The first biannual strategic report

THE FIRST BIANNUAL STRATEGIC REPORT DEC.2016

CONTENTS »»Executive Summary.........................................................................8 »»Internal Affairs.............................................................................. 11 »»The Presidency of the Republic Institution...................................12 »»The Presidential Institution and the Supreme Leader of Revolution.......................................................................12 »» The Institution of the Presidency and the Legislative Authority..................................................................26 »»The Presidential Institution and its Role in the Conflict between the Legislative and Judicial Authorities.... 28 »»The Military Institution.................................................................32 »»The Budgets of Revolutionary Guard and the Army..................... 32 »»War Production............................................................................ 34 »»Drones Development Program..................................................... 36 »»Rockets Program...........................................................................37 »»The Reality of Iranian Military Productions.................................. 37 »»Maneuvers and Training Projects................................................. 38 »»Iranian Navy Activities.................................................................. 39 »»Trump Promises Iranian Navy a Harsh Response..........................41 »»Iranian Ambitions in Building Naval Bases in Syria and Yemen.....42 »»Military Cooperation with Foreign Countries............................... 43 »»Iran and the Syrian War................................................................ 46 »»Conclusions...................................................................................48 »»The Security File............................................................................51 »»Repression of non-Persians...........................................................51 »»The Future of Mobilization in non-Persians Areas........................56 »»Future Scenarios in the Iranian Regime's Dealings with the non-Persians....................................................................................57

»»The Human Rights Situation in Iran...............................................58 »»Conclusions................................................................................... 68 »»Economic part................................................................................70 »»First Axis: Iranian economy indicators and future scenarios......... 70 »»Positive signs during the last six months and their economic repercussions....................................................................................71 »»Two future scenarios..................................................................... 79 »»The first scenario........................................................................... 79 »»The second scenario......................................................................80 »»Second Axis: The Iranian banking system exchange rate a year after the nuclear deal and the direction of future progress......................81 »»First: The banking system...............................................................82 »»Second: The Iranian currency's exchange rate against the US dollar.................................................................................... 83 »»Third Axis: Iranian citizens’ standards of living -what comes next?.............................................................88 »»First: Future economic conditions and their impact on citizens' living standards.................................................................................88 »»Second: The new budget plan and its possible impact on a citizen in the future......................................................................................91 »»Conclusion.....................................................................................92 »»Arab Affairs..................................................................................101 »»First Axis: The Future of GCC-Iranian Relations in a Troubled Region......................................................................101 »»First: Determinants of Gulf-Iranian Relations...............................102 »»1. The State Geo-Strategic Determinant......................................102 »»2. The Oil-ECHO Determinant......................................................103 »»3. Sectarian Links and Population Increases................................104 »»4. The US Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its Impact on the Regional Balance of Power .................................................104 »»Second: Gulf-Iranian relations, heading where?.........................106.

»»First Phase: Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979......................106 »»Second Phase: During and After the Iranian Revolution, 1979....107 »»Third Phase: After the Fall of Saddam Hussein's Regime in 2003............................................................................... 108 »»Third: GCC-Iranian relations during the second half of 2016.......112 »»1. Ongoing Saudi Arabia-Iran conflicts.........................................112 »»2- The growing Iranian threats towards Bahrain..........................115 »»3- The escalation in UAE-Iranian differences............................... 115 »»Fourth: Conclusions of the biannual strategic report period.......116 »»Fifth: The Future for Gulf-Iranian relations..................................118 »»Second Axis: Iran's Role in the Neighboring Gulf Countries Iraq and Yemen..............................................................................119 »»First: Iraq as a springboard for Iran’s expansionist strategy.........120 »»1- Shift in Iran's strategy from integration to empowerment......122 »»2- The Challenges of Iran’s role in Iraq.........................................126 »»3- The future of Iran’s role in Iraq and the expected trends........127 »»Second: The future of Iran’s role in the Yemeni crisis..................129 »»1. Yemen’s geostrategic importance for Iran............................... 129 »»2. Iran's strategy in Yemen...........................................................129 »»3. Increasing Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen.............. 131 »»4. The results of Iranian support for the Houthis.........................134 »»5. Developments in Yemen in favor of legitimacy........................136 »»Third Axis: The future of Iran’s role in the Syrian crisis… A rise or fall?..................................................... 138 »»First: The axes of Iran blocking for political settlement to the Syrian crisis..........................................................................139 »»1. The Political Axis...................................................................... 139 »»2. The Military Axis...................................................................... 140 »»Second: The Inconsistency of Iranian-Russian interests in Syria..141

»»Third - The Iranian-Russian contentious issues on Syria..............143 »»Fourth - Aspects of Russian-Iranian differences inSyria.............. 146 »»Fifth - The Iranian escalation boundaries with Turkey on Syria... 147 »»Sixth – Absence of US variables in the Syrian crisis..................... 148 »»Seventh - The future scenarios of the Iranian role in Syria..........150 »»International Affairs..................................................................... 159 »»The Future of American-Iranian Relations in a Changing World..159 »»First: The American-Iranian relations during

the Obama Presidency...................................................................160 »»Second: The American-Iranian relations timeline

during the second half of 2016......................................................161 »»Third: The impact of Obama’s doctrine on both

the American and Iranian roles in the Midle-East region...............163 »»Fourth: Possible scenarios for future US-Iranian relations.......... 165 »»EU-Iranian Relations....................................................................166 »»European foreign policy between the European

Union Council and the European Parliament.................................167 »»Limitations of the European Foreign Policytoward Iran.............. 167 »»The EU Boosting Trade Relations with Iran

and its Strategy toward this Country ........................................... 170 »»The EU’s Strategies toward Tehran.............................................. 170 »»Opening an EU delegation in Tehran............................................171 »»German-Iranian Relations.............................................................173 »»Russia-Iranian Relations...............................................................176 »»The Syrian Crisis...........................................................................176 »»Military Cooperation....................................................................180 »»The Future of the Military and Economic

Cooperation Between Russia and Iran...........................................184 »»Conclusions...................................................................................184 »»Closure..........................................................................................185

Executive Summary

T

his is a biannual report that tracks the most important developments in Iran during the last six months of 2016 to provide precise details about the Iranian case file on internal, Arab, and international levels.

» Internal Affairs This section focuses on four central points: 1. Institution of the Presidency a. The relationship with the Supreme Leader. This report focuses on the points of disagreement between both sides such as the nuclear deal, economic sector, governmental reshuffle, and the upcoming elections. b. The relationship with the legislative authority, which includes: 1. The role of the Institution of the Presidency in the balance of power inside the Islamic Shurra Council.

2. The establishment of a parliamentary bloc for the Turkish majority provinces’ MPs. 3. Defection of the Moderate and Reform trend. c. The relationship with the judicial authority. This report focuses on the Institution of the Republic’s efforts to mediate between the legislative and judicial authorities.

2. The Military Institute. a. This report presents a comparison between the Army and the Revolutionary Guard in terms of budgets and President Rouhani’s call for a reduction in the IRGC’s provisions in order to restore a balance with the traditional military institute.

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b. The Iranian military industry and reasons behind Iran’s active efforts to update its military capabilities. c. Iran’s military exercises during the second half of 2016. d. The harassment of American warships by Iranian naval vessels. e. Iran’s increased presence in international waters within the framework of its expansionist ambitions.

