition outside the country (14) IRGC Accusations of Corruption As a leading economic actor which dominates most of Iran’s economic sectors, the IRGC owns several companies and major projects that generate massive sums of money outside the financial system of the state; despite its efforts to silence condemnation, there has been continuous criticism of its financial policies, with a number of press reports about the endemic corruption within the organization and the inflated salaries of the IRGC commanders. Meanwhile, Iranian president
Journal for Iranian Studies
117
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
Hassan Rouhani obliquely condemned the IRGC without daring to openly name it a few months ago, saying – clearly in reference to the Revolutionary Guards - “There is a corrupt organization standing behind smuggling; we have to confront this corruption.” This statement reopened longstanding resentment over the massive corruption, which pervades all the IRGC’s operations, amid increasing calls in recent years to limit its influence. The Supreme Leader’s absolute and uncritical support for the IRGC and its deep permeation of all the state’s apparatuses, along with its brutal repression of all dissent, mean that its influence remains strong and prevents it from being harmed by criticism. The IRGC external interventions The IRGC has absolute power over the running of complex external operations such as the regime’s intervention in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon. It provides unlimited support to Iran’s proxies in these countries, which have fueled the current catastrophic situation in the ill-fated region. 1.Iraq: The Iranian regime is a major player in Iraq on all levels, with massive influence in the neighboring country where it is throwing all its weight behind efforts to preserve its pivotal role due to its understanding of the vital strategic location of Iraq as a gateway to the Arab countries, especially its allies in the region. This role has political, security, economic, and ideological dimensions that could not have been achieved without the turbulent situation and crises resulting from the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 (15). Iran’s success in gaining control over Iraq can be attributed to the IRGC’s early awareness of the golden opportunity offered to Iran by the 2003 US invasion to expand in the country, which was evident in the statement of Muhsin Sazgara, one of the IRGC’s founders and now a staunch opponent of the Iranian regime living in the United States, who said, “The IRGC’s evaluation of the Western invasion of Iraq was: We have a golden opportunity. We can use the American involvement in Iraq and create chaos and tension in this country.” (16) Following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, a number of Shiite militias were established through direct financial support and supervision by the Tehran regime. Iran’s major military arm in Iraq is the Public Mobilization Forces, which was recognized by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, who has acknowledged the significant Iranian military support to the militia group. In addition to these
Journal for Iranian Studies
118
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
militias, Iran also announced its dispatching of military advisors to Iraq under the leadership of Al-Quds division commander, Major General Qassem Suleimani at the request of the Iraqi government. The Public Mobilization Forces consist of hundreds of IRGC-backed Shiite militias fighting side by side with the Iraqi regular army. (17). In fact, the level of interference by the IRGC in Iraq is now so total that Iranian MP Mohammad Saleh Jokar has called for establishing an Iraqi Revolutionary Guards Force modeled on the Iranian prototype via the consolidation of the existing Shiite factions and making Saraya Al Khorasani its core militia (18). 2.Syria: Iran’s role in Syria is clear. Iran has deployed and continues to use all of its political, security, economic, and sectarian weight to prevent the fall of the Syrian regime. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Iran has provided massive military, financial, and technical support to Bashar Assad. It dispatched experts from the IRGC to train the Syrian regime’s own Iranian-backed militias, as well as the Lebanese Hezbollah militias. The IRGC also recruited and trained mercenaries, many of them refugees, from Afghanistan and Pakistan and dispatched them to fight in Syria to preserve the regime of Bashar Assad (19). 3.Yemen Iran could not have expanded in Yemen without certain factors, the most important of which was the Houthi rebels who played the key role in Iran’s expansion there. Moreover, the Iranian influence in Yemen could not have been achieved in a unified society, and stable and powerful state. Iran used the chaotic situation in Yemen following the revolution and the establishment of a new government to support and strengthen its proxies in the country through military escalation and creating a state of confusion to tip the balance of power and expand its regional influence. As a result, Iran has dedicated its efforts since the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions to strengthening the Houthi movement in Yemen in the media and through military support. In fact, Iran provides weaponry to Houthis by either smuggling these weapons to Sa’dah or by providing financial support to buy weapons from the domestic market in Yemen (20). The UN and Yemeni government have both issued reports confirming Iran’s military support to Houthi rebels since 2009, although, the Iranian officials have, typically, denied these reports and asserted that the regime’s activities in Yemen are limited to political support and humanitarian aid. In reality, the Revolutionary Guards oversee
Journal for Iranian Studies
119
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
training, prepare military plans against government forces, and provide weaponry to the Houthi rebels. The United Nations experts relied on the report of the Special Committee for Iran in the International Security Council to investigate an incident when a shipment of weapons aboard the Iranian vessel ‘Jayhan’ was found and confiscated in 2013. Yet more clear evidence of the level of the IRGC’s intervention in Yemen came from a statement by the General Commander of the IRGC, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, who spoke about his country’s role in creating the Houthi rebel military force in Yemen, which he said he considered another achievement of the Iranian revolution (21) . Another example showing the Iranian role in Yemen is a statement by Iranian MP Ali Riza Zakani, who said in a statement to the Iranian parliament that Sana’a had become the fourth Arab capital under Tehran’s control after Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad. He also asserted that Houthi rebellion is an extension of the Khomeinist revolution, adding that 14 Yemeni provinces out of 20 are under the domination of this movement which he asserted would expand further to enter Saudi Arabia. On the same subject, Ali Akbar Velayati, the engineer of Iranian foreign policy, has officially admitted the Iranian support of Houthis in Yemen, asserting that his country is supporting what he described as “the Houthis’ just and legitimate struggle” (22). 4.Argentina On July 18, 1994, a suicide bomber blew up a Jewish center in Buenos Aires killing 85 people and injuring 300 more; fingers were immediately pointed at Hezbollah and Iran. In 2007, the Argentinean Attorney General accused some Iranian suspects of being behind the 1994 attack, including the then-Minister of Defense, General Ahmad Wahidi, who was the Commander of a Revolutionary Guards unit at the time of the explosion (23). In May 2013 an Argentinean prosecutor issued a 500-page indictment concerning the case at which he accused Iran of establishing terrorist groups in Argentina and in other South American countries to launch terrorist attacks in these nations (24). 5.Kingdom of Saudi Arabia On June 25, 1996, a suicide tank bomber killed 19 American Air Force personnel, injuring 372 other people, and causing tens of casualties amongst people of other nationalities, in an attack in Khobar, Saudi Arabia. Despite the massive evidence tying them to the terror attack, the Iranian authorities, of course, denied any relation to
Journal for Iranian Studies
120
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
