Journal for iranian studies%2c issue 3

JOURNAL FOR IRANIAN STUDIES Specialized Studies

A Peer-Reviewed Quarterly Periodical Journal

Year 1. issue 3 - June, 2017

ISSUED BY

Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies www.arabiangcis.org

JOURNAL FOR IRANIAN STUDIES

A Peer-Reviewed Scientific Periodical Journal Issued in both Arabic and English Languages Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, Sahafah NBHD, Al-Takhassusi St. P.O. Box: 12275 | Zip code: 11473 For (JIS) Journal annual subscription, contact the Journal Email at: JIS@arabiangcis.com Individuals inside Saudi Arabia: 32 $ Individuals outside Saudi Arabia: 80 $ Institutes inside Saudi Arabia and Abroad: 160 $

ISSN: 1658-757X

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Publishing Terms and Conditions »»All submitted materials should be related to the Journal’s specialty. »»Allmaterials should not have been published previously or is not under consideration for publication elsewhere. »»Margins and sources should be listed at the end of the submitted material. »»Acknowledgments, margins and sources are to be listed carefully with special focus on names and concepts. »»Citing all sources in the alphabetical order by author’s last name. »»Allmaterials are preferred to be submitted electronically. »»Allsubmitted materials should be original; not copies. »»All submitted materials are not be returned back to their authors either accepted for publication or rejected. »»Reproduction of any of the materials of this Journal is prohibited without written authorization from the Journal’s editor-in-Chief. »»All materials are subject to extensive editing and refereeing before being considered for publication.

Advisory Board Prof. Abdulhameed Alansari Prof. Ahmad Alshatheli Prof. Mohammed Alsaeed Prof. Mohannad Almobaideen Prof. Radwan Assayed Prof. Saleh Alkhathlan Prof. Yahia Ibn Junaid Abdulkarim Jaradat (PH.D.) Sultan Alnu’aimi (PH.D.)

Editor in Chief

Mohammed Alsulami (PH.D.) Editorial Board

Fathi Almaraghy (PH.D.) Mutasim Abdullah (PH.D.) Abdulrauf Alghoniemy Ahmed Leila Editorial Director Mahmoud Abu Alqasim Editorial Secretary Mahmoud Jumaa Art Direction Hani Yassin

CONTENTS º

The Jurist State and the Dilemma of the Institutionalization of Parties in Iran Mohammed Bashandi ........................................................................................... 8

º

Alliance of Necessity between Iran and Russia: Dialectical Interaction between Opportunities and Challenges Mohammad al-Sa’eed Idris (Ph.D.)...................................................................... 34

º Riyadh Summit and Prospects of Iran’s Regional Role

Ahmed Sayed Ahmed (Ph.D.).............................................................................. 56

º

Diffusion in the Opposition Environment: A Field Study on the Reality of Shiites in Egypt Ahmed Zaghloul Shlata ......................................................................................78

º Iran and Armed Militias in post-ISIS Iraq

Mohammad Al-Iraqi..............................................................................................96

º Motivations of Russian-Iranian Interference in Afghanistan

Mohammed Abdullah Younis..............................................................................116

º

Russian Economic Interests in Iran between Partnership and Sanctions Asma Hassan Alkhouli ......................................................................................128

The Jurist State and the Dilemma of the Institutionalization of Parties in Iran Mohammed Bashandi Specialist researcher in political sciences

I

ran had been familiar with the failings of political parties and organizations before the Iranian revolution of 1979.

Under the Shah’s regime, the religious, nationalist, and Marxist parties faced intense pressure from the country’s authorities, forcing them to work underground.1 The situation hardly changed after the revolution, following the defeat of the liberal and then the socialist movements in the wake of the uprising, with nonreligious parties ultimately failing to attain any parliamentary representation; this became effectively impossible after the new constitution imposed regulations against political parties’ work.

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Iran’s current theocratic political system is founded on the theory of the Jurist Leadership [Wilayat-Faqih], which rests on three pillars. First is the religious pillar represented by the Supreme Leader and the senior clerics who rule the country. Second is the security pillar in the form of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the security services, which are affiliated with the Supreme Leader.2 The third is the political pillar embodied by the elected political institutions; this is the weakest of the three in terms of influence in political decision-making, which is negligible unlike the absolute power of the unelected organs of state. Although the creation of political parties is nominally allowed by the constitution, the prescriptions on any meaningful dissent or deviation from the regime’s worldview mean there is no way to build a genuine pluralist democracy in Iran.3 The splits and division within these parties, typical of political life and of the steady decline within Iranian society, appear to be inherent characteristics.

There are several reasons for these divisions, the foremost one being the totalitarian nature of the country’s political system which hinders the formation of independent and varied political schools of thought capable of broad, nondoctrinal thinking that accepts other views. Another reason is the party leaders’ and members’ failure to agree on a political model which dovetails with the religious and cultural values promoted by the regime. For these and other reasons, the various political movements have been unable to establish a party with any staying power, with schisms and dissolution being the fate of opposition parties and political movements within Iran.4 In the context of the aforementioned observations, this study focuses on measuring the degree of institutionalization or conformity to the regime’s worldview within the Iranian party system, measuring the degree of institutionalization within the party entities or semi partisan movements competing for power in Iran. The study argues that the greater the degree of conformity to the regime’s worldview and internal institutionalization of its perspectives, both in the parties’ own organizational hierarchy and through their policies, the less able they are to promote or participate in meaningful democratic transformation.

First: Party Institutions and Promoting the Democratic Transformation Process Democratic transition refers to the processes and interactions associated with the shift from an undemocratic regime to a democratic system of government. This is divided into several phases and subphases ending with the consolidation of democracy; this refers to the evolution of the democratic system into a stable institutional system that can continue and embody the values of democracy, its components, and mechanisms5 and to establish institutions and permanent arrangements for the functioning of the democratic process,6 with a view to reach political decisions in which individuals have the power to decide from a range of competing choices through voting.7 Similarly, Schmitter defined the minimum consolidation of the democratic system as the process of transforming the occasional arrangements that emerged during the transition period into recognized and reliable cooperative and competitive relationships, practiced regularly and accepted voluntarily by individual actors or political groups involved in democratic governance, that is, the consolidation of Huntington’s democratic culture.8

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Gunther, Diamandourus, and Puhle also viewed the democratic system as being strengthened when all politically important groups consider the main political institutions as being the only legitimate framework for the political rivalry. Similarly, Robert Dahl lists eight institutional requirements for a democracy.9 These are »»the freedom to form and join organizations »»the freedom of expression »»the right to vote »»access to public positions »»the right of political leaders to compete for voters’ votes »»the existence of alternative sources of information »»free and fair elections »»elected institutions for government policy-making based on votes and other expressions of preference.

A democratic system exists where governments are formed by individuals who win free and fair elections. Possible deviations which can undermine the authority of democratically elected governments and diminish their means include »»the existence of the power of guardianship, that is if the power centers of policy-making belonging to the nonelected elites. »»the existence of spheres of power and policy-making excluded from the control of the elected majority. »»electoral discrimination and biased electoral systems against minorities who cannot win parliamentary seats. »»military coups or rebellions by political actors.10 In this context, Diamond pointed out that promoting democracy means developing the quality, depth, and authenticity of the democratic process so that political competition is fairer, more participatory, and better represented and accommodated. Procedural democratic transformations, such as free and restricted elections that prevent participation and party competition, do not guarantee democratic consolidation.11 Wolfgang Merkel identified the following four dimensions in promoting political democracy: Institutional Consolidation: This denotes the principles and standards of central constitutional and political institutions, such as the head of state, the parliament, the government, the judiciary, and the electoral system and their ability to include politics and society (minorities are not discriminated against), institutional efficiency (rapid decisionmaking and implementation), and political effectiveness (political decisions contribute to problem-solving).

Representative Consolidation: This refers to parties and interest groups, as well as factors such as low levels of disintegration, polarization, and voter turnout, which are elements conducive to the promotion of democracy. Parties and interest groups are important links between politics and society and must be effective and inclusive.

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Behavioral Consolidation: This refers to the veto granted to political actors such as the military, paramilitary groups, powerful economic actors, or terrorist groups.

Civic Culture or Political Culture: This is the basis of democracy. Hence, espousing democracy is synonymous with institution-building. The centrality of the parties’ role in promoting democracy becomes clear.12 The parties fulfill a number of vital functions, including the consolidation of citizens’ interests; the formation of governments; the development and strengthening of attitudes, policies, and programs; the empowerment, selection, and training of political leaders; and the organization of electoral campaigns and consolidation of community interests, establishing a necessary link between the state and civil society.13 14 However, what do we mean by partisan institutions? What are their levels?

We should distinguish between the institutionalization of political parties and the institutionalization of the party system.

The institutionalization of the party system has several criteria: »»A competitive party system, that is, power-sharing between parties, enhancing the prospects for electoral accountability. »»A behavioral dimension: this refers to the relationship between the parties, that is, mutual acceptance, and their interaction as legitimate competitors. »»A structural dimension that entails the interaction of the party system with the state and, to an appropriate degree, independence from it. »»The existence of a degree of public trust in the parties as political institutions. »»Regarding institutionalization of political parties, we can first state that organizations are not necessarily institutions. Over time, some organizations transform into institutions.

While political parties are organizations, they are primitive even if they are established with some form of official rules and objectives.15 Huntington suggested several institutional dimensions which apply to political parties: »»Adaptability. The older the organization and the more peaceful the succession of leadership, the higher the level of institutionalization. »»Complexity/Simplicity. The less it depends on individuals and the greater the number of organizational units, the more institutionalized the entity is. »»Independence. Organizations that are considered as tools for a social class, such as a clan and a class, lack independence and institutionalization. »»Cohesion/Division. This is the extent of accumulation of splits between leaders and members.16 Panebianco stressed that by adopting an “institutional” form, an organization acquires elements of power, a process through which the organization slowly loses its character as a tool, to become a value in itself, with its existence becoming the target of many of its supporters.17 Randall and Svasand determined four institutional elements: The systemic dimension: This refers to how the party is established. The more

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it was built through the “spread” of ideology from the center to the fringes, the more institutionalized its thinking, with parties that rely on charismatic appeal disappearing after the transfer of power.

Value infusion: This alludes to the roots of the party within a society and its association with the social and economic classes therein.

Independence: Any party’s dependence on external supporters is an institutional weakness, transferring the center of its loyalties outside the party structures and making the external institutions the source of leadership and legitimacy.

Symbolic embodiment (reification): The degree to which the party has become an unforgettable institution because of the symbolic values it represents.

In their model of political party institutionalization, Basedau and Stroh identified four key dimensions for measuring the degree of institutionalization, namely, the level of organization, internal cohesion, independence, and socialization.

Kristina Weissenbach added other elements and institutionalized dimensions, including the following: Organization: The ability of the party to act as a professional bureaucratic entity within all its organizational levels, its ability to access fixed resources, and its strong organizational presence outside the capital.

Internal Party Democracy: This refers to a model in which the political will within the party is formed from the bottom up, from the base to the party leadership, thus ensuring that the decision-making process is transparent and is carried out within legitimate official committees rather than through informal party gatherings.

Program: This refers to defining the party’s core set of values and objectives to form a clear ideological basis which is consistently reflected in the party’s political program.

Autonomy: The independence of a party organization from any influence by individuals within or outside the party, and the independence of the decision-making structures from external actors.

Roots in Society: This refers to the strength of the party’s roots in its society, meaning the party can, therefore, rely on a broad base of appreciation and support from voters.

Coherence: Cohesion and internal unity, while ensuring diversity of views and tolerance of political discussions within the party, ensure that relations between internal groups should not undermine the unity of the party.18 Second: Political Parties Operating in Iran “Factions, not Parties” In dealing with the nature of political parties operating in Iran, it is necessary to first describe the social and political environment within which they are interacting. This refers to a number of factors, the most important being the following:

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1- The Iranian political system is a restricted “authoritarian” system rather than a democratic one, despite its claims to the contrary. This means that the pluralism within it is restricted to the entities working and competing within the system of the Jurist Leadership.19 2- The post-revolutionary political and political structures of Iran have been shaped by historical events and military involvement therein, such as the revolution, the attack on the Iranian Embassy, the formation of popular committees, and the Iran-Iraq war.

3- Acceptance of the Jurist Leadership system’s primacy is the main condition for granting any political party a license to operate inside Iran, which has led to a strong degree of uniformity among the country’s parties, with any differences being negligible since they are all working within the confines of the regime’s ideology, being denied any right to oppose it.

4- Iran’s political parties are very different from those of other countries. In the immediate wake of the 1979 revolution, Iran briefly had parties spanning the political left, right, and center with a leftist president, Seyyed Abolhassan Banisadr, taking office in February 1980; with his impeachment in June 1981 after only 16 months in office, the clerics’ theocratic establishment brutally eradicated any political movement which it felt contravened the principle of the rule of the jurist and the Iranian state, eradicating any real political pluralism.

5- The men of the religious circles [Hawzas] (seminaries for training Shia Muslim clerics) established the Iranian Republic Party in mid-1979 to counter the growing influence of leftist parties. This was the only recognized political party in Iran up to the end of 1987, with no new parties formed before 1994, when close associates of Hashemi Rafsanjani formed the ‘Executives of Construction of Iran Party,’ which is a reformist political party, although of course it operates within the boundaries of the regime’s ideology.

6- After Mohammad Khatami had been elected president of Iran in 1997, other parties emerged. In 1998, the formation of other political parties was formally permitted by the leadership, but these are more coalitions based on concern and special interests rather than political parties in any meaningful sense.

Based on this information, it is clear from the contemporary political scene in Iran that there is no real political opposition, with the regime remaining a theocratic authority that does not allow any meaningful margin of disagreement. The absolute power enjoyed by the Supreme Leader and the subservient institutions which implement his orders in accordance with the theocratic system adopted by the regime means that any opposition is effectively outlawed not only from political activity but also even from the public declaration of any opposing ideas, with the voices of groups of a civil or secular character so limited as to be ineffectual.20 The active political forces in Iran are divided into two principal groups— reformists and conservatives—whose members enjoy political flexibility allowing them to move freely between the two streams because they are ultimately loyal to the rule of the Jurist [Faqih] and operate under the umbrella of the Iranian Constitution.

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The map of Iran’s political forces—the aforementioned reformists and conservatives— is characterized by extreme liquidity and frequently changes from one election to the next. Thus, the classification of Iran’s political entities can be based on their position on the issue of the relationship between the state and the revolutionary bodies (related to the Iranian revolution). Broadly speaking, the state focuses on considerations of construction and development, while the revolutionary bodies are concerned with security and military power and the desire for external influence. Given these factors, it can be said, therefore, that the active political forces are distributed in Iran among several major factions: A. “Revolutionary” faction. This bloc, which seeks to promote the “priorities of the revolution” over any other, comprises the radical and fundamentalist Shiite groups, the most important of which are the fundamentalist United Front and the ‘Line of Imam Front.’ These groups, which receive the support of the Supreme Leader (Khamenei), the Revolutionary Guards, and the country’s religious institutions, thereby wielding great political and financial influence, are funded by the “khums,” that is, via the religious taxation levied by the state, which means that one-fifth of the value of certain items a person acquires as wealth must be paid to the “state of Islam,” that is, the Jurists, scholars, clerics, and other agents of the Guardian of the Jurist.

B. Iran’s current state. This faction believes that priority should be given to the process of developing the regime and the state through expanding the scope of its development and reducing Iran’s political isolation, increasing economic openness to the outside world.

This bloc, described as reformist, is spearheaded by reformist figures such as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and a group of the more open-minded politicians and clerics in the regime, such as the now-deceased Rafsanjani, his sons, Murtada Asraghi, Khomeini’s grandson, and others.

C. The minority reformist faction which has promoted issues such as pluralism and freedoms. This bloc, which was the driving force behind the so-called “Green Revolution” of 2009, was formed and expanded during the rule of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It includes groups of intellectuals, artists, students, and small liberal groups but has yet to attain any political power or influence within the political system.21 In general, political factions in Iran should not be understood as mass political parties.

They are informal coalitions that lack explicit programs and hierarchical organizational structures but rely on personal charisma and elite networks.

These factions are the main means of political activity in Iran, with the logical consequence of the limitations imposed on them being a weak organization between the elite system and the social circles that seek to represent them in the absence of institutional mechanisms.22 Third: The Degree of Institutionalization in the Iranian Party System The institutionalization of the party system which sees the political blocs and factions as reflecting the regime’s interests is the result of a series of developments. Some of these have come from direct influence through the institutionalization of the constituent parties

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of the party system, while others are more indirect. A number of parties may attain distinct institutional advantages because of their close association with the regime or affiliated autocratic regimes, which allows them to limit the possibilities for growth and influence among rival blocs. Conflicts can be due to some factions having greater non-political sources of institutional power, such as ethnic or cultural affiliation with certain groups. Each bloc or faction represents or claims to represent a distinct social group, which effectively negates political competition, undermines popular trust in political parties, and affects the political system.23 To measure the degree of institutionalization within the Iranian party system, one can study the indicators shown in the following figure: Indicators of an institutionalized party system 1- The degree of competition within the party system.

In 1975, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi announced the dissolution of all political parties in the country and the establishment of one party, the Baath Party. Shah Pahlavi then tried to make changes to the systems of administration and governance in what he called the “White Revolution.” As as a result of the subsequent brutal political repression and the disintegration of civil society, the popularity and domination of the religious trend increased, boosting public support for the then-exiled opposition leader, Khomeini. This ultimately led to the Iranian Revolution of 1979; despite the revolution, however, the same repression and denial of political pluralism remained under the new theocratic system.

Although Khomeini had asserted during his time in exile that the Iranian republic would be dependent on democracy and political pluralism, on his return he immediately got rid of the symbols of the national movement when they clashed with his concept of a theocratic state.

Since these developments, both before and after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, political life in Iran has been characterized by a clear ideological monopoly. There is no opportunity for the establishment of any political party which doesn’t follow the edicts of the rule of the jurist. Iran’s political life exists solely under the Supreme Leader’s ideological umbrella, with no space for those outside it. Therefore, we are talking about political trends within those ideological limitations rather than any real political pluralism or actual political parties. Even the so-called reformists are deeply conservative in origin; there is realistically no space for any healthy disagreement or plurality of views.24 Indeed, if there is a consistent pattern of power between two major factions, it possesses no real diversity or competition.25 Under these conditions, large segments of the population feel that they have been effectively disenfranchised and removed from the participatory process, leading to frustration and a turn toward nonpeaceful or undemocratic means of expression, with any democratic or peaceful protests brutally suppressed as seen during the Green Revolution of 2009.26 2- Behavioral dimension: the degree of acceptance between political parties and the pattern of their interactions.

The rivalry between political factions is limited, with the political elites enjoying a close relationship. This continuing peaceful rivalry depends on accepting the principle of

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consensus between the rival political blocs to reach some measure of relative agreement through mutual concessions.27 One of the clearest demonstrations of the close relationship between the political blocs in Iran is the selection of presidential candidates by the Majlis Shura and the Council of Experts; as seen in the recent election, the Guardian Council, headed by Ahmed Jannati, rejected more than 99 percent of the reformist and moderate candidates who put their names forward, preventing them from standing for election. This demonstrates the absolute power wielded by the religious fundamentalists over state affairs, showing once again that there is no real possibility of any political advancement by anyone not approved by the conservative factions, which must work within the limitations set by the Shura Council and the Council of Experts on Leadership. The same applies to political and civil life in general.

Current events in the government of Hassan Rouhani is further proof of the growing conviction that Iran needs a third political movement capable of leading the country out of its current domestic political impasse. This is why both Rafsanjani and Rouhani hoped to see their candidate win the presidency of the Assembly of Experts to realize their hope that this council, formally elected on February 26, 2017, would play the central role in determining the future of Iran since it would be responsible for choosing the new leader of the country as an alternative to Khamenei. Their dismay was evident at the victory of Ahmed Jannati, who had limited the reformists by controlling the selection of presidential candidates (as what happened to Rafsanjani when the Guardian Council rejected him as a presidential candidate in 2009 in favor of Ahmadinejad). Jannati has also taken control over the selection of candidates for parliament and domestic councils as well as placing further restrictions on already heavily prescribed reformist media, closing down most reformist media outlets, a repeat of events during the tenure of former president Mohammad Khatami.28 3- Structural dimension: the party system’s interaction with the state and the extent of its independence from it.

Iran’s nonelected governing authorities interfere significantly in all political areas, with elections conducted under the supervision of the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards. Any individuals aspiring for candidacy must first win Khameini’s approval for their nominations. When candidates register, the Guardian Council, led by Ahmad Jannati, must declare their eligibility based on several criteria, particularly their “practical” loyalty to the Supreme Leader and their recognition of the principle of the Jurist’s mandate. When the elections are over, the council has exclusive responsibility for implementing the final result, despite its participation in the supervisory authority for vote-counting along with the Ministry of the Interior. This ensures that election results do not deviate significantly from those desired by the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards, the Guardian Council, and other institutions.29 Candidates are not eliminated based on the flawed selection criteria, but regime officials will take arbitrary steps exceeding their legal powers to exclude any candidate even if they meet the discriminatory criteria set forth in electoral laws. In recent years, the council has expanded its oversight and introduced various blatantly unjust

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measures, including collecting information on candidates from undisclosed sources, by which means they can exclude any candidate they wish to.

During the violent government crackdown that followed the disputed 2009 presidential election, hundreds of peaceful activists and demonstrators were arrested and convicted. On December 27, 2015, Najatullah Ibrahimian, spokesman for the Guardian Council, announced that the candidates for the 2017 election must adhere to clear boundaries separating them from the “sedition” of 2009 (a term used to describe post-election protests at that time).

In a similar case, a branch of the Revolutionary Court in 2010 ordered the dissolution of two prominent reform parties, the ‘Islamic Iran Participation Front’ and the ‘Mujahideen Coup,’ partly because of the participation of leaders of both parties and their members in the 2009 post-election protests.

Iranian authorities have also detained prominent opposition figures such as Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Zahra Rahnawad (Mir Moussaoui’s wife) under house arrest without judicial orders.30 Moderates used a strategy of registering many candidates in the 2016 elections to ensure that enough of them passed the scrutiny process for the elections. Although the elections saw a record number of applications for candidature, initially only 38.9 percent of the candidates were found to be qualified to stand for Parliament, with around 20 percent deemed sufficiently qualified for the Council of Experts. After appeals to President Rouhani, some candidates were requalified, bringing the total number of eligible candidates to the parliament to around half of the total number registered. In some constituencies, no moderates qualified to become candidates at all although this exclusion was not limited solely to moderates, with radical fundamentalists such as Hamid Rezaei, a member of parliament who had opposed the nuclear deal, also failing to qualify for candidacy.31 The leader of the Iranian Republic also agreed to the exclusion of the majority of reformist candidates, defending the decisions of the Guardian Council by declaring that opponents of the values of the Shiite religious authority in Iran should not be allowed to run for parliament. He called upon opponents of the regime to vote, stressing, “This does not mean that opponents of the Iranian Republic enter the parliament, but only those who believe in the Iranian republic and its values.” He added, “Even in America, which claims to be the ‘land of the free’ as naïve people view this, during the Cold War, those with the slightest inclination towards socialism were marginalized.”

4- A degree of public trust exists in the parties as political institutions.

The Constitution of Iran recognizes the formation and activities of political parties and provides for the formation of parties, political and professional associations, and religious associations, whether Islamic or related to one of the recognized religions, provided they do not violate the principles of national unity or the standards of Islam or the foundations of the Iranian republic. In fact, the weak performance of the Iranian parties in their long history has been a major reason for public discontent. In the absence of confidence in their ability to bring about the desired change, the public has not forgotten the negative roles of political

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parties prior to the Iranian revolution that supported the suppression of democracy, such as the Baath party during Shah Pahlavi’s rule. These parties were viewed as being active solely during election periods and absent from the political arena the rest of the time, with their geographic concentration in the capital and major cities losing them grassroots support and undermining their claim to legitimacy for much of the population It is clear from these factors that the Iranian party system is erratic, affecting the behavior of the political elites and weakening the chances of institutionalizing Iranian political parties/ factions from inside.32 Fourth: The Degree of Institutionalization in Iranian Political Parties/Factions The association of political parties or factions with religious social movements is of crucial importance in any analysis of Iran’s political life.33 Through this intertwined relationship, political activities are integrated with social and spiritual life. Membership in religious parties seems to be more closely linked to membership in other civil and social groups than that in other parties; however, a certain degree of functional differentiation will still exist, especially since forming a religious bloc to serve as a political party implies recognizing the need for divergent principles of regulation in the private and public spheres.

Religious political parties are legitimate like other political parties.34 When they receive popular support, religiosity dovetails with the political needs and interests of part of the population.35 What concerns us here is not to challenge the legitimacy of religious parties but to measure the degree of Iran’s domestic institutions and these parties’ impact on the performance of their functions. Several indicators express the level of institutionalization in this sphere as shown in the following figure: Institutionalization of parties A. Party organization B. Internal party democracy C. Program dimension D. Independence E. Socialization F. Internal coherence G. Financing H. H: Media capacity A. Party Organization, interconnected networks: Iranian parties suffer from an absence of organizational power. With few actual party members, the political blocs’ and factions’ primary focus is on organizing their supporters during election campaigns rather than creating a strong party structure. The low level of membership prevents parties from building up financial reserves from means such as membership fees, which in turn prevent the establishment of active party branches in different cities; instead, the parties resort to seeking endorsement from influential figures. Although reformists outnumbered

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conservatives between 1997 and 2001 in terms of ability to attract voters, this support has not turned into a significant organizational force. None of the reformist parties or blocs have an effective grassroots organization that can connect with the broader sectors of Iranian society,36 with most remaining loose networks of reformist academics and clerics instead. This situation, in turn, reinforces the reformists’ own rejection of strictly organized formations.37 This was seen during the two presidential terms of President Mohammad Khatami between 1997 and 2005, during which Khatami received no support from any of the country’s political blocs despite having 70 percent of the public vote. Even with such a strong public support, the lack of backing from the political blocs weakened his position; the absence of any strong political party in parliament left him politically vulnerable to his adversaries. Nonetheless, Khatami has continued to confront the conservatives and resist organizational representation,38 viewing himself as separate from partisan politics.39 B. Internal party democracy: individual tyranny: Democracy cannot be said to exist in any meaningful sense within Iranian parties. Despite several elections, the political culture of the parties’ leadership is still weak and characterized by features such as dependency, an emotional and tribal political culture, nepotism, ethnic identification, collective weakness, low levels of trust, and little sense of accountability, along with intolerance and ego worship.40 Iranian parties are characterized by members following a single charismatic factional leader rather than uniting individual party members under a single political umbrella according to party objectives and programs, with these entities being essentially based on loyalty to the party founder, with the party’s position rising or falling according to this individual’s position of authority or activities which win him some degree of power.

Because they are founded and centered on following the party leader, the party collapses with him when he fails.41 The longevity of a party, therefore, depends on the longevity of its founder. These are not entities whose functions vary and whose social influence grows through working with the public but essentially miniature personality cults with a political platform. This leaves a crisis of representation for the public, who are effectively left unrepresented once the elections are over, and leads to a narrow,42 volatile, and unstable political culture almost wholly reliant on charismatic individuals rather than on political programs and policies.43 C. The programmatic dimension: theoretical weakness and crisis of discourse: Iranian parties have not succeeded in codifying any political theory incompatible with the frame of reference of the Iranian republic. Many subjects such as civil society, freedoms, justice, and pluralism remain controversial, making it difficult for parties, even those from the same reformist trend, to analyze or formulate policies in these areas.44 In addition, most of the parties fail to formulate any specific party-political positions regarding most political issues, with leaders and members rarely issuing statements expressing their own parties’ positions and instead of expressing their individual opinions.

This lack of policy statements is due to the absence of party manifestos, which would

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be redundant since the parties lack any specific and recognizable political ideologies or objectives45 reflecting the crisis in wider political discourse within Iran. Even Iran’s reformists and intellectuals lack the capacity to enrich the country’s political language and landscape, with their rhetoric presenting only the most ambiguous vocabulary and vague policy suggestions. Although the reformists can be clearly distinguished from the conservatives in some areas, they are still more alike than they are different because of the overlap between the theocratic and political leadership, which gives religious characteristics to political issues and language, which is then caused by the dominance of religious discourse within all areas of life in Iran. This can be confusing both to the elites themselves and to the Iranian public.46 The development-oriented reform discourse of the Khatami period failed largely because of the lack of any supporting rigorous and coherent program, a demonstration of the government’s weakness in the face of overwhelming structural and societal challenges in the system. This led to a gap emerging between the people and the reformers, including the student movement.47 In these conditions dominated by stagnation and waning competitiveness in the political scene, the distinctions and boundaries between political currents are fluid and appear to be unclear.48 D. Independence: crises of establishment and nepotism: Many parties were created by direct government edict or through influential figures in government, making them vulnerable to political fluctuations and changes and shifting government priorities. Two examples of such parties are the ‘Executives of Construction Party’ founded by Rafsanjani and the ‘Islamic Iran Participation Front’ founded by Khatami.

The establishment of these parties was linked to the authority of the time, meaning they are effectively extensions of their founders or the government of the moment, being used directly or indirectly as tools to assert these individuals’ or entities’ own power; other examples include the ‘Republican Islamic Party’ in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution and the ‘Rastakhiz party’ from the time of the Shah.

Generally, the existence of political bodies is closely related to the establishment of a stable and influential opposition that enjoys harmony with democratic practices, but the absence of democratic institutions in Iran prevents the emergence of an effective opposition, with parties operating informally or even resort to working in secret. This means there is a lack of opportunities to accumulate the practical experience necessary for the internal construction of institutional parties, with the country’s political life remaining hostage to the worldview of the theocratic elite, impeding the advent of democratic institutions.49 Support for these parties is not permanent, however. During the first period of Rafsanjani’s presidency in which the reformists dominated the presidency and the majority of the seats in parliament, Rafsanjani and his pragmatic group supported it, but pragmatists might change their alliance with the reformists if their position is damaged.

During the political crisis that took place after the 2009 presidential elections, which was between the hardliners who supported Ahmadinejad and the moderates supporting

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the Green Movement, Rafsanjani adopted a neutral stance because he did not want a direct confrontation with Ahmadinejad, the Revolutionary Guards, and the Supreme Leader.

In the 2016 legislative elections, Rafsanjani’s position changed once again as his pragmatist movement moved back in line with the reformists, forming a coalition with them to prevent the hardline candidates from dominating parliament and the Council of Experts.50 Because of this almost absolute dependence on power or influential individuals within it, the parties’ activities are shaped by these individuals’ positions or their absence. The death of Hashemi Rafsanjani—both a middleman and a leader in the performance of all the institutions of government and political forces, as well as a crucial link between the conservatives and reformists—caused a spike in tensions between the two currents, especially the reformist movement, which, despite its inflexible middle positions, regarded Rafsanjani as the man who would play a pivotal role in the battle for the next “political caliphate” after Khamenei’s demise.51 One of the regime’s favorite tools in controlling parties and civil society is its dominant networks of patronage. Although favoritism in Iranian political life is not the creation of the Iranian revolution, having existed since the days of the Shah, it has become even more firmly entrenched under the theocratic regime. The most prominent example of this is the transformation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from a military apparatus created to protect the revolution and to implement its objectives into a complex and multifaceted organization that penetrates deep into the Iranian economy and is involved in diverse areas of Iranian society. This transformation has, to some degree, weakened the institution’s ideological commitment and has turned it into a commercial entity—first, a coalition affiliated with the fundamentalist political faction of the ‘Khomeinist Islamic Republican Party’ and second, an alliance with Khamenei. While Khatami made a largely fruitless effort to reduce the influence of the IRGC during his time in office, Ahmadinejad bolstered long-standing alliances with the IRGC by giving the Revolutionary Guards a series of lucrative government contracts and appointing members of the IRGC, the Basij, and veteran members of his government to benefit from IRGC and Basij activities which had some positive effects on certain groups, especially poor rural people. On the other hand, the current Supreme Leader, Khamenei—who lacks the charisma of his predecessor—needs the political support of the Revolutionary Guards to strengthen his power, given his reduced military, economic, and political clout.52 The IRGC has expanded far beyond its original security and military mandate. In the 2005 presidential election, it was the IRGC which largely voted for and ensured the success of Ahmadinejad. In 2009, the Revolutionary Guards also demonstrated their ability to quell any insurgency by brutally crushing the moderate pro-democracy demonstrations that were part of the Green Movement.53 By the same logic, the Revolutionary Guards tried in 2017 to mobilize the electorate, rallying its members, the Basij, and the supporters of the Supreme Leader for fear of domination by reformist streams.54

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E. Grassroots support: fully absent: When political parties, in general, succeed in gaining the trust of the citizens and establishing a viable relationship with them, it can be said that the political parties have grassroots support within society, which helps them to become institutionalized, while the absence of such support means that they remain distant entities from the people. This lack of support and public identification with specific parties means that citizens find it difficult to distinguish between the parties and to determine who best represents their interests—particularly given the lack of real policy statements and manifestos. As a result, voting behavior varies widely from one election to the next; many individuals nominate themselves as independents (though they too have no recognizable policies or political identity) and political instability increases, further weakening the existing political parties. In Iran, although the factions may appear to be rooted in society, where there is some differentiation between the voting patterns of the more traditional and religious groups and the more highly educated people, a significant number of voters do not have any sense of belonging to a specific political party and may vote for candidates from different factions in successive elections or even vote for members of two factions in the same parliamentary election, with the individual’s appeal superseding that of the parties. Candidates also prefer to use their abilities to win elections and conduct independent campaigns. For example, Ahmadinejad has presented himself as a nonpartisan and has not tried to gain the support of political parties although he enjoys the support of the conservative faction and the Revolutionary Guards.55 F. Internal cohesion: splits and political liquidity: While factions are seen as a feature of the so-called modernization process in Iran, in which individuals and groups overcome traditional patterns of political behavior, the degree of political participation and institutionalization remains low.56 Political factions are not cohesive groups. Each has no clear leader, and are composed of a loose coalition of groups and individuals. Political factions often change their views and policies for short-term political gain. Often, different opinions within one faction have caused imbalances and alliances with other factions or have led to the emergence of new ones.57 These factions are quickly split and in turn form parallel entities. Thus, disagreements within the ‘Combatant Clergy Association,’ the bestknown conservative faction, led to the creation of the Association of Combatant Clerics, which endorsed economic policies that were more in keeping with a pro-labor-oriented government economy, leading to the offshoot group subsequently becoming one of the most important reformist factions.

In this confused situation, there is no mechanism of commitment to party principles, with many Iranian politicians being members of several political parties at the same time and not adhering to any one party’s views on most issues; this fluidity means there are no fixed electoral blocs in parliament, with the blocs instead forming and reforming different alliances without any particular party identity or affiliation within any one government term. This means that Iranian parliamentary life is characterized by a state of constant liquidity and changing attitudes according to personal and factional interests.58 Political

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allegiances are also combined with family, religious, and regional loyalties while the factions’ practices are based on networks of patronage acting as a central mobilization mechanism.

This multiplicity of influences is reflected in parliamentary groups whose party loyalty is not governed by any shared support for policies or a political manifesto but by informal and flexible personal agreements between politicians. A clear sign of the lack of loyalty, discipline, or party commitment is the parliamentary approval of ministers, with cabinet members often not receiving the same number of votes during the vote of confidence, which means that there is no clear party orientation. The MPs decide on their endorsement for ministers according to ideological affiliations or personal loyalties rather than on the candidates’ suitability for the ministerial positions. This is not unusual; given the dozens of political bodies which lack any clear ideological identity and in which no official membership is recognized, one politician can declare his affiliation to several factions at the same time.

Even during the electoral processes, these political bodies can support their own candidates or support joint lists or other independent candidates. This encourages flexible and temporary electoral alliances. The candidate can be included on several lists regardless of his or her wishes or knowledge.59 The electoral list may include two ideologically contradictory candidates. For example, in the Shura Council elections of 2016, the reformist “Hope List” consisted of a diverse range of moderates, reformers, and even traditionalists such as Ali Motaheri, the social conservative who sided with Rouhani on the nuclear deal.

In the elections for the Assembly of Experts in the same year, candidates from the conservative ‘Association of Combatant Clerics’ got the highest number of votes, followed by those from the radical fundamentalist Assembly of Qom Seminary Scholars and Researchers (also known as the Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom), then by the moderate List of Hope [Omid], and finally the independents. However, the party lines remained vaguer in the council than in the parliament, with 42 percent of the elected members of the council appearing on all three main blocs’ lists.60 One of the signs liquidity is high in the Iranian political party scene: 1- Seven of the sixteen electoral winners in Tehran were listed not only on the reform list but also on a list of their direct rivals established by the conservative “fundamentalist” movement. These candidates were Muhammad Ali Muhadi Kermani, Mohammad Imami Kashani, Mohsen Qomi, Ibrahim Al Amini, Qirban Ali Dari Najaf Abadi, Mohammad Mohammadi Rishaheri, and Abu al-Fadl Mir Mohammadi.

2- Two out of the seven winners (Rishaheri and Derry) are former intelligence ministers and prominent violators of human rights.

3- The most prominent winners from the list of reformers were Rouhani and Rafsanjani.

Of the incumbents who stood in the context of a conservative in the last parliamentary elections, two candidates have been nominated against reformists who have been a member of the ‘Combatant Clergy Association’ since the late 1990s, as they also ran against the leftists before the reform movement.

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4- None of the other winners in Tehran claimed to be reformist; some openly declared their historical and ideological opposition to reformists.

5- With Larijani and other conservatives losing their traditional ties to the fundamentalist camp, Larijani was unable to stand as either a reformist or conservative, instead presenting himself as an “independent” candidate.

6- Ali Motaheri and other prominent figures were allowed inclusion on the reformist list even while they formed a new conservative movement the ‘Peoples Voice Coalition’ (also known as the Nation’s Voice Coalition) and publicly insisted that they were not reformists.