The future of Iranian-Chinese and Iranian-Pakistani military cooperation. f. Iran’s military involvement in the war in Syria and the criticism directed at Tehran because of its role in the Syrian crisis.

3. The Security Issue.

This report focuses on the following aspects:

a. Segregation and oppression of non-Persian ethnic minorities in terms of: 1. Current events in Kurdistan, Ahwaz, and Baluchistan.

2. Future conflict between the Iranian regime and ethnic minorities in light of the regime’s constant use of violence and its rejection of their demands for freedom and equality.

3. Possible scenarios for the regime’s relations with non-Persian ethnic groups. b. Human rights conditions, especially the executions of ethnic minority activists. c. ISIS’ plans for a series of attacks on several districts in Tehran and the contradictions by Iranian officials concerning this issue. d. Reasons behind the restrictions on multinationals. e. The fires that started in vital Iranian economic sites.

4. The Economy a. This report discusses the most important economic indicators in Iran during the second half of 2016 and the possible scenarios for economic growth in Iran based on those indicators. b. Developments in the banking system a year after signing the nuclear deal, and changes in the exchange rates in Iran and their future expectations by the end of 2017. c. The Iranian people’s living conditions and the impact of the economic policies on their lives. » Arab Affairs This part of the report focuses on the following points:

1. The future of the Gulf-Iran relations in a troubled region in terms of: a. The nature of these relations before and after the Revolution of 1979. b. Determiners of these relations. c. Gulf-Iran relations during the second half of 2016. d. Possible scenarios for future relations that fluctuate between cooperation and tension.

2. Iran’s role in the neighboring Gulf countries, especially in Iraq and Yemen since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 in terms of:

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a. Iran’s expansionist strategy in Iraq and the change from a strategy of integration into control. b. The future of Iran’s role in Iraq. c. The future of Iran’s role in Yemen through analyzing Yemen’s geostrategic importance for Iran and Iranian support for the Houthi rebels. This report also studies the latest developments in favor of legitimacy and the future of the Yemeni crisis. d. The future of Iran’s role in Syria through analyzing Iran’s interference in the political solution and the conflict of interests between Iran and Russia about this country. » International Affairs This report covers the following key factors on an international level: 1. American-Iranian relations under the title “The future of the American-Iranian relations in a changing world.” This report discusses the rapprochement between the two countries during the Obama administration in 2016 after signing the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 group in July 2015 and its impact on Iran’s regional strategy. It also covers the latest developments and the future of these relations following Republican Donald Trump winning the presidency of the United States according to three possible scenarios: a. Continuation of the nuclear deal and a non-confrontational policy. b. Review of the nuclear deal. c. A new stage of confrontation and a resumption of sanctions, which is the most probable scenario.

2. European-Iranian relations. This report focuses on the following points: a. The European Union This report discusses the foundations of EU foreign policy toward Iran and its approach to relations between both sides during the second half of 2016. It also covers the EU’s desire to open an EU delegation in Iran and the responses of the various Iranian political movements to this. As a model for EU-Iranian relations, this report deals with the improvement of German-Iranian relations and their impact on Iran’s internal and foreign policies. b. Russia This report analyzes the following points concerning the Russian- Iranian relations: 1. Coordination between Iran and Russia on the Syrian crisis.

2. The use of Nogah Airbase in Hamadan province by Russian jet fighters to attack Syrian targets.

3. The contradictions in Iranian officials’ statements concerning this issue and the legal status of giving permission to Russian bombers to use this base.

4. Russian-Iranian points of disagreement on Syria.

5. The future of relations between the two countries.

6. Continuation of military cooperation through the completion of the S300 missile deal, the Kalashnikov-103 machine gun deal, and other military deals signed by the two countries during the second half of 2016.

7. Joint military exercises and visits by Russian naval vessels to the Iranian ports.

8. The Russian-Iranian cooperation in the oil, energy, nuclear, and electricity sectors, in the banking sector, and in space.

9.The future of Russian-Iranian relations in all economic and military sectors.

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INTRODUCTION

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

I

ran’s internal affairs are characterized as taking precedence over other Iranian political affairs. Their unique nature makes an analysis of events in Iran and their repercussions dependent on examining all aspects of Iranian internal affairs: social, economic, political, and, specifically, both security and related military issues. This means that an exploration of the future of Iran’s domestic affairs necessitates analyzing all these aspects and studying the connectivity between various events, basing one’s conclusions on the resulting findings.

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»»The Presidency of the Republic Institution In this chapter of our bi-annual strategic report concerning the second half of 2016, we deal with the institution of the presidency of the Iranian Republic through its relationship with the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Republic, who is considered the supreme authority over the Iranian regime, including the representative legislative institution in the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the judicial authority. The period covered by this report runs from the second half of the beginning of 2016 following the signing of the nuclear agreement through the last half of the year and beginning of 2017, ending with the run-up to the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for May 2017. This was a turbulent period, ending the previous relatively calm phase lasting around two-an-ahalf years during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, which witnessed only the usual conflict between the Conservatives and the Reformists during the nuclear program negotiations.

»»The Presidential Institution and the Supreme Leader of Revolution The Presidential Institution occupies an intermediate position between the presidency and the prime ministry in the parliamentary republican regime of the Islamic Republic.

In other words, the Iranian presidential leader is not considered the head of the State, as is usually the case in other presidential systems. The President in Iran enjoys greater authority than that of the executive, judicial, and legislative heads; thus, the dissolution of the prime minister’s position in 1998 was considered an uncontroversial decision. The reason for this concerns similar duties, which the President performs, and which are the same as those of any prime minister in any parliamentary system. In this context, the Supreme Leader appoints ambassadors and constitutes the government. However, only the designation of both Ministers of Defense and Intelligence must be approved by the Supreme Leader before the parliamentary approval. In other words, the Supreme Leader is the official head of the Iranian Republic.1 Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the Iranian Supreme Leader since 1990, lived through four different presidencies, serving for 26 consecutive years, which were preceded by eight more, although these were not consecutive. Rafsanjani enjoyed privileges directly granted by the constitution and the authoritative institutions. He was entitled to exert full control over the regime and the direction of the political system in Iran.2 In spite of all this authority, Rafsanjani was almost overthrown by Iranians’ protests during the 2009 demonstrations, which broke out after the controversial re-election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad to the presidency. Reformist leaders were put under house arrest after Ahmadinejad played the role of the savior of Khamenei's policies by abolishing the reformist current along with its advocates and dismantling civil society institutions, which had been established during Mohammad Khatami's presidential term.

»»Rouhani and the Problematic Issue of Political Affiliation Analysts disagree about the exact positioning of President Rouhani’s political affiliation, despite the passage of three-and-a-half years since his election, arguing over whether he should be ideologically placed among the moderate Conservatives or the Reformists.

This disagreement is not only a concern among analysts but among Iranian politicians themselves.

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Despite his long history of service in highly sensitive positions only assigned to individuals close to Khamenei, Rouhani, who served as the leader of the air force and as national security advisor for 13 consecutive years, as well as being appointed to head the Iranian delegation at the nuclear talks between 2003- 2005, and as the Vice-President of the High Council of National Security, and serving as an MP from the 1980s until 2000, presented himself during the 2013 elections as a moderate who rejected the oppressive acts which took place in 2009. He also called for greater convergence with the West, releasing the Green movement prisoners, and reforming the domestic media.3 These policies attracted the remaining members of the Reformist movement, who aligned themselves alongside him. Those who believe that Khamenei did not welcome these positions and his subsequent rise, however, were mistaken. Indeed, by presenting himself in this way, Rouhani gained many benefits for the theocratic leadership.