it. Some reports circulated about efforts by former president Hashemi Rafsanjani and the current president Hassan Rouhani who was then a member of the Iranian National Security Council, to contain tension between the two countries, which was reduced by the victory of the moderate Mohammad Khatami president of the Iranian Republic. Riyadh did not officially accuse Tehran of being behind this attack, while Americans did suggest that the IRGC’s Al-Quds force bore responsibility for enlisting and training those suspected of carrying it out (25). 6.Afghanistan The American Department of Defense and the Iranian regime were accused of providing support to extremist individuals and groups in Afghanistan, including Qalboddin Hekmatyar, Ahmad and Ismail Khan, and Ahmad Shah Masud via the Al-Quds force that works with NGOs in the country. In 2010, the Pentagon reported that 107 missiles were delivered by the IRGC to Afghani extremists, and some arsenals of Iranian-made weapons were unveiled in Afghanistan (26). The US Department of State also accused Iran of providing training, weaponry, rockets, mortar rocket launchers, missiles, and explosives to the Taliban (27). In addition to that, other regional countries, including Kuwait and Bahrain, have accused the IRGC of interfering in their internal affairs. The IRGC Budget In recent years, the annual budget of both the IRGC and the Iranian army were significantly different. For example, in the 2013-2014 budget - the last year of former president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad reign - the Iranian military budget for all sectors (army, IRGC, Mobilization Forces, Joint General Staff of the army, and Joint General Staff of the IRGC) totaled $6 billion and 240 million. In the next year 2014-2015, the budget amounted to more than $8 billion with added amount of $1 billion and 850 million. In 2013-2014, the IRGC received $3 billion and 305 million of the total, while in 2014-2015 the portion of the budget allocated to the IRGC jumped to $5billion. This year, 2016, the IRGC’s budget decreased to $4 billion and 200 million. In addition to the annual allowance the IRGC receives from the government, it also makes massive amounts of money from its economic projects in the country. As for the regular army, its budgets for 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 did not exceed $2 billion and 500 million. Although President Hassan Rouhani declared a 15 percent,
Journal for Iranian Studies
121
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
an increase in the army’s budget for the current year 2016, the gap is still huge between the two wings of the Iranian military. The Iranian Army and IRGC Budgets for the Years 2014, 2105, 2016 Year
2014
2015
2016
IRGC
$3.305 Billion
$5 Billion
$4.100 Billion
Army
$1.5 Billion
$1.5 Billion
$1.750 Billion
The Iranian Army: Its Components and Capabilities The Iranian army consists of a Joint General Staff and four major divisions - Land, Navy, Air Force, and the ‘Khatam Alanbia Base for Air Defense’. The Supreme Leader is the Commander-in-Chief of these armed forces. The Iranian army consists of a large number of soldiers and military installations Although its capabilities exceed those of the Revolutionary Guards, the Revolutionary Guards’ budget is three times more than that of the army. During the reign of the Shah, the army reported directly to him. Its commanders were subsequently accused by the incoming theocratic regime of being loyal to the Shah due to the financial rewards and promotion they had received. During the revolution, many of these officers were either imprisoned or killed due to their attempts to defend the Shah and prevent his fall. Others acquired the faith and respect of the new regime due to their cooperation and refusal to challenge the revolution (29); despite this, the new regime placed severe restrictions on them for a long time because of the belief that “Too many officers and soldiers claimed they supported the revolution but were looking for the opportunity to bring it down.” This theory was the primary motive for the ‘cleansing’ of the Iranian military from the remnants of the Shah’s army, which meant in effect creating a new military organization which reports directly to the Supreme Leader of the ‘revolutionary’ “Islamic Republic”, enjoying a respectful status and acceptance so long as it values the goals and ideologies of the revolution, and protects the regime while maintaining its survival. Over the first fifteen months of the revolution until the end of the eight-year Iraqi-Iranian war in 1988, Iran’s army witnessed the expulsion and replacement of
Journal for Iranian Studies
122
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
a large number of its commanders and chiefs of staff. Among the 13 commanders of the army, eight were imprisoned, executed or expelled, while others escaped to exile outside the country (30). The army had reached a stage of near-dissolution after the execution of some of its commanders and escape of others in addition to the expulsion of the chiefs of staff one after another in less than two years such as Major General Farbad, Major General Shadmuhr, Colonel Shad, and Colonel Falahi (31). After the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war, Abu Alhassan Bani Sadr (the first Chief of Staff after the revolution from 1980 to 1981) dedicated his efforts to restructuring the army and equipping it with American-made weaponry. He also assigned previous military commanders and experts who had been expelled during the revolution because of the army’s need for their expertise, although the new regime leaders rejected these reassignments under the pretext of “Jihad against Iraqi lies about the Revolutionary Guards only,” and “Ethics are a priority in Jihad and defending Islam.” Despite its participation in wars and continuous military improvement, the clerics always pointed fingers at the regular army, which, in the words of one of its commanders, preferred Iraqi bombs over the clerics’ stabs in the back (32). Despite the regime’s attempts to strangle the army and its engagement in war with Iraq, some of its commanders launched a number of attempted military coups to overthrow the regime in the first three years after the revolution. The most important of these coups was 1982 one. The coup failed and 160 of the army commanders were killed. Former Foreign Minister, Sadiq Qutob Zadeh was executed on charges of being behind the coup with the help of the Chief of Staff of the Army and Special Forces. In 1983, Iran witnessed another coup attempt announced by Rafsanjani, leading to the execution of another large number of army commanders, who were charged with conspiring against the regime and contacting with the Soviet Union (33). At the height of the 1980-88 war, the regime lessened its attempts to stifle the army because of its urgent military needs for its services. The army worked side by side with the IRGC to liberate Iranian cities occupied by the Iraqi forces through significant coordination between the two wings of the Iranian military.
Journal for Iranian Studies
123
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
After the end of war, the two ministries of defense and IRGC were consolidated in one ministry. This combination allowed the regime closer monitoring over the regular army and over the movements of its commanders. Since that period, the role of the army has deteriorated and the influence of the Guards increased in most of the state organizations. After the Iranian-Iraqi war, the regular army was excluded from Iranian political life because of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei assumed the responsibility of the Iranian Armed Forces, allowing him to practice closer supervision and censorship of the army through assigning the most loyal of its commanders and excluding the others. Army and IRGC Disagreement Since the revolution in 1979, Iran’s regular army has been mistreated and neglected. The army commanders and troops have never publicly responded to the state of marginalization and neglect they have experienced over the past years due to the absolute allegiance of some of the army’s senior officers to the brutally oppressive Iranian regime, fears of expulsion, or losing the privileges and financial incentives they had gained. The nature of complaints sent by army officers and soldiers to President Rouhani on his web page, however, shows the significant level of their disappointment. A lot of them complain about their bad economic situation, low wages, and not receiving any education. Others complain about being excluded from promotion despite being more highly qualified than their Revolutionary Guards peers who are promoted. Another point of dispute is that IRGC members are promoted every three years while army members are only eligible every four years, which adds to the frustration and dissatisfaction of most Iranian army personnel (34). The IRGC, meanwhile, is in control of almost all the available resources in the country. It enjoys major influence and receives most of the regime’s political attention. This has led to a state of resentment among regular army personnel, which has risen over the years. The belief among army personnel that the IRGC has exceeded its limits and is behaving as an independent organization separate to Iran’s other armed forces led the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani to call for granting more support to the defense ministry and restructuring of the army through improving the quality of its training, weaponry, and equipment.