7- Kazem Jalali, the head of the conservative fundamentalist faction of the ‘Jurist Leadership bloc,’ has been included on the reform list simply because of his support for the nuclear deal.61 G. Poor funding sources: Finance is one of the decisive factors affecting the performance of any political party. However, political parties in Iran lack any means of financial support. Large private companies do not exist. Most companies and banks are under government control and are unwilling to support political parties, most citizens are not interested in becoming members of parties that may be required to pay membership fees, and political parties do not have government support.62 H. Media capacity: Iran’s recent presidential elections saw the already heavy restrictions on the country’s media freedoms further intensified, with the closure of Arab news channels’ offices and blocking of access to Western media, along with the shutting down of several news websites and Iranian opposition newspapers, especially those connected with the reformist movement.63 This is another problem for Iranian political parties, namely, the lack of any access to independent media, with all media tightly controlled by the state, which owns most media outlets and forbids the establishment of private satellite TV channels.64 Despite this, voters find ways to circumvent the regime’s draconian restrictions and access encoded alternative media—particularly the Telegram channel—which worries the regime, given the implications for undermining the state’s monopoly on information and its dominant role in mobilizing voters.65 All these factors demonstrate the weakness of political institutions within the Iranian blocs and other political entities, showing their inability to lead any process of democratic transformation or political change within Iran and underlining the need for a comprehensive internal reform process within these bodies so that they can play a role in any such course.

Fifth: The Challenges of the Transition to Nonpartisan Institutions in Iran There are many organizational models available to political parties, with no single ideal, one-size-fits-all organizational form to fit any entity since the advantages of a particular model of organizational structure or philosophy may be disadvantageous at other times and in different circumstances.66

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In this context, we can refer to several criteria considered to offer the bare minimum of efficacy required for the establishment of any effective political party. These are essentially the criteria that present challenges to the emergence of a real political party in Iran: 1- Creating and developing a party-political identity: In the present circumstances, it is very difficult to establish parties that have party-political programs, electoral programs, and detailed manifestos. A party’s program represents its identity, its general direction, its values, and the justification for its existence, possessing a long-term character that does not focus on partisan issues. It is also necessary to issue electoral manifestos containing specific policy proposals, which are redesigned from a short-term perspective during each election campaign. Policy papers should be prepared concerning detailed positions on certain economic, security, and agricultural issues, and others.67 This is the root of the party’s identity which enables it to build a base of support and is independent of individual party leaders, being based on ideas rather than any individual’s character. This identity largely depends on the extent to which members and domestic structures are involved in the identification and formulation of priority programs and policies for endorsement by the party’s decision-making bodies.68 2- Strong organization and presence outside the capital: For any party to succeed in political competition, it needs constant organization, that is, direct membership, decentralized organizations according to residential or neighborhood areas, and communication with nonpartisan domestic organizations such as religious institutions, civil and professional bodies, and others. The Iranian regime, by its authoritarian nature, opposes any political activity outside the framework set by the revolution for its regime, constitution, and theory of governance, precluding the existence of any alternative organization as well as the existence of real opportunities for its dissemination.69 3- Avoidance of personality cults and promotion of participatory and internal democracy: Political parties which encourage their supporters’ participation the most offer better choices to voters because they are more likely to be more receptive to new ideas and less focused on the protection of power by a handful of party leaders. Participatory politics reflects the breadth of the decision-making circle in the party,70 with internal democracy being necessary to increase the influence of party members so as not to deepen the alienation between the leadership and membership. Domestic committees need to play an influential role in the decision-making process, with the absence of complete consensus on issues not being a sign of weakness but instead an indication of vital and healthy partypolitical life promoting political debate and party experience. This remains nonexistent, however, meaning the preference for authoritarian policy-making has not been shaken off, and society lacks any degree of participatory politics which would allow such internal party mobility.71 4- The need for sustainable communication and diversification of communication channels with the community: This refers to forming connections between several

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channels, including those of direct contact controlled by party organizations such as domestic branch meetings, party conferences, campaign activities, leaders’ speeches, electoral campaign tours, publications and party statements, websites, activist blogs, and networks’ e-mails.72 Intermediate or indirect channels are also required to reach a wider audience, depending on interviews with leaders, writing campaigns for the press, radio communication, and website messaging as well as personal contact. This, along with carefully prepared home visits, is the best way to convince voters to join a political party.

Parties should also create a database of interested non-member citizens.73 Parties must determine the conditions for membership, such as ensuring that members have attained the legal voting age, and determine members’ rights and responsibilities, such as the payment of membership subscriptions and the obligation to attend meetings. In Iran, we’ve seen how the regime managed to quell any internal movement or effort to create channels of communication between the opposition forces or reform, with leaders of the Green Movement placed under house arrest to prevent them from having any contact with the masses, while draconian restrictions are placed on all means of communication including the Internet, suppressing any party activity and opening prisons to incarcerate dissidents and opposition figures.74 5- Avoid splits and enhance internal party conflict management: Regular internal conflicts over differing political views or even over personal rivalries about positions and influence are inevitable in party politics but must be properly managed internally. One way of doing this is to establish permanent party committees to mediate and resolve internal conflicts. There are also “soft” forms of mediation through power-sharing, by trying to integrate representatives of different groups into the party’s organizational structures and allocating leadership positions to improve the representation of some groups, apart from rigid quota arrangements.

6- The need for minority representation: Representing religious and ethnic minorities within the party membership structure, ensuring their involvement in domestic and national party committees, and preparing them and guaranteeing their candidacy in the general elections are essential in creating strong links between the parties and these minorities.75 7- Party discipline: Clear rules must be established to regulate the relations between the parties and their elected representatives, beginning with the identification of communication lines, power, and accountability between the parliamentary group and the party; periodic selection procedures for parliamentary group leaders; decision-making procedures; and the adoption of mechanisms for coordination and information exchange among parties regarding the need for coordinated action in the legislative body on the one hand and recognition of the legitimate right to violate these terms under certain conditions on the other.76 8- Multilateral or plural sources of funding: Parties require financial resources to carry out their tasks effectively and can find multiple sources of funding through membership

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fees, financial contributions by members of parliament and party executives, capital income for income-generating activities, public donations, and government support.77 Membership fees must represent a large part of the income, with donations to be made public and government support to respect the principle of equal opportunity. Adherence to these preconditions allows the emergence of permanent and coherent party organizational entities that may play a very important role in Iran’s future.

Regardless of the pressures from nonelected entities, strong, disciplined, and cohesive party institutions can impose their political agenda, or at least part of it, notwithstanding the external environment, because of their sustained political activity and internal cohesion. This in turn would positively affect the external environment as well as the degree of institutionalization in the party system in Iran since the availability of these factors would increase public confidence in the political parties and regulate the competition between them on a civil basis that allows for dialogue, alliance, and bargaining instead of mutual negation based on a censorious authoritarian constitution.

In general, given the nature of Iran’s regime, its ideology, power structure, and decision-making bodies and the nature of the competing forces operating according to the Jurist Leadership doctrine, its political environment presents serious challenges to the establishment of any institutional party entities.

Sixth: Institutional Political Parties and the Future of Democratic Transformation in Iran The victory of the Iranian Revolution meant that the clerics monopolized power and were determined to exclude the populace from exerting any influence which might impede their decision-making and theocratic rule.78 Having assigned themselves the role of mediator between God and the people, they accorded themselves the sole right to interpret the Quran and monopolized religion as a major source of their legitimacy.79 Any transition to a genuinely democratic system in Iran through elections held under the mandate of the jurist is almost impossible no matter how great the public support.80 In 1992, Rafsanjani won the presidency as a reformer, followed by Mohammad Khatami in 2000; neither could carry out any meaningful reforms, reflecting their lack of any real influence on the nature of the system and its working mechanisms.81 The political control of Iran by clerics and bureaucratic institutions associated with the interests of the theocratic elite has placed restrictions on the development of genuine democratic practice, with politics largely becoming a matter of bureaucratic ritual constrained by strict procedures to ensure the election of the symbols of governing institutions without reflecting any genuine support for the electorate’s choices that would mirror real political pluralism in society.82 It is also impossible to imagine a genuine exercise of democracy without a free party system that reflects popular participation in the decision-making process. This cannot be found in a contractual system whose legitimacy is linked to ideological values whose origins then derive from the belief in the Supreme Leader’s metaphysical potential. The Iranian Revolution is morally and ideologically backward and reflects the model of a

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totalitarian theocratic state, in which religion determines the legitimacy of government and the clergy controls the institutions of its political system. Interestingly, a oneparty rule—one of the factors of authoritarianism—does not nominally exist in Iran.

However, the absence of a dominant party has not translated into multiple institutional parties. Iran’s policy has been characterized by multiple centers of power and division among different factions.83 It is clear that the Iranian state still opposes the existence of serious political parties or of a pluralist and institutionalized party system. The weakly institutionalized parties which do exist are allowed to maintain their presence because they do not challenge Khamenei’s authoritarian rule.84 There is also a clear tendency among the nonelected institutions to support the conservative faction within all the institutions of the regime.85 There is no doubt that the cohesion of the theocratic system, its power, and its ability to manage internal interactions to protect it from any dramatic change of influence casts a heavy shadow over the extremely slender chances of change at the current stage, which may affect the structure of the regime, including the party system, and in its heart institutionalize its parties.

On the other hand, the hope for change remains present within Iranian society itself, especially considering the emergence of the reformist tendencies after the war with Iraq.

Liberal intellectuals such as Abdolkarim Soroush have already begun to present theories about civil society and the relationship of religion to the state. Outside the control of the conservative current, this is causing significant changes in the values ​​of the system and the movement of its institutions.86 Over time, the calls for reform have become part of a political culture supported not only by the reformers but also by all groups and all political and intellectual actors,87 from some fundamentalists to dissidents abroad, from clerics to writers, artists, and film stars, all of whom desire a society that believes in reform and change and want a more transparent, capable, and less totalitarian state. When we review the ideas of most of the sons of the leaders of the Iranian republic and their daughters, including the descendants of Khomeini, we discover that they have moved from the Iranian Revolution’s ideologies to ideas of reform.88 It is not surprising to any student of Iran’s history that Iranian society has sought democracy for decades. This was shown in the constitutional revolution of 1905 and in the 1951 election of a prime minister who fought for the right to vote and the participation of women in elections in 1963. This same democratic spirit also led to the overthrow of the Shah’s regime and approved and supported Khatami and Rafsanjani and then Mousavi in the current regime.89 The beginning of Khatami’s reform experiment was an important indicator of future opportunities for change, winning broad-based support which saw him get over two-thirds of the 1997 election vote.90 In the wake of this experience, a class of young people born and raised after the revolution grew up with ideas and concerns different from those of their predecessors,

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reflecting the modern age. This was accompanied by a change in the cultural structure of Iranian society. The most important indicators were the greatly increased levels of knowledge and university education in rural areas and cities. With new interests and demands, many eventually supported Khatami as their potential “savior” from the conditions in which they lived.91 Continuing this gradual political and social movement toward modernity, Hassan Rouhani was elected as the “moderate” candidate in 2013. He won a second term in 2017 with a wide popular participation rate of 73 percent. The trends and participation of urban voters did not differ from those of their rural counterparts, with a large percentage also voting for Rouhani. The revolution of communication92 and its renewal came as an objection to the actual system of power. Most of the votes that went to Rouhani were with him as much as he was against his rival forces, the “Supreme Leader,” the “Revolutionary Guards,” and the rival candidate of the fundamentalist movement.93 It can be said that despite the authoritarian pressures from nonelected institutions and the absence of institutionalization in the party system and the compliance of Iran’s political parties with the regime, the chances for change in Iran are not impossible given this remarkable social development, which ensures that the country will continue to have a solid foundation for steady political development in general and for the institutionalization of political parties in particular.

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Endnotes ( 1) Hussein Al-Husseini (Ph.D.), “Determinants of Politics and Governance in Iran,” https://goo.gl/wpjmeY. ( 2) Bashir Abdel Fattah, “The Limits of Betting on the Electoral Achievement of Reformers and Moderates in Iran,” http://cutt.us/vbmLC. ( 3) Azam Moghadas and Ghaffari Masuod, “Civil Society and Democratization in Iran (1979–2009),” Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities 5, no. 4 (2016), 37. ( 4) Fatima Al-Smadi, “Political Currents in Iran,” Doha: Arab Center for Policy Research, 2012, 3–349. ( 5) Hassanein Tawfiq Ibrahim (Ph.D.), “Democratic Transition: A Conceptual Framework,” http://cutt.us/DIk0v. ( 6) Timothy Power and Nancy Powers, “Issues in the Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective,” University of Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute and Professor and Chair of Sociology, Working Paper #113, October 1988, 6. ( 7) Şebnem Y. Geyikçi, “The Impact of Parties and Party Systems on Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Turkey,” University of Essex, 6–8. ( 8) Ibid. ( 9) Claus Fabian Faulenbach, “The Concept of Democratic Consolidation: A Tool to Aid Actors with Democracy Assistance?” University of Twente, October 2007, 5–8. ( 10) J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions,” University of Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute and Professor and Chair of Sociology, Working Paper #150, December 1990, 6–14. ( 11) A. Aduku Akubo and Adejo Umoru Yakubu, “Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,” ibid, 87–89. ( 12) Claus Fabian Faulenbach, “The Concept of Democratic Consolidation: A Tool to Aid Actors with Democracy Assistance?” University of Twente, October 2007, 8–11. ( 13) Andreas Schedler, “Concepts of Democratic Consolidation,” Mexico: The Latin American Studies Association (LASA), April 1997, 17–21. ( 14) A. Aduku Akubo and Adejo Umoru Yakubu, “Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, ibid, 89–91. ( 15) Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” London: SAGE Publications, 8, no. 1, 7–14. ( 16 ) Andrey A. Meleshevich, Party Systems in Post-Soviet Countries (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 11–14. ( 17) Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” ibid, 10. ( 18) Kristina Weissenbach, “Political Parties and Party Types - Conceptual Approaches to the Institutionalization of Political Parties in Transitional States: The Case of the Philippines,” University of Duisberg-Essen: NRW School of Governance, 2010, 21–36. ( 19) Amr Shobaki, “Rafsanjani Forum of Contradictions,” http://cutt.us/r4xoh. ( 20) Binda Youssef, “Iranian Political Parties... Charisma Personalities, Not Ideology,” http://cutt.us/yB0bH. ( 21) Ibrahim Nawar (Ph.D.), “Iranian Elections and Future Options,” http://www.acrseg.org/39954. ( 22) Feyzi Karabekir Akkoyunlu, “The Rise of the Hybrid Regime: Guardianship and Democracy in Iran and Turkey” (dissertation, Department of Government of the London School of Economics, London, February 2014), 135–136. ( 23) Vicky Randall and Lars Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies,” Ibid, 7–14. ( 24) Ahmad Lashin, “Multilateralism in Iran and the Illusion of Democracy (Parties from the Monarchy to the Religious State),” http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=179638. ( 25) Azam Moghadas and Ghaffari Masuod, “Civil Society and Democratization in Iran (1979–2009),” Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities 5, no. 4 (2016), 39.

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( 26) Ali Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, Culture, and Political Change (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 99–100. ( 27) Ghaffar Zarei and Ali Mohammadi, “The Cultural Interactive̓s Effect of Party Elites on Soft Power of Islamic Republic of Iran,” WALIA Journal 30, S1 (2014), 134. ( 28) Mohamed al-Sa’eed Idris (Ph.D.), “Trends of the Conflict: The Future of the Political System in Iran,” http://www.acrseg.org/40225 ( 29) Mehdi Khalji, “Iranian Moderates Face Major Obstacles in the 2016 Elections,” http://cutt.us/Q3gqI. ( 30) Human Rights Watch, “Freedom and Integrity of Iranian Elections Under Threat,” https://www.hrw.org/ar/ news/2016/01/24/286001. ( 31) Farzan Thabet, “Iran Elections 2016: Change or Continuity? A Panoramic Picture of Iran’s Political Scene, http:// rawabetcenter.com/archives/28458. ( 32) Bashir Abdel Fattah, “Iran’s Election and the ‘Stalemate’ of the Reformist Movement,” http://cutt.us/MXrBW. ( 33) Mohammad Hassan Khani (Ph.D.), “Political Parties in the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Short Review,” http://cutt.us/vpjzK. ( 34) Fatima Smadi: Political Currents in Iran, op. Cit., Pp. 341-345. ( 35) Anke Schuster, “Religious Political Parties: A Gap in Multicultural Theories” (paper for the workshop “Multiculturalism and Moral Conflict,” University of Durham, March 21–23, 2007), 7–8. ( 36) Azam Moghadas and Ghaffari Masuod, “Civil Society and Democratization in Iran (1979–2009), Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities 5, no. 4 (2016), 40–41. ( 37) Bjorn Olaf Otvik, “The Dilemma of Reformists in Iran,” http://cutt.us/XOY9. ( 38) Middle East Forum, “Are Conservatives in Iran an Invincible Obstacle?” http://cutt.us/Gp6o2. ( 39) Ali Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, Culture, and Political Change (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 100. ( 40) Ghaffar Zarei and Seyed Ali Mortazavian, “Impact of Culture of Elites of Political Parties on the Political Development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Science Journal (CSJ) 36, no. 4 (Special Issue, 2015), 843. ( 41) Middle East Forum, “Are Conservatives in Iran an Invincible Obstacle?” http://cutt.us/Gp6o2. ( 42) Fatima Samadi: Political Currents in Iran, op. Cit., P. 347. ( 43) Ali Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, Culture, and Political Change (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 100. ( 44) Fatima Samadi: Political Currents in Iran, op. Cit., P. 346. ( 45) Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies, “Map of the Iranian Parties in 2016.” ( 46) Ali Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, Culture, and Political Change (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 101. ( 47) Kamran Rahmani and Alireza Azghandi, “Islamic Revolution of Iran and Political Development Issue (1997– 2005), Journal of Politics and Law 9, no. 10 (2016), 40. ( 48) Mohammed al-Zaghul, “Scenarios for Iranian Politics in the Light of the Legislative Elections,”http://cutt.us/ qY9dD. ( 49) Fatima Samadi: Political Currents in Iran, op. Cit., Pp. 341-344. ( 50) Middle East Forum, “Are Conservatives in Iran an Invincible Obstacle?” http://cutt.us/Gp6o2. ( 51) Mohamed al-Sa’eed Idris (Ph.D.), “The Difficult Question: Rafsanjani’s Departure and the Struggles of the “Political Caliphate” in Iran, http://www.acrseg.org/40433. ( 52) Mareike Enghusen, “Clientelism in the Islamic Republic, Illustrated at the Example of IRGC and Basij (Dissertation, University of St. Andrews, School of History, August 27, 2011), 35–36. ( 53) Middle East Forum, “Are Conservatives in Iran an Invincible Obstacle?” http://cutt.us/Gp6o2. ( 54) Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Jan. 3, 2016, http://cutt.us/8CRXl. ( 55) Azam Moghadas and Ghaffari Masuod, “Civil Society and Democratization in Iran (1979–2009), Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities 5, no. 4 (2016), 40. ( 56) Luciano Zaccara, “Elections and Authoritarianism in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Elections and Democratization in the Middle East, 2014, eds. Mahmoud Hamad and Khalil al-Anani, 166.

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( 57) Rakel, E. P., “The Iranian Political Elite, State and Society Relations, and Foreign Relations Since the Islamic Revolution,” Digital Academic Repository, University of Amsterdam, 2008, 79–80. ( 58) Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies: Map of Iranian Parties, 2016, op. Cit. ( 59) Luciano Zaccara, “Elections and Authoritarianism in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Elections and Democratization in the Middle East, 2014, eds. Mahmoud Hamad and Khalil al-Anani, 166–168. ( 60) Farzan Thabet: Iran Elections 2016: Change or Continuity? A panoramic view of Iran’s political scene, op. Cit. ( 61) Mahdi Khalji, “Reformists Rely on the Theory of “the Least Evil” in the Iranian Elections,” http://cutt.us/xuRgb. ( 62) Hossein Asayesh, Adlina Ab Halim (Ph.D.), and Seyedeh Nosrat Shojaei, “Obstacles of Political Party Development in Iran,” Report and Opinion 2, no. 10 (2010), 29. ( 63) Shaimaa Bahauddin, “Society and Change the Rules of the Game in Iran,” http://cutt.us/Nwu81. ( 64) Hossein Asayesh, Adlina Ab Halim (Ph.D.), and Seyedeh Nosrat Shojaei, “Obstacles of Political Party Development in Iran,” Report and Opinion 2, no. 10 (2010), p 29. ( 65) Farsan Thabet, Iran Elections 2016: Change or Continuity? A panoramic view of Iran’s political scene, op. Cit. ( 66) Patrick Köllner and Matthias Basedau, “Factionalism in Political Parties: An Analytical Framework for Comparative Studies,” German Overseas Institute (DÜI): Working papers, Global and Area Studies, 2005, 5–6. ( 67) Wilhelm Hofmeister and Karsten Grabow, “Political Parties: Functions and Organisation in Democratic Societies,” Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011, 40–41. ( 68) National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, “Political and Democratic Parties in Theory and Practice: Preparing Party Policies,” Washington, 2014, 55–57. ( 69) Wilhelm Hofmeister and Karsten Grabow, “Political Parties: Functions and Organisation in Democratic Societies,” Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011, 27–33. ( 70) Susan Scaro, “Political and Democratic Parties in Theory and Practice: Democratization of Parties,” Washington: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2005, 3–6. ( 71) Wilhelm Hofmeister and Karsten Grabow, “Political Parties: Functions and Organisation in Democratic Societies,” Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011, 48–51. ( 72) Bipa Norris, “Political and Democratic Parties in Theory and Practice: Developments in Party Contacts,” Washington: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2005, 4–5. ( 73) Wilhelm Hofmeister and Karsten Grabow, “Political Parties: Functions and Organisation in Democratic Societies,” Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011, 35–37. ( 74) National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, “Minimum Standards for the Work of Democratic Political Parties,” Washington, 2008, 7–8. ( 75) Wilhelm Hofmeister and Karsten Grabow, “Political Parties: Functions and Organisation in Democratic Societies,” Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011, 46–54. ( 76) Norm Kelly and Sifakur Ashyagpur, “Political and Democratic Parties in Theory and Practice: Parliamentary Groups,” Washington: The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, DT, 33–34. ( 77) Wilhelm Hofmeister and Karsten Grabow, “Political Parties: Functions and Organisation in Democratic Societies,” Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011, 55–59. ( 78) Mohammed bin Ali al-Mahmoud, “Iran... Theocracy in the Liberal Era,” http://www.alriyadh.com/1055907. ( 79) Mehran Kamrava and Houchang Hassan-Yari, “Suspended Equilibrium in Iran’s Political System,” The Muslim World 94 (October 2004), 512–520. ( 80) Jibril al-Obeidi (Ph.D.), “Iran and the Election of the Wilayat al-Faqih,” http://cutt.us/lAGnW. ( 81) Jihad al-Khazen, “Ayoon Wa Azan (Reformers in Iran: Won and Lost),” http://cutt.us/gcmQi. ( 82) Talal Saleh Binan (Ph.D.), “Iran: The Dilemma of Coexistence Between the Theory of the Rule of Jurisprudence and Democracy,” http://www.alrased.net/main/articles.aspx?selected_article_no=5244. ( 83) Güneş Murat Tezcür, “Democracy Promotion, Authoritarian Resiliency, and Political Unrest in Iran,” Democratization 19, no. 1 (February 2012), 122–123. ( 84) Ariabarzan Mohammadighalehtaki, “Organisational Change in Political Parties in Iran after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 with Special Reference to the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) and the Islamic Iran Participation Front Party (Mosharekat)” (dissertation, Durham University, School of Government and International Affairs, 2011), 2011–2012.

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( 85) Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, “Intra-State Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Presidency and the Struggle for Political Authority, 1989–2009” (dissertation, Department of History, University of London, September 2011), 183–184. ( 86) Talal Saleh Binan (Ph.D.): Iran: the dilemma of coexistence between the theory of the rule of jurisprudence and democracy, a previous reference. ( 87) Adel Hobah, “Iran: Two Decades of Gradual Transformation,”https://goo.gl/C85D98. ( 88) Shafiq Nazim al-Ghubra, “Contradictions of Iran: A Conservative System and an Open Society,” http://cutt.us/ KDwjz. ( 89) Abbas Milani, “The Change in Iranian society... A Hundred Years Ago,” http://cutt.us/BDnpu. ( 90) Mohamed Sayed Rasas, “Khatami’s Failure. Conservatives Are More Pragmatic Than the Reformists,” http://www.voltairenet.org/article91340.html. ( 91) Saad bin Nami, “The Phenomenon of the Reformist Trend in Iran and Its Orientations.” ( 92) Abbas Milani, “The Change in Iranian society... A Hundred Years Ago,” http://cutt.us/BDnpu. ( 93) Iyad Abu Shaqra, “Iran: The Nature of the System and the Accounts of the Interest,” http://cutt.us/9hx2h.

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Alliance of Necessity between Iran and Russia Dialectical Interaction between Opportunities and Challenges Mohammad al-Sa’eed Idris (Ph.D.) Prof. and consultant of political sciences in al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies

H

istorically, Russian-Iranian relations provide an almost unique paradigm on managing relations that are ruled by contradicted, multiple factors such as ideological, interests, geopolitical, and historical factors.

However, in the midst of these factors were international conflicts and the Middle Eastern regional environment that played key roles in resolving these available opportunities and complex challenges. Before the 1979 revolution, Soviet-Shah relations were pursued in this same historical manner; from then until 1991, the Soviets and the Iranian Republic pursued a new strategy. After that, Russian-Iranian relations changed into their contemporary form.

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The nature of Russian-Iranian relations is such that there are opportunities for understanding and cooperation. These opportunities come in addition to the relations of rivalry and mutual conflict that continue to this day. These opportunities exist despite the regional instability that exists in the ME, especially after 2011 – the year of chaos in Arab countries and the “Syrian Crisis,” which is especially important considering that the Syrian regime is a joint ally of Moscow and Tehran.

There had been conflicts in the Middle East that influenced Russian-Iranian relations, especially in 1979 and 1991, but the events of 2011 had a greater impact on these relations and prompt questions about the future of Russian-Iranian relations and their implications: An alliance or a rivalry that will turn later to conflict?

In 1979, four major developments happened in the Middle East that shattered the patterns of alliances and conflicts. These developments have affected Russian-Iranian relations until now: 1- The fall of the Shah Regime and the establishment of the Iranian republic.

2- The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

3- Egypt’s signing of the peace treaty with Israel, which removed Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Then, Iran emerged as an element in this conflict and in all other regional affairs.

4- The eight-year war in 1980 between Iraq and Iran.

In the midst of these four developments, Iranian-Russian (Soviet) relations developed with a balance between cooperation, rivalry and conflict.

In 1991, the United States led an international coalition in the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi invasion. This international intervention in the Gulf led to major important developments in GCC-US relations and profound transformations in the equation of Arabian Gulf security. In the same year, the Soviet Union had fallen and the Warsaw Pact has been disintegrated, which resulted in the collapse of an international bipolar system; the United States sought to impose itself at the top of a unipolar global system, which had major impacts on the Middle East, especially the Gulf and Iran. Equal to these impacts were its direct influence on the Russian Federation, which inherited the Soviet Union legacy of military and political burdens of which it could not get rid. These negative effects were the motivation for a new renaissance of Russia’s international role, which was now looking forward to competing or at least participating in the Global system leadership, especially with the advent of President Vladimir Putin to political power in Moscow.

These impacts were felt at the domestic and Middle East regional level in Iran and Russia, as well as at the level of global interactions, especially after the new emergence of Russia and China as countries seeking to impose a multipolar global system and curb US power, which was straining after two difficult wars in Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003. Iran and Russia developed patterns of corporation at times and rivalry at others, but the post-2011

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Arabian status quo will decide the nature of the new Iranian-Russian relations and their future: whether an “Alliance of Necessity” imposed by the Syrian crisis or a “Necessary Evil.”1 Both Iran and Russia currently see the other as a partner or necessary alliance, but how long will this continue? More importantly, who must decide: Russia or Iran? In other words, who is the key player?

If we agree that power is with Russia, specifically in managing the Syrian crisis, then we must consider that this crisis is the key point regarding Russian-Iranian relations. First, we must understand Russia’s ambitions in the Middle East, and the position of Iran within future international policies toward the ME. We must also understand the factors that influence Russian-Iranian relations and finally discover the implications and future of these relations.

This paper will review and explore these factors: First: The determinants of the Russian-Iranian relations

The development of Russian-Iranian relations reveals many factors that support the improvement of these relations, but there exist others that could cause a failure of them. In other words, there are factors both of mutual interests and of risk prevention, so, while the two countries are seeking to maximize possible gains and face semi-mutual challenges, this may be interrupted by the ambivalence of the relations between Iran and Russia.

Although Russia got rid of its Soviet ideological legacy, which reached its peak during the Cold War as support for “Global Liberation Movements” against US-led Western colonialism, but it did not dispose of the legacy of competition with the US In addition, the collapse of Soviet ideology led to use of the ‘interest factor’ in the Russian foreign policy making. All this made Russia keen to be present in global regions which hold strategic and economic interest, as well as regions of former Soviet influence that have moved towards the United States.

In general, the Middle East has a place of priority in Russian foreign policy. The Arabian Gulf, for example, is still an ambition for Russia to reach the ‘Warm Water’ coasts across Iran to reduce the United States’ influence and advance their interests. This policy also needed to confront particular challenges with Putin’s second era beginning in 2012, which coincided with Arab region chaos and wars on terrorism. The new Russian role in the Middle East can be observed through the following factors:2 1- Russian-Putin ambitions to be an international power against the United States of America.

2- Russian failure to restart relations with the United States (Rest) in the Vladimir Medvedev era.

3- The US-EU embargo on Russia because of the Ukraine crisis, and Russians response to use the Middle East an appropriate place to gain influence against the West, show Russia as an international power and end the embargo.

4- The emergence of ‘political Islam,’ which encouraged Russia to enter into this development and oppose pro-terrorist-movements, considered a threat to its interests in the Middle East.

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5- The major deception toward Russia regarding Security Council Resolution No. 173. At that time, Russia abstained from voting and did not use ‘VETO’, which allowed Atlantic Military intervention in Libya and ousted Gaddafi’s regime.

6- Russia realized that all developments in the region, and specifically in Syria, its only ally in the region, require strong intervention to protect interests and confront challenges.3 Here, Russia and Iran coincided. Iran early defended Bashar Assad’s regime and did not recognize the Syrian crisis as a revolution, but as a coup, rebellion and foreign plot.

This was contrary to Iran’s view of ‘revolutions’ in the rest of Arab countries, which were considered as an ‘Islamic Revival’ similar to the ‘Iranian Revolution.’4 There are several reasons for the Russian-Iranian rapprochement. Mutual relations developed after the 1990s at the levels of economy, commerce and oil. Also, Russian experts participated in many semi-nuclear and military projects in Iran and contributed to the establishment of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, and signed 20bn dollars’ worth of mutual contracts on oil, gas and energy.5 For Russia, Iran is not only an important trade partner or armament importer but a state of strategic influence in the Gulf and the Middle East. Iran also has a long history of adversity toward United States’ policies in the Gulf and the Middle East. Furthermore, Russia considers itself as confronting two major strategic threats: 1- The United States attempts to blockade Russia and, through NATO, approach into neighboring countries.

2- Extremist groups’ that are deployed across Central Asian countries.

In this context, Iran is a ‘safety valve’ for Russia, due to its ideological controversy with some of these extremist groups and its confrontation against the United States’ project of domination that threatens it with sanctions and embargo.6 Russia has many factors to rapprochement with Iran. The latter is seen as a Shiite power to cope with Sunni regional powers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Another factor is the Gulf States scramble to establish a joint coalition with the United States against Iran, as happened in Camp David, Washington in June 2015, when the Gulf States met with former president Barack Obama after P5+1 countries signed the JCPOA with Iran.

Finally, there is the fear of lifting economic sanctions on Iran, especially after Iran’s blatant interference in Yemen.7 The crucial motivation that pushes Russia towards Iran is the latter’s alignment with Bashar Assad’s regime. Russia saw in Iran the only pillar to ensure Assad’s survival and to confront [in Moscow’s view] the ‘pervasive terrorist wave’ that engulfed Syria. As never before, Russia and Iran rapprochement reached its peak on the joint Syrian battlefield, although Moscow’s realization of the motives varies with Iran. At the same time, Iran sees Russia as the only power to defend their Syrian ally, keeping in mind that Iranian rapprochement toward Russia is an expression of interactions in Iranian foreign policy.

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Three essential components rule foreign policy in Iran: 1- Ideology.

2- Iranian national identity.

3- Iranian revolution earnings.8 These three components influence the Iranian regime, and not only on foreign policy.

An additional ‘geostrategic component’ could appear as a fourth in this case to strengthen Iranian foreign policy according to its abundant chances toward confronting challenges.

The geostrategic component can be mixed with the ideological one, as they both create an Iranian role and national interest among Iranian ideological and strategic potential.

In other words, the ideological component is concentrated in the Shiite twelfth sect ruled by the Jurist Leadership [Wilayat Faqih] doctrine, which has become not only a political regime but also a dominating religious and cultural identity, as well as a ‘national interest’ that controls the regime’s performance.9 Simultaneously, the geostrategic determinant consists of chance and threat for Iran, due to its geographic location, a place that is associated with its political and economic history with an area of 1,648,195 km², equivalent to threefold France’s area. Iran has borders of a length of 8731 km: 1280 km with Iraq, 470 km with Turkey, 827 km with Afghanistan, 877 km with Pakistan, 1740 km with Central Asia countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan) and the remaining 2700 km re littoral on the Arabian Gulf, Qazvin Sea and Arab Sea.10 Historically, these borders were the reason behind many foreign invasions of Iran, including from ‘Tsarist Russia.’

Eventually, the Iranian role that grew out of the political project of the Iranian Republic has imposed more challenges on Iran because of its ideological-political duality. This is in addition to the consequences that hit Iran as reaction from neighboring regional countries and international powers that have interests that clash directly with the Iranian project.

The Iranian project also overwhelmed its historical role in the region, and this project faces two challenges to achieve its goals: A- Defending a regime that has suffered embargo since its establishment in 1979, because it came from the rubble of the Shah’s regime that was allied with the United States, Arab countries, Turkey [between partnership and competition] and Israel, with which the following clerical regime severed ties. The Iranian regime also adopted a revolutionary project and seeks to export it across the region in the name of historical and doctrine responsibilities. The regime also suffers challenges inside Iran due to its demographic, sectarian and ethnic diversity. Furthermore, Iran’s strategic location makes it an inevitable part of international conflicts, especially after the independence of many Soviet Republics post-1991 and the United States and Israeli military and intelligence mastery after Sep. 11th. In other words, after the American invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran became surrounded by intense American military action.11 B- The struggle for regional domination, which increased in magnitude compared to the Shah’s attempts. The Iranian republic’s political revolutionary sectarian project seeks overall change and to ‘Export the Iranian Revolution’ in order to impose its nature on the

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region. This radical ideological regime always raises slogans such as disown ‘injustice’ and ‘arrogant.’ The Iranian regime also claims the support of ‘oppressed people’ all around the world, a matter that creates clashes with regional powers, as Iran is involved in policies of interference in other countries’ internal affairs, penetrating into them to make illicit internal alliances and clash with other international and regional parties. Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution states that “The official religion of the state is ‘Islam’ on the ‘Twelfth Jafari’ doctrine.” Article 76 states that “The Iranian president should be Iranian to the root, hold Iranian citizenship and have full belief in the Iranian Republic’s principles and its official doctrine.”12 Those two constitutional texts caused a crucial question about the “Global Islamism” or “Islamic Unity”: were they intended in this context or one of ‘Shiite Sectarian Islam’? In other words, is the Iranian republic a ‘global Islamic’ project or ‘Shiite Sectarian’ project?

Officially, there is a categorical denial that the Iranian republic project is a Shiite sectarian one, but practical acts reveal a key role for the sectarianism in foreign policy making domestically and abroad. The Iranian republic is concentrated in two terms: the ‘Republic’ [Interest] and ‘Islamic’ [Ideology]. The republic is a mixture of both the ‘State’ and the ‘Iranian society,’ with its long history of culture and global civilization, Islamic civilization in particular.

Whether it is ‘Islamic’ or not, the Iranian republic has essential interests in its state, society, civilization, history and regional role due to its commitment to an ‘Islamic global’ project no matter its denomination. However, the ‘Shiite doctrine’ unintentionally overburdens the Iranian republic. Therefore, Iran is not just a republic that holds ‘Islamic’ or sectarian [Shiite] commitments, but also a state that has multiple nationalities, faiths and sects and must further its own national security requirements.

‘Islamic’ principles and national interests in Iran differ from one Iranian political current to another and from one leader to another. Thus, Iran can experience all gradients between maximum adherence to national interests without any consideration for ‘Islam’ to maximum enthusiasm for Islamism without any consideration for national interests.

These two axes have many political powers and currents in-between that interact, vary and coincide on political visions and national programs inside Iran and abroad.

For example, because of this mixture of political variety, Iran decided to stand with the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq due to its sectarian and political conflicts with the Taliban and its eight-year military struggle with Saddam’s regime. In addition, Iran encouraged United States’ policies toward Iraq from 2003-2005, which served the Iranian project in terms of dismantling any anti-Iran regime in Baghdad, but then the dual interests in Iraq become inconsistent after Washington’s awareness of the negative effect of allying with Shiites on relations with Sunnis, a matter that escalated political Shiism in neighboring countries. Sunnis inside turned to support for resistance and Sunnis abroad turned to a movement against the American project in Iraq.

In fact, the Iranian project has always been in conflict with the Americans since the born of the republic after 1979, which raised “Death to America” slogan and named it

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[the United States] as the “Great Satan.” This clash turned to an American-Israeli military threat toward Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its project that stands against the AmericanIsraeli project of peace and the American existence in Iraq since 2005.13 Consequently, Iran becomes a ‘Rogue State’ from the American and Israeli perspectives, and become a threat for many Arabian Gulf Countries due to involvement in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. The perception of Iranian threat among the Arabian Gulf States increased after the JCPOA signing with P5+1. Iran considered the nuclear deal an international recognition of its crucial regional role that allows Iranian interference in other countries’ affairs, an issue confirmed by the Saudi FM Adel al-Jubeir in the ‘Munich Security Conference’: “Iran is the major sponsor of terrorism in the world” and “Iran is the source of challenge in the region, as it is based on ‘Exporting the Iranian Revolution’ and does not believe in citizenship concept and wants all Shiites in the world to be exclusively affiliated for Iran and not for their origin countries.” Adel al-Jubeir accused Iran of “seeking to change regimes in the Middle East.”14 The Iranian military’s direct intervention in Syria was backed with affiliated Shiite organizations, especially Lebanese ‘Hezbollah’ and other Iraqi Shiite and Afghani militias. This exacerbated tensions within the region and with the United States and other Western countries and made Russia realize that Iran has become a major regional power.

