Journal for iranian studies%2c march2017

2 Year 1, issue 2- March. 2017

JOURNAL FOR IRANIAN STUDIES Specialized Studies

A Peer-Reviewed Quarterly Periodical Journal

Year 1, issue 2- March. 2017

www.arabiangcis.org

JOURNAL FOR IRANIAN STUDIES

A Peer-Reviewed Scientific Periodical Journal Issued in both Arabic and English Languages Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, Sahafah NBHD, Al-Takhassusi St. P.O. Box: 12275 | Zip code: 11473 For (JIS) Journal annual subscription, contact the Journal Email at: JIS@arabiangcis.com Individuals inside Saudi Arabia: 32 $ Individuals outside Saudi Arabia: 80 $ Institutes inside Saudi Arabia and Abroad: 160 $

ISSN: 1658-757X

Publishing Terms and Conditions •All submitted materials should be related to the Journal’s specialty.

•All materials should not have been published previously or is not under consideration for publication elsewhere.

•Margins and sources should be listed at the end of the submitted material.

•Acknowledgments, margins and sources are to be listed carefully with special focus on names and concepts.

Advisory Board Prof. Abdulhameed Alansari Prof. Ahmad Alshatheli Prof. Mohammed Alsaeed

•Citing all sources in the alphabetical order by author’s last name.

Prof. Mohannad Almobaideen

•All materials are preferred to be submitted electronically.

Prof. Radwan Assayed

•All submitted materials should be original; not copies.

Prof. Saleh Alkhathlan Prof. Yahia Ibn Junaid

•All submitted materials are not be returned back to their authors either accepted for publication or rejected.

•Reproduction of any of the materials of this Journal is prohibited without written authorization from the Journal’s editor-in-Chief.

•All materials are subject to extensive editing and refereeing before being considered for publication.

Abdulkarim Jaradat (PH.D.) Sultan Alnu’aimi (PH.D.)

Editor in Chief

Mohammed Alsulami (PH.D.) Editorial Board

Fathi Almaraghy (PH.D.) Mutasim Abdullah (PH.D.) Abdulrauf Alghoniemy Ahmed Leila Editorial Director Mahmoud Abu Alqasim Editorial Secretary Mahmoud Jumaa Art Direction Hani Yassin

CONTENTS • The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016 Mo’taz Salamah (Ph.D.) ...................................................................................... 8 • Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran Abdullah Bozkurt............................................................................................... 28 • The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes Karim Abdian (Ph.D.)..................................................................................................

42

• Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa Najla Mari (Ph.D.) .............................................................................................. 56 • Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Oppositionn Fathi Abu Bakr Almaraghi (Ph.D.)........................................................................70 • Turkey and Iran a regional cold war justified by economic interests Karam Said......................................................................................................... 84 • Demographic and Identity Changes in Syria and Iraq Mohammad Saied Alsayyad ........................................................................... 104

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

Mo’taz Salamah (Ph.D.) Chief of the Arabian and Regional Studies Unit and Head of the Arabian Gulf Program in Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies

S

ince the fifties in the last century, the Arab national security has been linked with the Arab-Israeli conflict after having been previously linked with foreign occupation and colonization for a long period of time. Although the Arab countries suffered severe losses at the hands of colonists during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Israeli threat emerged in the mid-twentieth century and constituted the most severe danger to the Arab national security from several perspectives, especially with reference to the fragmentation of the demographic and geographic extension of the Arab World.1

Journal for Iranian Studies

8

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

This situation lasted until other threats to the Arab national security emerged from other neighboring countries such as Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia. For decades, Turkey adopted a secular national trend until the mid-nineties when it resumed its historical Islamic ties driven by religious doctrines, the emergence of internal Islamic currents, and the rise of the Erdogan project or the so called, “The Neo-Ottomanism.” The Ethiopian threat to the Arab world was limited to the disagreement on Alnahdah Dam and the Egyptian and Sudan historical shares of the Nile waters in 2011. The Iranian threats to the Arab national security have materialized since the Iranian revolution in 1979, which has shaped one of the most important regional characteristics over the last four decades.

The Arab positions toward the Iranian revolution differed from one country to another. Some were optimistic about it due to the Iranian support to the Palestinian question and its hostile position against Israel and the West. They believed it would enhance the Arab position after the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel in 1979, while other regimes and thinkers were suspicious about its leaders and extremist trends.

They believed that the new Iranian foreign policy will be an extension of the Shah Policies and regional status as the Gulf policeman in favor of the Western nations.

The Iraqi-Iranian war from 1980-1988 materialized the Iranian threat to the Arab national security. Iran engaged in war with a Baath country that was considered one of the Arab nationalism castles and the Iraqi propaganda described its president Saddam Hussein as a guardian of the eastern gate of the Arab world. Although the war ended with an Iraqi semi-triumph and symbolic pride reflected in the national security through corroborating Iraq as a guardian and defender of the Arab eastern gate, Iraq lost most of its overall capabilities that excluded it from the Arab-Israeli conflict formula. In 1990, the Iraqi regime invaded Kuwait, leading to the “Desert Storm” war and liberation of this country followed by the Madrid Conference and the Arab-Israeli peace talks in 1991 seeking to reach a peaceful settlement for the Palestinian question. All in all, the Iraqi-Iranian war, the destruction of the Iraqi capabilities starting from 1991, and the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, have contributed to the emergence of Iran as one of the major sources of threat to the Arab national security.

I. The Serious Problems of the Arab National Security from 2011-2016 Studies specialized in the national security of the whole Arab world or the national security of each Arab country relied on a classical title referred to as the “determinants of the national security,” which is common in the scientific proposals and academic publications that handle the most influential internal, regional, and international factors and determinants of national security, so that countries can

Journal for Iranian Studies

9

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

decide on their policies toward this issue. In fact, the “determinants of the national security” are characterized by static and stalemate and concentrate on the following factors: the country’s geographic location; its political, economic, social, and demographic components; and the nature and model of its political leadership and cultural elite in order to approach the sources of threat to the Arab national security and how to react to any threat to their security.

In this study, we will discuss the problems and not the determinants of the Arab national security and the Arab conditions that have influenced the Arab position toward Iran and led to the increase of the Iranian influence in the Arab world. Since it is hard to include all the details related to the serious problems of the Arab national security in this study, we will cover the most important issues based on the extended Arab experience and the consequences of the Arab revolutions since 2011 that have contributed to the increase of the Iranian influence in the Arab countries as follows: 1. The Arab National Security: The Problem of the Concept Traditionally, the concept of the Arab national security has been linked to the whole Arab world security as one nation and not to the security of each Arab country separately. In the Arab mentality, the problem of the concept of the Arab national security is related to the security of the twenty-two Arab countries as one nation and one nationality away from the country. Hence, the concept of the Arab national security took the form of solidarity and emotions rather than pragmatism, mutual obligations, and practical plans and programs between different countries. Indeed, the Arabs had an inflated sense of unity and cooperation in the security issues rather than working to materialize any of their obligations on the ground. This has created inappropriate delusions of unity and cooperation during times of crisis and led to severe setbacks and disastrous decisions by some Arab regimes.

The national security of a group of countries cannot be established based on the belief in one nationality and one nation despite the availability of political acceptance and satisfaction among these countries. This concept is too broad and closer to a dream rather than reality. It creates a state of denial and insecurity and distracts people’s thoughts when they have to worry about tens of national questions outside their borders that negatively influences them politically and personally, which might in turn influence the state organizations as a whole and ends up as propaganda that cannot be achieved in reality.

2. Problem of Theorizing the Arab National Security The concept of national security of a country needs to determine the specific political borders of that country. But in the case of the national security based on

Journal for Iranian Studies

10

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

the concept of the “nation”, such as in the case of the Arab world and its twentytwo member countries it is difficult to determine those meant by this concept and their interpretation of it. It is possible that a group of countries can raise the slogan, “One for all; all for one,” which means that any threat to any of them is a threat to all countries such as in the case of the NATO countries and former Warsaw alliance, but the issue is different in the Arab world or the “Arab nation” because of the difficulty to materialize the many Arab goals and ambitions that go beyond reality, drawing the Arab national security closer to a utopian unrealistic concept.

In general, it is hard to form a national security concept for the Arab world.

However, this can be achieved upon agreeing on common threats and challenges to all Arab countries, which raises a big question about the Arab national security concept: Does the Arab national security refer to the security of each Arab country separately or, as some believe, the security of all Arab countries as one nation, which means that any threat to the national security of any Arab country is a threat to all Arab countries, and the enhancement of the national security of the Arab countries supports the whole Arab national security?2 The problem of this definition is that it does not rely on consolidating the common questions and identifying the sources of threat to the Arab national security. On the contrary, it relies on an aggregate number of threats to the security of each political unit without referring to the national security in its true sense. This false concept of the Arab national security prevailed over the past decades and regarded all Arab military capabilities as one unit in defending the Arab national security against Israel, which has never happened due to the differences between the Arab countries on determining the sources of threat to each Arab country.

3. Problem of the Arab Strategic Thinking Differences between the Arab elite, loyalty to different regimes, and the common factors between the Arab people are some reasons for the Arab national security problems. This could be behind the focus of the American researcher Harry R. Yarger on the scientific issues that determine the American national security and his complaint about the inability to form a convenient theory and strategy for the national security because of the laxity of rulers, public opinion, and the media to conduct specialized discussions and talks about the national security issues.

According to Yarger, all concerned with this issue are confused and do not know how to differentiate between politics, strategy, and planning. This situation severed because of the American mystified national media that usually misleads the American people. The local political rivalry usually complicates the situation and makes it difficult to conduct suitable constructive arguments and mobilize national consensus

Journal for Iranian Studies

11

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

in order to move the nation forward.3 Given the difficulty to theorize the American national security as stated by Yarger, how can twenty-two Arab countries come to an agreement on their political, economic, social, and media conditions in light of all the chaos and violence following the Arab revolutions?!

4. Conflict between the National (whole Arab nation) and State (each country separately) Security The twenty-two members of the Arab league identifying themselves as Arab countries, use this concept in their names and constitutions and acknowledge that the Arabic language is their official language.4 However, they are independent countries with different interests and policies that sometimes contradict and confront each other. This state of contradiction between the national and state security was established in the mid-forties during the establishment of the Arab official system and the Arab league despite the frequent repetition of the national security concept in the documents and resolutions of the Arab league, leaving this concept undetermined and immaterialized in practice. In fact, there is no specific definition for this concept or determinants of the sources of threat, and significant distribution of policies, duties, and goals between the Arab countries. What can be seen by an Arab country as part of the national security might be seen as a threat by another. In all cases over the history of the Arab system, the Palestinian question is the only factor that has achieved solidarity and conformity between the Arab countries. Nevertheless, it has been a point of dispute in terms of techniques and goals and one of the biggest conflict issues between the Arab regimes.5 5. The Arab-Arab Conflicts In addition to the dispute on the concept of the Arab national security, the contradiction between national and state interests, and disagreement on the central issues of the Arab system, the Arab-Arab conflicts broke out early thus questioning the possibility of forming a common concept for the Arab national security. The Arab countries have engaged in mutual conflicts with each other on the differences between the political regimes, conflicts over resources, borders, trends, and sponsoring opposition groups in other Arab countries. Some regimes confronted each other because of their different ideologies and approaches toward their internal situations and regional priorities. Many Arab countries interfered in others’ affairs and many others confronted each other directly or on the ground of a third country and many blocs emerged to face each other on some Arab questions. In fact, what harmed the Arab national security the most, was not the external threats but the internal conflicts between the Arab countries: royal and progressive, progressive with each other, the Arab conflicts on the Palestinian question, border disputes, regional

Journal for Iranian Studies

12

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

requirements, the Arab unity, foreign relations, and the security and economic issues of the Arab countries, which were concluded by the pioneer study about the ArabArab conflicts by Ahmed Yusuf Ahmed (Ph.D.).6 In addition to the emergence of the Arab-Arab conflicts as one of the largest detriments to the national security, most Arab cooperation and unity initiatives between the Arab countries have severely failed, such as Egypt and Syria 1958-1961, the integration attempts between Egypt and Sudan during the seventies, and the Arab Cooperation Council between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen in 1989 that was dissolved following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Furthermore, the attempts to establish a unified, confederate, or federal Yemen have been dwindling after the end of the Yemeni crisis. All in all, most attempts to unify the Arab national security concepts have failed, starting from the joint Arab defense treaty that was signed in the beginning of the fifties and has never been implemented, and the suggestion of the establishment of a joint Arab force by Egypt.

6. Problem of the Social and Sectarian Composition of the Arab Countries Many Arab countries are not demographically homogeneous and have diverse ethnic and sectarian groups such as Iraq and Syria. These are the two biggest Arab countries comprising such diversity and neighboring two interventionist countries, namely Turkey and Iran. In fact, the influence of the social composition of these two countries could have been limited inside their borders since they have no sectarian and ethnic intersections with other Arab countries. However, this case is different for Turkey and Iran that found it a good opportunity to use the explosive conditions in some Arab countries to serve their interventionist interests in the Arab world.

The Arab countries did not tend to resist the Turkish-Iranian expanding influence in relation to the internal affairs of Iraq and Syria, which has made it a one-sided interventionist relation and rendered the Arab countries vulnerable to threats rather than as sources of threats. The Arab countries submitted to their neighbors due to the internal pressure becoming a burden on the Arab national security and enhancing the interventionist position of their neighboring countries in the Arab affairs. For example, Iraq and Syria have become a burden on the Arab world when the regimes in both countries approached Turkey and Iran and enabled them to enhance their positions against the Arabian Gulf Countries. Moreover, the turbulent political state in the Arab countries since 2011 has paved the way for Iran to enhance its position in Iraq and Syria and harm the Arab national security in general. Indeed, Iran, as claimed by its politicians, is occupying four Arab countries and four Arab capitals are now under Iranian domination.

Journal for Iranian Studies

13

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

7. Unstable Arab Relations with Neighboring Powers It has been seven decades since the establishment of the Arab system. However, the Arab countries have never been able to form a joint and specific strategy toward relations with their regional neighbors. They cannot determine whether a country is a source of threat or a positive factor to the Arab national security and how to shift from alliance and friendship to rivalry and enmity. In fact, the Arab countries do not have a clear strategy on how to deal with other countries and the tools they should use with each of them. Since the beginning of the Arab system, the nationalism concept has dominated the Arab strategy toward their neighboring countries and looked at these countries from a hostile point of view driven by the foreign intervention in the Arab affairs, which has prevented the possibility of building stable relations with these countries. In case of disparity of the Arab policies toward their neighboring countries without matching the Arab resolutions toward these countries with real actions on the ground and taking into consideration the resolutions of the Arab summits and ministerial meetings that condemn the intervention of the regional powers in the Arab affairs, the reality and policies of the Arab countries contradict these resolutions. These differences were reflected on the positions of the Arab countries toward their neighboring countries and enabled them to engage with the concept of national security to a greater extent. For example, the most important Arab countries that adopted the Baath national doctrine were Syria and Iraq that have paved the way for Iran to infiltrate into the Arab world and approach Tehran more than any other Arab country. The Turkish relations with some Arab countries also seem strong in spite of its position toward Egypt following June 30th. Hence, a different picture of the Arab-Turkish and Arab-Iranian relations can be drawn that oscillates between friendship, tension, and hostility, cold, and normal relations.

This resulted in a lot of turbulence in relation to the concept of the Arab national security and established the foundations for big contradictions between theory, application, and practices. The whole situation ended up with the inability of the Arab League to design a strategy for the Arab relations with the regional powers, which is evident through the abrupt and contradicting suggestions over the recent years such as the initiative of the Secretary-General of the Arab League at that time Amro Mousa in 2010 when he suggested to establish an Association of Neighboring Countries between Turkey and Iran.

8. Disparity of the Foreign and Defense Relations of the Arab Countries The Arab countries have different relations with the international powers. In the sixties, some Arab countries enjoyed strong relations with the former Eastern camp (Warsaw Alliance and the former Soviet Union), while other Arab countries had

Journal for Iranian Studies

14

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

defense and security links with the Western camp (NATO and the United States). These varying relations with the international powers had influenced the Arab countries decisions during the cold war period. Due to the different views on the major Arab question the Palestinian question they had different views on their national security, starting from their differences on ending the Arab-Israeli conflict and settlement that continued even after the end of the cold war and collapse of the Warsaw Alliance.

Although most Arab countries approached the West, specifically the United States, most radical Arab regimes such as the Iraqi and Libyan regimes have collapsed, and the complication of the future of the Syrian regime and collapse of what was called the axis of resistance, the Arab countries continued to have different international ties, armament contracts, military doctrines, and size and kind of obligations toward their national security issues in light of these contrasting international relations. As a result, the Arab relations with different international powers have severed the Arab inability to undertake their obligations toward their national security even among countries with the same international directions and ties. Although the directions of the Arab league have been recently influenced by the changes of power in the West, it has submitted to the Western influence and international role in the Arab affairs, which was apparent in its position toward the Syrian, Libyan, and Yemeni crises, leading to the continuation of the Arab differences on the role of the international military powers in the Arab region.

II. Models of the Iranian Threat to the Arab National Security There are seven models for the Iranian threat to the Arab national security since the Iranian revolution in 1979. Iran has adopted these seven models based on its awareness of the aforementioned conditions of the Arab national security as follows: 1. Distraction of the Arab system from its central issue “The Palestinian Question” Despite the negative consequences of the Iraqi-Iranian war on the national security of the Arab world during the eighties, Iran cannot bear responsibility for tipping the balance of power between the Arab countries and Israel; basically, the Iraqi military power was not directed toward Israel at that time; had the Iraqi-Iranian war not happened, the Iraqi military power would have been directed toward the GCC countries with the hostile trends of Saddam Hussein. However, through the real and materialistic calculations and by considering that the Saddam Hussein Iraq would not adopt expansionist ambitions in its neighboring countries, the Iraqi-Iranian war led to the enforcement of a discrepancy between the Gulf security and the Arab national security.7

Journal for Iranian Studies

15

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

The war has declined the status of the Palestinian question as a central case for the Arab system. The Palestinian conditions ended up worse than before, which was apparent not only through the size of the lost military effort that was directed toward Iran for almost one decade instead of Israel, but also through the Arab League resolutions and pacts that revealed that the Iraqi-Iranian war had diminished the Arab League efforts toward the Palestinian question, which was announced in the resolutions of the Arab summit in Jordan in 1987. The summit discussed the significant risks of the Iranian practices for the Arab national security that overwhelmed the Zionist threat and gave the Iraqi-Iranian war priority over the Arab-Israeli conflict.8 This war which divided the GCC countries between two regional powers resulted in a different road map for the Gulf security. When the war erupted, the GCC countries rejected any foreign intervention in the region and involved the necessity to shield the region from international conflicts, and especially from the presence of any foreign military fleets and installations9 sailing the Gulf waters at that time; consequently, the Iraqi-Iranian war was the main reason for taking the Gulf security away from the Arab national security.

During the eighties, a period that witnessed the Iraqi-Iranian war, Israel achieved military superiority over the Arab world and launched a lot of military attacks on the Arab countries such as the attack on the Iraqi nuclear plant Oziraq in 1981, Lebanon in 1982, and Tunisia in 1985. The war also caused a big rift between the two Baath countries, Iraq and Syria as a result of the Syrian supporting position to Iran.

2. Restricting the Military Power of the Gulf Countries in the Arab Military Effort One of the roles Iran played in harming the Arab national security over the years from 1979-2016 is that it contributed to the exclusion of the Gulf military capabilities from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the GCC countries did not provide significant military contributions in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of their limited capabilities in the seventies, they provided significant support to the Arab defense capabilities in the 1967 and 1973 wars.

The role of the GCC countries in the Palestinian question can be defined on the basis of four directions: the contribution to the military effort, economic support to the countries of confrontation and to Palestinians, using the influence of oil, and introducing political initiatives, which would have been more influential in the ArabIsraeli conflict had the Iranian threat not surfaced.

The Iranian adoption of the principle of exporting the revolution led to the involvement of the GCC countries in their security. The political and media means

Journal for Iranian Studies

16

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

of the Gulf spent a lot of time on confronting the Iranian media and its efforts to destabilize the internal security of the Gulf countries. Iran sought to enhance its regional legitimacy through supporting the Palestinian question against, allegedly, their mutual enemy, Israel. However, this conformity on the mutual enemy diminishes when it comes to the national interests of each side.10 The necessity of founding a common ground between its principles and political interests made Tehran adopt a different strategy from that of the Arab countries. Iran has never contributed to the Arab efforts toward the Palestinian question. It did not enter the Arab-Israeli conflict through the Arab gate but through rivalry and the implementation of a parallel confrontational military line that, in most cases, confronted the Arab countries rather than Israel. Tehran supported the opposition movements in the Arab countries against the national trend and the Palestinian official line, which diminished the Arab capabilities and embarrassed the Palestinians due to their inability to balance their relations with the GCC countries that had always supported the Palestinian question, and Iran that approached and helped them but entered a state of rivalry and conflict with the GCC countries.11 3. Enhancement of the Relations with Minor Groups against the National State The most dangerous policies adopted by Iran were constituted by its nonrecognition of the official and legitimate national authorities of the Arab countries and adoption of an interventionist trend in the Arab internal affairs. The Iranian relations with the Arab countries have never been official or based on mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s affairs. Iran has interfered in the internal affairs of the Arab countries and followed discriminating policies between people of the same country in order to escalate tension and destabilize the security of these countries.

It also established proxy groups under the allegiance of the Shiite sect superiority, which has torn out many of the Arab countries and flooded them with violence. The nature and doctrine of the Iranian expansion in the Arab countries prove that Iran has relied on the belief that capabilities and quality overcome quantity either by subjugation or by dispersing, which Iran has implemented in more than one Arab city in Syria and Iraq, such as Baghdad, Najaf, Mosel, Hums, Aleppo, and Damascus. All in all, some people believe that this war is clearly targeting the Arabian demography and changing the Sunni Arab majority into a minority in their countries.12 The Iranian strategy adopted by the Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian groups before and after 2011, and with Yemen after 2011 is a clear model for its dispersing policies against the Arab national entities. The Iranian relations with the official governments in these countries resulted in creating sectarian groups fighting their national countries in favor of Iran and its political and sectarian trends. Iran has

Journal for Iranian Studies

17

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

established sectarian militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen on the basis of the Hezbollah model.13 The Iranian interference in the Arab internal affairs became clear through the Iranian reaction to the decision of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to execute Sheikh Nimer Al-Nimer in January 2016, which led to attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad, in addition to the support of the Shiite sect to the Iranian position expressed by the head of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah.

In fact, in recent years the Iranian practices - in addition to other factors - have deprived the Arab world from any opportunity to unite based on a strong national basis and come up with a unanimous strategy toward the Palestinian question. The Arab world has remained divided for decades between the axis of moderation and the axis of resistance. When the countries of the axis of resistance had fallen down mainly Iraq and Syria - Iran has built a substitute axis and adopted a strategy against the Arab unity. Iran has taken control of some Arab countries and penetrated their social compositions, leading to the breakdown of the Arab world and emergence of obstacles against its unity by escalating tension between their sectarian and social components and dissemination of the Shiite ideology. Consequently, most Arab countries have become hesitant to build strong relations with Iran and cut their relations with this country. In 2016, Algeria expressed its fears from the Shiite expansion when the head of the Algerian Islamic council warned against the destabilization of the Algerian unity. The Algerian minister of religious affairs also stated that some currents are trying to penetrate the Algerian society such as Al-Ahmadi and the Shiite doctrines and complained about the sectarian invasion of his country.14 Moreover, the head of Alsahwah Alhurra Alsalafiah in Algeria also accused the Iranian embassy of spreading the Shiite ideology on the basis of octopus approaches.15 In January 2016, some Algerian activists launched a campaign to expel Amir Mousavi, the attachĂŠ in the Iranian embassy because of his active role in spreading the Shiite doctrine under the pretext of economic rapprochement between the two countries.16 Furthermore, the Egyptian frequent procrastination of rapprochement with Iran for security purposes sought to avoid any damage to the national components resulting from the dissemination of the Shiite ideology.

As for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it cut its diplomatic relations with Iran from 1987-1991 due to the bloody confrontations in Mecca after the Iranian pilgrims had gone on violent demonstrations. The Kingdom of Morocco also cut its relations with Iran in 2009 after accusing it of attempting to change the Moroccan essential identity and undermining the Sunni Malki doctrine in Morocco, which was considered to be an unacceptable interference in the Moroccan affairs and to violate the diplomatic principals and ethics. In the first half of 2015, the Yemeni legitimate government

Journal for Iranian Studies

18

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

decided to expel the Iranian Ambassador in Sana’a and withdraw the Yemeni Charge’ d’affaires in Tehran in order to express its rejection of the Iranian support to the Houthi rebels against President Abdraboh Mansour Hadi.

4. Supporting Internal Groups and Organizations and Espionage cells The aforementioned forms included the Iranian political and sectarian trends that represented the general form of the Iranian interventionist policies. The Iranian activities harming the Arab national security took real forms on the ground of the GCC countries, which is evident in the tens of incidents announced by them, blaming Iran for being behind these events in an attempt to destabilize the security of the Gulf countries and establish surveillance and violent cells and networks. These incidents repeated frequently in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia and resulted in the arrest of violent and surveillance cells for Iran, which has led to the distraction of the internal security agencies in the GCC countries.

The ministries of Internal Affairs of the GCC countries casted documented accusations toward Iran. The Saudi Crown Prince and Minister of Internal Affairs, Prince Mohammed Ibn Nayef delivered a speech in front of the General Assembly during the annual session of the United Nations on September 21, 2016. His speech was comprehensive and expressive when he confirmed that the Kingdom had been exposed to more than 100 terrorist attacks since 1992, eighteen of which were triggered by elements linked to regional countries. The speech of the Bahraini Foreign Minister in front of the General Assembly on September 26, 2016, was more open when he accused Iran of attempting to destabilize its peace and security, noting that Tehran is still interfering in the region through terrorist groups and militias.

5. Promoting Sectarianism in the Arab World to Materialize the Sunni-Shiite Polarization The Iranian trend toward promoting sectarianism in the Arab world has been linked to the Iranian revolution and clergy. At a when the time the world is oriented towards building modern democratic countries and diminishing the domination of the religious organizations and religious discourse, Iran is using history and past events to revive the sectarian theocracy in many of the Arab countries in order to enhance its political influence in these countries.17 The religious references and political leadership seek to spread the Shiite ideology in order to enhance the sectarian and political loyalty to Iran by using the soft powers of the Iranian cultural tools and influence in the Shiite districts through the revival of the Hawzah activities in Qum and restriction of the power and status of Al-Najaf Hawzah, establishing Shiite Hawzas in some Arab countries, building Husseini as, and promoting the Iranian Shiite doctrine in the these countries. Furthermore, Iran has the biggest media in

Journal for Iranian Studies

19

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

the region; there is an official commission supervised by the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Republic that oversees the media policies for all TV and radio channels in the country in a way that resonates with the state’s tendencies.18 Since the beginning of the Arab revolutions in 2011, Iran has adopted a policy of sectarian conflicts through the slogans of the “Holy Jihad”, which resulted in broad enlistment campaigns for the Jihadist brigades belonging to the Revolutionary Guards in some turbulent Arab countries, especially Iraq and Syria. Iran has also attracted and enlisted the Shiite Jihadist groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central Asian countries under the pretext of fighting the armed Salafi groups in Iraq and Syria in a way that retrieves the historical sectarian conflicts in the Arab countries.

These policies might be an introduction for an Iranian regional project to establish the Shiite crescent with a regional leadership surrounded by four Arab countries under the Iranian influence, facing a Sunni axis headed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which would be the biggest sectarian rupture in the history of the region.

Despite the many calls of the rational powers of both sects that warn of this kind of conflict, the majority of the followers of both sects go after their religious references, which might lead to a more comprehensive war in the region in a way that the current battles fought by groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Abu Alfadl-Alabbas brigade, the Zainabioun brigade, the Fatimioun brigade, ISIS, Fath Alsham, and Ahrar Alsham will be seen as minor threats compared with the upcoming war.

The Saudi-Iranian disagreement over the Hajj of 2015 and 2016, the Iranian calls to internationalize the Hajj and the holy places, and the Iranian calls to take up Najaf and Karbala instead of Mecca and Medina could serve as an introduction for bigger disagreements in the region. Although the war machine is functioning in the Gulf and in the Eastern Arab countries, no Arab country will be excluded from its consequences. These events can be repeated as a carbon copy in all Arab countries through small models of sectarian conflicts, leading to bigger ones.

The critical point in this instance lies in the emergence of signs of a combination of the Sectarian Jihadists with terrorism following the eruption of the Arab revolutions, which paved the way for Iran to expand its influence in the region.19 This point was highlighted by the Secretary-General of the Arab Interior Ministers when he stated in his speech in the 19th Arab summit for countering terrorism that the most dangerous factor to escalate tension in the Arab world is constituted by the disgusting sectarian calls raised by some regional powers in order to weaken the Arab nation.20

Journal for Iranian Studies

20

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

6. Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction The Iranian nuclear ambitions have created many critical challenges to the GCC countries more than to any other Arab country, and especially to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; a nuclear Iran would be a serious threat to the kingdom, which made the Saudi officials emphasize the necessity of possessing nuclear weapons no matter the cost is in case Iran achieves its nuclear ambitions.

During the years of negotiations between Iran and the West over its nuclear program, the GCC countries worried that the deal might be concluded at their expense and enhance the Iranian position in the region and in the world. After closing the Iranian nuclear deal, some were skeptical about its consequences since some terms allow Iran to possess nuclear power in the long run. So far, the GCC countries are still looking forward to the results of the deal and groping some of its negatives in light of the change of the American policies and alliances - specifically during the Obama administration - that approached Iran at the expense of the GCC countries.

7. Direct Military Intervention in the Arab Crisis Areas after 2011 The Iranian models of a threat to the Arab national security do not correlate with the previous models of threat and indirect intervention. Following the Arab revolts in 2011, Iran has adopted new models of threat, such as the direct military intervention of the RG forces and commanders in the Arab crisis countries. This new model includes direct Iranian military intervention through commanders and elements of the RG forces to set the military plans, run the battles, and change the balance of power in the Arab crisis countries. The RG forces work outside Iran through the Al Quds Division, specifically in Iraq and Syria.21 In recent years, the presence of Qasem Suleimani, the commander of the Al-Quds Division and his movement between Iraq and Syria, has become usual and broadcasted by the media and satellite channels periodically. In the battle of the Syrian Aleppo, the RG elements played a major role in the artillery effort in the eastern part of this city and established a security committee in Aleppo that included a number of the RG commanders.22 On the other hand, many of the RG elements and commanders were killed in the battles in Syria. Some estimates revealed the killing of about 300 Iranian military individuals since October 2015 until July 2016 in battles with what Iran calls, “Takfiri groups to defend the religious shrines�. In fact, Iran believes that its presence in Iraq and Syria is part of its national security, which is evident in the statement of the commander of the protection in the RG forces, General Gharji Zadah when he stated that those defending the religious shrines did not go to Syria to defend Bashar Assad, but to defend the existence of Iran, asserting that they should not wait until the arrival of enemies on the borders of his country, but should instead go after them where they are.23

Journal for Iranian Studies

21

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

The major impact of the Iranian policies on the Arab national security since the Iranian revolution in 1979 is that Iran has been one of the major obstacles facing the development of a significant Arab national security system. Iran contributed to the separation of the GCC countries from the Arab national security system and posed a serious threat to the GCC countries that devoted their efforts to protecting themselves from the Iranian intervention. Iran also escalated tension in the region and raged serious internal conflicts in most Arab countries. Despite the other factors behind this regional turmoil, Iran has become - since the beginning of the third millennium - the main concern to the national security of the GCC countries. In light of the aforementioned seven models of the Iranian threat to the Arab national security, it can be said that the republic of Iran has been a wrangler neighbor to the Arab world, specifically to the GCC countries through its continuous threats and intervention in the affairs of the Arab world.

II. Scenarios of the Arab Reactions Toward Iran It is important for the Arab world to think about alternative scenarios for dealing with Iran and enhancing their national security. The possible scenarios for the ArabIranian relations from the Arab national security perspective can be summarized as follows: 1. Continuation of the current model of conflict (proxy wars and presence in the turbulent countries) This means the continuation of the Iranian confrontation and interventionist trend in some Arab countries, an increase of the sectarian polarizing policies in the region, and continuation of the current conflicts using the same techniques and tools in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, which would extend conflicts and exhaust the Arab and Iranian capabilities. This scenario would tear both sides apart through proxy battles that engage armed groups and organizations cloaked in sectarianism with unlimited capabilities to continue fighting as long as they receive materialist and military support from their sponsors.

In this case, the Arab-Iranian relations will remain at the level of the proxy wars and a direct Iranian presence in the crisis countries without any Arab military mobilization. Furthermore, the cost of war will be expensive on both sides, especially with the current regional armament race and the Iranian constant threat to the Arab national security under the seven aforementioned models. If we take the Iranian nuclear deal and its influence in lessening tension between Iran and the West and its rapprochement with the international community into consideration in light of the deterioration of oil prices and the GCC governmental austerity policies, we can imagine a scenario in which Iran controls the Arab national security, while the Arab

Journal for Iranian Studies

22

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

capabilities deteriorate and become insufficient to continue this confrontation.

Consequently, Iran would continue its pressure on the Arab national security and the Arabs would be unable to adopt a clear unanimous strategy toward Iran, which would enhance the Iranian threat to the Arab national security that started in 1979 following the Iranian revolution.