Journal for Iranian Studies
124
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
Recently, some component parts of the Iranian regime, including the IRGC, have been sharply critical of the regular army, accusing it of weakness and failure. These accusations were broadcast in a documentary shown on Iranian TV about the role of the Iranian army and the IRGC in the Iraqi-Iranian war. In fact, this documentary massively underestimated the role of the army during the first year of the war and its failure in four battles with the Iraqi army. The commanders of the Iranian army responded angrily to the documentary, strongly condemning the regime’s radio and TV media division for underestimating the military institution and its central role. The commander of the army’s land forces, General Ahmad Riza Bordistan, said that the army was not easily broken during the Iraqi-Iranian war as some had erroneously suggested, adding that on the contrary some parties, which he did not name, had attempted to dissolve it when they noticed its powerful position in the war. The Deputy General Commander of the Khatam Alanbia base, Major General Mohammad Hassan Husni Sadi, also strongly condemned the regime’s radio and TV media division over the documentary, accusing it of underestimating the capabilities and efficiency of the Iranian army (35). A number of other senior army commanders further accused the IRGC of being behind the documentary and giving the green light to the regime media authority to broadcast it specifically in order to present a false image of the army (36). Another indicators of disharmony between the army and the IRGC is a speech by former IRGC naval commander and prominent regime loyalist and fundamentalist ideologue General Hassan Abbasi, who directed his criticism nominally to the United States, saying, “In case the country is exposed to flooding and erosion, the army would never respond or take any action”, a clear reference to the army’s weakness. He added that the IRGC and Basij forces had confronted the unrest following the 2009 elections while the army did not. He also implicitly accused the army of carelessness concerning the current crises and turbulent period in Iran’s history. These claims and allegations were in turn sharply criticized by the commander of the army’s land forces, Ahmad Riza Bordistan, who called Abbasi’s statements unbalanced and illogical, going so far as to threaten taking legal action against Abbasi if he did not issue an apology to the army. On the same subject, the chief of the army’s marine forces, Habibollah Siari, also criticized Abbasi, asserting that
Journal for Iranian Studies
125
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
his statements did not help either the regime or Iran’s national security
(37)
.
The aforementioned events- Abbasi’s statements and the TV documentaryprovide a demonstration of the seriousness of the disagreement between the army and the Guards. One senior military official, responsible for running the regime’s Tabnak website, which catalogues the orders and directives of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei and has close ties to the Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council General Muhsin Riza’I, revealed that Major General Hassan Fairoz Abadi was dismissed as Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces due to his support for the nuclear deal and for President Hassan Rouhani. Although the regime has so far been able to defuse the mounting tensions to some degree or to quickly resolve these incidents through placating the commanders of both wings of the Iranian military, the regime has continued its clearly preferential treatment of the IRGC over the army in every way. This was evident through the dismissal of Major General Abadi, a confidante of Rouhani’s, who was replaced by an IRGC official, demonstrating Khamenei’s fears about the impact of the current tensions on Iran’s domestic and overseas military policies (38). In an attempt by the regime to reform the military organization, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, Mohammad Baqiri said that his mission consists of four stages designed by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as follows: improve all Iranian armed forces divisions over the next five years, strengthen the Public Mobilization Forces and boost their role in defense and security issues; strengthen Iran’s defense capabilities; and combine the IRGC and the Iranian regular army into one force (39). The rationale behind this plan seems to be an attempt by the regime to eliminate the major gap in capabilities and privileges between the two wings of the Iranian military resulting from the regime’s negligence towards the regular army, its expansion of the IRGC and its involvement in several conflicts in the Middle East. The plan also aims to strengthen the army and enhance its role to meet any domestic deficit and pave the way for the Guards to achieve their objectives both inside and outside Iran.
Journal for Iranian Studies
126
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
Conclusion: Based on all the aforementioned information, it is clear that the IRGC represents the military, intelligence, and economic arm of the Iranian regime. This organization has come to dominate the regime from the inside and succeeded to a great extent in carrying out its projects and overseas interventions through exporting the “Islamic Revolution” and its doctrines; this position of privilege given to the IRGC by the Iranian regime contrasts with the regime’s deliberate negligence towards the army which has been calculatingly excluded from Iran’s political and economic life. The most important reasons for the Iranian regime’s negligence towards the army and its support of the idea of creating a parallel military organization to the regular army tasked with protecting the revolution and implementing its plans were the fears of the Jurist Leadership regime of a military coup that could bring it down; the neutrality of the army during the revolution, and support of some of its commanders for Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlavi to prevent his fall and preserve his reign, and the failed coups by some army commanders during the first years of the revolution. The consolidation of the IRGC and the Army into one Ministry, with the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei assuming responsibility as the Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Armed Forces that comprises the army, IRGC, and the Iranian internal security agencies, has led to heavier control and more significant censorship of the regular army and its commanders, and tipping the balance of power in favor of the IRGC.
Journal for Iranian Studies
127
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
REFERENCES (1) Sasapost, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, August 12, 2015, http://www.sasapost.com/irans-revolutionary-guards/ (2) Ibrahim Abu Zayed, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Iran’s central bank for terrorism, June 15, 2016, http:// aawsat.com/home/article/666006/ (3) Rafidah Taha, All you need to know about the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, May 4, 2015, http://www.sasapost.com/translation/irgc/ (4) Arabiya net, Iranian Revolutionary Guards, between strength and weakness, November 6, 2016, http:// www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/11/06/248015.html (5) Kenneth Katzman: the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.. its inception, composition and role, the Emirates Center for Research Studies, Abu Dhabi, 1998, p. 9. (6) Ibid, p. 10. (7) Ibid, p. 9. (8) Almezmaah Center, divisions between the Revolutionary Guards and the Iranian army, http://almezmaah.com/2016/08/01 (9) Greg Bruno, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, 14 June 2013, http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-revolutionary-guards/p14324 (10) Beirut Center for Middle East Studies, does Rouhani affect the balance of the Revolutionary Guards? January 28, 2016, http://www.beirutme.com/?p=16815. (11) Aljazeera, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, http://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/military/2014/11/6 (12) National defense research institute, The Rise of the Pasdaran, 2009, p. 21, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf (13) The website of www.albainah.net, what are the Iranian Basij forces? October 20, 2015, http://www.albainah.net/index.aspx?function=Item&id=62995 (14) Iranian terrorism and its objectives, August 6, 2012, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20378/A_137_12_2142995590.pdf. (15) Muammar Faisal Kholi, the Iranian penetration in Iraq .. motivations, forms and tools to influence, June 11, 2016, http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/27905 (16) Ibid, Iranian Revolutionary Guards between strength and weakness. (17) Sam Tamiz, Why Is Iran Shaking Up Its Military Leadership? July 27, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-iran-shaking-its-military-leadership-17133?page=3 (18) Alkhaleejaffairs, Iraqi Revolutionary Guards. Declaration of a new Iranian war to where? 