To start with, Rouhani’s position helped to quell the still widespread political anger after the regime’s repression of the 2009 protests and to find a way out of the deadlock that afflicted the Iranian political scene, which was still wracked by instability after the Conservatives took control over all of the authoritative institutions, from the presidency to the parliament, to the local organizations, as well as their own headquarters in the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, and the judicial authority.

Rouhani’s policies also enabled Iran to escape from the economic crisis afflicting it, which had reached a very critical stage by the end of Ahmadinejad’s term in office, especially after the collapse of the national currency, which lost more than 80 percent of its value following Western sanctions.

As President, Rouhani also managed to reach an agreement with the West concerning the Iranian nuclear program, an especially crucial achievement after the banning of Iranian oil exports, which also averted the threat of a military attack.

As all this shows, Khamenei’s decision to give Rouhani the chance of a presidential role was motivated by political pragmatism and necessity, all of which led him to view this appointment as an essential yet manageable risk. This is not to question Rouhani’s loyalty to Khamenei, however, as much as to point out the leadership’s acceptance beforehand of a possibly inevitable clash between the President and Supreme Leader, more especially given the great level of relative personal independence in decision-making enjoyed by the President. Such differences in opinion had occurred with all the previous Iranian Presidents under the theocratic regime, except for Ahmadinejad during the early period of his presidency, and Mohammad Ali Rajai, who was assassinated 18 days after his election in August 1981.

Therefore, for Khamenei, Rouhani was simply the man of the hour chosen to carry out specific missions, but not to become a popular leader, as was the case with Mohammad Khatami. Rouhani, himself, meanwhile, was very much aware of the nature of the political game in Iran through his extensive experience in prominent and sensitive senior positions within the regime. As a result, in forming his government, Rouhani depended on the moderate Conservative bloc under the leadership of Ali Larijani and did not appoint any minister from the reformists’ ranks. Rouhani was aware that this would not be viewed as a suitable time for the reformists to return to power. Bearing this in mind,

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this decision led to political tensions between the two political blocs during the sixmonth period of writing this report. The nature of the disagreement concerned political competitiveness, however, rather than any dissent over the content or core of the political system itself.

»»Changing relations between the President and the Supreme Leader The disagreement between the two institutional figures representing the Presidency and the Guidance Council, respectively, was concerned with various issues:

»»Nuclear Agreement Once Khamenei was assured that the threat of Western military action had been averted and the earlier economic sanctions on Iran had been lifted, he began attacking the nuclear agreement, which Rouhani and his group were not to sign, unless Khamenei approved every word of it. At the beginning of March 2016, Khamenei announced his rejection of the agreement. He expressed this opposition after the US delayed its lifting of the banking sanctions on Iran, expressly stating that he had accepted the signing of the agreement only to prove that the US is Iran’s principal enemy and will not keep its promises. Khamenei continued issuing official statements, which were critical of Rouhani and his group's dealings with the US.4 Two objectives were behind Khamenei's attack on the nuclear agreement: Firstly, this provided a useful external target for the Iranian public’s anger, as the people had witnessed none of the promised improvements in the country’s economic situation despite the lifting of sanctions and the subsequent release of massive sums of money to the regime in funds previously frozen in Western banks, along with the regime’s collection of the significant accumulated oil funds from Indian importers, which Iran had previously been unable to collect due to the banking sanctions.

Secondly, the attack enabled the Supreme Leader to distort Rouhani’s achievement in the nuclear agreement and to diminish his popularity as a leader with the public.

Rouhani, meanwhile, rejected Khamenei’s criticisms, calling the nuclear deal “a winning agreement for both parties” and asserting that it had had a positive good influence on Iran’s economic situation. For the first time, Rouhani publicly opposed Khamenei's statements, provoking outrage among Conservatives, who subjected the President to a storm of severe censure and condemnation to the extent of demanding his trial on charges of treason to the Islamic Republic, deceptiveness, and attempting to move the leadership from the Jurist Leadership Regime.

The Supreme Leader’s aggressive attack was accompanied by other criticisms aimed at the person of Rouhani, who was accused of adopting an unrealistically positive perspective on future Iranian-Western relations. Rouhani rejected these accusations, stating, “Being positive about the nuclear agreement does not mean being positive about the major world powers,” and assuring the leadership that his government does not place any trust in the US to implement the nuclear agreement’s articles, although he is positive about the agreement itself and about his role in solving the country’s problems.

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This failed to placate the Conservatives, who further escalated their attack on Rouhani over his disagreement with Khamenei regarding the nuclear agreement. This led to intervention by parliamentary head Ali Larijani, a Conservative ally of Rouhani, in an effort to re-establish national unity and ease the Khamenei: Supreme Leader Hassan Rouhani:the President of Iran tensions between the Reformists and Conservatives. At the same time, through mobilizing supportive Conservatives, Rouhani aimed to both strengthen them and to win backing for the agreement, believing it to be one of the first steps for the implementation of a program of intensive political reforms under the name ‘Bergam 2,’ an acronym whose Persian initials mean ‘Comprehensive Action Plan.’ Rouhani views the nuclear agreement as being the first step in this comprehensive action plan, to be followed by political reforms, although Khamenei does not accept any negotiations on this subject, as he believes the current political situation in Iran is ideal and considers any attempts to introduce amendments an act of treason and rebellion against the regime and his own authority.

Khamenei's attacks on both Rouhani and the agreement continued throughout July 2016 until the arrival of State Week, which commemorates the assassination of Mohammed Ali Rajai, the Islamic Republic’s second elected President on August 30th, 1981. On this occasion, the Iranian government presents reports publicly for the Supreme Leader, to be announced mostly on national television. By the end of the week, the Supreme Leader issues his directives to the government with an action plan that the government must abide by.5 In the light of these continuous meetings and the inevitable proximity between the Supreme Leader and the President, Khamenei changed his discourse toward Rouhani and the agreement. He stated: “My criticism of the nuclear agreement is a criticism of the breaking of the covenant and the malice of the other [party – i.e. the U.S.], not of our own men, because the Iranian delegates worked, with extreme efforts, day and night and we do appreciate all of the troubles they put themselves to."

At this point, Khamenei adopted a reconciliatory stand towards the nuclear agreement, which sounded more rational. He now criticized only some of the executive procedures of the agreement. That occasion, however, was considered a milestone in the relationship

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between Rouhani and Khamenei. No direct intense attack on Rouhani by Khamenei was as marked as during those months before State Week. Nevertheless, the Conservatives fiercely attacked Rouhani for a number of reasons:

• High salaries paid to the heads of governmental organizations.

• The interference of Hossein Fereydon, the brother of Rouhani, in state affairs and being accused of financial embezzlement.

• The crisis of the convention against corruption (FATF).

• Questioning governmental records of the economic development rate and employment rate in Iran.