2. More Regional Military Confrontations Iran might undertake more hostile behaviors through its attempts to explore the possible policies and capabilities in the region. As a result, the operations of the RG forces might increase the open conflict frontiers between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. This situation will force the GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, to proceed with the confrontation, which suggests an increased number of confrontational models than before. This point is supported by the fact that the Iranian nuclear deal - should it survive - will allow Iran to return back its frozen assets, enabling it to expand more in the Middle East and in other regions.24 This new Iranian status will most likely enhance the Iranian domination of the central government in Iraq, the Iraqi security forces, the sectarian militias, and some Iraqi oil fields, which are the most productive oil fields in the Middle East.25 Iran can also increase its influence in the Arab peninsula, which means surrounding the GCC countries that might lead to more proxy wars on the borders of the Arab peninsula.26 The importance of this scenario will come clear after the disclosure of the position of the US president Donald Trump, who is most likely to adopt a hostile policy toward Tehran and warmer and strategic relations with the GCC countries. The value of this scenario basically lies in its opposition to the analyses between the increases of the Iranian hostile behavior against the GCC countries and the Iranian nuclear ambitions.27 Despite the nuclear deal, this scenario refers to the fact that the Iranian hostile policies will continue due to the Iranian political and sectarian doctrines. Most likely, the GCC countries would push the Trump administration for a direct confrontation with Iran. But if Trump decides to launch a comprehensive war against Tehran, the GCC countries are most likely to adopt a neutral position, which is considered to be far from reality. However, the GCC countries would prefer the restoration of the economic sanctions on Iran that were repealed by the former US president Obama, which proved their significance and influence over military operations.28 In light of this scenario, the Arab disagreement on Iran might materialize thus leading to the transformation of the Arab inability to adopt a unanimous position toward Iran to a stage of testing and sorting of positions. Some Arab countries might find themselves unable to respond to the Iranian practices and collaborate with Iran

Journal for Iranian Studies

23

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

against the Arab national security in order to return the Iranian favor when it supported them during their own crises driven by sectarian motivations,or as a response to some internal challenges caused by the Iranian intervention.

3. Settlement and Negotiations (Regional Talks) Although the escalation of tension is the most possible scenario in the Gulf region based on the experience from the previous decades, settlements and negotiations between Arabs and Iran are still possible although unprecedented. One reason for the escalation of tension between the Arabs and Iran goes back to the changes of the American policies during the era of former president Obama. The tendency of the Trump administration toward a comprehensive war and direct confrontation with all sides in a torn-out region for decades might force them to change their policies and understand the importance of regional coexistence.

Certainly, confrontation is the least desirable option for the GCC countries in spite of their chronic conflict with Iran. During the Obama administration, the United States encouraged the Arabs and Iran to hold significant talks and practical negotiations, which were supported by some Iranian officials such as foreign minister, Mohammed Jawad Zarif.29 Although the last days of the Obama administration witnessed disagreement between the US and the GCC countries and rapprochement between Washington and Iran, the Iranian experience with the United States might coerce Iran to change its policies toward the region, proxy wars, and cold war with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is supported by the fact that interests overwhelm ideologies.

In fact, the Iranian practices reflect the Iranian red lines driven by ideologies, but the Iranian decision-makers might tend to adopt more practical policies of negotiations and settlement than the Iranian trends,30 which have been significantly enhanced following the Trump administration’s hostile trend toward Iran.

Iran is on the threshold of a dramatic internal change that might alter the foundations of its mutual relations with other countries. It is waiting for serious changes in the event of the death of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the presidential elections in May 2017. On the Arab side, the next years to come might witness a serious change in the internal conditions and policies of the GCC countries as a result of the decline in oil prices and their tendencies to adopt new internal policies. All these factors invite both Iran and the GCC countries to reconsider their goals and positions toward each other.

These changes would topple down the formula of the aforementioned models of the Iranian threat to the Arab national security, which might lead to cooperation and agreement rather than sectarian hostility in the Iranian position toward the Arab

Journal for Iranian Studies

24

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

countries, thus leading to the resumption of good relations between both sides.

The Kuwaiti (Gulf) initiative toward Iran in January 2017 and the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Oman and Kuwait in February 2017 are considered to be the beginning of either good future relations between the Arabs and Iran or of a setback predicting failure in achieving any change in the Arab-Iranian relations.

Recommendations There are some recommendations in order to limit and face the sources of the Iranian threat to the Arab national security such as: 1. Any Arab strategy toward Iran should reject reliance on any religious sectarian factors and confirm that the Arab political positions toward Iran results from the Iranian sectarian policies and attempts to build its political system on a sectarian basis, which is evident in the Iranian claims that the Arab hate towards Iran results from its religious doctrine that enables it to promote false propaganda in the Shiite societies in some Arab countries. Basically, the most important point is to expose and reject the Iranian policies.

2. Break Iran down in terms of politics and concepts and adopt diverse strategies for dealing with Tehran that do not antagonize all of Iran, including the internal opposition that rejects the regime’s policies and supports the Arab case. This opposition comprises not only the Iranian Sunnis, Shiite Arabs, and ethnic minorities, but also some of the internal and external oppositions from the Persian ethnicity to keep acquainted with the Iranian internal conditions not for conflicts and fragmentation, but in order to strengthen relations with the Arab friends in Iran, such as the open-minded clergy and politicians.

3. Avoiding tension and conflict with the Iranian proxy states in the Arab world in order to obstruct the Iranian project of building an Iranian supporting camp in the Arab region through restoration. This might include adopting new strategies toward Iraq and Syria and remodeling them from a new Arab perspective in order to bring them back as influential elements in the Arab system rather than to enhance the Iranian influence.

4. Eliminate the regional attempts to put Israel on the line of the Arab-Iranian relations, which promotes the Iranian image in the Arab world. It is noted that the Israeli policies and part of the Arab policies which consider Iran as a common enemy for both Israel and the Gulf countries. This underestimates the GCC countries’ position toward Iran from the Arab point of view and does not support the general position of the Arab world in its relations with Tehran that can mobilize political, social, and media proxies for its own interests.

Journal for Iranian Studies

25

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

Endnotes 1. Hassan Naf’ah (Ph.D.) paper, Alamn Alqawmi Alarabi Bain Akhtar Almadhi Wa Tahadiyat Alhadhir Wa Afaq Almustaqbal, The Arab Future Journal, The Arab Unity Studies Center, August 2015 http://www.caus.org.lb/PDF/EmagazineArticles/mustaqbal_438_hassannaf3a.pdf 2. Nizar Mu’aiyad Jazan (Ph.D.), Muhadharat fi Alaman Alqawmi nAlarabi http://www.ina.edu.sy/tbl_images/FileLectures16-7-2014-747.pdf 3. Harry R Yarger, The Strategy and the National Security Professionals: The Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the Twenty 21st Century- the Emirates Center for Strategic Research and Studies, Abu Dhabi, 2011, page 15 4. Altajani Alhamzawi, Dawlah Arabia... Muhawalah Lilta’reef, Donia Alwatan, March 7, 2016, https://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content/print/396498.html 5. This is what was revealed by Ahmed Yousuf Ahmed’s (Ph.D.) study, “Alsira’at Alarabiah –Alarabiah 1945-1981,” a survey study, the Arab Unity Studies Center: Beirut, May 1996, page 152-153.

6. Ibid, pp. 145-158.

7. The concept of the Arabian Gulf security was mentioned for the first time in the Arab summit resolutions in Fez, Morocco 1982 following the Iranian revolution in 1979, which means that the Shah’s ambitions in the region and his relations with the US were not annoying the Arab official system as much as those of the new Iranian regime. See Ahmed Yousuf Ahmed (Ph.D.), Alamn Alqawmi Alarabi, Dorous Alkhibrah Almadiyah Wa Mu’dilat Alwad’ Alrahin, the Arab Parliament, Political and Foreign Affairs and national Security Committee, June 2007, page 9.

8. Ahmed Yousuf Ahmed (Ph.D.), “Qadiyat Alarab Alola fi Majlis Aljam’ah,” Alitihad newspaper, March 12, 2013. http://www.alittihad.ae/wajhatdetails.php?id=71334 9. The final statement of the first two cycles of the Higher Council of the GCC countries in their summits in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh November 25-26, 1981. https://goo.gl/mAJ1L8 10. Abdulqadir Tafish, Iran Wa Alqadiyah Alfilisteniah: Alwaqi’ Wa Almutagairat, Aljazeera Studies Center, December 13, 2012 http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/reports/2012/12/2012121373958469610.html 11. Ahmed Yousuf (Ph.D.), Iran Wa Alqadiyah Alfilisteniah Bain Atifat Aldin Wa Istrategiat Alsiasah, the Palestinian Sama News Agancy, August 17, 2013 12. Mustafa Fahs, Hawadirina Almudamarah fi Safar Altamadud Alirani, the Middle East Newspaper, November 3, 2016.

13. See the article of Abdulrahman Alrashid, Yemen: Kaifa Nata’amal Ma’ Alhouthi, the Middle East Newspaper, November 1, 2016.

14. Qalaq Jaza’iri Mina Almad Alshi’i… Malaf Alta’ifah Alahmediyah Amam Alqada’ Qareeban, the Middle East Newspaper, October 19, 2016.

15. Altashaiu’ fi Aljaza’ir, Alta’seel Center for Research and Studies, Alburhan website, May 4, 2015 http://www.alburhan.com/Article/index/8616 16. Hameed Ghamrasah, Algeria… Hamlah Litard Diplomaci Irani Yas’a Linashr Altashaiu’ Alarabia website, January 25, 2016 https://goo.gl/PGvz6E

Journal for Iranian Studies

26

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The Iranian Threat Models to the Arab National Security 1979-2016

17. Arab and Muslim National Security: Debating the Iranian Dimension, Cordoba Intellectual Revisions, Series briefing Paper no. 2, 11 January 201, p. 3. http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/attach/CIR_EngArabic_09_WEB.pdf 18. Radwi Ahmed Abduljalil, Alistrategiah Aliraniah Tijah Almantiqah Alarabiah fi Alfatrah 2003-2015: studying the “IraqiLebanese” casefiles, the Arabian Democratic Center http://democraticac.de/?p=41389 19. Ephraim Kam, “Iran and the Turmoil in the Arab World” in Yoel Guzansky and Mark A. Heller Editors, One Year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications, the Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum 113. page43.

20. An Arab meeting in Tunisia to study countering terrorism and the consequences of the problem, the Middle East Newspaper October 19, 2016.

21. The Iranian IRGC commander: 200 thousand soldiers in 5 countries in the region, the National Council for Resistance, January 2, 2016 22. Sa’ad Almas’oudi, Hazihi Hia Militiat Alharas Althawri Alati Qatalat fi Halab, Alarabia website December 21, 2016.

23. Revolutionary Guards: We fight in Syria to protect Iran, Aljazeera website, July 23, 2016 24. General James Conway, USMC (ret.) and General Charles Wald, Assessment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Strategic Consequences for U.S. National Security, JINSA’s Iran Strategy Council, September 2015, p.7. http://www.jinsa. org/files/StrategicConsequencesforU.S.NationalSecurity.pdf 25. Ibid, p.8.

26. Ibid, p.8.

27. See: Alireza Nader, Iran After the Bomb: How Would a Nuclear-Armed Tehran Behave? RAND Corporation. National Security Research Division, 2013, pp. vii - viii.

28. Abdulrahman Alrashid, Hal Naseer Khalf Trump? The Middle East Newspaper, February 16, 2017.

29. See: Payam Mohseni(Editor), Iran and the Arab World after the Nuclear Deal, Rivalry and Engagement in a New Era, The Iran Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, August 2015, pp. 1-2. http:// belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Impact%20on%20Arab%20World%20-%20Web.pdf 30. Rouzbeh Parsi,The Middle East and the Deal: In Search of a New Balance, In: Paolo Magri and Annalisa Perteghella (Editors), Iran After the Deal: the Road Ahead, The Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), First edition: 2015 p. 74. http://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/Iran_after_the_Deal.pdfedition.pdf http://cutt.us/Kmdiv

Journal for Iranian Studies

27

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

Abdullah Bozkurt Researcher in the Iranian Affairs

B

usiness, trade and investment ties between Turkey and Iran, two competing powers in the region with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $1.14 trillion1, have been thwarted for decades from unleashing their full potential mainly by the protectionist policies pursued by the Tehran regime for various reasons.

For one, Iran is keen to safeguard its relatively uncompetitive industry against Turkish manufacturing and industrial products, preserve the hold of Mullahs and of the military on its economy.

The ideological hostility toward Turkey, a predominantly Sunni nation, coupled with the long-running historical rivalry in the region, has also played a significant role in impeding the further development of the economic ties.

Journal for Iranian Studies

28

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

Sometimes security considerations outweighed trade interests with reference to opening up key industries in the Iranian economy to Turkish companies. In some cases, Turkey has been a victim of internal jockeying for power among the competing interests pursued by the government, religious class and security and intelligence establishments. It is striking to see the deeply entrenched prejudices in Iranian bureaucracy against Turkey that contributed to the decline of what initially appeared to be very promising joint ventures and business deals.

1. Sputtering Trade Volume The performance on the trade volume between the two countries is disappointing given their combined GDPs and a huge consumer market of some 160 million people tells the sad story of an unfulfilled potential between Turkey and Iran. Encouraged by the new mark on the trade volume that hit $10.2 billion for the first time in 2008, then-Prime Minister and now president Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced during his visit to Tehran in October 2009 that both countries decided to set a goal of $30 billion in trade volume in the next five years. That ambitious target suffered an immediate blow when the trade volume was almost halved within two months of this visit as the new data for year 2009 was announced. The annual trade volume took a nosedive by declining to $5.4 billion, thus representing a 47 percent drop compared to 2008.

Although the 2008 financial crisis might have played a role in the slump, the analysis of data over the years since the crisis suggests that the fundamental problem in preventing the boost in trade and economic ties between Turkey and Iran has more to do with systemic and structural reasons rather than with a temporary shift in the financial and economic conditions on a global scale. More than seven years have passed since Turkish and Iranian officials firstly announced the joint target volume of $30 billion, yet the 2016 trade figure remained at $9.7 billion, slightly below the 2008 figure. In other words, eight years had passed but the trade volume has largely remained about the same.

The unprecedented spike in the trade volume in the years of 2012, 2013 and 2014 is largely attributed to the sale of precious materials, mostly gold payments for the oil and gas purchases Turkey had made from Iran that had difficulties in processing payments and using financial institutions because of the sanctions on Tehran over the controversial nuclear programme. Therefore, that should not count as the real trade but rather as funds transferred in gold and by other means. In fact, the major corruption probes of Dec. 2013 in Turkey revealed how Iran used middleman Reza Zarrab, an Iranian national with connections to the Iranian government, to stage an illicit gold trade and fictitious trade in commodities in order to run a financial scheme and move Iranian state funds around.

Journal for Iranian Studies

29

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

Such illicit business activities placed Turkey at odds with its main ally, the United States, that has own unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran in addition to the sanctions that were approved by the United Nations Security Council resolutions. Zarrab apparently bribed senior Turkish government officials, including three ministers, who were later forced to resign from the government in a major shake-up. The case against Zarrab was later dropped and the investigation was interrupted after the intervention by the Turkish government. Zarrab was later arrested by the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Miami on March 2015 and indicted on money laundering charges and violating of the Iran sanctions bill. He was placed in pre-trial detention and the case is still pending in the US district court in Manhattan.

In January 2017, the last available data according to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) suggested that Turkey’s monthly export to Iran was $275 million, a drop of 4.4 percent compared to the same period last year. Turkey’s imports from Iran accounted for $563 million in the same period, indicating a whopping 56 percent increase over the same period last year. That suggests that a chronic trade balance favouring Iran has come back after breaking even only for the year 2016 largely due to the low crude oil prices. In other words, the current trade relations with Iran are rather contributing to widening Turkey’s current account deficit (CAD), which is one of the major challenges faced by the Turkish economy. The CAD stood at $2.76 billion in January, up by almost $561 million on an annual basis according to the Turkish Central Bank’s report2, corresponding to the 12-month rolling deficit of $33.16 billion.

The comparison between Turkey’s exports to Iran with a consumer market estimated at 80 million and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with 9.4 million shows how Iran lags behind the Gulf nation despite having a larger market. It also confirms the difficulties for Turkish companies in penetrating into the Iranian market. Turkey’s exports to Iran amounted to 3.5 percent of the overall Turkish exports in 2016 while the UAE took 3.8 percent, rendering the Gulf state as 7th largest export destination for Turkish products. The opposite is happening with respect to the imports to Turkey. Iran accounted for 2.4 percent of the Turkish imports overall in 2016 while the UAE remained at 1.9 percent. The trade volume between Turkey and the UAE was recorded as $9.1 billion in 2016, an increase of 36 percent compared to the previous year.

2. Trade mostly based on oil and gas A deeper look in the trade between Turkey and Iran exposes the problems in the qualitative aspect of trade, which not only favours the Iranian side but is mainly based on the hydrocarbon sales to Turkey as well. Iran is the number one supplier

Journal for Iranian Studies

30

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

of crude oil to Turkey, with 26.7 percent in the total share in Turkish imports as of December 2016 according to the data from the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK). 3 Iraq came in second with a 23.45 percent share in Turkey’s crude imports in the same period.

As the crude price is determined globally and by the availability of many sellers, Turkey has more alternatives to Iran’s oil. When the US imposed sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas sales, Turkey was able to cut its imports from Iran dramatically even though it had received waivers for a certain period of time in 2012 and 2013.

4 However, in natural gas imports which require a long-term contract commitment and fixed investments in billions of dollars for the infrastructure such as laying down pipelines and pumps, Ankara is more dependent on Iran.

The last available data from Turkish regulator EPDK shows that Turkey imported 15.39 percent of its natural gas from Iran in December 2016. 5 Turkey’s other pipeline gas suppliers are Russia (50.70 percent) and Azerbaijan (10.67 percent). The rest is secured from the LNG contracts and purchases on spot markets, mainly from Algeria (10.32 percent) and Nigeria (3.49 percent).

It appears that Iran made more progress in promoting its own interests when Islamists were in power in Turkey. The first contract for 10 billion cubic meters of gas sale on an annual basis between Turkey and Iran was signed during a coalition government led by Necmettin Erbakan, the father of political Islam in Turkey and a mentor to Turkish president Erdoğan. Erbakan’s love affair with Iran helped finalise a 25-year-long contract on August 8, 1996 when he was the prime minister. From Turkey’s border provinces to the capital of Ankara, many cities today rely on Iranian gas to a great extent. That made Turkey dependent on Iran for almost one-fifth of its gas imports, an unnecessary leverage that Iranian hawks never fail to bring up every time they talk about Turkey’s reliance on Iran.

Unlike other suppliers such as Russia and Azerbaijan, Turkey has often encountered problems with Iran when it comes to the natural gas trade. For one, the relatively poor infrastructure of the pipeline on the Iranian side has caused interruptions especially during winter time when many residential customers need the gas flow for heating their homes. Citing a peak demand at home, Iran had decided to divert the gas flow to domestic customers on several occasions, leaving the daily pump volume to Turkey below the agreed minimum amount under the contract. What is more, Turkey asserted that Iranian gas quality remained poor compared to the products of other suppliers.

Journal for Iranian Studies

31

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

Another major challenge Turkey has encountered with Iranian gas refers to pricing. Turkey pays the most for Iranian gas according to the reported figures. As an official confirmation of the price would amount to a breach of confidentiality of the contract, the figures reported in the media, which presumably came from reliable leaks from Turkish government circles, are considered to be accurate. The Turkish government has never denied or refuted these figures either. While the cost of Iranian gas per 1,000 cubic meters was $507 in 2013, Turkey paid $428 for Russia, and $349 for Azerbaijan. 6 In other words, Turkey buys the most expensive natural gas from Iran.

As opposed to other suppliers such as Russia and Azerbaijan that adjusted their prices depending on the changing market conditions as envisaged in the contract, Iran has proved to be quite stubborn on offering discounts, forcing the Turkish government to seek an international arbitration. When Turkey invoked the relevant article in the contract in 2003 based on the different market conditions and supplydemand fluctuations, Iran balked at Turkey’s request. As a result, Turkey had to apply to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) on March 2004 in order to resolve the differences on pricing. The arbitration lasted five years and the ICC ruled in favour of Turkey, determining that Iran did not fulfil its obligations in the contract and levied a hefty $760 million fine unto the Iranian gas company.

The price dispute erupted again in 2012, resulting in another suit filed by Turkey at the ICC for the overpricing of natural gas sales by Iran after the bilateral talks with Tehran were inconclusive. The ICC once more ruled in favour of Turkey on Jan. 20, 2016 in an interim decision, stating that a discount between 13.3 and 15.8 percent is warranted based on the market conditions that required an adjustment of price under the contract.7 The price changes covered the period between Jan. 1, 2014 to Sept. 19, 2011. Iran is expected to pay $1.9 billion as compensation to Turkey according to Iran’s Deputy Petroleum Minister Hamid Reza Araqi. 8 The fact that Turkey had to take Iran to arbitration twice under similar conditions shows the difficulty in promoting trade and economic ties with the Tehran regime.

In order to diversify its suppliers, Turkey had long ago approached Turkmenistan to bring its gas to the Turkish market using the Caspian route through Azerbaijan and Georgia, bypassing Iran. The framework agreement for the supply of 30 billion cubic meters of gas to Turkey (16 billion cubic meters were to be forwarded to the European market) was signed in Ankara on Oct. 29, 1988. That was followed by a 30-year agreement for the sale of 16 billion of cubic meters of gas that was signed between the two countries in Ashkabat on May 21, 1999. Unfortunately, these agreements have never been realised amid the lobbying efforts by Iran to change

Journal for Iranian Studies

32

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

the route from the Caspian Sea to its own territory. The unresolved differences in the Caspian Sea among the littoral countries including Iran also had a role in this failed contract. In the meantime, Iran has been purchasing Turkmen gas at substantially low prices and reselling it to Turkey with a huge mark-up.

3. Turkish investments blocked On the investment side, Iran has displayed a fairly protectionist approach when it comes to allowing Turkish firms to enter the Iranian market. The effect of two notorious examples on how Iran thwarted Turkish investments at a great cost to Turkish companies still lingers on today. In the first case, mobile phone service provider Turkcell signed a deal worth of $3 billion with Iran in what was touted as the largest foreign investment Iran set to receive in decades. 9 Yet the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and conservatives had managed to block the deal that was successfully awarded to a consortium led by Turkcell on Feb. 18, 2004.

The contract was later given to South Africa’s MTN Group, Africa’s largest mobilephone operator, following a bill in the Iranian Parliament that revised the terms of the agreement, effectively reducing the share of Turkcell. Turkish GSM operator was kicked out from the contract eventually. Then Turkish Prime Minister and now president Erdogan paid a visit to Tehran on Sept. 26, 2004 with a large business delegation but was unable to resolve the differences. Turkcell took the case to the arbitration panel in Hague in 2008 invoking the 1996 intergovernmental deal called the Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment. The case was brought to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

In the complaint, Turkcell claimed it incurred losses in amounting to $600 million.

In a statement to Turkey’s Capital Markets Board on Oct. 16, 2014, Turkcell declared that the tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the claims brought under the Turkey-Iran bilateral investment treaty. 10 On March 28, 2012, Turkcell also brought a $4.2 billion lawsuit against MTN in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the company bribed officials, arranged meetings between Iranian and South African leaders, and promised Iranian weapons and United Nations votes in exchange for a licence to provide wireless services in Iran.

11 Following the US Supreme Court’s ruling on April 2013 in another case that interpreted the Alien Tort Statute and that set a precedent, Turkcell decided to withdraw the lawsuit from the US court. 12 Turkcell said it dropped the lawsuit “in order to file a lawsuit in another jurisdiction.” 13 The company filed a revised lawsuit against MTN in Johannesburg, South Africa.

Journal for Iranian Studies

33

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

In the second case, a Turkish company trading under the name TAV Airports Holding was literally kicked out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in 2004 after spending millions of dollars on a 11-year contract to operate Terminal One of the city’s new international airport and build a second terminal for $193 million that was awarded to TAV on July 2003 as part of the build-operate-transfer deal. 14 The airport, named after the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was opened briefly with only one flight allowed to land before the Iranian army moved in and shut the airport. The decision was purportedly made on concerns for national security. The army claimed that entrusting the airport’s operation to TAV “threatens the security of the country as well as its dignity”. It further noted that “Unfortunately airport officials took this untimely decision without taking into account either security constraints or the Supreme Council law on national security banning the use of foreign forces.” 15 The issue has quickly become a bilateral matter between Turkey and Iran. It is worth noting that Turkey’s Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, then as a minister for transportation, went to Tehran to inaugurate the opening of the airport with Iranian officials on Feb. 1, 2004. 16 The airport started the formal operations on May 8, 2004 but within a few hours the IRGC moved in to occupy the tower, and terminate the operations altogether. The second civilian plane was diverted to another airport in the region and escorted by Iranian fighter jets. The airport was reopened on May 13 with full control by the IRGC after the Turkish company was forced out. Turkey has raised the issue on a bilateral level on numerous occasions with no success.

These terrible experiences in the Iranian market by two major Turkish companies deeply rattled Turkish investors’ confidence in Iran, resulting in most big businesses shying away from this market. It has exerted an impact on the psyche of Turkish businesspeople for years to come. This is one of the reasons why many Turkish firms were reluctant to rush into Iran after the major powers agreed to a nuclear deal with Tehran in 2015 following long negotiations in exchange for a relief on the sanction regime in Iran.

Another botched deal in recent years was the agreement to explore gas in Iran’s South Pars field by the government-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO).

The agreement, valued at $6 billion, was signed on October 2009 during Erdoğan’s visit to Tehran but was eventually abolished in 2014 after five years of negotiations.

The main reason for Turkey’s withdrawal from the Pars field was because the plots offered by Iran were found to be less promising as opposed to the initial offers. In other words, Tehran had tried to short-change Ankara by not allowing the TPAO to tap into potentially lucrative fields. The US pressure on Turkey also played a role in

Journal for Iranian Studies

34

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

the decision. Turkey claimed it would reconsider its decision if Iran made a new offer with new conditions. 17 The only major exception in the long line of failures of Turkish investments in Iran appears to be the purchase of Iran’s Razi Petrochemical on Feb. 20, 2008 by the Turkish fertiliser company Gübretaş (Gübre Fabrikaları T.A.Ş.) for $656 million.

The sale, dubbed as the second largest purchase abroad by a Turkish company, was subjected to major controversy when the main opposition party submitted a motion in the parliament on March 29, 2013. 18 The motion asked the government to reveal the minority stakeholders in the Gübretaş-led joint venture, specifically mentioning two Turkish firms, namely AsyaGaz (Asya Gas Enerji ve Petrokimya Ürunleri Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi ) and Tabosan (Tabosan Muhendislik lmalat ve Montaj Şirketi) that were involved in the purchase of Iranian Razi Petrochemical. The motion stated that AsyaGaz was set up only 20 days before the sale and alleged that it may be a shell company. Tabosan was reported to be on the verge of bankruptcy at the time of the sale yet it still embarked on a major deal. 19 Moreover, they were both granted a credit line of 20 million euro each from Turkey’s state-owned banks Vakifbank and Halkbank on April 7, 2008, some three weeks prior to the sale. Both AsyaGaz and Tabosan own up to 23.91 percent and 10.88 percent in shares respectively in Razi Petrochemical. 20 The sale later became subject to a probe by Turkish investigators who were looking into Iranian intelligence activities in Turkey as part of their investigation into the Iran-backed deadly terror group Tevhid Selam, funded and supported by the IRGC’s Quds Force. Several suspects, including an Iranian intelligence operative named Sayed Ali Akber Mir Vakili, who were wiretapped by the judge’s order revealed how Gübretaş and the alleged shell companies AsyaGaz and Tabosan were discussed among the suspects. The probe also uncovered a Turkish man identified as Hakkı Selçuk Şanlı, who reportedly helped to set up the Quds Force operation in Turkey on orders from then-Revolutionary Guard Commander Nasir Takipur in the 1990s, who coordinated Gübretaş’s sale. The probe into Tevhid Selam was hushed up by the Turkish government when it implicated senior officials.

4. Transportation hurdles Iran has also been implementing several measures to prevent Turkey from using Iranian territory as a gateway to central Asian countries including Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The perpetual problem stems from the difficulties and restrictions faced by the Turkish transportation industry when it comes to delivering the load to a destination in Iran or transiting Iran for a third country.

Journal for Iranian Studies

35

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

According to the International Transporters Association (UND), this problem has continued for some 20 years in violation of the existing treaty agreement of 1994 and the protocol by the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) dated 2001. 21 According to the UND, Iran has been unlawfully charging Turkish truckers an additional fuel surcharge of $750 for transit passages and $550 on the return for each truck in addition to other fees, resulting in a loss of millions of dollars. Because of Iran’s practices, 90 percent of the transportation routes between Iran and Turkey were taken over by Iranian drivers with tens of thousands of Turkish truckers giving up on the Iranian route.

The problem had remained unresolved for years despite several JEC meetings during which Turkish representatives repeatedly raised the matter. Only after Turkey was forced to implement counter measures to the Iranian representatives, the latter reportedly agreed to reduce the fuel surcharges that would save 21 million Euros for the Turkish trucking industry which is estimated to dispatch some 30 thousand to 35 thousand trucks to Iran annually. 22 The agreement, reached during a joint meeting on Jan. 13-15, 2015, has nevertheless not been implemented fully by the Iranian side. Industry representatives continue reporting the problems encountered while dealing with Iranian border and customs officials.

The problems in modernising existing customs border gates and opening new ones to facilitate trade have lasted for years, hurting the transportation industry and adding further costs to the Turkish businesses. Currently, there are three border crossings between the two countries located along the common border that runs for 499 kilometres: Gürbulak (connects to Bazargan in Iran) in the eastern province of Ağrı, Kapıköy (Razi) in the eastern province of Van and Esendere (Serow) in the southeastern province of Hakkari. From time to time, Iran shuts down these border gates citing security concerns. On August 2015, Iran closed Gürbulak unilaterally, claiming that Iranian trucks were attacked in Turkey. 23 On the Kapıköy crossing point which is open only for small vehicles, Iran said it could not complete the 75-km road it was supposed to build on the Iranian side in order to make the border fully operational for trucks. Instead, it proposed that Turkey should build it and pay for the expenses. 24 5. Promising tourism Perhaps one of the most promising aspects on the economic ties between Turkey and Iran is the booming tourism. Turkey has proven to be one of the leading destinations for Iranian tourists. According to Turkish government data, 1.7 million Iranians visited Turkey in 2016, representing 6.7 percent of all tourists who came to Turkey that year. 25 The number appears to have remained constant in recent years. The visa free regime offered for Iranian citizens by Turkey helped them stay in the country for up to 90 days. The number of Iranians who come to Turkey to

Journal for Iranian Studies

36

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

use the country as a transit point rather than as a destination is also included in the total figure.

Despite the fact that the number of foreign travellers to Turkey has dropped by 30 percent in 2016 compared to the year before, the drop in Iranian tourists was negligible by only 2.07 percent. For the month of January 2017, the number of Iranian tourists has increased to 101,636 from 92,260 in January 2016. In other words, while Turkey recorded a 9.81 percent drop in January for a month-onmonth comparison overall, the number of travellers from Iran to Turkey increased.

In contrast, the number of Turkish tourists who visit Iran is quite low. In 2016, the number of Turks who visited Iran was recorded at 244,000 according to the Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat) figure. The figure for the year 2015 was 164,000. 26 6. WTO and other problems Another stumbling block in halting the flourishing of trade between Turkey and Iran is the fact that Iran is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) due to the opposition by the United States. The WTO helps promote trade and offers a trade-related dispute mechanism for members to resolve their differences. The lack of such a mechanism has been an irritant in the bilateral trade and economic ties for many years. This has become much more important for Turkey given the fact that the 164-member WTO’s landmark deal called the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) formally entered into force on Feb. 22, 2017. 27 The deal provides expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit.

According to the projections of the Turkish government, the WTO agreement may create an additional $20 billion from export revenue and $40 billion from a rise in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the Turkish economy, not to mention its share from the job creation of some 20 million in the overall figure. 28 Many issues that were dealt with by the TFA have proved to be difficult to resolve on a bilateral level with the Iranian government. This is especially true for the transportation industry and movement of goods through customs. Turkey has so far lodged complaints against three trading partners, namely Egypt, South Africa and Morocco using the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.

Another major hindrance in front of Turkish traders and investors is the dual exchange rate system in Iran with a divergence between the official and unofficial market rates. The currency fluctuations in the world made it harder to manage this dual rate system for businesses that trade with Iran. Under the sanctions regime, banking complications and difficulties in processing financial transactions have also obstructed the trade between the two countries for many years. Although many

Journal for Iranian Studies

37

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

Iranian banks were reconnected to the global transaction network SWIFT after the lifting of sanctions on Tehran, problems are still being reported. Turkish initiatives to use local currencies in the trade with Iran have so far had limited success.

The absence of a free trade agreement (FTA) is also another stumbling block in bilateral trade. The preferential trade agreement (PTA) that had been negotiated for ten years was finally signed in 2014. 29 Since the agreement came into force in January 2015, it did not produce the expected results of lowering the tariffs covered by only a limited number of goods. Iranians, known for savvy negotiation skills, managed to limit the concessions Turkey received on industrial goods to 125 items only. Considering that Turkish exports to Iran largely comprise industrial goods, the PTA left substantial trade out of the scope of the agreement. In fact, machinery exports to Iran which accounted to $475 million in 2014 decreased by 11 percent in 2015. Turkey, ranked as the sixth machinery exporter to Iran, is set to lose further market share to other players. 30 In contrast to the difficulties associated with entering the Iranian market which was ranked at the 120th place by the World Bank in 2016 in terms of its business index (1 being the most business-friendly), many Iranian companies find it easy to establish themselves in the Turkish market which was ranked at 69th place in the same survey.

According to the Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB), Iranians set up 298 firms in Turkey in 2016, 31 becoming the second largest country with foreign-owned companies in Turkey. It was not surprising to see that Syria was the leading country considering that almost 3 million Syrians are living in Turkey as refugees and were granted rights to open businesses.