Khamenei’s Iran asserted there would not be any future corporation with the United States, especially after America not only showed deliberate reluctance toward repealing sanctions imposed on it after the nuclear deal, but also endorsed new ones.15 Eventually, Iran and Russia met on the Syrian crisis and established a cooperation, not a strategic one but to prevent the fall of Assad’s regime and write a new political equation to ensure the interests of both Tehran and Moscow in Syria.

The Iranian-Russian rapprochement happened as a reaction to sanctions and their joint position toward their embargoes, one regarding the Iranian nuclear program and the other the Russian crisis in Ukraine. In addition, Iranian-Russian interests coincided in advocating for their violated interests in Libya by the West and other atrisk interests in Syria. These factors did not exist pre-2012 in the Medvedev era, who marginalized relations with Iran, a decision that was reversed in the next era when Putin reassumed the Kremlin.16 This Russian political transformation toward Iran was realized after the 4th conference of Qazvin Countries in Sep. 29th, 2014, where Russian political analysts asserted that the Moscow-Tehran relations had been improved on all economic, trade, industrial and military levels after the Medvedev era. This was in addition to joint regional coordination toward certain issues. Iranian observers have been optimistic, especially after the Joint Commerce Committee meeting in Tehran Sep. 7th-11th, 2014, which led to Iranian observers expecting a tenfold rise in trade volume equalling almost 70bn Euro.17 Russian investors have found an opportunity to cooperate with Iran, especially in the fields of oil, gas, petrochemicals, nuclear power, electricity, roads and construction infrastructure. On November 11, 2014, Russia signed an agreement with Iran to build eight new nuclear power plants with an ambition to build two new nuclear reactors at the Bushehr Nuclear Complex in addition to a nuclear power unit built by Russian engineers

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and delivered in 2013. Iran’s interest in developing economic relations with Russia was equaled by the other side, especially as Iran weighed the nuclear deal’s possible results on the P5+1 group, such as a continuation of sanctions and perhaps multiplication of them.

Therefore, there was no safe alternative for a commercial and economic partner other than Russia.

During and following the failure to reach a comprehensive settlement for the Iranian nuclear program crisis in Vienna, the Russian Minister of Economic Development, Alex Olokayev, arrived in Tehran and signed a memorandum of understanding with the Iranian Minister of Industry, Mohammad Reza Nemtazadeh, aimed at supporting investment and joint trade between the two countries. Moreover, they agreed to consolidate strategic cooperation between Russian export companies and the Iranian export guarantee fund, hoping to ease the impact of Western sanctions on Iran.18 During these years, especially prior to the nuclear deal signing, Iranians were concerned that this increasing pace of cooperation relations with Moscow could continue, because they realized that these relations were linked to external variables, especially the rise and fall of Russian-American relations. Their bet was that only without strong economic ties between the West and Russia would the latter not back down in developing its relationships with Iran.

This Iranian skepticism did not come from a vacuum; there were Russian practices that made Iran not rely on an alliance or partnership with Russia and there was an Iranian perception that the priority for Moscow was and will always be the relationship with the West, which is a network of huge geostrategic and economic interests for Russia. The most important indicators of this perception were the Russian position on the Iranian nuclear issue, as Russia fully adhered to the P5+1 position, regardless of the cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in the peaceful nuclear energy field.

Russia has repeatedly rejected Iranian military nuclear capabilities and has committed to positive voting in favor of all Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran [six decisions since 2006 to 2010] for failing to comply with IAEA requirements.19 Russia also committed to banning the export of weapons to Iran, according to former President Medvedev’s decision on Sep. 22nd, 2010; unilaterally Russia has imposed a ban on the export of the (S-300) missile system, worth $800 million, which was contracted by the Russian government and Iran. The latter then resorted to the International Court of Arbitration to get compensation worth four billion dollars for canceling the (S-300) missiles deal.20 Russia has continued to satisfy the West at the expense of Iran over the nuclear program crisis. Russia proposed to be an intermediary to enrich Iranian uranium on the Russian soil, a solution to the West’s insistence on preventing Iran from uranium enrichment, which Iran vehemently rejected. Russia has also delayed the completion of the final stages of the Bushehr reactor for more than seven years due to Western and Israeli pressure.

The shift in the Russian position took place when conflict with the United States intensified after Washington’s insistence on expanding NATO to Russia’s neighboring countries in the Central Asia, Caucasus and Caspian regions. Russia found that cooperation with Iran might be one of Russia’s most important defensive policies against aggressive Western attitudes.

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Thus, the Iranian-Russian relations continued to oscillate between ascendancy and decline due to various determinants and factors that prevented any convergence towards an alliance or a strategic partnership, but also prevented the deterioration of cooperation towards a conflict, especially in light of a mutual need for cooperation as a ‘Necessary Alliance’ in the Syrian crisis.

Second: The Syrian crisis and the development of Russian-Iranian relations The Syrian crisis imposed an alliance between Iran and Russia, but despite all the factors encouraging this alliance, it did not exceed a ‘selective strategic alliance,’ which reflects the progress and retreat in this relationship caused by the convergence or divergence of the two countries’ roles. This balance is further motivated by the roles of competing forces towards Iran regarding the relationship with Russia in the Syrian crisis: the United States, Turkey and Israel, all parties that have played distinctive roles in the Russian-Iranian partnership rapprochement in Syria, and which will inevitably govern the future of these relations according to their interactions in the Syrian crisis.

In order to determine the parameters of interaction between Iran and Russia, it is necessary to indicate a number of facts: 1- Iran preceded Russia in intervening in the Syrian crisis alongside President Bashar al-Assad’s regime against what it considered an “external conspiracy” targeting the forces of resistance.

2- Iran played a crucial role in convincing Russia to intervene in Syria.

3- Russia realized that its interests in Syria were threatened, and that these interests intermingled with those of other parties. Other international and regional factors in the Syrian crisis were still controlling the course of Iran’s relations development with Russia, particularly during the last two years.

There are two narratives for the Iranian attempt to convince Russia to intervene in the Syrian crisis: 1- Ali Khamenei, as the supreme commander of the Iranian armed forces, directly requested Russian intervention in a letter held by his adviser for international affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, before September 2015 and handed personally to Russian President Vladimir Putin.21 2- General Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Quds Force, visited Moscow, held talks with the Russian President Vladimir Putin and persuaded him to join the Iranian-led “resistance front.” The Iranian ambition was “to extend Russian intervention in order to provide the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad with power that he needs.”22 These two narratives may be questionable in the light of Russia’s strong and clear position as the only [so to speak] independent variable and Iran as a dependent variable in the relationship between the two parties in the Syrian crisis. Therefore, if we seek to investigate the crisis, we must focus mainly on the Russian factor and the factors influencing its positions toward Syria.

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In this context, we should note remarkable positions and statements: 1- After two years of Russian intervention in Syria, President Vladimir Putin said that “if there will be any force responsible for restructuring the Middle East, so it will be Russia not Iran.”

2- Regarding the responsible party for inviting other parties to Lausanne conference, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that ‘’Russia persuaded its American partners to allow Iran to participate in the Lausanne conference alongside other regional countries.”23 3- An Iranian text, issued by the ‘Center for Strategic Studies’ in Iran, focused on the Russian intervention in Syria as motivated by Russian interests, including President Vladimir Putin’s assertion that “the Russian military presence in Syria is to counter terrorism” and that “without the help of Russia, Syria will get worse, will fall into the hands of ISIS, and the number of refugees fleeing to Europe will increase.” The Iranian ‘Center for Strategic Studies,’ in its Strategic Report (No. 75- October 2015), states that President Putin has chosen the right time to send Russian troops to Syria. On the one hand, the Assad army lost much of its territory and suffered more losses. On the other hand, after the losses resulting from the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States’ desire for isolation has increased,24 meaning that only Russia could intervene seriously to stop ISIS. Nikolai Koraliev, the former Russian military attaché in Tehran, gave an important clarification to CNN that gave more assurances about the nature of Russia’s role in Syria: “Russia is not fighting for Assad, but it helps him to preserve the Syrian lands.25” According to this definition of the relationship between Russia and Iran in Syria, we can distinguish three tracks and reveal the limits of compatibility and divergence between Russia and Iran: the Russia-Iran disagreement over crisis management after the Vienna Conference to achieve peace in Syria, the Turkish-Russian relations and their positive impact on the Russian-Iranian relations and the post-battles of Aleppo and the split in the Iranian-Russian visions on the American role and the limits of Turkish participation and Russian-Israeli understandings.

Russia-Iran disagreement on the Vienna Conference Recently, Russia and Iran enjoyed strong relations with Iraq and Syria. This rapprochement between the two countries was driven by many reasons: the Russian perception of US-Iranian disagreement, even after signing the nuclear deal against Israeli and GCC countries’ expectations, the defeat of the Syrian regime’s army, the progress of the US, Turkish and Arabian-supported opposition on the battleground in Syria and the US involvement in the Iraqi internal crisis by establishing domestic Sunni forces to confront ISIS. In the beginning, Russia-Iran cooperation in Iraq started by establishing a quartet intelligence centers to exchange information between Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria and confront ISIS, as stated by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on September 27, 2015. On his part, Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammed Jawad Zarif, said that Tehran favored this cooperation due to its common interests with Russia, unlike Iran’s severe relations with the United States.

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Zarif met John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, on September 25, 2015, in Washington and the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov on August 17, 2017. Kerry insisted on overthrowing Syrian president Bashar Assad, while Lavrov rejected Assad’s removal and said Assad was the foundation of Syrian unity and part of the war on terrorism.26 The two different positions of the two ministers drove Tehran to enhance ties with Russia to preserve the reign of its ally, Bashar Assad in Syria.

On September 20, 2015, Russia announced the beginning of its military operations in Syria, known as the Sukhoi Storm. Russian military interference tipped the scales in favor of a political solution in Syria for the first time since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011. In the Vienna conference, with the participation of sixteen countries, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, the European Union and the P5 group on October 30, 2015, Russia pushed toward a political settlement for the Syrian crisis, supported by all participants, based on Security Council resolution 2254 on December 18, 2015. Participants also agreed on a timetable for ceasefire and establishment of a comprehensive government followed by constitutional amendments or construction of a new constitution and parliamentary and presidential elections within eighteen months.

However, the conference did not refer to the future of Syrian president Assad at the will of Moscow and Tehran, who insisted on giving this right to the Syrian people without any foreign interference.

The Vienna conference resolutions upset Iran. Tehran was surprised by the Russian position and this new conflict of interests between the two countries on the Syrian issue. In addition to Tehran, the Syrian regime and Hezbollah were also disappointed after a wave of optimism about Russian military operations in Syria. The three allies expected Russian interference to tip the balance of power in Syria in favor of the Syrian regime, especially with the extension of Russia’s airstrikes on ISIS and the other Jihadist groups supported by some Arabic, regional and international actors. These strikes were also expected to weaken the Syrian opposition and negatively influence its political position in any future peace talks on Syria, strengthen the regime’s stand to regain control of the country and rule out the idea of overthrowing Assad’s regime that was required by the United States and its regional and international allies and the Syrian opposition.27 Nevertheless, Iran, Bashar Assad and Hezbollah found themselves on opposite ends against their Russian Ally due to Russia’s eagerness for a political solution to the Syrian civil war.

Russia expressed its position early and called Bashar Assad to meet President Vladimir Putin to discuss Assad’s future rather than the Russian political solution for the Syrian crises. Unlike Tehran and the Syrian regime’s expectations, this was a message to Iran and its allies that Russia ruled out the condition of securing Assad’s regime when negotiating a political settlement for the Syrian civil war and preserving Syrian unity. In fact, Russia and Iran seemed to be fighting two separate wars in Syria. The Russian goal was to bring all sides to the table, find a political solution and avoid any military confrontation with the United States and Israel in Syria, while Iran sought to preserve Assad’s regime in this country.

Russia had a high level of coordination in Syria with both the US and Israel to avoid any clashes between the three actors. For example, Israeli warplanes attacked a Syrian military

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convoy in Qalamoun—a Russian intensive flying area—near the Lebanese borders loaded with arms supplies going to Hezbollah, which further deepened disagreement between Russia and Iran in Syria.28 Russia-Iran disagreement also increased due to Russian eagerness to restore the Syrian regular army. Russia adopted this policy after Bashar Assad had called Moscow for help due to the significant losses in his army and as a message that Iran had failed to achieve any progress for the Syrian regime on the ground. According to Russian deputy foreign minister, Michael Bogdanov, Russia responded to Assad’s request to preserve the state’s organizations, especially the Syrian army. He said that Russia would attack any armed groups outside the military institute and, at the same time, welcomed anyone who would like to join the Syrian regular army. This announcement opened the door for all options, including attacking Iranian armed groups and militias in Syria like the National Defense Army, People’s Committees and ‘Al-Ba’th’ battalions, should they continue working independently. Furthermore, Russia was keen to establish a Syrian military council to restructure the Syrian national army beyond the control of Bashar Assad to preserve Syrian unity and, if necessary, re-enlist military personnel who resigned in protest against the regime’s incorrect military practices, which contradicts the will of Assad and Iran.

After the Vienna conference, Russia classified the Syrian Free Army as a non-terrorist organization and decided to include it in politics and provide it with air support to confront ISIS. Indeed, Russia’s rapprochement and cooperation with the opposition forces angered Iran and the Assad regime, especially after the chief of military operations in the Russian General Staff Headquarters, General André Kartabolov, announced on November 3, 2015 that Russian warplanes had attacked twenty-four ISIS positions defined by the Syrian opposition forces. Kartabolov also said, “Many times, we announced that we are ready to cooperate with opposition factions fighting ISIS and ‘Al-Nusra’ Front in Syria. I’d like to tell you that within the framework of the international counterterrorism coalition in the Middle East, we made contact with a number of leaders and field commanders of opposition forces.” He added, “We have established a coordinating group to organize all joint efforts to confront ISIS, but we cannot disclose the structure of this group for certain reasons.” Kartabolov also said that the Russian and American warplanes had conducted joint military exercises in Syria to avoid any clashes between the two sides.

Russian insistence on implementing the political solution based on the Vienna resolutions and conducting Syrian-Syrian talks between the regime and moderate opposition, including all Syrian social segments, increased the gap between Russia on one side and Iran and the Syrian regime on the other. In a phone call with his American counterpart John Kerry, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov was determined to have international support to settle the Syrian crisis through Syrian national talks between the regime and opposition representatives and unify all efforts to countering terrorism.29 Iran declined conducting such negotiations and any direct or indirect talks with Washington on Syria, as stated by Ali Akbar Velayati, the Iranian Supreme Leader’s Advisor for international affairs, after his meeting with Feisal Muqdad, the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister in Tehran. Velayati said that his country could not accept any initiative declined by the Syrian government and the Syrian people, while Iranian foreign minister

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Mohammed Jawad Zarif supported the Syrian right for self-determination. At the same time, Tehran resumed its war of words against Washington when Khamenei reaffirmed Iran’s position against the United States and re-raised the slogan “Death to America” that is, according to Iranians, inspired by the constitution. Speaking to thousands of university students at the national day anniversary for confronting the world’s arrogant powers, Khamenei reassured the United States real goals toward the Iranian republic, saying that Americans were untrustworthy and will destroy Iran once they have the opportunity.

Tehran also heightened rhetoric against Moscow, as Iranian officials threatened to withdraw from the Vienna talks and the IRGC commander criticized the Russian strategy in Syria, saying that Russia works only for its own interests. Accordingly, Tehran no longer looked at Russia as a partner and ally in Syria, especially after the Russian initiative for a political settlement of the Syrian crisis was based on the principle “no victor no vanquished.”30 US-Turkish escalation against Russia in Syria and its reflection on Arab-Iran relations The positions of Iran’s regional and international rivals in Syria played a major role in determining Russia-Iran relations in this country. After an episode of cold relations as a result of the Vienna conference resolutions, Moscow and Tehran re-enhanced their bilateral relations for two reasons: A.The shooting down of a Russian Sukhoi by the Turkish Air Force.

Russia’s response to the Turkish shooting down of a Russian SU-24 warplane went in two directions; first, Russia enhanced its military presence in Syria by deploying state of the art weapons to tip the balance of power in favor of Moscow and its allies, Iran and the Syrian regular army. This step was exactly what Iran demanded during and after the Vienna conference: to pursue a military option and decline a political solution in Syria.

Second, Moscow re-enhanced its bilateral relations with Tehran on all levels, including military cooperation against the opposition military factions and thwarting Turkish goals in Syria as well.

Russia was aware of Turkish goals in shooting down the Russian warplane. Turkey was keen to harm the morale of Russian president Vladimir Putin by shooting down the SU-24, considered a symbol of the Russian campaign in Syria. It also sought to deplete Russian diplomatic and military efforts directed to counterterrorism and political settlement of the Syrian crisis by soliciting Moscow for a confrontation beyond the Syrian borders and most importantly, force NATO to accept Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s plan for the establishment of a safe territory that extends from Jarabuls to the Mediterranean.

As a result, Russia was keen to topple the Turkish plan by rescuing the second Russian pilot using Russian-Syrian Commandos successfully and frustrating the Turkish goal of dragging Moscow into a Russian-Atlantic war. Furthermore, Russia adopted the plan of the safe territory and, instead of imposing this territory near the Turkish borders, Moscow deployed S-300 and S-400 missiles, warplanes and T-980 tanks to confront ISIS and the other armed groups. Russia also adopted new procedures in its diplomatic confrontation with Turkey by imposing visa requirements on Turks visiting Russia starting

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from 2016, threatening to close borders between Syria and Turkey as an important step to counterterrorism and launching air strikes on stolen oil from Syria that confused Turkey, as stated by Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov.

These developments led to a resumption of bilateral relations between Russia and Iran when Russian president Vladimir Putin visited Tehran on November 23, 2015, to attend the OPEC-Gas summit. On the sidelines of the summit, Putin met Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and both discussed Russia-Iran bilateral relations, the Syrian crisis and their positions toward the United States.

“This visit established a strategic partnership between the two countries in the face of the US hegemony” President Putin said. He added that Moscow would lift the embargo on selling nuclear technologies to Tehran, saying that Moscow does not betray its allies as others do, referring to the United States. Moscow also opened the door for establishment of a free trade zone between Iran and the Eurasian union, enhanced cooperation among OPEC-Gas members given their weight in the world energy sector and enhanced economic integration between these members and the other economic blocs where Russia is a key player similar to the Shanghai Organization, Caucasus countries community, the BRIICS group and the Eurasian union.

In a meeting between Putin and the Iranian Supreme Leader, both discussed the Iranian post-nuclear deal era, Russia’s increasing involvement in the Syrian crisis, the possibility of Russian ground intervention in this country and the convergence of visions on the future of Bashar Assad, unlike the statement of the IRGC commander in this concern. Both sides had a common stand on this issue saying, “No one can impose anything on the Syrian people.” Furthermore, Khamenei praised Russia’s role in Syria and its position against the US plans when he talked to Putin, saying, “Americans always try to put their rivals in a state of confusion, but you ruined that policy.” He added, “The Russian decisions and actions in Syria enhanced Russia and President Putin’s regional and international credibility.”

On his part, Putin praised Iran and its leadership saying, “Iran is an independent nation with promising prospects.” He added, “Iran is a trustworthy reliable ally in the region and the world. On the contrary of others, we are committed toward our friends and do not betray them. Even when we disagree on certain issues, we come to the table and solve our disputes.”31 B. The US attack on the Syrian regular army in Deir ez-Zor. Russia-Iran ties severed again over the priority of operations in Syria, despite attempts to find common ground between both sides. However, the US attack on a Syrian military camp on Saturday, August 17, 2016 in Deir ez-Zor tipped the balance of power again and forced Russia to intensify airstrikes against Syrian opposition to support Iran and its militias in Northern Syria, especially at the battles of Aleppo, where Russia and its allies achieved a great victory.

Russia-Iran relations continued wavering depending on regional and international developments. On August 16, 2016, the Russian minister of defense announced that Russian Tupolev-27 and U-34 took off from the Iranian air base Nogah in the city

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of Hamadan northwestern Iran and bombed ISIS and the ‘Al-Nusra’ Front in Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Idled in Syria. This Russian announcement infuriated the Iranian political and military personnel, which obliged the Iranian government to contain the crisis and declare that it was a necessity for war in Syria, but not compromise on any of Iran’s national foundations.32 In response to the Russian announcement, Iran’s Minister of defense criticized the Russian media and how it dealt with this issue. He said that the Russian procedures were irrational and came as a form of self-promotion when he said, “Of course Russians are eager to show themselves as a superpower and influential nation alongside their activities in the regional and world security issues.”

The Iranian parliament also, as stated by Representative Hishmatollah Falahat, accused the Iranian government of breaking article 146 of the Iranian constitution, which prohibits the presence of any foreign military bases in Iran, even for peaceful purposes. On August 20, 2016, twenty Iranian representatives joined Falahat and called for a closed session to discuss this issue.33 On his part, Ali Larijani, Speaker of the Iranian parliament, denied the presence of any foreign bases in Iran. On the contrary, Aladdin Brojardi, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in parliament, said that the Russian warplanes took off from Hamadan airport to strike targets in Syria after approval of the Iranian Higher Council for National Security, which means that it was a governmental decision approved by president Hassan Rouhani who is, by law, chief of this council. In addition, this action received the approval of the chiefs of the three authorities—Executive, Legislative, and Judicial—the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the Head of Budgetary and Planning Department, the two representatives of the Supreme Leader, the Army Chief, the IRGC Commander and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Security, who are all members of the council by law. Most importantly, this decision was approved by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, since no decisions can pass without his approval.

Minister of Defense Hussein Dehghan responded to the parliamentary representatives’ questions in the strongest terms and defended the positioning of the Russian warplanes at Hamadan airbase to launch attacks in Syria, saying that they did not break the law when they made this decision. Dehghan added that the Parliament had nothing to do with the decision, which heightened the Parliament’s dissatisfaction. As a result, the legal advisor in the ministry of defense defended Dehghan when he said that the Minister’s statement was misunderstood and what he was trying to say was that the decision did not need the approval of Parliament. However, these clarifications did not restrain the representatives’ anger, which forced Larijani, despite his approval of Russia-Iran cooperation and the continuation of Russian warplanes launching from Hamadan airbase, to openly criticize the statements of the Iranian Minister of Defense when he said, “The minister’s behavior was inappropriate and did not show respect to the council.” The dispute between parliament and the government continued until a spokesperson of the Iranian government, Bahram Qassimi, announced, at a press conference on August 22, 2016, the halting of Russian warplanes from using the Iranian air base in Hamadan to launch strikes in Syria; he was quoted saying, “They have gone and their use of the base depends on the regional security developments and our permission.”34

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This raises a question: since Russia-Iran military relations are tied to such sensitive factors, which level of relations between both sides can be materialized? Is building a strategic military alliance between them impossible, at least on the level of a selective strategic alliance?

Indeed, the US attacks on Deir ez-Zor contributed to the restoration of a certain form of alliance between Moscow and Tehran. Before the attacks, which were followed by the biggest ISIS offense on ‘Deir ez-Zor’ military airport, located on the outskirts of the city and separated between ISIS and the two remaining safe neighborhoods, some observers believed that the inherited mutual mistrust between Russia and Iran and the geopolitical factors remained the key determinants of Iran’s decision-making. It was believed that this would prevent a strategic coalition between the two countries. In fact, Russia-Iran relations would remain tied to certain security issues and disagreement might result from other files.

Other Russian observers questioned the possibility of building strategic relations between Russia and Iran. Vladimir Sajin, an expert in the Middle East Institute, said on this issue, “Formally, Russia-Iran relations seem good. We have joint work in Syria to support Assad’s regime despite our different views on the Syrian president.” Sajin continued, “The positions of the two countries are similar on certain issues and differ on others; consequently, Russia and Iran cannot build strategic relations due to the many points of disagreement.”

The state of doubt in Russia-Iran relations also included the United States, as Americans said they had reservations on Russian deployment of warplanes in Syria. The US Department of State said it was studying whether the Russian use of the Iranian air base violated Security Council resolution 2231, which banned selling weapons and warplanes to Iran without approval of the Security Council. When US Secretary of State John Kerry expressed his fears to his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, about the Russian use of the Iranian air base to launch attacks in Syria, the Russian minister responded severely when he highlighted the US military presence all over the world, invasion of many countries without permission from the Security Council and launching attacks in Syria without the authorization from a Syrian government that the US claimed had lost legitimacy. Lavrov also said, “The Russian warplanes on the Iranian base of Hamadan do not violate the Security Council resolution 2231. The Security Council resolution bans selling warplanes and arms and we did not violate this resolution because we did not sell arms or warplanes to Iran.” He concluded, “The United States is trying to distract the attention from the main responsibility, which is to settle the Syrian crisis.35 Tension after the battles of Aleppo The Russia-Iran collaboration and its militias’ cooperation peaked in the battles of Aleppo.

However, this coordination faced many problems on the ground between Russia on one side and Iran, the Syrian army and militias on the other. Russia was keen for a political solution in Syria and sought to attract the United States as a partner to solve the Syrian problem and coordinate with Turkey, which supported the Russian plan for a political settlement. Turkey adopted this position after severing relations with the United States as a result of Washington’s rapprochement with the Syrian Kurdish militias and the US rejection of handing the Kurdish opponent Fethullah Gülen

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over to the Turkish government. However, Iran and the Syrian army were focused on the military option to recapture the opposition’s territories after taking control of Aleppo and diminishing the Turkish role to exclude it from any political settlement in Syria. Accordingly, Russia-Iran relations severed because of three critical issues: A. Disagreement on the Turkish role in Syria Iran reluctantly accepted the inclusion of Turkey as a third sponsor in the Astana talks. Turkey imposed itself as a guarantor, alongside Russia and Iran, in the Astana talks through sponsoring the opposition delegate and coordinating with Russia to evacuate the opposition militants from Aleppo. Iran was aware that the Turkish operation “The Euphrates Shield” on August 24, 2016, would extend deep into Syria up to Aleppo, the ultimate Turkish target; this became evident when Turkey supported the opposition forces against the Syrian regime army in the Bab Battle in Northern Syria.

Russia supported the Turkish role in sponsoring negotiations between the Syrian regime and opposition alongside Iran in Astana, which heightened disagreement between Russia and Iran again.36 Iran believed that the Turkish success in the Bab battle would achieve three Turkish goals and represent a setback for the Iran-backed Assad regime, mainly in the Astana talks and the ceasefire in Syria.

Turkey aimed at achieving two goals in this battle. Firstly, it sought to separate the Kurds in Kobanî and Efrin to establish a safe zone, as discussed between Turkish President Erdogan and US President Donald Trump following his inauguration of the new US president. The second Turkish goal in the Bab battle was to approach Aleppo, where Russians, Iranians, Hezbollah, the Iraqi Shiite militias and the Syrian regime army had launched a decisive campaign to recapture this city from opposition forces. Indeed, the strategic battle of Bab would tip the balance of powers in Syria due to the presence of several powers with different goals, like the Syrian Democratic Forces—supported by the United States—that planned to enter the city from two directions, the Iranian and Syrian regime forces and their allies who were ahead of the other forces toward the city and the Turkish forces.37 These developments made Iran call Turkey to review its regional policies38 and warned Turkish officials from antagonizing Iran following Turkish foreign minister Mawlod Jawish Oglu’s accusations at Tehran of turning Iraq and Syria into Shiite states.39 Iran accused Turkey of occupying Syria and asked Ankara to leave as soon as possible—in reference to the Turkish involvement the Bab Battle—in response to the Turkish demands of Iran to exert pressure on the Lebanese Hezbollah to leave Syria. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chief of the national security and foreign policy committee in the Iranian parliament, defended the presence of Hezbollah in Syria after his meeting with Bashar Assad in Damascus when he said, “We and Hezbollah are in Syria as advisors in coordination with the Syrian government and under its request; so, the others have to leave Syria because they came to this country without permission or coordination with its government.”40 B. Iran’s rejection of the Russian willingness to involve the United States in the Astana talks Russia defended its position and, at the same time, criticized Iran indirectly when Moscow announced that it had made all victories in Syria and had the right to make invitations to anyone to participate in negotiations, not Iran. These developments reflected a disagreement between both

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sides on the Syrian crisis and their agendas in the post-Aleppo era; to continue military operations or negotiate a peaceful solution with the opposition. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov was clear when he defended his country’s position, saying, “The goal of the Russian military presence in Syria was not to support the legitimate government and defeat direct threats. After the battle of Aleppo we can say that we have preserved the secular Syria and its sovereignty in compliance with the Security Council resolution 2254.” He added, “Without the Russian interference, Damascus would have fallen in two or three weeks in the hands of terrorists.” Lavrov’s words were clear and he praised the Russian position over the Iranian one through imposing its conditions and bringing all concerned with the Syrian crisis to the table. Lavrov’s statement came in response to the Iranian Tasnim news agency, which quoted the words of Iranian foreign minister Mohammed Jawad Zarif when he responded to a question about the US participation in Astana, “We did not invite the Americans; we reject their participation.”41 Unlike in previous disputes with Tehran, Moscow was keen to illustrate this disagreement as a message, more to Americans than to Iranians, that Moscow is in control of conditions in Syria, which raises a question about the future of Russia-Iran relations. In an interview on a Russia channel, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said, “Iran rejected the American participation in Astana, but we had invited representatives of the US administration to these talks.”

On the same issue, Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov acknowledged the differences between Moscow and Tehran on this matter and said that settlement of the Syrian crisis could not come about with the participation of the United States. He added, “There is no need to make deals with the United States; we need cooperation.”42 Indeed, Lavrov’s statements reflected the Russian acceptance of an American role in Syria.

C. Russia-Israel understandings on what Israel believes are its rights in Syria or at least some gains in this country, especially Israeli supremacy over the Syrian Golan Heights.

Israel was keen to prevent Iran, Hezbollah and the Iranian militias from taking a foothold and imposing a permanent military presence or political influence in Syria, especially near the Golan Heights, to prevent creating new frontiers in Northern Israel on the model of South Lebanon.

Israel also warned of establishing an Iranian permanent naval base near Latakia in Syria.43 Iran pursued Benjamin Netanyahu’s four visits to Moscow in 2016. However, the Iranian reactions to Netanyahu’s first visit to Moscow on March 9, 2017, surprised Moscow due to the importance of this visit. In fact, this visit took place in the context of two Israeli strategic perceptions; the first was that the Syrian crisis had entered its final stage after six years of war and the allocating of gains by the victorious parties like Iran and its proxy Hezbollah. Indeed, Tel Aviv was keen to prevent and corner the Iranian influence in Syria in order to avoid tipping the balance of powers against Israel. The second is that Russia, but not the United States, had the final decision on Syria and would be the one to redistribute the spoils on all sides. In addition, the United States is not only helpless against Russia in Syria but also was not willing to confront Iran, neither in Syria nor anywhere else, which made Israel move toward Russia.

In his meeting with the Israeli cabinet before heading to Moscow, Netanyahu expressed the Israeli rejection of a permanent Iranian military presence in Syria that would open a new frontier against Israel in the Golan Heights. Netanyahu also aimed at negotiating an agreement with Moscow to avoid any future military clashes between Russia and Israel in Syria.

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In fact, Netanyahu’s visit to Moscow in 2017 differed from the previous four visits in 2016. In the first four, Netanyahu aimed at taking the Russian green light to strike certain targets in Syria, especially the advanced arms suppliers to Hezbollah, that would tip the balance of powers against Israel. Furthermore, Israel sought coordination with Russia to prevent any unintended clashes between Israeli and Russian warplanes in the Syrian airspace. However, the latest visit in 2017 concerned Israeli red lines against the Iranian presence in Syria in light of the recent developments and planning of the future of bilateral relations between Tehran and Damascus.

Likewise, Iran was aware of all these developments. It felt the gap with the Russian ally was increasing and sought to bridge this gap with Moscow as much as possible for two reasons. The first was Tehran’s recognition that Russia is the strongest actor in Syria that would determine the course of settlement in this country. The second reason was that Tehran did not have a strong regional or international ally to count on in its project in Syria, especially after the deterioration of Iran’s relations with Turkey and the GCC countries.

On March 2017, Iranian president Hassan Rouhani visited Moscow and met Russian president Vladimir Putin to save relations with Russia in light of the new Iranian rivals in Syria. Rouhani expressed his country’s eagerness to cooperate with Moscow on countering terrorism in the whole region, hinted to some unresolved issues between the two countries and offered to grant Russia concessions to use Iranian military bases. On the sidelines of the visit, both sides signed fourteen memoranda of cooperation, including nuclear materials, infrastructures and Heavy industries.

Moreover, Gas Prom Corporation—the biggest Russian gas producer—signed an agreement with the Iranian National Oil Company to cooperate in the natural gas sector.

The two presidents did not refer to the unresolved issues between them, but some Russian diplomats favored enhancing relations with Iran on regional and international issues. The final statement of the two presidents declared that both countries should respect the unity, independence and sovereignty of Syria, the necessity of a peaceful diplomatic solution in this country based on Security Council resolution 2254 and considered Russia, Iran and Turkey as guarantors of the Astana talks in order to reach a political solution in Syria. Most importantly, President Putin said that both countries were keen to build a strategic partnership, which was the first time he had described Russia’s relations with Iran as strategic. Putin added that both countries agreed to boost economic cooperation, including in the nuclear sector, and urged the continuation of the war on ISIS and Al-Nusrah organizations and the normalization of relations between all Syrian parties.44 Third: Future of Russia-Iran Relations Regarding the future, the main question is whether Russia-Iran relations going towards breakup, strong relations or are they going to continue wavering between breakups and strong ties as in the past two years?

In order to answer this question, we developed the following conclusions: A. Russia-Iran relations are based on mutual interests: some are agreed upon and others are still debatable between the two countries.

B. It does not matter whether Iran had called Russia to interfere in Syria or Russia came independently to this country under national will and a careful strategic read of its interests and sources of threat. Either way, Iran was of great importance for Russia on the military level over the

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past two years. Iran has been in control of the ground forces and militias, while Russia defined its role on airstrikes. Indeed, they achieved success together and their rivalry led to setbacks for both of them.

C. In addition to its military role over the past two years in Syria, Iran is also a political ally of the Syrian regime in accomplishing diplomatic settlement under Russian administration. However, Iran is still an obstacle in the face of a Russian project that is bigger than the narrow alliance with Tehran.

D. Iran has strong competitors in Syria: the United States, Turkey and, to a lesser degree, Israel.

Whenever Russia approaches these countries, it breaks with Iran.

E. The United States was determined to interfere in Syria, but only through an understanding with Russia. This was evident when Presidents Trump and Putin agreed on a ceasefire in Southern Syria as a beginning for further understandings between the two countries on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Hamburg, Germany.45 However, the United States was keen to break the RussiaIran coalition, which was evident when Washington announced it would never negotiate with Iran’s allies, giving Russia one of two choices: Iran or the United States.46 F. Turkey was keen to approach Russia. Some Russian officials called for a Russian-Turkish strategic alliance and considered Russia-Iran relations as limited and unable to reach the stage of a strategic alliance.47 The agreement between Russian Gas Prom and Turkish Governmental Corporation for Pipelines “Potas” on financing the Turkish “Stream” gas project was a foundation for a strong partnership between the two countries. This project would achieve many gains for Russia by selling Russian gas to the European markets via Turkey, which would diminish the risks of transporting Russian gas via Ukraine.48 All in all, given the Russian president’s rapprochement with US president Donald Trump to gain American support for the Russian plan of peaceful settlement in Syria, the Israeli critical demands from Russia concerning the Iranian presence in this country, Russian assurances of preserving the security of Israel,49 Russia-Turkey agreements to enhance bilateral relations and the US-Russia agreement on ceasefire in Southern Syria, specifically in Dar’a, As-Suwayda and Quneitrah, the next stage will be difficult for the Iranian decision maker concerning relations with Russia. Indeed, the presence of new Russian partners, the deterioration of the military option and a tendency toward a political solution has come to the forefront of the Syrian scene.

Russia-Iran relations are linked to US-Russia relations and will continue wavering between robust and severe ties. However, the common interests of the two countries will preserve RussiaIran relations and prevent them from deteriorating to a level less than an alliance of necessity.

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Endnotes (1) Ra’ed Jabr, “Russian-Iranian Relations are a Necessary Evil,” Al-Hayat, February 6, 2017.

(2) Nurhan Sheikh, “The Russian Position toward the Arab Revolutions: An Analytic Vision, the Strategic Report, ‘the Nation and the Reality of Reform and Mechanisms of Change,’“ Al-Baiyan 9 (2012): 275–277.

(3) Ezzat Saad Al-Sayed, “Between Terrorist Expansion and Iranian Expansion: Russian Politics and Middle East Security,” Al-Siyasah Al-Dawliya 201 (July 2015): 110–115.

(4) “Iran and Egypt: Thorny Entry Points for Relations,” The Gulf Newspaper, Feb. 23, 2013, http://cutt.us/jfbyi.

With the publication of the message “Life is what is inspired by the mandate of the Jurist,” the writer refutes the Iranians’ reevaluation of the situation in relation to the Arab revolutions and with the proposed solution of confronting crises.

(5) Talal Atrissi,“American Turnaround: Iran’s Position and its Regional Role in the Strategies of Major Powers,” Al-Siyasah Al-Dawliya 199 (January 2015): 31–35.

(6) Ibid., 33.

(7) Izzat Saad al-Sayyid, “Between Terrorist Expansion and Iranian Expansion,” 112.

(8) Mohamed El-Said Abdelmoumen, “The Courageous Flexibility: Iranian Capabilities in Face of a Potential Historic Transformation,” Al-Siyasah Al-Dawliya 199 (January 2015): 7.

(9) Ibid., 11.

(10) Talal Atrissi, “American Turnaround,” 31.

(11) International Center for Future Studies, “Evolution of the Regional Role of Iran in Light of International and Regional Changes,” (Cairo, unpublished study).

(12) Iranian Const. art. 13, 76, http://cutt.us/Sd25P (13) International Center for Futures Studies, “Evolution of the Regional Role of Iran.”