The pull and push strategies between the President and the Supreme Leader decreased the conflict level so as to preserve and therefore shield the image of the Supreme Leader, as he is not assumed to be a part of any political tensions between the regime’s fractions, nor deemed to be affected by any. From his side, Rouhani stopped engaging in personal criticism of Khamenei. However, at the same time, he responded to the Conservatives through encouraging the Reformists to pursue the pitfalls of the Conservatives. As a result, the Reformists heightened the case of Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf, the Mayor of Tehran, who was accused of distributing State land to his acquaintances and friends, and of financial corruption in the Legislative Authority, which also affected its President, Sadiq Larijani. Qalibaf is known to be an ally of the Conservatives.

Driving the level of conflict away from the President and the Supreme Leader to the political currents allowed for coordination between the two, which substantiated itself through Rouhani’s address to the International Forums to compel the United States to comply with the commitments given in the nuclear agreement, reassuring chiefly that European banks and companies, which were abstinent from dealing and trading with Iran, were not going to be subject to US economic sanctions.

While addressing his State speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, Rouhani demanded the implementation of the articles of the nuclear agreement and minimized his criticism. He demanded Group ‘5+ 1’ to meet its commitments, which were promised to Iran after the agreement. His speech was mainly addressing the US with the warning that “Neglecting the implementation of the agreement articles is a contravention of international laws.” He called on the US to amend its “strategic mistake” as outlined in its infringement of its commitment. Rouhani further asserted that among the agreed promises were the subject of the sale of US civilian aircraft to Iran, namely to lift the sanctions which had prevented Iran's from completing the aircraft deal with different companies.6 In his speech, Rouhani’s main concern was the implementation of the agreement’s articles that were multilateral and international, not only between Iran and the US. Any cancellation by one of the parties was not admissible since this would be a failure to adhere to the international commitment, which demanded a fair reaction from the other countries who had signed and ratified the agreement.

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After Rouhani’s New York speech, the debate continued between the proponents and opponents. Soon afterward, the US displayed some signs of resolving the civilian aircraft purchase issue; either the US Boeing or the European Airbus. Signs of the US Treasury uplifting the ban, which had been placed on Iranian banks, were subsequently followed by US approval. Nevertheless, we dismiss the idea that the diplomatic pressure exercised by Rouhani on the US was the main cause for this approval by the US. It is most likely that the Iranian-Russian convergence of interests and the increase in the level of cooperation between the two sides caused the US to ease the pressure on Iran so as not to further advance its cooperation with Russia. However, no one can deny that Rouhani’s speech had a great impact on the European countries who signed the agreement, and which from the beginning had hoped for all sides to cooperate with Iran. The European countries required that International stand to be able to encounter the US position represented by the US Congress with the support of both Obama and John Kerry to the nuclear agreement.

Donald Trump's triumph in the US presidential elections caused a lot of anxiety in Iranian political circles because of his hostile rhetoric toward Iran during his presidential campaign and his threat to 'tear up' the nuclear agreement if he reached the White House. The leaders of the Iranian regime did not forget that Trump belongs to the Republican Party, whose leaders had vowed to break the agreement in Congress. Nothing was left for Tehran but to await Trump's decisions about the nuclear program.

Official announcements and reactions regarding Trump's victory revealed fears concerning the fate of the nuclear agreement, which Tehran had achieved after marathon negotiations and years of international sanctions which had put substantial economic constraints on Iran.

The Iranian President immediately reminded Trump that the nuclear agreement was international and therefore he could not cancel it from his side because a number of parties had participated in drafting and concluding it. He confirmed that his country would keep to all of its promises, and demanded that all the parties involved would keep theirs as well, in terms of what they had promised Iran.7 Rouhani’s fears arose because the agreement had accomplished a lot. This was apparent in the speech he delivered in front of the economic sector officials in Alborz province when he stated that the nuclear agreement with the six major powers had accomplished much for Iran that could not be annulled and that his country would not allow the US or Europe to cancel or change it.8 Moreover, some groups in Iran did not mind Trump's cancellation of the agreement and they noted that it was a great victory for Iran because they believed the agreement had not achieved any of its stated outcomes, especially regarding the lifting of sanctions. They believed that the grave economic situation would continue and that the US would still inflict sanctions on Iran.9 The third group of political analysts observed that Trump would not cancel the nuclear agreement, particularly after his councilors had undermined Trump's statements.

Analysts thought that Trump would change his policies toward the agreement and Iran in

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general, and that whatever Trump was working to achieve had to do with amending the agreement’s articles and probably imposing sanctions for reasons other than the nuclear program, such as the missile program, supporting participants in regional conflicts, or human rights violations.

Iranian concerns concerning the cancellation of the agreement did not increase national solidarity against the probability of an external danger. On the contrary, this caused the Conservatives to gloat about the Moderates. The Conservatives saw that freezing the agreement, or even its cancellation would bring an end to Rouhani’s political movement.

Calls started to be heard for the nomination of a Conservative to run for the next presidential elections to counterattack Trump's hidden policies toward Iran. Expectations were divided between Mohammed Baqer Qalifbaf, the Mayor of Tehran, who has an honorable military past and a strong connection with the Conservatives, and Saeed Jalili, a member of the Supreme Council of the Iranian National Security and a previous negotiator for and opponent to the nuclear agreement.

There is no doubt that Trump gaining power in the US has weakened Hassan Rouhani’s position in spite of continuous European reassurances to Iran that the nuclear agreement would still continue in spite of Trump's claims. However, if the agreement is frozen, Rouhani will lose much of his popularity and the Conservatives’ power will increase as they are supported by the Supreme Leader. In this context, the agreement between these two players, the President and the Supreme Leader, has become very closely connected to Iran's external situation in spite of the fact that the conflict is internal. This is no longer a bilateral equation since Trump has now become the third part, as has the European Union. Rouhani is counting on the EU's support for Iran on the nuclear agreement, but in return, the EU has its own demands regarding human rights violations, minorities, and Iran's interference in Middle-Eastern conflicts. As a result, Iran’s foreign policy has become one of the defining links between the President and the Supreme Leader, whether Rouhani stays in power or leaves after the upcoming elections.

»»Economic File in the President and the Supreme Leader Disputes After signing the nuclear agreement, the Iranians were hopeful that this would bring foreign investments to their country to alleviate the economic recession and open doors for imports to compensate for the shortage of commodities which the market suffers from, especially high-quality goods from the European and American markets.

Rouhani and the Reformists support open economic policies with the West for a number of reasons:

A. Generating new investments to increase the economic growth rate after it showed a decline during Ahmadinejad’s terms in office.

B. Developing Iran’s industries, which would benefit from Western technologies.

C. Improving the standards of living for Iranians and allowing them to enjoy luxury goods.

D. Preventing shortages of strategic goods such as medicines.

On his behalf, Khamenei called for what he named ‘Resistance Economy Policy,’ which ostensibly is close to austerity policies, but in substance is more closely connected to war

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economics. Khamenei's experience was relevant to the executive authority he gained throughout his presidency during the war with Iraq. He wanted to downsize foreign business trading and replace it with self-sustainment policies in different economic sectors while depending on whatever local technologies were available. In addition, he did not encourage giving business to foreign companies, instead of depending on local ones, especially in the oil and energy sectors. Iranian society was divided between these two economic approaches, as each has its logical economic objectives and justifications.10 This division, however, has other non-economic reasons. Resistance Economy Policy means the continuation of the power of the Revolutionary Guards in most of Iran’s economic sectors, which are mainly oil and energy. Converging with the West means a decline in that power and probably adjusting some internal policies and international stands to be in line with Western economic policies.