The spike in the number of Iranian-owned companies in Turkey started in 2011 with 590 firms established in one year, an increase of 41 percent compared to the previous year. Given that Iran is not a major trading partner of Turkey, some representatives in Turkey questioned this sudden increase by asserting that some of these companies may be shells for the Iranian regime to penetrate third markets using Turkey as a springboard as well as circumvent the sanctions imposed on Iran by the UN, US and EU. In the police investigation file into Iran-backed Tevhid Selam terror group, investigators discovered that the IRGC Quds Force has been setting up businesses in various provinces of Turkey as a cover to plant operatives and fund their operations.

The rivalry between Turkey and Iran exerted an impact on Turkey’s economic and trade ties in third countries, especially considering that in this respect Iran enjoys significant leverage. For example, Turkish companies and contracting firms complain about the favouritism displayed for Iranian companies by Iraqi officials in tendering

Journal for Iranian Studies

38

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

and contract awarding processes. Instead of competing on the price and quality of workmanship on a level playing field, ideological reasons put Turkish firms at a disadvantage with respect to their Iranian competitors in the Iraqi market.

CONCLUSION The prospect of seeing a serious development in the trade and economic ties of Turkey with Iran commensurate with the size of their economies and markets looks rather dim as long as the security-oriented approach by the Iranian leadership helps shape policies with respect to Turkey. Tehran sees trade and economic policies as an extension of its political leverage and does not refrain from using these ties to advance its political goals. Iran has indicated time and again that it will be ready to sacrifice economic ties to send a political message to its partners.

In fact, angry with the criticism from Turkey’s leaders on Iran’s policies in Iraq and Syria, Iran decided to postpone the Turkey-Iran Business Forum that was to be held on February 25 in Tehran and attended by Turkish and Iranian ministers. 32 The bias and even animosity toward Turkey remain deeply entrenched in Iranian bureaucracy.

Iran, a multi ethnic society with a large Azeri Turkish population, has always shown scepticism in opening up to Turkish business initiatives, fearing that it may weaken the Mullah regime and undermine the establishment. At the same time, Tehran knows it cannot shut Turkey out altogether, thereby allowing only a limited number of Turkish firms, mainly small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), to do business in the Iranian market. Iran also realises that it needs Turkish manufactured goods especially machinery to support its own industry and can procure materials from the Turkish market when it comes under international pressure.

Therefore, Iran will always keep Turkey at an arms’ length, trying to manage trade and business relations on its own terms that will benefit the Iranian establishment most at the expense of Iranian people and to the detriment of its oil dependent economy. In a nutshell, as long as Iran acts as a non-state and as an ideological actor rather than as a rational player with a realistic approach in regional politics, expecting Turkey to have economic and trade ties with Iran on a sustainable growth pattern will be largely infeasible.

Journal for Iranian Studies

39

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

Endnotes

1. World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, (2017, February 1). Retrieved from http://databank.worldbank. org/data/download/GDP.pdf 2. Ödemeler Dengesi: Ocak 2017, Central Bank of Turkey (2017, January). Retrieved from http://www.tcmb.gov. tr/wps/wcm/connect/TCMB+TR/TCMB+TR/Main+Menu/Istatistikler/Odemeler+Dengesi+ve+Ilgili+Istatistikler/ Odemeler+Dengesi+Istatistikleri/Odemeler+Dengesi+Gelismeleri 3. Petrol Piyasası Sektör Raporu / Aralık 2016 (2016, December) T.C. Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu. Retrieved from http://www.epdk.org.tr/TR/Dokumanlar/Petrol/YayinlarRaporlar/Aylik 4. Turkey’s Iranian oil purchases fall by one-third in one month, (2013, February 23). Retrieved from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-iranian-oil-purchases-fall-by-one-third-in-one-month-. aspx?pageID=238&nID=41147&NewsCatID=348 5. Petrol Piyasası Sektör Raporu / Aralık 2016 (2016, December) T.C. Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu. Retrieved from http://www.epdk.org.tr/TR/Dokumanlar/Petrol/YayinlarRaporlar/Aylik 6. Türkiye hangi ülkeden kaç liraya doğalgaz alıyor? (2013, March 31). Retrieved from http://enerjienstitusu.com/2013/03/31/ turkiye-hangi-ulkeden-kac-liraya-dogalgaz-aliyor/ 7. Doğalgazda indirim bilmecesi! (2016, February 2). Retrieved from http://www.dunya.com/gundem/dogalgazda-indirimbilmecesi-haberi-306285 8. Iran to pay $1.9 billion to Turkey in gas dispute, reduce prices (2017, January 24). Retrieved from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iran-to-pay-19-billion-to-turkey-in-gas-dispute-reduce-prices. aspx?pageID=238&nID=108930&NewsCatID=348 9. Turkcell sees risks in Iran GSM licence after bill (2005, February 15). Retrieved from http://www.hurriyetdailynews. com/turkcell-sees-risks-in-iran-gsm-licence-after-bill.aspx?pageID=438&n=turkcell-sees-risks-in-iran-gsm-licence-afterbill-2005-02-15 10. Announcement Regarding the Arbitration Case in Relation to the GSM License Tender in Iran (2014, October 16). Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1071321/000094787114000659/ss404199_6k.htm 11. Turkcell Dismisses Suit Against MTN Over Iran License (2013, May 2). Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2013-05-01/turkcell-dismisses-suit-against-mtn-over-iran-license-m 12. Turkcell withdraws U.S. lawsuit against MTN Group (2013, May 1). Retrieved from http://uk.reuters.com/article/usmtn-turkcell-lawsuit-idUKBRE94014G20130501 13. Turkcell’s consolidated financial statements (2015, December 31). Retrieved from http://investor.turkcell.com.tr/2015/ content/report/report-en.pdf 14. Iran to compensate Turkey’s TAV – report (2008, March 10). Retrieved from http://uk.reuters.com/article/iran-turkeytav-idUKSED05189520080310 15. New Tehran airport shut by army (2004, May 8) Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3696801.stm 16. Parliamentary question motion. (2004, May 31) Response by Abdullah Gül, Foreign Minister of Turkey. Retrieved from

Journal for Iranian Studies

40

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey’s rather lackluster economic ties with Iran

http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d22/7/7-2624c.pdf 17. Turkish government decides against TPAO investment in Iranian energy sector (2014, February 12). Retrieved from http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/istanbul/turkish-government-decides-against-tpao-investment-26708443 18. Parliamentary question motion (2013, May 16) Response by Mehmet Mehdi Eker, Agriculture Minister of Turkey.

Retrieved from http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/7/7-20976c.pdf 19. Gübrede Büyük Vurgun (2010, June 9). Retrieved from http://www.ortadogugazetesi.net/haber.php?id=16580 20. Informality process of the company. Retrieved from http://www.razip.com/en/aboutus/informality 21. UND’den Türkiye-İran Krizine Çözüm Atağı (Basın Bülteni) | UND. (2014, October 17). Retrieved from https://und.web. tr/tr/16034/undden-turkiye-iran-krizine-cozum-atagi-basin-bulteni22. İran›la «tır sorunu»nun çözümü nakliyecileri sevindirdi (2015, January 16). Retrieved from http://www.hurriyet.com. tr/iranla-tir-sorununun-cozumu-nakliyecileri-sevindirdi-37040794 23. İran Türkiye sınırındaki Gürbulak-Bazargan Gümrük Kapısı’nı kapadı (2015, August 12). Retrieved from http://www. hurriyet.com.tr/iran-turkiye-sinirindaki-gurbulak-bazargan-gumruk-kapisini-kapadi-29793644 24. Türkiye›nin yeni bir sınır kapısı olacak (2015, February 3). Retrieved from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkiyenin-yenibir-sinir-kapisi-olacak-28106880 25. Sınır Giriş-Çıkış İstatistikleri, Turkey’s culture and Tourism Ministry. Retrieved from http://yigm.kulturturizm.gov.tr/ TR,9854/sinir-giris-cikis-istatistikleri.html 26. Gidilen Ülkelere Göre Yurt Dışına Giden Vatandaşlar, 2003-2016, TUİK. Retrieved from http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Start.do 27. WTO members welcome entry into force of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (2017, February 27). Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fac_27feb17_e.htm 28. Deliberations at Turkey’s Parliamentary Commission for Industry, Trade, Energy, Natural Resources, Information and Technology (2015, December 23). Retrieved from https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/komisyon_tutanaklari. goruntule?pTutanakId=1395 29. Türkiye-İran Tercihli Ticaret Anlaşması Metni, The Official Gazette of Turkey (2014, November 4). Retrieved from http:// www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/11/20141104-2-1.pdf 30. Ambargo Sonrası Iran Ekonomik ve Ticari Etki Analizi, DEIK & TİM, (2016, June). Retrieved from http://www.tim.org.tr/ files/downloads/Raporlar/Ambargo%20Sonrasi%20Iran%20Ekonomik%20Etki%20Analizi_web.pdf 31. Kurulan/Kapanan Şirket İstatistikleri, TOBB, (2017, January 20). Retrieved fromhttps://www.tobb.org.tr/ BilgiErisimMudurlugu/Sayfalar/KurulanKapananSirketistatistikleri.php 32. İran’daki iş toplantısına siyaset gölgesi (2017, February 22). Retrieved from http://www.dunya.com/ekonomi/irandakiis-toplantisina-siyaset-golgesi-haberi-350960

Journal for Iranian Studies

41

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

Karim Abdian (Ph.D.) Specialist in the Iranian and ME Affairs

T

he modern Iranian nation-state dates back to the early sixteenth century AD, specifically to the establishment of the Safavid state by Shah Ismail Safavid in 1501.

The state at that time was not based on nationality, but was composed of different regions and ethnic groups that were heterogeneous, independent of each other, and lived without any organic association 1

Journal for Iranian Studies

42

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

In addition to the different peoples who lived in this region, there were different religions and sects, including Manichaeism, Muzikid, Maitra, and Zoroastrianism, which preceded Islam. They lived in this region even after the Islamic conquest and the defeat of Sassanids by Arab Muslims in the battle of Qadisiyah. 2 These peoples and their ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural components were heterogeneous groups.3 At no stage, even before the advent of the Safavids, did harmony exist among them—not historically nor politically.4 Demographic composition of Iran in modern and contemporary history In the course of its modern and contemporary history, Iran has witnessed two eras in which its rulers have attempted to dissolve the various ethnic and national identities of the Iranian peoples within the wider Persian ethnic group, namely the Safavid (1501−1736) and the Pahlavi states (1925−1979).

In the era of the Safavid state The Safavids did not allow the participation of minorities or different ethnicities in the system of government. Their oppressive theocratic system did not even allow the participation of minorities from fellow Shiite sects such as the Musha’sha’iyyah Ahwazi Arabs, a Shiite sect who ruled over the Howeyzeh area in the province of Ahwaz, which the Safavids called “Arabistan.” Instead, the Musha’sha’iyyah, like other Arabs and members of other minorities, were subject to persecution and ethnocide in order to seize their land, after which the Safavids were able to control large areas stretching from Mesopotamia to the Arabian Gulf in the south and India to the east.

In the Pahlavi state After the British-backed 1921 coup d’état by Reza Pahlavi and his subsequent dissolution of the constitutional movement, he ended the system of provinces and states that had prevailed for centuries in the country; the Pahlavi dynasty introduced the modern persecution of non-Persian ethnicities and nationalities in Iran.

Reza Shah sought to eliminate these nationalities and unify Iran at all costs based on Persian ethnocentrism as completely and rapidly as possible. To impose his rule and establish his authority, he relied on three main institutions: the army, the institution of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, and the institution of the monarchy.

Through these three institutions, Reza Khan implemented an ambitious program permeating Iran’s economic, social, and cultural spheres, in line with proposals put forward by the profoundly racist eugenicist Persian theorists of that time 5.

The period between 1941 and 1946 witnessed three major events: the establishment of the national government of Azerbaijan or the self-governing Republic of Azerbaijan, the establishment of the Kurdistan National Government

Journal for Iranian Studies

43

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

or the Republic of Mahabad, and the demand for autonomy by Ahwazi Arabs in “Arabistan.”

Conditions of nationalities under the Shah Reza Pahlavi and his son from 1925 until 1979 The reign of Shah Reza Pahlavi began with the implementation of an initiative nurtured by racial supremacist Persians, the ‘State Nation Project’, which was a distorted version of the 19th century European nation-state concept, creating a new political entity in Iran and a new identity for this entity radically different to the situation that existed before the coup.

The Pahlavi state-nation project was completely contradictory to the European concept of the nation-state, which was based on democracy. In pursuit of this project, the Shah’s regime adopted a number of decisions, including amending some provisions of the Constitution, which were the outcome of the constitutional movement (the conditional revolution) and excising others.

Ultimately, this resulted in emptying Iran’s Constitution of its core content— and greatly limiting the role of Parliament in the ratification of decisions issued by the rulers—in preparation for the establishment of a strong central state based on tyranny.

Aryan Race Theory The theory of Iranian racial, national, and cultural supremacy, which has been based on a false historical assumption that the civilization within the territories of Iran is a creation of the Aryans alone, emphasizes key fascist concepts like the unity of blood and race. This theory excludes Ahwazi Arabs and Turks in Iran due to their “inferior” non-Aryan status, although Kurds and Baluchis are accepted as Aryan peoples. As with all such supremacist ideologies, there is no historical or other evidence to support these theories, or indeed to support the idea that Persians and those groups which supposedly share these “superior” Aryan characteristics are, in fact, Aryan in the sense of ethnicity 6.

Constitution against nationalities On October 10, 1937, the administrative divisions were radically revised, with the ancient historical names of the Iranian territories being omitted from the new maps and Iran being divided under this law into six provinces: North, West, North, South, Makran, and Northeast. In December of the same year, these geographical divisions were once again revised, and the country was divided into 10 governorates, 49 counties, and 29 districts.

Journal for Iranian Studies

44

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

The Islamic republic’s regime’s treatment of other nationalities The long-oppressed peoples of non-Persian ethnicity actively and enthusiastically participated in the Iranian people’s uprising against the Shah’s regime, which ended in 1979. These nationalities hoped that they would gain their rights under a new regime that calls for the values of Islam based on justice, equality, and rights for all peoples regardless of race, ethnicity, or origin. But what happened is the opposite; the regime of the nascent Islamic Republic launched an extensive campaign of repression against the defeated Ahwaz Arabs in Muhammarah, the Turkmen in the desert of Turkmenistan, and the Kurds in western Iran. Their demands for self-rule, self-autonomy, and equal rights were met with the mass execution of the Turkoman leaders, the gunning down of protesters in the Muhammarah neighbourhood of Ahwaz city, the eponymously named Ahwazi capital, and a military invasion of Kurdistan ordered via a fatwa from Khomeini, the leader of the revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic.

In recent years, mass protests in the territory of Azerbaijan in northwestern Iran denouncing racist slanders against Turkish people on regime-run Iranian state TV have returned, once again bringing the issue of oppression of ethnic minorities in Iran to the forefront. This oppression has also generated protests among the people of Ahwaz, with an uprising on April 15, 2005, that subsequently became known as the ‘April Intifada.’ The uprising was prompted by public outrage about a leaked regime document, the “Abtahi Document,” written by an aide to Mohammad Khatami, concerning the regime’s plan to change the demographic fabric of Ahwaz via population and transfer and ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Arab people.

The increasing protests by the non-Persian minorities in Iran, who make up more than half the country’s population, against the regime’s endemic racism, oppression, and injustice have resulted in unease among the regime leadership, with many experts warning that the country in its current form could ultimately disintegrate if these minorities are not granted their basic rights.

The Islamic Republic’s regime, however, continued to follow the racist doctrines of Shah Reza Pahlavi and his son, simply wedding fundamentalist Shiite theocracy to their Persian nationalism. Thus the ruling junta, which believed in a “nationalreligious” ideology, continues to rule Iran and to deprive the country’s religious and ethnic minorities of the most basic rights, with the people’s ethnic, religious, and cultural identities being forcibly denied as the regime attempts to impose enforced homogeneity, while denying the people their identity or the most basic of rights. 7

Journal for Iranian Studies

45

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

A security perspective on national issues Tehran’s centralist state rulers view the demands of the country’s ethnic and religious minorities with contempt as being a threat to their own power, accordingly treating them as a state security threat and routinely proposing and implementing brutally repressive policies, which further limit the movements and already restricted freedoms of these groups. Lawyer Hussein Rashi said that the security-centered political environment, coupled with the severe repression of all ethnic and religious minorities, has made the daily life of these groups a constant series of problems and injustices, condemning the regime’s “unjustified discrimination against minorities, with the support of the constitution and across the law” and suggesting that this systematic persecution has “led to the establishment of a culture of discrimination and violence against all minorities in Iran.” 8 Discrimination against minorities in the Constitution Discrimination by the current regime against religious and ethnic minorities began with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. Iranian lawyer and human rights activist Hossein Razi points out that Article 107 of the Constitution expressly prohibits any minority member or adherent of religions and sects other than the regime’s Twelver Shiism, including Sunnis, from running for the post of leader or membership of the Council of Experts in Iran. This article allows only a few Shi’a clerics, and in special circumstances, possibly other regime officials, to serve in these powerful positions.

The constitution also prohibits religious and ethnic minorities from holding any political, judicial, and presidential positions—for example, the President of the Republic must be chosen from among the Shiite clerics approved by the Supreme Leader. Article 115, paragraph 5 of the Constitution stipulates that the President of the Republic shall be a believer in the principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and an adherent of the country’s official Shiite faith.

Meanwhile, a passage in a section of Article 121 of the Constitution concerning the performance of the President of the Islamic Republic asserts the official’s position as “being the guardian of the official doctrine” only. 9 Discrimination against ethnic minorities in the Constitution even extends to denying these groups to speak their mother tongue in schools and universities or even in publishing and media. Another inevitable result of the enforced dominance of the Persian language and the suppression of local languages is the destruction and deterioration in terms of the identity, literature, culture, and music of these non–Persian ethnic groups. 10

Journal for Iranian Studies

46

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

Future of non-Persian ethnic minorities’ mobility Although Iran is among the most diverse countries in the Middle East in terms of ethnic diversity, successive Iranian governments have deliberately concealed this fact, particularly through the Shah’s intelligence apparatus, which has worked tirelessly to obscure this fact. Persian racial supremacists also attempt to deny this inconvenient reality, preventing any serious study on the percentages and variety of ethnic minorities in the country 11.

However, with the growing information revolution, the advent of globalization and increasing levels of political awareness among the marginalized non-Persian peoples excluded from participating in political decision-making, hiding the mobility of these minority groups is impossible.

Despite the passage of 38 years since the foundation of the Islamic Republic and despite the repeated efforts of the opposition to overthrow the regime of the rule of the jurist, it remains clear that without the participation of all parts of society, more especially the oppressed ethnic and religious minorities, no single ethnic group can change the regime on its own, no matter how great its efforts or capacity.12 There have been a number of attempts to oust the regime in this period of almost 40 years. Here we must mention two examples of these attempts: First, the 1988 “Faruq Jawaidan” initiative, a battle planned by the Mujahedeen Khalq or MEK (People’s Mujahedeen Organization of Iran), the leftist opposition-in-exile.

This began with a large-scale attack by MEK members across the western border with Iraq. Despite the severe weakness of the Iranian army, then at the tail end of its eight-year war with Iraq, the MEK was defeated after several days of intense fighting, losing the battle, with many of its members killed and the plan thwarted.

Second, the June 2009 spontaneous uprising, known as the “Green Movement,” when more than three million citizens protested in Tehran following hotly debated election results. The regime responded with its customary brutality, and the uprising was quickly crushed, with many protesters killed or imprisoned.

In spite of all the sacrifices and courage shown by the fighters of the People’s Mujahedeen and the protesters involved in the Green Movement, they did not point out in their subsequent analyses the reasons for the failure of the project to overthrow or change the regime. The main reason—in my view—that led to the failure of these attempts was the lack of any organized and effective participation by the country’s ethnic minorities in these two events since the leaders of both movements did not care about the roles of these groups and about the wider range of confrontation with the regime in the regions inhabited by the non-Persian minorities.

Journal for Iranian Studies

47

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

The fact that the Green Movement’s Intifada was not widespread and was concentrated in the capital, Tehran, allowed the regime to gather its forces and quickly crush them, while the MEK focused on its own strengths and did not involve the oppressed nationalities in the movement against the regime. Therefore, we see that the only way to win any movement in the future is through coordinated and widespread civil disobedience amongst all groups in all of the country’s major cities such as Tehran and Tabriz, together with the minority regions from the Kurdistan region, “Arabistan” (Al-Ahwaz) and Baluchistan, and the deserts of the Turkmen province13-14.

The future of non-Persian minorities as a force of change The mobility of ethnic minorities is one of the most important forces of change in Iran, due to their widespread and expanding nature in recent years, particularly the last 15 years or so. This force comes not from the limited military operations carried out by some national organizations dubbed resisting the occupation, but from soft power and strong popular movements on the ground, which defy oppression and suppression. This movement has begun to resemble, to a great extent, the uprisings seen in the Eastern Bloc countries in the last decades of the 20th century such as the Velvet Revolution in then-Czechoslovakia in 1989 15.

The Iranian regime has a lengthy, systemic, and damning record of violations against the various ethnic and religious minorities within Iranian society, which are even more severe against the ethnic and religious minorities; violations that should be high on the agenda of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).

These grave violations, well documented by international organizations, have unfortunately been neglected since Iranian regime, its intelligence agencies, lobbyists, and foreign allies have devoted great energy to suppressing any efforts to present the case to the UN Security Council, while the Arab nations have been remarkable only for their inaction, allowing the regime to continue to escape any serious collective international condemnation or censure. 16 For example, the extensive evidence of the extremely well-documented phenomenon of the regime’s ethnic cleansing against the Arab people of Ahwaz includes a report prepared by the so-called “Human Rights Commission of the Iranian Judiciary” on nationalities and minorities, which was documented in the proceedings of the ninth session of the UN’s Forum on Minority Issues held on November 24 and 25, 2016 at the UNHRC headquarters in Geneva. 17

Journal for Iranian Studies

48

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

Movement of non-Persian nationalities and the Iranian opposition Most Iranian opposition parties and groups still ignore non-Persian ethnic minority movements, sadly failing, despite their beliefs in freedom and human rights, to rid themselves of the Persian supremacist rhetoric against non-Persian ethnic groups within Iran.

Although the participation of the Persian forces in the struggle to oust the dictatorial regime is clearly crucial, the main weakness of these opposition forces lies in their division, dispersal, and inconsistency on the one hand, and their lack of confidence in large part in the abilities of their ethnically non-Persian counterparts, leading to a reluctance to enter into an alliance with them in order to create a comprehensive anti-regime coalition. Another factor weakening opposition is the intervention of the mullahs, who have succeeded in either dividing or paying off many opposition movements by material or doctrinal reasons.

Meanwhile, the movements of the ethnic minorities themselves, although they continue to grow, are also vulnerable to certain weaknesses, especially in relation to the issues of the progressive demands of the right to self-determination. The nationalist movements are divided in strategy and tactics on achieving demands and restoring their violated rights between the idea of ​​secession and the formation of independent states, with those who believe that federal rule, self-rule should be based on the destruction of the mullahs’ regime, arguing that it is essential to prioritize the right to self-determination.

By examining the realities of these minority movements, we can sum up the strengths and weaknesses of the various groups of non-Persian peoples in Iran as follows: 1: The Azerbaijani Turks (Azerbaijanis): The strength of this group lies in their large numbers as the largest ethnic minority in Iran, which gives them control of trading, the market economy, and significant influence in the army, the Revolutionary Guards, and the state institutions. Their demands remain constitutional up till the present time. 18 However, the weakness of the Turks in Iran lies in the loss of any strong central organization and factionalism among the various groups, along with the absence of any coherent political leadership. They are also, in comparison to other ethnic minorities, living in relative economic and social well-being. Since many of them have influence over the market economy, the fear of losing these privileges leads some to be wary of considering any demand for separation or independence or even for a greater share of power and wealth. The regime also makes efforts to retain their loyalty in various ways, such as allowing them to form a bloc in the Shura (Parliament) which has around 100 deputies from the Turkish regions in Iran.

Journal for Iranian Studies

49

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

The other point weakening the struggle of the Turkmen people against the Iranian regime lies in their historical differences with Kurds over the administrative borders of the regions of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, with the two sides having longstanding disagreements over control of some ethnically mixed areas of Turks and Kurds and some Kurdish towns and villages in the provinces of the province of Azerbaijan, as well as some areas inhabited by Turks. These results in some administrative chaos, and any escalation of these differences would lead to civil war, weakening any hope for a united front against the regime.

2: The Kurds: The Kurdish people are among the most organizationally experienced minorities in Iran, with a long history of struggle, in addition to the existence of organizational harmony and relatively strong leadership, although they are distributed across a number of parties. The vast majority of the Kurdish people identify strongly with one of five main opposition parties. Some of these parties, led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (the organizational ‘mother’ of all the Kurdish parties), have now entered into direct armed conflict with the regime, and their movement has international support.

Another important point that distinguishes the Kurdish people in Iran is that the vast majority are Sunnis, with this distinction distinguishing them culturally and religiously from the Shiite Persians.

The weakness of Iran’s Kurds, however, lies in their interconnectedness and their ethnic and linguistic proximity with the Persians, since most Persian and Kurdish intellectuals consider themselves Aryans, placing themselves in a position of superiority over other (non-Aryan) peoples, especially Arabs and Turks. In this respect, the Persians have always been trying to woo the Kurds and build alliances with them on the basis of a racist discourse that prioritizes their racial superiority as Aryan races over the other peoples of the region.

3: The Arabs of Ahwaz: It has been widely acknowledged, even among some Persian historians, that the Ahwazi Arab people settled in the land of Ahwaz many thousands of years ago long before the advent of Islam, although the Persian supremacist narrative claims that the Ahwazi people’s history in the region dates back only to the arrival of Islam in Iran. 19 The Ahwazis’ strengths lie first in their national and cultural depth and the increasing regional support on the Arab street for their struggle, despite the continued disregard of the official Arab regimes towards the Ahwaz cause.

Ahwazis were also the original inhabitants of the Ahwaz region, which was a semi-autonomous and autonomous emirate in different historical periods, being

Journal for Iranian Studies

50

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

autonomous at the time of the Persian Shah’s annexation in 1925 when he overthrew its last ruler, Sheikh Khazal ibn Jabir al-Kaabi.

The Ahwazis’ strong national awareness is the biggest factor in the continuation of their struggle, in addition to the expansion of their activities internally, regionally, and internationally. Ahwazis have now begun to raise awareness of their cause regionally and globally more than ever before, especially with regard to the brutally repressive practices of successive Iranian governments which attempted to end the Arab presence in the region through ethnic cleansing and plans for systematic demographic change, marginalization, and eradication of the Ahwazi Arab people’s great heritage, identity, and culture. One of the main weaknesses that have hampered their efforts to attain freedom for almost a century now is the international response to the presence of oil in the region, which the Ahwazi people call a curse rather than a blessing on their freedom, with the world’s nations turning a blind eye to the Iranian regime’s heinous abuses and vast racism towards Ahwazis in exchange for oil deals; more than 95 percent of the oil and gas claimed by the Iranian regime are situated on Ahwazis’ land.

In 1908, when oil was first discovered in Ahwaz, then known to non-Ahwazis as ‘Arabistan’, 98 percent of the regional population of the region was Arab; despite the relentless subsequent efforts of successive regimes to ethnically cleanse and displace the Arab population, they have not managed, to date, to change the demographic reality of the region’s predominantly Arab character, although largescale dispossession, along with organized immigration of settlers from ethnically Persian areas, has raised the percentage of non-Arab immigrants and settlers in the region to around 30 percent.

Among the reasons behind the failure of Arab society in Ahwaz are disproportionately high rates of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy, due to successive regimes’ policies of discrimination and marginalization, which led invariably in response to an escalation of rhetoric calling for armed resistance and prioritizing the need for armed confrontation towards the Iranian regime; this understandable militant response to the brutal oppression weakened the peaceful democratic popular movement, which languished up until its revival in the past two decades.

The Ahwazis are also disorganized politically and lack a long-term strategy. Some researchers argue that the Shiite belief system shared by the majority of the Ahwazi population with Persians is one of the primary obstacles facing the Ahwazi people’s struggle against the Iranian regime,20 although there is a significant and rapidly increasing Sunni minority in Ahwaz, with a steady rise in the numbers converting from Shiism e to Sunnism in recent years.

Journal for Iranian Studies

51

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

4. Baluch: Baluchis in Iran suffer a dual sectarian and ethnic persecution by the regime due to their being majority Sunni, suffering the highest rates of poverty, deprivation, underdevelopment, and lack of any development amongst all Iran’s minorities. What strengthens the struggle of Iran’s Baluchi peoples is their ethnic affiliation and close ties with their Baluchi brothers in Pakistan, where they enjoy federalism, as well as in Afghanistan, where there is a strategic and logistical depth among their movement.

Baluchis also have a significant presence in the Gulf countries where many are senior officials, businessmen, and prominent figures.

The weakness of Iran’s Baluchi minority lies in the high rates of cultural and social backwardness, illiteracy in this group due to decades of deliberate oppression and neglect, along with the lack of any organized political opposition (except for some parties in exile), and the associated lack of a future strategy to frame their struggles.

There is also an active presence of some Salafist movements which emphasize a reactionary religious identity, which the Iranian regime has exploited as an excuse to launch a broad and powerful media war against the struggle of the Baluch people for freedom.

Despite the claims of Persian intellectuals that the Baluch belong to the same supposedly Aryan race as themselves, Baluchis differ in doctrine and language.

5: Turkmans: Although the Iranian Turkmans’ numbers are very low compared to other minorities in Iran, their close association with the Republic of Turkmenistan means that they have a high degree of cultural awareness. They are also associated with Turkmans, as well as with the Uighur minority in China. There is a strategic and logistical depth in the Turkoman people’s struggle and a strong disposition towards self-sufficiency.

The weakness of the Turkoman minority lies in their being scattered across several Persian provinces, in addition to losing the experience of political organization, having been at the forefront of the struggle against the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the victory of the revolution. Other factors distinguishing the Turkoman people, so-named due to their mother language being Turkish, are that they are not associated with the Persian language of the Iranian majority or the Shiite sect, with most being Sunni.

6: Lor and Bakhtiari: Due to their historical presence in Iran’s mountainous and isolated areas, the tribes of the Lor and Bakhtiari have maintained their strong ethnic and cultural identity, with many prominent intellectuals coming from this group, which has prioritized education. During the rule of Sheikh Khazal, the last ruler of Ahwaz, the Ahwazis maintained excellent links and close ties with them. 21

Journal for Iranian Studies

52

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

Unfortunately, a weakness of the Lor and Bakhtiari is widespread corruption, with many taking bribes from the regime which has settled a large number of the previously nomadic people in Ahwaz where they are widely considered to be a ‘fifth column’ of the regime due to their influence in its security institutions, as well in the army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The regime grants the Lor and Bakhtiari tribes many material and political privileges, considering them to be Aryans and therefore racially superior to the Arab and other minorities, using them as part of its demographic change plan in Ahwaz. General Mohsen Rezai, the secretary of the regime’s Expediency Council and the former IRGC commander of the Bakhtiari, evicted a large number of Lor and Bakhtiaris from their own areas, settling them in the middle of Ahwazi Arab neighborhoods and cities and handing over Arab agricultural and residential areas to their control in exchange for privileges.

The regime’s cynical exploitation of the Lor and Bakhtiari tribes as a tool to implement the regime’s demographic change strategy in Ahwaz is also a typically imperialist tool of division and rule, potentially pitting the Ahwazis peoples against the Lor and Bakhtiari tribes in a civil war in the future over the Ahwazis’ homelands.

Regional and international changes and their impact on national issues in Iran A desire for access to Iran’s massive oil and gas reserves, primarily concentrated in Ahwaz, is among the primary reasons for Western nations’ continuing disregard for the demands of non-Persian minorities in Iran. Historically, the major oil companies preferred to deal with one strong central government for economic reasons and to maintain Iran as a consumer market, rather than dealing with a number of states.

22 For this reason, the Western countries have firmly maintained the need for the continuing territorial integrity of Iran and rejected any break-up of the nation, solely based on economic considerations. The potential for instability and security chaos triggered by any movement towards freedom by its peoples due to the country’s geopolitically strategic location leads these nations to oppose any calls to dismantle the country or oust the regime, solely to preserve these nations’ own economic interests.

In meetings attended by the author of this study with representatives of the relevant US government bodies, particularly the State Department, we found that the presidents of the United States, whether under Clinton, Bush, or Obama, are opposed to any call by Iran’s peoples for autonomy or division of Iran.

During his meetings with the leaders of the European Parliament in Brussels, the author noted that the heads of State of the European Union support the rights

Journal for Iranian Studies

53

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

of minorities and their struggles for partial autonomy but will not support any movement for secession or independence from Iran.

Meanwhile, the nations of the region, due to the fear of tensions among their own ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities, are also unwilling to publicly support the rights of the brutally oppressed minorities in Iran.

Conclusions On the basis of all the above, we believe that the only feasible way to win support for freedom in Iran, which should be a priority of all groups, is for the various groups to unite and prove to the international community that in the event of any change of power in Iran, they can peacefully coexist and that they will quickly and effectively quell any form of instability. At the same time, these groups must offer an alternative to decentralization; that is, through the distribution of power between the center and the various parties to prevent future dictatorial or totalitarian rule in Iran. This would eliminate the dreams of the Jurist Leadership regime in continuing its brutal rule or building a regional Shiite empire no less brutal.

Indeed, the experience of the coexistence of the various peoples in India can be a model for the peoples of Iran, as well as helping to resolve the chronic problems plaguing the nation, helping to put an end to the regional tensions and the regional adventurism of the expansionist Islamic Republic.

In addition, non-Persian peoples should demand a constitutional guarantee to establish a semi-independent, semi-autonomous federal system to address the political, economic, social, and cultural inequalities in Iran and jointly declare their unwillingness to negate this demand since it comes within the framework of measures to ensure the continuity of democracy and peaceful coexistence among all ethnic and religious groups in the country, including the main Persian ethnic group.