17 May 2016, http://news.alkhaleejaffairs.online/c-37137 (19) Ibid, Ibrahim Abu Zayed. (20) Ahmad Amin Al-shojaa, Iranian interference in Yemen, its facts, goals, and means, 2017, 1, 17, http://www.alburhan.com/Article/index/7770 (21) Hameed Saleh, commander of the Revolutionary Guards: Houthis recent achievement for Iran, http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/iran/2015/05/04/ (22) Yemen Saeed website, Iranian interference in Yemen, its coverts and secrets, February 29, 2016, http://www.yemensaeed.com/news52584.htm (23) Argentina Passes Iran Amia Deal,” BBC, February 28, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-21612517. (24) AMIA: Prosecutor Accuses Iran of Infiltrating South American Countries,” Buenos Aires Herald, May 29, 2013,
Journal for Iranian Studies
128
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
Military Institutions between Trust and marginalization
http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/132260/amia-prosecutor-nisman-accuses-iran-fugitiverabbani-of-infiltrating-several-south-american-countries. (25) Mirza Khuwaylidi, responsible for the Khobar bombings, after 16 years, is in the grip of Saudi security, August 26, 2015, http://www.alarabiya.net/servlet/aa/pdf/c285bf29-12fc-4963-b0fb-2f908608819c . (26) Bill Gertz, “Iran Boosts Quds Shock Troops in Venezuela,” Washington Times, April 21, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/21/iran-boosts-qods-shock-troops-in-venezuela . (27) Greg Bruno, “State Sponsors: Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated October 13, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362. (28) Abbas Qydari, Rouhani declared reducing Revolutionary Guard budget and increasing the army budget, May 5, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fa/originals/2016/05/iran-military-spending-irgcbudget-reduced-army-increase.html#ixzz4FbDM2FJ9. (29) Ibid, Kenneth Katzman, p. 20. (30) Hussein Karmiyan, weakening Iran’s military structure, June 27, 2007, http://r8saldefa.blogfa.com/cat-40.aspx. (31) Holy war website, Weakening the military structure, December 7, 2011, http://www.the-big-war. blogfa.com/post-8.aspx. (32) Amal Sabki: Iran’s political history between the two revolutions of 1906-1979, Kuwait, the world of knowledge, 1999, p. 229. (33) Ibid. P. 238. (34) President Hassan Rouhani site on the Internet, http://rouhani.ir/rooznevesht.php?rooznevesht_id=9 (35) Fars News Agency, Major-General Hassani Saadi criticizes some analysis about the army’s role in the war, September 26, 2011, http://www.farsnews.com/printable.php?nn=13900704000717 (36) “Iranian students’ website”, the army and the Revolutionary Guards differences over the duration of the war, Nov 13, 2008, http://www.daneshju.ir/forum/f344/t55647.html. (37) Shargh newspaper: East, the army complains, 2016/07/31, http://www.sharghdaily.ir/News/99127 (38) Almezmaah, divisions between the Revolutionary Guards and the Iranian army, 2016/08/01, http:// almezmaah.com (39) Why Is Iran Shaking Up Its Military Leadership? Sam July 27, 2016: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-iran-shaking-its-military-leadership-17133?page=3
Journal for Iranian Studies
129
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century Manal Almreitib (PH.D.) Researcher in Iranian-Gulf relations
INTRODUCTION
At
the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Arabian Gulf suffered from ferocious Portuguese military attacks. The Portuguese first arrived in the Arabian Gulf in 1507, almost immediately launching a blistering attack on the region’s most prominent cities, and ports seized the Qalhat (2), Muscat and Sohar (3) and other Omani cities. The Portuguese quickly gained dominance over the Hormuz Strait, the gateway to the Arabian Gulf, building a castle there to act as the central base for their presence of the Portuguese in the region (4).
Oman before the Persian occupation The Portuguese military attacks were characterized by massive power and savage destruction, with the Portuguese fleets not only looting those cities but setting fire to them and taking their populations as prisoners; when the invading ships could not accommodate the captured peoples, they were savagely brutalized, with the survivors being released often after their noses and ears had been severed. (5) This brutality was intended to break the spirit of the region’s peoples and terrorize them into subjugation, with Portugal quickly becoming the dominant force in the Arab region, controlling its ports and coastal areas and monopolizing regional trade, with the peoples of the area only allowed
Journal for Iranian Studies
130
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
to conduct limited business, which was tightly controlled by the Portuguese occupiers. This continued for more than a century until the Alya’aribah dynasty emerged and succeeded in expelling the Portuguese colonialists from Oman. (6) The history of the Alya’aribah family (7) began when the people of Oman accepted Nasir Ibn Murshid Ibn Sultan Alya’aribah (known as Nasir Ibn Murshid in short) as their ruler and pledged allegiance to him in the early half of the 1620s while the country was still under Portuguese occupation; he was officially appointed by the Omani people as ruler in 1624 and became renowned for his just and righteous rule. One of his first acts on being appointed as ruler was to set about uniting Oman, which was at the time divided into many districts, each with their own domestic leader. The most prominent coastal cities at the time remained under the rule of Portugal; however, he succeeded in taking control of Nizwa (8) and Samail (9), as well as of a number of inland areas. (10) After this, he devoted his efforts to liberating a number of Portuguese garrison towns on the coast, seizing several cities, including Galfar (11), Sur (12), and Sohar. Laying siege to the Omani capital, Muscat, in 1643, Nasir Ibn Murshid eventually forced the Portuguese colonialists to sign an agreement obliging Portugal to pay an annual tax to him in return for retaining control of the city (3). The Portuguese occupiers were outraged at the terms of this agreement, which they viewed as humiliating, taking this as a cue to resume war against the Omani people. Nasir Ibn Murshid was ready for this, however, and launched an attack against the garrison in Muscat (13), forcing the occupiers in 1648 to comply with the terms of the previous agreement (14). Following the death of Nasir Ibn Murshid in 1649, the Omani people pledged their allegiance to his cousin, Sultan Ibn Saif Alya’aribah, who followed in Nasir’s footsteps, confronting the Portuguese occupiers and recapturing the remaining Portuguese garrison towns along the Omani coast, with Portuguese forces fully driven out of Muscat in 1650 (15). Sultan Ibn Saif did not stop with the expulsion of the Portuguese from Oman but also sent ships to attack some of the Portuguese colonies on the Indian coast (16) in response to pleas for help from Muslims there who were subjected to similar savage brutality and oppression by the Portuguese occupiers. In 1699, his navy even seized control of Mombasa in Kenya (17), the Center of the Portuguese colonization of East Africa, after which Oman became the ruler over