(14) “Al-Jubeir: Iran’s Greatest Sponsor of Terrorism and Dialogue Will Happen Only after Changing its Behavior,” Al-Hayat Daily, February 20, 2017, 1.

(15) The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, doubted the seriousness of any opportunity for Iranian cooperation with the United States as a result of the signing of the nuclear agreement. “The nuclear deal protected Iran from US military aggression,” he said, describing the threats as an error. He asserted, “The aim of these threats is to divert attention from the real war, that is, the economic war, which is a priority.” He added, “The enemy is planning in the near term to create chaos and strife in the country to deprive the Iranian Republic.” He also said, “The enemy’s long-term goal is to change the foundations of the Islamic regime.” Moreover, he indicated that he had told officials, “There is no difference between the terms of regime change and regime behavior change.” He also asserted that he had said, “Behavior change means getting away from Islam and Khomeini’s line.” See Khamenei’s “The Military Options are False,” Al-Akhbar, February 16, 2008; Mohammed Saleh Sadeqian, “Khamenei Considers that the Call for Iran’s Behavior Change is not Very Different from Dropping the Regime,” Al-Hayat, May 11, 2017.

(16) Mohammad Reza Farqani, “Russian Aspirations to Support Strategic Relations with Iran,” Iranian Anthology 172 (February 8, 2015): 61.

(17) “Is Russia a True Friend for Iran? Iranian Diplomacy,” Iranian Anthology 172 (February 8, 2015): 62–63.

(18) Ibid.

(19) These commitments to a sanctions policy on Iran were not easy for Russia. Rather, because of them, its economy suffered significant losses. See A. Balkanov, “The Iranian Key to the Middle East Door,” Russia in Global Affairs 11 (October 27, 2013).

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(20) Izzat Saad al-Sayyid: “Between Terrorist Expansion and Iranian Expansion,” 114.

(21) Talal Atrissi, “American Turnaround,” 34.

(22) Mohammed Saleh Sadeqian, “Khamenei asked Putin to Intervene in Syria,” Al-Hayat, August 19, 2016.

(23) Amir Taheri. “Moscow is Pushing Tehran to the Shadow in Syria: Assad is Differentiating in Treatment between Them,” Middle East, October 21, 2016.

(24) Ibid.

(25) Nasser Taffi Amri, “Is It Possible for the Russian Military Intervention to Change the Situation in Syria?,” Iranian Anthology 179 (October 14, 2015), 24.

(26) Mohammed al-Sa’eed Idris, “Tahadiat Iran fi Altahaluf Ma’ Russia,” Majalt Mukhtarat Iraniah 178 (September 2015): 6–9.

(27) Ibid.

(28) Ibid., 9.

(29) “Iran wa Sadmatuha fi Alhalif Alrussi,” Alkhaleej, November 21, 2015.

(30) Mohammed al-Sa’eed Idris, “Tahadiat Almasalih baina Itraf Salam Vienna wa Mustaqbal Altaswiyah Alsuriah,” Majalt Mukhtarat Iraniah 179 (October 2015): 7.

(31) Ibid., 7–8.

(32) Nourhan Alsheikh, “Asharq Alawsat Aljadeed Taquduho Russia,” Al-Ihram, January 8, 2017.

(33) The revelation of this information provoked a wide range of reactions; some defended the regime, and others analyzed the events to justify the cooperation. For more information, see Paul R. Pillar, “Saving Face in Tehran,” The National Interest, August 24, 2016; Daniel R. Depetris, “3 Reasons Russia’s Bombers in Iran Were a Big Deal,” The National Interest, August 24, 2016.

(34) Falih Alhamrani, “Nashr Almuqatilat Alrussiah fi Qa’idat Hamadan Al-Iranianh: Mu’ashir li Tahaluf Am Safqah Mu’aqatah?”

(35) Mohammed Saleh Sidqian, “Khameini Talaba min Putin Altadakhul fi Suria,” Alhayat; Ibid.

(36) Mohammed al-Sa’eed Idris, “Alidwan Alamriki ala Deir Azzor wa Khayar Altahaluf Alistrategi Alintiqa’i baina Tehran wa Moscow,” Majalat Mukhtarat Iraniah 178 (July 2016): 6–7.

(37) See Baha’ Abu Akram, “Altafahum Alturkey Alrussi wa Tumouhat Iran,” Alhayat, January 17, 2017; Yahya Dabouq “Altamawdu’ Alturkey fi Suria: La Tanazul an Alquah,” Alakhbar, January 17, 2017; Mohammed Nouraddin, “Turkiah wa Halab: Umq Istratgy Istahal faji’ah Istratejiah,” Alsafeer, December 10, 2016.

(38) Najah Mohammed Ali, “Iran wa Turkia: Ma’rakat Kasr Adhm Am Tafahumat,” Alquds Alarabi, February 18, 2017.

(39) Mohammed Saleh Sidqian, “Tehran Tuhazir Ankara: Lissabr Hdoud,” Alhayat, February 21, 2017.

(40) “Iran Tatahim Turkia Bihtilal Suria,” Alhayat, January 5, 2017.

(41) Ibid.

(42) Ra’ed Jabr and Mohammed Saleh Sidqian, “Tabaion Russi-Irani ala Da’wat America ila Astana,” Alhayat, January 18, 2017.

(43) Mohammed Bdeir, “Tahzerat Israeliah: Alqa’idah Aliranian fi Suria Khutwah Mutatarifah,” Alakhbar, March 1, 2017.

(44) Markiz Almustaqbal lilabhath Waddirasat Almutaqadimah (Abu Dhabi), “Hal Tusahim Ziarat Rouhani fi Taqlees Misahat Alkhilaf ma’ Moscow?,” Alhayat, March 29, 2017; Ra’ed Jabr, “Russia wa Iran Tata’ahadan Tasfiat Alirahab fi Almantiqah,” Alhayat, March 29, 2017.

(45) Baha’ Abu Kroum, “Qimmat Alwaqi’iah fi Hamburg” Alhayat, July 14, 2017.

(46) Alexander Atasontsef, “Russia Amam Muftaraq Turuq: Iran Am America?” The Russian Gaztia Website, February 23, 2017.

(47) Baha’ Abu Kroum, “Qimmat Alwaqi’iah fi Hamburg.”

(48) Zahra Kha’mohammadi, “Taqieem Athar Mashrou’ Alsail Alturkey ala Istratejiat Tehran” Strategic Report 237 (November 2016); Majalat Mukhtarat Iraniah 189 (October 2016), 32–33 (49) Ra’ed Jabr, “Moscow Tata’ahad Mura’at Almutatalabat Alamniah li Israel,” Alhayat, July 18, 2017.

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Riyadh Summit and Prospects of Iran’s Regional Role Ahmed Sayed Ahmed (Ph.D.) Specialist researcher in international relations and American affairs in al-Ahram Center for Political and Stategic Studies

I

ran’s role in the Middle East has considerably increased in the last decade, and the country has emerged as a key player in the post–Arab Spring crises afflicting Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Iran’s influence rose in 2003 due in part to its control of the Iraqi political process and its support for the country’s Shiites at the expense of marginalizing its Sunni population.

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In addition to its massively destructive role in Iraq, Iran also expanded its sphere of influence into Syria after the outbreak of the revolution in 2011, backing Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and supporting his regime by supplying both money and weaponry. Iran has also engaged with Syria militarily by sending thousands of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) troops and members of affiliated militias to fight alongside the Assad regime’s army in crushing the Syrian people’s calls for freedom. Iran has also emerged as an influential party in Yemen by supporting the Houthis with both money and weaponry, as well as providing support to Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Shiite groups in some Gulf countries such as Bahrain.

Through all these conflicts, Iran has sought to establish itself as a regional powerhouse in the framework of the Middle Eastern political system. To do this, Iran has employed its material resources of oil and gas, developing its ballistic and nuclear military capabilities as well.

On the occasion of the United States president Donald Trump’s first visit to Saudi Arabia, 55 Arab and Muslim leaders and senior representatives came together to attend the May 2017 Riyadh Summit. This event included a bilateral meeting between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia and two multilateral meetings, one between the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the other between a variety of Arab and Muslim countries. This summit was a turning point that will eventually serve to determine the future of the Middle East.

To understand Iran’s complex participation in the region, it is imperative to examine reasons for the escalation of the regime’s role and the tools it has used to advance its agenda, as well as the dangerous repercussions of this involvement on the stability in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

The fundamental question to be addressed is, what are the repercussions of the Riyadh Summit on Iran’s regional role, and to what extent can Iran be deterred from continuing to have a negative impact on the region?

Because of the recent strategic changes in regional and international alliances, the Riyadh Summit seems to have constituted an important turning point toward curbing the Iranian regime’s destructive role in the region.

First: Reasons for the escalation of the Iranian role and tools used in the region According to Boston University department chair and Professor David J. Mayers’s model on roles in the Middle East, the inability of major powers to extend full control over regions has provided an opportunity for countries such as Iran to exercise their aspirations of hegemony over the nations and peoples within their geographical reach.

According to Mayers, three participatory forces can be distinguished. The first force is a regional or hegemonic entity, such as a country that already has power or control over a regional system (Iran). The second force is a bargaining power or interventionist entity, such as a power that has enough clout to bargain with another dominant power or intervene in such a way to make the situation for that dominant power more difficult

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(i.e., Western powers with fundamental interests in the Arabian Gulf region). The third force is a balancing entity, such as a force within the regional system with a vested interest in both other powers because of a desire to create balance within the regional system.1 A. Reasons for the escalation of the Iranian role According to Professor Mayers’s framework, the Iranian role in the region in the last decade can be explained by several factors: 1- Invasion of Iraq The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its subsequent strategy of withdrawal in 2011 left Iraq as an unstable open arena, a vacuum that Iran sought to fill, bringing Iraq into its own sphere of influence. By consolidating relations with Iraq’s Shiite ruling elite, Iran was able to control the course of this political equation and guide the country in a direction that would best serve Iranian interests rather than the interests of the Iraqi people.2 2- Absence of Arab countries’ involvement in Iraq and Syria The absence of Arab countries’ involvement in the crises in both Iraq and Syria contributed to the creation of situations that Iran used to its own advantage. In Iraq, the Iranian regime allied itself with the Iraqi Shiite ruling elite in an effort to draw Iraqis away from retaining a strong Arab identity or connection with other less involved Arab countries.

Iran also used the absence of a strong Arab country’s involvement to put itself into a position of power in Syria. Since 2011, Iran has supported President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal efforts to crush an initially peaceful people’s revolution for freedom. However, in 2014, when Assad was most at risk of being overthrown, Iran directly intervened strategically to prop up the regime more militarily. As such, Iran played a major role in preventing the people’s revolution from dismantling the Assad regime.

The increasing prevalence of non-Arab roles in Arab crises has led to growth in the involvement of regional and international players, including Iran, in these situations. Iran has exploited the current weakness of the Arab system to its own benefit. Because of a general state of decline in the region and the waning power within many Arab countries owing to domestic crises, Iran has been able to strengthen its political and military influence in the region. This has paved the way for Iran to become a major player in Arab crises throughout the region.

3- Western focus on only Sunni and not Shiite terror Western duplicity in dealing with the issue of terrorism has contributed to the growth of Iranian power in the region. When Western nations declared their “War on Terror,” with a selective focus on Sunni terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, they overlooked the importance of investigating Shiite terrorist organizations, which are no less dangerous than their Sunni counterparts, as clearly shown by their organized terror activities in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. One of the primary reasons contributing to the growth and persistence of organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda is their being a reaction to the growing role of Iranian-backed armed Shiite groups.

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4- Iran nuclear deal The 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 group (composed of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China, plus Germany) and the EU contributed to Iran’s suspension of its uranium enrichment program.

This nuclear deal did not, however, result in Iran completely dismantling its nuclear structures, meaning that there is a possibility of their restoration at any time. In return for suspending the uranium enrichment program, Iran was able to get heavy international sanctions lifted, thereby releasing tens of billions of dollars to the country. The Iranian regime did not use this money to develop Iran, to bridge the extreme disparities in wealth, or to raise the standard of living for the majority of Iranian citizens suffering crushing mass poverty and unemployment. Instead, the regime used this money to serve its regional ambitions of expanding its influence by supporting allied terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and regimes such as that of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. The nuclear agreement disastrously ignored the complex combination of political, religious, and ethnic climates, instead focusing solely on one aspect of Iran’s negative potential, rather than taking into account how Iran could utilize other methods to destabilize the region.3 5- Russian-Iranian alliance The Russo-Iranian alliance in Syria was a major factor in strengthening Iran’s regional Influence. The goal of saving Bashar al-Assad’s regime from collapse was the initial factor in bringing Russia and Iran together, with Russia intervening through its air force in 2015 to bomb Syrian opposition areas, while Iran intervened though its militias operating on the ground alongside Assad’s army. Despite massive losses of civilian life and the incessant targeting of areas with no presence of any terrorist groups, Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime continued to claim that their military engagement was focused solely on dismantling terrorist groups—especially ISIS. Russia’s goal in allying with Iran and supporting the Syrian regime was to ensure its influence in the region by establishing military bases in Syria, such as the one in Tartus. Russia felt the need to expand the range of its power due in part to a new cold war with the United States.

In 2014, Russia annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea in the aftermath of the Ukrainian revolution. In response, multiple world powers, including the United States, issued harsh sanctions against Russia. These sanctions were only the beginning of escalating nonviolent tensions between the two nations that continue to the present day. To help ease the pain of these sanctions, Russia sought to gain influence on a territory that it had largely ignored for some years—the Middle East.

The complex relationship between Russia and the United States also proved a fertile ground for a Russo-Iranian alliance. Not only is an alliance with Russia breaking Iran’s international isolation because of Western sanctions, but Russia’s success in the Middle East may serve to weaken American influence in the region, which would be a further massive boon to Iran.4

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6- Rise of terrorist organizations Iran has sought to increase the prevalence of terrorist organizations in both Iraq and Syria to continue fulfilling its role in the region, supposedly as a buffer against terrorism.

The regime in Tehran has taken painstaking efforts to convince the West and Russia of its commitment to fighting terrorism in Iraq and Syria. In reality, however, Iran is directly responsible for the emergence and growth of these types of organizations due to its support of extremist and heavily sectarian Shiite policies in Iraq and its alliance with the Shiitemajority Syrian regime.

Pursuing a policy of pragmatism, the United States has continued to avoid engaging militarily with Shiite and Iranian groups in Iraq so as to protect its forces from involvement in the escalating conflict. This refusal to engage terrorist Shiite groups is giving carte blanche to Iran and its terrorist militias in Iraq to continue committing crimes against Sunnis.

B. Tools of the Iranian role in the region Iran’s regional role in interfering in the affairs of other countries varies, depending on its military strength, geographical location, and other sectarian factors.5 Iran also relies on strategic alliances with terrorist groups and organizations in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon rather than with those states retaining strong international or American ties.6 The tools that the Iranian regime relies on most heavily in maintaining positions of regional power and influence are as follows: 1- Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is the military arm of the Iranian revolution in Iran and has served as Iran’s primary tool in implementing its foreign agenda in the Arab region. The IRGC was established after the revolution in 1981 as a parallel military force to the Iranian army.

The IRGC is based on the principle of [Wilayat-e-Faqih], or “Jurist Leadership,” the founding doctrine of the regime, denoting blind loyalty and total obedience to the rule of Iran’s ruling Islamic legal scholars, or Jurists, meaning that this armed force is ideologically dissimilar to typical armies. The IRGC has a massive budget, ties to over 100 major and extremely profitable companies, billions of dollars in business/construction revenue, and billions more in oil/gas/petrochemical contracts. In addition to protecting the regime and arresting opposition elements, the IRGC is supposedly tasked with supporting liberation movements and the oppressed/vulnerable people of the world.7 Over the past three decades, the IRGC has been active in illicit activities in more than a dozen countries in various forms. This involvement increased dramatically after the nuclear agreement in 2015. The IRGC has been directly involved in occupations in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon and continues to have a strong military presence in all four countries. Since 2014, around 70,000 pro-Iranian regime militia members have been permanently stationed in Syria. The IRGC intervenes in the internal affairs of no less than

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eight countries, namely, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine, Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan. Twelve IRGC centers inside Iran are tasked with providing training to foreign agents joining the ranks of the Iranian regime’s regional military forces and militias— especially from Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Afghanistan.8 The IRGC is one of the strongest economic institutions in Iran; the profits from the IRGC’s various commercial and economic interests finance the Iranian regime’s interventions in other countries, although such activities have a heavy toll on Iran’s economy. Over the last five years, Iran has spent more than $100 billion on its regional interventions. A large proportion of this budget has been allocated through the clandestine office of the revolutionary leader Khomeini. Most of the money has been spent on arms purchases as well as the costs incurred in propping up the Syrian regime. Among other expenses, Iran has allocated nearly $1 billion a year to pay the salaries of the IRGC and their military allies, including paying the members of the Syrian regime army and their affiliated militias.

2- The Quds Force The Quds Force is the elite unit and main arm of the IRGC. Led by Qassem Suleimani, the Quds Force aims to engage in Iran’s overseas military operations, which primarily involve exacerbating already-turbulent conflicts. The most prominent activities of the Quds Force are training Hezbollah’s soldiers in Lebanon and supporting Shiite movements and militias affiliated with the Iranian regime in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan.9 The Quds Force was established in 1990 in the wake of the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War to be the main arm of the Iranian regime in extending its hegemonic reach. The Quds Force is estimated to have approximately 15,000 troops, according to a 1998 document by the Federation of American Scientists on how fundamentalist terrorist groups are trained.10 Although the IRGC and the Quds Force are funded and trained in Iran, they carry out terrorist activities by establishing mercenary networks across a variety of countries, with the Iranian regime using its embassies abroad to coordinate, plan, support, and fund these terrorist groups.

Second: Risks and implications of the Iranian role in the region Iran’s role in the Arab region has been a central factor contributing to escalating regional instability, tension, and violence in several ways:

1- Feeding sectarian conflicts in the region Iran has taken to intervening in a variety of crises in the region by aligning itself with whichever domestic group or sect proves to be the most loyal to Iran. More often than not, the groups Iran tends to support favor a Shiite majority, but the regime will form unions with any group that will increase its expansion of power in the region. This in turn increases sectarian polarization among the people in these countries. Iran’s role in such sectarian conflicts has not been a passive one. Iranian militias such as the Quds Force, led by Qassem Suleimani, have been leading forces in liquidating tens of thousands of Sunnis from Iraq,

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killing thousands of Sunni opposition members in Syria, and supporting predominantly Shiite Houthis in the Yemeni crisis.

Iran’s regime has continued to claim that the aim of its military interventions is to support oppressed and defenseless groups in these crises. In reality, however, the regime’s actions have shown that its support is contingent solely upon which groups will prove to be advantageous political/religious allies—often at the direct expense of other groups that are suffering from deteriorating humanitarian conditions. These kinds of alliances only further sectarian rifts and exacerbate the downward spiral of violence between groups.11 2- Exporting the Iranian Revolution and the rule of Jurist Leadership Religion plays a pivotal role in Iran’s foreign policy in the region, with the regime primarily seeking to support pro-Shiite groups across the Middle East. The regime’s goal of spreading Shi’ism stems from a desire to expand its regional influence and revive the “Persian Empire”. This is a direct threat to the security, independence, and sovereignty of Arab countries, as Iran has now become a powerful governing force in four Arab capitals—Baghdad in Iraq, Damascus in Syria, Beirut in Lebanon, and Sanaa in Yemen. A deputy of the Iranian Shura Council described Iran’s regional interventions by saying that “three Arab capitals are now held by Iran and the Iranian revolution and Sanaa has now become the fourth capital on its way to joining the Iranian revolution”.12 The IRGC and the Quds Force carry out the Iranian regime’s agenda of interference in the affairs of other countries as well as the “export” of their supposedly Iranian revolution.

Iran’s objective for utilizing these forces is not just to overthrow governments but also to establish heavily sectarian Shiite states in their place.

Iran wishes to establish Jurist Leadership across the region. Jurist Leadership is a theory in Shia Islam that holds that Islam gives the [Jurist] a divinely ordained right of guardianship over people. In Iran, the primary Jurist is called the “Supreme Leader.”

Iran’s heavily sectarian foreign policy has exacerbated regional crises by escalating sectarian conflicts between religious and ethnic groups. This in turn has increased insecurity and instability in the region, creating an environment conducive to the growth of extremist groups and terrorist organizations. In this way, Iran exports its Shia revolution to weaken regional powers, dismantle regimes, and replace them with their satrapies, ideally under the Jurist Leadership doctrine.

3- Threat to Arab and Gulf national security Iran’s regional role has become a destabilizing threat to Arab national security in general and Gulf national security in particular. While Iran claims that its aim is to combat terrorism in the region, in reality, the regime continues to support domestic terrorist factions and Shiite uprisings that exacerbate regional tension and instigate escalations of conflicts. It is in practice allied with a policy of well-organized advocacy, which the regime allows to be extended and used to justify terrorism.

In Bahrain, Iran has supported the Shiite uprising, and in Syria, Iranian militias have continually supported the Shia-majority Assad regime to crush the Sunni-majority

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population. Iranian support for these groups has created the perfect environment for the growth of extremist groups since neither country is making any serious effort to dismantle domestic terrorist organizations.

4- Maximizing Iran’s economic interests The Iranian regime seeks to maximize its geopolitical interests in the Arab region through intervention in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to establish what it calls the “Shiite Crescent.” Whoever controls this crescent region will then dominate the region’s economic capabilities. Having already established control over Iraq’s oil wealth, Iran is now trying to establish a land corridor to reach the Mediterranean Sea by occupying parts of Syria and Sunni provinces in North and West Iraq such as Anbar, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Nineveh. To achieve this, Iran is using a policy of forced displacement and demographic change in Iraq and Syria to impose its hegemony over large areas. By shifting those regions’ identities towards a Shia majority, Iran aims to take control of Iraqi and Syrian wealth. Such insidious efforts pose massive threats to both domestic and regional national security.

Third: Iranian role in the crises of the region Iran’s negative role has emerged in many crises in the Arab region.

1- Iran’s role in Iraq One of the central causes of the political insecurity and countrywide crisis in Iraq is the negative role of Iran, with the Tehran regime completely dominating the country’s political arena after America’s withdrawal, representing Iran’s interests in the country rather than those of the Iraqi people. Iran’s intervention in Iraq has contributed to strengthened sectarianism through a network of strong alliances with the ruling Iraqi Shiite elite.

Iran has predominantly supported Shiites to retain positions of power in Iraq, thereby marginalizing Sunnis in the political process and further oppressing Sunni civilians.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime weakened the country severely, leaving a political vacuum that allowed the Iranian regime to step in as a powerful main player. Iran deployed the ‘’Badr Army’’ and the ‘’Quds Force’’ to assist in the forced displacement of Iraqi Sunnis during the sectarian war between 2006 and 2008.

The Iranian role in Iraq’s sectarian conflicts contributed to the creation of an atmosphere ripe for the emergence of terrorist organizations. Because of lack of representation, the oppressed Iraqi Sunnis began supporting domestic extremist groups to defend their interests. By 2014, terrorist groups such as ISIS gained control of half of Iraq’s north and west. Their presence poses a real danger of dividing the country.13 In an effort to retake these areas from ISIS, Iran used the Quds Force to train domestic Shiite forces and gave the Iraqi state–sponsored Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces militias permission to monitor and control large swaths of the country. However, these militias have become best known for their brutal policies against domestic Sunnis, fueling sectarian tension and strengthening ISIS’s power in the country.

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2- Iran’s role in Yemen Iran’s role in the Yemeni crisis is a clear encapsulation of how its intervention has escalated instability in the region. Iran’s military, political, and financial support for the Houthi group contributed to the crisis and massively aggravated the Yemeni humanitarian tragedy. After a series of uprisings in Yemen forced the authoritarian president Ali Abdullah Saleh to hand over power to his deputy, Mansour Hadi, in 2011, Hadi proved ill-equipped to address a plethora of problems in the country, including an upsurge in alQaeda attacks, a southern separatist movement, divisions in the military due to continued loyalty to Saleh among a vocal minority of the population, and widespread corruption, unemployment, and hunger.

Houthis allied with forces loyal to Saleh exploited Hadi’s struggle, seizing control of the large Yemeni city of Sa’da in 2014. Many Yemenis supported this action because of their dissatisfaction with the country’s leadership at the time. By 2015, the Houthis had secured the city of Sa’da enough to completely surround the presidential palace, effectively initiating a coup. Hadi fled the country soon after.

Since 2009, Iran has supplied the Houthis with military advisers and advanced weaponry and has helped in launching ballistic missiles, also provided by Tehran, at Saudi targets from border areas such as Najran and Jazan. Iran’s strategy has been based on changing the balance of power in Yemen to favor the Houthis. Despite multiple instances of the presence of Iranian weaponry in Yemen, with large quantities being confiscated, Iran has continued to smuggle supplies for the Houthis—even after the embargo imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 2216.14 Continued military and political support for the Houthis from Iran has led to the group’s defiance of the international community and rejection of any political solution to the Yemeni crisis. The outcomes of this national dialogue and UN Security Council Resolution 2216 led Saudi Arabia and eight other mostly Sunni Arab states to confront the Houthis militarily in support of President Hadi Mansour. These efforts succeeded in regaining control of more than 80% of the Yemeni territory.

The continuation of the coup has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

The aggression of hostile forces has led to thousands of deaths and injuries of Yemeni civilians—one-third of whom have been children. Years of conflict have destroyed the country’s infrastructure and brought Yemen to the brink of famine.

Areas controlled by the Houthis and forces loyal to Saleh have seen mass cholera outbreaks. Some 17 million people are currently considered food insecure, and 6.8 million are suffering from severe food insecurity. Malnutrition has become an epidemic sweeping over Yemen. Millions of Yemenis are either under siege or internally displaced, while hundreds of thousands more have fled the country. Because of high demand, the country’s understaffed and overcrowded hospitals cannot meet the needs of the Yemeni people.

3- Iran’s role in Syria Iran’s intervention in Syria has been a major negative factor further complicating a war, which has lasted for over six years to date. The war in Syria began in 2011 when people of

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the Sunni-majority country rose in peaceful protests against the oppressive Shiite Assad regime, which had subjected the country to brutal tyranny since 1971. President Bashar al-Assad acted to suppress this revolution with immediate and shocking disproportionate violence, opening fire on unarmed protesters and abducting civilians on the streets. This ultimately led to the people taking up arms to defend themselves. Eventually, these armed groups organized themselves into armed opposition forces seeking autonomy for the people from regime rule. Assad responded by ramping up military engagement, releasing terrorist criminals from jail to create dissent in the revolution, and using siege as a weapon to force rebellious areas into submission. The once peaceful revolution escalated to a complex and bloody war between multiple groups with disparate interests.

Iran has supported Assad’s brutal regime financially, militarily, and politically, with Iranian forces from the IRGC and the Quds Force participating in the battles against the Syrian armed opposition alongside other Shiite forces such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah. The total number of Hezbollah operatives in Syria currently stands at around 10,000, but the group has lost up to 1,500 fighters in combat to date, including many of its senior officers.

Numerous Iraqi Shiite militias, also backed by Iran, are also engaged in support of the Assad regime in Syria, including Iraqi Hezbollah, the Iraqi Shia paramilitary group Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, the Iraqi “al-Nujaba” movement, the militias of “Imam Hussein”, the “Imam Ali” Brigades, and the brigades of Abu al-Fadl Abbas.15 Iran’s influence in Syria and its support for the violent Assad regime has led to the failure of the five Geneva peace talks’ conferences, which aimed to reach a consensual political solution that would facilitate Assad’s transition from power. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, all groups were “demanded” to immediately cease any attacks against civilian targets, “urged” to support efforts to achieve a ceasefire, and “requested” to engage in formal negotiations in early January 2016. The resolution called for “free and fair” elections to be held in Syria within 18 months under UN supervision.

Iran is one of three countries, along with Russia and Turkey, tasked with monitoring the ceasefire agreement reached during the first round of the Astana talks in January 2017.

Despite the opposition’s relatively strong commitment to this ceasefire agreement, the Assad regime has continued to bombard civilian areas with all kinds of weaponry, with this continuing aggression toward civilians supported in the air by Russia, and on the ground

by Iran’s IRGC, and other allied militias. These continuing clashes have prevented any political solutions from being effective in Syria.

4- Iran’s interference in Gulf affairs Iran has continuously attempted to export its Shiite revolution to Gulf nations, with its methods in these efforts varying over time. In the 1980s, Iran was able to export revolution by inciting conflict in Kuwait when a member of the Iran-backed “Da’wa Party” attempted to assassinate the Emir. Years later, the Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani stated that exporting the Shiite revolution would not be achieved without force. During the era of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, meanwhile, the Iranian regime’s goal of exporting the revolution was hidden behind a façade of civil dialogue and friendly

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relationships between neighboring countries. Later, during the term of Ahmadinejad, Iran exported the revolution by presenting itself as supposedly being a protector of all the world’s most vulnerable and oppressed people on the earth. Once the incumbent Iranian President Hassan Rouhani assumed power in his first term, Iran returned to its tried and tested methods of exporting the revolution by inciting regional instability through IRGC and the Quds Force, with military interventions in neighboring Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Bahrain.16 In 1984, the Iranian regime established the so-called Gulf Hezbollah under the leadership of Brigadier General Mohammad Mustafa al-Najjar, with the aim of interfering in the affairs of neighboring Gulf states.

After the establishment of the Quds Force in 1990, headed at the time by Brigadier General Ahmed Sharifi, dean of the Revolutionary Guard, the new force took over the role of exporting terrorism to the Gulf states to destabilize the region. Sharifi played an active role in the internal conflict in Bahrain in 1993.

Since 2014, Brigadier General Amiran has been the senior official directing the Quds Force’s activities in Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. The Sixth Corps of the Quds Force took responsibility for intervention in the Gulf States. In the wake of the crisis that erupted in February 2011, the Iranian regime became heavily involved in the situation in Bahrain, taking multiple steps to intervene and create crises. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei referred to Bahrain in 17 speeches between March 13, 2011, and June 3, 2012, claiming that Iran’s intervention in Bahrain would be controlled by the Jurist Leadership regime.

The measures taken by the Iranian regime to intervene in Bahrain include a directive issued by the regime’s Supreme Security Council to the Quds Forces instructing Lebanese Hezbollah militia members present in Bahrain to operate under the cover of trade and family relations. Iran also provided the media channel Al-Alam to Rashid Al-Rashed (Ph.D.), a leader of Islamic Action in Bahrain, to furnish him with a public platform to call for the overthrow of the Bahraini government.

The Iranian regime also used the Quds Forces of Iraq to support Tehran-affiliated groups in Bahrain. In late 2014, the Quds Force in Baghdad sent weapons and explosives to Bahrain and established a network of operatives there. The Bahraini security forces uncovered one such cell on September 30, 2015, when a bomb-making factory was discovered in the Nuwaidrat neighborhood, south of the Bahrain capital, Manama. On June 20, 2016, IRGC and Quds Force Major General Qassem Suleimani issued a public statement threatening that if Bahrain exceeded the “red line” issued by the Iranian regime, Iran would ignite a fire in Bahrain and throughout the region.17 On July 22, 2016, Bahraini authorities detained five people suspected of having links with the Iranian regime, who had attempted to plant bombs. Bahraini authorities noted that these individuals had received military training from the IRGC and at Hezbollah centers in Iraq and were planning to place explosives throughout the Kingdom of Bahrain.18 Iran’s negative role and intervention in the affairs of Saudi Arabia have also increased significantly since the Iranian revolution in 1979, with the Iranian regime carrying out

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many terrorist operations inside the kingdom. Ahmed Sharifi, a senior Quds Force official, led the terrorist attack on Saudi Arabia’s Khobar Towers in 1996, which resulted in the death of 19 American soldiers and injured 400 others. The Iranian regime also tried to use the IRGC to incite the Shiite population in southern Saudi Arabia against the country’s leaders. In September 2011, the US government arrested an Iranian named Mansoor Arbabsiar for attempting to assassinate the then Saudi ambassador in Washington, Adel al-Jubair, who is now the kingdom’s foreign minister. In January 2016, factions of the IRGC and Basij forces were reportedly instructed directly by Khomeini to attack the Saudi embassy in Tehran, although the Iranian regime has, of course, denied responsibility for that incident.

In the United Arab Emirates, meanwhile, the Quds Force’s Sixth Corps has carried out multiple terror operations. In April 2016, a number of IRGC members were captured and put on trial, with the Emirates’ Supreme Court ultimately convicting four individuals on charges of spying for Iran and Hezbollah.19 On February 2, 2016, Iranian-backed sabotage activities by Lebanese Hezbollah operatives in the UAE prompted all the Gulf states to include Hezbollah on their list of terrorist organizations.

In Kuwait, meanwhile, members of an Iranian terror cell known as al-Abdali were arrested and tried by the Kuwaiti government in January 2015. Investigations showed that a number of Iranian diplomats at the Iranian embassy in Kuwait had covertly supported the Abdali cell through training, financial assistance, and coordination among cell members.

Iran’s activities threaten the nationals of all the Gulf countries, even when they are outside their own nations. On January 2, 2016, the IRGC and the Quds Forces, in cooperation with the Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq, abducted a number of Qatari nationals in Iraq.

5- The Gulf’s response to and concerns regarding Iran Despite these efforts to destabilize the Gulf region and nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, all the nations have continued to reject Iran’s attempts to assert its power regionally. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution in Iran led by Khomeini, Iran has adopted a strong policy of exporting the Iranian revolution and consistently interfered in the affairs of other countries to destabilize the region and establish Shiite states in nations such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

The Gulf states can clearly see that Iran is seeking to maximize its regional role at the expense of Arab nations, continuing its acquisition of military and nuclear power in an effort to forcibly impose hegemonic control over the region. Iran occupies three islands of the United Arab Emirates, as well as maintain a heavy presence in the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. For Iran’s regime, the occupation of these lands blocks Gulf states from the north and south in the hopes of reviving the “Persian Empire”. Such a revival represents a threat to the national security of these countries.

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While the Iranian regime should be free to seek to maximize its interests and to play a full regional role, such advantages should not be achieved at the expense of Arab nations’ sovereignty.

Arab countries recognize Iran’s right to develop its peaceful nuclear capabilities but remain extremely wary of its possession of military capabilities that pose a clear threat to the security and stability of the region. There are also legitimate concerns regarding Iran’s growing role in the region after the signing of the regime’s nuclear agreement with the West.

The Gulf States take care to distinguish between the Iranian people and the Iranian regime and respect the importance of establishing a state of peaceful coexistence with Shia-majority Iranian citizens and the Iranian regime, which is governed by the mullahs [learned in theology and law] in accordance with the mandate of the Jurist [Faqih]. The Sunni-majority Gulf states make every effort to respect the common Shia practice of al-Taqiyah [Shiite term referring to precautionary dissimulation or denial of religious belief and practice in the face of persecution]. However, while the Gulf States constantly endeavor to support coexistence, cooperation, good neighborliness, and respect for regional sovereignty, Iran’s regime has done the exact opposite. While claiming to seek peaceful relations, the regime’s actions in the Gulf region are very clearly founded on supporting terrorism and destabilization.

As such, the Gulf keeps a respectful yet cautious stance toward Iran, engaging with the regime based on a commitment to a policy of good neighborliness, respect for the principles of international law, noninterference in its internal affairs, cessation of support for terrorist organizations, and relations based on mutual respect and coexistence.

While Iran continues a policy of aggression, the Gulf states respond diplomatically and methodically to protect their interests and national security.

Fourth: Implications of the Riyadh Summit on Iran’s role in the region The American Islamic Summit in Riyadh on May 21, 2017, was an important turning point in confronting and limiting Iran’s role in the region in several ways:

1- Revealing Iran’s role in supporting terrorism Saudi Arabia succeeded in mobilizing 55 Arab and Muslim countries to participate in the Riyadh Summit, which also included participation from the United States leadership.

At the summit, Saudi King Salman bin Abdul Aziz, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, has described Iran as the spearhead of terrorism in the region. United States President Donald Trump also stated that he considers Iran to be the main sponsor of terrorism in the world ever since the Khomeinist revolution of 1979. Trump asserted that nations in the region should unite in their efforts to confront the Iranian regime. Trump also declared his support for the Saudi war in Yemen against the Iran-backed Houthi coup.20 “From Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Iran funds, arms, and trains terrorists, militias, and other extremist groups that spread destruction and chaos across the region. For decades, Iran has fueled the fires of sectarian conflict and terror,” Trump orated before the summit. He continued, “Among

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Iran’s most tragic and destabilizing interventions have been in Syria. Bolstered by Iran, Assad has committed unspeakable crimes, and the United States has taken firm action in response to the use of banned chemical weapons by the Assad Regime—launching 59 Tomahawk missiles at the Syrian air base from where that murderous attack originated.”

Trump also asserted that “responsible nations must work together to end the humanitarian crisis in Syria, eradicate ISIS, and restore stability to the region.” Trump went on to note that “the Iranian regime’s longest-suffering victims are its own people.21 Iran has a rich history and culture, but the people of Iran have endured hardship and despair under their leaders’ reckless pursuit of conflict and terror.”

Talks during the Riyadh Summit revealed the true face of Iran. Because of its flagrant support for terrorism and its hunger to destabilize the region’s countries, the leaders attending the summit proved that Iran is a threat to global peace and security. Although Iran claims to be more moderate and open because of President Hassan Rouhani’s policies, the country is the farthest thing imaginable from either of these things. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, along with the country’s other senior clerics, control Iranian foreign policy, and the IRGC is constitutionally mandated not only to defend Iran’s borders and maintain internal order but also to protect the nation’s “Islamic identity.” As such, the supposed moderate influence of Rouhani is subsumed by the absolute control wielded by the Iranian regime and its militia.

The delegates at the summit also stressed that terrorism is not only represented by radical Sunni organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS but also by extremist Shiite organizations such as the IRGC, the Quds Force, and pro-Iranian regime organizations such as “Badr Army”, “al-Nujaba” movements and “Asaib al-Haq” in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Lebanese Hezbollah terror group. In this way, the summit refused to dignify Iran’s claims to be fighting Sunni terrorism when it is simply deploying Shiite terrorism, a primary contributor to an unending cycle of sectarian extremism. The delegates focused their efforts on how to address and combat terrorism in all its forms— most especially the extremist Shiite organizations supported by Iran, without whom there would be no ISIS or al-Qaeda. Such open discourse demonstrating the symbiosis between the Iranian regime and terrorism exposed Iran’s true intentions before the world in a truly revelatory manner.