Journal for Iranian Studies

54

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

The future movement of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran in the light of regional and international changes

Endnotes

1. Ethnic Identity Crisis in Iran: Ali Al-Taie (Ph.D.), Shadegan Publication, Tehran 1999 p-165 2. Azeezullah Bayat, Ez Arab Ta Dialme, Nashr Gangeene, Tehran, 1984, p. 2.

3. Alireza Asgharzadeh, Iran and the Challenge of Diversity, Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism, and Democratic Struggle New York, Palgrave2007 pp-8 4. Nike R. Keddie, Modern Iran, Roots and Results of Revolution- New Heaven &London, Yale University Press 2003 P2 5. Mohammad Qasemi, Shesh Sal Ez Enghelab Mashroteh, Entesharat Hezb Todeh “Tofan,” 1974, p. 8.

6. Naser Bour Berar, 12 Qarn Sokout, Ketab Awal, Nashr Qarnak, Tehran, 1379, p. 87.

7. National Demonstrations, Peoples Right or Iran Dismantling, Saleh Hamid, Alarabiya.net at: http://ara.tv/m4xvd 8. Hussein Raesi, Discrimination against nationalities and religious minorities in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Translation by Jabir Ahmad at: http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=397321 9. http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=3973, http://www.eslam.de/arab/manuskript_arab/verfassung_iri/ verfassung_iri.htm 10. Hussein Raesi, Ibid.

11. Joya Blondel Saad, The Images of Arabs in Modern Persian Literature , University Press of America, Maryland, p3 12. Manifesto, Congress of Nationalities for a Federal Iran http://www.iran-federal.org 13.NYT Opinion 3/14/1988 Soviet nationalities seeking autonomy https://goo.gl/ste4H3 14. The challenge of Russian nationalism to soviet stability https://goo.gl/1Ne2nA 15. Peter Ackerman and Jack Dual, A Force More Powerful, a century of nonviolent conflict, Palgrave,2000 NYC, p 494 16. See: Karim Abdian, Arabs Must Use Soft Power against Iran, 11 Feb. 2016, at: https://goo.gl/rgFHSP 17. Ahmad Bina, Supervisor Iran High Council for Human Rights, Center of The Press and Publication of the Judiciary, Tehran 2016 http://ar.ahwaznews.tv/2016/12/AhwazUN.html 18. Mostafa Ansari: The History of Khuzestan, 1878−1925, PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 1974 p1 19. Mostafa Ansari: The History of Khuzestan, 1878−1925, PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 1974 p1 20. Joya Blondel Saad, The image of Arabs in Modern Persian Literature, University Press of America New York and London p-5 21. William TH Srrunk, The Reign of Shaykh Khaz”l Ibn Jaber and the Suppression of the Principality of Arabistan: A Study of British Imperialism in Southwestern Iran PhD Dissertation, 1977 University of Indianap-124 22. Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, How Conflicts Within Islam Shape the Future, W.W. Norton company, New York 2006 P.212

Journal for Iranian Studies

55

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

Najla Mari (Ph.D.) Political Researcher and African-International Affairs Specialist

I

ran’s subtle infiltration of Africa has increased due to the regional and international rivalry over this continent. In order to achieve some gains and circumvent its isolation resulting from international sanctions, Iran has aligned itself with several African nations to win their votes in international organizations, to achieve its goals, and to preserve its sovereignty and security against any external threat.

The international competition for oil and uranium in Africa has entered a new era; the two key determinants of international relations and foreign policy, whereby Iran gives promises of economic aid in energy and construction and sells them oil cheaply as a way of improving their ties with Tehran.

Journal for Iranian Studies

56

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

Based on that assumption, this study aims to tackle Iran’s subtle infiltration of Africa and expose its influence on this continent in comparison with other influential regional and international powers that will use any pretext to antagonize Tehran.

Furthermore, it focuses on how the Iranian Foreign Ministry has benefited from Israel’s infiltration of the African continent to find suitable tools and methods to achieve its goals, especially after Iran’s growing role and status as a regional power.

This study will try to answer one main question; what is the impact of the international scramble for Africa with regard to Iran’s growing subtle power on this continent through the following central issues?

I. Iran’s presence in Africa: its goals and areas of control Iran has improved its relations with some African nations that antagonize the USA’s presence in Africa and gained their support, especially for its civilian nuclear program as follows: 1. The East and the Horn of Africa Iran’s strategy in the East and the Horn of Africa and the neighboring countries on the Red Sea aims to improve its political influence and to establish an anti-Western axis comprising these countries. Nevertheless, the growing Iranian presence in the Horn of Africa has negatively impacted Arabian national security as much as Israel’s activities in this region.1 2. West Africa West Africa has been a theater for regional and international rivalry due to the increasing discoveries of oil in this region. Moreover, Iran is trying very hard to improve its relations with the uranium-rich countries in this region due to its critical need for this material for its nuclear program. For example, Iran offered to transfer its nuclear energy expertise to Nigeria to help it overcome the shortcomings in its electrical supplies. Gambia also enjoys good relations with Tehran, supports its civilian nuclear ambitions, and shares its hostile position toward the West.2 3. South Africa Iran focuses on building strong economic and political relations with the most influential nations in the world regardless of religion, especially those rich in oil and uranium. It also seeks to gain these countries’ support in the international arena against any new sanctions resulting from its bad human rights record and nuclear program.

Consequently, Tehran succeeded in having some of the international resolutions against it abolished thanks to its southern friends – countries to the south of the Sahara desert.3 South Africa, for example, did not vote for the UN resolutions condemning Iran for its human rights violations and nuclear program. Zimbabwe also supported

Journal for Iranian Studies

57

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

Iran’s right to develop its own civilian nuclear program and signed ten agreements concerning technology and the generation of electricity, as well as investing in the energy and other sectors.4 II. Iran’s Ambitions and International Influence in Africa Iranian-African relations cannot be explained without looking at the regional and international influence in this continent that drives the international antagonizing policies toward Iran as follows: 1. Iran’s and America’s growing influence in Africa Following 9/11, the US played a major role in Africa due to the US administration’s policy of mobilizing the world against so-called, “Islamic Terrorism” and the discovery of oil on this continent. Furthermore, the Bush administration rationed out its economic aid for African nations according to their commitment to countering terrorism, which turned Africa into a strategic US base for oil supplies, the home of many American military bases, and areas for its military exercises.

In fact, the United States used certain procedures to achieve its goals in Africa as follows: A. Improving political and diplomatic relations.

The US improved its relations with African oil-producing states by intensifying its military presence there and visits by high-ranking US officials to negotiate the security and energy issues on this continent. For example, President Barack Obama visited Ghana in July 2009 and addressed the African Nations, followed by his visit to Nigeria, one of the most important African oil exporters to the United States.5 The United States also settled the conflicts in the areas close to the strategic oil fields in the Nigeria Delta, which could have been a threat to its oil supplies, through conducting joint military exercises to protect these oil fields and the international shipping lanes.6 Nigeria succeeded in settling its border disputes with both Sao Tome and Equatorial Guinea, which paved the way for American oil companies to invest in these areas.7 Washington responded positively to the suggestion by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS) by establishing a military base in Sao Tome in order to protect the movements of oil tankers in the Gulf of Guinea according to the African Coast Security Program (ACSP). According to this program, the United States naval and air forces will receive all the necessary services to improve its naval capabilities in this region.

Journal for Iranian Studies

58

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

With this American support, Equatorial Guinea signed a border demarcation agreement with Nigeria, which is clear evidence of the importance of American interests over any other considerations related to human rights. In fact, the need for African oil motivated Washington to maintain strong political relations with Nigeria, which has become the fourth most important destination for American investments in Africa regardless of its bad human rights record.8 B. Political and developmental assistance.

US aid for Africa has increased in recent years, especially health programs to achieve certain strategic goals such as: 1. Promoting strategic partnerships 2. Countering terrorism 3. Democratic transition 4. Enhancing regional security 5. Boosting economic growth and development 6. Providing humanitarian programs and developmental assistance 7. Supporting regional organizations9 The United States has also provided significant economic support for African oilproducing countries such as: 1. The Amerada Hess Corporation granted $18 billion to the Gabon oil industry to increase Angolan oil production by up to 3.2 million barrels per day.

2. It also granted $368 thousand to generate electricity in Botswana.

3. And $695 thousand to develop the natural gas industry in Cameroon.10 C. Military aid.

The US Congressional Committee for Africa adopted an African program for training and aid worth $660 million spread over five years within the framework of the American partnership with African militaries to improve their capabilities in the peacekeeping processes.

Washington also established the African ARP peace-keeping program with an annual budget of $30-40 million to finance, train, and support African participation in the peace-keeping processes, especially Nigeria,11 and re-deployed its military bases in oilrich territories such as the American Unified Military Command for Africa “AFRICOM,� which aims to secure American strategic interests on this continent. All in all, US policy relies on preventative security measures in many humanitarian, economic, and social issues along with its military and security precautions.12

Journal for Iranian Studies

59

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

Based on that assumption, the US is confronting Iran’s growing influence in Africa, where Iran is using a joint religious doctrine and selling oil for low prices as a way of improving its relations with African nations.

Iran is also confronting US influence in Sudan because of its strategic location, through improving its political, economic, and military relations with this country to help export the Iranian Revolution, which was evident in Iran’s condemnation of the international ruling to arrest President Omar Bashir, which Tehran described as an “unjust rule driven by political perspectives” in exchange for the Sudan government’s support for Iran’s right to develop civilian nuclear capabilities.13 On the other hand, with the beginning of the decisive conflict in the Yemen by the Arab coalition under Saudi leadership, Saudi strategy has started building strong, strategic relations with African nations, which manifested itself in the participation of Sudanese soldiers in the Arab coalition to support the legitimate government in the Yemen after an agreement with Riyadh to decrease Sudan’s political and military cooperation with Tehran.

In fact, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adopted a policy of rapprochement with African nations in order to confront Iran’s subtle infiltration of this continent, which became evident through the Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Aljubeir’s visits to more than one African country to claim Iran’s bad intentions toward this continent.

Arab African countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, and Comoros responded immediately to Saudi Arabia’s call, cut their ties with Iran, and expelled the Iranian Ambassadors from their countries, especially after the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Iran, which resulted in Sudan’s participation in the Ra’d Alshamal military exercises in Hafr Albatin in northern Saudi Arabia, along with 20 other countries.14 Aljubeir briefed the African leaders he visited on Iran’s practices in some African countries, which made them stand by Saudi Arabia and establish unconditional partnerships with the Kingdom in many areas, especially after the attacks on the Saudi Embassy in Iran.

In essence, Saudi relations with the countries in the Horn of Africa are hindering the export of the Khomeini Revolution to the African continent.15 2. Iran in the face of Israeli influence in Africa.

Africa has become a theater for conflict between Iran and Israel to dominate this continent, which is expected to increase in the near future.

Iran recently tried to establish links with all international, African, and Arab communities through all possible means. Following the nuclear deal with the P5+1

Journal for Iranian Studies

60

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

group, Tehran adopted the “The Soft Power” policy to lobby for international support, especially on its right to develop a civilian nuclear program and convey a message to the international community that it has the ability to open up to the world and change the stereotype of extremism about Iran.

The Iranian president’s visit to some African countries was evidence of Iran’s interest in this continent. He visited Djibouti to improve Iran’s ties with this country because of its strategic location next to the shipping lanes on the Red Sea and its land borders with Eritrea, which is, along with Sudan, an arms-smuggling corridor. The Iranian president also won his Djibouti counterpart’s support for Iran’s nuclear program and its role as a regional guardian. This rapprochement disturbed Israel and the West, as did the fact that Iran’s influence in Djibouti might extend to the whole of the Middle East based on the Somali, Sudanese, and Eritrean models, which enjoy strong diplomatic relations with Tehran.16 However, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has adopted a long-term strategy toward African nations through building strong economic and trade partnerships with these countries; this has become a top priority for Saudi foreign policy. For Riyadh, the Horn of Africa occupies a strategic location close to the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait in order to support the Saudi military operations in the Yemen, which motivated the Saudi military leadership to visit some areas in Djibouti in preparation for the establishment of military bases,17 which is in fact a step toward confronting Iran’s presence in Africa.

This message became clearer when Djibouti’s foreign minister announced that his country had felt, from the very start, that their relations with Tehran were suspicious and distrustful, leading to their breaking up with Iran.

In fact, the Saudi presence in Djibouti is of great importance in light of the international scramble for this country as one of the most important international shipping lanes, home of the American Lemonier military base since 2001, and the French base close to Djibouti airport.18 Saudi’s overtures toward Djibouti began with the gift of five state-of-the-art speedboats to this country, and an intense military build-up on its territory. These developments contributed to the success of the operations by the Arab coalition warships in liberating Mion Island and the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait from the Houthi rebels. Tactically, the Yemeni national army took over this Strait, which passes through Djibouti.19 Furthermore, Kenya and Uganda maintained strong relations with Iran on one side and the US and Israel on the other. They benefited from Iranian economic aid, technical support, oil, and arms. All in all, the East African countries established a pragmatic model for the competing nations with a foothold in the Horn of Africa,

Journal for Iranian Studies

61

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

which raised Israeli fears, as stated by the Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman during his visit to four nations in this region in 2009.

In response to the Iranian-Eritrean military cooperation, Israel deployed its Navy to face any surprise threats that consisted of, according to Israeli General Jacob Amidor, rocket boats, helicopters, and submarines located in critical positions in the Red Sea along the Suez Canal. He also added that Israel has full cooperation with the American Fifth Fleet, and recommended in his report to the Israeli National Security Council the necessity of confronting Iran’s infiltration of Africa.20 Israel feared that Iran’s strong relations with some African nations might translate into logistical and military support, which made it plan its strategic goals in Africa based on the following approaches: A. Breaking its isolation imposed by Arab countries.

B. The attempt to win support and a kind of political legitimacy in the international arena.

C. Receiving African countries’ support in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict.

D. Maintaining Israel’s water security, which is considered a pillar of any country’s presence and expansion.

E. Building a strategic base to achieve regional supremacy and target Arab national security.

F. Achieving freedom of navigation in the Red Sea as one of the basic foundations of Israel’s security and its military and economic requirements.21 Israel has adopted several ways to penetrate the African societies relying on the so called, “The Israeli Model” that has been supported by the international community through the development aids. Many Israeli writers described this strategy as the real application of the Soft Power principle created by Josef Nay. The development of assistance to Africa Israel relied on the international cooperation program to achieve its strategy toward African nations by providing agricultural, irrigation, and urban and cooperative planning assistance. It expanded its activities on this continent through the establishment of the International “MASHAV” Cooperation Unit in the Israeli Foreign Ministry to manage and coordinate this program of developmental assistance.

One of the most important types of assistance introduced by Israel in the agricultural and food security fields was the “The African Market Garden” project, which aims to minimize the dangers and increase productivity in small family farms located on barren lands.22

Journal for Iranian Studies

62

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

Military and strategic assistance Israel has adopted diverse military tactics to increase its influence and assume control of African political organizations. Israel’s infiltration has extended to include the establishment of military bases and intelligence agencies, and participate in the protection of some African regimes. In fact, Israel has succeeded in building military relations with more than 25 African nations.23 Israel’s presence in Eritrea is limited but influential, which was evident in the American Stratford Agency’s disclosure of information in 2012 about Israeli naval units in the Dahlak Archipelago and Msawi Port, and the monitoring post in the Amba Sweira mountains, which aims to gather intelligence on any unusual activities in the Red Sea, especially by Iran.

The security issue is the biggest motive for Eritrea to improve its relations with Israel after gaining independence from Ethiopia, which has become a landlocked country and is trying to reestablish a water corridor onto the Red Sea by taking control of the Port of Assab.

In order to end its international isolation, Eritrea has established strong relations with Iran, which wants control of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait and the water corridor leading to the Suez Canal. These developments have indeed turned Eritrea into a theater of conflict between the competing Middle Eastern powers (Israel and Iran), which threaten Arab interests in the region.24 Trade and economic infiltration This factor has great importance in Israel’s strategy toward Africa. The trade exchange between Israel and some African nations increased in 2010 as follows: A. Kenya: $67 million in exports and $18.9 million in imports.

B. Ethiopia: $19.7 million in exports and about $45.7 million in imports.25 Israel’s ultimate goal is to take control of the African mining industry and natural resources such as diamonds in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and the Central African Republic, in addition to uranium in Niger. Today, Israel has the biggest companies that dominate African economies such as the agricultural Grid Abb Corporation specializing in the rehabilitation of degraded land, Alra, Motorola, Trading Kon, Solelboneh, African Hotels, and so on.

These Israeli companies won more than $4 billion in contracts to build governmental complexes, roads, bridges, tunnels, and ports. It also exports passenger airplanes, training airplanes, warplanes, tanks, communications equipment, and missiles to these nations.26

Journal for Iranian Studies

63

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

On the other hand, Iran has been using the same Israeli tools and methods to infiltrate Africa, relying mainly on developmental assistance, which provoked Israel against Iran’s activities in Africa as a direct threat to its strategic interests on this continent.

III. The “Soft Power” Strategy to Materialize Iran’s Infiltration of Africa Iran’s strategy toward Africa has been designed to lessen the impact of the diplomatic and economic pressure resulting from its rivalry with the West, especially the United States. The consequences of this enmity can explain the nature of this competition through the use of Iran’s tools and methods in implementing its foreign policy toward Africa as follows: 1. Diplomacy and the Soft Power Strategy: Iran has adopted a pragmatic form of diplomacy toward African nations in its competition with the US and Israel. Israel’s long history of diplomatic, economic, and security ties with Africa have for a long time obstructed the expansion of Iran’s influence on this continent. However, Iran made some gains in Africa when Mauritania cut its relations with Israel due to the Israeli war in Gaza in 2010.

In September 2010, Tehran hosted the Iran-Africa summit for two days. Leaders, businessmen, and diplomats from about fifty states attended the conference. In an attempt to stir up the feelings of the non-aligned countries, the Iranian President Ahmadinejad called for more cooperation between the two sides, noting that Iran and the African nations could establish an international system based on respect for these countries’ rights and dignity.

Nevertheless, Iran’s diplomatic efforts in Africa are still restrained for several reasons: A. Iran’s resources and capabilities, as well as its diplomatic and economic influence, are incomparable with those of the superpowers, especially the United States and China.

B. Although many of the African nations welcome cooperation with Iran, it is expected that these relations will remain restricted in case they harm African relations with more influential and stable powers.

C. Iran’s secret arms trade and difficult relations with its proxy extremist factions would complicate Iranian-African relations.

D. Iran’s ambitions in Africa are bound by its adverse internal economic conditions and external pressures resulting from the international sanctions.27 For example, South Africa has unstable relations with Tehran but supported Iran’s right to develop civilian nuclear technology. Nevertheless, it responded to international pressure and decreased its economic ties with Iran such as the Sasol Corporation, which used to be the biggest producer of coal fuel in the world, but stopped its operations in Iran and reviewed its current projects there.28

Journal for Iranian Studies

64

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

Iranian diplomacy has primarily relied on a developmental assistance policy and the International Cooperation Program to achieve its goals in Africa, which is a standard model for the Soft Power policy.

It tried to sell the Iranian model through giving developmental assistance and joint ventures in technology and energy such as drilling for oil, refinery maintenance, petrochemicals and gas, agriculture, health, the construction of dams, and defense and military bases.29 In Tanzania, Iran opened a Constructional Jihad Bureau to carry out any construction projects the Iranian government granted to this country and opened an educational center in the Sarka district. In Nigeria, Iran built the Jao Bridge over the Niger River using Iranian technical expertise, and transferred Iranian knowledge in the agricultural and industrial sectors, including the establishment of several automobile, shuttle, and agricultural equipment factories. In Uganda, Iran built two dams and many electrical stations on the Nile River using Water Fall Technology. In Senegal, it developed the transport sector through granting 300 Iranian-made Smind cars.30 Nevertheless, the US aid programs have played a major role in obstructing Iran’s influence in the countries Tehran is trying to approach, which has relatively diminished Iran’s presence in Africa.

2. Economic tools and “Oil for Uranium” diplomacy: Zimbabwe is an example of the Iranian oil for uranium policy. In addition to technology, experts, engineers, and specialist scientists, Iran’s efforts to operate one nuclear fuel cycle independently in Iranian nuclear plants need sufficient quantities of uranium. In 2010, Iran signed an agreement called, “The agreement of enhancing and protecting the bilateral investment with Zimbabwe” in exchange for the oil Zimbabwe urgently needs to repair its ravaged economy. According to this agreement, Iran will be able to receive about 455 thousand tons of crude uranium to produce twenty tons of enriched uranium. However, this agreement was rejected by Zimbabwe’s Parliament due to international pressure.31 Iranian diplomacy succeeded in making several bilateral cooperation agreements in most economical and technical sectors with African nations in addition to public and private investments on this continent. Nevertheless, African fears that Iran’s developmental assistance might be linked to the exportation of the Iranian Revolution or to spreading Shiite ideology are hindering Iran’s progress on this continent.

Journal for Iranian Studies

65

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

3. The sectarian issue and the consequences of Shiite expansion: Nigeria is home to the biggest Shiite community in Africa. In Zaria, the Islamic movement is the largest Shiite organization in West Africa and looks after Shiite affairs and Al Al-Bait rituals. Fifty Shiite educational schools have been established in the cities of Cano, Baoshi, Wazaria, and Lagos, in addition to the establishment of the Islamic Nation Security library and the Foudiah School. In the media, Iranian radio broadcasts daily messages to the Nigerian people for more than three hours per day.32 In Benin, the Iranian embassy plays an active role in reviving Shiite traditions, especially significant religious events. The Iranian community is also a major player in building schools and institutes such as the Islamic Al-Kawthar, hospitals, and clinics, and opening preaching and charity organizations and centers such as Ahl Al-Bait AlIslami lilda’wah Waltableegh-Baraco, the Al-Imam Al-Sadiq center for Da’wah and Guidance-Kandi. In most cases, young people who have a high school diploma in this country can get a scholarship in Iran.33 In Mali, Iran’s cultural center was established in the capital Bamako. There are ten schools belonging to this center, from where many Imams and preachers have graduated.

Comoros is a model for Iran’s capability of infiltrating and imperialism, as well as the spread of Shiite ideology in this Muslim country. In 2006, a cultural center was established in the capital Moroni called the Al-Thaqalain center to elect and send students from this country to the Iranian Hawzas.34 Closure An Overview of the International Powers’ Strategic Rivalry and their Impact on Iran’s Influence in Africa Iran’s infiltration of Africa is the result of intense efforts that aim to lessen the pressure of Western sanctions on Iran. Iran’s influence has been increasing in African countries, especially since signing the nuclear deal with the West on July 14, 2015, and the constant US pressure and imposition of sanctions on countries that supply Iran with fissile materials for its nuclear program.

In fact, the US is closely watching Iran’s infiltration of Africa and the expansion of its interests on this continent, which was evident when the US Congress extended the sanctions on Iran for another ten years in November 2016 to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons.

Despite the American and Israeli fears of Iran’s expansion in Africa, Iran has never

Journal for Iranian Studies

66

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

carried out any activities to harm American interests directly, despite the Israeli security experts’ prediction of these events in case of any attack on Iran’s nuclear plants, which would provoke Tehran to use all possible means to protect its interests.

Indeed, Iran’s current accounts in Africa are limited to achieving diplomatic and economic gains, supporting its proxies, and employing new ones.

In fact, Iran is still far from building an international coalition to create a balance of power with the West. Iran’s inability to achieve its goals results from the active and alert international role of isolating Tehran and preserving the status quo, especially the latest Saudi efforts to diminish Iran’s presence on the African continent. The Saudi Foreign Minister’s negotiations with some African foreign ministers and officials such as South Africa, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Benin, and so on were of great importance in improving relations between both sides. This was an extension of the intensive meetings the Saudi Foreign Minister held with African leaders in Addis Ababa during the latest African summit in addition to the negotiations he held with some Arab African countries such as Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Mauritania, and others, which demonstrated the joint Arab-African work under the leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As a result, the Islamic military coalition for countering terrorism was established, whereby African nations play a major role through severing relations with Tehran and diminishing its role in Africa due to their fears about its influence and intervention, especially after the attacks on the Saudi Embassy in Iran.

Journal for Iranian Studies

67

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

Endnotes 1. Nisreen Qassab, “The Iranian-Israeli Competition in the Horn of Africa, Almezmaah center for research and studies.

2. Brandon Fite, Chloe Coughlin Schulte, U.S and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa, and the Peripheral States, (USA, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2013), p24-23.

3. Abdulmalik Ali Alhamdi, “ Altawagul Al-Irani Filqarrah Alifriqiah,” Arabian Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, July 25, 2016.

4. Alsaied Awad Othman (Ph.D.), “Alnofooz Al-Irani Alna’im Filqarrah Alifriqiah,” Silsilat Dawliat A1, Cairo: the Arabian Center for Humanitarian Studies, January 2010, p 48-49.

5. Najla’ Mar’I (Ph.D.), “Mawqi’ Ifriqia .. fi Istratigiat Al’amn Alqawmi Alqawmi Alamriki 2015” the annual summit under the title, “Altahadiat Alamniah Waliqtisadiah Alrahinah fi Afrikia, the University of Cairo: the African Institute for Research and Studies, 2016, p138-140.

6. Abdulmin’im Tal’at, Alhojoom Alhadi’: Almasalih Alistratigiah Alamrikiah Waltahdidat Alamniah fi Khleej Guinea, Cairo: Alihram Establishment, 2008, p165-173.

7. Abdulmin’im Tal’at, “Mashakil Al’amn Walistiqrar fi Khaleej Guinea,” Alsiasah Aldawliah, A177, July 2009, p265-266.

8. Abdulmin’im Tal’at, Alhojoom Alhadi’: Almasalih Alistratigiah Alamrikiah Waltahdidat Alamniah fi Khleej Guinea, previous reference, p 162-170.

9. “Sub – Saharan Africa: Overview of U.S Foreign Assistance to Africa,” www.usaid. gov.

10. Najla’ Mar’I (Ph.D.), Alnaft Walma’: Alistratigiah Alamrikiah Tijah Afrikiah: Al-Sudan Namoozagan, Cairo: The Arabian Center for Humanitarian Studies, 2012, p 163.

11. Volman, Daniel, “The Bush Administration & African Oil; the security Implications of Us Energy policy”, Review of African Political Economy, No. 98, 2003, pp. 576 – 578.

12. Crawley, Vince, “U-S Military’s Africa Command will help African leaders: Officials say new AFRICOM will emphasize humanitarian missions, civil affairs”, Bureau of International Information programs, U-S Department of state, April 2007.

13. Najla’ Mar’I (Ph.D.), Alalaqat Alamrikiah Alsudaniah: Alnaft Waltakalub Alamriki Ala Al-Sudan, Cairo: Alarabi Lilnashr Waltawzee’, 2016, p 87.

14. Shahinaz Alaqabaqi, “Harb Saudiah-iraniah Baridah fi Afrikia.. Diplomasiat Almamlakah Tagzo Alqarrah Alsamra” 15. Ibid.

16. Ahmed Algareeb, “Alnashat Alaskari Aliranin Filqarn Alafriki Wahaqiqat Almakhawif Alisraeliah?” Alhamlah Alalamiah Limuqwamat Alidwan, April 24, 2009, http://ar.qawim.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4864 17. Zoheir Fahad Alharthi, “Alsaudiah Wadual Alqarn Alifriqi.. Magza Alziarat! Al-Riyadh Magazine, February 12, 2017.

18. Islam Farhat, Alsaudiah Waafriqiah.. Hal Ja’ Alrad Ala Iran Muta’akhiran? Islam on Line, September 19, 2016.

19. Abdulhalim Hatim, “Istidarat Alsaudiah Nahwa Africa.. Istithmar Siasi Bijadwa A’la, Alkhaleej on Line, Februari 24, 2016.

20. Amani Altaweel (Ph.D.), “Israel Walqarn Alifriki: Muhadidat Alalaqah Wa’aliat Altadbiq,” fi Ijlal Ra’fat Wa’akharoon, Alarab Walqarn Alifriki: Jadaliat Aljiwar Walintima’, Doha, Arabian Center for Research and Studies, 2013, p 341-342.

21. Hamdi Abdulrahman (Ph.D.), “Israel Waifrikia fi Alam Mutagaier: Minaltagalgul Ila Alhaimanah, Silsilat Dirasat

Journal for Iranian Studies

68

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Iran in the Face of the International Scramble for Africa

Masriah Ifrikiah, A3, University of Cairo: Egyptian-African Research Center, October 2001, p2.

22. Hamdi Abdulrahman (Ph.D.), Alikhtiraq Alisraeli Li’ifrikiah, Qatar: Muntada Alalaqat Alarabiah Waldawliah, 2015, p 90-92.

23. Jamal Mansour Hassan, Dawr Almo’asasah Alaskariah fi Sun’ Alsiasah Alkharijiah Alisraeliah Tijah Africa Ba’d Intiha’ Alharb Albaridah Aam 1991, Master’s thesis, University of Cairo: Economic and Political Science College, 2012, p 130-132.

24. Hamdi Abdulrahman (Ph.D.), Alikhtiraq Alisraeli Liafrikia, previous reference, p 111-112.

25. Israel Center Bureau of Statistics, Export and Imports by Country of Purchases and Destination 2010.

26. Amir Khalil Ahmed Khalil, Alsiasah Alkharijiah Alisraeliah Tijah Africa “Alsudan Namoozagan”, Beirut: Alzaitooneh Center for Studies and Consultations, 2011, p 41-43.

27. Brandon Fite, Chloe Coughlin Schulte, U.S and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa, and the Peripheral States, (USA, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2013), p 22.

28. Ibid, pp. 25-26.

29. Sharif Sha’ban Mabrook, “Alsiasah Alkharijiah Aliraniah fi Africa,” Dirasah Istrategiah, A166, Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Research and Studies, 2011, p 64-65.

30. Mahir Mohammed Ali, Alalaqat Aliraniah-Alifrikiah Munzo Aam 1979, Master’s thesis, Cairo: African Research and Studies Institute, 2009, p 126-131.

31. Najla’ Mar’I (Ph.D.), “Alikhtiraq Alirani Alna’im fi Africa: Wama’alatih Ala Alomah Alarabiah fi Zil Alrabee’ Alarabi fi “Alomah Wama’rakat Alta’ifiah,” the 13th strategic report for the Arabian Center for Humanitarian Studies, Cairo: Arabian Center for Humanitarian Studies, 2016, p 375-378.

32. Taqreer Altashaio’ fi Africa “Field Report,” previous reference, p 230-234.

33. Ibid, pp. 130-132.

34. Alsaied Awad Othman (Ph.D.), Ibid, pp. 69-70.

Journal for Iranian Studies

69

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition Fathi Abu Bakr Almaraghi (Ph.D.) Political Researcher and Iranian Affairs Specialist in the Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies

T

he Iranian Regime claims legitimacy through the Shiite Doctrine Jurist Leadership (Wilayat Al-Faqih) that grants clerics supreme authority over the regime and all social categories. The Iranian 1979 revolution broke down the state’s structure practically and theoretically.

It abolished the legitimate monarchy and established a theocratic form of government where clerics took over the Iranian republic through the theory of the Jurist Leadership.

This study discusses the intellectual determinants of the Jurist Leadership Opposition in the contemporary Iranian literature. Although many previous studies handled this theory and its reflections on the Iranian political system and the opposition, there is a need to clarify the intellectual determinants of the Jurist Leadership opposition that contributed to the establishment of the contemporary Iranian cult and political doctrine.

Journal for Iranian Studies

70

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

The study discusses the evolution of the Jurist Leadership theory and then divides the intellectual determinants of its Opposition into two parts as follows: I. Doctrinal Determinants 1. Imposition of Shirk and Takfir Sentences 2. Rejection of the Jurist Leadership for lack of evidence of being of Aal Albait (Prophet’s family) legacy 3. Rejection of the Jurist Leadership for lack of evidence in the Shiite early pioneers’ books 4. Rejection of the theocratic form of government II. Political Determinants 1. Theory of the divine right 2. The Jurist Leadership contradiction with democracy 3. The call for Islamic Protestantism Evolution of Jurist Leadership (Wilayat Al-Faqih) The theory of the Jurist Leadership was established at the early beginning of the Shiite doctrine in the fourth century, Hijri date. It was first mentioned in the Shiite pioneers’ books such as Al-Sheikh Al-Mufeed1 in 413 and Al-Saied Al-Murtaza2 in 436, Hijri date. In the beginning, the Jurist Leadership was limited to the theory: “All rulers in the time of the Imam’s absence are claimers of his right of rule and must not be dealt with. The Imam is represented by an eligible Shiite Jurist who has all absent Imam’s powers in judiciary, passing of sentences, custodian of those who do not have one, people placed under custodianship, and collecting of charities and giving them out to needy people under a tyrant ruler who claimed the right of the Imam.3 With the rise of the Shiite Safavid state at the beginning of the sixth century Gregorian date, some Shiite scholars acknowledged the Safavid Monarchy during the time of the Imam’s absence in exchange for recognition of their political status through the appointment of Al-Muhaqiq Al-Karaki deputy of Al-Mahdi Imam,4 which means that the Shiite clergy materialized their status during the Safavid dynasty theoretically and practically.5 In 1245 Hijri date, Ahmed Al-Naraqi6 made significant progress in theorizing Jurist Leadership (Wilayat Al-Faqih), starting with the necessity of the rise of the State at all times, breaking down “The Waiting” foundation in the Shiite ideology and condemning all rulers for claiming the right of the absent Imam. Al-Naraqi also called for supremacy of Jurist Leadership over rulers in terms of necessity rather than legitimacy. However, his views were not supported by the Shiite scholars until the rise of Khomeini’s theory of Jurist Leadership (Wilayat Al-Faqih) following the Iranian revolution in 1979.