Journal for Iranian Studies
131
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
East Africa (18). The Alya’aribah dynasty continued to be an economic and political powerhouse for many years, extending its political influence far beyond Oman, from the East African coast, along with the entire southern Arabian Peninsula, to the west coast of the Indus Valley in northwest India. This was the Golden Age of the Alya’aribah dynasty, which began to fade following the death of Sultan Ibn Saif in 1718 (19). In the wake of the celebrated leader’s death, there was debate over who was best qualified to succeed him, with the public keen to see his son, Saif Ibn Sultan, assume power, while the leading Omani scholars of the time insisted that it should go to another family member, Muhanna Ibn Sultan (20), rejecting the concept of hereditary rule which they insisted violated the precepts of the Ibadi imamate system (21), as well as expressing unhappiness at Saif Ibn Sultan’s youth and relative inexperience compared to Muhanna’s greater maturity which they insisted meant that he, rather than Saif Ibn Sultan, met the requirements of the imamate (22). The Ulama’s decision to swear allegiance to Muhanna Ibn Sultan led to public unrest that eventually evolved into a civil war. Despite the fact that Muhanna Ibn Sultan was killed in 1720, the battle for power continued, with new rivals appearing to contest the right of the second Saif Ibn Sultan to assume power. This rivalry extended and expanded to include most of the tribes in Oman, passing through several stages and arguments between various would-be rulers, ultimately resulting into Oman effectively splitting into two blocs, the Huhannawi and the Ghafiriyeh blocs, each of which insisted on its right to supremacy (23). The long and bloody conflict between the Huhannawi and Ghafiriyeh over supremacy had a lasting impact not only domestically but regionally, extending to neighboring rival states around the Arabian Gulf region, whose rulers used the power struggle to their advantage to achieve their own political objectives and expansionist aspirations. The primary rival among these was the Persian kingdom, whose military succeeded in exploiting the turmoil to its own advantage to seize control of Oman, which it subsequently occupied for some years (24). The first Persian occupation of Oman Saif Ibn Sultan II was ultimately been approved to attain the status of the ruler of the imamate in 1728; however, he neglected the affairs of governance and perpetrated a number of ill-conceived acts, which angered not only the Abadites but ordinary Omanis, leading to his being stripped of his imamate status in 1732. At this point, another member of the Alya’aribah family, a cousin named Belarab
Journal for Iranian Studies
132
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
Ibn Hammir, was appointed to the imamate, angering Saif Ibn Sultan II, who sought to regain the title for himself, asking in 1735 for assistance from the Balochi people. However, the forces of Belarab Ibn Hammir managed to defeat the Balochi forces amassed by Saif Ibn Sultan II, killing many of them (25). Following this defeat, Saif Ibn Sultan II began seeking another ally to assist him in the restoration of power, requesting assistance from the Persian rulers, who warmly welcomed his pleas for help against his opponent. There are two questions over this; why did the second Saif Ibn Sultan turn to the Persians specifically, and why did the Persian Shah of the time welcome this plea and rush to offer assistance? To answer these questions, one must examine the history of that period, when Persia had suffered a long series of domestic conflicts and periods of turmoil, which led to the nation being occupied in 1722 by Afghan forces who captured its then-capital Isfahan. The Persian Safavid ruler of the time, Shah Hussein, conceded power to the Afghan commander, Mahmoud Mir, which signaled the end of the Safavids’ rule for the next seven years of Afghani occupation of Persia. During this seven-year period, the Turks and Russians also occupied parts of the country adjacent to their borders, with this chaotic state continuing until a Persian leader named Nadir Gholi was able to expel the Afghani occupiers from Isfahan and restore Safavid rule in 1729. Tahmasp Mirza, the son of Shah Hussein, then inherited his father’s title, becoming Shah before abdicating and appointing his young son, Abbas Shah, as the third Shah of Persia, with Tahmasp acting as his guardian. After succeeding in strengthening his own position and restoring stability to Persia, he did everything in his power to ensure strong governance for the country, resuming his place on the throne in 1736 and taking the title of Nadir Shah for himself (26). As Nadir Shah, Tahmasp began showing the strength of his character and vast ambition; this was soon noticed by Saif Ibn Sultan II in Oman, who was so impressed by it that he felt that Nadir Shah would be the ideal source to turn to for help in restoring his own power, not only because of the Persian ruler’s power and influence but because of the proximity of the two countries across the Arabian Gulf, which Saif Ibn Sultan felt would help in ensuring the success of his objective. Nadir Shah, meanwhile, welcomed the request of Saif Ibn Sultan II for assistance since he viewed it as a means of fulfilling his own expansionist ambitions to establish a Persian empire extending to the eastern and western shores of the Arabian Gulf. For Nadir Shah, the Omani leader’s request allowed him to achieve two objectives,
Journal for Iranian Studies
133
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
First, weakening then eliminating the Yaruba dynasty. During the period of Alya’aribah rule, the Omani Navy was the main regional rival and obstacle to Persian expansion, with Oman was still enjoying the status of the predominant regional power, which extended to maritime supremacy and control of both the eastern and western coasts of the Arabian Gulf; Oman even controlled the main Persian port of Bandar Abbas since first capturing it in around 1720 AD. The request of Saif Ibn Sultan II, therefore, allowed Nadir Shah to set about weakening and eliminating Oman’s regional power. Second, the ambitious Persian Nadir Shah found Saif’s request as an excellent opportunity to take control of the Persian and Omani coasts dominated by some Arab Emirates to achieve his expansionist ambitions of eliminating the Arab rule on both sides of the Arabian Gulf. In 1737 Nadir Shah responded to Saif Ibn Sultan II by asking help from the English and Dutch agencies at Bandar Abbas to transport his forces to the Omani coast due to the weakness of the Persian navy. The English rejected his request while the Dutch agreed to exchange of some privileges in the Gulf. Five thousand Persian soldiers were transported in April 1737 from Bandar Abbas to Khor Fakhan and Ras al-Khaimah. The Persian forces, led by Latif Khan invaded both territories and moved to the inside where they defeated Bilarab Ibn Hmaier and took control of most Omani territories (27). The Persian leader Latif Khan declared himself an absolute military ruler of Oman. Consequently, Saif Ibn Sultan II found himself in a difficult situation; he angered Scholars and people, and the in same time, was treated arrogantly with disrespect by the Persian leader. Saif finally recognized that the Persian quick response to his request aimed at dominating Oman, eliminating Alya’aribah dynasty, and expand the Persian rule. Factors of Persian presence elimination in Oman The tension between Saif Ibn Sultan and Latif Khan led to the fall of their coalition and the retreat of the Persian leader from the inside of Oman to Ras al-Khaimah; consequently, Nadir Shah launched another campaign to assist Latif Khan headed by Taqi Khan to keep domination of Oman. Both leaders invaded the rest of the Omani cities such as Nazwa, Bahla (28), Azka (29), and finally, captured Muscat in March 1737 (30).