These disputes opened up a new area of conflict about new contractual agreements to explore and develop oil fields. The new oil agreements ‘IPC: Iran Petroleum Contracts’ became the most important issue for Iranian oil exports during July 2016. This paved the way for accusations of corruption and obstructing the national interest between Ali Khamenei on one side and Rouhani and his government on the other. This happened after the government formed a technical group of experts to develop the articles and framework for oil and energy agreements in Iran, based on a decision by the Finance Minister. This type of agreement allows foreign companies to be partners with national oil companies in explorations and progress, and to exploit oil and gas fields. However, this was something new; as it had not been implemented before in Iran and foreign companies had not been allowed to enjoy these rights. The agreement was designed to be implemented in high-risk investment areas, specifically the Iranian fields in the Arabian Gulf, the oil deposits in the South Pars gas field, and so on.11 In spite of the infamous history of the State-owned Iranian oil companies’ development of oil fields, Khamenei insisted on giving the new oil contracts to companies under Revolutionary Guard control. From his side, Rouhani resisted Khamenei’s orders for two months, although he eventually succumbed to the pressure and agreed to share the contracts between the Revolutionary Guard companies and the foreign companies. This issue was met by the severe disapproval of Rouhani and the Minister of Oil, which led them to transfer the oil file to be debated in Parliament.

The Conservatives put pressure on the Rouhani administration by accusing the Minister of Oil of corruption. The Minister responded by saying that he would expose the Qatari Lobby which was operating inside Iran, and which was trying to block attempts to exploit the joint oil fields. He further threatened to expose the opponents of the new agreement by presenting facts that would result in their condemnation, but without giving any further details in this regard. This issue was used by opponents to make more allegations about the Minister by charging him with deliberately covering up a number of corrupt persons, and threatened to open an old file on corruption in the Ministry that was signed during his term in office; that an Iranian oil sector official had received a 15-milliondollar bribe to enforce an agreement signed by the Ministry and the Norwegian State Oil Company. In addition, according to the Iranian Kayhan newspaper, a signed agreement

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with Crescent Petroleum ended up with Iran paying billions of dollars in penalties to this UAE company as a result of poor Iranian management that had adversely affected them; this was according to an international verdict which states that Iran has to export oil at a rate lower than the market price, In due course, Rouhani and his Finance Minister gave up and awarded the new oil agreements to the Revolutionary Guard companies.

The second case in the economic file disputes was followed by inflicting a severe blow, particularly on the Revolutionary Guard. As per Rouhani’s governmental orders, the Millat Bank declined to open accounts or carry out financial transfers in the name of the Khatam Al-Anbiya' Military Base owned by the IRGC, which strictly monitors most of the economic activities for the IRGC, and massively funds the Al-Quds Force outside Iran, as well as other armed forces collaborating with Iran. The bank denied this under the agreement’s articles about combating money-laundering, which Iran signed during Ahmadinejad’s government. Nevertheless, the agreement was not implemented until August 2016. The reason for this postponement was the mounting conflict between the two political movements. On the other side, the Conservatives viewed the agreement as a violation of Iran’s sovereignty on the basis that it had subjected its institutions to foreign orders on Iranian soil. The case was further submitted to the High Council of National Security. In spite of the fact that the case has not been resolved to this day, it is undoubtedly considered one of the victorious moments of Rouhani’s government, as it marks the first time the government has opposed one of the Revolutionary Guard’s procedures.12

»»Ministerial Amendment Hassan Rouhani was put under intense political pressure to force him toward a cabinet reshuffle, whether from the Supreme Leader and his Conservative followers, or the Reformists, who were aspiring to again political advantage from their coalition with Rouhani and from the upcoming presidential elections in May 2017; besides, Rouhani needed the Reformists’ continued support to make sure there was no rival Conservative candidate who might take the votes which Rouhani would receive from these supporting voters.

In October 2016, Rouhani made a limited ministerial amendment after a long period of waiting by various political factions. On October 9th forecasts about the amendment began by spreading the news of the dismissal of the Minister of Culture, Ali Jannati. Over a period of nine days, predictions continued about who was going to be included in the amendment until it was declared officially that it would be Mahmoud Goudarzi, the Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports, and Ali Asghar Fani, the Minister of Education, who continued to deny this news until the last moment. This ministerial amendment indicated that Rouhani was not being decisive about who he was going dismiss. Also, negotiations about who was going to be dismissed were probably not even held.

The ministers who were part of the amendment and the direct reasons behind it suggest that it was a largely a response to direct pressure from Khamenei because the ministers who were dismissed were viewed as Modernists and close to the Reformists, especially the Minister of Culture Ali Jannati, whom the amendment started with. These

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three ministers had the most interaction with the youth sector, which is considered the base of the Reformist movement, and to which supporters give their votes.13 Nothing, however, was said by the Iranian government to explain the reasons behind the dismissals. On the contrary, they were presented as if the ministers had themselves resigned. Moreover, it was understood that each of these ministers had a significant disagreement with the Conservatives.

The most significant crisis concerned Ali Jannati, the Minister of Culture and son of the religious fundamentalist Ahmad Jannati. After a lot of pressure from the religious authorities on the grounds of authorizing a classical concert in Mashhad, where the majority of clergymen, teachers, and Hawza students live; this classical concert was the subject of criticism from the Conservatives because it attracted a large number of young people and because nationalist musical pieces were performed that contributed to a certain extent to substituting the religious perspective in Iranian culture for a nationalist one.

As part of his policy, Rouhani was forcing Jannati into an individual confrontation with the Conservatives with no real support from him, especially after he (Jannati) had been attacked by the legislative authority and Mashhad scholars.

The Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports’ consecutive statements were in fact about criticizing the nuclear agreement, while the government’s criticism was about not submitting the budget assigned to youth and sports infrastructure, which was one of the reasons for his dismissal.14 But we should never forget that the Iran-South Korea football match was held on the 9th Muharram, which was the day of mourning for the murder of Hussein bin Ali (May Allah be Pleased with Him). That was the reason the Conservatives criticized Ali Goudarzi.15 Removing Ali Asghar Fani was an extremely dramatic gesture.

Goudarzi was hounded by endless accusations of corruption and misappropriation of the Teachers Pension Funds. In spite of the fact that the hatred harbored against the minister was against him personally, the Conservatives’ criticism was also directed towards changes in the academic curricula on the basis that it contradicted the ideologies of the Revolution and was regarded as having been a distortion and misuse of the curricula from the time of the Construction and Reconstruction of the Government up to the time of the Reformists during Khatami's era.16 It is believed that the cabinet reshuffle only cemented Rouhani’s authority inside the government, and even if this was not the case, it would have been more appropriate for him to wait out the remaining months of his government. Besides, he did not actually need to rearrange his house from inside, and the ministerial changes were proof of Rouhani’s maneuvering to win a game. We believe that these changes improved the performance of these ministries for that short period. These actions were essentially trying to calm the situation between Rouhani and the Reformists, who were most affected by the ministerial changes. Another reason, which did not consider the point of view of setting right the relationship between Rouhani and the Reformists, had a practical basis which asserted that a calming process was occurring after Khamenei gave Ahmadinejad some public advice about not running in the upcoming mid-year

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presidential elections and the relevantly quiet political situation which Rouhani was experiencing a month later, along with less criticism. There was also the response to a letter sent by the Hawza Association of Muslim Scholars, of which no details were given, except that the Qom scholars indicated they were not happy with the performance of the Minister of Culture Ali Jannati. In addition, there was an announcement about a contract for the largest Iranian oil deal after signing the nuclear agreement which was estimated to be worth three billion dollars for local companies mainly owned by the Revolutionary Guards for developing the South Pars gas field, especially in light of the fact that these same companies had failed to develop earlier phases of the same field. In this case, we can see a fully-fledged political deal between Rouhani and Khamenei, which includes the following articles: Removing Rouhani’s Conservative electoral opponents, mainly Ahmadinejad, who had expressed his determination to run for the upcoming second presidency, in return for Rouhani getting rid of the semi-reformist nature of the government by dismissing the three above-mentioned ministers. This would ensure no future requests to increase freedom and rights, which would please the Qom scholars.17 If this is confirmed to be true, then we are looking at a long-term political deal that guarantees a second presidential term for Rouhani, who will have to curb the Reformists and give the Revolutionary Guard the rights to attain new oil agreements, whereby it would strengthen its grip on the IRGC and increase its military and economic role beyond Iran’s borders.