Journal for Iranian Studies

71

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

Khomeini commenced his theory of the legitimacy of the Jurist Leadership based on the necessity of the rise of the state at the time of the Imam’s absence through intellectual but not quoting proofs—from previous sources—through perception and analysis of Al-Sharee’ah rules and quoting the speeches of Al-Faqih (the Jurist), either the smaller Wilayat or consulting the ruler to direct rule, which was stated in the Iranian constitution, Article 5, which says, “At the time of the Imam Mahdi’s absence, leadership and power in the Iranian Republic shall be in the hands of the Jurist Leader; the just, piety, pious, insightful of modern-day issues, and the courageous who is capable of handling and managing things.”7 According to this article, the supreme leader provides political guardianship over the Iranian people and the nation, President of the Republic and high ranking political and religious authorities although the very next article states, “The state’s administration should be run based on the public opinion through electing the president, the parliament, and local councils.”

The two articles were extremely different in terms of decisiveness and openness in granting the Jurist Leader guardianship and imamate over the nation, and the president of the republics’ powers in the structure of the Iranian political system.

Based on that assumption, the rights of each of them had remained debatable until 1988 when Khomeini announced the absolute Jurist Leadership, which, according to a message he sent to Khameini who was president of the republic at that time, means that the rules and decisions passed by the Jurist Leader are above law and the authorities of any person or organization in the Iranian republic.

The intellectual evidence provided by Khomeini on the validity of the absolute Leadership (Jurist Leadership) were compelling to his supporting current, but at the same time, provoked—and is still provoking—waves of rejection and opposition in Iran either within the framework of the Shiite doctrinal or the civilian political determinants.

I. Determinants of the Doctrinal Rejection of the Jurist Leadership The doctrinal opposition to the Jurist Leadership emerged at the theory’s early beginning by all Shiite scholars at that time except Ayatoallah Brojardi who approved it conditionally. In this study, we will discuss this opposition to the Jurist Leadership through the intellectual platforms it was initiated from as follows: 1. Imposition of Shirk (polytheism) and Takfir (Infidelity) Sentences The imposition of Shirk and Takfir on the Jurist Leadership supporters stems from the fact that it is unsubstantiated in the Holy Quran; neither Ahmed Al-Naraqi nor Khomeini came up with any evidence from the Holy Quran to prove this theory. Many times, Khomeini mentioned that that the Jurist Leader has a divine right and has been appointed by the Prophet or the Imam to run the Muslims secular and religious affairs,

Journal for Iranian Studies

72

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

which appeared clearly in his response to the opponents of his appointment of Mahdi Bazirjian head of the transitional government after the 1979 revolution when he said, “I appointed him based on my divine right; his obedience is a must and people must follow him,”8 which is, in fact, slander and defamation of Islam.

The Takfir sentence on the Jurist Leadership followers was supported by Khomeini’s letter to Khmeini in 1988 when he said, “The government is one branch of the absolute guardianship of the Prophet (peace be upon him). It is one of the fundamental principles of Islam and is above all other provisions even Prayer, Fasting, and Hajj.”

In his statement, Khomeini relied on a verse in the Holy Quran that included the word Provisions (Islamic Laws), while his opponents believed that this word refers to arbitration, judiciary, and the ethical and religious codes of Islam but not to forcing people on faithfulness, worship, nor to running the state’s affair.9 This view was expressed by Ayatoallah Alsaied Abu Alfadl Bin Alriza Alborq’i Alqumi10 in 1991 in his book “Sawanih Alayam” when he said that Shirk laws should not be cloaked in the Islamic religion because one might say that there are many news and speeches that refer to the Jurist Leadership. Although there is no verse or speech that approves Jurists have guardianship over the Believers in Islam, some might refer to some speeches such as “Scholars are successors of prophets” and apply it on the Jurist Leadership that might be inferred from the saying, “Consult our hadeeth (speeches) narrators,” which, in fact, does not refer to the Jurist Leadership at all. News and sayings that oppose the Holy Quran must be rejected and those who want to force themselves on people through some early Jurists’ sayings about the Jurist and ruler’s guardianship over orphans, the immature, and the mindless if they do not have any guardians, are classifying all people within the category of the immature and mindless through the absolute Jurist Leadership and the turbans on their heads. In Islam, the obedience of the Muslim ruler is linked with his obedience of Allah. We obey him only if he is committed to the orders of Allah, not because of his rule, guardianship, and jurisprudence that only appeared in the fourth century, Hijri date. Alqumi added, “Personally, I did not expect that Shirk (polytheism) to be imposed officially in Iran since the absolute obedience of any creatures rather than Allah is an acknowledgement of Leviathan and setting up of Jurists as equal as Allah, the Almighty. Indeed, we should say the truth, although ‘Most of them are haters of the truth,’ Allah, the Almighty, says in the Holy Quran, ‘You have neither guardian nor glorious protector except Allah’ Al-Baqara: 107, which means that giving the absolute guardianship to anyone except Allah is an evidence for infidelity and Shirk (polytheism).”

Alborqu’i is one of Abdulkarim Alha’iri’s disciples, founder of Qum scientific Hawzah.

He received the license of jurisprudence in Najaf from Alsaied Abu Alhassan Alasfahani.

Journal for Iranian Studies

73

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

Alburqu’i belongs to “The Quran-Committed Shiites” group. When he was forty-five, he announced that the Shiite doctrine has many superstitions such as the reverence of Ali Bin Abi Taleb and begging the Imams. He added that the principle of the “Fifth” (a portion the Shiite Imams take from people’s properties) concerns war trophies only and rejected the belief in the signs and miracles of the Imams’ graves. His views triggered a burst of reactions in Iran, especially his book “A lesson about the Guardianship” and his translation of Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdulwahab and Ibn Taimiah books such as “Altawheed” into the Persian language that escalated tension inside the Iranian society.11 Some of Alborqui’s views on Khomeini were when he said, “Mr Khomeini was drowned in the Greek philosophy but did not have significant knowledge of the Quran.

He explains the Quran based on the views of philosophers and believes that the Word of Allah is impenetrable as he had never read what Allah says in the Quran, ‘Preaching for people’ and ‘Clarification for people’ (Imran Chapter, verse 138), and ‘Guidance for people’ (Baqara Chapter, verse 1855). He concluded, “I can say that Mr Khomeini is highly drowned in superstitions.”12 Alburqu’i was subject to severe criticism and accusation because of his rejection of the Jurist Leadership. He was imprisoned for accusations of following the Sunni doctrine and Imam Mohammed Bin Abdulwahab although his denial of these allegations in his diaries. Indeed, many Shiite scholars opposed the Jurist Leadership at the early beginning of the Iranian Republic for many reasons, but Alburqu’i was distinguished by the judgment of Khomeini’s Atheism because of his sacrilegious views and lies that were not substantiated in the Holy Quran.

2. Rejection of the Jurist Leadership for lack of evidence of being of Aal Al-Bait (Prophet’s family) legacy Followers of this “Evidential” trend in the rejection of the Jurist Leadership did not say of Khomeini’s Atheism. They contributed their rejection to the Jurist Leadership for lack of evidence from Aal Al-Bait legacy. In the beginning, they participated with Khomeini in the political work but broke up with him after his announcement of the absolute Jurist Leadership even more than that of the Shah. The most prominent figures of this trend were Ayatoallah Alozma Mohammed Hassan Tabtaba’i Qumi 131905−2007 and Ayatoallah the Reference Mohammed Kazem Sharetmadari 1905−1986.14 Followers of this trend enjoyed esteemed scientific and scholastic status. Tabtaba’i and Sharee’atmadari were of the traditional references inside and outside Iran.

Tabtaba’i rejected the narratives about the powers of the Jurist Leadership and said that it is only limited to his religious duties. He also believes that the term Hakim

Journal for Iranian Studies

74

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

(Judge or Ruler) for Ibn Hanzalah when he said, “I made him a Hakim over you” means a judge that decides cases between people and gives advisory opinion, but not an absolute ruler over all people’s affairs.15 As for Sharee’ati, he supported Khomeini at the beginning of the revolution and supported the establishment of the Islamic Republic in the referendum of 1980. However, he opposed the Jurist Leadership when it was included in the constitution and gave the Jurist Leader political, military, and administrative powers, especially Article 110 of the Iranian Constitution,16 which means that Sharee’ati’s opposition to the Jurist Leadership was driven by political motivations, although it was cloaked in jurisprudent evidence through re-translation of the narratives of this theory.

3. Rejection of the Jurist Leadership for lack of evidence in the Shiite early pioneers’ books Some renewal writers, especially during the reign of Iranian reform president Mohammed Khtami, relied—in their rejection of the Jurist Leadership—on its lack of evidence in the Shiite scholar’s books since the fourth century, Hijri date until now except on judiciary cases, including punishments and guardianship over orphans, mindless, and incompetents in terms of control over their properties. Until the tenth century Hijri date, the Shiite political doctrine had not acknowledged a fallible ruler since impeccability is a condition of the ruler, which does not exist—as they believe in—except in the Prophet and Imams after him. Nevertheless, the Shiite scholars have never presented a political theory to run the society. Through tracking the evolution of the Jurist Leadership during a recent stage of the history of the Shiite doctrine,17 we find out that followers of this trend seek to prove that there is no divine source of the Jurist Leadership. They believe that it is just a political theory with no relation to religion, which denies the holiness and absolute powers of the Jurist Leader he receives—as he pretends—from Allah through the Imams.

The most prominent figure of this trend is Muhsin Kadior, who influenced the Iranian doctrinal and political beliefs since the mid of the nineties of last century. His credibility came from the license he received from Ayatollah Montaziri after 17 years in Hawzas’ studies in the doctrinal jurisprudence and his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Tarbiyat Mudarris in Tehran. However, he was soon imprisoned and banned from teaching, and finally lived outside Iran.

4. Rejection of the theocratic form of government Followers of this trend believed that the clerics’ taking administrative positions would make people like some of them to run their errands and hate others, which would influence their feelings toward religion itself once clerics fail to meet people’s needs, and prevail corruption that would damage the spiritual status of clerics through

Journal for Iranian Studies

75

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

diminishing their major role in the call for Allah and attracting people to faith and the righteous path. They believed that the scholars’ job is to urge governments to be committed to the pillars and laws of Islam and advise people to vote for the righteous candidates, but not a theocracy at which the Jurist Leader has absolute powers and runs the state directly.

The most prominent figure of this trend is Ayatoallah Alsaied Riza Zanjani 1903−1983.18 He applied his ideas practically through his rejection of assuming any position in Musadaq’s cabinet. Following the 1979 revolution, he and his big brother Alsaied Abu Al-Fadl and the two sons of the founder of Qum Hawza, Murtazi and Mahdi Alha’iri, also refused to assume governmental positions and asked Khomeini to ban clerics from interfering in the state’s administration.19 The Iranian clerics’ opposition to the Jurist Leadership is not confined to the jurisprudent evidence of the models presented in this study; there is a big list of clerics who rejected it that can be included within one of the three previous points.

The Iranian regime was cruel with its opponents away from negotiations and talks clerics deserve such as Mohammed Al-Shirazi head of Shirazi current, Ayatoallah Mohammed Riza Jalbaijani, Ayatoallah Mohammed Sadiq Tehrani, Ayatoallah Ali Safa’i Qumi that was house arrested until death, and Ayatoallah Ahmed Khawansari.

The most prominent figures that opposed the Jurist Leadership were: Ayatoallah Mohammed Al-Shirazi head of Al-Shirazi current, Ayatoallah Mohammed Riza Jalbaijani, Ayatoallah Mohammed Sadiq Tehrani, Ayatoallah Ali Safa’i Qumi that was sentenced to house arrest until death, Ayatoallah Ahmed Khwansari that was house arrested until his mysterious death, the same fate faced Ayatoallah Hussein Ali Muntaziri, Ayatoallah Alsied Hassan Tabtaba’i Qumi, and Ayatoallah Yousef Sani’i, in addition to all that sympathized with the clerics who opposed the Jurist Leadership, especially the traditional Reference Ayatoallah Sharee’atmadary that was accused of inciting a coup to overthrow the Iranian regime at the beginning of the revolution. Furthermore, every cleric who attended Sharee’atmadary’s funeral was either imprisoned, or house arrested such as Alsaied Riza Alsadr brother of Alsadr Imam, Ayatoallah Tasouji, and Ayatoallah Saied Rasoul.20 II. Determinants of the Political Rejection of the Jurist Leadership Theory The rejection of the Jurist Leadership in the Iranian literature emerged before the establishment of the Iranian republic and the emergence of the final shape of this theory. This rejection was accompanied by the constitutional revolution and the Iranian struggle to establish a parliamentary form of government and topple down the tyrant monarchy in 1906.

Journal for Iranian Studies

76

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

1. The theory of Divine Right This theory was presented by Mohammed Hussein Algharwi Alna’ini who died in 1936 and states that: A. Allah has granted the right to administer the Muslim nation to its own people to carry out his orders within the religious standards B. People run their social affairs by divine right from Allah the Almighty, and no one can revoke them this right C. People have to elect a Leader and an administration from those who have the legitimate conditions to manage and organize the society in compliance with the constitution that abides by with the rules of religion D. Jurists guarantee compliance with laws passed by people with religion.21 Alna’ini included his views in his book “Tanbeeh Alomah Wa Tanzeeh Almillah” (Waking up the Nation and Honoring the Cult) that was introduced by two prominent traditional references in Najaf, Ayatoallah Alakhaw and Mohammed Kazim Alkhurasani and Sheikh Abdullah Almazindarani; however, the Iranian society did not welcome Alna’ini’s views at that time because of its ignoring of the Shiite principles in most of its introductions and its commencement from the general Islamic principles rather than the Shiite doctrinal ones. Moreover, his was clearly influenced by the book “Taba’i Alistibad” (Nature of tyranny) for Abdurrahman Alkawakibi.22 Alna’ini’s book had a great impact on the Iranian political beliefs during the Islamic Republic era through Ayatoallah Altalqani who wrote an introduction and reprinted this book in 1955 that has become one of the most important resources of the Iranian political beliefs since then. Alna’ini’s views have incurred major change in the Iranian political discourse about the state’s legitimacy through including the public right as a foundation for legitimacy to rule and submitting to the majority opinion, which was rejected in the Shiite literatures before due to the rejection of the Shura (Consultancy) principle and the provision of impeccability of the legitimate ruler.23 Alna’ini did not reject the view that says, “Any rule in the absence of the Imam is an extortion of the Imam’s right.” On the contrary, he approved the rejection of the Imam Deputies’ rule as an extortion of the absent Imam’s and people’s rights.24 It is noted that Alna’ini did not use the term “Jurist Leadership” openly in his views, which refers to the nonproliferation of this principle at the beginning of the twentieth century although Alnaraqi’s discussion of it a long time ago.

These enlightening ideas prevailed in Iran at the beginning of the twentieth century but were exposed to change and defamation during the reign of both Al-Qajari and

Journal for Iranian Studies

77

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

Albahlavi dynasties; however, it remained substantial in the Iranian political beliefs of democracy advocates who reject tyranny. With the development of the opposing currents against Shah Mohammed Riza Bahlavi, Ayatoallah Talqani was aware of the revival of Alna’ini’s views to establish a modern rule theory that combines the religious teachings with people’s sovereignty to attract all opposition currents; religious, Communists, and Liberals.

2. Contradiction of the Jurist Leadership with democracy Khomeini’s inclusion of the Jurist Leadership in the Iranian constitution in 1980 shocked his companions in the revolution and made the other political factions realize that clerics were about to carry out an exclusion campaign against all other parties and establish a theocratic rule through an invented Shiite doctrinal theory that had never been implemented as a foundation for the regime, not even during the Safavid dynasty.

The political currents reactions varied between rejection and rebellion and carrying out armed operations against the new regime. One of these political currents was, Nahzat Azadi Iran (Frontier of the Liberation of Iran) took a special ideological position through the issuance of a book titled “Explaining and analyzing the absolute Jurist Leadership”25 as an official statement of the movement in response to the announcement of the absolute Jurist Leadership in Khomeini’s speech directed to Khameini through a suggestion by Engineer Mahdi Bazarjan, head of the transitional government appointed by Khomeini after the revolution, which is the first political criticism of the Jurist Leadership in the Islamic Republic era.

Jabhat Tahreer Iran believed that the absolute Jurist Leadership opposes all liberties guaranteed by democratic laws such as freedom of religion, speech, and parties. It also opposes the concept of relying on people’s opinion, damages the states’ national sovereignty, and mislays people’s and religious minorities’ rights, which contradicts Khomeini’s pledges he had made a long time ago to the Iranian people during his stay in exile in Najaf and Paris.26 This movement asserted that the absolute Jurist Leadership had paved the way for dictatorship and tyranny, quoting from the views of Abdurrahman Alkawakibi’s book “Taba’i Alistibdad” (nature of tyranny) and Alna’ini’s views in his book “Tanbeeh Alomah Wa Tanzeeh Almillah” (Waking up the Nation and Honoring the Cult) of combining all powers in the hands of one person (the Supreme Leader) who controls the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial authorities. The Liberation of Iran movement supported Alna’ini’s views, which states that religious tyranny is a filthy issue that leads to the divinity of clerics and that salvation from religious cruelty is harder than

Journal for Iranian Studies

78

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

salvation from political oppression.27 The movement announced that the Jurist Leadership violates the Iranian constitution in Articles 6, 7, 8, 9 that state: A. The state’s administration should rely on people’s opinions B. The Islamic elected Shura Council and local councils are the sources of legislation in Iran C. Promoting virtue and preventing vice is a group and mutual responsibility of all people D. No one has the right to seize another’s legitimate rights even through passing of laws.28 Based on that assumption, we find that the Liberation of Iran Movement—the only political faction from outside the clerical circle that had practiced its political activities until 2009—believes that the Jurist leadership, which is the essence of the Iranian political system, is a tyrant theory that damages the democratic values, public liberties, and opposes the constitution.

3. The Call for the Islamic Protestantism With the relatively political openness in Iran during former President Mohammed Khatami’s era and his political development project, the Jurist Leadership re-faced severe criticism from Iranian political factions that had been excluded since the 1979 revolution. Some of the nearly prohibited Liberal current members represented by factions that belong to the National leader Mohammad Musaddaq, other individuals of the enlightened religious current, and the left powers of the various trends came to the forefront of the Iranian political arena.29 Reformers directed their criticism during this stage to the clergy institution and their social status imposed on the Iranian society during the past years of the Islamic Republic. Criticism had no more been directed to the Jurist Leadership theory from religious or even political perspectives in order to prove its invalidity but to break down the priesthood structure that, according to reformers, stands behind these superstitions that enslave people. The most prominent reformer who called for that trend was Abdulkarim Soroush who stated: “When religion turns into a states’ ideology, its theme changes from being a source of model virtues into a justification of the class domination.”30 The issue was extended to the rejection of the Shiite doctrinal bases from the clerical point of view such as classifying Muslims into jurisprudents and traditional; a licensed clergy is a jurisprudent while all other Muslims, although their scientific qualifications in their majors or social status, are traditional to the jurisprudent and follow his views and legislations, whatever they concern.

President Khatami enhanced the constitution’s status above the Jurist Leader’s.

He believed that the constitution is the Iranian regime’s supreme law and the Jurist

Journal for Iranian Studies

79

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

Leadership receives its importance from its inclusion in the constitution, which means that without the constitution, it would have just been like any other doctrinal theories.31 In his presentation of the Islamic Protestantism in 2002 in the memory of the Iranian thinker Ali Sharee’ati, Hashem Aqajri (Ph.D.) criticized the Iranian religious institution through resembling it to the Catholic Church before the emergence of the Christian Protestant Reform movement based on the belief that the Holy Book cannot be understood by normal people other than the clergy. He also compared between the church’s hostile position against science in the Middle Ages and the Shiite Hawza’s position toward learning the English language before 70 or 80 years old that, according to the Hawza, violates religion.

Aqajiri rejected the belief that the clergies’ understanding of the Holy Quran during the past ages is compulsory to Muslims in the modern age, asserting that modern-age clergy has the same rights of jurisprudence and understanding as their ancestors. He added that the Iranian clergy believes that any student’s attempt to understand the Holy Quran is a major crime because doing so, according to Aqajari, would destroy the clergies’ business.

Aqajiri rejected the clerical classification. He considered their ranks as names they created during the Safavid era on the same priesthood ranking model of the church. In fact, Islam does not have ranks and titles like Ayatoallah, Hijjatollah, Thiqatolislam, Almarji’, and Ayatoallah Alozmah. Aqajiri added, “Religion has turned into administrative positions and the clerics have a separate class away from the society they live in.” All in all, Aqajiri believes that the Islamic Protestantism is a constant project to recover from extremism and hard lining.32 The constant criticism to the Jurist Leadership since its beginning until now reflects the Iranian doctrinal and political beliefs rejection of this theory, which means illegitimacy of the Iranian regime that relies on the Jurist Leadership imposed on the Iranians by force. However, the aforementioned analysis does not mean that the majority of the Iranian people reject the Jurist Leadership. It is an influential part in the Iranian doctrinal and political beliefs dominating all components of the Iranian society by force. In fact, non-use of force in the imposition of the Jurist Leadership on people would result in a theoretical change in the source of the regime’s legitimacy since the idea of rejecting this theory is available in the Iranian political beliefs.

Journal for Iranian Studies

80

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

Conclusion 1. The rejection of the Jurist leadership within religious determinants was more influential than the political determinants for the following reasons: A. Its jurisprudent origin B. The clerics’ power during the Republic era was not linked with political conditions C. The difficulty of accusing clerics of being agents and hostile to the regime except in rare cases 2. The political exclusion and the condition of the belief in the Jurist Leadership to practice politics in Iran diminished the political criticism to this theory.

3. The Jurist Leadership theory is combined with the religious institution in the Iranian political beliefs, which led to a state of hate and rejection to clerics that might extend to religion itself in the Iranian society.

4. The Iranian regime responded to the opposing current to the Jurist Leadership by raising the ceiling of the Jurist Leader’s powers. The Jurist Leader’s absolute powers have reached the point of no return on both sides; the regime can neither decrease the Jurist Leader’s powers nor make any theoretical amendments, and the opposition is unable to acknowledge the Jurist leadership in its same form at the beginning of the republic, which means that the confrontation would be thunderous shall the regime weaken.

5. The Jurist Leadership criticism inside Iran diminished its ability to spread outside the Iranian borders and to be convincing to the Shiite communities abroad.

6. The Jurist Leadership theory has not justified the legitimacy of the Iranian regime to the Iranian Non-Shiite people. Precisely, how can the Iranian Non-Shiite or NonMuslim citizens believe in the legitimacy of a regime that receives its jurisprudent theory from a religious doctrine they do not believe in?

Journal for Iranian Studies

81

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

Endnotes 1. Al-Sheikh Al-Mufeed; lived in the second half of the fourth century, Hijri date and the beginning of the fifth century.

His name is Mohammed Ibn Mohammed Ibn Al-No’man. He wrote the origins of the Shiite doctrine and is the founder of the Shiite Jurisprudent School. He represents the moderate current between Al-Hadeeth and Al-Qisas doctrines and was inspired by his master Ibn Abi Aqeel Al-Omani, the electronic encyclopedia for Al-Albait http://cutt.us/qWGve 2. Al-Saied Al-Murtazi: Ali Ibn Mousa who was known as Al-Saied Al-Murtazi, Al-Shareef Al-Murtazzi, Alam Al-Huda.

He was a Jurist of the Imamate sprakers. He was Born in 355, Hijri date and died in 436 Hijri date. He was one of the greatest Shiie scholars and Author of Al-Amali book. He is the disciple of Sheikh Al-Mufeed and master of Al-Sheikh Al-Tousi, the electronic encyclopedia for Al-Albait http://cutt.us/qWGve 3. Abu Mansour Al-Hassan Al-Hilli: the diverse Shiites, Tehran, Part4, p. 497.

4. Al-Muhaqiq Al-Karaki: Ali Ibn Al-Hussein Ibn Abdula’ali Al-Karaki Al-Amili, was known as Al-Muhaqiq Al-thani and Al-Muhaqiq Al-Karaki 940 Hijri date. He was of the greatest Shiite scholars who lived during Al-Safawi age. He migrated from Lebanon to Iran at the invitation of Shah Ismail Alsafawi to spread the Shiite doctrine. He had a big role in spreading the Shiite culture in Iran and has many jurisprudent writings such as, “Jami’ Almaqasid fi Sharh Qawa’id Al’alameh;” therefore, he was called, “Sahib Almaqasid. He also has other opinions supporting the Jurist Leadership. The electronic encyclopedia for Al-Albait http://cutt.us/qWGve 5. Malik Mustafah Al’amili: Itifaq Alkalimah Bain Olama’ Al’omah Ala Wilayat Alfaqih, Beirut 2006, p. 130.

6. Ahmed Alnaraqi: Ahmed Ibn Mohammed Mahdi Alnaraqi. Oters said, Mahdi Ibn Abi Zar Alsafa’i Alnaraqi 11851245. He is a scholar, a jurist, and a poet from Naraq in the Iranian Kashan where he was born in 1185 or 1186 Hijri date. He traveled to Iraq to continue his Hawza studies in Najaf and Karbala and returned back to Kashan and faced the “Reference” theory after the death of his father in 1209 http://cutt.us/mD7g5 7. The constitution of the Iranian republic http://cutt.us/xjh1x 8. Al-Nour newspaper: Establishment of Organizing and Spreading Imam Khomeini’s Legacy, Tehran 1358 Hijri date 1358, part HG 6, p. 31.

9. Muhsin Kadior: Nakhsatain Naqd Wilayat Faqih, website Rasmi Muhsin Kadior http://cutt.us/ummfV 10. Abu Alfadl Albirqu’i 1908-1992. A Shiite scholar from Qum. He is a descendent of Alsaied Ahmed Ibn Mousa Almubarqi’ Ibn Imam Mohammed Altaqi Aljawad Ibn Ali Ibn Mousa Alriza. He was accused of following the Sunni doctrine because of his writings although his acknowledgement of following some of the Shiite references. His official website: http://cutt.us/fGzr 11. Ayatoallah Alozmah Abu Alfadl Alborqu’i: Sawanih Alayam, Dar Alaqeedah, 2013, p. 178.

12. Ibid, p. 180.

13. Ayatoallah Alozmah Mohammed Hassan Tabyaba’i Qumi. An Iranian Shiite reference born in 1329 Hijri date in Mashhad city and died in it in 1428. He was one of those who stood against canceling the third Shahadah in Azan (prayer call) in the Iranian Radio and was house arrested by the end of his life due to his rejection of the Jurist Leadership.

14. Ayatoallah the reference Mohammed Kazim Sharee’atmadary: an Iranian Shiite reference with a major political and religious role in both Iraq and Iran. One of his political achievements during the reign of Shah Riza Bahlawi was saving Khomeini from execution. He became a Reference in 1961 after the death of the Reference Hussein Albroujardi for a big number of Shiites in Iran, Pakistan, India, Lebanon, and the GCC countries.

15. Saied Muhsin Tabtaba’i: Nahj Albalagah: an analysis of Albai’ Min Almakasib book for Alsheikh Alazam Alansari,

Journal for Iranian Studies

82

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Jurist Leadership in the Iranian Modern Cult and Political Mentality Intellectual Determinants of the Political Opposition

Intisharat 22 Bahman, Qum 1371 Hijri date, page 299, quoting from Jameelah Kadior, Tahawol Kaftman Siasi Shiite Der Iran, page 376, quoting from Alshaima’ Aldamardash Alaqali: The Jurist Leadership theory and its Application, Beirut 2011, p. 190.

16. Tareekhjah Ai Az Hasr, Sanat Jomhouri Islami Brai Hadf Mu’tarizan Az Ayatoallah Kazim Sharee’atmadari Ta Mousawi Wakarroubi, Kambeen Bain Almilli Hqouq Bashr Der Iran http://cutt.us/nNwt 17. Muhsin Kadior (Ph.D.): Tamli Der Mas’alah Wilayat Faqih, website Rasmi Muhsin Kadior http://cutt.us/K527K 18. Ayatoallah Saied Riza Zanjani; the closest disciple of Abdulkarim Alha’iri, founder of Qum Hawzah. He studied in Qum with Khomeini who was one year older than him. He was the closest cleric to Mohammed Musadaq and founder of the National Resistance movement. He became Prime Minister and nationalized oil and was toppled down in the coup in 1953.

19. Muhsin Kadior: Saied Riza Zanjani Wa Takfeer Khomeini, website rasmi Muhsin Kadior http://cutt.us/Cfy7S , quoting from Ali Ashraf Fathi, Bradran Zanjani, Kazarshi Az Kafatko Ba Husseini, Torjan, 2 Mardad 1387.

20. Laisat Ayatoallah Hai Mukhalif Wilayat Faqih, Bilitreen http://cutt.us/q5bLf. 21. Muhsin Kadior (Ph.D.): Nazariah Hai Dawlat Der Fiqh Shiite, Nashr Ni, Tehran 1376 Hijri date, p. 49.

22. Muhsin Karimi: Bararsi Maqaisah Ai Nazariah Hokoumat Islami Az Didkah Muhaqiq Na’ini Wa Imam Khomeini Bayan Namah Kar Shnasi Arshad, Danshkdah Oloum Insani, Danshkah Tarbyat Mudaris, Bah Rahnmayi Mir Hussein Mousawi 1375-1376 AH, pp. 61-91.

23. Muhsin Kadior (Ph.D.): Nazaryah Hai Dawlat Der Fiqh Shi’I, p. 118-120.

24. Mohammed Hussein Alna’ini: Tanbeeh Alomah Wa Tanzeeh Amilah, p. 65.

25. The Liberation of Iran movement released two statements on the Jurist Leadership. The first on January 20, 1988 titled, “Bayan Harakat Tahreer Iran Hawl Wilayat Alfiqih Almutlaqah Aw Alinqilab Alrabi.” This was criticism to the Absolute Jurist Leadership. The second statement was “Tafseel Wa Tahleel Alwilayah Almutlaqah Lilfaqih” book that was published through an internal journal for the Liberation of Iran movement in April 1988.

26. Tafseel Wa Tahleel Wilayat Mutlagah Faqih, page 48 http://cutt.us/AwpT9 27. Ibid, p. 55.

28. Ibid, p. 68.

29. Sa’ad Mohammed Saleh Ibn Nami (Ph.D.): Harakat Alislah Alsiasi fi Iran fi Ahd Khatami 1997-2005, Dar Alriza 2008, Cairo page 117 30. Jalal Aldin Mohammed Saleh: Wilayat Alfaqih Wa Ishkalyat Alsultah Alsiasiah I Alfiqh Alshi’i, Riyadh, 2015, page 330 31. Tawfiq Alseif: Hodoud Aldemocratiyah Aldiniyah, Dar Alsaqi, Beirut, 2008, page 215.

32. Matn Kamil Sakhnarani Daktar Aghajri, Der Mo’arikh March 29, 1981, Talar Mu’alim Hamadan, Karamidasht Salroze Shahadat Dakar Sharee’ati, Muhajir http://cutt.us/Kmdiv

Journal for Iranian Studies

83

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

Turkey and Iran a regional cold war justified by economic interests

Karam Said Researcher and Specialist in Turkish affairs at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies

T

he increasing number of differences in opinion between Turkey and Iran has been reflected in exchanges of statements and counter-statements between the two countries in recent weeks. It seems that the extent of these discrepancies will gradually increase in the near term, especially given the tendency of both countries towards increasing their political and military influence in Syria and Iraq.

Journal for Iranian Studies

84

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

While Turkey seeks to build and extend military bases between Jarablus and Azaz in Syria, and to intensify “Operations Euphrates Shield,” which was launched on August 25, 2016, despite strong Iranian opposition, Tehran, as the primary regional supporter of the Assad regime, has strengthened its influence in several centers in Syrian territory to enable the Iranian regime to control the land corridors which it requires to maintain its strategic access to the shores of the Mediterranean. These centers are tasked with strengthening Iran’s “Shiite Crescent,” bringing Iran into direct conflict with Turkey in Ankara’s commercial, economic and political gateway to the Arab world, with the Turkish leadership already in a tense relationship with the European Union over the freezing last November of negotiations in the European Parliament about Turkey’s application for EU membership.

On a separate but related issue, the battle to liberate the Iraqi city of Mosul, which began on October 17 last year, revealed the extent of the conflict between Turkey and Iran. While Iran considers the battle of Mosul to be the primary action to expand Shiite influence in the region and to re-establish Iraq’s demographic balance in favor of Shia by reducing the Sunni presence in northern Iraq, Turkey sees the battle of Mosul as being strategically important for its own national security. To that end, it pressed Washington to participate in the fight for the city, as well as implementing security and military measures on its border with Iraq in preparation.

Turkey is supporting a number of armed opposition groups in Syria and opposes the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity there, while Tehran supports the Assad regime and does not mind giving the Kurds a greater position and prominence in Syria and Iraq.

The already frosty climate between the two countries entered a freezing phase after Iran’s official protest against Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s description of Iran’s regional policy as “sectarian” in remarks made on the sidelines of a security conference in Munich last February, in which he said, “Tehran aspires to turn Syria and Iraq into two Shiite states.” This was the second time in a short period Çavuşoğlu had made such a controversial statement, asserting on the eve of a visit to Bahrain in mid-February that Iran is seeking to divide Iraq and Syria, and is acting from a nationalist standpoint.