Journal for Iranian Studies
134
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
Saif Ibn Sultan lost control of the country to the Persians; as a result, he was obliged to come to an agreement with Belarab Ibn Hammir and unify the Omani tribes. Hammir gave up the Imamate to Saif with the approval of Alghafiriah, who side by side with Hanawiah assembled under the banner of Saif Ibn Sultan II to drive the Persians out of Oman. Omanis used disagreement between the two Persian leaders, Taqi Khan and Latif Khan and drove the Persians out of the country (31). The brave resistance of Sahar’s ruler Ahmad Ibn Saeed (32) helped defeat the Persians in Sahar and Azka where the Persian forces were eliminated by the Omanis who took back control of their homeland. Nadir Shah used the Arab sailors inhibiting the eastern coast of the Arabian Gulf to build the Persian fleet due to their maritime skills and the Persians ignorance of sea routes. The Arab sailors had earlier helped the Persians in the attacks on Portuguese but refused to help in the attacks on their Arab brothers on the western coast of the Arabian Gulf. In 1740 they rebelled and killed the commander of the Persian fleet Mir Ali Khan and seized some Persian ships, which made Nadir Shah ask help from the Dutch to attack the Arab sailors who defeated both Persians and Dutch. These events contributed to weakening the position of the Persian garrison in Oman and helped Omanis drive the Persians out of their country that retreated to Bandar Abbas. (33) The failure Persian reoccupying of Oman After Persians had left Oman, a dispute over Imamate continued between the Omanis themselves. People broke up with Saif and swore allegiance to another member of the family, Sultan Ibn Mirshid who took Muscat, the capital. That made Saif re-contact the Persians, disregarding their ambitions in Oman and their devastation of the country. He gave them promises of recognizing the Persian sovereignty over Sahar, the symbol of the Omani resistance under the leadership of the wise and genius ruler Ahmad Ibn Saeed who foiled the Persian plot of occupying Oman. (34) The second phase of the Persian occupation of Oman started in 1742. The Persian fleet headed by Taqi Shah left Bushehr port and arrived in Ras al-Khaimah. The Persian army split up into two divisions, one headed to Muscat and defeated Sultan Ibn Mirshid. It took control of the capital and its neighboring cities in February 1743. The other group blockaded Sahar with constant bombing
Journal for Iranian Studies
135
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
of the city. The Imam, Sultan Ibn Mirshid broke the siege around Sahar and entered Ahmad Ibn Saeed’s fort where he died of his wounds in 1743. On the other side, the Persians betrayed Saif again and refused to give him Muscat and Matrouh, which made him hide in Alhazm keep in Ristaq where he lived until death suffering sorrow and coercion few days after the killing of Sultan Ibn Mirshid. With the passing of the two leaders, Oman laid under the Persian domination. (35) Omanis rallied around the ruler of Sahar that became the symbol of their resistance. The Persians continued their land and sea blockade of Sahar for more than seven months with the constant bombing that resulted in many casualties of Omani people (36). After a prolonged period of blocked, both sides signed a treaty of arbitration stating that all Persian forces retreat from Sahar to Muscat, while Ahmad Ibn Saeed kept Sahar and Barka (37) in exchange for annual tax paid to the Persians (38). Resources differed about the reasons of the treaty. Some said that the Persians signed it because of the strong resistance of Ahmad Ibn Saeed and the losses they suffered (39), while others said that Ahmad’s running out of munitions and desire to strengthen his political position made him asked for the treaty (40). All in all, with this treaty the Persian blockade of Sahar ended and the Persian leader Taqi Khan retreated and went back to Persia, leaving his troops in Muscat and some other Omani territories. Ahmad Ibn Saeed had succeeded in strengthening his position inside Oman and gathering Omanis around him. After that, he blockaded the Persian garrisons in Muscat and stalled paying the annual tax to them. The Persian leaders became incapable of paying salaries to their soldiers, which made a significant number of them escape to Persia. What severed the position of the Persian troops in Oman was the repeal of tariff on goods coming to Barka port, attracting merchants from Muscat and declining the financial status of the Persians (41). Moreover, Nadir Shah failed to send new supplies to his troops in Oman because of his engagement in war with the Ottoman Empire and his efforts to end the internal rebellions led by some of his leaders that contributed to the decline of the Persian forces financially and militarily. The most prominent of these rebellions was the one led by Taqi Khan, the Persian leader who led the campaigns on Oman before (42).
Journal for Iranian Studies
136
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
Due to this deterioration of the Persian capabilities, commanders of the Persian garrisons in Oman were obliged to leave. The Persian government asked Alya’aribah to dispatch the closest relative for Saif Ibn Sultan, Majid Ibn Sultan to Persia to have a hand in Oman. Nadir Shah gave him a letter to the Persian garrisons in Oman asking them to leave their positions and hand them over to Majid Ibn Sultan. Before Majid got to the garrisons, Ahmad Ibn Saeed had seized this letter from him and attacked the Persian forces while they were preparing to leave and killed most of them, while those escaped, drowned in the sea (43). By doing this, Ahmad Ibn Saeed liberated Oman from the Persian occupation completely in 1744 (44). All Omanis gathered and swore allegiance to him and ended Alya’aribah dynasty that signaled the beginning of Albosa’eedi reign. Alya’aribah succeeded in driving Portuguese out of the country with the support of all Omanis same as Ahmad Ibn Saeed who drove Persians out through the full support of all Omani people and succeed to the throne of Oman. Conclusion People have to learn an everlasting lesson that the use of foreign forces in any internal disagreement between people of the same country makes them easy prey for these forces and invaders. Controversy, division, and ambitions for power contributed to the fall of Oman under the Persian domination; on the contrary, unification led to its liberation and driving invaders out of the country. Finally, the Omani case is evidence that the Persian ambitions in the Arabian Gulf are not new but deeply rooted in history.
Journal for Iranian Studies
137
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
REFERENCES (1)Fars (Persia) is the official name of Iran since ancient times and continued so until the Pahlavi rule when Reza Shah in March 1935, issued a decision to change the state name from Persia to Iran. (2) Qalhat: is a village on the cost of Sultanate of Muscat that is located 13 miles northwest of Sur city, this city has flourished in the sixth century but destroyed by the Portuguese in their invasion of the region, J. G. Lorimer: Gulf guide geographical section, Doha, Darul Uloom for printing and publication, D.t, C 3, p. 1205, Abdul Rahman al-Ani: Oman in the early Islamic eras, Beirut, Prints Distribution Company, 2001,p. 62. (3) Sohar or Suhar: is located on the Gulf of Oman, and with the advent of Islam was an important commercial center, and today is one of the most important cities of Oman. Alani: Oman in the Islamic Ages, p. 58. (4) Mohammad Shaibah Al Salmi: nahdat al’aeyan bahriat eammana, Beirut, Dar-Jalil, 1998, p. 11; Nawal Alsyrfy: alnnufudh alburtughali fi alkhalij alearbi, Riyadh, Al Hilal House Press, 1983, pp. 118-124; Badr al-Din Al-Khasosi: dirasat fi alkhalij alearabi alhadith walmaeasir, C 1, 2 publication, Kuwait, With series, 1984, p. 16; Brahim Khoury AND Ahmad Tadmoury: saltanat Hormuz alarabia almustaqila .. rakayizuha, hawzatuha, sikaanuha wa iqtisadiha wa himnituha, Ras Al Khaimah, Ras Al Khaimah National printing house, 1999, c 2, pp. 170-172: S.B Miles, The Countries And Tribes Of Persian Gulf, (London ; Harrison And Sons,1919) pp. 146-150. (5) Amputating, cutting off something from its origins, such as cutting off an ear, the nose of their origins. Abou El Fadl Jamal al-Din Mohammad Ibn Manthur, Lessan Alarab, c 12, Beirut, Dar Sader, D.t, p. 340. (6) Sairafi: Alnnufudh Alburtughali fi alkhalij, pp. 122-124, pp. 188-189; Saleh Abed: Alssirae Aleumani Alburtughali Watahrir Alshrq Al’iifriqi Khilal Alqarn Alssabe’ Ashr, the Center for Studies and Documentation at the office of the Amir in Ras Al Khaimah, 1987, c 2, p. 126. (7) Their origins backs to The Azd or Al Azd are an Arabian tribe. They were a branch of the Kahlan tribe, which was one of the two branches of Qahtan the other being Himyar. Humaid Ibn Mohammad Ibn Rezziq: Fateh Al-MoIbn Sirret Sadat Al-Busaidiin, 1422 Hegira, 2001, pp. 7, 229. Salem Al Siyabil: Essaf Al-Aaayan Fi Anssab Ahel Oman, Beirut, Islamic office, 1384 Hegira, p. 97. Wendell Phillips, Oman’s history, translated, Mohammad Amin Abdullah, Oman, the Ministry of National Heritage and Culture, 1983, Publication 2, p. 57. (8) Nizwa is the most important inland cities located in the southern part of Green Mountain, is the largest city in Oman, Lorimer: Gulf guide geographical section, c 4, pp. 1733-1734; Alani: Oman in the Islamic Ages, p. 64. (9) Samail is an important Omani city, located in the valley of Samail with a length of more than a hundred miles, Samail is the main route trade between Muscat and the interior region. Pisi Mailiz; Gulf.. its countries and tribes, translated, Mohammad Amin Abdullah, Oman, the Ministry of National Heritage and Culture, 1982, p. 308. samuel Barrett Miles: The countries and Tribes of the Gulf, Translated, Mohammad Amin Abdullah, Oman, the Ministry of National Heritage and Culture, 1982, p. 308.