»» The New Ministers Rouhani appointed and introduced the names of his new ministers in order to win Parliament’s confidence. These ministers were Reza Salehi, Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance; Fakher Al-Deen Ahmadi Eshtiani, Minister of Education; and Masoud Soltanifar, Minister of Youth and Sports.

Rouhani also nominated Ameri Wadansha Shishtani and Soltanifar for different ministerial positions after winning the presidential elections in 2013, except that they did not enjoy Parliament’s confidence at that time. However, winning the vote of confidence this time happened after Rouhani had stated, on his entry to the Parliamentary Hall during the session where the votes were officially declared, that the ministers’ names were appointed after consultation with Khamenei.

The supervising officer of the Al-Shura Council, Ali Yousef Nejad, reassured that the council had initiated intensive consultations about the three ministers proposed by Rouhani. He also confirmed that the MP’s worked independently and that he had checked their experience and expertise;18 the fact that this was referred to earlier shows that a mutual political deal had been struck between Rouhani and Khamenei.

»»The Next Presidential Elections Over the six-month period covered by this report, the subject of Rouhani’s standing for a second presidential term was the subject of much debate in Iran. As well as being unable to win widespread popularity among the Iranian public, Rouhani has also come under heavy political criticism from Conservatives, with his independent streak in running

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his government his own way and his genuine desire to control the State’s political and economic course placing him in conflict with the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Moreover, the coalition which he formed, which helped him succeed in the previous elections, has not been as harmonious as it once was, since the primary point unifying its members was the aim of breaking the political deadlock which Iran suffered from during Ahmadinejad’s term in office. With Ahmadinejad gone, however, the discordance between the different factions came to the fore.

Rouhani’s political performance, away from the success of the nuclear agreement and Iranian diplomacy, was somewhat unsuccessful during the second half of 2016, with the President committing a number of political blunders in July, which harmed and adversely affected his popularity. During a visit to Kermanshah in western Iran, he ignited public anger with a speech about the problem of unemployment, with members of the audience jeering him and disrupting his speech by yelling slogans and shouting abuse.

Rouhani’s efforts to silence these outbursts came in for heavy criticism, both from the public and from the previously supportive reformist media in Iran, which condemned his failure to listen to the electorate. A similar incident took place during an international conference for mayors and city councilors in Tehran, when Rouhani said in his speech that he does not blame the senior city officials for their attempts to develop financial resources for their own cities, even while Tehran’s residents are up in arms about the local municipality selling off the city’s parks and green spaces to developers. The Reformists slammed this speech, saying that Rouhani is not in step with the times and that Iran should leave his era behind.

While it is true that a number of Reformists changed their mind about this statement the next day, with some, led by Mohammed Reza Aref, declaring Rouhani to be the only option for the Reformists in the upcoming elections, disagreements remain within Reformist circles over the alliance between Rouhani and the country’s Reformist bloc, particularly following revelations that Rouhani remained popular amongst only 24 percent of his supporters.

With Rouhani’s popularity declining, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made an effort to return to the political spotlight, delivering campaign speeches in several Iranian towns, which were well received, most particularly in Malayer, where he received a rapturous welcome. While Ahmadinejad’s reemergence threw the Reformists into chaos, initially leading them to embrace Rouhani as their candidate, they subsequently decided to nominate another candidate of their own choice.

In light of this shower of criticism to Rouhani’s government and the policy of tug-of-war between different political currents in Iran, Iranian newspapers started speculating about a number of different possible scenarios for Rouhani and making predictions about his political future. One of these scenarios is verifiable:

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1. Spontaneous withdrawal: Rouhani may be forced to make this choice, especially after the attack on his brother, Hussein Fereydon, whose name was listed in a case involving embezzlement from the Mallet Bank.

2. Narrowing down the supervisory bodies for political liquidation: This would mean ruling out Rouhani’s run for election by the Shura Maintenance Council. This scenario, in spite of the expense and political changes required, copies previous models, which makes it possible, if improbable.

3. Weakening Rouhani's government through supporting a new contender: This would mean allowing Rouhani to stand for election before defeating him at the ballot box.

4. Accepting Rouhani’s run for a second presidential period. This remains a choice, in spite of its being unfavorable for all political parties. However, it remains a choice with some positive features in comparison to the other options, especially since it attracts a large number from all political factions within the regime, including those who believe that Rouhani cannot be replaced in the next upcoming presidential period.

The first two choices are highly improbable, with Rouhani showing no indications of any intention to withdraw from the political race, while there is no justification or excuse for the Shura Maintenance Council to exclude him. The possibility of the third option has been greatly reduced after the scandal over Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and declarations by some of the leading Conservative figures that they would not accept the nomination of Ahmadinejad. The last option to remain on the table is the acceptance of Rouhani to run for a second presidential period.

According to Reformist theorist, Saeed Hajaryan, “Because Rouhani knows quite well that the Reformists have no choice except to support him in the next presidential election, Rouhani's attention was lately drawn towards the Conservatives to try and get close to them to win their votes.”19 Because of this, Rouhani seemed to be closer to winning a second presidential term in May’s election, with his team apparently more solid and stronger than before and able to regain its popularity.

Rouhani did not surrender to failure following his earlier public meetings in July.

Instead, he amended his speech and went next to the town of Qazvin near Tehran, which enjoys a relatively high economic status, avoiding the heart of the Iranian countryside, where supporters are mainly Conservatives and where he has proven less popular. During his speech in Qazvin, Rouhani criticized the misconceptions among Ahmadinejad’s supporters about the system of economic management, which he followed during his presidential term, saying that between 2005 and 2013 Iran was run at massive expense, which encouraged corruption and poverty. This mismanagement he said created a huge crisis, which the current government was still recovering from. He further added that at that time under Ahmadinejad’s rule, while Iran was trying to earn very high oil revenue, the government was internally and externally borrowing heavily and issuing budget permission in order to balance the general budget. Despite these points, however, the newspapers criticized Rouhani for not implementing his electoral promises of meeting regularly with Iranian economists, demanding that he listen to their opinions in a friendly meeting and inviting him to strengthen his relationship with the economic experts and

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recruit them to explain the worsening economic situation of Ahmadinejad’s rule and to express their opinions about the economic future of the country.20 Despite all of this, however, the Reformists have still been unable to consider breaking up the coalition with Rouhani as the 2017 election approaches, being unable to fight it individually or with a new coalition. Unhappy at this lack of options, they have already begun discussing their political future in the 2021 elections. One of the prominent members of the ‘Participation Front’ and the ‘Union of Islamic People Party,’ Hossein Kashefi, said that nobody expected the Reformists to choose a non-Reformist in the 2013 elections (a reference to Rouhani himself), adding, “It was normal to support Mohammad Reza Aref, but on balance we chose the country’s interest in that period over any other interest and we voted for Hassan Rouhani.” Khashefi has called for working to choose a candidate who more closely represents the interests of the Reformist bloc in the 2021 elections.21 It seems that this choice by the Reformists to nominate presidential candidates who do not belong to the same political bloc has provoked some of its other members too, with a number of the parties already making moves towards nominating someone with a Reformist identity in the 2021 elections.