The Iranian regime’s sectarian orientation has become clearer and caused more anxiety since the regime admitted in August 2016 that it had formed a sectarian military force, named the “Shiite Liberation Army,” which is fighting in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

General Mohammad Ali Falaki, a senior commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and a commander of Iran’s forces in Syria formally announced the creation

Journal for Iranian Studies

85

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

of this new army, during an interview with the Iranian state-owned Mashreq news agency, which has close ties to the IRGC. In the interview, General Falaki stated that Iran had “formed the Shiite Liberation Army led by the commander of the Quds Force, Qassim Suleimani, who is fighting on three fronts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.”1 As part of Iran’s military build-up in the region, the regime has established a base at Damascus International Airport, which acts as the headquarters of the IRGC in Syria, as well as another base at Mount Ezzan near Aleppo. The Iranian regime believes that it has become known as a growing military force to reckon with among conventional international forces, with this new status making it all the more vital to establish military bases outside its territory that reflect its military prowess. In this context, the Iranian military’s Chief of Staff, Major General Mohammad Baqri, on November 26, 2016, said that Iran is moving towards “the construction of naval bases on the coasts of Syria and Yemen, meeting the need of Iranian fleets to travel to distant bases.” These statements have caused concern not only in Ankara but also among Iran’s neighboring states, particularly in the Gulf.2 The Central Asian region and the Caspian Sea represent an area of influence and conflict between Ankara and Tehran, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent states in this region, which contain significant levels of natural energy resources, particularly oil and gas.

Against this general background, the conflict between geopolitical and sectarian tendencies has escalated, resulting in historically poor relations between Iran and Turkey. The increasing political and cultural tensions between the two countries remain the most prominent and public example of the worsening bilateral relations; however, these are still tempered, as always, by economic cooperation and trade exchanges.

Stimulus of conflict and its maximum level As well as the escalation of long-term tensions over old issues, this is the first time in modern history that Ankara and Tehran have rushed towards real political conflict against the backdrop of a situation in Syria and Iraq. The mutual recriminations over their network of economic and trade interests have been overshadowed by the suspension of meetings of the Turkish-Iranian Business Forum, with the last one, scheduled for February 25, 2017, not taking place at all.

Over the course of the six-hundred-year history of the relationship, since the war between the Ottoman and Safavid empires, both Iran and Turkey have previously shown pragmatism in their bilateral relations and prioritized finding balance despite the many factors of conflict. Although they differ over almost everything, from the struggle for influence in the Central Asian republics to the Arab world, the two nations

Journal for Iranian Studies

86

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

have always been keen to maintain bilateral relations, which are often leveraged and driven by the economy. Here, the Turkish discussions avoided the revival of the fifth anniversary of the “Jalderan” battle which took place between the two countries in 1514 to avoid tension with Iran.

The uprisings of the Arab Spring since 2011, however, have revealed profound contradictions between the two countries, with sharp differences emerging from the beginning of the crisis in Iraq and Syria. While Ankara initially tried to convince Damascus to reform and respond to popular demands instead of raising its “big stick” against protesters then sided with the anti-Assad opposition after this diplomatic approach failed, Tehran sided with the regime from the start, almost immediately deploying its forces and militias, as well as deploying its regional proxies, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite militias and volunteers.

The Turkish-Iranian relationship was further complicated following the emergence of the so-called “Islamic State” organization, widely known by its pejorative Arabic abbreviation “ISIL,” whose primary objective was to dismantle and destroy these nations and peoples, and apparently to slander and distort Islam. Following the emergence of ISIL, Turkey opened its “Incirlik” airbase to the U.S.-led international coalition forces founded in 2014 to defeat the terror group. Turkey’s subsequent decision to allow the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which it is a member state, to establish an anti-missile shield on its territory on the eve of Russia’s entry into the Syrian debacle, caused concern and anger in Tehran.

The aforementioned comments by Turkish FM Çavuşoğlu on the sidelines of the 53rd Security Conference in Munich on February 17, in which he labeled Iran’s policy as “sectarian” and claimed that Iran is seeking to spread Shiism and convert Syria and Iraq to two sovereign Shiite states further increased tensions, as did a statement by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a visit to Bahrain in mid-February, in which he asserted that “Iran seeks to divide Iraq and Syria and act from a national standpoint.” The Iranian regime officially protested against these comments and summoned the Turkish ambassador to Tehran, calling the remarks “unconstructive.”

In a barbed response to the Turkish comments, Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, called Turkey “a neighbor with weak memory which denies the good.”

Despite recent tensions over differences in the handling of some issues, such as the battle of Mosul and developments in the countries involved in the conflict, especially Syria and Yemen, however, the two countries have not forgotten that many considerations could be influenced by changes in their relationship; this motivates both to attempt not only to control the limits of this tension and not to escalate them any

Journal for Iranian Studies

87

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

more than is essential in an effort to avoid negative repercussions on their interests but also to seek to reach consensus on controversial issues.

It is likely that despite the current grave differences between the two countries, given the folk memory of previous bloody wars between them five centuries ago, and despite their expansionist aspirations and historical tensions over their regional projects, the leaderships in both nations will impose red lines on any escalation of tensions, with both taking the other’s objectives into account before acting to fulfill their own ambitions in order to avoid direct military confrontation. Thus, while Tehran may frustrate Ankara with its use of multiple regional players, including the Shiite militias and the PKK and its proxies, it cannot risk further intensifying its dispute with Ankara. Meanwhile, Turkey’s pragmatic nature prevents it from being dragged into any military adventurism with Tehran.3 Historical experience in the joint management of protracted conflicts between the two countries, and the longevity of Turkish-Iranian bilateral relations, which witnessed some 12 wars in 1823 alone for only one example, confirm the political realism that characterizes the relations between the two countries. This was manifested in the signing of the Treaty of Qasr-e-Shirin, also known as the Zehab Treaty, signed on May 17, 1639, which, despite sporadic conflicts, has proved a remarkably long-lasting and useful reference point for the peaceful settlement of disputes between the two countries.

Although the governments in Ankara and Tehran represent two very different political systems, one secular and the other theocratic, they have coexisted for some time in this state of ideological dissonance with no significant problems, with both countries keen to develop and strengthen their economic relations. Levels of bilateral coordination and economic exchange increased with the arrival of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in power in Turkey in 2002. The first ten years of Erdogan’s rule were marked by convergence between the two countries of a warmth unseen since the fall of the Shah in 1979. Within that decade, political ties between Turkey and Iran were greatly strengthened and the number of official diplomatic visits doubled, while trade between the two countries increased from $1 billion in 2000 to around US $16.5 billion in 2012.

This political coordination reached a peak in 2010 with Ankara’s involvement in June of that year, along with Brazil, in a United Nations mediation mission concerning the Iranian nuclear dossier. Turkey’s official position was based on the principle of refusing to impose further sanctions due to the lack of sufficient evidence to convict Iran. Turkey, therefore, voted against UN Resolution 1929 of June 2010, which would have seen new sanctions imposed on Tehran.4

Journal for Iranian Studies

88

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

In light of the above, the study sheds light on the historical relationship between Iran and Turkey and the thorny issues in their current relationship, as well as the counterconsiderations that impede any narrowing of the gap between them, in addition to the incentives for continued cooperation.

Different visions The relationship between Ankara and Tehran was given a great boost in terms of its development after Iran adopted a supportive stance towards Turkey in the wake of the failed coup in July 2016, underlining its support for Turkish sovereignty in alignment with the “Moscow – Tehran – Hezbollah” axis regarding the Syrian crisis, and the engagement of the two countries in the Astana negotiations. Despite this, however, the need for improved political relations remains a concern.

If the conflict of influence between Turkey and Iran remains the most prominent dispute between them, there are other differences, which are no less important: Crisis Management in Syria The standpoints of Ankara and Tehran differ significantly towards the management of the Syrian crisis. The Iranian regime is extremely sensitive to Turkey’s military presence on Syrian territory, with Brigadier Dehghan, the Iranian Defense Minister, asserting, “Turkish military intervention on Syrian territory, is an assault and a violation of all Syrian territory, and is without consent, and is even resented by the Syrian government.” Dehghan added, “If Turkey enters Syria even at the request of the Syrian government, they must leave immediately, whether at the request of Damascus, or otherwise; they are aggressors against Syria.”5 Such statements very clearly reveal Iran’s views on the Turkish military presence in Syria and on Turkey’s “Operation Euphrates Shield,” launched on August 25. On the other hand, the Assad regime’s “liberation” of Aleppo last December, which relied on both Iranian and Russian backing, was a turning point in the Iranian presence in Syria, with the Tehran regime betting on a political settlement. On the other hand, Turkey had a starting point for wider military operations in eastern Syria, which is quite the opposite of Iran’s political and military priorities in the Syrian conflict.

Another issue is evidence of the mutual antagonism between Iran’s and Turkey’s positions in the Syrian crisis, which show deep differences and a lack of any shared view on the future of the Syrian political system. The main question for Turkey here is the impossibility of tolerating a ruler who has systematically killed his people in an effort to crush a popular uprising against tyranny and oppression. On the other hand, Ankara believes that its entry into strategic cooperation with Iran under the current situation would offer a political advantage for Iran in support of the Assad

Journal for Iranian Studies

89

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

government in future Syrian developments, although Ankara considers Assad to be wholly illegitimate.

Iran’s sectarianism Iran’s sectarian practices in Syria and Iraq, and systematic doctrinal policies and efforts to build Shiite influence in the region, made the rapprochement between Turkey and Iran on the eve of the Turkish coup fragile, and escalated the dispute between Ankara and Tehran, especially after the latter’s refusal in February 2016 to heed Turkish calls for the establishment of safe areas in Syria to accommodate the displaced people there. Responding to Turkey’s calls, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Bahram Qasimi claimed that such action would “further exacerbate the situation there,” with Iran rejecting the proposal to establish safe areas, arguing that the situation in Syria is complex, and requires multiple understandings and initiatives to reach a solution.

On the other hand, the situation between Iran and Turkey has recently turned into a hotbed of tension and confrontation, and all the signs seem unmistakable that the timeless conflict between the two countries, with its Ottoman-Safavid dimension on the basis of Sunni-Shia sectarian divisions, has turned Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon into the battlegrounds of this conflict.6 This appears to mean an inevitable escalation of the sectarian conflict, with Turkey opposing the “Iran project,” which relies on the use of sectarianism in neighboring countries as a military and political tool in achieving the Tehran regime’s expansionist objectives in the countries of the region. From the Iranian regime’s perspective, the Shiite presence in the Arab region is a scattered minority among a geographically connected Sunni majority. To achieve meaningful penetration of and dominion over this Sunni territory, therefore, Tehran sees it as essential to make demographic changes in the Sunni Arab majority extending from Mosul to Aleppo through Iraqi cities such as Tal Afar and Sinjar on Turkey’s borders with Syria and Iraq.7 It seems likely that the wholly sectarian orientation of the Iranian regime’s regional objectives became even clearer and more alarming to Turkey with the aforementioned announcement in August 2016 by General Falaki of the IRGC of the establishment of the “Shiite Liberation Army” led by Quds Force Commander Qassim Suleimani.8 Reducing Turkish influence in Iraq The battle for the liberation of Mosul, which began on October 17, 2016, has wrought further division between Tehran and Ankara, after the Iranian regime’s initial push to prevent Turkey from participating in it. In October 2016, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein Amir Abdullahian said the presence of Turkish troops at the Iraqi

Journal for Iranian Studies

90

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

camp of Baashika was “wrong,” despite Ankara’s belief that it is legally entitled to participate as a member of the international coalition against ISIS, authorizing Turkey to deploy its forces in Iraq to fight the terror group without the approval of the Baghdad government. This is substantiated by the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2249 (2015) and the 1919 Treaty of Lausanne, which give Turkey the right to secure its borders by military intervention in Iraq or Syria.9 The repercussions from the battle for Mosul have had a negative effect on the relationship between Iran and Turkey, especially while the Iranian regime supports the well-documented violations by the “Popular Mobilization Forces” militias or Popular Mobilization, a de facto unofficial military wing of Iran in Iraq, which participated in the battle of Mosul; this participation and the abuses perpetrated by the militia members against the Turkmen minority loyal to Turkey based in the Tal Afar area further escalated these tensions, with Turkey likely to bear the humanitarian and economic consequences of the demographic changes and forced displacements inflicted by the militias.

Following the start of the battle for Mosul, Iran succeeded in forcing the Iraqi government to include large numbers of the Popular Mobilization in the official Iraqi forces via legislation passed in the Iraqi Parliament on November 26, effectively institutionalizing Iran’s presence in the country. Under this controversial new law, the Popular Mobilization factions and formations now have official status and legal protection as legal entities subordinate to the country’s security forces, giving them the right to maintain their identity and privacy.

With the imminent conclusion of the battle of Mosul and expectations that the liberation of the city will be announced following military advances that have succeeded in fatally wounding ISIL, there are widespread perceptions that the Popular Mobilization militias may subsequently launch a bid to seize power in Iraq. The members of these factions view themselves as more deserving of ruling the nation than the politicians who came to power with the protection of the Americans following the occupation of Iraq in April 2003, despite being associated with Nouri al-Maliki, an Iranian proxy, who was himself appointed by the USA. The Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization wants to re-divide the Iraqi “cake” using a framework and maps that are not very different from the current framework of party, factional and regional quotas.

Ankara believes that this legitimization of the Popular Mobilization will contribute to the escalation of sectarianism in the region, as well as thwart efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis. Foreseeing intensifying Turkish-Iranian competition in Iraq, Turkey is searching for new means to bring balance to the situation and prevent the sectarian

Journal for Iranian Studies

91

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

influence of the Iranian regime from escalating by strengthening the Turkish presence in northern Iraq and intensifying its support for the national mobilization forces in the Baasheqa camp.

In fact, the absence of Turkey from the battle of Mosul was a major blow to Ankara’s interests and involvement in wider Iraqi and regional security, as well as increasing its concern over Iran’s penetration of Iraqi Kurdistan in light of the broad area of understanding and coordination between Kurds and Iran, giving Tehran further control over Iraq, and enabling it to shape the landscape to fit its regional ambitions. Turkey is also concerned about the growing refugee crisis, which is directly impacting it, especially in light of the Popular Mobilization militias’ massive ethnosectarian cleansing of the Sunni people of Mosul and other cities.

In addition to the above factors, the Kurdish issue itself represents an irritating aspect for the Turkish and Iranian regimes, with military confrontations escalating between the Turkish army and the PKK in southeast Turkey since July 2015 following the failure of political settlement negotiations which began in 2012, while Tehran is also increasing its punitive approach to the Iranian Kurdish population, demonstrated by the regime’s mass execution of 20 Kurds on August 2, 2016 and threatening military operations in the areas of northern Iraq with a large presence of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and Iranian-Kurdish PJAK militias in response to clashes between these forces and Revolutionary Guards in some western regions of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in Iran. Both Iran and Turkey share a common vision of the Kurdish organizations in Turkey, Iran, and Syria as “constituting the source of the threat.”10 Although Turkey and Iran are unable to change the existing rules of strategic understanding between them to stifle the aspirations of the Kurds in the region, the Iranian regime continues to exploit the Kurdish issue where expedient, as shown

by Quds Force Commander Qassim Suleimani intervening to provide assistance for the PKK, classified as a terrorist organization by Ankara, in order to enlist its help in liberating Ain al-Arab (Kobani) from ISIL around two years ago. Turkey is also monitoring Iranian support for Kurdish factions in southeastern Turkey.

The gap between the positions of Iran and Turkey has widened over the PKK, with Ankara seeking to prevent the expansion of Kurdistan in northern Iraq, especially after the deployment of PKK bases in Sinjar, which followed the PKK’s assistance in 2014 in helping to free the region from the grip of ISIL. The Turkish President warned on October 27, 2016, “Sinjar is turning into a new Kandil,” a reference to the Kandil Mountain in the triangular Iraqi-Turkish-Iranian border region in northern Iraq, which is the backbone of the PKK. In contrast, Tehran has strengthened the PKK’s presence

Journal for Iranian Studies

92

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani, which welcomes its presence in Kurdistan. Quds Force Commander Qassim Suleimani has called on the PKK to participate in the battle for Mosul and vowed to increase military and material support for the group, despite the rejection of both the presidency of the Iraqi Kurdistan region and Turkey on allowing the PKK to participate.

Iran aims to strengthen the PKK’s presence in northern Iraq to use this as leverage against both Turkey and the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Masoud Barzani, who enjoys a broadly positive relationship with Turkey.

The clash of Iranian-Turkish influence through the countries’ patronage of Kurdish groups and militias was even clearer after the events seen in the town of Sinjar in Iraq on March 26, 2017, when clashes broke out between members of two factions, the PKK’s “Sinjar Protection Units,” which have close ties to both Iran and the Popular Mobilization militia, and the “Syrian Peshmerga forces,” trained by the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Masoud Barzani, which have close ties with Turkey. These confrontations were not the first of their kind, with other examples such as the confrontation on March 2, 2017 on the eve of the assumption of control of the area by a Kurdish Peshmerga faction belonging to the PKK party, led by Jalal Talabani close to Tehran’s oil fields in Kirkuk operated by Kurdish forces belonging to the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Barzani, which is supported by Ankara.11 It is likely that these events are only one manifestation of the Turkish-Iranian power struggle through the use of Kurdish proxies, especially as Tehran seeks to acquire a significant share of Kirkuk’s oil reserves and build an export pipeline from Kirkuk to Tehran replacing the Kirkuk-Ankara line, which turned Turkey into a global energy center, after it made major strides in the construction of the Turkish pipeline to transport Russian gas to European markets via Turkey.

Gulf Circle Iran is closely watching the consensus in the relationship with between Turkey and the Gulf States with growing concern, with this relationship crystallizing since early 2015, and becoming even more firmly established with Turkey’s announcement of its support for the Saudi-led “Operation Decisive Storm” against the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, although Ankara is not participating in the military offensive. Turkey also supported Saudi Arabia’s position after the execution of the Shiite cleric, Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, in January 2016, in the face of Iranian intervention in Bahrain through Tehran’s support of Shiite groups.

The growing shared interests and common political visions on regional issues between Turkey and the Gulf nations, demonstrated by the visit of the Turkish President

Journal for Iranian Studies

93

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

on February 13 to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar, have led to a qualitative shift in relations between Ankara and the Gulf countries, as Turkey’s trade with Saudi Arabia and the UAE reaches advanced levels. The total sum of non-oil-related foreign trade between the two countries at the end of 2015 reached around $7.4 billion, including the free zones, while the rate of exchange with Qatar stood at around $700 million.

The volume of trade between Turkey and Kuwait, meanwhile, has tripled since 2002, rising from around $165 million that year to approximately $700 million by the end of 2011. The number of Kuwaiti tourists in Turkey has also increased in recent years, with Turkey registering 180,000 Kuwaiti tourists in 2016, compared to a mere 8,000 in 2002.

The number of Kuwaitis who own real estate in Turkey has also risen, currently standing at around about 1,744 in total, with Kuwaitis occupying third place in the list of foreign real estate owners and realtors in Turkey after Iraqis and Saudis. Kuwaiti investments in Turkey, meanwhile, amount to around $2 billion, spread across 271 companies and institutions active in the Turkish market since 2004 in the real estate, commercial and industrial sectors. On the other hand, the volume of trade exchange with Bahrain reached about US $350 million.12 Turkey’s relationship with the Gulf States was further enhanced with the establishment of the Saudi-Turkish Coordination Council in April 2016. The most important development for Ankara has been the opening of a Turkish military base in May 2016 in the State of Qatar, Turkey’s closest ally in the region, the first such regional initiative for Turkey since the end of the Ottoman Empire. This move was in line with the Sunni alliance officially launched by Riyadh in March 2016, an alliance that both Ankara and Doha have joined.13 While Turkey is witnessing a close convergence with the Gulf, the relationship between Tehran and its Gulf neighbors appears to be a concern, especially as negative perceptions of Iran have sharply increased in Yemen and Bahrain in recent years due to Tehran’s support for the Houthi organization in Yemen and for the Saraya al-Ashtar terrorist group in Bahrain, which has targeted Bahraini security forces and is widely viewed as undermining the stability of the Kingdom.

The relationship between Tehran and Riyadh also deteriorated markedly in the year after the Iranian authorities banned Iran’s citizens from performing the Hajj pilgrimage due to the regime’s political disputes with Saudi Arabia, which suspended its diplomatic and political ties with Tehran after an attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in January 2016. This took place against the background of the execution of 47 “terrorists and instigators,” including the Shiite cleric Baqir al-Nimr, and the Iranian

Journal for Iranian Studies

94

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

authorities’ refusal to punish the perpetrators of the embassy attack.

These Iranian-Saudi tensions were not the first of their kind in recent years; in October 2011, two Iranian operatives tried to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, on Tehran’s behalf, with the U.S. Justice Department revealing details of the thwarted murder plot.14 Iran is currently making efforts to calm the tensions with the Gulf and to rebalance the growing Turkish role in Gulf circles, as seen in the visit by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to Qatar in early 2017, not to mention an Iranian message received by Kuwait at the end of the month, part of a diplomatic outreach initiative by Tehran attempting to normalize its relations with Gulf countries. Iran’s attempts to improve its relations with the Gulf nations do not exceed the level of rhetoric and slogans, however, while in practice the regime continues its aggressive efforts to expand its influence within the geographical circles that represent the strategic depth of the Gulf, including Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.

President Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Kuwait and the Sultanate of Oman in midMarch 2017 demonstrated the Iranian regime’s desire to quell tensions with the Gulf, especially in light of the escalating rift between Iran and the United States of America following threats against Tehran by the administration of US President Donald Trump in recent months.

The Trump administration began its mandate by adopting a tougher stance against Iran. Recently, Trump wrote on his Twitter account that “Iran is playing with fire – they don’t appreciate how ‘kind’ President Obama was to them. Not me!” As White House spokesperson Sean Spicer later said, “The Iranians got the message and they continue to get it, and the administration will be tougher in dealing with them than it was under President Obama.” Trump’s administration has also escalated the sanctions against entities involved in the Iranian ballistic missile program, with Congress extending the sanctions for another ten years.15 These points provide context in showing the importance of Rouhani’s visits to Kuwait and Oman, demonstrating Iran’s determination to attempt to establish back channels through which to reach understandings with the new US administration on the various contentious issues linked to the factors controlling the limits of Tehran’s handling of the pressures imposed by successive US administrations since the Revolution in 1979. They also once again demonstrate Tehran’s determination to maintain its constant pursuit of its expansionist objectives, despite the regime’s implausible claim of “adaptive flexibility” within its ideology, and its determination to achieve its aims even in the event of any possible danger approaching its borders. Another goal in

Journal for Iranian Studies

95

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

Rouhani’s visit was to persuade Kuwait to mediate in normalizing Tehran’s diplomatic relations with Riyadh. It’s also notable that the Iranian President’s visit took place in the wake of NATO’s opening of a regional center in Kuwait in January 2017; this regional center is the first such NATO facility in the region, signifying the magnitude of the threats it faces.16 Convergence of necessity In spite of the controversy in the relationship between Iran and Turkey, as well as rising concern over statements and counter-statements, and Ankara’s alarm at Iran’s seeking to extend its influence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, through exploiting the danger posed by ISIL and Al Qaeda in these countries to control their policies, many factors may push the two regional powers to work together to control the limits of the tensions between them and maintain open channels of communication in the next phase.

Ankara and Tehran have shown particular interest in working together to confront the terrorist threat, particularly the danger posed by the ISIL terror group, especially in the wake of recent attacks on some Turkish cities. The group claimed responsibility for the attacks on the basis of its anger at the Turkish-backed “Operation Euphrates Shield” in northern Syria. Iran’s policy in confronting ISIL, meanwhile, is based on countering the rise of foreign influence in the region via the Washington-led international coalition to fight ISIL and the regime’s search for alternative ways to end the power of ISIL and similar extremist organizations without increasing foreign, particularly Western, influence in the regional countries.17 Another factor possibly influencing Iran’s decision is that Iran itself has now become a nominal target for ISIL, at least verbally, especially after Abu al-Hasan al-Muhajir, a spokesman for the terror organization, threatened Iran in a speech broadcast on December 2, 2016, by ISIL’s own Amaq News Agency, in which he said, “Iran, through its agents and experts and consultants...is now roaming in the land of the people of the Sunnah and fighting the worshipers of God, the united Mujahideen long and wide who they are bombing by supporting the Crusaders and their apostate governments.”

This speech was not the first of its kind, with former ISIL spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani issuing an audio recording published by the Amaq agency on July 27, 2016, in which he accused Arab regional nations of appeasing Iran “to maintain the interests of al-Qaeda, and its supply lines,” while calling for bombings in Iran, saying, “I call upon all Muslims in Iran to carry out bombings in Iran in the heart of Tehran to respond to their crimes against Sunnis in Iraq and Syria.”18 It is clear that the ISIL terror organization has become a phenomenon that threatens all the region’s countries, although many have expressed well-founded suspicions

Journal for Iranian Studies

96

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

of the Iranian regime’s hand in the organization, which has provided it with a useful pretext for achieving its goals in “restoring security” in Syria and Iraq via its own militias, particularly the Popular Mobilization militias, which have played a pivotal role in the battle of Mosul, as well as in Syria. Turkey also needs to eradicate ISIL, which has engaged the forces backed by Ankara in “Operation Euphrates Shield” in heavy fighting in the city of Al-Bab. In addition, potential important benefits for Turkey and Iran in the next phase may impose on both parties a need to work to reduce tension and expand the scope of understanding, with positive bilateral relations forming a crucial focal point in attaining those benefits, especially as they relate directly to events in Syria and Iraq and the nature of the relationship with the Gulf States, issues of primary importance for the leadership and political parties in both countries.

On April 16, Turkey is expected to hold a referendum on constitutional amendments aimed at transforming the country’s political system from a parliamentary to a presidential system, with the aim of strengthening the president’s powers. Meanwhile, presidential elections in Iran will take place on May 19, with nominally reformist President Hassan Rouhani seeking a second term. Rouhani faces strong competition, especially under the threat of conservative blocs and fundamentalists, who would like to prevent him from nomination by withdrawing the vote of confidence in him in the Guardian Council, which determines the eligibility of candidates and who dominates the list.

In addition to the aforementioned factors, Turkish-Iranian relations are becoming increasingly important after the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House, with Trump’s administration calling for the weakening and encirclement of Iran. This is reflected in Trump’s negative comments on Iran. On February 2, for instance, he wrote on his Twitter account, “Iran is rapidly taking over more and more of Iraq even after the U.S. has squandered three trillion dollars there. Obvious long ago!”

Meanwhile, the US House of Representatives, “Congress,” last December extended the “Iran Sanctions Act,” which had been scheduled to expire on December 31, 2016, for another ten years by an overwhelming majority, with 419 supporting the move and only one voting against.

Iran has been subject to US sanctions since August 4, 1996, when President Bill Clinton signed the sanctions law on Libya and Iran, known as the “Damato,” which was subsequently approved by Congress. In 2006, amendments were made to the legislation, with the sanctions on Libya being abolished, so that the bill was limited solely to the Islamic Republic of Iran; the legislation penalizes companies that

Journal for Iranian Studies

97

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

invest more than $20 million in annual trade with Iran in the oil and gas industries.

The penalties provided for in the law include various types and generally constitute a protective barrier to foreign investment in energy in Iran.19 Despite its continuing criticism of Iranian policy, Turkey does not appear to wish to further escalate tension with Iran to an unprecedented degree, especially during the current period, particularly after Washington expressed its preference to rely on the forces of “democratic Syria’ in the battle to liberate Raqqa. In this battle, Washington has also coordinated with Moscow as well as Turkish forces and other forces affiliated with Ankara, such as the Free Syrian Army and the Kurdish Peshmerga. Moscow also recently hosted a “Kurdish conference” and called on the PKK-affiliated Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) to attend the Geneva negotiations, a move which angered Ankara.

On the other hand, the dispute between Ankara and Washington over the situation of the Kurdish forces in northern Syria has deepened, with the US administration ignoring Turkish reservations, especially concerning the participation of the YPG forces in the liberation process. The United States has reinforced its military presence in Manbij in northern Syria, as well as resuming support for a third phase of military operations

by Syrian Kurds on March 5, which coincided with the announcement by Stephen Townsend, the US Commander of the international coalition forces, that the Kurds of Syria would participate in the restoration of Raqqa. On March 4, the Turkish President expressed his country’s readiness to join Russia in the fight against ISIL in Syria, which some interpreted as an offer to cooperate in the process of liberating Raqqa.20 Ankara is also in dire need of coordination with Iran and Moscow in the north of Syria, in light of recent military developments in the area following an announcement by the Manbij Council under the control of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units that it will hand over the villages along the line with the adjacent Al-Bab area on the west of the town, currently under the control of the Euphrates Shield forces, to the forces of the Syrian regime under an agreement concluded by the Council with Moscow, with Russian troops driving military vehicles and armored vehicles to the western Manbij countryside to secure the villages handed over by the Manbij military council.

On the other hand, the expected upcoming Battle of Raqqa may necessitate underthe-table coordination between Ankara and Tehran, as Turkey seeks to prevent the participation of Kurdish forces in the fighting, while Iran fears that this battle may be the beginning of dismantling the Russian axis in the region, of which it is part, through working to break its close relations with Moscow by playing on the hidden contradictions of the two allies in terms of the mechanisms of the Syrian crisis. Tehran knows that the Battle of Raqqa, if successful in evicting ISIL, may be the back door

Journal for Iranian Studies

98

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

to reducing its influence in Syria, especially with the announcement of the Trump administration’s Ambassador to the UN Nicky Haley, who told the UN that her country “supports a dialogue on Syrian peace, led by the international organizations,” stressing that “Syria cannot remain a safe haven for terrorists, and it is important to remove Iran and its agents from Syria.”21 The fourth consideration concerning this issue and how it affects Iranian-Turkish relations is Iran’s recognition of the importance of Turkey as a key regional player, which effectively represents Iran’s economic lung after the US Congress’ decision in November 2016 to extend the sanctions on Iran for another decade. Ankara is aware of Turkey’s importance for Iran as a gateway to Asia.

It should also be remembered that both Turkey and Iran, despite their contradictions in the region’s total portfolio, retain important ties in a range of economic and energyrelated issues. First, oil and gas are imported, while Tehran relies on Ankara to provide a significant portion of its consumer needs in materials as diverse as bananas, cereals, tobacco, industrial machinery, cotton, medicines, and paper.

Despite the diplomatic relationship between Tehran and Ankara extending back more than six centuries, a relationship necessitated by considerations of shared interests and geographical proximity, the curve of the relationship reached its nadir with the Syrian revolution in 2011, and Tehran’s insistence on aligning itself with Assad. The Iranian role has been a crucial factor in keeping Assad among the components of the Syrian scene thanks to Iran’s unstinting military support and aid policy.

The political and ideological breach between the two countries has increased in light of the developments in Syria and Iraq, due to Tehran’s attempt to tailor and design demographic changes on the ground to fit its political objectives, with Turkish forces in the camp of Bashika and near Mosul in Iraq recently described by Iranian President Rouhani as “illegal elements.” Rouhani also referred to the presence of a battalion of the Turkish army in the city of Baishika Iraqi as being “very dangerous.”

There is also growing unease in Ankara over Iranian expansion on Turkey’s borders, and direct Iranian support for PKK bases in the area around Sinjar in Iraq, in addition to concern about Iran’s efforts to reduce Turkish influence in Iraq.

In this general context, it is theoretically possible to identify three levels of IranianTurkish relations, the first of which is the freezing of the situation, i.e. without any tangible increase in existing tensions, with the possibility of some form of escalation in the future.

The second level is limited improvement allowed by the local developments in the

Journal for Iranian Studies

99

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

two countries. Iran is considering presidential elections that are the most exceptional in the Islamic Republic’s history. These elections are witnessing a sharp political polarization between Iran’s reformists and hardliners, especially as the regime’s authorities continue to impose house arrest on reformist candidates Mir Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who have both been under house arrest since 2011 for their leadership of the protests of the 2009 Green Movement, when they announced their rejection of that year’s election results; these concerns are further heightened by the decline of the Iranian economy and the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in engineering the electoral process.22 On March 21, 2017, US President Trump called for the removal of elements of the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization militias, with the new president asserting that the militias should be forced to hand over their heavy weapons to Iraq’s conventional forces, and should not continue to play any role in the Iraqi security system.

Meanwhile, Turkey is set to witness a referendum on constitutional amendments mandated by the system of governance in terms of the presidential system in addition to the overall regional conditions, especially after the entry of Turkey militarily into the Syrian quagmire. In this context, a number of problems may be resolved, while escalation may be averted in other areas, which are difficult to resolve at the present time.

The third level is the movement of the two countries towards ending the bilateral tensions, which have been reflected in fiery mutual recriminations. An example of the efforts to heal this rift came with the meeting between Turkish President Erdogan and his counterpart Hassan Rouhani on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit in Islamabad in early 2017, with the Turkish Foreign Minister lauding the “brotherhood” between Turkey and Iran prior to the meeting, and stressing that Ankara has not forgotten Iran’s support following the failed coup of July 2016.

In fact, Iran was one of the first countries to express solidarity with Turkey in the wake of the failed coup, with the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs posting a message of support for the Turkish government on Twitter in the hours following the announcement of the coup attempt’s being thwarted, while Iran’s Supreme National Security Council headed by President Hassan Rouhani met and expressed the State’s official support for the Turkish government.

Akbar Velayati, an adviser to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, also emphasized Iran’s opposition to the coup in Turkey, issuing a statement, which said, “The neighboring and brother country Turkey held elections and formed government years ago in accordance with democratic principles. If a small group of military personnel

Journal for Iranian Studies

100

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

seeks to neglect the votes of the people under any influence or factors and to topple the popular government of Erdogan, it is natural that the Islamic Republic and its principles will reject this coup and any other coup.”23 It is true that Iran made its position in support of the AKP government conditional in the context of its support for all legitimate governments, supposedly led by the Syrian government, but the Iranian move to condemn the coup also shows that Iran’s aspirations concerning Turkey are limited to bringing about a change in the Turkish leadership’s position on the Syrian crisis and on other regional issues.24 Thus, the two countries are likely to maintain a cooperative relationship, albeit one characterized more than previously by wariness and caution, without entering into full-blown tensions. This was also demonstrated by Turkey’s refusal to participate in the Saudiled “Operation Decisive Storm” in Yemen and its quest for a peaceful settlement to maintain its interests in maintaining good relations with both Riyadh and Tehran.