Journal for Iranian Studies
138
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
(10): Abdullah Sahari: Tareekh Oman, King Faisal library for Islamic Studies and Research, p. 114, unknown: Tareekh Ahel Oman, research, Saeed Ashour, Oman, Ministry of National Heritage, 1980, pp. 126-130, Abdul Aziz Awad. Studies in the history of the modern Arab Gulf, Beirut, Dar- Al-Jalil, 1991, C 2, p. 64 Mustafa Agil, Altanafos Aldwali fi Alkhaleej Alarabi, 1622 -1763, Doha, the World Foundation for Printing and Publishing, 1991, 2nd, pp. 110-112. (11) Julphar: is a historic town, al-Hamwi called it Jorffar, on its ruins the city of Ras Al Khaimah was built, Hamwi: Lexicon of countries, c 2, p. 49, Salem Al Siyabi, illustrations in monuments of the qawasim history, Revision of Ahmad Tadmoury, Damascus, cooperative print shop, 1976, p. 19. (12) Sur: Sur is coastal city and is a capital city of Ash Sharqiyah Region, northeastern Oman, on the coast of the Gulf of Oman. It is located at around 22°34′0″N 59°31′44″E and is 93 miles southeast of the Omani capital Muscat. In addition, it is near to Qalhat and located at the entrance to the Gulf. Alani: Oman fi Alosour Alislamia, p. 62. (13) Sahari: Tareekh Oman, p. 127; unknown: Tareekh Ahel Oman, p. 145, Agil: Altanafos Aldwali fi Alkhaleej Alarabi, pp. 113-114; Al-Abed: Alssirae Alomani Alburtughali Watahrir alshrq Al’iifriqi, p. 127. (14) Agil: Alssirae Alomani Alburtughali Watahrir alshrq Al’iifriqi, pp. 118-120; Awad: Studies in the history of the Arabian Gulf, c 2, p. 64; Al Abed: Omani – Portuguese conflict, pp. 128-130. (15): Sahari: Tareekh Oman, p. 127; unknown: Tareekh Ahel Oman, p. 145; Al-Abed: Alssirae Alomani Alburtughali Watahrir alshrq Al’iifriqi, p. 130; Awad: Derasat fi Tareekh Alkhalij Alarabi, c 2, p. 65. (16) Unknown: Tareekh Oman, p. 145; Al-Abed: Alssirae Alomani Alburtughali Watahrir alshrq Al’iifriqi, p. 132. Belgrave, Charles; The Pirate Coast, (Beirut; Librairie Du liban 1972), p. 15. (17) Mombasa: second-largest city in Kenya after the capital Nairobi, located on the east coast of Africa, the city became an important port on the coast of Africa since the thirteenth century, has been dominated by the Omanis until 1877, then occupied by the British until gained independence in 1963. Almawsou’a Ala’rabia Almoyasara, Riyadh: Ammal Foundation of Encyclopedia Publishing and Distribution, 1999, C 24, p. 141. (18) Jamal Kassim Zakaria: the State of Bou Said in Oman and East Africa 1741-1861, Cairo, Cairo Modern Library, 1967, p. 16; Phillips: Oman’s history, p. 64; Faleh Handal: Arabs and Portugal in History 711 -1720 , Abu Dhabi, the Publications of Cultural Foundation, 1997, pp. 523-524, Tariq al-Hamdani: Maqawamat Alomanieen lilhamalat Alirania ‘al Beladehim, 1737 -1744 , Journal for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula studies, E37, p. 10, 1982 , p. 112. (19) Sahari: Tareekh Oman, pp. 128-129; unknown: Tareekh Ahel Oman, pp. 150-151; Handal: Ala’arab Walbortoghal fi Altareekh, pp. 526-527. (20) Historians have disputed over Muhanna Ibn Sultan lineage, samuel Barrett Miles mentions in his book that he was the brother of Imam Sultan and the uncle of Saif Ibn Sultan. Miles: Gulf. Its countries and tribes, p. 214. But Al Abed stated that he was the younger brother of the great Imam Saif Ibn Sultan, Al-Abed: the role of the qawasim in the Arabian Gulf during 1747 -1820, But preponderant opinion is that Muhanna Ibn Sultan Ibn Majid was the husband of daughter of Imam Saif, the sister of Imam Sultan. Abdullah Al Salmi: Tohfato Ala’yan Bseerate Ahl Oman, Egypt, al-Imam printing house, D.t, 5th F, c 2, p. 115; Sarhan Alozkoa: Kashf Alghomma fi Ahwal Aomma, Invistagtion: Abdul Majid al-Qaisi, Oman, Arab log Press, 1986, 2nd Floor, p. 113; unknown: Tareekh Ahel Oman, p. 151.