Despite the political blocs’ belief in the inevitability of Rouhani’s running for a second presidential term in the upcoming elections, some voices demanded that he give up his candidacy. A fundamentalist MP from the previous parliament, Javad Karimi Ghodoosi, asserted that Rouhani was not running for the 2017 elections for the purpose of rescuing the country and finding a solution to the dead-end state it had reached, adding that Rouhani's coming to power had not been good for his personal interests or for those of the country.22 Nevertheless, these personal opinions of some Reformists who are not quite happy with Rouhani's performance do not represent the wider public opinion, either among the elite or among the supporters of the Reformist bloc in the public.

Even the majority of Conservatives are convinced that Rouhani should run for a second presidential term, even if they are somewhat dissatisfied with him.

Khamenei used Rouhani's pending reelection for a second term as leverage in political debates over the past six months, although he was not a part of the ongoing political debate. However, Khamenei’s advice to Ahmadinejad not to run for re-election effectively shut the political door in Ahmadinejad’s face and greatly changed the course of domestic politics in Iran. Many changed their opinions of the candidates aspiring to stand as rivals in the presidential race following Khamenei’s announcement, especially when he stated that a number of politicians are uninterested in running for election, such as the Head of the Parliament, Ali Larejani; the Secretary General of the Expediency Council, Mohsen Rezai; the Secretary General of the Islamic Union of Engineers, Mohammed-Reza Bahonar; and Khamenei's representative in the ‘Ettelaat Foundation,’ Mahmoud Da'aye, who swore by “the spirit of the Imam” that he had no intention of standing for election.

As for the current Foreign Minister, Mohammed Javad Zarif, he rejected claims that he intended to announce his candidacy for the elections, making it very clear that he had no intention of doing so. Another rumored presidential candidate, the commander of the Al-Quds Force, General Qassem Suleimani, also rejected any suggestions that he would

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stand for office, saying he is a soldier in the Jurist Leadership and the Islamic regime and will remain one for the rest of his life, adding that has no interest in the political arena.23 After Trump’s victory in the American presidential elections, there was fresh discussion in Iranian political circles of the possibility of more Conservative candidates, such as Saeed Jalili, running for the 2017 presidential elections in order to ensure the failing of the nuclear agreement and to assert that Rouhani is unfit to deal with the new American President in the light of the latter’s taking a hardline stance against Iran.

»»The Institution of the Presidency and the Legislative Authority The Islamic Shura Council undertakes the duties of the legislative authority in the Iranian Islamic Regime; although the 12-member Shura Council is elected, its power is not absolute, with the approval of the Guardian Council of Constitution required to approve laws issued by the Shura Council. Six of the Council’s members are appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, while other Shura Council members nominate the other six, although these members also require the approval of the Supreme Leader before they can take office. In cases when the Guardian Council of Constitution rejects one of the laws issued by the Shura Council, the legislation is returned to the legislative authority to amend it. In case the Guardian Council of Constitution does not agree to it during a second reading, it is referred to the Expediency Council to adjudicate between the two councils.

February 2016 saw Iranian parliamentary elections, with the Conservatives, the Moderate Alliance, and the Reformists claiming to have won; these claims stemmed from a lack of clarity in the political affiliations of a large number of the winning MPs, especially those entering the election under the name the ‘Omed Coalition’ (Al-Amal). Despite the competing claims, however, the Conservatives’ losses were obvious. Most of the new MPs’ political affiliation began with the election of the Head of the Parliament, which saw a confrontation between the Reformist Mohammad Aref and the moderate Conservative and Rouhani ally Ali Larijani. The parliamentary election results indicated that the Reformist candidates won 133 seats against 125 Conservatives. When electing the Head of the Parliament, Aref received only 102 votes. This showed that a number of the MPs who stood as Reformists were not loyal to their political bloc, as well as a tendency amongst independent MPs to side with the Conservatives. Many of the Reformists saw a need for Rouhani’s return favors to Mohammad Aref, who withdrew from the elections in 2013. Rouhani, from his part, did not take a supporting stand in the election of Aref as Head of Parliament. In spite of not having a supporting Parliament with the majority of voters, Rouhani got rid of the MPs who opposed the nuclear agreement. 60% of the MPs became new members of the Parliament.

During the six-month period of preparing this report, the Iranian Parliament witnessed two events as equally important as the election of the Head of Parliament, Ali Larejani.

One was the formation of a conglomerate of representatives of the Turkish-majority areas in the Iranian Parliament, which made a lot of noise inside and outside Iran. The supporters of this action saw that it would contribute largely to defending Turkish rights and recognizing them as a basic constituent of the Iranian population. Those who were against this saw that it might increase racial bigotry and divide national unity.

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170 university professors and Iranian historians expressed their rejection of the deputies’ coalition of Turkish areas, and they sent a letter to the Head of Parliament in order to stop dividing Parliament into national parties.

This coalition included 100 persons forming most of the Turkish members of the Parliament. Masoud Baztchak Bour was chosen as head of the coalition and Zahra' Saye as an official speaker.

In spite of the extreme rejections and warnings against forming this coalition, Rouhani’s government supported the idea. The spokesman, Mohammed Baqer Sadeq Larijani: head of the judicial system Nobakhat, confirmed the government’s stand that is supportive of forming national coalitions and questioned: “What is the wrong with forming coalitions in the Iranian Parliament for all minorities: Azeris, Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs and others?”

Some linked Rouhani’s government’s support of the formation of a coalition inside Parliament with his need to win votes from the ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Al-Ahwaz, and the rest of the marginalized border areas.

It is likely that forming a coalition for the minority in Parliament is linked to the upcoming presidential elections because in the 2013 elections Rouhani got most of the votes from the minority-populated areas. It is thought that the government supported this step to win the Turks’ support and win their votes for the next elections.24 The second event was the breakup of Kazem Jalali from the 'Velayat Movement' and forming a third coalition inside Parliament, which included 40 MPs. With this, those 40 MPs were deducted from Rouhani’s coalition. Jalali stated that the number of members in the Parliamentary bloc would reach 80 within days.

With these changes taking place in Rouhani’s relationship with the political blocs in Parliament, many MPs demanded that Rouhani deal firmly with his brother and personal assistant Hussein Fereydon and stop him from entering the Presidential Institution, referring to the fact that Freydon’s name was often mentioned in many media sources. These sources talked about his influential role in appointing managers and bank presidents, in addition to his illegal activities. In a letter sent to Rouhani, it was mentioned that reliable media sources referred to Rouhani’s personal assistant cancelling the travel plans of the Assistant President of Women’s and Children’s Affairs, Shahyndecht Mulorda, in order to achieve his personal objectives, as well as disposing of lands in Kish with the help of managers from the Presidency Institution in return for money. In response, Hussein Fereydon stated that these accusations were unfounded and anything being circulated by the media was aimed to take on Rouhani and those around him for political objectives and gains.