For its part, Tehran offered to mediate in resolving the crisis that arose between Ankara and Moscow after a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian Sukhoi plane on November 27, 2015. In the spring of 2016, the two parties also signed a bilateral tourism agreement, and have continued their strategic cooperation in the field of oil and energy.

If the political and regional ambitions represent a deep gap between the two countries that is difficult to bridge, economic factors are still a persuasive motive for maintaining positive relations as far as possible, as well as providing a guarantee at the same time that any tension between them will be overcome as rapidly as possible, with a bilateral diplomatic infrastructure linked to the effects of economic and social direct superstructure that relate to ideology and the coordination of values and ideas.

Although the differences between the two countries have been clearly reflected in the value of the economic exchanges between them, the economic relationship has been damaged by the events of recent years, with trade levels falling sharply, from $21.89 billion in 2002 to $13.7 billion in 2014, and then to $9.7 billion by the end of 2015. Following this continuous decline in trade, it seems likely that the efforts to end the tensions between the two countries aim to increase the exchange rate to about $35 billion and perhaps $50 billion by 2020.25 It should also be noted that joint Turkish-Iranian efforts are already underway to restore the momentum of economic exchange, especially as Ankara seeks to reengineer its foreign policy by reducing its liabilities in the region, especially with the escalation of tension with Europe and the decline of 20 percent in Turkish economy figures since 2012. Turkey is also keen to meet its energy needs and secure its returns

Journal for Iranian Studies

101

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

from Iranian gas, while Tehran is a lucrative market for Turkish exports. For its part, Iran seeks to freeze the dispute with Ankara, as well as to prevent any regional expansion

by Turkey. With the escalation of international and Western sanctions against Tehran, Turkey is an important outlet for Iran to circumvent these sanctions, particularly in securing continued Iranian access to revenues from the export of energy production, as well as access to gold as an alternative method of payment, given the prohibition of many foreign transactions from abroad.

The revival of the economic momentum between the two countries was revealed in a statement issued by Istanbul’s Chamber of Commerce on October 27, 2016, which unveiled a new plan for the establishment of a joint industrial zone, the first of its kind, a project that is estimated to be worth US $10 billion.

It should also be emphasized that the legacy of over 600 years of historical expertise and cooperation is inevitably a crucial factor in leading both parties to wish to continue this long record of mutually beneficial collaboration, which has resulted in long-term stability since the Treaty of Qasr Shirin, which first set the Turkish-Iranian border, the oldest fixed borders between two countries in the Middle East, as well as influencing regional developments concerning the Syrian crisis. A period of stagnation in Obama’s era, not to mention developments domestically in both countries and possible repercussions as Iran awaits a presidential ballot, while Turkey is preparing for a referendum on constitutional amendments which could give the president wider powers and may bring him closer to autocratic rule.

Journal for Iranian Studies

102

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Turkey and Iran: a regional cold war justified by economic interests

Endnotes 1. Karam Said, Turkey and Iran: convergence of necessity, Iranian selection, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, January 2017.

2. Iranian regime and naval military bases in Syria and Yemen, the Center for Links to Research and Strategic Studies, 29/11/2016, www.rawabetcenter.com.

3. George Simaan, The confrontation between Turkey and Iran in the grip of Trump and Putin, March 6, 2017.

4. Mohammad Reza Jalili and Tari Kalner, Turkey and Iran.. Alliance or rivalry, Al-Ahram, Supplement Le Monde Diplomatique, January 7, 2017.

5. Iranian Defense Minister: The Turks should leave Syria if Damascus asks for it, December 17, 2016, www.arabic.sputniknews.com.

6. Khurshid Dali, Republic of the hazy: Turkey’s exorbitant price of external policies - Future Center for Research and Future Studies, January 23, 2017, WWW.FUTUREAE.COM. 7. Karam Said, The Turkish-Iranian Intersection in Iraq, International Political Magazine, No. 207, January 2017.

8. Iran recognizes the formation of the “Shiite Liberation Army” in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, Middle East, August 18, 2016.

9. Omar Kush, Turkey and the effects of the Battle of Mosul, October 23, www.alhazeera.net.

10. Center for the Future of Research and Advanced Studies, a special confrontation: the motives and mechanisms of Iranian escalation against the Kurds, August 11, 2016, www.futuercenter.ae.

11. Iranian-Turkish power struggle with Kurdish tools, Life, March 3, 2017.

12. Said Abdul Razak, Emir of Kuwait begins a visit to Turkey today focusing on bilateral relations, Middle East, 20 March 2017.

13. Turkish base in Qatar: Political Interests and Military Influence, Alternative April 4, 2016, www.elbadil.com.

14. Attempt to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington 2011, Wikipedia, www.wikipedia.com.

15. Trump: Iran is playing with fire and I will not be good with it - February 3, 2017, www.aljazeera.net.

16. Opening of the Regional Center for NATO in Kuwait, January 24, 2017, www.skynewsarabia.com.

17. Hussein Ahmed Yan (Ph.D.) - Vision from Iran: Why “Must” Face Extremist Organizations, State of the Region, No. 12, Regional Center for Strategic Studies.

18. ISIL threatens Turkey and attack Iran and calls on his gunmen not to flee Tal Afar, www.kurdistan24.net, December 2, 2016.

19. Fathi Khatib, a political escalation is hot: America extends the sanctions .., Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, the site of tomorrow, December 3, 2016, www.alghad.tv.

20. US general: Kurdish fighters will participate in the attack of tenderness in Syria, March 1, 2017, www.reuters.com.

21. Mustafa Shafiq Allam, competing interests: Are Washington, Ankara, and Moscow heading to deal in the battle of Raqqa? Center for the Future of Research and Advanced Studies, March 16, 2017, www.futuercenter.ae.

22. Khomeini denies involvement in presidential elections and continues his criticism of the economy, Middle East, March 22, 2017.

23. Mohamed Abboud, amid mutual caution... Relations between Turkey and Iran between cooperation and competition, Gulf newspaper, September 18, 2016.

24. Karam Said, Turkey after the coup... Re-engineering of foreign policy, strategic pamphlets, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, No. 266, July 2016.

25. Mohammad Reza Jalili and Tari Kalner, Turkey and Iran: Alliance or Competitiveness, op. Cit.

Journal for Iranian Studies

103

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

Demographic and Identity Changes in Syria and Iraq

Mohammad Saied Alsayyad Researcher in the intellectual and ideological studies in the AGCIS

S

ince the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Iranian regime has not been shy about announcing its founding principle of “exporting the Revolution,” and supporting Shiite “liberation” movements – through armament, logistical support, and propaganda, as well as the creation of loyal militias in the region. The Iranian regime has massively altered the concept of Iranian national security, seeking to exploit the chaotic situation in the region in the wake of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the Arab Spring in the region. Iran has leapt to take advantage of regional events, considering this is a decisive opportunity to change the demographic composition of the Arab region in order to intensify and embed its own regional presence and influence in the medium and long term, more particularly since the unstable security and economic conditions in the region make it difficult for other powers to focus on confronting the regime.

This state intervention in the form of what might be termed demographic wars mean that the impact of the regime’s actions in changing conditions on the ground across the region is more serious than its use of hard, military power alone. The regime has already begun establishing new supportive militias and loyalist groups, who are then utilized for political, economic and sectarian purposes, imposing pressure that serves the geographical and doctrinal objectives which the Islamic Republic claims are essential for its national security.

Journal for Iranian Studies

104

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

The aims of this study are: to analyze Iran’s moves and its creation of loyalist strongholds in the region; to assess the regime’s efforts to relocate and increase the Shiite minority, and to create other new entities so as to expand the Iranian regime’s control throughout as many areas as possible, particularly those at the center of Iran’s interests; and to extend the area of its influence and achieve the objectives of the Iranian leadership, with this expansionist doctrine growing in power in the collective mind of the regime’s decision-makers.

First: The reason behind creating a demographic legacy Put simply, demography is the study of populations,1 with any nation’s populace being, obviously, one of the primary pillars of the state and the backbone of its military.

States’ progress and civilization are based on their peoples’ wellbeing and capabilities, and the stability of any state’s security, economy, and political well-being is based upon ensuring harmonious coexistence among its populace.

Thus, the more that the worldview of the populace is established on strong shared cultural and civilizational foundations, and united with a unified religious heritage, the greater the level of peaceful coexistence and political stability amongst all the sections of the populace, with the power of society being more important than the power of any political theory propagated by the state.2 The greater the gap between the state’s peoples in areas such as language, religion, and culture, as well as in their religious, national, and cultural legacies, the greater the possibility of political and sectarian unrest and conflicting loyalties, which can subsequently be exploited by other regional and international powers, more especially in third-world countries.

In regional conditions with no strong single power ruling, no framework to ensure peaceful coexistence, and no culture of respect for minorities, or any religious and sectarian pluralism, this highlights the seriousness of the changing demography and identity across the region, with this state of uncertainty posing a grave threat to public peace, and the stability of communities largely unchanged for centuries, with conflicts unfolding as a result, and the seats of power changing on the basis of demographic alterations.

The main objective of demographic wars is to dismantle communities and expel their population for the benefit of powerful forces seeking hegemony and expansion, who then have the power over these areas. Having achieved control, these forces can change the demographic composition of the population by replacing disloyal diverse groups who might support democracy with more submissive groups which are culturally, intellectually, and politically loyal to the new controllers, thus establishing

Journal for Iranian Studies

105

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

an entity with the same cultural, religious, ethnic, and civilizational heritage as the controllers; this is the de facto reality of the policies pursued by the Iranian regime in Damascus and Baghdad. With Iran well aware of the determining factors in any regional conflict, it seeks to establish a new fulcrum in shaping these factors according to geographical location and population.3 Demographic change also depends to some degree on the complete replacement of disloyal populations with other loyal groups. Sometimes the indigenous people are allowed to remain, although their community is largely dismantled and disempowered through deliberate neglect, impoverishment, and a very conscious strategy of denial of public resources, effectively making the indigenous people second-class citizens.

The policy pursued may be a combination of the two methods. If we look at Pakistan and India, formerly one country divided into two by partition in 1947, as an example of the seriousness of the threats inherent in such demographic wars, we see the upheaval and bloodshed that can result, as well as the divisions on all religious and sectarian grounds.4 Iraq and Syria are two major regional states, possessing massive human capacity, which were home to some of the best specialists in all fields; in recent years, however, the demographic war waged by Iran has largely destroyed both nations, leaving them with no dynamic forward momentum and robbing them of their political and economic influence in the region. Both are now effectively failed states, drowning in a quagmire of sectarian strife, resulting from unprecedented systematic relocation, deportation, and forcible demographic transfer of their populations driven by Iran.

Iran has a number of goals in pursuing this policy of demographic change through violent sectarian conflict in Syria and Iraq: 1. Dismantling the Sunni community: Changing the demographic structure, and effectively destroying the educational potential for an entire generation and the generations following it invariably pushes millions towards extremism, violence, and terrorism; without any intervention to stop this devastating process, this becomes a generational legacy, being passed on from one generation to the next, creating a chain of poverty and radicalization which disempowers and marginalizes the oppressed people.

2. Iran has waged a demographic war through forced displacement and demographic change,5 eradicating the potential and life chances for an entire generation of young people, who, robbed of education and the most basic of opportunities, face a life of dispossession, powerlessness, and backwardness. Waging sectarian wars in Iraq and Syria is, for the Iranian regime, a viable means of accelerating demographic change and paving the way for Iran to destroy the national armies and empower its own

Journal for Iranian Studies

106

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

sectarian militias, destroying the social fabric and bringing in newcomers to replace the indigenous population who have fled their homes and areas.6 In the absence of any unified Arab strategy to take control and reduce the chaos, Iran is able to exploit the chaotic situation and influx of population due to the war in the region to make large-scale changes in the demographic fabric to the Tehran regime’s advantage. Arab countries have not resorted to such wars, perhaps realizing that engaging in conflicts of this nature will lead to rifts in the community, and international condemnation; instead they have continued to believe that it’s preferable to utilize soft power, partly as a means of preserving the social fabric, and perhaps to maintain at least a minimal level of cohesion through citizenship, and cultural and social pluralism. The Iranian regime, however, disregards all of these values and ideals, even ignoring the condemnation of the international community, preferring to focus on achieving its expansionist objectives and to impose a fait accompli on the ground to disrupt any peace efforts.

To sum up: the red lines, the concept of conflict, and the maps of the influence of the parties involved in the regional rivalry are radically different.

Second: Iranian pillars of demographic change in Syria and Iraq: The Iranian regime’s policy is based on a number of pillars which are key to understanding the practices observed in Iranian foreign policy, in which these pillars shape the military doctrine, as well as being steadfast principles in the mindset governing Iranian diplomacy, both as a form of soft power and, via the Revolutionary Guards, as a variant of hard power.

These can be described in the following manner: The first theme is provoking and exploiting sectarian rifts: Focusing initially on those states which contain Shiite minorities makes it easier for the Iranian regime to strengthen its political pillars; provoking and exploiting sectarian rifts helps Tehran to advance its policy of political and religious expansionism in an effort to secure the outlying vital areas of Iran’s new regional empire. These elements, working on Iran’s behalf, create a divisive thorn in the side of Arab states, especially in countries with Shiite minorities, as the Iranian regime will spare no expense in its efforts to shape and utilize these loyalist pockets to its own ends in order to form defensive geopolitical buffers for itself, thus extending the dynamic domain of Iran’s sectarian empire-building.7 One can understand the dimensions of the strategic objectives of the Iranian policy in creating these sectarian rifts through analysis of Khomeini’s vision of the concept of the state and the theory of Shiite areas as sectarian basis for expanding the regime’s founding Jurist Leadership [Velayat-e Faqih] doctrine, a theory initially propounded by Mohammad Javad Larijani.

Journal for Iranian Studies

107

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

As we can see, the nature of Iran’s political system and the attitudes and beliefs of the ruling elite are directly reflected in the state’s foreign policies.8 As Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Jurist Leadership doctrine, stated, the doctrine does not apply only to the Iranian people, but to all of the world’s Shiite peoples, for whom it is infallible and undisputable, meaning that Shiite followers of the Iranian regime’s form of Shiism in Iraq, Lebanon, or elsewhere have no more right than their Iranian counterparts to question or disobey the Jurist Leadership or to reject its mandate. since this is for them a sacred duty. As Khomeini said, a Shiite person is “like a little child who needs the command of his father”9 to decide their fate and govern their affairs.

The Jurist Leadership doctrine is confined only to the followers and scholars of the Iranian regime’s school of Shiism, limiting the election process or appointment mechanisms of the supreme leader to the relevant appointed bodies within the Iranian parliament, the Assembly of Experts of the Leadership, and the Council of Experts; these are the only bodies empowered to designate or dismiss the Supreme Leader of Iran. Despite these limitations, the regime wants the regime’s leadership and doctrine to be empowered regionally, not only domestically.

According to the current Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Shiite doctrine means that it is incumbent upon all Muslims to obey the commands and prohibitions of the Iranian State’s Supreme Leader, with this provision also including all Shiite sects, since commitment to the Jurist Leadership doctrine is inseparable from commitment to Islam and the mandate of the twelve infallible Imams.10 Thus, Iran’s foreign policy is based on the universal nature of the Jurist Leadership doctrine and its rulings, which apply regionally and globally to all Shia, allowing the regime to establish cross-border revolutionary Shiite groups loyal to Tehran, whose objectives form an integral part of the Iranian concepts of national security and international relations. As a matter of fact, the theory of the “mother of villages,” part of the geopolitical theory of Khomeini, depends on the geopolitical perspective and is not ideologically sectarian.11 The theory is based on: 1. The formation of a unified global Islamic government of Islamic nations ruled by Jurist Leadership, with Iran at its center.

2. The Supreme Leader of this Jurist Leadership-ruled global Islamic government has absolute authority over the state of the Islamic nation as a whole.12 We note here the predominantly populist and nationalist character of the Iranian policymakers, who place the base and center of their desired global Islamic government in Iran. Under such a government, an Iranian jurist appointed by the Iranian Council of Experts would have authority over the unified Arab and Islamic nation. Thus, the way

Journal for Iranian Studies

108

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

in which Persian nationalism continues to dominate the collective mind and memory of Iran is encapsulated by Iran’s foreign policy and its international relations,13 which assume the same expansionist approach, along with the “Persianization” of the region to facilitate its subordination to the central government in Tehran.

This policy is based on the philosophical foundations of the Iranian regime’s relations with the Sunni Muslim world, in particular on the fact that the Shiite Twelver doctrine is not, at least in its origins, a missionary doctrine to convert non-Sunnis. Hence, Iran’s ideological expansionism is often targeted solely at Arab and Sunni peoples rather than towards the Asian countries or other neighboring nations.14 Iran also recognizes that while its expansionist project may succeed in the medium term if it is limited to political expansion, its long-term survival and sustainability depend on large-scale ideological and demographic change on the ground.

While Safavid Iran’s Fatimid caliphate ruled Egypt for more than 200 years from 909 – 1171 AD, it did not use systematic demographic war as a strategy,15 with Egypt’s people remaining predominantly Sunni, despite the Safavid Persian State ruling over the Persian Shiite State, which it established on Sunni soil largely through systematic demographic change and transforming Shiism into an ideology espoused by many of its senior military figures and policy- makers. Iran’s Khomeini (an heir to the Safavid regime politically and religiously) sought, and his successors still seek, to revive and implement that doctrine in the region due to its profound impact and deep influence on the Iranian psyche.

From all the above, it is clear that there is a perfect harmony between the theory of rule by Jurist Leadership [Velayat-e Faqih] and the theory of Umm al-Qura [Shiite villages’], whose base and center is Qom city. The first doctrine is based on the centrality of religious rule and the global mandate of the appointed supreme jurist or Supreme Leader [Wali al-Faqih], meaning that the Supreme Leader in Tehran is the one who controls the decisions of Muslims worldwide, rather than simply within Iran. According to this doctrine, it paves the way for Shiites to rescue and save the weak and disadvantaged peoples of the world; in the view of the religious leaders in Tehran, these individuals would not be ruled according to Iranian law, but according to the universal mandate of the Jurist.16 In fact, the ultimate objective of Khomeini’s philosophical doctrine is that the subject peoples achieve contentment by complete submission to the rule of the Jurist.

The second axis: the national and populist political factor One of Iran’s primary goals is to expand its power to encompass Iraq and Syria and to change the demographic structure in both countries. This is driven not only by religious

Journal for Iranian Studies

109

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

and sectarian factors, and the regime’s insistence that all Muslims should be subject to the rule of the Supreme Leadership. The strongest factor, in fact, is the national and populist influence that dominates foreign relations in all aspects of Iranian politics and national security issues. Economic, religious, doctrinal, and perhaps sectarian factors are simply various means to achieve the regime’s expansionist dreams of rebuilding the Persian Empire in the region.17 The expansionist Persian obsession is the driving force in the mentality of the Iranian regime in Tehran, extending even to the theory of Supreme Leadership itself, which restricts the Jurist’s nationality, selection, and appointment to Iranians, despite being nominally universal; the Jurist can only be elected by Iran’s Assembly of Experts. This supremacist theory is rooted in the regime’s unspoken but very clearly demonstrated idea that Persian Iranian ethnicity is naturally superior, possessing an innate nobility and leadership qualities not available to other nationalities and ethnicities, meaning that Persian Iranians alone possess the qualities necessary for a Jurist and guardian of all Muslims. Since the emergence of the Safavid State, Iran has been an incubator of the emergence of Persian nationalism as a cultural identity and political and strategic worldview, with the emergence of Safavid Shiism counters to the concepts of true universal Islam, both Sunni and Shiite.

This supremacist mindset (Pathological hate) is widespread among Iranians, more especially toward Arabs and other non-Western peoples.18 During his meeting with Pope Benedict XVI, the former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presented the leader of the Catholic faith with a copy of a historical work entitled “The Shahnameh.”19 During the Ahmadinejad era, his acolytes were given to boasting of Iran’s greatness, its advanced civilization and its ability to lead the world.

Ahmadinejad published and celebrated the so-called charter of Cyrus, the “Founder of the First Iranian Empire,” ironically a work on the rights of citizenship and human rights.20 This Persian supremacism is not limited to Ahmadinejad, with many regime leadership officials sharing similar views; another example is the 2015 statement

by Ali Younisi, an adviser to President Rouhani, that Baghdad was once again the capital of the Persian Empire, with Younisi also demanding that the current design of the Iranian flag be replaced with the former symbol of the lion and the red sun, the symbols of Cyrus’ dynasty formerly used by the Pahlavi regime on the national flag.21 As a result of this supremacist doctrine, the state has spent billions – despite its economic problems and the high rates of poverty within Iran – in order to realize its dreams of expansionist nationalism and populism in the region.22 Despite being nominally concerned with spiritual issues and transcending narrow nationalism, the

Journal for Iranian Studies

110

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

Jurist Leadership doctrine also supports this worldview; no matter how far the regime’s “Shiite nation” may expand, it must submit to rule by the Jurist in Tehran.23 Many Arab Shiite philosophers have recognized and objected to this sectarian, nationalist, and populist dimension embedded in the concept of Iranian national security, opposing the Iranian regime’s policy not only towards Arab Sunnis but also against Arab Shiites.

It is clear that Iran’s obsession with regional control is not only detrimental to Sunnis but all Arabs, with the regime using and exploiting Shiism as a tool to impose its projects on the ground and inciting sectarian division. A number of prominent Arab Shiite philosophers have noted that while the doctrine of the rule of the Supreme Leader is theoretically a relatively cosmopolitan religious philosophy, in practice it is divisive and sectarian.24 This is because the Supreme Leader in Iran believes in his absolute right not only to appoint himself as the ruler of the world’s Shiites but also to subordinate whole nations to his rule, with their peoples forbidden from appointing any domestic rulers, being wholly subservient to rule by the Jurist in Tehran. This doctrine effectively means that Arab and all other Shiites, along with non-Shiites come under the rule of Jurist Leadership.25 Arab Shiite philosophers and thinkers, however, have realized that this doctrine threatens their own well-being, as well as being devastating to the millennia-old coexistence between Sunni and Shiite Arabs in nations across the region.

One prominent Shiite thinker, Hani Fahs, wrote: “Iran has colonized Arabs politically, describing them as “the Iranian community” in dealing with the Shiites of Lebanon.

Iran justifies this by saying “Because Iran is a dominant power and the origin of these communities.” Iran does not want to play a role, however, but to have supreme influence. A role means partnership; a role requires the other [partner], influence, and complementing one another and unity; Iran acts more like a customer who rents, who [thinks he] buys the neck and the mind together; it’s interested in reaching its goal, very pragmatic, and preoccupied with the obsession of the empire, wanting to restore the logic of Persian or Shiite or Iranian power in exchange for Arab abundance.”26 Fahs also warns against the theory of Iranian cosmopolitanism, writing, “I’ve paid close attention to Iranian nationalism.” He continues, “Personally, I was a cosmopolitan citizen, not a patriot; my country in my mind was a mythical place, without boundaries, without a definite location. I noticed that there’s an Iranian nationalism, and I said to myself, ‘I am a Muslim. Is their patriotism against Islam, against Sharia?’ Why am I not paying attention to my Arabism?! I don’t have to be a Baathist or an Arab nationalist, but I am an Arab and this is part of my identity. I decided to return to Lebanon without Arab hostility to Iran. But I insist on differentiation. And so I began

Journal for Iranian Studies

111

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

to change my former thinking and renewed my reading of the cultural meaning of Arabism, the emergence of the entity and its role and meaning, and the meaning of citizenship as a choice must become law.”27 Third: demographic change in Syria It seems probable that Iran exploited the outbreak of the Syrian Revolution to intervene openly and directly in the affairs of the Syrian state, and to effectively assume control of the security and economic system. The Syrian Revolution was an opportunity for the Iranian regime – in the absence of influential players in the region – to annex Syria to make it part of its demographic belt with Iraq and extend Iran’s demographic borders to the Mediterranean.

For decades, Iran has been pushing for comprehensive demographic change in Syria to bring it within Iran’s sphere of influence. Here we can observe the demographic changes in Syria and the factors that helped accelerate this in the wake of the revolution’s outbreak, in the following ways: History of demographic change in Syria: There is no doubt that decisive demographic change was observed after the outbreak of the Syrian Revolution, but an observant individual will note that the process of covert gradual demographic change did not stop for one day throughout the rule of the Assad family, with the interests of the Iranian and Syrian regimes converging in this issue. We have already noted the interests of the Iranian regime. As for the interests of the Syrian regime, particularly since it faced a series of protests in the late 1970s and 1980s which included most of the cities of Syria, the Syrian regime realized that it ruled over and oppressed a Sunni majority. At that time, the Alawite sect accounted for about 7% of the total Syrian population. The Assad regime implemented a number of strategies in an attempt to raise this percentage: 1. By facilitating the recruitment of Alawites in Turkey and Lebanon, giving them Syrian nationality.

2. In 1981, Jamil al-Assad established the Al-Murtada Association, a body concerned with spreading the Alawite doctrine in Syria, and with propagating a wholly false narrative that Alawism was the doctrine of Syria before the Ottomans imposed the Sunni doctrine.

3. Offering financial incentives for Alawites: one example is Rifaat al-Assad’s guarantee to pay the wedding expenses for Alawite soldiers in the regime army, with Alawites also offered additional bonuses for childbearing.

Journal for Iranian Studies

112

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

4. Appointing Alawites to military leadership posts and establishing sectarian military units and militias: All senior military positions within the regime were given to Alawites, while extremely well-armed, heavily sectarian Alawite groups, including the “Defence Brigades” and the Republican Guard, were provided with the latest weapons.

Basing these groups and their military leadership primarily around Latakia, Tartous, and Damascus effectively created sectarian belts around these cities. Damascus, for example, is bordered by Sumerian in the south, and Ash- Alwarwar in the north, both almost entirely Alawite, with the populations in Mezzeh to the south and the Al-Assad suburb to the north also nearly completely Alawite.28 The demographic change at that stage was wholly in the hands of the Assad regime itself; fearing the possibility of unrest among the majority of Syria’s population, Hafez al-Assad realized that to maintain power, the regime needed to institute radical structural changes, both in geography and demography. Following the emergency of the Iranian regime as another crucial player in Syrian domestic affairs, a demographic change took another direction.29 The stage of Iranian intervention on the line of demographic change: After the 1979 Revolution in Iran, an alliance was quickly formed between Ayatollah Khomeini and Hafez al-Assad. Damascus could not ignore the historical and political value of partnership with Khomeini and Iran. The Persian supremacists of the regime were overjoyed at what they viewed as this opportunity for entrenchment in historically Sunni Arab Damascus and its embrace of Persian political doctrine, which they saw as both a political and doctrinal achievement. After this historical decade, and the sectarian legacy, just as they viewed Baghdad as a present from the cities of Persia; in the words of Rouhani’s advisor Ali Younisi,30 Iran views Damascus as an Umayyad stronghold that must be demolished and annexed to its own castles and cities.

Following the 1979 Revolution in Iran and the promising start of relations with the Assads, Tehran rushed towards Damascus, desperate to maintain and strengthen its relationship with the Syrian regime, helping to found Hezbollah in the early 1980s to retain its foothold and its ideological and geographical proximity to its Shiite outposts in southern Lebanon, in order to strengthen Tehran’s influence in the region. As usual, Tehran, implausibly, proclaimed this to be part of its “export of the Revolution,”31 in support of the oppressed and disadvantaged.

The Assad regime needed Iran’s support in light of the continued tension between Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, as well as with a number of Arab countries, in addition to the domestic unrest that led to the Hama Intifada in 1986, in which the regime killed up to 40,000 Syrians. Hafez had a finely attuned understanding of

Journal for Iranian Studies

113

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

the sectarian proximity between his regime and the new Iranian regime; he wanted this to be based on a strong regional alliance with an ally whose political and cultural values intersected with his own, as well as prizing the sectarian support offered by Tehran; this coordination between the two regimes created a close bond, which led them to label themselves the “Axis of Resistance.”

The decision-makers in both countries wanted the alliance between the two regimes not to be merely a temporary political or tactical enterprise ending with the conclusion of any passing upheavals or conflicts, but to be a long-term strategic partnership. To this end, the leadership in both Tehran and Damascus worked to strengthen sectarian relations, while attempting to shape positive public perceptions of the alliance by downplaying its sectarian aspects, although it was widely viewed as the “alliance of the Alawites and the Twelver Shiites.” The new alliance also allowed Iran to overtly intercede in the country to promote Shiism across the country; this can be seen from the increase in the percentage of Shia in Syria, which rose from around one percent in 1970 to approximately 13 percent by 2011. This demographic change was also boosted by the massive exodus of Lebanese Shiites to Syria during the Lebanese civil war. Since the outbreak of the Syrian Revolution in 2011, the percentage of Shiites in and around Damascus has sharply increased, with Iranian Shiite missionaries and affiliated figures now intensively proselytizing in the capital and opening numerous religious centers.

A number of other factors such as the Israeli war on Lebanon, the siege of Iraq, the Iraq-Iran war, and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, all led to radical changes in the form of the Syrian state. One example of the devastating policy of demographic change in action is the town of Jaramana, near Damascus; in the 1990s, Jaramana had a population of several thousand, mostly Druze and Christian; now it has been turned into a city of more than half a million people, predominantly Iraqi in terms of dialect, and Shiite in doctrine.32 Then, of course, there is the neighborhood around the Sayeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus, which has now been turned into a Persian province inside Syria.33 The Iranian regime’s exploitation of religious shrines is another important economic factor that cannot be ignored in its restructuring of Syria’s demographic composition.

More than half a million Iranians flock to Damascus every year to visit these shrines,34 with the pilgrims wanting hotels with a Persian feeling to them. Catering to this tourism sector, Iranian businessmen have set up hotels in the capital, pumping massive sums in investment into these areas, as well as buying large numbers of properties and vast tracts of land around and near the shrines from the regime for peppercorn prices.

Journal for Iranian Studies

114

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

The main language used in these hotels and in the Syrian capital’s markets nowadays is Persian. The Iranian embassy and Iranian cultural centers have become overtly sectarian, used for missionary work and proselytizing.35 Trade in the vicinity of the shrines is brisk, with tens of thousands of Iranian pilgrims passing through, guarded over by Iranian troops and affiliated militias.

Demographic decisive phase: Iran analyzed the Syrian Revolution not only from the perspective of its return to prominence as a player in deciding the regional balance of power and shaping the maps of conflicts and alliances in the region, but from the viewpoint of duplicity and pragmatic exploitation, although they publicly rejected the uprising and took a hostile stance against it.36 In actual fact, Iran has benefited from the revolution far more than the Syrian regime, using it to justify appointing Iranian experts to the most prominent and sensitive positions within the regime army and to conclude economic agreements with Assad which heavily favor Tehran. Iran has used the Syrian Revolution as a means of attempting to decisively alter the demographic balance within Syria in its favor, possibly realizing that this is a unique opportunity to manipulate Syria’s demographic composition far more rapidly than its efforts over the past 30 years.

Iran has achieved this by implementing a plan including a range of objectives and strategies. The most important of these are: 1. Dispossessing Syrian citizens by confiscating property: The Syrian regime has confiscated the properties of thousands of Syrian citizens at Tehran’s behest, claiming that the properties belong to opposition figures or terrorist organizations. Article 4 of the regime’s “anti-terror legislation” provides for the confiscation of the property of all those who support terror, a term used by the regime to apply to anyone opposing Assad. Under this legislation, the regime bans any efforts by the owners to reclaim their properties or bring legal action to prevent them being sold, transferred, or disposed of. This legislation has led to countless Syrian families being dispossessed, with more than 300 such cases in the towns of Yabroud and Qalamoun alone, and others in cities, towns, and villages across Syria.37 The legislation means that the owners of the properties, many of them passed down through generations, have no chance of ever regaining them.38 Often the regime confiscates properties and transfers them directly to Hezbollah terrorists or Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops working in the areas.39 The regime has also revived agrarian reform legislation last used in 1958 to seize agricultural land owned by “opposition-affiliated” individuals and groups, with the land seized also being transferred to Iranian “investors,” and any tenant farmers or other residents being evicted.40

Journal for Iranian Studies

115

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

2. Displacement of indigenous peoples The Assad regime, supported by Iran and Russia, has also implemented strategies specifically intended to kill or dispossess the population in towns, cities, and villages across Syria, with methods including: A: Arrests and killings inside prisons.41 B: Kidnapping and torture.42 C: Starvation, siege, and bombardment, followed by “negotiation.”43 D: Conscription or deportation.

E: Indiscriminate shelling.44 These are all stages leading to forced displacement,45 in the form of “voluntary displacement.” If the population refuses to leave, these are followed by forced public displacement.46 This was the case with the city of Darya, where the regime carried out a mass deportation of the indigenous people for the benefit of the fighters of Iran and Hezbollah, which confirms that the demographic war is strategic for the Iranian and Syrian regimes, which is the main objective of the longevity and permanence of this war. In the view of the Iranian leadership and the Assad regime, once most of the population has been dispossessed and replaced with foreign loyalists, the Syrian regime will remain strong for tens and perhaps hundreds of years by creating a docile and subservient loyal population. The Iranian regime believes that the war will ensure that it is deeply demographically embedded in the fabric of Syria, socially, politically, and economically, transforming Syria from a political and strategic ally to a follower and merging it into the Iranian state, a model which Tehran has implemented in Iraq and Lebanon with varying degrees of success.47 A number of methods are used to achieve this objective, including: 1. The replacement of indigenous families with Shiite families from Iran, Lebanon, and elsewhere: Troops from the IRGC and terrorists from Hezbollah and other militias are “given” the homes of the dispossessed indigenous people by Iran as a “reward” for their efforts in “exporting the Islamic Revolution” and implementing decisive changes in the regional demographic map. This is evident in the neighborhood of Hall Bebrud, whose name was transformed into a “neighborhood of Zahra” after it was cleansed of its residents and repopulated by Hezbollah fighters and their families.48 2. The burning of official documents and registry offices: The Syrian and Iranian regimes not only confiscated properties but burnt down registry offices and other repositories of official property ownership documents. One example of this was the burning down of the land registry offices in Homs city,49 in order to leave no trace of the documents

Journal for Iranian Studies

116

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

proving the ownership deeds and rights of the properties in the city and province in an effort to leave no trace of legal evidence that would allow the owners to reclaim their stolen homes, farms, and other properties.50 3. Granting Syrian nationality to foreign fighters and mercenaries: Since the start of the Syrian Revolution in 2011, the Assad regime has granted Syrian nationality to tens of thousands of Iranians, Iraqis,51 and others brought in by the Revolutionary Guards while denying citizenship to millions of Syrians.52 The aim of this policy is to offer Iran’s militias a means of claiming legitimacy for remaining in Syria once the war has ended so that they can be part of Iran’s new regional empire and components in maintaining its cultural, demographic, and military supremacism,53 as well as pursuing its strategic and geopolitical interests.