The summit succeeded in conveying a firm and dissuasive message to the Iranian regime that the Muslim world and major powers led by the United States will not allow the expansion of the Iranian regime’s influence and its negative role in destabilizing the region and supporting terrorism there.

2- Building an international partnership against Iran The Riyadh Summit resulted in several political, military, and intellectual understandings that facilitated the building of important international partnerships to confront Iran’s role in the region.

A. Political and military partnership to counter Iran’s expansion The Riyadh Summit succeeded in reshaping alliances in the region by creating an Arab-

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Islamic-American coalition capable of balancing and reducing the Russian-Iranian alliance.

This new alliance will help resolve political crises and conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

The alliance will also develop a clear road map to change the Iraqi political equation by involving the Iraqi people in the political process. The alliance will also work to achieve a real political transition in Syria that cannot include Assad, as his continuing hold on power will only continue the war and strengthen ISIS in the region. The alliance will also seek to end the disastrous war and illegitimate coup in Yemen and resolve the crisis by political means in accordance with the Gulf initiative and UN Security Council Resolution 2216.

B. Intellectual partnership to counter terrorism The Riyadh Summit marked an important turning point in the strategy for the War on Terror and the containment of the Iranian regime’s threats of extremism. It also somewhat changed the perceptions of President Trump and his determination to confront terrorism. In the early days of his presidency, Trump issued an executive order banning the entry into the USA of those from seven predominantly Muslim countries. This controversial executive order was perceived to be “anti-Muslim” by the American people and was suspended by the United States judicial branch. Trump eventually seemed to loosen his obdurate stance, becoming more careful to distinguish between the 1.6 billion moderate Muslims on earth and the organized extremist minority, which constitutes less than 0.016% of the total Islamic population, who are the extremists’ primary victims. Trump’s summit speeches in front of more than 50 leaders from the Muslim world seemed to show he could have a more nuanced awareness of terrorism, thereby changing the region’s perception of Trump being anti-Muslim.22 The summit stressed that making the US counterterrorism strategy successful in the face of terrorism requires cooperation and alliances with moderate Islamic countries, led by Saudi Arabia. The summit highlighted the importance of a comprehensive confrontation of terrorism in all forms, through military, security, and intelligence strategies. The summit also encouraged a more open exchange of information between allies to sever the sources of funding for terrorist groups by countries such as Iran. Additionally, the summit called for a comprehensive de-escalation of conflict by presenting a moderate Islamic discourse based on tolerance, diversity, and coexistence. Saudi Arabia will be a leader in this new strategy due to its regional importance as a symbol of the Islamic world and its religious significance as the home of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

The establishment of the World Center for Combating Extremism and Terrorism in Riyadh was the product of a new partnership between the United States and the Islamic world to confront extremist ideas on the ground and in cyberspace.23 C. Strengthening the regional role of Saudi Arabia The ability of any country to exercise a regional role of power depends on its military, political, and economic capabilities. The regional role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has increased, and the American Islamic Summit supported Saudi Arabia in confronting Iran’s regional role in several ways:

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º Military Power At the summit, Saudi Arabia and the United States signed several letters of interest and intent for future arms sales. These arms deals, set to take place over the course of 10 years, include $350 billion in potential sales of tanks, combat ships, missile defense systems, radar, and communication/cyber-security technology. This deal is viewed as a necessary strategic counterbalance against Iran’s influence in the region. By enhancing the military capabilities of Saudi Arabia, the kingdom can lead the Islamic coalition of more than 40 countries in combating terrorism and limiting Iran’s disruptive regional practices.

The alliance also aims to support a legitimate leader in Yemen and put an end to the coup launched by the Houthi and pro-Saleh forces. The summit also succeeded in establishing a better Arab-American-Islamic understanding of how to confront Iran’s role in the region and formulate a clear strategy to stop its expansion in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Saudi Arabia has the primary responsibility of defending its national security and dealing with crises in the region, which emerged in its leadership of the Arab Alliance to Support Legitimacy in Yemen. Trump praised Saudi Arabia’s strong leadership in this alliance during his address at the summit, stating that “Saudi Arabia and a regional coalition have taken strong action against Houthi militants in Yemen.” Trump stated that he feels that their arms deal will “help the Saudi military to take a greater role in security operations.”

The new Saudi strategy began to attract Iraq to the alliance after the visit of Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir to the country last April. The United States has also changed its strategy in Iraq to curb Iranian influence by strengthening the US military presence there.

The US participation in the battle of Mosul against ISIS seeks to dismantle the terrorist group, liberate the city, and prevent any outside forces from enacting demographic change in accordance with sectarian considerations.24 º Economic Power

Saudi Arabia is a huge economic force and a member of the G20, an international forum where governments and central bank governors from 20 major economies come together to discuss policy issues related to international financial stability. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has started to diversify its economic base to avoid relying solely on oil and gas revenues.

Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 blueprint for the country, which was announced by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2016, seeks to present an “ambitious yet achievable blueprint, which expresses our long-term goals and expectations and reflects our country’s strengths and capabilities.” One of the goals put forth in Vision 2030 is the establishment of more significant industrial, agricultural, and commercial economies in the kingdom.

Since the growth of Saudi Arabia’s economy has already proven to be a successful feature of the Vision 2030 strategy, one of the important results of the Riyadh Summit was the establishment of major economic partnerships between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Through joint investments of more than $400 billion, the powers aim to bring technology and American investments to Saudi Arabia, thus creating jobs and opening new horizons for the Saudi economy.

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º Political Power Saudi Arabia represents the main regional power in the region in light of the collapse and disintegration of most Arab countries, whether through wars and conflicts, such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, or through economic and political crises. Saudi Arabia also enjoys close relations with major powers in the international system, such as the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, and Japan. Saudi Arabia has become a focal point in the region’s political interactions and is capable of leading the Arab world in the coming period in the face of hostile Iranian interventions.

3- Building a Gulf Arab partnership to counter Iran’s role During the Riyadh Summit, Saudi Arabia succeeded in strengthening Gulf Arab partnerships to work to curb the Iranian regime’s destructive role in the region. A partnership of notable importance is the Saudi-Egyptian partnership, which was confirmed at the Riyadh Summit during a meeting between King Salman and President al-Sisi. This meeting helped Egypt recalculate its position regarding Iran’s meddling in the region, which destabilizes not only the Gulf but also Egypt.25 4- Changing US policy toward Iran after the Riyadh Summit The Riyadh Summit was an important factor that seemed to bring about a positive change in US policy toward Iran under President Trump compared with the unfavorable policies during the Obama administration. The administration of former US President Barack Obama adopted a lenient policy toward Iran based on absorption, containment, and the pursuit of diplomatic negotiations. After difficult negotiations during the Obama administration in 2015 to reach an agreement regarding Iran’s nuclear program, all efforts thereafter failed to curb Iran’s regional dominance. The release of frozen assets to the Iranian regime only strengthened its level of involvement and exacerbated the instability in the region. The Obama administration also sought to increase coordination with Iran in Iraq under the pretext of fighting terrorism, but Iran’s role in Iraq has only further complicated the crisis. Obama’s decision to withdraw US military presence from Iraq in 2011 led to a vacuum that Iran exploited for its own regional ambitions to control Iraqi wealth.

In contrast to Obama’s policies, Trump’s approach focuses on strengthening relationships with Arab allies to limit Iran’s advance in the region while curbing the Tehran regime’s nuclear program.26 The Riyadh Summit succeeded in changing the US position toward Iran with the adoption of a firmer, more aggressive policy. The administration of US President Donald Trump has criticized the Obama administration’s policy toward Iran, especially with regard to Iraq. The United States has begun to renew its military presence in Iraq with the aim of correcting what the Trump administration considers to be the mistake of withdrawing from the country too early. The Trump administration feels that Obama’s disbanding of the US military presence in Iraq made the country vulnerable to coming under Iranian control and terrorist occupation in the wake of an invasion that cost trillions of dollars. The war against ISIS in the region presents a favorable opportunity to secure that military return.27

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The Trump administration also rejected the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program as being bad for US interests. As an astute businessman, Trump pledged to cancel the agreement during his election campaign. Once he was elected, however, because of international pressure, the UN Security Council resolution on the agreement, and opposition from other major powers, he subsequently changed his position. Trump is now seeking to formulate an alternative agreement that will enable American companies to enter the Iranian market as the nuclear agreement enabled Russian companies and European investors to enter the Iranian market.

Since the summit, the critical political and diplomatic discourse of Trump’s administration toward Iran has also escalated. The Trump administration has explicitly accused the Tehran regime of supporting terrorism to escalate instability in the region, thereby complicating US efforts to work toward greater peace across the region.

Fifth: US strategy toward Iran after the Riyadh Summit America has several options when it comes to deciding how to address Iran’s regional role after the Riyadh Summit.

America seems to no longer be passively complicit with Iran’s role in the region. The US strategy in the war against ISIS in Iraq and Syria must run parallel to a process that reduces Iran’s influence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.28 In the Syrian crisis, the Trump administration has taken a tougher policy toward the Syrian regime, striking an air base with Tomahawk missiles after Assad was accused of using sarin gas against civilians in Khan Shaykhun.

The United States also bombed an arms convoy belonging to Iran near an Assad air base in Southern Syria. This action sent a deterrent message to the Iranian regime, warning it of consequences the United States is willing to inflict on perpetrators of criminal activities.

America seems to be playing an increasingly active role militarily in Syria to deter Russian and Iranian influence in the country.

In the Iraqi crisis, the United States has increased its military presence to take part in the battle to liberate Mosul from ISIS. The United States’ renewed presence in Iraq also aims to limit Iranian influence.

In the Yemeni crisis, the United States has supported the Arab alliance to end the Houthi coup and stop Iran from further supporting Houthi activities.

The dismantling of the Russian-Iranian alliance, through the concept of a deal, is based on the idea of enabling Russia in Syria in exchange for dismantling the Russo-Iranian alliance in Syria and ending any Iranian military or political presence and any presence of Hezbollah there. If this strategy is successful, Washington will achieve two goals: first, securing its ally Israel from any new threat on the border with Syria, and second, leaving Hezbollah without the Iranian and Syrian regime support, on which it relies.29 A US military option against Iran is unlikely, as there are limits to any success that armed confrontation might achieve for several reasons: First, an outbreak of armed confrontation between the United States and Iran would cause both countries to sustain high costs, both politically and financially. The United States, especially, is not interested in fighting new military wars abroad, particularly after

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the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in high death tolls and massive financial losses to the US economy. War is not easy to manage, and Trump is still in the process of rebuilding and readying the US military.

Second, the American military presence in Iraq and the Gulf region makes US interests and soldiers easy targets for Iranian aggression. Russia especially has a vested interest in defusing tensions between the United States and Iran, considering their position in Syria.

The Trump administration has also taken precaution by refusing to classify the IRGC as a terrorist organization after warnings from US intelligence services of possible retaliation against US forces in light of such move.

Third, the history of American-Iranian relations since the Iranian Revolution and throughout the various American administrations indicates that diplomatic hostility, rather than military hostility, has been the more successful method of maintaining civil relations.

The United States and Iran cooperated in the war in Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban.

They also coordinated in the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The two countries also cooperate on energy issues in the Caspian region. In light of these factors, relations between the two countries will remain at the level of verbal hostility only, with diplomatic and political discourse ongoing to facilitate continuing cooperation.30 Conclusion After the repercussions of the Riyadh Summit on Iran’s role in the region were discussed, a number of results can be reached:

Regarding the Iranian role in the region 1- The escalation of the Iranian role in the region was a result of the weakness and absence of the Arab role and the policies of the major powers in the region, led by the United States, especially under the Obama administration.

2- The Iranian role was a negative factor that led to the escalation of the instability in the region, which took on sectarian dimensions. This contributed to fueling sectarian conflict in the region, resulting in an escalating threat of terrorism and the proliferation of terrorist groups.

3- Iran’s regime has used the ISIS organization and the issue of terrorism in general to strengthen its influence and expand its regional role in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, while actually supporting terrorism and spreading it across the region.

4- The leaders of the Iranian regime rejected the statement of the Riyadh Summit and has adopted a policy of defiance, thereby confirming the continuation of Iran’s negative role and its aggressive policy toward the countries of the region.

Regarding the implications of the Riyadh Summit for the future of the Iranian role in the region 1- The Riyadh Summit was an important turning point in confronting and reducing the Iranian regime’s destructive role in the region.

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2- The summit revealed the true face of the Iranian regime as a supporter of terrorism in the world, conclusively refuting its claims to be fighting terrorism as well.

3- The summit contributed to building an Arab-Muslim-American partnership to counter the Iranian regime’s expansion in the region, as well as showing a real change in US policy in the Trump era, demonstrating increasing combativeness toward Iran’s negative role.

4- The summit delegates agreed to confront the Iranian role by adopting a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism in all its forms, as well as to face all terrorist organizations, especially those supported by Iran.

5- The American-Islamic Arab partnership will contribute to resolving the crises in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, thus reducing Iran’s destructive role across the region.

6- The Riyadh Summit contributed to strengthening the regional role of Saudi Arabia in combating terrorism and confronting the destabilizing role played by the Iranian regime in the region.

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Endnotes

(1) Mohamed El-Said Idris, A Study in the Origins of Regional International Relations (Cairo: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Foundation, 2001), 59.

(2) Mamdouh Brik Jazi, Iranian Influence in the Arab Region in the Light of the Changes in American Policy Towards the Region: 2003 - 2011 (Amman: The Academics for Publishing and Distribution, 2017), 67.

(3) Ahmed Sayed Ahmed (Ph.D.), “Beyond Iran’s Nuclear Agreement,” Al-Ahram Newspaper, July 15, 2015, http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/414564.aspx.

(4) Rania Makram, “Expansionism, the Future of the Regional Role of Tehran,” Al-Ahram Newspaper, April 14, 2015, http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/101511/80/377919.

(5) Ashraf Mohammed Kishk (Ph.D.), “Gulf States and Iran, Issues of Conflict and Strategies of Confrontation,” Journal of Iranian Studies (Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies) 1, December (2016), 10.

(6) Nasr Mohammad Ali (Ph.D.), “Iranian Strategy in the Middle East,” Future Center for Strategic Studies, December 8, 2015, http://mcsr.net/news101.

(7) Mu’tasim Siddiq Abdullah (Ph.D.), “Military Institutions between Trust and Marginalization, Comparison between the Status of the Revolutionary Guards and the Army in the Structure of the Iranian Regime,” Journal of Iranian Studies (Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies) Issue 1, December (2016), 138.

(8) Tasnim News Agency, October 27, 2016.

(9) Abdullah, Mutasim Siddiq. “Military Institutions between Trust and Marginalization, Comparison of the Status of the Revolutionary Guard and the Army in the Structure of the Iranian Regime, Journal of Iranian Studies (Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies) Issue 1, Dec. 2016, p.140.

(10) Adnan Hashim, “Al Quds Corps... Terrorist Militia outside Iran,” Al Bayan Magazine, October 24, http://www.albayan.co.uk/Article2.aspx?id=5376.

(11) Ahmed Sayed Ahmed (Ph.D.), “Iran’s Negative Role in Arab Issues,” Al-Ahram Newspaper, April 20, 2016, http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/503134.aspx.

(12) “Iranian Official: Sana’a is the Fourth Arab Capital Belonging to Us, Arabic 21, September 22, 2014, http://www.arabi21.com/story.

(13) Ahmed Sayed Ahmed (Ph.D.), “Sectarian Quotas and Terrorism Ravage in Iraq,” Al-Ahram Newspaper, May 4, 2016, http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/508770.aspx.

(14) Adnan Hashim, “Iranian Networks for Arms Smuggling to Yemen,” Al Bayan Magazine, September 26, 2016, http://www.albayan.co.uk/Article2.aspx?id=5323.

(15) Hussein Talal, “IRGC and Recruitment of Refugees for Outside the Border, Al-Bayan Journal, March 23, 2017, http://www.albayan.co.uk/Article2.aspx?id=5671.

(16) Ashraf Mohammed Kishk, “Gulf-Iranian Relations: Reality and Future Prospects” (Manama: Bahrain Center for Strategic and International Studies and Energy, 2014), p. 16.

(17) BBC Radio, June 20, 2016.

(18) Official Bahrain News Agency, July 22, 2016.

(19) UAE News Agency (WAM), April 2016.

(20) Hala Mustafa (Ph.D.), “Arabic NATO,” Al-Ahram Newspaper, June 3, 2017,https://goo.gl/QJ5QQF (21) “President Trump’s Speech before the Islamic Summit,” Al-Ahram Newspaper, May 22, 2017.

(22) Simon Henderson, “Arabian-Rendezvous: What Trump Can Achieve in Riyadh,” Washington Institute, May 17, 2017, https://goo.gl/em9NFP

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(23) Ahmed Sayed Ahmed (Ph.D.), “The Islamic American Summit, ‘Reasons and Implications,’” Al-Ahram Newspaper, May 17, 2017, http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/594568.aspx#.WRvThZMA7_M.facebook.

(24) Safinaz Mohammed Ahmed, “Saudi-Iraqi Relations... the Signs of Convergence in the Light of the Iranian Variable, The International Policy Magazine, April 5, 2017, http://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/16270.aspx.

(25) Mo’taz Salameh (Ph.D.), “Cairo and Riyadh: Introduction to the Establishment of ‘Political Doctrine’ and Strategic Planning of Relations,” The International Policy magazine, October 26, 2017, http://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/16286.aspx.

(26) Salim Mohammed Al-Zanoun (Ph.D.), “Trump’s Visit to the Region, Reactivating the Strategy of Pillars,” Center for Links and Strategic Studies, May 12, 2017, http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/46265.

(27) Muammar Faysal Khouli, “Why is the US Military Presence in Iraq Growing?,” Center for Research and Strategic Studies, April 13, 2017, http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/44445.

(28) Mohammed Al-Said Idris (Ph.D.), “American Strategy of Multi-Dimensional Confrontation with Iran,” Afaq Iranian Magazine, February 2017, 7.

(29) Ibid., 8.

(30) Ahmed Sayed Ahmed (Ph.D.), “America and Iran between the Escalation Speech and the Language of Interest, Al-Ahram Newspaper, February 22, 2017, http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/580243.aspx.

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Diffusion in the Opposition Environment A Field Study on the Reality of Shiites in Egypt Ahmed Zaghloul Shlata Specialist researcher in Islamic movements affairs

I

n most countries, which have not yet addressed questions of identity and belonging, especially in those nations like Egypt with a multiplicity of ethnicities, sects, and religions, a number of major issues arise from this diversity; these take the form of political demands, class-related points, and religious and cultural rights.

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A Field Study on the Reality of Shiites in Egypt

These factors often open the door to externally imposed interventions and pressures that may induce fragility and instability in a state and society, which, by its very nature, is already riven by political and social complexity. If the situation worsens, the form and cohesion of the state will be tested if the issues of sub-identities within the group identity are transformed into separatist demands. In fact, since the dawn of history, Egypt has remained a united and centralized state, and historically it has been a crucible and melting pot for a vast diversity of peoples, races, religions, and cultures with multiple differences between them.

The Shiite presence in Egypt periodically raises a number of questions about the nature and limits of the presence and dissemination of Shiism in the country. This is particularly due to increasing talk about the risks of heightened regional sectarianism and the possible repercussions on the religious situation in Egypt, as well as the political challenges posed by the drive to recruit people into Shiism and the potential of this for worsening the crises, which have roiled the region over the past decade.

In this context, this study seeks to analyze the Shiite situation in Egypt by focusing on the religious and political practices of the supporters of this trend and their social and political activity in order to answer the main question: does the current situation of the Shiites in Egypt allow for further dissemination? The study reaches two conclusions; firstly, that Egypt is not a suitable environment for the spread of Shiism, proving strongly resistant to it and, secondly, that the crisis of the Shiite movement is closely linked to its absence of vision and leadership and the dominance of a cult of personality.

First: the Shiite issue in Egypt The Egyptian Shiite experience is worthy of reflection, insofar as it is very different from its counterparts in the Levant or Iran; Egyptian Shia have been unable to form a defined group with set shared characteristics discrete from other groups,1 and Shiism has not been widely disseminated throughout Egyptian society. This cautiousness is largely due to the Shiite doctrine of “taqiyya”,2 which literally means “prudence,” an Islamic term which refers to precautionary dissimulation or denial of religious belief and practice in the face of possible persecution.

Shia Muslims have also been virtually absent from representation on the political scene and on social issues, although adherents are keen to suggest that they are part of the interactions in the country’s political life (through attempts that largely seem to be “propaganda”) to pressurise successive regimes to achieve political and social gains for Shia.

In reality, however, there is limited scope for advancement for the country’s Shia community, given their small numbers and nugatory influence. No geographic area in Egypt embraces the proponents of this doctrine no extended family networks, and no legacy of Shiite doctrine and its teachings from one generation to the next.

The situation for Shiites in Egypt is different to those in other nations in the region, with Egypt’s Shia representing an intertwined mix of sects, schools, and doctrines motivated by a variety of emotional, religious, political and historical reasons. In this context, it is possible to define the limits and nature of this situation by referring to the following elements:

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1- Egyptian religiosity and deep-seated passion for Ahl al-Bayt (which is a phrase meaning, literally, “People of the House” or “Family of the House”. Within the Islamic tradition, the term refers to the family of the Islamic prophet Mohammad): the Shiites have adopted this as “emotional Shi’ism” in an attempt to exploit the leading position and status of the Prophet’s family in the hearts of the Egyptians. This is reflected in the Shiite ceremonies and celebrations that have been organized for the for Ahl al-Bayt through the ages. We can conjecture that this emotional attachment is the result of the cross-pollination between Sufi ideas and practices, which are massively influential in Egyptian culture, and Shiite practices and beliefs, although the two schools are very much separate from one another.

2- Egypt and its historical relation to the doctrine and rituals of Shiism: according to Sunni narratives, Egypt’s historical relationship to the doctrine of Shiism first began during the rule of the Fatimid state (which succeeded the rule of the Ekhshidian state by the leader Jowhar al-Sukkali), particularly after the beginning of the reign of the Fatimid caliph alMu’izz Ladinullah in 969 AD, which lasted until 1171 AD. Shiism in accordance with the perceptions of this state did not spread, however, with the Salahuddin al-Ayyubi eliminating it during his tenure as Sultan of Egypt.

During the era of the Fatimid state, according to historians, “Shiite slogans and rituals began to emerge on the Egyptian scene, including [references to] the superiority of Ali and prayers being directed to him and to Hussein and Fatima...”. While some suggest that “the masses have voluntarily submitted to the call of the Ahl al-Bayt,”3the historical reality indicates the opposite. In view of the policies of the state, we find that it was driven to convert the whole community into Shiism.

According to the historical records, the rulers of the time “supported all that agree with the Shiites’ doctrine of the Alawites, presenting them and following and therefore working based on the sayings of their imams”.4 The same records state that the Al-Azhar Mosque was also originally created to spread and teach Shiism until it became the official doctrine, although it has not been proven historically that the general public embraced this doctrine. This continued until Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi came to the rule after the death of the last Fatimid Caliph and established a mosque in Cairo, the ‘Mosque of Hakim’ or ‘Ruling Mosque’,5 subsequently nicknamed ‘Al-Anwar’, as a center of Shiite thought. This mosque retained its preeminent status in the city for a century until a decision was taken to restore the main Friday sermon to Al-Azhar during the reign of King Al-Azhar Bibars.6 Since then, Shiism has had no real influence in Egypt up to the present day, where it is still confined to a small minority with a very limited number of supporters.

3- Egypt and the Shiite revolutionary model: some analysts suggest that admiration for the 1979 ‘Iranian Revolution’ in Iran more than the traditional Shiite religious doctrine itself gave a boost to the profile of Shiism in Egypt and regionally, with Islamists of all sects and schools being inspired by this Islamic model of socio-political change. The revolution brought great momentum, both to the general Islamic groups and to the educated elites who began to express interest in this unique political experience. This admiration was limited

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to the socio-political model of the revolution, however, rather than demonstrating any enthusiasm for the Iranian regime’s Jurist Leadership [Wilayat-e-Faqih] doctrine.7 Second: the development of Shiite activities in Egypt: In the context of observing Egypt’s relationship with Shiism in ideological, intellectual, and historical terms in recent decades, we find that the debate on Shiism in Egypt has been confined to the practical aspects and a narrative focusing on issues of Sunni-Shiite conflict.

This dialogue has not been the cause of religious debate as it was in previous ages to varying degrees. The controversy arose at the end of the nineteenth century when the interaction between other groups and Shia adherents and clerics began through the analysis of scientific visits or discussions, such as:8 1- A visit to Egypt by Abdul Hussain Sharaf al-Din from Lebanon, and the resulting dialogue between him and Sheikh Al-Azhar and Sheikh Salim al-Bishri early this century, who later published a book called “Revisions,” with many Sunnis taking issue with the claims made in the book. Proponents of this view, see the lack of corresponding evidence for the claims made, were primarily those concerning Sheikh Salim al-Bishri, especially since the book concluded by stating that Sheikh Salim al-Bishri converted to Shiism after being persuaded by the arguments of his interlocutors. Among these books were: “The Great Pharaoh Reviews” by Ali Al-Salous, the book “Evidence in the Response to Abattil Reviews [Clues/Evidence to Rebut Fabrications/Falsehoods of Shiite Reviews]” by Mahmoud alZu’bi, and the book “The compelling arguments of the criticism of the book collection of Shiite reviews” of Abu Maryam bin Mohammed Al-Adhami.9 2- The visit to Egypt by al-Sheikh Alkashif Alqata in the mid-sixties accompanied by a delegation of Iraqi Shiite scholars at the invitation of Egyptian officials, and his discussions with Sheikh Al-Azhar and Sheikh Al-Maraghi on the interpretation of Sūrat al-Ḥujurāt.

3- The journey of Nawaf Safavi, leader of the “Fedayeen Islam”, to discuss opposition to the Iranian Shah’s regime in the mid-1950s.

4- The visit in the 1970s by Sheikh Mohammed Javad Mughniyeh, Lebanon’s Chief Justice of Ja’afari, and Morteza Al-Radawi.

5- The writings of Sheikh Mohammad Jawad Mughniyeh and his response to Muhibin al-Din al-Khatib in his book “The Outlines”, which was published in Egypt.

6- The calls for rapprochement between the schools of thought in Egypt, adopted by many Al-Azhar scholars since 1946, including Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltout, Sheikh Abdul Majeed Salim, Sheikh Sharabasi, Sheikh Al-Faham, and Sheikh Mohammed Al-Madani, all of which have been supported by the Muslim Brotherhood.

7- Some of Al -Azhar’s Sheikhs sought to publish their books in Egypt, including Morteza Al-Radawi who was eager to publish his book complete with an introduction from one of the Islamic and cultural symbols in the country. In 1965, Al-Radawi asked the

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director of the Book House to create a special collection of Shiite works, in the hope that these would ultimately be presented to the technical body in Najaf, Iraq. This relationship began to undergo a shift in subsequent years, however, particularly after Iran’s 1979 Iranian Revolution, moving away from simple discussions and debates towards a more evangelical role in actively attempting to convert Sunnis to Shiism. We can see this by the following examples:10 A. A number of Shiite publishing houses were established in Egypt in the years after Iran’s Iranian Revolution, the most famous of which is Dar al-Baita, the first Shia publishing house in Egypt, which was set up in late 1986. This was followed by Al-Hadaf and others.

B. A total of 22 Shiite channels, including programming targeted at children,11 were launched via the Egyptian satellite, “Nile Sat”. This was accompanied by campaigns on various social media.

C. A total of 27 Shiite NGOs have been established in Egypt since the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, some with official Egyptian regime authorization for their activities, for example, Al-Thaqlin, Zahra and Ahbab Al-Atara Mohammadiyah.12 D. The appearance of a number of Shiite missionaries to Egypt who are intended to symbolize domestic representation of the sect, as well as Arab Shiite scholars and adherents from other countries, primarily Iraq and Bahrain.

Since 2011, Iranian authorities have tried to take advantage of the relative state of openness in Egypt by attracting many intellectuals to bring the two countries closer together in order to form a cultural and political reserve so as to serve as ‘soft power’ ambassadors to improve Iran’s image. Officially and popularly, this has led to the formation of an Iranian media lobby in Egypt rather than a political one, at least in the current circumstances.13 This has become apparent in two ways: The first is an apparently concerted PR campaign to encourage positive attitudes towards Iran amongst Egyptian journalists. This appears to be the main objective behind regular media junkets funded by Iran’s regime in the years since 2011, with Egyptian journalists being flown to Iran every couple of weeks to enjoy a special all expenses paid regime-hosted trip planned to reflect a positive image of the country and regime. At least 500 Egyptian journalists and media figures have enjoyed such junkets since 2011, with the beneficiaries being chosen according to various criteria, the most important of which is an enthusiasm for closer Egyptian-Iranian relations.14 The second is the Arab Islamic Gathering to support Iran’s supposed stance of resistance to Zionism. Iran’s regime is trying to align itself with various groups and bodies under the banner of resistance and confrontation. The founding members of the ‘Arab Islamic Gathering’ (AIG) were members of a delegation that traveled to Iran under the guise of “popular diplomacy” in 2011, with the group holding its founding conference in Cairo on 24th and 25th July the same year. The group stresses its commitment to supporting the resistance and defending its choice and weapons as an active response to the three evils of occupation, tyranny, and under development.15

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Third: the reality of the Shiite movement in Egypt Despite the efforts of various individuals and organizations, the Shiite movement in the last three decades has failed to establish itself as a bloc or wield any significant influence in Egypt, although Shiism retains a presence in the country.

The realities facing Shiites in Egypt can be summarized in the following points: 1- The method of organization and work: the idea of any systematized “organization” of Shiite activists in Egypt is difficult to achieve theoretically or practically, although there is certainly a desire to expand in some of the available community spaces by members of the Shiite community. Shiite activism has tended to be individualized and associated with certain figures, each of whom has supportive constituencies. A lack of agreement has persisted between leaders of Egypt’s Shiite community over the last three decades on the importance and form of any organization to bring together and organize the Shiites of Egypt. This dispute was linked to two things: The first: personal differences about the establishment or absence of such an organization due to concerns over possible negative results based on the awareness of the experiences of other Islamic groups.

Second: a general lack of agreement on the ideal image chosen to represent the Shiite presence in Egypt with arguments over various issues, such as whether it would be better to form a discrete group or work within existing groups as part of the wider social fabric. Some argue that the goal should not be the establishment of an organization in itself, as much as the establishment of an organized form of work within the community that allows Egypt’s Shiites to consult one another and organize their activities if necessary.16 Others assert that a “disorganized” approach is,17 counterintuitively, the best form of organization, with this view being the more popular one within the Shiite community.

In practice, this approach has had largely negative results, with no progress in terms of political or social rights for Shia, with such “clannish logic” ultimately producing several different leaders of the country’s Shiite community, often with conflicting interests and goals. Over the past three decades, only two attempts to form a Shiite proselytizing organization have been formally recorded; the first of these was officially announced in 1989 and the second in 1996. These doomed attempts resulted in almost immediate imprisonment for the two groups’ founders on charges of ‘forming a secret organization to harm the interests of state security’ and of receiving funds from foreign bodies; although both were freed after serving several months in prison, there is widespread opposition to any effort to form another such group, which is regarded as difficult and expensive.

2- Areas of movement: while Egypt’s Shia Muslims have not been able to build any

significant bloc to proselytise for Shiism, they have sought to expand their influence within the country’s intellectual, cultural and social spaces, in order to ensure a minimum of visibility and acceptance at the social level, as the following examples show:

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A. The establishment of civil associations: the oldest of which is the Ahl al-Bayt Association which emerged in 1973 and was suspended, supposedly for security reasons, in 1981. This approach continued through the establishment of associations under the guise of social causes. Among the most prominent Egyptian entities that presented themselves as representative of Shiites, many are groups headed by Mohammed al-Derini*.

B. The establishment of publishing houses: this appears to be an attempt by pioneering Shiite figure Saleh al-Wardani to establish a Shiite-oriented publishing house. Al-Wardani is best-known for two such initiatives; firstly, the House of Al-Bedayeh, the first Shiite publishing house in Egypt, founded in late 1986, which sparked clashes with security authorities and Salafists and, secondly, an experimental new publishing house which he called ‘Al-Hadaf’.18 C. Research centers: the Center for the Sciences of Ahl al-Bayt for Humanitarian Studies19 was established in October 2006 as a center for historical studies aimed at introducing Shia doctrine, as well as providing social services to the poor and needy. This was established at the same time as the “Al-Noor Center for Development and Quranic Studies”, which promotes various pro-Iranian studies and research papers.20

3- The geography of Shiite expansion: consistent with the view of Shiism as an intellectual

phenomenon21 and the absence of the sect’s characteristics among Egyptian Shiites is the difficulty of identifying the geographical areas in which they are expanding in Egypt. In monitoring the events and activities that have been announced and given press coverage, we find that these are primarily concentrated in the Nile Delta region, especially the governorates of Sharqia, Gharbia, and Dakahlia. This is largely due to the fact that: A. Some of Egypt’s most prominent Shiite figures are from these regions, so their missionary activities are primarily focused in the surrounding areas.

B. The widespread overcrowding and poverty in these areas can be exploited to attract potential converts and to polarize opinion there.

C. The presence of several mystical Sufi shrines in these areas can also be exploited as a doorway to Shiism.

There is also a relatively strong Shiite presence in some neighbourhoods of Greater Cairo, in the Hussein area due to the historical religious symbolism there, and in 6th October City due to the presence of large numbers of Iraqi refugees dating back to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, with others also present in the villages of Abu Al-Nimras centre in Giza governorate. There is also a Shiite presence in the southern provinces of Egypt, particularly in the Aswan region. There are also reports of members of the large ‘Jaafara’ tribe converting to Shiism and of the establishment of a ‘Higher Council for the Dissemination of Shiite Ideology in Egypt, Sudan, and the Maghreb countries,’ supposedly to counter extremist Sunni ideology by creating an entity parallel to existing Salafi groups.22 This does not mean that Shiites are absent in other areas, especially given the overlap and intertwining between

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Sufism and Shiism in Egypt, which means that it can be difficult to distinguish between these groups in some areas.

4- Shiite party: the strong security restrictions on Shiites in Egypt have remained in place

since the era of Hosni Mubarak, with detention being mandated under the emergency law regulations for all those who announced their conversion to Shiism.23 An attempt in 2005 by Mohammed Al-Derini to form a political party, called the ‘Shiite Party’,24 with the objective of pressuring the regime into introducing political and social rights for Egyptian Shiites, resulted in Al-Derini being imprisoned for a year. After Mubarak had been ousted on February 11th, 2011, Egypt’s Shiite leaders tried to benefit from the state of political openness, especially after the rise of political Islamism came to the fore under the Muslim Brotherhood up to the 2013 coup, which gave greater influence to parties with a religious inclination. The new parties can be summarized as follows: A. Al-Ghadeer Party: this party was launched in February 2012 by Mohammed al-Derini, who asserted that the party aimed to achieve the objectives of the revolution and eliminate corruption.25 As with Al-Derini’s previous experience, the party was disbanded in 2013 after al-Sisi came to power and Al-Derini was once again imprisoned.

B. Unity and Freedom Party: launched in August 2011, the party’s program revolved around three slogans - freedom, justice, and unity, with its policies coming close to the ideology of democratic socialism.26 The party advocated state citizenship, and the separation of religious and political affairs, asserting that the political arena should be concerned solely with pursuing the interests of society. The party was disbanded following differences between its founders.

C. The ‘Liberation’ party: following the break-up of the ‘Unity and Freedom’ party, one of the co-founders, Ahmed Rasim al-Nafis, attempted to form a new bloc, the ‘Liberation’ party. Although he presented the correct official documents to establish the party, he was refused due to not meeting the necessary legal requirements. Al-Nafis insisted that this restriction was imposed due to pressure from Egypt’s security agencies on the Committee on Party Affairs. He subsequently took legal action to complain about this, taking the case to the Supreme Administrative Court. The case has not yet been resolved and, given the al-Sisi administration’s quashing of opposition parties generally, is unlikely to be.27 The movement to establish Shiite parties can be summarized as follows: Personality cults or individual party leaders’ characteristics are the strongest factors in º the establishment of these parties, which are more reflective of these individuals’ personal ambitions than of any overarching political or sectarian project.

º All these attempts have been damaged by the absence of any boundaries between the “party” and “doctrine”, as well as by the absence of boundaries between political activism and Shiite activism.

º These attempts were affected by the absence of any unifying Shiite political figure in Egypt, a result of the diversity of groups and disputes amongst the leaders and the different and various figures presenting themselves as representatives of the party.

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º The parties’ anti-Islamist, or anti-Sunni Islamist, political discourse is vague and does not

indicate any clear frame of reference that can be built upon, as it is largely personal and based on subjective negative experience.

º The security awareness of the parties’ leaders is high, as they directly or indirectly place

the blame for every failure by themselves or their parties on the continuous security pressure they are under.

º These parties fail to engage in different political positions at the domestic level, with their leaders primarily interested in external issues.

º Despite claims by some Shiite figures that there are a million Shiites in Egypt, none of the party projects could obtain sponsorship and support from authorities that would allow the establishment of a political party, which casts serious doubt on the veracity of such assertions.

5- Factors weakening the Shiite movement in Egypt The Shiites in Egypt did not achieve any significant socio-political gains; this can be attributed to a number of factors, notably: A. That the Shiites in Egypt do not represent a specific range of features and attributes, with the absence of these factors frustrating their mobility and diminishing the effectiveness of their efforts.

B. That the composition of Egyptian society is largely cohesive ethnically and culturally, despite the diversity of its components; this has played a central role in the lack of progress

by Shiites, unlike the situation of other minorities and the composition of communities in the Levant, for example.

C. Issues concerning minorities in Egypt, in general, are subject to administrative oversight by the country’s security services, which view Shiite parties as having some relation to external threats and deal with them extremely harshly; this is a significant factor in quelling any growth in Shiite activities.

D. The deep-rooted, strong and influential Salafi presence in the Egyptian public religious sphere for decades has succeeded in creating a sense of hostility to the Shiite movement in general, as Salafis consider Shiites to be not Muslim at all rather than simply followers of an alternative Islamic doctrine.