Journal for Iranian Studies
139
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
(21) Most of the Omani rulers embraced Ibadi sect, which was attributed to Abdullah Ibn Ibad, this sect is more moderate and pushed them away from exaggeration and extremism. For more detail, Abul Fateh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Shahristani: “Almelalo Walnehal”, Halabi Foundation, c 1, p. 134; Muhammad Abu Zahra: Tareekh Almathaheb Alislamia fi Alsiasah Wal’agae’d Wa Tareekh Almathaheb Alfekria, Cairo, Dar Alfikr Alarabi, D.t, p.73-74. (22) Alozkoa: “Kashf Alghomma”, p. 114; Salmi: Tohfato Ala’yan, c 2, p. 115; Jamal Kassim Zakaria: Tareekh Alkhalij Alhadeeth Walmo’aser, C 1, Cairo, Dar Alfikr Alarabi, 1997, pp. 122- 123. (23) Most of the party of Gaferi tribes belonging to Al-Adenanyen Arabs, most of whom are Sunnis, while the party Hinaoa linage backs to Qahtanites Arabs, and the majority of the Hanaouay are followers of the Ibadi sect. It must be pointed out that despite the partisanship of the two blocs to Ghaferi Adnanis and Hinaoa Qahtanis, this division does not mean that these two blocs have maintained their origins without mixing and integration between them throughout the ages. The party of Ghaferi includes Qahtanis and Adnanis tribes that are almost equal in numbers and this is the case also applies to the party of Hinaoa. Salmi: Tohfato Ala’yan, c 21, p. 125; Ahmad Borini: Alemarat Alsab’ ‘la Alsahel Al’akhdhar, Beirut, Dar al-Hikma, 1957, pp. 129-130. (24) Hamdani: Maqawamat Alomanieen lilhamalat Alirania ‘al Beladehim, p. 115. (25) Alozkoa: Oman’s history, p. 139; Ibn Rezziq: Al-Fath Al-Mobin, p. 288; Salmi: Tohfato Ala’yan, c 2, p. 44; unknown: Tareekh Ahel Oman, p. 178. (26) Lorimer: Gulf guide, historical section, c 1, S137-138. (27) Belgrave: The Pirate Coast, p. 20, Lorimer: Historical Gulf guide c 2, pp. 941-942; Abdel Kawi Fahmi: qawasim, Nashatohom Albahri ,a’alagatohom Belqewa Almahalia Alkharejia, 1747-1853 A.D. Ras Al Khaimah, Ras Al Khaimah National print house , p. 25; Khososi : Derasat fi Tareekh Alkhalij, c 1, p. 72; Mohammad Hassan Aidaroos: Altadakhol Alfarsi fi Asho’un Alomania, 1737-1744 , Journal for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, 1408 H-1988 , pp. 152-163. (28) Izki is a town in the region Ad Dakhiliyah, in northeastern Oman. It is located at about 22°56′2″N 57°46′30″E and has a population of 35,173, Lorimer: geographical Gulf guide part 3, p. 1087. (29) Bhalla is away from Nizwa around 30 km, and features a historic castle built during the Persian occupation, Yahya Shami: Mawsou’at Almodon A’arabia Walislamia, Beirut, Dar Alfikr Alarabi, I 1.1993, pp. 85-86. (30) Belgrave: The Pirate Coast, p. 20, Lockhart, L.: Nadir Shan A critical Study Based Mainly Upon, Contemporary Sources, London; Luzac& co, 1938, pp. 182-183 ؛Qasim: State Bou Said, p. 40; Fahmi: qawasim .. Nashtohom Albahri, p. 26; Khososi: Derasat fi Tareekh Alkhalij, c. 1, p. 72, and al-Hamdani: Maqawamat Alomanieen lilhamalat Alirania ‘al Beladehim, p. 117. (31) Qasim: State Bou Said, p. 41; Khososi: Derasat fi Tareekh Alkhalij, C 1, p. 73; Fahmi: qawasim .. Nashtohom Albahri, p. 26; Aidaroos: Altadakhol Alfarsi fi Asho’un Alomania, p. 168; Mursi: UAE coast, p. 70. (32) Ahmad Ibn Saeed: belongs to the tribe Busaid that their lineage backs to Alozd, a Hinaoa originally Ibadhi doctrine, this tribe has settled in the town of Adam on the edge of the Empty Quarter, Ahmad Ibn Saeed is a sophisticated mind, weighty figure, was appointed by Sultan Ibn Saif as his adviser, then appointed him as ruler of the port of Sohar, and emerged as a political star in during the Persian
Journal for Iranian Studies
140
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016
The Persian Occupation of Oman in the Eighteenth Century
intervention in Oman , and his proficiency in fighting the Persian siege to Sohar, for more detail, Ibn Rezzig: Alfath Al-Mobin, p. 309; Salmi: Tohfato Ala’yan, c 2, p. 168. (33) Lorimer: Gulf guide, historic section c 1, pp. 159-160; Haifa Abdul-Aziz al-Rubaie: Ghozat fi Alkhalij, Mosul, National Library, 1989, pp. 110-111. (34) Lockhart: Nadir Shah, pp. 215-216; Aidaroos: Altadakhol Alfarsi fi Asho’un Alomania, S172-173. (35) Sahari: Tareekh Oman, pp. 159 a -160 b; Ibn Rezziq: AlfathAl-MoIbn , p. 304; Abu Suleiman Mohammad Ibn Amer Ma’awali: stories and news that took place in Oman, 2nd F, Oman, Printing Arabs record, 1406 H / 1986, p. 149; Salmi: Tohfato Ala’yan, c 2 , p. 15; C. Niebuhr: Travels Through Arabia and Other Countries In the East (London: Morison and Son Bookers, 1792) p. 119. (36) Ibn Rezziq: Fath Al-Mobin, p. 300; Salmi: Tohfato Ala’yan, c 2, pp. 152-156, Hamdani: Maqawamat Alomanieen lilhamalat Alirania ‘al Beladehim, p. 119. (37) Barka: Located on the coast of Oman, and away from Muscat about 43 miles away, Lorimer: Gulf guide geographical section, c 1, p. 335. (38) Sahari: Tareekh Oman, pp. 160 -160 A. B, Phillips, Oman, p. 77, Qasim, Tareekh Alkhalij Alarabi, C 1, p. 129; Aidaroos: Altadakhol Alfarsi fi Asho’un Alomania, p. 179. (39) Salmi: Tohfato Ala’yan, c 2, p. 154; Ibn Rezzig: AlfathAl-Mobin, p. 304. (40) Aidaroos, Altadakhol Alfarsi fi Asho’un Alomania, p. 179, Qasim: Dawlat Bou Said, p. 143; Khososi: Derasat fi Tareekh Alkhalij, C 1, p. 75. (41) Lockhart: Nadir Shah, p. 219 ؛Phillips: Oman, p. 77; Aidaroos: Altadakhol Alfarsi fi Asho’un Alomania, p. 180. (42) Lockhart: Nadir Shah, pp. 223-224, Qasim: Dawlat Bou Said, p. 44, Hamdani: Maqawamat Alomanieen lilhamalat Alirania ‘al Beladehim, p. 115. (43) Ahmad Ibn Saeed invited Persian garrison to a big feast in plain Barka, once their horses entered the fort and gave them banquets until Omani caller called out from the top of the castle “anyone who wishes to take revenge from Persians can take it now. Then, a large number of people including old and young man waged a fierce battle against the Persians killing many numbers. Some had surrendered themselves and pleaded for a pardon from Ahmad Ibn Saeed and some fled trying to cross the sea by swinging but became exhausted half way and drowned there after the domestic Omani people set their ships on fire. Ibn Rezziq: AlFath Al-Mobin, p. 307; Salmi: Tohfato Ala’yan, c 2, p. 157. (44) Lorimer: Historical Gulf guide c 1, p. 215; Ma’awali: Qesas Wa Akhbar Jarat fi Oman, p. 147; Murad: Sera’ Alqewa, p. 232; Hamdani: Maqawamat Alomanieen lilhamalat Alirania ‘al Beladehim, pp. 117-120.
Journal for Iranian Studies
141
Year 1,issue 1- Dec. 2016