4. Missionary and proselytism activities to gain converts to Shiism: Shiite missionaries have been extremely active in the neighborhoods of Damascus and other Syrian cities where they are based, with the Baath Party also extending its youth wing activities among school children, indoctrinating the younger generations into supporting the regime and endorsing political Shiism and the Iranian regime.54 This is, of course, in addition to far greater political focus on the presence of the Husayniyat and Shiite shrines, and trips to the areas surrounding the shrines, such as the shrine of Sayeda Zeinab and the tomb of Sayeda Ruqaya and others, in addition to introducing and promoting Shiite rituals and rites and presence of Shiite Iranian panegyrists.55 5. Buying Property: Since the days of Hafez al-Assad, Iranians have been buying up property and land adjacent to Shiite shrines and working to expand and glorify the shrines. As soon as the 1980s ended, Iranian-backed Shiites took over the Sunni endowments body, which included the protection of mausoleums and tombs that they discovered and developed. The most prominent of these was the residence of Sayeda Ruqaya, with the buildings surrounding the shrine being deliberately vandalized in order to justify their being knocked down to make way for a huge building containing a school and a large mosque, whose construction was completed in 1990. This process was repeated in the shrines of Uday ibn Hajar al-Kindi in rural Damascus province, and Ammar bin Yasser in Raqqa. The history of Iran’s property purchases in Syria has been extensive since the Iranian Revolution up to the present day.56 After the Syrian Revolution began in 2011, the Syrian regime openly offered tenders solely for Iranian buyers, allowing them an even greater penetration into the Syrian real estate market. The Iranian embassy in Damascus effectively established a residential neighborhood in the Mezzeh district turning the area into “Little Tehran,” a fully Iranian district. In gratitude for the Iranian regime maintaining Assad in power, the regime

Journal for Iranian Studies

117

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

issued special laws to expedite Iranian property acquisitions in Syria, such as Law No. 25 of 2013, and issued presidential decrees allowing the sale and purchase of Syrian land on the basis of profitability and partnership. The Iranian regime encouraged Iranian investors to buy property in Syria and pumped large sums of money into real estates and lands.57 Traders and investors bought luxury homes, villas, and apartments in vital areas of Damascus and along the Syrian coastline.58 The economic factor was also present in the scene, as Iran took advantage of long-term agreements humiliating to the Syrian regime on quotas in the Syrian market, and signed deals and agreements in the government sectors and heavy industries.

In conclusion, the Iranian regime is investing massively in every way in Syria, regarding the Syrian State as a key part of the strategic depth of Iranian national security. Mehdi Taib, a senior Iranian regime official who described Syria as Iran’s thirty-fifth province, clarified the crucial importance of Syria to Iran, saying, “If we keep Syria then we will be able to recover Khuzestan [Al-Ahwaz Arab region occupied by Iran since 1925], but if we lose Syria then we will not be able to keep Tehran.” Taib further asserted that although the Syrian regime has an army, “it lacks the ability to manage the war in Syrian cities,” adding, “This is why the Iranian government has proposed the creation of 60,000 troops for urban warfare. Fighters, to receive the task of the street war of the Syrian army.59 The revolution against Bashar is considered by the Iranians to be a revolution against Khamenei himself.”60 Fourth: demographic change in Iraq In its Persian-language literature, the Iranian regime has long routinely referred to Iraq as being part of the ancient Persian Empire and part of the ancient and modern Shiite Kingdom. These literary references have now translated into official regime policy.61 Two Persian and Safavid States ruled over Iraq during different periods of history. The Buhayyans came from Persia, ruled parts of Iraq and controlled the political decision-making during the period of Abbasid rule.62 Thus, the Iranian regime’s collective mindset and the folk memory of its policymakers are keenly aware of Iraq’s geopolitical importance.63 Iran has changed the demography of Iraq to its advantage, using similar measures to those employed in Syria; quantitative forced displacement, and use of the “War on Terror” narrative to change the demographic balance in Sunni areas, which are then deprived of spending on basic public utilities, infrastructure, education, and health.

This is leading to the creation of a younger generation lacking the education and life chances of their peers in the ruling south of Iraq, and the autonomous north of Iraq.

Iran’s demographic change in Iraq was much simpler to achieve than in Syria, because Iran entered Iraq via the existing Iranian sectarian belt, especially after the US invasion

Journal for Iranian Studies

118

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

of Iraq, and was able to recruit and establish tens of thousands of militias affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard and the Iranian leadership. Through the establishment of sectarian loyalties and clan and tribal loyalties, in addition to the existence of the government-backed Dawa Party, Iran was able to implement its demographic policy under cover of populist sectarian, and authoritarian control of the levers of power.

Iran’s strategy towards Iraq: Iran is implementing qualitative demographic changes across the whole of Iraq.

It is in Iran’s interest to prevent Iraq from turning back into a strong country which might again confront Iran, whether militarily or politically, and limit its capabilities and influence, possibly thwarting its achievement of its objectives in the Arab region.64 Through these policies, Tehran seeks to effectively destroy any Iraqi sovereignty, turning all of Iraq into an Iranian political and economic dependency65 by utilizing a number of strategic affiliates that implement the Iranian regime’s interests and demographic change on the ground. Iran has not given priority to quantitative demographic change in Iraq because of the existing large Shiite population blocs in Iraq, which are sufficient to achieve sectarian and political allegiances.66 However, quantitative change began in some Sunni Arab cities after the bombing of the shrines of two Al-Askari imams in the city of Samarra in 2006, although these changes were slow to develop after the invasion in 2003.67 Iranian policy has been based on a set of foundations for dramatic change on the ground. These can be summarized68 in the following points: First: Militarization of the Sunni cities: Iran’s strategy in Iraq works to isolate only the Shiite cities and provinces from tension and terrorism while immersing the Sunni provinces in the horrendously destructive fire of war – military conflict serves as one of the pillars and drivers of demographic change aspired to by both regimes. Even during the US occupation of Iraq, Iran was careful to shield Shiite areas from conflict, supporting Shiite militias’ attacks on the US troops only in Sunni provinces. This policy, which has continued to date, helped to achieve Tehran’s political and demographic interests in Iraq, leading to the mass displacement of millions of Sunnis in an unprecedented population transfer, all of which has gone unnoticed by the West, busy focusing solely on the “war on terror.”69 Another stage of decisive demographic change has been followed by Iran in the border provinces, whose security is a concern to the Iranian regime. In Diyala province,70 for example, Iran has changed its usual approach to demographic change in the governorate, relying on its armed militias. It has carried out campaigns of arrest, destruction of Sunni mosques,71 land-clearing, leveling, and bulldozing, all of which became systematic after the 2006 bombings and subsequent internal fighting.72

Journal for Iranian Studies

119

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

This already vicious campaign of forced displacement took a more sectarian and even more violent turn of events after the expulsion of the Islamic State organization from Diyala in 2014. The Shiite militias used this pretext to implement decisive and comprehensive changes73 to the demographic make-up of the city, including killing based on sectarian identity, forced displacement, mass arrests, and preventing internally displaced peoples [IDPs] from the city from returning to their homes.74 The same pretext has been used in all the Sunni cities under the excuse of combating terrorism, as happened in Mosul, Salah al-Din, and Ramadi,75 but the cities bordering Iran and the Baghdad belt have suffered the largest share of forced and violent displacement; tellingly, the nominally Sunni “Islamic State” terror group has very rarely targeted Shiite areas, reserving its brutality for Sunni peoples.76 Second: Indirect displacement: This included a range of mechanisms such as: 1. Water Deprivation: Iran built dams on the sources of the Diyala River, which led to the rivers drying up, large-scale pollution, and widespread desertification, forcing many residents to leave and abandon their farms and homes.77 2. Iranian “cultural offices”: In the era of Nouri al-Maliki, Iran opened three cultural offices in Diyala province alone, more than the number of Iranian offices in Najaf, Basra, and Karbala, where each city has one office.78 3. Redistribution of land to regime loyalist Shi’ites: Nouri al-Maliki distributed the territory and lands of the Sunni provinces – especially Diyala – to the citizens of southern Iraq loyal to the government in sectarian and doctrinal terms.79 The use of all of these “soft power” strategies led to massive changes in the demographic map of the Sunni Arab cities and to suffering for millions of dispossessed people, both of which are rapidly increasing in the absence of effective international and Arab pressure on the Iraqi government.

The consequences of demographic change If the Iranian project succeeds in enforcing conclusive demographic change in Syria and Iraq – as it has gone a long way towards doing in Iraq – it will have disastrous political consequences, politically, economically, and ideologically, making it very difficult for the regime to return to its previous demographic shape and balance, or to restore any sort of unity, at least in the medium term. We can extrapolate the mentality of the Iranian decision-makers in their determination to annex Syria to Iran’s territory and its demographic regional “belt,” through the following points: The Iranians believe that the region is experiencing a full strategic vacuum, in the absence of any joint Arab force confronting Iranian expansionism. Hence, the opportunity is ripe for hegemony over Iraqi political decision-making.80 Journal for Iranian Studies

120

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

By consolidating its political, military, and sectarian presence in Syria and Iraq, Iran guarantees its share of the two countries’ wealth – in markets, oil, energy, minerals, and unequal trade – benefiting its companies and capital.81 1. Control of Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, includes the removal of Turkey in whole or in part as a regional power, isolating it from being part of the Arab world and ridding Tehran of one of its biggest competitors in the region, which enjoys widespread popular support, and would deflect any Turkish efforts at penetration. This is felt to be particularly important since both Iraq and Syria were once under the control of the Ottoman Empire, and represent important factors in the Turkish economy, in addition to enjoying strategic depth and security.

2. Iran is depicting itself to the West as a strong regional player, which can serve as the region’s policeman and can be relied upon to secure Western national security, particularly if there are consensus and division of roles, at the expense of the Arab countries in general and the Gulf in particular. This proposition reinforces Iran’s hypocrisy in claiming to represent plurality towards the West, while offering only sectarianism, war, and “Islamic guardianship” towards its regional neighbors.

Despite all the above, the Iranian project to annex Syria and Iraq as a regional demographic belt for the regime is fraught with problems and weaknesses that must be taken into consideration, and used by those who wish to defeat it, such as: 1. The huge and growing financial drain from the Iranian treasury in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen with the opening of new fronts, in the shadow of near-empty coffers and massive domestic inflation, along with internal problems which threaten the regime’s own domestic power base.82 2. The massive, possibly irreparable damage done to Iran’s reputation in the Arab and Islamic world by its support for sectarian militias in the region, and its position on the Syrian Revolution and other regional issues have put it in stark opposition to a billion Sunni Muslims worldwide, severely threatening the standing and image of the Iranian regime with other Muslims and damaging any efforts to use its soft power by proselytizing and missionary work.

3. Iran cannot continue to disregard international law and human rights conventions with impunity, meaning that if it does not succeed in enforcing conclusive and profound change on the ground, it will need to resort to a long-term policy of peaceful change and long-term strategies.

The opposite demography: tens of thousands of Syrian refugees have been forced to flee to Lebanon, threatening Lebanese demographics with major change. This

Journal for Iranian Studies

121

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

worries Hezbollah, prompting the terror group to demand the return of the Syrian refugees trapped in Lebanon to their homes, apparently unaware of the irony in the same group which forced many of the refugees to flee now calling for their return.

This call is caused by fear of a demographic change in Lebanon, which threatens the demographic superiority of Hezbollah in Lebanon.83 Possible approaches: Arab decision-makers can confront the Iranian project in Iraq and Syria through implementing a set of strategies which can be monitored and altered as required.

Amongst these are: 1. Political and logistical support for Sunni Arabs in Iraq, along with opening cultural centers akin to the Iranian centers, which preserve the cultural and civilizational identity of the Arabs there.

2. Confronting Iranian media by exposing the regime’s practices in Syria and Iraq by Arab Media.

3. Building a strong Gulf Arab-Turkish Islamic alliance to confront Iranian influence in the region and preventing its demographic expansion at the expense of coexistence, historical constants, and Arab cultural heritage.

4. Creating and supporting groups that support pro-Arab issues within the Iranian State.

5. The beginning of the collapse of any expansionist project begins with defeating it at its most sensitive pivotal point. In other words, the defeat of the Iranian project in Syria, or its suppression and its entirety, will guarantee a complete retreat in Iranian politics and the ideological cracks in its ideological system, followed by comprehensive reviews and the end of the so-called Shiite geopolitical project. This is likely to occur with the fall of the Syrian regime, with all the implications that would bring off the collapse of any bets on the permanence of the Iranian regional project.

The main findings of this paper can be summarized in the following points: 1. Iran has succeeded in creating affiliated loyalist areas and groups providing political and ideological support for Tehran in Syria and Iraq. This has been the fruit of longterm politics since the Islamic Revolution.

2. The imposition by the Iranian State of a new demographic reality in Syria and Iraq is difficult to change in the long term by buying houses and buildings directly belonging to the Iranian State, changing educational curricula, and displacing large numbers of people.

Journal for Iranian Studies

122

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

3. Iran’s exploitation of Shiite groups in Iraq and Syria to achieve the so-called Shiite Cosmopolitanism, which serves Iranian interests.

The Iranian regime believes that Syria is Iran’s 35th province and that Baghdad has become the capital of the new Iranian empire, demonstrating that confrontation with Iran is an ideological strategy. Iran’s expansion in Syria and Iraq is not only for its political and economic interests.

4.Iran has worked to dismantle the Sunni community in Syria and Iraq, consciously stripping both communities of vital factors for the creation of urbanization, commerce, and industrialization, which has weakened the communities, leaving them in poverty and susceptible to financial inducements, and thus easy to control and direct.

5.Confrontation with Iran requires the formulation of a common vision by the Arab states, a precise concept of Arab national security, and military alliances based on a deterrent military force.

Journal for Iranian Studies

123

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

Endnotes

1. Demography is the study of populations. It seeks to understand population dynamics in terms of time and space including populations’ structures and their distribution geographically and socially and their changes on the long-run.

Demographics developed to include historical demography that studies all ancient peoples. As for the Differentiated Demography, it includes the diverse societies such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Lebanon where people are divided according to their doctrines including the representation of these sects and doctrines in the governmental organizations.

This characteristic leads to a state of political, security, and economic instability in case the different sects do not get along with each other. Dr. Alexander Abi Younin: Alsultah fi Lebanon Wa Khareedat Aldemografia Altamaioziah, the National Defense Journal issued by the Lebanese Army, January 2016.

2. Aily Ihram, February 15, 2016.

3. Ashraf Keshk (Ph.D.), Dwal Alkhaleej Wa Iran: Qadhaia Alsira’ Wa Istratejiat Almuajaha, The Iraian Studies Journal, 1st issue, December 2016 4. Nasr Aref (Ph.D.): Alhoroub Aldemografiah, Tafkeek Almujtama’at Wa Tafreegh Alsukan, Al-Ihram, January 23, 2017 5. Josef Olmet (Ph.D.), the Syrian Civil War and the Demographic Changes to Expect August 27, 2012, http://www. huffingtonpost.com/dr-josef-olmert/syrian-civil-war-demographics_b_1833672.html 6. Nasr Aref (Ph.D.): Alhoroub Aldemografiah, Al-Ihram, January 23, 2017, Wa Alab’ad Aldemografiah Lilfawzah Alarabia, Al-Ihram, January 16, 2017 7. Iran Wa dwal Alkhaleej: Masadat Mazhabiah Ala Tasado’at Siasiah, Dr. Adel Ali Alabdallah, The GCC Council Secretary General’s Advisor, page 306, a study within “The Iranian Project in the Region,” Albasheer Publisher.

8. Mohammed Jawad Larijani (Ph.D.): Alidarah Alsiasiah fi Alsadr Alislami, a long debate within “Mutarahat fi Alfikr Alsiasi Alislami” book, for Haider Hoballah, Alintishar Alarabi Beirut 2015, p. 55.

9. The official website of Ayatoallah Ali Khameini, Alistifta’at, Ahkam Taqleed chapter- Wilayat Fiqih Wa Hukm Hakim.

And Hassan alomari: Alqarar Alsiasi fi Iran Bain Althawrah Wa Aldawlah, Aljazeera Studies Center http://studies. aljazeera.net/ar/files/iranandstrengthfactors/2013/04/201343105119173879.html 10. Adel Ali Abdullah (Ph.D.): Almuharikat Alsiasiah Alirania fi Mantiqat Alkhaleej Alarabi, quoting from: Iran Wa Dwal Alkhaleej Masadat Mazhabiah Ala Tasado’at Siasiah, Omaiah Center, p. 313.

11. Mohammed Jawad Larijani: Maqoulat fi Alistrategiah Alwataniah, Alasr Center for Strategicuture Studies 2013, page 46. And Dr. Mohammed Alsulami: Algeopolitic Alshi’i: Alwaqi’ Wa Almustaqbal, the Iranian Studies Journal, 1st issue, December 2016, p. 48.

12. James Warl, Dara and Khomeini: Exploring the Iranian National Identity, Alexandria Library 2016.

13. Iran Wa Dwal Alkhaleej: Masadat Mazhabiah Ala Tasado’at Siasiah, p. 313.

14. STNLY LANE POOLE: A HISTORY OF EGYPTIAN IN THE MIDDLE AGES, Publisher: New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1901.

15. Khomeini and his Mullahs companions classify themselves as the chosen ones by Allah to save people: (We are the chosen ones to save the oppressed, we are ordered to help them and confront tyrants) - Khomeini: The Islamic Government, p. 58.

Journal for Iranian Studies

124

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

16. By its diverse structure, Iran is an ambitious expansionist country; within the empirical arena, Dr. Jamal Hamdan: Muqadimat Mawsou’a Shakhsiah, Egypt, Alshorouq Publisher in Cairo.

17. Joya Blandal Sa’ad: Sourat Alarab fi Aladab Alfarsi Alhadeeth, translatd by Sakhr Alhaj Hussein, Alahliah for publishing and distribution, Jordan, p. 16-28.

18. Abdullah Alnufeisi (Ph.D.), Wa Alsa’eed Edrees Wa Fatmah Alsmadi and others: Almashro’ Alirani fi Almantiqah, page 13, Ibid.

19. Mohammed Alsa’eed (Ph.D.), Aljomhouriah Althalithah fi Iran, Egyptian General Committee for Books 2012, page 152 20. See: Rouhani Advisor’s statements and their consequences: Russia today, March 17, 2015. The flag carrying the Lion and Sun slogans were used by the Safawi and Qajari states to revive the Persian symbols before Islam where Qajar announced that this flag is the division between good and evil since the time of Zoroaster. Later, it became the Iranian national symbol over the Ottoman crescent. Arond Ibrahimian: Tareekh Iran Alhadeeth, Alam Alma’rifah, Kuwait 2014, page 38 http://cutt.us/stOTv 21. See Shaza Khaleel, Ajindat Iran Tuhlik Iqtisadiha Wa Tuza’zi’ Istiqrar Alsharq Alawsat, Alrawabit Center for Strategic Studies, January 14, 2017.

22. Bohouth Wilayat Alfaqih, prepared by Noon Center for Writing and Translation, 1999, section: “Kaifa Yakoun Alwali Alfaqih Almuntakhab min Majlis Alkhubara’ fi Iran Walian Ala Ahl Balad Akhar?” page 114. It is noted that the Iranian authorities arrested Ahmed Alqabanji, the Iraqi thinker for his writings against the Jurist Leadership when he visited Tehran. See Dr. Ahmed Alkanani: Mahakim Altafteesh Ta’oud min Jadeed, Almuthaqaf Newspaper November 30, 2012.

23. Ilah Roustami: Ta’theer Iran wa Nofouziha fi Almantiqah, translated by: Dr. Fatmah Nasr, 2011. See also: Almashro’ Alirani fi Almantiqah Alarabiah wa Alislamiah, Dr Sa’eed Edrees wa Fatmah Alsmadi and others, Ibid.

24. Cosmopolitanism: refers to loyalty outside one’s own country. After the eruption of the Iranian revolution in 1979, Iran attracted the Arab Shiite sects in favor of Tehran through its proxy militias to implement its expansionist ambitions.

25. Hani Fahs: a meeting with the Lebanese Alnahar Newspaper, Seeptember 18, 2014.

26. Hani Fahs: Alnahar Newspaper, September 18, 2014. See also: Exclusive Meeting, a mmeting with the Iranian president Mohammed Khatami, May 23, 1999.

27. Imad Bouzo (Ph.D.): Awham Altagieer Aldemography fi Syria, Orient, January 13, 2016. See also: Obaidah Amer: Allo’bah Alkobra… Kaifa To’eed Iran Tashkeel Syria Demographian? February 20, 2017, Midan website.

28. See: Atef Mu’tamad (Ph.D.): Alshi’ah fi Almashriq Alislami, Tathweer Almazhab wa Tafkeek Alkhareetah, Nahzat Masr 2008, page 155. See also: Khareetat Alshi’ah fi Alalam Alislami, Amir Sa’ad, Alrisalah Studies Center 2013.

29. See the statements of Ali Alyounisi: Iran… Asbahna Empratoriah Asimatoha Baghdad, Alarabiah Net, March 8, 2015, http://cutt.us/qz83m 30. See: Alsulami (Ph.D.), Guneimi: Algeopolitic Alshi’i, Journal for Iranian Studies, 1st issue, page 32, The Arabian Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, Riyadh.

31. See: Imad Bouzo: Awham Altagieer Aldemography fi Syria, Ibid.

32. See: Hakaza Tabtali’ Iran Asimat Alomawieen, Malaf An ALtashaio’ fi Damascus” Orient, may 26, 2016, and see: Alo’bah Alkobra… Kaifa To’eed Iran Tashkeel Syria Demografian? February 20, 2017.

33. Midan website http://cutt.us/vZ18H, http://cutt.us/6ignn 34. See: Nisf Million Irani fi Syria Sanawian, the Middle East, December 4, 2009, http://cutt.us/bNX6 35. See: Asrar Altagalgul Alshi’i fi Damascus- Report May 5, 2011, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/60623.html 36. Mohammed Alsa’eed Edrees (Ph.D.) wa Fatmah Alsmadi (Ph.D.) and others: Almashro’ Alirani fi Almantiqah Alarabiah wa Alislamiah, page 178, Omaiah Center for Strategic research and Studies+ Albashir Publisher, 2015.

37. Nizam Alasad Yosadir Mumtalakat Allaji’een wa Almu’aradah, Arabi 21, February 25, 2015, http://cutt.us/hEcgL 38. Alqalamon… Tahjeer wa Istinzaf wa Taskheer Lilharb, Aljazeera Net February 2, 2016, http://cutt.us/MuyD4

Journal for Iranian Studies

125

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

39. Ta’seed Alqalamon, Aljazeera Net, January 14, 2015http://cutt.us/9AcMG 40. Alasad Yusadir Amlak Almu’arideen Bimojab Qanon Ya’oud Lisitat Oqoud, Alarabi Aljadeed: June 29, 2016 http:// cutt.us/auRjw 41.\ Sadnaya Prison, the biggest prison in Syria about 30 Kilometer to the North of Damascus. More than 13 thousand prisoners were executed in this prison in 2011-2015. It was described as a human abattoir by the Amnesty International.

More than 10 thousand women are in the Syrian Prisons. See: the Amnesty International Report, Tuesday 7, 2017, Maslakh Bashari: Shanq Jama’i wa Ibadah fi Sijn Sidnaya, http://cutt.us/r3qwk, http://cutt.us/gb9Z7 42. See: Palmyra Prison… Almawt Arham min Alhaya, the Arab Present Program, May 23, 2015, Aljazeera Alfada’iah.

And see: Sojoun Syria… Almawt Ta’zeeban, Comprehensive report, Aljazeera Net, http://cutt.us/HDvE4, And; Rights Organization Accuses Syrian Government of Mass Hangings, http://cutt.us/NAUum 43. Omar Koush: Alhudn wa Altagieer Aldimografi fi Syria, January 1, 2016, Aljazeera Net, http://cutt.us/rsOop 44. The attack included houses, lands, and hospitals in a random way led to they flee of civilians to other cities or outside Syria; in both cases, their properties were seized after they leave.

45. See: Hal Yas’a Alasad Lifrag Syria min Mu’arideeh? Aljazeera Net September 8, 2015, http://cutt.us/njuY2 46. Hezbollah fi Syria… Thjeer Alsukan Alanan, “Repor,” September 20, 2016, http://cutt.us/dkd0X 47. Daria… Halaqah Jadeedah min Musalsal Altahjeer Li’qamat Syria Almufeedah, “Report”, Alarabi Aljadeed, Sunday August 28, 2016. See: also Masro’ Irani fi Damascus Yuhadid Ma’atai Alf Syrian Biltahjeer, Alquds Alarabi, August 29, 2015, http://cutt.us/xdfb8, http://cutt.us/K1eM 48. Alqalamoun… Tahjeer wa Istinzaf wa Taskheer Lilharb, previous reference. See: Omar Kokash: Alhudan wa Altagieer Aldemogaphy fi Syria, Aljazera Net, previous reference. See also: The Guardian… How is Iran Changing the Sectarian Structure of Syria, Arabi 21,January 15, 2017, http://cutt.us/kNys 49. Alnizam Alsoury wa Ta’deel Demographia Alsukan, Ma Wara’ Alkhabar program, Aljazeera, July 17, 2013. See: Iran Tugaier Tarkeeby Syria Alsukaniah Bitaween Alshiite, January 15, 2017, http://cutt.us/LJBGC 50. Tagieer Aldemographia Alsukaniah Bisouria Abr Altahjeer wa Alihlal, Alwaqi’ Alarabi program, December 8, 2014.

51. See: Michael Nits: The Iranian Division: The Role of the Iraqi Shiite Militias in Syria, Institute of Washington for the Far East, June 27, 2013, http://cutt.us/1vGA5 52. Tagieer Aldemographia Alsukaniah Bisouria, previous Reference. Some reports reveal that the Syrian regime has granted the Syrian nationality for about 750 thousand people in from Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran in 2011-2013 only. See also: Alnizam Alsoury wa Ta’deel Demographia Alsukan, Ibid.

53. Tajnees Aliranieen fi Syria, Alarabia Alhadath, August 25, 2015 http://cutt.us/ugqRW 54. Tajnees Almilitiat Aliraniah min Baghdad ila Damascus, Okaz Newspaper, February 1, 2016 http://okaz.com.sa/article/1041068/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A3%D9%8A/ 55. Alqalamon: Tahjeer wa Taskheer Lilharb, Ibid.

56. Almadahon Almutajihon ila Damascus Yad’on Li’iran, report, October 27, 2016, the Arabian Gulf Center for Iranian Studies http://cutt.us/MMNL9 57. Alo’bah Alkobra… Kaifa To’eed Iran Tashkeel Syria Demografian, Ibid.

58. Iran’s Plan for Syria Without Assad, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/irans-plan-syria-without-assad-14762 And: Iranians Fuel Property Frenzy in Syria. http://www.voanews.com/a/iranians-fuel-property-frenzy-syria/3250125.html 59. See: Itiraf Irani Bimawjat Shira’ Alaqarat fi Damascus, Arabi 21, March27, 2016. See also: Alhodan wa Altagieer

Journal for Iranian Studies

126

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

Aldemografi fi Suria, Ibid, http://cutt.us/jcMKJ , See also: Mashro’ Istidani… Iran Tagzo Souq Alaqarat fi Damascus wa Hims, Huffington Post, March 26, 2016, http://cutt.us/8xD8, And Iran Tashtary Syria, report, Sasa Post, March 31, 2016.

60. See: Tasreehat Mahdi Ta’ib: Alarabia Net, Friday, February 15, 2013 http://cutt.us/voZZa 61. See: Alikhwan wa Iran, Almisbar Center 1st edition, 2015, p. 151.

62. Ali Alyounsi, advisor of the Iranian president said:”The Iraqi-Iranian geography cannot be separated and our culture cannot be broken down, so, we have to fight together and unite. Iran is today an empire as before and its capital is Baghdad, the center of our culture and identity.” See the statements of Rouhani’s advisor, Iran: we have become an empire and Baghdad is our capital, Alarabia Net, March 8, 2015, http://cutt.us/IGnbG 63. See: Albdulamir Kazim Zahid: Alfiqh Aldustouri fi Alijtihad Alshi’I, Alintishar Alarabi, p. 325.

64. See the Iranian Influence in Iraq, Dr. Arafat Jargon: Alalaqat Alirania Alkhaleejia, 1st edition, Alarabi Lilnashr wa Altawzee’ 2016, p. 88.

65. Ishaq Naqash says, “The new formation of Iraq has been a challenge for the Iranian position in the Arabian Gulf and its economic interests in the region; the establishment of the Iraqi railroad and the construction of the road extending from the western borders up to Hamadan before 1921. They were as an elimination of the Iranian traditional northern trade roads resulted in the transfer of most of the exportation and transit in northwest Iran toward Baghdad and Basra and increase of the Iranian trade interests in Iraq. As a result, the Iranian government sought to escalate tension in Iraq through weakening this country and obstructing any attempt to build a strong Iraqi national army.

Ishaq Naqash, Shiite Aliraq, translated by Abdulilah Alnu’aimi, Almadar Publishers 1996, page 180. (Ishaq Naqash: A Professor in History in the American Brandies University and Teacher of Historical Studies in the Advanced Studies Institute in the American University of Princeton; a Jewish Oriental from Iraqi origins.

66. Dayala wa Altagieer Aldemography, Barq Center for Research and Studies, “Study” http://cutt.us/ywJEg 67. Tagieer Altarkeebah Alsukaniah Lidayala Aliraqia: Alab’ad wa Aldawafi’, Alwaqi’ Alarabi, Aljazeera, October 29, 2015.

68. See: Altagieer Aldemografi: Aliah Ta’ifiah Litamzeeq Aliraq, Aljazeera Net, September 11, 2014.

69. See: Makhawif Iraqia min Askarat Alta’ifiah, Aljazeera Net June 16, 2014.

70. Diyala Province: lies to the northeast of Baghdad on the Iraqi-Iranian borders, its center is Ba’qoba city, 60 kilometer away from Baghdad and lies at the line of contact with the Iraqi Kurdistan borders. It shares Iran in 240 kilometers land borders and considered the gate of Pilgrims and visitors of the Holy places from Iran to Iraq and Syria. The Sunni Arabs represent 80% of the province.

71. The Shiite militias carried out massacres in the Sunni mosques under the leadership of Hadi Alamiri such as the massacre of Sariah mosque, Mos’ab bin Omair mosque, and Barwanah district. See: Ra’id Alhamid: Tehran wa Baghdad: Sa’I Lilikhlal Biltawazon Alsukani fi Daiyala, Aljazeera studies Center, March 20, 2015. See also: Makhawif min Tajadud Alhajamat Alta’ifiah Ba’d Majzarat Masjid Daiyala, Aljazeera Net, Saturday, August 23, 2014.

72. Tagieer Altarkeebah Alsukaniah Lidiyala Aliraqia, Alab’ad wa Aldawafi’, Alwaqi’ Alarabi, Aljazeera, October 29, 2015.

73. See: Daiyala: Qalaq min Altagieer Aldemografi Bilqwah, Aljazeera Net August 2, 2016, and Daiyala Aliraqia: Tagieer Demographi wa Tawator Ta’ifi wa Irqi, Aljazeera Net October 25, 2015, Wa Malazi Yajri fi Daiyala Aliraqia, Aljazeera Net, Thursday, January 14, 2016.

74. Daiyala wa Altagieer Aldemografi, previous reference. Statistics show the displacement of 350 thousand families from Dayala. See Ibid.

75. See: Sa’ad bin Abdulqadir: Ab’ad Altagieer Aldemografi fi Almousel, The Saudi Aljazeera Newspaper, October 22, 2016.

76. Ra’ed Alhamid: Tehran wa Baghdad: Sa’i Lilikhlal Biltawazon Alsukani fi Daiyala, study, Aljazeera Studies Center, March 20, 2015.

Journal for Iranian Studies

127

Year 1,issue 2- March. 2017

Changing demographics and identity in Syria and Iraq

77. Roa’ Haidar: Miah Aliraq Bain Fakkai Kammashat Turkey wa Iran, Sawt Aliraq Alhur radio, http://www.greenline. com.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?tp=7403 78. See: Daiyala wa Altagieer Aldemografi, Barq Center for Research and Studies, Ibid.

79. See: Ibid.

80. See: Tanafus wa Sira’at Lilhaimanah Ala Qarar Shiite Aliraq, the Middle East, October 10, 2016.

81. See: Alsila’ Alirania Biliraq Bain Altijara wa Alsiasah, report, Aljazeera Net, June 26, 2012.

82. Shaza Khlil: Ajindat Iran Altawaso’iah Tuhlik Iqtisadiha wa Tuza’zi’ Istiqrar Alsharq Alawsat, Rawabit Center for Strategic Studies, Ibid.

83. Alsourion Bilibnan: Hawajis Aldemografia wa Ta’qidat Alsiasah, a report on Aljazeera Net, February 13, 2017.

+966112166696 INFO@ARABIANGCIS.COM

www.arabiangcis.org ARABIANGCIS