Fourth: Egypt’s Shiites and the network of internal and external relations The Shiite movement in Egypt exists in an environment in which religion plays an important role at the grassroots level generally, with organizations and other bodies largely close to their regional counterparts. In this context, the Shiite movement is organized and its interactions with this environment can be seen domestically and externally in the following ways:

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1- Domestic Relations Network The Shiite movement in Egypt interacts with an informal public domain dominated by three main groups: the Salafis, the Sufis, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The relationship of this movement differs with each of these parties. Regarding Shiites’ relationship with Sufism, there are overlapping areas that cannot be separated between Sufi and Shia who share a positive attitude towards Ahl al-Bayt. This positive attitude intersects with the veneration of most Egyptians for the people of Ahl al-Bayt.

Demonstrations of this shared veneration are seen in the public celebrations for the central figures in Ahl al-Bayt, whose graves have been turned into established holy sites visited by the public. As well as sharing a deep faith in the sanctity of the Ahl al-Bayt, Sufis’ rituals and beliefs are very similar to those of Shiites. The common space between these parties is a soft area that is easy for Shia proselytizers to exploit. If, as some suggest, there is an “emotional Shiism” among some Egyptians, it should also be noted that there is a common space with the Sufi methods exploited by Shiite figures in their missionary zeal as they seek to exploit the common emotional bond formed by this shared veneration of Ahl al-Bayt and to veil their own proselytism behind it.28 In the view of Shiite leaders, the relationship between the Shiites and Sufis in Egypt originates from Shiite antecedents, with the history of Shiism in Egypt preceding the history of Sufism by many centuries,29 This link and the common features between the two doctrinal schools have led some Shiite leaders to conflate Shiism with Sufism, asserting that there are one million Shia Muslims in Egypt, many of whom are disguised as followers of 76 Sufi creeds,30 other prominent Shiites, however, insist that the only common feature between them and the Sufis is the love of Ahl al-Bayt. As for Shiism, they assert, it is a superior form of Sufism in which followers have a more profound insight and knowledge of Ahl al-Bayt with some Sufis becoming Shia without declaring it.31 As for the Shiites’ view towards Ashraf [referring to those individuals who are considered to be nobility among Muslims due to their supposedly being direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed], some Shia Muslims have suggested that al-Ashraf were, in fact, originally Shia members of Ahl al-Bayt who travelled to Egypt before merging into Sunni Egyptian society due to political and social pressures, with only a few continuing to follow their Shiite faith.32 Even those holding this view do not believe that all Shiites are Ashraf and mystics, or that all Ashraf are Sufi or Shiites,33 although all share a negative attitude towards followers of Salafism. One of the most prominent Sufi methods close to the Shiites is the “eccentric way”, which some see as “the branch of Shi’ism in Egypt34 as well as the Mohammadiyah clan.35 In regard to the relationship between Egypt’s Shiite movements and other Islamic groups, the relationship between the Shiites and the Muslim Brotherhood is the most dynamic and positive, unlike the relationship between the Shiites and other Islamic groups; this is despite the fundamental doctrinal and ideological differences between the two groups and affiliated schools, such as the Salafis.

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The Muslim Brotherhood’s support for the idea of rapprochement between the Islamic sects was evident through MB founder Hassan Banna’s writings and in his interactions with leading Shiite contemporaries, such as Mohammad Taqi al-Qami of the General Center of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Shiite cleric Kashani during the Hajj in 1948. The group also represented an inspiring “motivational” model for the Shiites, who sought membership of the MB in Iraq prior to the founding of Mohammad al-Sadr’s Dawa Party, which derived its ideology, methodology, and vision from the group. It also inspired Nawaf Safavi and a number of other Shiite Iranian students who studied in Egypt and went on to form the “Fedayeen Islam” group which opposed the regime of the then Iranian Shah, who expressed their admiration and support of the Muslim Brotherhood.36 Following the Iranian revolution in Iran and the formation of the Iranian Republic there in 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood welcomed and supported it as an Islamic model of change. In his testimony following the revolution, Abdel Moneim Abul-Fotouh said: “The Islamic Group supported the Iranian revolution and saw it as a model to emulate. Because it was a Shiite revolution, however, this was seen as a reason to limit our openness to it and not to think of approaching it, because Wahhabist Salafism was strongly represented in our intellectual formation at the time, so it formed a barrier between us and the Iranian revolution, but nevertheless we welcomed it with great enthusiasm and considered it a victory for the political project and we declared our rejection towards the official position which was against it.”

At the level of the Brotherhood’s senior leaders, their position was cautiously supportive of Iran’s revolution, which they considered being Islamic in nature. They felt that it was necessary to be careful in communicating directly with its leaders in Iran, particularly due to the nature of the political tension between the two countries. Yousef Nada, a Swiss resident, was the source of the Brotherhood’s main information about the revolution, its vision, and its performance. A delegation of Brotherhood leaders based outside Egypt visited Iran on the basis of a proposal accepted by the leader, Omar al-Tlemceni.37 This support led to some division amongst student supporters of some Islamic groups [Jamaah Islamiah] at Egyptian universities. While a large section of the Islamic groups had begun to lean towards adopting the same positive view of it as the Brotherhood, another Islamic Sunni group rejected this approach and direction. This group, which was more Salafist in nature, later stated that it saw the events of the revolution as presenting a direct challenge to the Sunnis, which was extremely dangerous to Sunni doctrine.

The group insisted that Shiite principles cannot be reconciled with the beliefs of Sunnis and the community and that Khomeini could not be considered an imam amongst Muslim imams. This Salafist group was the only voice rejecting the revolution amidst an atmosphere of a general fascination with the revolution, which was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Azhar, ‘Jemaah Islamiah’, and Jihad, which viewed it as a positive first step towards real political and social change.

After the revolution of January 2011, the position of the Brotherhood was confirmed by the convergence of the regime of Mohamed Morsi with Iran. Morsi wanted to dismantle the

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psychological, political and security barrier set up by the former regime between Egypt and Iran, by adopting the principle that Egypt’s foreign policy must be based on the principle of balance to achieve national interest. He proposed the establishment of a regional quartet consisting of Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.38 The Syrian revolution, in which Morsi and Turkey’s governments strongly opposed Iran’s ally Bashar al-Assad, ultimately thwarted this initiative. However, for its part, Tehran sought to restore a positive relationship with Cairo in the context of its eagerness to end international sanctions on Iran and benefit from the change of the new political system and its strained relations with the Gulf countries, in addition to seeking to promote its Middle East Islamic project. Iran initially viewed the revolutions in the Arab region as being inspired by and reflective of the 1979 Iranian revolution, with the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei referring to them as “aftershocks of the revolution in Iran” in a speech on February 4th, 2011.39 Iran has continued to promote the idea of positive relations between the two countries, despite Morsi being deposed in a coup by Abdelfattah al-Sisi a few months after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s historic three-day trip to Egypt as he visited Cairo in February 2013 as part of his participation in a summit of Islamic countries.

The ‘Salafi Call’ group also formed a committee to confront the spread of Shiism in Egypt, along with a coalition of the descendants of the Sahaba and Ahl al-Bayt. The Salafi Call group also drew up a number of preconditions for restoring diplomatic relations with Iran, including an insistence that: “Iran stops its attempts at domination and intellectual invasion, and the Gulf states, taking into account the rights of Sunnis, prevent their persecution in Iran, and prevent [Iran’s] interference in the affairs of Iraq and the Gulf states”.

2- Foreign relations and the problem of allegiance between the homeland and the doctrine: Before the Iranian revolution in 1979, there were no significant problems related to allegiance amongst Egyptian Shiites, as Shiism in Egypt remained only a matter of intellectual rather than political concern. Those Shiite groups were preoccupied solely with doctrinal matters, viewing themselves as having returned to the true Islam, without considering the nature or form of the Egyptian state which they believe, as a political entity, is subject to periodic flux and change rather than being permanent and unchangeable.40 Sectarian tensions only arose following the political changes in Iran after the revolution there when the new regime embraced the principle of exporting the revolution and extending its network of relations with Shiites regionally and globally. Suddenly Shiite minorities in some countries fell in the emotional passion of belonging and began questioning their allegiance, feeling torn between the mandate of the Jurist [Faqih] and their actual citizenship and homelands.

Given the minor and weak Shiite presence in Egypt and its limited distribution, however, along with the strong central authority and government, the ancient state of Egypt and its strong national fabric, Egypt’s Shia did not find any space for movement to allow their expansion as a group, organisation, sect or groups outside the general national context.

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There is no doubt that the rise of sectarian conflict to the forefront in the region during the current phase has created a kind of sectarian alignment in certain countries based on the primary religious and sectarian affiliations This sectarian alignment between sects and political and religious implications regionally and globally affecting the cohesion of the communities and countries of the region .41 In the context of this competition between Iran and the Gulf States, the conflict has taken the form of doctrinal questions over the nature of national loyalty, damaging the cohesion of states; this has been most evident in the relations between domestic Shiites and Iranian institutions, as some continue to support Iran over their own nations, albeit largely on a symbolic emotional level.42 In this context, it is worth mentioning the nature of the domestic Shiites’ relationship with Iran’s regime, as follows: 1- Intellectual relationship: the following: º Religious reference: this is one of the primary pillars of mainstream Shiite thought,43 parallel to the role of the Mufti of the Sunnis, but more profound, as the Shiite reference, the Supreme Leader of Iran, is the only interpreter for all adherents, rather like the Pope in Catholicism.

Egyptian Shiites have no domestic authority to equal him or to oversee their own affairs. They imitate a reference from the recognized references through his books, personal communications via the Internet or by reference to their leadership figures44 for whom he is also the reference.

Among the most prominent Shiite figures in Egypt are al- Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, and Sadiq al-Husseini al-Shirazi. º Educational reference represents the adoption by Egypt’s Shiites of the religious educational works by the leading Shiite clerics in Iran and Syria;45 despite the existence of works by domestic clerics,46 these are viewed as very much inferior to the works from Iran.

2- Socio-economic relationship: the support provided by Iranian individuals’ organizations and entities for Egyptian Shiites is seen in Shiite associations that are launched from time to time, most of which are only known about following the emergence of reports of conflicts between their leaders over the support.47 3- Political relationship: this is demonstrated through the political support for Iranian policies in the region, whether through statements or comments on regional events, most notably the criticism of Saudi Arabia’s military operations in Yemen known as “Decisive Storm,”48 also through the individual advocacy of Iranian policies.

Fifth: day-to-day Shiite problems The situation of the Shiites in Egypt cannot be analyzed without looking at three issues: social acceptance, legal status, and the security situation. These issues can be summarized as follows: 1- Social acceptance: this refers to the societal acceptance of the opponents of the Sunni sect, which could in this context be divided into two stages: the first phase which preceded what is known as the Arab Spring, and the second stage that followed it. This division is linked to political developments in the region and the rise of sectarian conflict, as well as the openness

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of information and the great subsequent changes in thought, political and social changes; here we refer to two facts that illustrate these changes: The first experience of some individuals in the seventies and eighties who converted to Shiism noted that these experiences caused no social crises for several reasons,49 most notably that Shiism was an intellectual development as it did not draw the attention of many, especially in light of the limited information available at that time and the absence of satellite channels.

Another reason was the veneration shared by almost all Egyptians for the Ahl al-Bayt and the way in which Shiite converts benefited from sharing these common rituals and beliefs, which contributed to the existence of a safe environment for Shiites to practice their faith without problems or controversy.

The second experiment coincided with the resurgence of Islamic political movements during the last decade, especially in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, as society’s reactions began to change in line with rising support for Salafists’ warnings about Shiism and the danger posed

by Shiites. Prior to this, the worst thing likely to befall a Sunni Egyptian converting to Shiism was possible rejection by his devout family, meaning he might have to move home to avoid threats.50 51 In the wake of resurgent Salafism, however, the dangers for Egyptian Shia grew much more lethal.52 One tragic figure, Sheikh Hassan Shehata from the village of Zawiyeh Abu Muslim in Giza governorate, represented this changing perception; although he had experienced no problems previously after converting to Shiism in 1996,53 he and four friends were dragged out of his home by other villagers who stormed the house in a vicious sectarian attack before beating him to death in the street. This horrendous murder was the first incident of its kind in modern Egyptian history.54 2- Legal status: according to Article 64 of the Egyptian Constitution, “freedom of belief is absolute, while freedom to practice religious rites and to establish places of worship for the people of heavenly religions is a right regulated by law”. Despite this, however, all legal issues concerning Shiites are dealt with by the security authorities in accordance with Article 98 of the Penal Code, which punishes anyone who is found to be accused of contempt of religion.

According to human rights reports, between the 2011 revolution and the end of 2012 Egypt witnessed judicial trials of 10 Shia Muslims, representing 27% of all the Muslims accused of contempt of religion during that period.55 Six other defendants were also accused of ‘disseminating Shiite ideology’, despite asserting that they are Sunni Muslims. The report documented 36 cases of violations of civil liberties and the right to freedom of belief and expression of Shiites and non-Shiites.56 3- Security situation: all issues concerning Egyptian Shiites are dealt with by the country’s security services, a continuation of the Mubarak regime’s policy regarding Islamic groups and minorities. This is also linked to Egypt’s severed political relations with Iran, which have always been subject to national security considerations, as well as strategic relations concerning the Gulf States. This too is consistent with the Mubarak regime’s custom of questioning the loyalty of Arab Shiites and suggesting that the loyalty of most Shiites in the region lay with Iran rather than their own countries.57 In regard to the domestic situation, the Mubarak regime only ever dealt with Shiite-related issues through its security apparatus,

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periodically arresting their leading figures and accusing them of expressing contempt for religions through the years of Mubarak’s reign. During the short-lived Morsi era, despite his wish to develop a framework for building a positive relationship with Iran, regional calculations and the role of Iran in Syria and Yemen proved to be insurmountable obstacles in this regard, and security considerations remained an impediment to changing the nature of relations. This was apparent in an accusation directed by the Egyptian General Intelligence at Qassem Hosseini, the Third Secretary of the Iranian Interests Office in Cairo, who was accused of carrying out espionage operations and ordered to leave the country.58 Conclusion: an unfavorable environment Given all the aforementioned details of the nature of the Shiite presence in Egypt and the steady disintegration of Egyptian Shiites’ already weak mobility and limited activities in Egypt, it is clear that the country’s Shiite community faces many challenges. Some of these are self-evident from the facts presented above, which demonstrate the limited possibilities for any significant Shiite influence or impact in Egypt. Some of the challenges are closely related to the form and nature of the Egyptian state and society, challenges that reduce the likelihood of such movement to bring about any real changes in political and doctrinal experiences domestically or externally.

Although the Shiite presence in the country has had legal and social ramifications, in terms of the challenges which this community faces there are several problems, most notably the ‘clannish logic’ which restricts interactions and the absence of a regulatory framework to codify and organise relations, along with the dominance of a cult of personality with different figures vying for supremacy, leading to a struggle for leadership status.

This mutually antagonistic attitude means that Egyptian Shiites lack the unity and organizational strengths of their counterparts in the Levant and Iran, as well as the doctrinal views, which could attract more supporters. In Egypt, there are roughly two types of theoretical approaches among Shia Muslims; the first is clearly based on a perceived distinctly Shiite intellectual, spiritual and cultural paradigm, which is the adherent’s primary concern, namely, whether he or she agrees or disagrees with the Iranian political model. The second theoretical approach is that of the (supposedly) ‘educated’ Shiite, whose belief system and attitudes depend heavily on antagonism towards Sunnis and on casting doubt on Sunni narratives, doctrines, political and judicial decisions purely on the basis of anti-Sunni sentiment. This approach is strongly linked to personal ties with Iranian regime bodies.

In regard to the challenges imposed by Egyptian society, we find that the distinctive religiosity, which defines the nature of Egyptian society, means this atmosphere is not conducive for Shiite proselytism, whether ‘emotional’ or intellectual. Indeed, the label of ‘emotional Shiism’ should not be appended to Shiism in terms of doctrine, belief or sectarianism.

In reality, ‘emotional Shiism’ is simply a propagandists’ attempt to exploit sectarianism as a tool in an effort to exert pressure and lend some weight to their rhetoric It should also be noted that Egyptian society has a strong Salafi element, which is a significant counterbalance to Shiite proselytism.

Egypt’s Salafists have been successful in creating an extreme view of Shiites and in

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convincing many that Shiites are not simply followers of another sect but are wholly non-Islamic.

This turned many Egyptians against Shiites, not only ostracizing and socially excluding them from their communities but also even reaching the level of physically pursuing and killing them.

As for the challenges concerning the state’s approach, we note that the Egyptian state appears to lack a clear political vision to deal with this issue except in relation to Iran and the Gulf states, describing the Shiites domestically as an extension of Iran’s influence. This mitigates against any decision by a convert to Shiism to publicly proclaim his conversion.

The absence of or failure to implement legal guarantees preventing the arrest of citizens based on their beliefs represents a significant threat to Shia, reflected by the decisions of many Shia Muslims in the country to conceal their sectarian identity for safety.

In light of all the above facts, Egypt is not an environment conducive to the dissemination of Shiism in any of its religious or political aspects.

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Endnotes (1) Shiite writer Saleh al-Wardani, Shiites in Egypt, MS, p. 78.

(2) I.e. concealment of what they believe in order to avoid confrontation, and considering it to be the basis of religion and belief pillars, based on interpretations of some of the Quranic verses and what is attributed to the Prophet. http://cutt.us/m2gNj and http://cutt.us/7p8I1 (3) Saleh al-Wardani: Shiites in Egypt: from Imam Ali to Khomeini, (Medbouli al-Saghir Library, 1/1/1993), p. 27. http://cutt.us/clvHt. (4) Ya’qub ibn Kallas, the minister of Aziz al-’Alla ‘al-Fatimahi, wrote a book containing the fiqh on what he heard from the Mu’izz Al-din Allah and his son named Aziz bin Allah. The book is named “on the doors of fiqh” and it includes the jurisprudence of the Ismaili sect community. http://cutt.us/PRV60.

(5) Mohammad Ibn al-Mukhtar al-Shanqeeti: the policy of Salah al-Din in dealing with Shiites. The following link http://cutt.us/KwHwM. (6) See: Taqi al-Din: Preaching and consideration by mentioning plans and effects, an electronic version at the following link: http://cutt.us/WSYWb (7) This appeared in the openness of journalists and writers on the experience of study and research in the mechanisms of application/replication. It is one of the most open pieces of research on the Khomeini thought/experience and still raises controversy. See Nabil Sharaf al-Din, The Men of Iran in Egypt (1 and 2), on the following link: http://cutt.us/VOa6 and http://cutt.us/yNZGs (8) Saleh al-Wardani: Shiites in Egypt, MS, p. 115-130.

(9) But we note that the book of reviews is one of the basic books in the individual invitation to Shiites from the reality of meetings of the researcher with a number of Shiites.

(10) Saleh al-Wardani: Shiites in Egypt, MS, p. 144.

(11) Soft Shiism... Taha channel for children model, on the following link: http://goo.gl/5w0lQZ (12) Exposing Shiite associations and those who help them in Egypt, on the following link: http://cutt.us/ijSfl. (13) For more details on the background of these movements, see Mohammed Bin Saqr Al-Salami: What does Iran want from post-revolution Egypt? Majalla magazine, June 14, 2012, at the following link: https://goo.gl/ACd11z.

(14) Secrets of Organizing Journalists’ Travel to Iran: following link: http://cutt.us/hbLzT (15) For assembly see their official website at the following link: www.khayaralmoukawama.com and for their practices, see: www.albawabhnews.com/1254671.

(16) A meeting with Salem al-Sabbagh, the first expert in the formation of a Shiite organization in the 1980s, Mahalla al-Kubra on 4th November 2015.

(17) A meeting of the researcher with Ahmed Rasem Al-Nafees (Ph.D.), Professor of Mansoura University, who highlighted the current Shiite scene in Egypt and the most prominent communication circles between the Shiites of Egypt and Iran, from a meeting in Mansoura on 1st November 2015. (*): One of the Shiite symbols, his life, his changes and positions of much controversy; the contexts of his inception and the beginning of its transformation to Shiism.

(18) In the details of this experiment, see Saleh al-Wardani: Shiites in Egypt, MS, and p. 143: 147.

(19) For more information, see http://cutt.us/YWDSo and http://goo.gl/Lypik9.

(20) The Center is managed by Mahmoud Jaber, who supervised the publication of the Egyptian Readers’ Encyclopaedia in collaboration with the Iranian Cultural Attaché in Cairo. See http://cutt.us/KPTo8.

(21) Although Shiism in essence was a political position on the right of Imam Ali and his descendants in power in the context of the political conflict on governance with illiterate children.

(22) www.albawabhnews.com/1125839.

(23) Interview with Salem Al-Sabbagh, MS. (24) For this project see: www.alarabiya.net/articles/2005/09/19/16932.html (25) Interview with Mohamed El-Derini at http://shabab.ahram.org.eg/News/2860.aspx (26) http://islammemo.cc/akhbar/arab/2011/08/24/132606.html#2 (27) Al-Nafees said in a meeting with the researcher that the national security “Mahmoud Jaber” took off his video with one of the workers to withdraw from the party and refrained from handing over the funds to the agencies with him, and then the project did not succeed.

(28) This refers to the former Shiite thinker Saleh al-Wardani in his book “Shiites in Egypt”. See the following link: http://goo.gl/zPc0YS

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(29) Saleh al-Wardani: Shiites in Egypt, MS, p. 71.

(30) Interview with Mohammed Al-Derini with the Al-Arabiya website, http://cutt.us/zT1rS. (31) Dialogue for Al-Wardani, Rosalieouf, November 11th, 2006, at the following link: http://goo.gl/VW6ujH. (32) Saleh al-Wardani: Shiites in Egypt, MS, p. 73. At the following link: http://goo.gl/aOGIuz. (33) This is confirmed by Ahmad Rasem Al-Nafees and Salem Al-Sabbagh, MS. (34) The method of Al-Azmiyya... Qantara of Shiism in Egypt, at the following link: http://cutt.us/XRMrC as well as at the following link: http://goo.gl/8bg3SR. (35) Saleh al-Wardani notes in his book “Shiites in Egypt”, MS, p. 81, See the following link: http://goo.gl/ND0bfV. (36) See: Muslim Brotherhood and Shiites.. Between the vision of legitimacy and political practice (c 5), the site of Wikipedia: Muslim Brotherhood at the following link: http://goo.gl/SusnoY. (37) Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh (Ph.D.): A History of the Islamic Movement in Egypt, Hossam Tamam (Editor), Dar Al Shorouk, First Edition (2010), p. 1010-106.

(38) Bilal Abdullah: The Egyptian Revolution and Foreign Policy: Reality and Potential, Arab Institute for Studies, at the following link: http://goo.gl/MiIeAm. (39) “France 24”: Morsi visits Tehran in a gesture of normalization between Egypt and Iran, 28th August 2012, at the following link: http://goo.gl/F8EEEt, last visit 15th October 2014.

(40) Interview with Ahmed Rasem Al-Nafees, MS. (41) Interview with Salem Al-Sabbagh, MS. (42) Interview with Salem Al-Sabbagh, MS. See also Mohamed Mahfouz: Arab Shiites and the National State, at the following link: www.alriyadh.com/1041259.

(43) In the roles of reference see: Ali Ismail Nassar: Shiite authorities.. Alignments and loyalties and conflicts, at the following link: http://goo.gl/BY7wrN. (44) Interview with Salem Al-Sabbagh, MS. See also: www.albawabhnews.com/1595823.

(45) Salem al-Sabbagh pointed out in a meeting with the researcher that he went to the Cairo International Book Fair in the wake of the Iranian revolution.

(46) Saleh al-Wardani, Ahmad Rasim al-Nafis and Salem al-Sabbagh are considered among the most prominent of the Shiite clerics who have dealt domestically with many writings on Shi’ism.

(47) From this support to associations see: http://sha3ashe3.com/?p=5393.

(48) In this, see Ahmed Rasem al-Nafis’s remarks on the following link: www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yfg8l8cqiu.

(49) Salem al-Sabbagh says that his popularity in the late 1970s did not raise any personal crisis for him, either with his family or neighbors, because his religious practices did not change and his readings did not draw attention to either.

(50) Regarding this, see what Zahra, daughter of the Sheikh Hassan Shehata, narrated about the interactions surrounding her father and her family with his conversion to Shiism and the reflection of this on his none- Shiite children, in her dialogue at the following link: http://cutt.us/CZiYT. (51) In his conversation, Ahmad Rasem points to his constant exposure in the past two decades to many threatening calls, verbal and physical attacks on him and his property.

(52) The Salafi discourse agrees with considering the Shiites as none Muslims which they do not regard as followers of the Islamic doctrines. At the following link: http://cutt.us/fEJ6k.

(53) With the view that Shehata was famous for his “provocative” conversations to all Egyptians and insulting Sahaba and Aisha in a way that was pushing everyone to hold negative charges against him.

(54) For details: see Human Rights Watch report, http://cutt.us/3Gjzp.

(55) In these legal details see: Hamdi Al-Assiuti: At the following link: http://cutt.us/zLZTH, and Freedom of thought under siege: issues of contempt for religions in two years after the revolution, at the following link: http://cutt.us/YWUx8.

(56) For more details see: Shiites of Egypt in the midst of religious fanaticism and regional conflict, at the following link: http://goo.gl/ZIVnLr. (57) www.alarabiya.net/articles/2006/04/08/22686.html.

(58) The Egyptian Revolution and Foreign Policy, Reality and Potential. He was arrested in May 2011 and, following investigations, a decision to deport him was issued within 24 hours. See details at the following link: http://cutt.us/hB3js.

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Iran and Armed Militias in post-ISIS Iraq Mohammad Al-Iraqi Specialist researcher in political sciences

A

fter the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, many Shiite armed groups and militias emerged in different forms and affiliations and were directly involved in the Iraqi civil war. These militias differed in terms of strength and influence, depending on their connections and penetration of the Iraqi security agencies. The presence of these groups and militias has by no means been fortuitous. Many historical transformations and circumstances contributed to their emergence, and their expansion has torn out Iraq apart and flooded the country with violence and sectarian conflicts.

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The Shiite armed operations started a long time ago in Iraq, especially after the reign of the Ba’ath party excluded most Shiite parties from the politics. Consequently, the Shiite militias strove to destabilize the country and expand their activities to spark a Shiite revolution and topple the regime. Indeed, this strategy has become the foundation for the political work of most Shiite parties in Iraq.

The Shiite armed militias proliferated in Iraq due to the security vacuum created by the American invasion of this country in 2003. The new Iraqi leaders, especially during former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s era, oversaw the formation of the death squads and directed them to carry out the worst forms of repression and crimes against civilians and opponents.1 First: Emergence of the Armed Militias in Iraq The armed militias in Iraq appeared before the Iraqi-Iranian war and developed over time into their current shapes through the following stages:2 1- The first generation: Under the leadership of Hadi Alamiri, Badr division established in the 1980s as the military wing of the Higher Council for the Iranian Revolution in Iraq.

This division was headed by the Shiite Scholar Mohammed Baqir Alhakim. Side by side with other Shiite factions such as Alda’wah and the Iraqi National Summit parties, the Badr division carried out several military attacks on the Iraqi army during the Iraqi-Iranian war.

2- The second generation: Armed militias emerged after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. These militias included: Almahdi Army, ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’, Alyaom Almao’ud companies, Al-Nujaba Movement, the Iraqi Hezbollah, Abu Alfadl Alabbas Battalion, and others who represent the Resistance in Iraq. Many of these parties broke down into factions. For example, Al-Mahdi army split into three armed factions as follows: Alsalam companies under the leadership of Muqtada Al-Sadr, Asa’ib Ahlullhaq under the leadership of Qais Alkhaz’ali, and Al-Nujaba Movement under the leadership of Akram Alka’bi.

3- The third generation: This stage coincided with the emergence of ISIS and consisted of 61 factions that comprised the so-called Public Mobilization Forces (PMF), which included Imam Ali Battalion, Ashora companies, Sayyid al-Shuhada Battalion, Alghadhab Battalion and others.

In addition to the aforementioned, the following other Shiite militias also appeared in Iraq after the emergence of ISIS:3

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Most armed militias in Iraq owe allegiance to the Jurist Leader Ali Khamenei. To Shiites, Khamenei is the “Supreme Leader” and his orders are final and executory by a divine right until the comeback of Imam Al-Mahdi. This view was evident in Khamenei’s speeches when he frequently said that the mission of these militias is not confined to Iraq only, but they have to help oppressed people throughout the Middle East and the world.4 Most of these militias reported to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Interior that reports directly to the Iraqi Prime Minister and General Commander of the Armed Forces, Haider al-Abadi. Under pressure from Iran, Al-Abadi passed the PMF law and included these militias in the Iraqi army under the so-called Public Mobilization or the Resistance.

Accordingly, these armed militias reported to two main references: 4- Political reference: The Prime Minister and General Commander of the Iraqi Armed Forces, Haider al-Abadi 5- Religious reference: The Iranian Jurist Leader Ali Khamenei.

In addition, some militias reported to the Iraqi religious authorities, such as Alsalam companies to Muqtada Al-Sadr, Ashora companies to Ammar lhakim, Alabbas Alqitalyah Division and Ali Alakbar Brigade to Najaf authority.5 Second: The Armed Militias and their regional impact These militias have expanded their operations outside the Iraqi borders in the Middle East region to include the following countries: Syria Some of the militias working in this country came from Iraq, including Imam Ali Battalion, Abu Alfadl Alabbas Battalion, Al-Nujaba Movement, and others. In fact, the Syrian civil war attracted the Iraqi armed militias after Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki announced his support of Syrian President Bashar Assad, who opened the door for the Iraqi militias to come to Syria under the pretext of protecting the Shiite holy shrines.6 Al-Maliki also announced his readiness to send these militias to Syria starting in 2012

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to prevent the victory of the Sunni-majority opposition due to its impact on the balance of power back in Iraq itself. However, these militias moved toward the front lines, away from the Shiite territories and their religious symbols and became part of the Syrian crisis in mid-2014.7 Yemen The role of these militias has extended from providing logistic support, advice, and training to Houthi rebels to fighting on their side against the decisive storm carried out by the Saudi-led coalition. Some of the working militias in Yemen are the Iraqi Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahlolhaq, Al-Nujaba Movement, Alkhurasani companies, Imam Ali Battalion, Sayyid al-Shuhada Battalion, the Iraqi “Islamic Movement”, and others.8 In addition, a Houthi delegation visited Baghdad in September 2016 and met the militias’ leaders in Iraq. The purpose of the visit was to exchange the military expertise of these militias and transfer them to Yemen. The Houthi delegation met the PMF commanders such as Abu Mahdi Almuhandis, Hadi Alamiri, and Qais Alkhazalai. Both sides discussed establishing a joint strategy to cooperate in confronting the Arab coalition and carrying out joint operations in Yemen. Some sources revealed that both sides agreed to establish a proxy branch for the Imam Ali militia and send it to Yemen as the first step of cooperation without explaining its mechanism or whether the government of Haider al-Abadi would approve this step or not. Moreover, the Iraqi government granted the Houthi delegation fifty million USD at a time when Iraq was suffering a severe economic crisis as a result of the armed operations and the great migratory waves.9 Saudi Arabia The Iranians discovered that southern Iraq near the Saudi borders is a vital region for military operations against the kingdom. The IRGC succeeded in making the Iraqi city of Samawa a base for intelligence and logistic support on the inside of Saudi Arabia through Hezbollah militias in this area and espionage and surveillance missions across the SaudiIraqi borders, specifically in Alsalman and Um Alishoush territories. Hezbollah militias played a major role in Iraq by firing some missiles into the Saudi territories and carrying out a defamation campaign against the kingdom through propaganda, protests, and a call for boycotting Saudi products. These tactics impacted Iraq’s politics, security, and social aspects. The IRGC has won many investment contracts in Iraq, especially in land reclamation field in Samawa and Nasiriyah cities near the Saudi borders during Nouri alMaliki’s era; nevertheless, instead of developing the agricultural land in these areas, the IRGC surveilled them and planted many espionage and intelligence devices alongside the Saudi borders.10 Bahrain On March 27, 2017, the Bahraini authorities arrested an armed cell that was planning to carry out attacks in the capital, Manama. According to the Bahraini Ministry of Interior, most members of that cell were trained in the hands of the Iraqi Hezbollah. Qais Alkhazali, head of ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’, said that the Iraqi experience proved the inefficiency of

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the political and diplomatic works. He further said, “This is our view about the events in Bahrain. We think when the enemy finds people in this country standing up to oppression, he would submit to people’s demands and compromise.” On the same issue, the Secretary General of the PMF unit Sayyid al-Shuhada Battalion, Abu Ala’ Alwala’I, said that the Bahraini authorities had gone too far because the international community let the Bahraini people down and that the deprivation of nationality from Sheikh Issa Qassem is a clear violation of people’s rights. Alwala’i also said, “We here in Iraq warn of the policies of the tyrant regimes of the Gulf”.11 Kuwait After the recent disagreement between Iraq and Kuwait on Khor Abdullah, the armed militias appeared again and escalated tension between the two countries. The Al-Nujaba Movement, one of the PMF militias, warned of taking a decisive action against Kuwait in case it encroached upon the Iraqi sovereignty and asked the Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi to explain his government’s real position toward this crisis and the other regional countries’ infringement on the Iraqi territories. This militia asserted that it would not remain silent toward these violations and would take decisive action if the Iraqi government does not.12 Turkey Ankara warned of handing Mosul over to the PMF militias, asserting that these militias are similar to ISIS and that their control of the city would start a sectarian war. On the same issue, the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister and spokesperson for the Turkish government, No’man Qortolmosh, said in a TV interview with a Turkish channel, “We must not invite a terrorist organization to liberate Mosul from another terrorist organization. We must not leave the city in the hands of the PMF nor leave it to fall into the hands of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and its proxy in Syria, the Kurdish People Protection Units, under the pretext of liberating the city from the ISIS”.13 Furthermore, the armed militias threatened the Turkish presence in Ba’sheeqah camp and described it as an occupying force when Abu Mahdi Almuhandis said that the PMF participation in the Mosul battles was to prevent transforming the city into a Turkish base. A leader in the PMF, Jawad Altleibawi, also said, “After liberating the city of Hadhar, our next destination would be Ba’aj district and the Iraqi-Syrian borders to stop the Turkish offenses on the Iraqi territories”.14 In addition, these militias have opened training and logistic support camps carrying names with foreign connotations that have no relation to Iraq and extend to Arabic and regional countries, which means that the mission of these militias goes beyond Iraq to other countries, the same as was called for by ISIS. Some examples of these camps include Al-Baqi’ in Babel, Ahrar Al-Manamah (which hosts 500 militants including Kuwaitis and Bahrainis) in Najaf, ‘Soldiers of Imam’ near a residential area in Kout city, Wasit, and Martyr Hameed Taqawi Camp (named after the highest ranking Iranian General killed in Tikrit, Iraq, in 2015) in Bigi city of Salah Uddin province.15 Indeed, the regional events reflect the major role played by these militias, which

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coincides with the Iranian role in the region. For example, most militias denied any involvement in the kidnapping of the Qatari hunters in the Iraqi desert in 2016. According to the Iraqi Prime Minister, the Qataris entered Iraq legally. Later, the Iraqi Hezbollah claimed responsibility for this incident after the release of some members of the Lebanese Hezbollah who were arrested by Fatih Alsham Frontier (previously Jabhat Alnusrah); this incident reflects how these militias are woven into the fabric of the Iraqi security forces.

Furthermore, the kidnappers announced that they had carried out this operation on the orders and intelligence of the Iranian IRGC, which negatively influenced the reputation and sovereignty of Iraq that was referred to by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in a press conference following the release of the hunters. This operation is not the first of its kind; other incidents included the kidnapping of eighteen Turkish workers in September 2015 and seven Iraqi students on May 5, 2017, in Baghdad due to their civic activities in the protests calling for a civil state and the trial of corrupt officials in the country.

Since 2003, the Iranian leadership has been working on dominating political, security, economic, and religious decision-making processes in Iraq and the region. Indeed, Tehran has accomplished its project in Iraq as stated by the US National Intelligence Director, Dan Cots, when he said that Tehran had sent thousands of Iraqi, Afghani, and Pakistani militias to Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.

According to the American Voice Radio, Cots stated during the annual meeting of the security committee in the US Senate that Iran has ten thousand Iraqi, Afghani, and Pakistani militants trained and armed for fighting in Iraq and Syria. Cots also said that Iran is threatening the international security and still preserving its nuclear capabilities despite the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 group. Moreover, the Iranian IRGC has established training camps all over Iran to train its proxy militias from Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bahrain under the supervision of Quds Force.16 All in all, after including all militias officially under the umbrella of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, the PMF gained legal status and contributed to the chaotic situation in the Middle East. The appointment of the new Iranian ambassador to Iraq, Eirge Masjidi who was one of the IRGC commandants, advisor of Qassem Suleimani, and military supervisor of the battles of Fallujah, Tikrit, and Jurf Alsakhr in addition to the military advice he gave to the PMF in the Mosul battles reflected an Iranian tendency to assign Iranian military personnel to run and oversee the Iraqi file during the coming phase due to the continuous US pressure on Tehran. This new ambassador said more than one time that Iraq is the first line of defense for Iran and that the Iranian invasion of Fallujah aimed at keeping Iran at the center of Shiites in the world. He also said that without Iran and Quds Force, Bashar Assad would not have survived this long.17 Indeed, Tehran’s control of these militias means control of Iraq, which reflects the Iranian fear of any regional developments in the post-ISIS era.

Third: Iran and the Armed Militias in Iraq Most views related the establishment of the PMF to the fall of Mosul in the hands of ISIS; however, the real Iranian strategy in the Middle East, drawn by the Iranian National Security Council and implemented by Quds Force and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards

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Corps (IRGC), implies that the issue goes further than a fleeting moment in the Iraqi political history. The Jurist Leadership of the Shiite clerics over the PMF and its militias has become a religious tradition where each militia and group reports to a cleric, and the PMF ideology unveils an organized structure in terms of goals and missions. The Shiite leaders alleged the main goal of the PMF was to confront ISIS and protect the Shiite holy places, but the true goal was to create a parallel entity in Iraq and implement cross-borders goals in the neighboring countries, to consolidate the Iranian expansionist strategy in Iraq and the Middle East.

Transforming most of the armed militias into official organizations under PMF within the Iraqi government validated the Iranian interference in Iraq and silenced the Iraqi political opponents, especially the Sunnis who called for the breakdown of these militias.

Iran treated the emergence of ISIS as a great opportunity. Indeed, Tehran materialized its plans and ambitions and established and trained most Iraqi militias in Iran. On the other hand, the religious authorities in Najaf issued a fatwa (permission) for Jihad (holy war) on June 13, 2014, and called citizens to volunteer and join the security forces, but never pointed to the formation of the PMF. Since the ‘Shiite Fiqh’ (religious laws) revoke fatwa by annulling its purpose, the Iraqi people raised many questions about the validity of the PMF during the post-ISIS era. In response, Iran exerted pressure on the Shiite parties to legalize the formation of these militias within the structure of the Iraqi army. However, these militias worked independently from the Iraqi military institution to facilitate the work of the Iranian advisors and generals in battles like Diyala, Anbar, Salah Uddin, and Mosul.18 After the fall of Mosul in the hands of ISIS, the Iraqi government called people to volunteer in the PMF. Most volunteers were simple people driven by the religious fervor and spiritual values of Najaf. Nevertheless, the consequences were disastrous. The first battles for the PMF were in Baghdad’s surrounding area and resulted in thousands of casualties. These events exerted pressure on the government of Nouri al-Maliki, who withdrew all volunteers as unqualified personnel to engage in wars of attrition and guerrilla warfare. Instead, Al-Maliki mobilized the armed militias backed by Iranian military advisors under the leadership of Qassem Suleimani, which led to the inclusion of Shiite militias in the Iraqi regular army with the same rights and privileges as any regular military unit.

Though the Iraqi government paid these militias and supplied them with weapons, military uniforms, vehicles, and all other military equipment, in terms of military decisionmaking, they reported to Iran and the IRGC. In fact, the PMF could make decisions and go to war without permission from the Iraqi government, which allowed the PMF to carry out sectarian and political score-settling operations, commit mass murder, and forced migration and demographic change on the Sunnis in Diyala, Tikrit, Fallujah, Habbaniah, Yathrib, and other areas.19 Based on that assumption, Iran sought to dominate Iraq during the post-ISIS era in all aspects and consolidate the PMF in the Iraqi army on the Hezbollah model in Lebanon to be part of the Iraqi political structure. Indeed, the PMF became Iran’s proxy army to defend its regional interests outside its territories, which will materialize the Iranian influence and strong presence in the region, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.20

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Fourth: Iran and the Armed Militias in Mosul Battle The significant movement by the Iranians toward Mosul city was part of a comprehensive strategy on the regional and international levels. Iran strove to intensify its presence in Iraq and internationally through enhancing its political position toward the new US movement on the Iraqi-Syrian borders and the Middle East in general.

Since the beginning, Iran has had a major role in planning for the battle of Mosul and the type of troops required on the ground. While Iraq and the international coalition were focused on ending this war with fewer losses, Iran planned to make use of these events for all potentials of the Syrian war, which required the international community to read the Iranian role in this battle and after carefully.

On October 2016, the Iraqi military operation “Nineveh, we are coming!” started to take Mosul back from ISIS. The plan was to blockade the city on three directions- north, east, and south- while leaving the western direction near the Syrian borders open in order to drive ISIS elements out of the city toward Talafar and then into Syria. Nevertheless, Iran and Russia exerted pressure on the Iraqi government to blockade the western direction for the following strategic reasons: 1- Driving ISIS elements into Syria would prolong the Syrian war and give ISIS the opportunity to expand there, which would mean continued depletion of the Assad regime, Iran, and their proxy militias.

2- Giving the opportunity for ISIS to flee toward Syria means the possibility for most of these elements to go back near the Russian borders, specifically to Caucasia, which would exert more pressure on Russian security forces.21 On the level of administration and planning, Iran wanted to establish a foothold in Mosul, the Sunni city beyond the Iranian influence.

Since the beginning of the operations to liberate the Iraqi cities from ISIS, Iran has directed the movement of the PMF within strategic territories to preserve the Iranian security and interests in the Middle East. In Diyala, Iran supported its proxy militias to control the southern part of this Sunni city near the Iranian borders that represented an Iranian point of weakness during the Iranian-Iraqi war and prevent its people from coming back home even two and a half years after its battle. After that, Iran removed Alnakheeb district from Anbar province and handed it over to Asa’ib Ahlullhaq under the pretext of protecting the Shiites. Iran then annexed this district to Karbala province in order to cut off any connection between Anbar province and Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The same scenario was repeated in Jurf Alskhr, Touz Khirmato, Yathrib, Balad and others and is expected to extend to Talafar in Mosul city. In fact, Iran pushed the Iraqi government to assign the responsibility of Talafar’s battle to the PMF in order to influence on demographic, political and military developments in the post-ISIS era. Iran has participated in Talafar battle to prevent the establishment of Sunni provinces, scale the Turkish power in Iraqi northern areas and to make Talafar as an entry point to Syria, as well as enhancing Shiite powers through Shiite demographic movements.22 Furthermore, the latest crisis between Kirkuk and the Iraqi central government revealed the Iranian influence on the Iraqi Kurdistan province through the IRGC and its armed

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militias in this province and Kirkuk city. After the visit of General Qassem Suleimani to Suleimaniah on April 11, 2017, this issue was delayed until the post-ISIS era. Many sources said that the Iranian general threatened the Kurdish leadership in this province, which coincided with the Iranian IRGC establishing a number of military camps in Sayed Sadiq city in Suleimaniah province, Biran Shahr, and Shino districts near Kilsheen district in the province of Kurdistan. Iranian rapid intervention forces of 400 Iranian soldiers were also stationed near Suleimaniah and other military installations dominated by the Iranian forces that belonged to the rebel Kurdish Iranian party in Iraq Alhayah Alhurra “Bijak.”23 Furthermore, the northern command center of the PMF was stationed in Kirkuk under the leadership of Mohammed Albayati, the commander in Badr Division, and included six combat installations spread all over this city, which points to the critical Iranian militia influence in the Iraqi Kurdistan. Indeed, by the end of Mosul battle, the Iranian containment of the Iraqi Kurdistan province would be accomplished.

Iran has adopted the following strategies in Mosul: 1- Mobilize the PMF, specifically in Talafar.

2- With the ‘liberation’ of the left part of the city, Iran exerted pressure on its loyal Iraqi parties to open offices (such as Badr Organization, the Higher Council, and Dawlat Alqanoun) in the city of Mosul. Some sources said that Quds Force of the IRGC had opened a plethora of military and political posts under the PMF cover in the left part of this city. Some sources also revealed that the Iraqi Vice President and Secretary General of Alda’wah Party, Nouri al-Maliki, oversees these posts and supports them with money to attract some of the Sunni clan elders and citizens in the city. The spokesperson for the Arabian clans in Mosul, Mzahim Alhweit, said that Al-Maliki succeeded so far in attracting a number of the Sunni Arab clans sheikhs and figures in this part of the city. He added that Al-Maliki was working undercover to form clan councils in Mosul to report directly to him with direct support from the IRGC and the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Alhweit also said that the IRGC had opened posts for troops equipped with all types of weapons for small parties that Al-Maliki aims to deploy in Baghdad. Alhweit concluded that these posts were directly linked with the Iranian regime and each armed group controls a specific area to carry out dragnets against citizens.24 1- Support the PMF militias, like Almilitiat Alshabakiah under the leadership of Haneen Alqido, to carry out armed robbery operations on houses and personal property.

2- Support the Christian militia operations under the leadership of Rayan Alkildani to displace the Sunni Arabs on the Nineveh plains, specifically in Talkeef district, under the pretext of affiliation with ISIS. 3- Impose a fait accompli inside the city of Mosul by supporting one political party over the other. On one side is the former governor, Atheel Alnujeifi, backed by the Turkish and Kurdistan province; on the other, the current Governor, Nofal Alakoub, is backed by the

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Iraqi government and the PMF. Indeed, Iran’s close location to this city would allow the Iranian regime to achieve its goals.

4- Iran is aware of the importance of the city of Mosul for Turkey’s security, politics, religion, and economics. Tehran believes any positive results it achieves in Mosul means a strategic loss for Turkey, adding a crucial point to the series of conflicts between both sides in the region. On the same issue, the US military leadership in Mosul airport, the center of the joint operations, said that Turkey exerted pressure on the US to reject the involvement of the PMF in the battle of Talafar. The US leadership added that Ankara threatened to use the Turkish artillery against these militias if they approach the outskirts of the city.

5- Mosul would be a battleground to deplete the US forces in Iraq. With the beginning of the ‘liberation’ of the right part of Mosul, many US military units were stationed at the airport after taking it back from ISIS. In addition, there were about five hundred to one thousand U.S. advisors, contractors, and soldiers on Qayyarah airbase. Senior White House Advisor Jared Kushner’s visit to these two bases last April reflected the importance of Mosul to the United States in the post-ISIS era. About two thousand US soldiers are also concentrated on Sa’ad airbase on the Iraqi-Syrian borders near the Syrian city of Bokamal.

They carried out successful air drops on Deir ez-Zor city, arrested twenty-one leaders of ISIS, and are expected to play a major role in the forthcoming battle of Raqqa. This base has a strategic location and covers the main territories in the Middle East- in Iraq, Syria, the Red Sea, Yemen, Iran, and the logistic lines to Syria. On the other hand, Iran understood that it would be the next target after the elimination of ISIS and strove to prevent any future dangers. In early June 2017, a US technician was killed in the PMF-dominated area on the left side of Mosul, and this violence reflected the Iranian dissatisfaction with the US presence in Mosul vicinity. Despite the PMF leaders’ denial of being involved in this operation, the US investigations proved the opposite.

The future awaiting the city of Mosul is terrible. Each side has its goals and ambitions regionally and internationally in case ISIS loses this city. Many regional powers, like Turkey and the Gulf States, fear the potential dangers and negative consequences, while Iran has set up its geostrategic goals to expand its influence to Syria based on the results of this battle, opening future to all options, especially with the escalation of tension between Iran and the Trump administration.

Fifth: Future of the Armed Militias in Iraq after Mosul battle With Mosul battle coming to an end, the Iraqi people raised many questions about the future of these militias under the PMF during the post-ISIS era. Some have called for breaking down these militias, including them in the Iraqi army, or transforming them into civil society organizations. The PMF commanders, however, have argued for transforming these militias into independent organizations on the model of those established after the occupation of Iraq in 2003 (such as Alnazahah, Alshuhada, and Alsujana’ Alsiasieen) and governing them by separate rules and regulations away from common laws. Accordingly, the Iraqi House of Representatives passed the PMF law on November 26, 2016 session,

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but did not refer to these militias’ rights, duties, structure, and the mechanism of their inclusion in the Iraqi army and Ministry of Defense. In essence, this law violated the Iraqi Constitution from 2005 that prohibited the formation of any entities and organizations based on sectarian or ethnic backgrounds. Furthermore, this law acted as justification for other sects and ethnicities to form armed militias on the same model, which means a country inside another as referred to by Muqtada Al-Sadr when he called for the breakdown of the PMF militias due to their danger for the future of Iraq and the region.25 No one can predict how things will end in Iraq or what roles and duties the armed militias will play in the post-ISIS era.

Since these militias were officially annexed into the PMF under the umbrella of the Iraqi army and Ministry of Defense, their legal status now qualifies them to take larger political, security, economic, and social roles: Political The next period might witness intense political engagement for the political powers supporting these militias. The PMF has become the safest and strongest harbor of all Shiite political currents, which exerts pressure on the civilian powers running the next provincial councils and parliamentary elections. In reality, the PMF strove to achieve two main goals as stated by Al-Maliki: 1- Appear as the official representative of the PMF in front of the Shiite political spectrum 2- Upset the plans of the other Shiite political powers, such as Ammar Alhakim and Muqtada Al-Sadr, who adopt a relatively conciliatory speech compared with that of Al-Maliki. The first has introduced a resolution project to get out the severe Iraqi crisis by bringing all Iraqi political opponents to the table. This resolution was rejected by AlMaliki under the pretext that it would be at the expense of his political ambitions of going back to the cabinet office, while Al-Sadr is leading a public current that aims at toppling Al-Maliki’s project by all means, including public protests in Altahrir square in Baghdad.

Hence, the next political phase might witness the following events from the PMF: A. Running the upcoming elections to solidify its political and military status in Iraq.

B. Investing the victories achieved by the PMF against ISIS and giving these militias political momentum to convey a message as the only Shiite entity to preserve the Shiite political gains after 2003.

C. Winning Iranian support on all levels.

D. Consolidating the PMF’s political status as representative of the Shiite sect, though this will expose the PMF to criticism for representing one specific sect over the others.

Security The PMF law did not determine these militias’ purposes and missions. Today, the PMF is engaged in a relentless war against ISIS, which raises a question about their status in the post-ISIS era.

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Many times, former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that the mission of these militias does not end in Mosul, but extends to Raqqa, Aleppo, Yemen, and Bahrain. Head of ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’ Qais Alkhazali also said that his organization is proceeding with its project to establish the so-called Shiite Full Moon (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Arabian Gulf, and Yemen) rather than Shiite Crescent (Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon), which is evidence that the role of these militias might exceed that of the IRGC in the Middle East.

Moreover, Iraq is expected to witness internal security tension during the next phase for the following reasons: 1- The role and mission of these militias during the next phase is unclear, which makes its involvement selective when necessary.

2- If the PMF enters the Iraqi political arena as a political project or as a parliamentary coalition, it would confuse the Iraqi internal situation and might result in new political and security strategy in Iraq on the Hezbollah model in Lebanon.

3- Many PMF militias have established security centers and checkpoints on the streets and carried out campaigns of arrests without court orders. For example, the PMF arrested journalist Afrah Shawqi, who criticized bearing arms by members of these militias, reflecting the terrorist activities of the PMF. 4- The PMF carried out large-scale raids on the Baghdad surrounding area, especially in Altaji, Abu Ghraib, and Tarmiah districts, in an organized campaign to depopulate the Sunni territories within an Iranian strategy to establish pockets of security as a departure point toward northern Baghdad in the future.

5- The leadership of these militias always says that their military power overwhelms that of the Iraqi army, which reflects the intentions to play a more influential role in Iraq in the next phase.

These militias have adopted a policy of imposing the law by force and by courtship.

After invading Tikrit, they established the ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’ militia mostly from the Sunni clans in the city and from Baghdad, Mosul, Anbar, and others. Those who refused to join these militias were killed or persecuted for charges of cooperating with ISIS. These actions turned the country into a completely militant society.

6- The next phase will witness a true confrontation between the PMF and the Iraqi security forces, such as the US-backed Counterterrorism Service and other domestic and federal police agencies.

Economic Despite the economic austerity in Iraq, the PMF is proceeding toward economic independence that would allow them a great level of maneuverability in the next phase.

The PMF allocation funds are increasing continuously. In 2005, the PMF budget amounted to 6 trillion and 36 billion Iraqi dinars and increased an additional 160 billion dinars in 2006. That equals one billion US dollars. In 2017, the PMF received 3 trillion dinars as running costs and investments due to the current economic austerity and crisis in

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Iraq, which would represent big burdens on the Iraqi federal government’s budget in the next phase. Other factors that influence the PMF budget include the following: 1- The constant increase in financial aid for the PMF from Arab and Gulf businessmen.

2- Constant cuts in the state’s employee allowances that amount to 10% in favor of the PMF. 3- Constant donations from non-governmental organizations for these militias.

The Iraqi parliament’s decision to prohibit importing and selling alcohol in Iraq paved the way for the PMF to raise huge funds through smuggling marijuana, poppy, and drugs from Iran.26 The Iranian financial support to these militias goes through the following channels:27 1- As revealed by the Iranian opposition (the National Council for the Iranian Resistance) in the 1990s, the Iranian government gives monthly payments to the elements of these militias to buy their loyalty. This council also released a list of 31,690 names of Iraqi agents for the IRGC who receive monthly payments from Iran, which was confirmed by the French News Agency.

2- The IRGC militias in Iraq receive funds under technical, constructional, and charitable excuses in Iraq. In 2014, General Rustum Qassemi, former chief of ‘Khatam-al Anbiya’ base of the IRGC, said that Iran had paid five billion US dollars for technical and engineering services in Iraq.

3- Organizations like “the Iraqi-Iranian Joint Higher Committee” and “the Iraqi-Iranian Joint Committee for Trade and Economic Cooperation” were established in 2005 and financed by Iran.

Based on the aforementioned, the PMF’s influence and economic independence are increasing, which will help these militias to play an independent role away from the Iraqi government in the next phase.

Social The PMF started mobility without specific leadership in its early stages and introduced itself as a force to confront ISIS. After that, it developed and became an official organization with its own laws and regulations. However, these militias suffered significant losses and sought to introduce themselves within a comprehensive sociopolitical project with specific goals and dimensions as representatives of the Shiite community.

The PMF activities were accompanied by propaganda and misinformation. A number of satellite channels played a major role in enhancing the militias’ image in the minds of ordinary Shiite people. Some of these channels were: 1- Afaq belongs to Nouri al-Maliki.

2- Al-Nujaba militias.

3- Alghaddeer to Badr militia.

4- Al’ahid to ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’.

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5- Altaif Aljadeed and Almanhaj to Muqtada Alsadr current.

6- Alfurat to the Higher Council under the leadership of Ammar Alhakim.

7- Biladi to the Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim Alja’fari.

8- Alitijah to the Iraqi Hezbollah.

9- Other channels like Hashd, Hashduna, Karbala, Najaf, Thaqalain, Wilayah, Do’a, Minhaj, Arba’eeniah, Hujjah, Ahwaz, Anwar, Raj’iah, Hawzah Ilmiah, Mahdi, Fadk, Imam Hussein, Abbas, Nibras, Sadiq, Eeman, Iba’, Koufah, Ghadeer, and Ishraq.

All these channels praise the PMF, the IRGC, the Pakistani Zaynabioun militias, and the Afghani Fatimiyoun militias. These forces have committed mass murder against what they call the grandsons of Yazeed (one of the Sunni Caliphs 1,400 years ago), such as the crimes they committed in Tikrit, Diyala, Jurf Alsakhr, Mosul, Aleppo, Taiz, Hems, Irsal, Sham Tripoli, and Saida. Furthermore, these Iranian-backed militias released satellite and radio channels in the Kurdish, English, Azeri, French, Bosnian, Hausa, Bushtit, and Swahili languages.28 The media has played a major role in increasing the Shiite’s popular sympathy for the PMF. The armed militias’ great popular incubator is evident through the names “Alhashd Alsha’bi Almuqadas,” “Rijalollah,” and “Hashdollah,” with many connotations and implications that reflect the great status of the PMF in the minds of the Shiite people. Indeed, the PMF has become a red line as the holiest of the holy that cannot be crossed or criticized. The next phase will witness more efforts to consolidate this status in the Iraqi society.

Religious The doctrinal affiliation of the Iraqi armed militias is a big challenge in the next phase, especially after Sistani passes away. Most armed militias in Iraq are loyal to the Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei. They committed many crimes and increased their humanitarian violations in Iraq, which provoked the Najaf authority to establish armed militias under its umbrella, such as Abbas Combat Division and Ali Akbar.

This situation raises the question, what comes after Sistani? The Najaf religious authority headed by Sistani has always avoided the sectarian speech toward the GCC countries, especially Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. On the contrary, the religious authority in Iran released fatwa encouraging Shiites in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia to rebel against their political regimes and called Shiites to arm and fight on Bashar Assad regime’s side in Syria. In fact, Najaf’s position violates the Iranian sectarian trend in the Middle East, which raises the Iranian concerns about Sistani’s successor. Furthermore, Najaf’s support of Muqtada Al-Sadr’s initiative to break the PMF down after eliminating ISIS was a big hit to the Iranian project in Iraq. The new Iranian ambassador in Baghdad was appointed to plan the post-Sistani era in this country. Iran seeks to elect a person who adopts the Iranian extremist speech despite the possible contenders to succeed Sistani, such as Mohammed Baqir Alirwani, Abdula’la Alsibzawi, and his son Mohammed Riza Sistani. Iran will strive to expand its influence in Najaf; however, the Iranian Supreme Leader will have limited power over this authority for the following reasons:

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1. The power of the Iranian Jurist Leader comes from the political position in Tehran more than the religious status in Qum. 2. The Iranian Supreme Leader has few influential proxies in Najaf. For example, Mahmoud Alhashemi Alshahrawardi, the member in the Iranian Assembly of Experts of the Leadership, was born in Najaf, but has a small office and few disciples there, while Kamal Alhaidary, a former Iraqi Scholar, who studied in Najaf and lives in Qum, belongs to a Reform Shiite sect, which is less popular among the Iraqi people.29 Hence, the next phase will witness growing Iranian influence in the scholastic Hawza in Najaf in order to control the election of the Shiite senior scholar in Iraq and exclude those acting outside the Iranian sectarian cycle. Indeed, the armed militias will play a decisive role in this concern.

Conclusion The armed militias played a major role in reshaping the Iraqi state, especially after the US invasion in 2003. Many circumstances such as the lawlessness state and security vacuum, contributed to the development and prevalence of these Iranian-backed militias in terms of efficiency and influence, which was evident through the statements of the Coalition Authority Leader and US ambassador in Iraq, Paul Braymer, about the Iranian dual role in Iraq. On the one hand, Iran supported the political process drawn by the US in Iraq after 2003, but on the other Iran supported the militias with weapons and money to carry out military operations against the US troops in Iraq. For example, ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’ carried out about six thousand operations against the US and Iraqi troops, including the kidnapping of foreigners such as the British expert Peter Moore and four of his companions, who were exchanged for the militia’s leader Alkhazali and hundreds of its elements who were imprisoned by the US in 2005-2007.30 Moreover, the Iraqi sectarian conflict enhanced the role of these militias through introducing themselves as a strong defender of the Shiite sect and its gains after the occupation of Iraq, which made them the center of attention of the Shiite socio-political arena.

After the emergence of ISIS, these militias acquired the form of holiness under the PMFC. Iran played a major role in the development and growth of these militias through supplying them with weapons, money, advice, and command and control systems until they became the major Iranian forces in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain. Indeed, these militias exposed the Iraqi sovereignty to serious challenges and became a point of concern for Iraq’s neighbors.

The post-ISIS phase would play a major role in determining the armed militias’ mission and their internal and regional influence. The significant involvement of Iran in the Iraqi political, religious, economic, social, and cultural affairs is expected to diminish due to the new US strategy under the Donald Trump presidency, who aims at containing the Iranian influence in Iraq and the Middle East in the post-ISIS phase, which would pose many questions about the near future of the region.

All in all, the armed militias have become a brand name for the Iranian Quds Force and the IRGC in Iraq because, first and foremost, the movements, strategies, and activities they carry out in Iraq or elsewhere are in favor of the Iranian national interests.

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Endnotes

(1) Rwabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies: Iraq.. State of militias, 9 September 2015: http:// rawabetcenter.com/archives/12089.

(2 ) Yahya Suhaib: Iraq, the state of militias, Barq Center for Studies and Researches, 2016: http://cutt.us/F9MRY. (3)Rwabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies, “The PMF in Iraq... Emergence and Future ‘Survey Study,’” August 28, 2016. http://cutt.us/zuMAw. (4 )Alghad Daily, Khamenei: Iran will help oppressed peoples in the region, 16 May 2015. http://cutt.us/1zxCG. (5) Hassan Zloughat: Iraqi Shi’a popular militias: Who are they? And what is their affiliation?, Pier 23, 25 February 2015: http://cutt.us/MfQv. (6 )Muthanna Faiq Al-Obeidi, Iman Musa Al-Nims: Iraq and Algeria dealing with the Arab uprising: A Comparative Study of the Situation and Implications, Beirut Center for Middle East Studies, 25 March 2015: http://cutt.us/PdWg. (7) “The Iraqi Shiite Militias and the Russian Military Interference in Syria,” Alrawabit Center for Strategic Research and Studies, October 11, 2015. http://cutt.us/bz5Rf (8) Ala’ Yousuf, “Iraqi Militias Announce Readiness to Fight in Yemen,” Aljazeera, March 5, 2015. http://cutt.us/ tYrNk (9) “The Houthi Delegation Visit to Iraq... from A to Z,” September 5, 2016. http://cutt.us/Va7KL (10) Ankara Center for Politics and Crisis Studies, “The Accounts of the Iranian War against Saudi Arabia,” March 20, 2017. http://cutt.us/zMyqP (11) “The Iraqi PMF Threatens Saudi Arabia and Bahrain: Our Duty Is to Help the Bahraini Shiites and Ihsa and Qatif Shiites in Saudi Arabia,” Bawabat Saida, May 21, 2016. http://cutt.us/UdBUs (12) “The PMF Threatens Kuwait and Almalki’s Coalition Considers It an Iraqi Territory,” Arabi 2, February 9, 2017. http://cutt.us/YCVa (13) “Turkey warns to Hand Mosul over to the PMF,” Aljazeera, October 20, 2016. http://cutt.us/SHWbj (14) “The PMF Threatens Turkey and Reveals Its Next Destination after Hadhar,” Qirtas News, April 27, 2017. http://cutt.us/AQ3LW (15) Othman Almukhtar, “Alam Almilitiat fi Aliraq: 53 Iranian-Backed Configurations,” Alarabi Aljadeed Newspaper, July 24, 2015. http://cutt.us/arXp5 (16) “The Iranian Mujahidee Khalq Organization, the US Chief of Intelligence: the Iranian Regime has 10 Thousand Elements in this Country,” May 13, 2017. http://cutt.us/GY38u (17) Iyad Alduleimi, “Masjidi... Ambassador and Governor of Baghdad,” Alarabi Aljadeed Newspaper, May 2, 2017. http://cutt.us/fZNis (18) Khaled Yaymot, the PMF Militia, an Iraqi Copy of the Iranian Basij, and His View on the Future of the Region, the National Council for the Iranian Resistance, February 2, 2015. http://cutt.us/p8fWG (19) Ibid.

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(20) Rwabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies, “Iran and the PMF in Iraq,” The Iraqi Studies Unit, October 22, 2015. http://cutt.us/lHNZu (21) Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies: Iran and Mosul, March 11, 2017. http://cutt.us/7WsfM (22) Ibid, (23) “The Establishment of a Missile Base for the IRGC in Kurdistan... Iran Finishes the Dream of a Kurdish Country,” The Islamic Movements Gate, May 28, 2016. http://cutt.us/O0tAW (24) “The Iranian Alquds Division Opens Tens of Posts in Mosul under the Supervision of Almalki,” The Iranian Mujahidee Khalq Organization, May 1, 2017. http://cutt.us/n3YeQ (25) Firas Ilias, Questions about the PMF Law, Almarkiz Aldimograti Alarabi, November 27, 2017 http://cutt.us/qtXDu (26) “Drugs Threaten Iraq: The Smuggling Hang are Expanding,” Alarabi Aljadeed Newspaper, January 25, 2017. http://cutt.us/e2VPR (27) Mohammed Amin, “The Share of Militias in the Middle East from the Iranian Economy,” The Iranian Khalq Mujahideen, April 19, 2017. http://cutt.us/gv5mi (28) Mahmoud Sa’eed, “The Sectarian Militias Media... About 100 Satellite Channels under Iranian Supervision,” Ro’ya News Agency, April 27, 2017. http://cutt.us/vAxky (29) Ali Mahmoud and Suzanne Maloney, “PolicyWatch 2763—After the Ayatollah: The Middle East PostKhameini,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 10, 2017. http://cutt.us/cmXhZ (30) “The Iraqi Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq,” Aljazeera, June 12, 2013. http://cutt.us/qxtkX

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Motivations of Russian-Iranian Interference in Afghanistan Mohammed Abdullah Younis Assistant Teacher in the College of Economic and Political Sciences, Cairo University

T

he growing role of Russia and Iran in Afghanistan has been a planned and systematic approach over the past two years. The two countries were initially fully involved in the Syrian crisis due to common interests and the confrontation with the US and NATO within the framework of the Hybrid War to stop the Western military expansion in the Russian and Iranian strategic depth.

1 Russia-Iran mobilization strategy in Afghanistan is similar to the Obama administration’s rebalancing strategy in the Middle East conflicts.

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This strategy relies on scaling down of direct military involvement, leading from behind, cost-sharing, and progressive containment of threats through coordination between all concerned countries.2 The United States adopted a force downsizing strategy that created security and a political vacuum in Afghanistan, which paved the way for the Taliban and ISIS to expand in this country. This chaotic situation prompted Russia and Iran to interfere in Afghanistan and cordon the Western military presence, stop the military expansion of Al-Qaida, reshape the Afghani political structure, and exclude the pro-Western political elite to preserve the interests of the two countries. Accordingly, this research focuses on agents of change in the Russia-Iran strategy toward Afghanistan and the consequences of this strategy on regional security and stability, interactions between the great and regional powers involved in Afghanistan, and the possible reactions of Russia and Iran toward the recent heavy US military presence in this country.

First: The Increasing Russia-Iran Presence in Afghanistan Russia and Iran’s increasing mobilization in Afghanistan is a fundamental shift in the two countries’ strategy toward the political and security conditions in this country. After decades of its defeat in Afghanistan in 1979 and the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1989, Russia returned to this country by supplying intelligence and logistic support to NATO to stop Taliban and Al-Qaeda expansion in Central Asia following the events of 2001 in the United States.3 Iran adopted the same strategy before and after 2001 and was one of the first countries to support the United States’ operations to topple the Taliban and hunt its elements and leaders in Afghanistan. In fact, Tehran accused the Taliban of antagonizing Shiites, attacking the Hazara Shiite minority, storming the Iranian consulate in Mazar Sharif in 1988, and executing eight Iranian diplomats, which prompted Tehran to mobilize seventy thousand IRGC elements on its borderline with Afghanistan.4 The Ideological difference between the Taliban and Iran did not cut off all ties between both sides, however. The ISIS establishment in Khorasan State, the control of wide territories of Nanjin Har Province, and the decrease in US military presence prompted Russia and Iran to change their strategy toward Afghanistan based on the following: Approaching the Taliban Until 2013, Russia had criticized the inclusion of the Taliban in Afghani politics due to counter-terrorism laws and to prevent the political legitimacy of this organization. However, Russia changed its views on the Taliban in December 2015 when the Russian representative for the Afghani affairs, Zamir Kapulov stated that ISIS was the number one enemy of Moscow and that his country’s interests corresponded to those of the Taliban’s through cooperation and exchange of information between the two sides.5 In December 2016, the Russian ambassador in Kabul, Alexander Mantinski announced his country’s readiness to mediate between the Afghani government and the Taliban due to Russia’s strong relations with the organization.6 During the Moscow International Security Summit in April 2017, the Russian chief of military intelligence, General Igor Koropove praised the Taliban’s role in halting the expansion of ISIS in Afghanistan, asserting that the Taliban enjoyed great support domestics and was in control of about 40 percent of the country.7

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On the other hand, the United States gave a negative evaluation of Russia’s role in Afghanistan. In February 2017, the US forces commander in chief in Afghanistan, General John Nicolson, said in the US Senate that Russia had legitimized the Taliban, asserting that the Russia-Iran mobilization in Afghanistan was aimed at limiting the US and NATO’s role in this country.8 Taliban-Iran relations seemed to be stronger than Taliban-Russia relations were. The Taliban-Iran rapprochement started in June 2013 when Tehran officially invited a Taliban delegate to meet some Iranian officials. In 2014, Iran opened a representation office for the Taliban in the Iranian city of Mashhad, giving the organization an international character. In May 2016, the Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansur, was killed in the province of Baluchistan in Pakistan. At the time, he was traveling back to Pakistan after residing for two months in Iran where he held intensive negotiations and signed several contracts with Iranian officials to confront ISIS in exchange for Iran’s support of the organization.9 Furthermore, Tehran is providing political support to the Taliban and is hosting a number of Taliban leaders who are classified as terrorist elements on the international lists. In December 2016, Tehran invited some Taliban leaders to participate in the Islamic Unity Summit, which was confirmed by the Iranian cleric, Muhsin Araki, Secretary General of the Islamic Sects Rapprochement Association, when he said that Tehran had invited the non-extremist elements in the Taliban to participate in the conference.10 Additionally, the Iranian ambassador in Kabul, Mohammed Riza Bahrami, acknowledged direct contact between his country and the Taliban after the Afghani authorities officially accused Tehran of providing direct military and logistics support to the organization. A spokesperson for the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mullah Zabihollah, also recognized the organization’s strong relations and understanding with Tehran.11 Military Infiltration The Russia-Iran military influence has escalated in Afghanistan. In April 2017, the US forces supreme commander in Afghanistan, General John Nicolson, released a report about the Russian military supplies delivered to the Taliban, especially machine guns, despite Russia’s denial.12 The Iranian military support for the Taliban also increased. In 2015, the Wall Street Journal revealed that Iran had provided the Taliban with 82 ml mortar shells, rifles, bombs, Kalashnikov guns, and explosive materials. Some Afghani officials also confirmed that Iran trained Taliban elements in camps in Mashhad and Zahedan in the Iranian province of Kerman under the supervision of the IRGC.13 In January 2017, the governor of the Afghani Province of Helmand, Hayatollah Hayat, said that Iran had supplied the Taliban with Iranian ballistic missiles to attack Afghani cities. This information was confirmed by the Afghani authorities when they discovered the remains of Iranian-made missiles launched by the Taliban on Afghani forces in the cities of Karamseir and Sankeen.14 Moreover, the Afghani authorities seized Iranian-made mines and huge amounts of arms and ammo in a raid on a Taliban arsenal in February 2016.

Political Mediation The Afghani government’s, clans’, and opposition’s failure to come to an agreement and the collapse of the quartet that included representatives from Afghanistan, China, Pakistan,

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and the United States prompted Russia and Iran to establish a new regional roadmap for reconciliation. It also prompted them to build bridges between political rivals in Afghanistan and diminish the United States’ role in this country. Russia held three rounds of the International Peace Conference. The first round took place in December 2016 with the participation of China, Pakistan, and Russia. The conference centered on the future of peace and security in Afghanistan, the consequences of instability on its neighboring countries, and the confrontation of ISIS in the country. However, participants were criticized by the Afghani president, Ashraf Ghani, for excluding his country from participation in the conference.15 The second round was held in February 2017 with the involvement of China, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. In this conference, Russia sharply criticized US politics during the Obama era while the other participants were willing to cooperate with the Trump administration.16 The third round was held on April 14, 2017, after the US had dropped its largest non-nuclear GPU-43 bomb (the mother of all bombs) on ISIS caves in eastern Afghanistan. Twelve countries attended the conference, including Pakistan, China, India, and Afghanistan while the United States declined the invitation.17 In Syria, Russia tried to build bridges and enforce a temporary truce between the Assad regime and the opposition. Accordingly, Russia strove to sponsor negotiations and bring the Afghani government and the Taliban to table on the Syrian model with the exclusion of the United States from these negotiations. To achieve its hegemony over Afghanistan, Russia linked its economic and military aids to investment in the various economic sectors in the country.

Recruitment of Afghani Refugees Iran recruits Afghani refugees and sends them to Syria and Iraq to defend Shiite holy places and support the Assad regime. On June 30, 2017, the New York Times published a report about the IRGC utilization of the Afghani refugees’ adverse conditions to enlist them in ‘Fatimiyoun’ brigade, which was established in 2014 from Hazara Afghani Shiites. The number of the Afghani refugees enlisted in ‘Fatimiyoun’ brigade ranged from eight thousand to fourteen thousand.

Iran paid them each eight hundred dollars per month and granted a ten-year legal residency for their families in exchange for defending Shiite holy shrines and fighting on the front lines in Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia in Syria.

The Iranian religious and political leadership honored the Afghanis who were killed in Syria by roaming the streets of Tehran and Qum, carrying their coffins before they buried them.

Furthermore, the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and General Qassem Suleimani met the families of those killed and promised them Iranian citizenship and several economic and social benefits.18 Suppressing the Afghani Government Russia and Iran believe the Afghani government is a puppet of the United States and NATO. Recently, they exerted more pressure on the Afghani government to hold talks with the Taliban and give up any policies that challenge the interests of the two countries.

The visit of former Afghani president Hammed Karzai to Russia on April 25, 2017, unveiled Russia’s ambitions to expand its political influence in Afghanistan. In his meeting

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with Karzai, Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, insisted on including the Taliban in the Afghani national talks while Karzai criticized the US policies in his country and accused it of being behind the instability and chaos in Kabul. The visit also raised the Afghani governments’ fears that accused Karzai of attempting to weaken the Afghani president Ashraf Ghani.19 On the other hand, Iran adopted a more aggressive policy against the Afghani government. According to the International Relief Organization, Tehran has deported about seven hundred thousand Afghani refugees since the beginning of 2016 and is planning to deport 2.5 million Afghani refugees from Iran in the next eighteen months, adding 10 percent to the Afghani population that would exert more pressure on the Afghani government.20 Iran also increased threats against Afghani water security. In July 2017, the Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, criticized the construction of the Afghani dams Kamal Khan, Kajki, and Salma under the pretext of damaging Iranian water security. This criticism elicited protests from the Afghani government that accused Iran of building more than thirty water dams on the rivers flowing into Afghanistan and consuming huge amounts of water from the Afghani districts of Helmand and Harod.21 Second: Motives for the Russia-Iran Mobilization The Russia-Iran mobilization in Afghanistan is linked to the recent dramatic changes in Central Asia and the Middle East. The rolling back of the US’s role during the Obama era and the minimizing of US military presence led to a state of security and a political vacuum in these territories, which paved the way for Russia and Iran to fill the gap in Afghanistan.

Russia and Iran were driven by the following motives: The US Flexible Balance Strategy Although the US and NATO put off withdrawal from Afghanistan that was scheduled to be completed by the end of 2014, they deployed only eight thousand four hundred American soldiers and a small number of NATO forces to train and support the Afghani forces, which created a state-of-security vacuum in Afghanistan.22 This Obama doctrine was based on the avoidance of direct military involvement in points of conflict around the world, limiting the US’s role in air strikes on the terrorist groups’ strongholds and establishing multilateral coalitions on the model of the international coalition against ISIS in Syria and Iraq.23 The Obama administration also adopted the strategy of flexible balance through avoiding direct confrontation with regional and international powers on the issues not affecting the US’s interests. For example, Obama believed that the Russian interference in Ukraine and Crimea was an internal affair within the vital Russian sphere and away from the US’s and NATO’s interests. Similarly, the Obama administration remained silent regarding the Russian military interference in Syria and believed any unplanned procedures would deplete the US military’s capabilities.24 In fact, the US’s neutrality during the Obama era paved the way for Russia and Iran to penetrate Afghanistan on the Syrian model. Moreover, the Iranian nuclear deal with the P5+1 group in 2015 drove Tehran to expand and adopt a more aggressive policy toward its

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neighbors. Nevertheless, after Donald Trump winning the presidency of the United States, the new US administration adopted a more tense policy toward Iran and its hostile activities in the region.

Securing Strategic Depth Russia and Iran strive to protect their vital spheres against any threats. The establishment of the state of Khorasan in Afghanistan by ISIS prompted the two countries to form domestic coalitions to confront this group in light of the weakness and disruption of the Afghani governmental organizations. Iran believes its 936 km borderline with Afghanistan is a direct threat to Iranian security, which provoked Tehran to proactively address potential threats and interfere in Afghanistan through joining forces with the Taliban. Likewise, the 2,087 km Afghani border with Central Asian countries—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan— are a source of threat to Russian security, especially after the expansion of ISIS threats across these borders.25 There are also other threats across these borders, such as drug smuggling; 90% of opium production comes from Afghanistan. Indeed, Russia suffers high rates of opium addiction and AIDS due to this problem. According to official Russian statistics, the number of addicts reached six hundred thousand people, 60 percent of whom were under age in April 2017. However, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, announced that there are 7.5 million drug users in Russia; two million of whom are permanent addicts.26 Anticipating the ISIS Threat Russia and Iran fear the transition of ISIS’s command and most experienced elements from Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The fall of the final ISIS stronghold in Mosul and the blockade of Raqqa—the ISIS capital in Syria—by Syrian democratic forces might drive ISIS to Khorasan province in Afghanistan, making it the new stronghold of ISIS. This fear was confirmed by the statement from the chief of Russian intelligence, Igor Korbov, on April 27, 2017, when he said that the number of ISIS militants amounted to three thousand five hundred elements spread across northern Afghanistan near the weak Russian front in Central Asia and Caucasia. According to a UN report released in September 2015, ISIS elements spread in twenty-five out of the thirty-four Afghani provinces.27 Russia and Iran believe the decapitation strategy adopted by the United States against the Taliban weakened the organization through targeting its leaders.28 Accordingly, Russia and Iran interfered in Afghanistan on the Syrian model and focused on defeating the armed groups outside the Russian and Iranian borders to prevent them from going back to Russia and the other former Soviet Union Republics.

On April 3, 2017, ISIS announced its responsibility for the explosion in the subway in the Russian city of Petersburg followed by a series of threats in reaction to Russia-Iran interference in Syria and support of the Assad regime.29 This attack reflects the changes in the terrorist group’s ambitions and points of expansion toward the Islamic territories in Central Asia, Russia, China, and Iran through the twin attack on Iranian parliament and the Khomeini tomb on June 7, 2017, which was the biggest attack in Tehran since the Zahedan attacks in 2010.30

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Encountering NATO Russia-Iran interests intersect in the utilization of proxy war strategy through using the Taliban to target the US and Western troops in Afghanistan. Some sources consider this war a Russian retaliation against the US and Western nations in response to their support of the armed Afghani groups that led to the defeat of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

This information was confirmed by the chief of the US forces in Afghanistan, General John Nicolson, on February 2017 when he accused Russia of trying to diminish the US and NATO’s role in the country.31 Iran believes the US military presence in Afghanistan near its borders is a direct threat to its security and existence, and that the US military mobilization in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Arabian Gulf, in addition to the NATO bases in Turkey, encircle Iran from two directions. Consequently, Tehran adopted a counter-containment policy toward the US and NATO and used the weak military presence of the West in Afghanistan to expand its military and political expansion in this country.32 Russia and Iran continued their accusations of the US and NATO’s failure to counter terrorism over the seventeen years since the US mobilization began in Afghanistan. Although the Afghani army outnumbered ISIS and the Taliban, it failed to take over the country because of the social division and bad economic conditions. Moscow strives to eliminate Western interference and the penetration of vital Russian spheres through supporting the Taliban to target NATO troops in Afghanistan and drive them away from Central Asia and Caucasia. Furthermore, the Kremlin’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kapolov, supported the Taliban’s call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan unconditionally, asserting that all Afghani neighbors support this step.33 Periphery Policy Russia and Iran adopted this policy against their regional and domestic rivals through taking the battle outside their own geographic spheres and pursuing their interests in several conflict hotspots. The Russian mobilization and support of the Taliban came in response to the Western sanctions on Moscow after the Russian military interference in Ukraine and Crimea as a way to exert more pressure on the Western military presence in Afghanistan.34 Moscow also strives to establish a regional security system in Central Asia and Caucasia that excludes the Western forces through spreading the idea that the US is a source of threat and instability in this region.35 It also tries to exert more pressure on the US and Western countries to negotiate a deal with the US president, Donald Trump, and pursue Russian interests in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Syria, and Afghanistan in exchange for Russia contributing to achieving peace and stability and decreasing pressure on NATO in Afghanistan.

Likewise, Iran has adopted the same strategy in the face of the US and the other domestic rivals in Afghanistan. Tehran is also using its alliance with the Taliban to exert pressure on the Afghani government to weaken its control over the country and obstruct the Afghani building dams and their negative impact on the Iranian water flow.36 Additionally, Iran aims

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to stand against the formation of a strong Afghani government that allies with the West and antagonizes Iran. Consequently, Tehran escalated its military and political support of the Taliban to fight a proxy war against the weak Afghani government, NATO, and the US as a way to impose itself as a major player in settling the conflict and restoring stability in Afghanistan.

Third: Consequences of the Russia-Iran interference in Afghanistan The Russia-Iran interference in Afghanistan raised controversy about each country’s goals. Observers and analysts were divided into two groups concerning this issue. The first believed that Russia and Iran were concerned about confronting the threats resulting from the chaotic state of their regional environments to prevent the expansion of ISIS, eliminate the cross borders drugs smugglers, and stop the flow of refugees from Afghanistan to its neighboring countries.37 The second group gave a negative evaluation of Russia-Iran policies. It believed that Afghanistan is only one part of many points of conflict between Russia and Iran on one side and the West on the other.

The Russia-Iran mobilization in Afghanistan lacks real justification and relies on aligning with terrorist organizations and illegal armed groups that manage the cultivation and trade of drugs as a projection of power. It also relies on the ability to alter regional and international events, compel the Western countries to acknowledge Russia-Iran’s regional influence, and include them in the settlement of conflict in Afghanistan.38 The Russia-Iran penetration of Afghanistan escalated the Taliban’s military operations on the Afghani forces and caused them to incur heavy losses. On April 21, 2017, the Taliban launched a wide military attack on the Afghani army in the city of North Mazar Sharif, killing 170 Afghani soldiers and injuring many more. The attackers were camouflaged in the Afghani army’s uniform and broke into the Shahin camp in the city of Mazar Sharif.39 Moreover, the Taliban’s operations were not confined to attacking the army and police forces but included the US forces in Afghanistan.

The Taliban launched several attacks on the American military bases in this country. For example, the Taliban attacked an American military base in the city of Khost, killing four Afghani soldiers and injuring eight when a booby-trapped car hit a control tower in the American Chapman camp on April 24, 2017, which coincided with the surprise visit of the US defense minister, James Mattis.40 On May 27, 2017, the Taliban also launched a suicide bombing on the US forces in the city of Khost, killing eighteen soldiers.41 Recently, the US and NATO increased their military presence in Afghanistan on the orders of the US president, Donald Trump, in June 2017. The US Minister of Defense stated before the congress that the United States would deploy a small number of troops in Afghanistan. However, US military experts suggested deploying additional three to five thousand soldiers to train the Afghani forces and air support, increasing the US forces in Afghanistan to thirteen thousand soldiers.42 Additionally, on June 29, 2017, the Secretary General of NATO, Yens Stoltenberg, announced that the organization had plans to increase its forces in Afghanistan after the Brussels summit resolutions in May 2016. He also referred to an agreement between fifteen countries to support international operations in Afghanistan in addition to the thirteen thousand soldiers stationed in the country to

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support the Afghani forces.43 Furthermore, in April 2017, the United States dispatched another three hundred soldiers to train Afghani soldiers in Helmand, which was the first US deployment of forces since 2014. 44 This change in NATO’s strategy for a long-term military presence in Central Asia might lead to a direct confrontation between Russia and Iran on one side and the US and NATO on the other as a result of conflicting interests and growing NATO military pressure on Russia and Iran’s allies in Afghanistan.

In contrast to Russia-Iran’s declared goals of fostering negotiations between all Afghani factions, the biased roles of Russia and Iran in Afghanistan obstruct the resolving of conflict in this country. Russia-Iran’s political and military support of the Taliban also gives this organization the incentive to take a more radical stance and reject negotiations with the Afghani government in order to enhance its political position, expand in the Afghani provinces, and target the US and Afghani forces before the United States and NATO increase their military presence in this country.

Conclusion The Russia-Iran mobilization in Afghanistan is one reason for political and security instability in the country. The two countries’ stated political and military support of the Taliban in the face of the US, NATO, and the Afghani government within the framework of a proxy war between the US and Russia has led to escalation of domestic tension in Afghanistan and the weakening of the Afghani forces ability to confront the armed groups and drug-smuggling rings. Furthermore, the Russian mediation in Afghanistan with Chinese, Pakistani, and Iranian support was aimed at excluding the Afghani government and the US-supported political factions in the country and including the Taliban in the Afghani negotiations to give it political legitimacy. These procedures have changed Russia’s role from mediator to a supporter of the Taliban, exerting more pressure on its political rivals. However, the US and NATO’s military mobilization in Afghanistan could change the political and military balance by supporting the Afghani government in the face of Russia, Iran, and the Taliban, in addition to exerting more pressure on Moscow and Tehran to stop interfering in Afghani internal affairs. Accordingly, the rivalry between Russia and the West regarding Afghanistan might lead to following consequences: An escalation of the tension between the two sides running the proxy war in the various areas of conflict in the Middle East, starting with Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan could occur because of the conflict of interests and Russia’s attempts to exert pressure on NATO and draw attention away from its points of weakness in Eastern Europe.

Russia-Iran could tactically retreat to avoid direct confrontation with the US and NATO and to practice indirect influence on Afghanistan. Such a retreat is unlikely to happen in light of the non-negotiable interests of the two world powers in this country.

Common ground for coexistence between the Russian camp and the Western camp that includes a minimum amount of agreements between both sides could be found. However, the conflict of interests prevents this option from coming to light.

All disputes and disagreements between both sides could be solved, including Russia’s role in Ukraine, the West’s sanctions on Russia, the expansion of NATO in Eastern

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Europe, the deployment of missile defense systems on the Russian borders, and the distribution of balanced roles between the countries concerning the areas of conflict in Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya. This scenario relies on rapprochement between the US president, Donald Trump, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. However, the institutionalized resistance, historical heritage, and conflict of interests make this scenario impossible to achieve in the short term.

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Endnotes ( 1) Christopher S. Chivvis, Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” and What Can be Done About It?, Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, March 22, 2017, 1–4. ( 2 ) Jeffery Goldberg: “The Obama Doctrine”, The Atlantic, April 2016:https://goo.gl/7bj1Rx (3) Amin Tarzi: “Iran, Russia, and the Taliban: Reassessing the Future of the Afghan State”, Philadelphia, PA: The Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 14, 2017: http://www.fpri.org/article/2017/06/iran-russia-taliban-reassessingfuture-afghan-state/ ( 4) Joshua Levkowitz: “Iran’s Taliban Gamble in Afghanistan”, Washington: MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, May 17, 2017: http://www.mei.edu/content/article/iran-s-taliban-gamble-afghanistan ( 5) “Taliban Lem Ta’od Alado Alawal Lirossia fi Afghanistan,” The Arab Londoner Newspaper, December 28, 2017. https://goo.gl/VrMyHp ( 6) “Russia wa Taliban: Taqarob Lidharb Al-NATO wa Alwojou Alamriki fi Afghanistan,” The Arab Londoner Newspaper, January 5, 2017. https://goo.gl/Zeyubu ( 7) “Taliban Played a Major Role in Limiting the Expansion of ISIS in Afghanistan,” Russia Alyawm: Alistikhbarat Alaskariah Alrussiah, April 26, 2017. https://goo.gl/Mjc1hX ( 8) Erin Cunningham:” While the U.S. wasn’t looking, Russia and Iran began carving out a bigger role in Afghanistan”, Washington Post, April 13, 2017: https://goo.gl/QTjtzA ( 9) Joshua Levkowitz: “Iran’s Taliban Gamble in Afghanistan.” ( 10) Salih Hmeid, “Iran Tastadheef Qiadieen min Talban Bimo’tamar Bitahran,” Al-Arabiyah News Website, December 14, 2016. https://goo.gl/sCWvWN ( 11) “Safeer Iran fi Kabul Yo’akid Itisalat Biladih Ma’ Talban,” Al-Arabiyah News Website, December 10, 2016. https://goo.gl/ac2pnf ( 12) Thomas Gibbons-Neff: “ Russia is sending weapons to Taliban, top U.S. general confirms”, Washington Post, April 24, 2017: https://goo.gl/XUM462 ( 13) “Afghanistan: Iran Tad’am Talban Bilsawarikh Lidharb Quatna,” Al-Arabiyah News Website, January 23, 2017. https://goo.gl/k5PbyR ( 14) Margherita Stancati: “Iran Backs Taliban With Cash and Arms”, Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2015: https://www. wsj.com/articles/iran-backs-taliban-with-cash-and-arms-1434065528 ( 15) Baqir Sajjad Syed: “Pakistan, “China, Russia agree to expand talks on Afghanistan”, The Dawn, December 28, 2016: https://www.dawn.com/news/1304931 ( 16) Hashim Wahdatyar: “ 4 Reasons Russia Increasingly Favors the Taliban in Afghanistan”, The Diplomat, February 14, 2017: http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/4-reasons-russia-increasingly-favors-the-taliban-in-afghanistan/ ( 1 7) Deutsche Welle: “US skips out on Afghanistan-Taliban conference in Moscow”, April 14, 2017: http://www.dw.com/en/us-skips-out-on-afghanistan-taliban-conference-in-moscow/a-38426486 ( 18) ALI M. LATIFI: “ How Iran Recruited Afghan Refugees to Fight Assad’s War”, New York Times, June 30,2017: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/opinion/sunday/iran-afghanistan-refugees-assad-syria.html ( 1 9) Howard Amos: “ Karzai Hails Deepening Russian-Afghan Ties”, The Mosco Times, 25 June 2015: https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/karzai-hails-deepening-russian-afghan-ties-47699 ( 20) Pakistan Defence: 130,000 Afghan Refugees Deported From Iran So Far This Year”, May 22, 2017:https://goo.gl/cSTevP (21) Chahar Burjak: “Dam project promises water – but also conflict – for dusty Afghan border lands”, The Guardian, March 22, 2017: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/mar/22/afghanistan-dam-project-irannimruz-helmand-river ( 22) Patrick Nopen: “The Impact of the Withdrawal from Afghanistan on Russia’s Security”, Security Policy Brief, No.54, GMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations, March 2014, pp.1-8 ( 23) Jeffery Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.” ( 24) Derek Chollet, Ellen Laipson, Michael Doran, and Michael Mandelbaum: “Does the Middle East Still Matter? The Obama Doctrine and U.S. Policy”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 14, 2016: https://goo.gl/f9a6N1

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( 25) Maps Of World website: “Afghanistan Borders”, 2017: https://goo.gl/HCoEuT ( 26) Russian Reality: “ Putin noted the growth in the number of drug addicts in Russia by 60%”, April 28, 2017: https://goo.gl/Ny3mNq ( 27) Russian News Agency: “ IS recruiting Taliban fighters in Afghanistan — Russia’s General Staff”, April 26, 2017: http://tass.com/defense/943431 ( 28) RICHARD WHITE: “ Five Years After Killing Bin Laden: The Failure of Decapitation Strategy”, Insergentsia, May 2017, https://goo.gl/NMsa38 ( 29) Mohamed Abdullah Yunis, “Tafjirat San Petersburg: Limaza Asbahat Russia fi Sadarat Ahdaf Altanzimat Alirhabiah?” Almustaqbal Center for Advanced Research and Studies, April 4, 2017. https://goo.gl/b5FzDe ( 30) “Iran: Hojoum Musalah Ala Alshourah wa Intihari ind Dharih Al-Khomeini,” Alarabiyah News Website, June 7, 2017. https://goo.gl/9NsvB5 ( 31) Washington Post: “Russia is sending weapons to Taliban, top U.S. general confirms”, April 24, 2017: https://goo.gl/mtQnEY ( 32) Ajay Patnaik‫‏‬: “Central Asia: Geopolitics, security and stability”, (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp.219-221 ( 33) Bloomberg:”Russia Backs Afghan Taliban Demand to Withdraw Foreign Troop”, March 31, 2017: https://goo.gl/EnWTVB ( 34) Stratfor:“Russia Re-Evaluates Security Ties in Central Asi”, March 3,2016:https://goo.gl/G7ksZU ( 35) Ahmad Majidyar: “ Iranian Support for Taliban Alarms Afghan Officials”, Middle East Institute, January 2017: http://www.mei.edu/content/io/iranian-support-taliban-alarms-afghan-officials ( 36) Hashim Wahdatyar, “Four Reasons Russia Increasingly Favors the Taliban in Afghanistan.” ( 37) Ryan Browne: “ US sees a resurgent Russian military expanding into Afghanistan, Libya”, CNN Politics, March 28, 2017: http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/28/politics/russia-afghanistan-libya-syria/index.html ( 38) New York Times: “Taliban Attack Afghan Army Base, Killing Dozens”, April 21, 2017: https://goo.gl/MKV3cB (39) The Dawn: “ Bomb attack hits US base in Afghanistan’s Khost”, April 24, 2017: https://goo.gl/u4Vy1P (40) Time Magazine: “Suicide Car Bomb Kills at Least 18 in Afghanistan”, May 27, 2017: http://time.com/4796563/ afghanistan-suicide-car-bomb-taliban/ ( 41) Washington Post: « Trump gives Pentagon authority to set troop levels in Afghanistan”, June 13, 2017: https://goo.gl/jfDyGy ( 42) New York Times: “ Trump Administration Is Split on Adding Troops in Afghanistan”, May 23, 2017: https://goo.gl/0g2bA0 ( 43) “NATO: Quwat Izafiah Ila Afghanistan wa Takthif Alta’awon ma’ Uropa fi Mukafahat Alirhab,” The Londoner Middle East Newspaper, June 30, 2017. https://goo.gl/czgqVh ( 44) “Quwat Amrikiah ila Afghanistan Li’awal Marah Munzo 2014,” Alarabiyah News Website, April 30, 2017. https://goo.gl/7KpZYS

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Russian Economic Interests in Iran between Partnership and Sanctions Asma Hassan Alkhouli Specialist researcher in Energy and International Affairs

H

istorically, Russia-Iran relations have oscillated from cooperation and friendship to rivalry and conflict influenced by the international developments and self-interests of both countries. However, due to the current events in the Middle East, Moscow and Tehran have found accommodation and understanding based on their domestic priorities and external strategies. Iran believes that Russia is a balancing force to Western hegemony in the Middle East and has made significant concessions to Moscow while Russia strives to expand its influence in the Middle East and protect its strategic interests and economic cooperation with the Republic of Iran.

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The Russian position toward Iran is determined by several factors such as Iran severing relations with the United States, Russian national security, the Iranian nuclear deal, and Russian economic interests in this country. Indeed, Iran is an important economic partner for Russia. Russian government corporations, supported by President Putin and his administration, signed several agreements and maintained strong economic ties with Tehran (Kozhanov)1, which raises many questions about the reasons behind this rapprochement and its dimensions, fields, and reflections on both countries.

This research sheds light on the strategic importance of Iran for Russia. It handles the history of Russia-Iran relations to date, including the 2017 agreements on exchanging oil for food, the Iranian sectors Russia is willing to control, the strong military cooperation and the role both countries play in the Middle East crises, and the future of these relations.

First: The Iranian Strategic Importance for Russia Historically, Iran has been considered a vital geopolitical sphere and national interest for Russia. The Russian Caesar, Peter the Great,2 and all his successors expressed their will to access the warm waters of the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean via Iran. Although the Czarist time is over and the new Russian leaders have taken over the Russian presidency— and hold current beliefs regarding globalization, labor unions, and good neighboring relations—Peter’s principles about Russian interests still exist. These principles lead to constant border disputes with Iran to date but with no real confrontation on the ground because of mutual interests of both countries3.

Iran’s regional and international geopolitical importance is essentially twofold: 1- It bridges Mid and East Asia with West Asia and the Mediterranean Sea.

The Physiography of Iran

2- Its strategic position makes it able to blockade Hormuz Strait, a bottleneck on the world’s most important oil sea route.4 Specifically, Iran has approximately 2,500 kilometers of coastline along three major water bodies—the Arabian Gulf on the southwest, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean on the south, and the Caspian Sea on the north,—giving Iran a strategic location on international oil transport routes.5 Furthermore, Iran has the fourth largest oil reserve in the world after Siberia and the Arabian Gulf. This fact attracted Russia and its oil corporations to expand their investments in the Iranian oil fields to secure the Russian position in the world oil market and extend Source: The Geopolitics of Iran: Holding the Center of a Mountain Fortress, its influence in this globally https://goo.gl/v86XrM https://goo.gl/v significant region.6

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Second: Evolution of Russia-Iran Economic Relations Economic relations between the two countries are bound by politics and regional and international developments. Russia-Iran relations were severed after the Iranian revolution in 1979 until 1986 when the two nations resumed cooperation, signed a $15 billion agreement, and exchanged official visits on all levels.7 Russia-Iran relations peaked in 1995 when Moscow agreed to build the Iranian Bushehr nuclear plant after the withdrawal of Germany and Ukraine under American and Israeli pressure.

It also decided to build three more nuclear plants for approximately $2 billion by the end of the 1990s.8 Indeed, Iran believed that Russia was a strategic ally and a source of armament and support to diminish the international pressure on Tehran under the leadership of the United States.

Both countries signed multilateral agreements to supply Tehran with defensive arms and spare parts and to share the contentious Caspian Sea resources between the five countries overlooking this sea. They also rejected the presence of foreign forces in this region and agreed to extend a petroleum pipeline up to the Caspian Sea.9 In fact, Russia used the Iranian nuclear deal that allowed Tehran to take approximately $100–140 billion US of its frozen assets out of the country and the huge funds Iran would gain by resuming its oil exports after the lifting of sanctions imposed on Tehran because of its nuclear program.10 The oil for goods agreement between Iran and Russia reflects the Russian support of the Iranian torn-out economy. This agreement has been changed more than once since the beginning in 2014. At first, it stated that Russia was to buy 500 thousand barrels of Iran’s oil per day for $1.5 billion of goods per month. Nevertheless, the agreement was put on hold to avoid obstruction of the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group. In May 2017, Russia decreased the agreed-upon amount from 500 thousand to 100 thousand barrels of Iran’s oil per day in exchange for railroad equipment, heavy machinery, and aerial technology for 50% of total price while the remaining amount was to be paid in cash to Tehran.11 The Iranian persistence to continue its barter trade with Russia was the result of Tehran’s fears of the US’s divergent positions on the nuclear deal and the possibility of renegotiating its terms and increasing international sanctions and isolation of Tehran by the Trump administration. Indeed, the US position toward Tehran severed the Iranian economy and prevented it from reintegrating into the world economic system.

For example, the United States did not lift sanctions on Iranian economic sectors such as banking transactions, which prevented international banks from doing business with Iranian corporations. However, Russia took a middle ground between the West and Iran and resumed negotiations with Tehran on the 2014 agreements to enhance its economic ties and expand its influence and presence in the Middle East.

Third: Indicators of Cooperation and Trade Exchange Rates With the beginning of the second millennium, many Russian corporations started

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doing business with Iran in fields such as oil, gas, mining, steel, and automotive. This cooperation between the two countries steadily increased until it peaked in 2010–2011 for about $3.7 billion US with $3.4 billion US in favor of Russia.12 After the imposition of new Western sanctions on Iran in 2012, Iran broke from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system, leading to several problems for Russian corporations concerning the fiscal adjustment with their Iranian partners. This increased business running costs and decreased the bilateral trade exchange between the two countries to $1.5 billion in 2015.13 During the international sanctions on Tehran, the steel industry absorbed the biggest share of Russia’s exports to Iran. To settle the issue of foreign currencies and do the math, Russian steel manufacturers appointed international mediators. After the lifting of international sanctions, Russian corporations resumed their activities in Iran due to the removal of banking obstacles and limitations. Trade exchange between the two countries jumped from $1.2 billion in 2015 to approximately $2 billion in 2016, especially in armament, non-oil products, development of Iranian infrastructure14, and other industrial projects that amounted to $40 billion US.15 Furthermore, Russia and Iran signed customs agreements for the so-called “Green Passage” and exchanged data about the flow of goods between the two countries while the trade exchange jumped to $155 million per month in 2017.16 All in all, the International Monetary Fund registered 0.9% growth rate in Russia-Iran non-oil trade exchanges concentrated on wheat, barley, and rolled steel in 2016–2017.17 In December 2016, Russia and Iran agreed to use their national currencies in trade exchange, open corresponding accounts for the two credit foundations in the two countries, and discussed opening a joint Islamic bank to facilitate economic cooperation. They also agreed to counter money laundering and all funds received through illegal channels and financing of terrorism.18 However, the Iranian banking system is wholly based on the ‘’Islamic principles’’ that bind foreign companies, which might obstruct some of its banking agreements with Russia.

Fourth: Areas of Economic Collaboration between Russia and Iran Iran became a significant agricultural source for Russia, especially after European agricultural exports to Moscow were suspended as part of international sanctions due to Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Moscow strove to invest and open new markets in Asia, especially in Iran—the Russian gateway to expand its influence in the Middle East. Accordingly, Moscow sought to control many of Iran’s economic sectors due to Tehran’s need for foreign investments, funds, and new markets to promote economic recovery after long-term sanctions that harmed the Iranian infrastructure and economy. The fields of cooperation between Russia and Iran include the following: 1- Nuclear After the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the fall of Shah, the United States

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renounced developing Iran’s nuclear program, which provoked Tehran to turn to Russia to accomplish Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In 1995, Russia built the first and only Iranian nuclear plant in the city of Bushehr, which reached its full production capacity in 2012 and handed it over to Iran in April 2016. Moreover, Iran has another plan to commence the second and third plants in Bushehr in 2024 and 2026 respectively and expand the number to six nuclear plants later.19 Similarly, the Russian government agreed to supply Iran with an initial amount of nuclear fuel for $30 million US for the first stage of the Bushehr nuclear plant this year until the Iranian TEFL Corporation for nuclear industries starts producing material by the end of November 2017.20 This agreement would provide all Iran’s nuclear fuel needs and avoid the risk of transporting this crucial substance via Iran’s neighboring countries.

2- Military Russia played a major role in the Iranian nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 group, which ended with signing the nuclear deal in Vienna in July 2015. With the implementation of the terms of the deal and the lifting of the international sanctions on Tehran at the beginning of 2016, Russia agreed to supply Iran with the Russian S300 missiles—Iran’s strongest defense system after being prohibited by international sanctions21 for $800 million US. Russia handed them over to Tehran in April 2016.22 Furthermore, Russia and Iran are intensely involved in the Syrian civil war and fight side-by-side against the Syrian opposition despite the minor conflict of interests between both countries.

3- Energy In June 2017, Iran’s Deputy Minister for Trade and International Affairs, Alamir Hussein Zamani Nia, and the Russian Deputy Minister of Energy, Kirill Molodtsov, signed an agreement of cooperation in the energy sector. Tehran needs a significant investment to increase its exports of oil and gas because it has the third largest oil reserve in the world after Saudi Arabia and Siberia and the second largest reserve of gas after Russia. According to Zamani Nia, Iran could develop fifty oil and gas projects for about $185 billion US until 2020, which, along with Iran’s strategic location, represents a strategic priority for the Russian economic decision maker.23 Indeed, Iran’s lack of experience in this field and European companies’ fears about doing business with Tehran paved the way for Russian corporations to expand their businesses and control Iran’s energy sector. Russia and Iran have 50% of the world’s natural gas reserves, which motivated Moscow to invest in the Iranian oil and gas sectors to take the lead in this field and diminish the US’s attempts to reduce the Russian influence in Central Asia.24 Several times, Russia has rejected joining the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to avoid abiding by this organization’s rules and resolutions. Russia sought to control the Iranian, Iraqi, and Venezuelan oil sectors to use them as forces

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of pressure and face the policies of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that seek balance in the world oil markets.

4- Food supply In 2014, Russia resumed exporting wheat to Iran, who became one of the biggest importers of the Russian cereal crops later in 2016. To transport these products to Iran and Turkey, Russia and Azerbaijan agreed to establish the joint Azerustrans Corporation and build a grain terminal with an initial capacity of thirty thousand tons annually on the Azeri-Iranian borders to revive the Russian grain exports.25 Due to rising wheat prices and the decline of its exportation, Russia planned to build grain warehouses in Iran to lower the costs and decrease prices of this material by 20– 30% as stated by André Locanski, representative of the Russian sales to Iran.26 5- Pharmaceutical Industry In 2016, Russia and Iran signed a number of new contracts to make human flu vaccines and establish a medication factory for chronic and terminal illnesses in Iran27 and to produce a vaccine for the hepatitis-B for Iran in Russia.

6- Tourism Russia and Iran signed a tourism agreement to streamline procedures of visas between the two countries. With the depreciation of the ruble, the number of Iranian tourists coming to Russia increased. Almost 67 thousand Iranian tourists visited Russia in 2016, with a 72% growth rate in compared to the previous year, and the Russians expect the number to jump to about 100 thousand visitors in 2017.28 To attract Russian tourists to visit Iran, the Iranian government canceled visas on Russians coming into Iran; however, only about 25 thousand Russian tourists visited Iran in 2015.29 Indeed, Russia stands to benefit most from these procedures, and Iran is struggling to attract Russian tourists because of the nature of the Iranian regime and other limitations on the Russian tourists.

7- Heavy Industries and Infrastructure Projects In 2016, machinery replaced agricultural products as Russia’s top exports to Iran, representing 60% of total Russian exports to this country. In the same year, Russia agreed to grant Tehran a loan of $2.2 billion US to improve the Iranian infrastructure, establish a PowerStation in Bandar Abbas, and accomplish the Rasht-Astara railroad and electrification of Garmzar-Ensh Boron railroad line.30 Fifth: Future of Russia-Iran Economic Relations The Russia-Iran economic partnership is expected to boost in the next phase.

Russian president Vladimir Putin was one of the first presidents to congratulate Rouhani on winning the Iranian presidential election on May 19, 2017, and express willingness to improve the partnership on all levels—infrastructure, industry, energy, and banking. On May 18, 2017, the Iranian authorities stated that Iran and Russia had

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taken the first step toward combining credit card systems to streamline tourism, microenterprises, and visa requirements between the two countries.31 Russia is the greatest beneficiary of economic relations with Iran, but the following are some limitations on this cooperation32: 1- Lack of clear policies for constant cooperation. Russia and Iran negotiated many economic agreements and protocols; however, most of them are still unimplemented.

2- The Iranian regime’s nature, economic agenda, and military and security organizations’ control of the economic decision-making process in the country. These factors made Iran an unsafe environment for investment and drove the Russian and other countries’ corporations to abandon doing business with Tehran.

3- International sanctions on Iran and companies cooperating with this country.

Although Western countries signed the nuclear deal, they are still wary of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its hostile behavior in the Middle East. Indeed, the economic sanctions are a significant force against Tehran to stop its hostilities against its neighbors.

4- Russia-Iran historic relations. Historically, Russia has never been a close friend to Iran. It has been considered an occupying force and threat since the czarist times, which was evident when Russia renounced Iran and prioritized relations with the US and Europe during President Medvedev’s era.

5- Russia’s keenness to balance its relations with all rival powers in the Middle East.

As a strategic policy, Moscow tries to found a middle ground in its dealings with other influential powers in the Middle East such as Israel and the Gulf States, which could be the reason behind Russia’s limited cooperation in terms of nuclear energy with Tehran.

6- The drawback of the Russian economic indicators after the price of oil sunk to decade lows of about 60%. This decline hindered Russia’s ability to meet Iran’s requirements and needs for billions of US dollars and state-of-the-art technology for economic relief.

7- Banking transactions. Because of the problems facing banks in Iran, hindering them from returning to the international financial markets, Russian corporations are still reluctant about doing business with Iran for fears of international sanctions and a lack of a way to do transactions with this country.

The future of Russia-Iran relations is tied to domestic and external developments.

As soon as Tehran returns to the world market and recovers its economy after the lifting of all international sanctions, Russian corporations will be ready to enhance economic cooperation and do business with Iran. Additionally, Russia needs to improve its capabilities to meet Iran’s needs and battle with American and European companies that have means to access any big developing markets.

However, if the Iranian regime continues its hostile practices to destabilize the Middle East and challenges the international community by violating the terms of the

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nuclear deal, it will be exposed to more sanctions and isolation, which will drive all economic partners to cut off ties with Tehran. Furthermore, Iranian internal economic policies are controversial; the Iranian supreme leader calls for economic resistance and self-sufficiency while President Rouhani and his team of reformers call for openness and integration into the global economy. Indeed, the Iranian economy will remain disrupted and does not allow Russia or any other strategic partner to enhance economic ties other than military and strategic cooperation.

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Endnotes (1) Nikolay Kozhanov, “Russia’s Relations with Iran: Dialogue without Commitments,” The Washington Institute, June 17, 2017, https://goo.gl/wsQd8C. (2) ‘Peter the Great’, Peter I or Piotr Alexeievich Romanov was (born in 1672) in the Kremlin and (died in 1725).

Peter is the son of the Russian tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. He ruled Russia from 1682 as a successor for Vyodor III until his death in 1725. He also ruled Russia with his half-brother Ivan V., because the latter was suffering from diseases until 1696.

(3) Beizan Ezdi, “Madkhal Ila Alsiasah Akharijiah Lijamhouriat Iran Alislamiah” (Beirut: Aldar Althaqafah Publishers, 2000), 43–44.

(4) Firas Mohammed Ahmed Aljheishi, “Alistratijiah Aljadeedah fi Dhou’ Bi’ah Amniah Mutaghaierah” (Alakadimioun Publishers, 2015), 152–153.

(5) Hassan Alrashidi, “Iran Min Manzour Aljagrafiah Alsiasiah,” June 17, 2017.

(6) Iran: Iran- International- Analysis- U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA) https://goo.gl/vNGRY8.

(7) Fatma Alsomadi, Iran and Russia: partnership or strategic alliance? Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies, https://goo.gl/dpgXyj. (8) Mohammed Sadiq Isma’il (Ph.D.), “Min Alshah Ila Najad . . . Iran Min Ain Ila Ain?” (larabi Publishers, 2010), 251.

(9) Ibid, p. 251.

(10) Russia and Iran: economy in terms of politics, https://goo.gl/wGWsnG. (11) Mathieu Bodner, “Iranian-Russian Economic Agreement,” June 20, 2017.

(12) Trade exchange rate between Russia and Iran in 2015, https://goo.gl/AnEUQj. (13) Russian International Affairs Council Institute for Iran-Eurasia Studies: Russia-Iran Partnership: an Overview and Prospects for the Future, Moscow 2016, P.23. https://goo.gl/8ZR6es (14) Nikita Smagin: How Russia managed to double its exports to Iran in 2016, Russia Beyond The Headlines. https://goo.gl/rZ36WA. (15) Hussein Panahov: Russian Prospects for Iran in Post-Sanctions, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 19 February 2017, http://cutt.us/HGSYe. (16) Sputnik: Russia-Iran Trade Turnover Doubled in January. https://goo.gl/rH6LRE. (17) International monetary Fund: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2016 Article IV Consultation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. https://goo.gl/3Lr3hj.

(18) Iran and Russia discuss Islamic bank establishment, https://goo.gl/rucHB8.

(19) Iranian students’ news agency: Iran’s Bushehr N. plant 2nd unit’s start-up planned for October 2024. https://goo.gl/dsycyB (20) Press Service of TVEL JSC: TVEL JSC and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Agree on Reserve Batch of Nuclear Fuel Supply, 20 June 2017. https://goo.gl/XreCuH. (21) Financial Tribune: Russia to Supply Fuel for Bushehr Nuclear Plant. https://goo.gl/T3tDEq. (22) Iranian Labour News Agency ILNA : Russia is ready to make tanks in Iran. https://goo.gl/kgr2zP. (23) Al-Jazeera Net: Prospects for economic relations between Iran and Russia, https://goo.gl/db4qrS. (24) Hassan Alrashidi: Are Iran’s natural resources point of strength or weakness? https://goo.gl/WvocVP. (25) Logistic support: Russian grain supplies for Azerbaijan and Iran, https://goo.gl/gUsvKr & Russia Beyond The Headlines: How Russia managed to double its exports to Iran in 2016. https://goo.gl/JpVVRL (26) AGROINFO: Russia wants to increase wheat exports to Iran. https://goo.gl/dtvE8m (27) Sputnik: Drug Money, in a Good Way: Russia & Iran Launch Multimillion Dollar Pharma Deal. https://sptnkne.ws/eN9K. (28) Vestnik: Iran seeks balanced tourism ties with Russia – media. https://goo.gl/BSn5dN. (29) Financial Tribune Daily: Time to Attract Russian Tourists. https://goo.gl/QZ0Qty. (30) I. Ivanov: Russia-Iran Partnership: an Overview and Prospects for the Future: Report No. 29/2016, Russian International Affairs& Council Institute for Iran-Eurasian Studies, 2016 p.123. https://goo.gl/8ZR6es.

(31) Al-Monitor: Second-term Rouhani likely to move closer to Russia.https://goo.gl/wv4B9f.

(32) Nikolai Kozhanove, “‘The Vigilant Partnership,’ Changes of Russia-Iran Relations,” June 28, 2017, https://goo.gl/TxgVtT.

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