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»»The Presidential Institution and its Role in the Conflict between the Legislative and Judicial Authorities In the absence of a clear division between the three executive, legislative, and judicial authorities in Iran, every now and then clashes occur. As the Expediency Council was founded to separate the legislative authority represented by the Shura Council and the Constitution Maintenance Council, which was formed by MPs and lawyers from the judicial authority and chosen by Khamenei, the judicial authority has clashed with Parliament in the past six months over two consecutive incidents: 1- Banning the Reformist MP Ali Motaheri from giving a speech in Mashhad The decision of the Deputy General of the City of Mashhad to ban MP Ali Motaheri from giving a speech caused a huge political disagreement that is still going on today. Police forces broke into the headquarters of the religious ceremonies, which Motaheri was visiting, and separated the attendees at that occasion.

The ban came days after Motaheri criticized the undermining of Rouhani’s authority and the decision-making centers in the country in light of the huge amount of power wielded

by Supreme Leader Khamenei.

This decision did not pass peacefully. Iranian sources reported clashes taking place between the police and the public who were refusing to leave the place.

Motahari described the break-in as an ‘ISIS attitude’ and called for President Rouhani to implement the necessary procedures to save the province from the tyrannical behavior practiced by some officials in response to the decision not to allow an orchestral concert in Mashhad which had been arranged by the judicial authority, whereby the dismissed Minister of Culture had succumbed to Ali Jannati. He also demanded clarification as to whether the official in Mashhad was the Governor or the Deputy General, or the Imam at Friday prayers. He added, “Did the Deputy General think about the consequences of violating the laws and the negative effects on young people who came from remote places in order to participate?”25 One of the most prominent critics of the judicial authority during this incident was President Rouhani, who warned against reducing the country to two fighting factions over who had authority, just because some officials were not allowed to give their speeches. He also warned about the rise of extremism in Iranian society and wondered, in a letter to the Minister of the Interior and Justice, that if some officials were enjoying having powers in highly sensitive locations in Mashhad, “whether they think that in silencing voices, shutting halls, and preventing speeches, they can participate in achieving progress for the country?”

Rouhani demanded the President of the judicial authority to confirm the duties of the police and security forces in securing ceremonies which are held legally and to guarantee the freedom of expression in the country. He considered their behavior shameful and demanded the Minister of the Interior to open a comprehensive investigation to disclose information about what happened during that incident.26 In his turn, the Minister of the Interior Abdolriza Rahmani Fazli issued a decree to form

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an investigation committee to examine the reasons behind the cancellation of the speech by the Vice President of the Shura Council Ali Motaheri, and to submit a report about the incident. Rahmani said that if there was a case of negligence or violation by the executive officials, they would be dealt with severely. He also said that the report would be sent to relevant parts since the necessary procedures were issued by the government and the Ministry of the Interior.

Fazli gave assurance that Motaheri’s program in Mashhad had obtained all the official and legal documents from the correct sources.27 The Mayer of Khorasan described the ban of the Deputy General by Ali Motaheri as “inappropriate and ugly.” He gave Ali Motahari : Iranian politician details about the case and assured that when the Deputy General Office had reported to him about banning Ali Motaheri’s speech, it was on the orders of Revolutionary Guard Intelligence.28 In spite of these justifications, the Head of Parliament Ali Larejani confirmed that the Deputy General in Mashhad had issued the ban based on the orders of Revolutionary Guard Intelligence. These statements were considered to be solid evidence by the public of the involvement of the Revolutionary Guard in the ban decision.

It was notable that the family relationship between the President of the judicial authority Sadiq Larijani and his brother the Parliamentary President Ali Larejani did not prevent them from clashing this month when many clashes occurred between the two authorities.

The second of these clashes was between the legislative and judicial authorities, which started with an attack by Reformist MP Mahmoud Sadiqi on the Conservative President of the judicial authority Sadiq Larijani. It occurred when Sadiqi asked the Finance Minister a question about millions of dollars having been deposited in Sadiq Larijani’s bank account and his demand to show all of his bank accounts to an official representing one of the core members of the Conservative movement and one of the most prominent religious leaders in Iran.

In spite of reassurances from judicial authority officials to the Parliamentary President Ali Larijani that they would not legally persecute Mahmoud Sadiqi, the police issued a legal warrant for his arrest on his return home. Sadiqi gave his assurance that he did not recognize the warrant because he believed it to be illegal.

This incident had two following separate results and caused much discussion in the political arena and the media:

• Secret Iranian Bank Accounts.

• MP’s Parliamentary Immunity.

Sadiqi's obtaining the bank account details of Larijani and knowing his bank balance brought into question the law of the confidentiality of bank accounts in Iran. Is it

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necessary to exclude officials from these laws in the future to avoid any financial corruption, which is endemic in Iran? The second issue is how an MP could be arrested when enjoying parliamentary immunity.

After the arrest warrant and the accompanying events, Sadiqi refused to comply with police orders.

A number of police officials gathered in front of his house. The news spread to social media networks and large numbers of people rushed to his house. After Rouhani’s and the Head of the Parliament Ali Larejani's intervention, and after some intensive phone calls, the police withdrew from Sadiqi's house.29

Ali Larijani: chairman of the Parliament of Iran

2- The Presidency and the Intervention in the Conflict between the Legislative and Judicial Authorities

The President of the judicial authority did not wait for the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to form an alliance with those who followed the executive authority and Parliament before attacking. They immediately launched an attack on Rouhani and his government, as they believed in the nature of the coalition between the Parliament and the executive authority.

The Conservative movement was found to be present in a number of cases presented to the Presidential Institution and the media were given an opportunity to demonstrate the contradictions in Rouhani’s stand. They demanded that the same procedures be followed that were put in place against the Reformist newspapers; namely, banning newspapers such as the Qanoun Newspaper, banning journalists from working, or even imprisonment in some cases.

In his 2013 campaign, Rouhani made promises to defend freedom of expression and to support the freedom of the press, although government institutions have so far lodged more than 102 complaints against 12 media organizations. It appears that Rouhani’s promises to give more freedom to the media and press were only electoral promises.30 The level of enmity between the media and the Presidency became extreme, especially when Rouhani's Assistant for Legal Affairs announced that “some of the media in Iran are imitating 'Mujahedin Khalq' at the beginning of the Revolution,” while others were imitating an anti-Revolution. He accused them of instigating a state of despair in society.

In spite of this position against the media in Iran, Rouhani recently called for the media to enjoy more freedom of expression during the inauguration of the 22nd publication exhibition in Tehran. He stressed the importance of its security and called for the establishment of a Journalists Union. Rouhani also said that broken pens and silenced voices could not do anything; therefore, he gave his assurance that breaking pens and silencing voices would not be allowed.

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The absence of equality in Iran and the legal dealings with the Iranian media reflected the need for a general media and press law to regulate legislative dealings with criminal press publications, as double standards had been noticed in legal dealings with the press and media according to press affiliations and the persons being criticized; this is why there are those whose blood is easily shed by the press and those who are protected according to strict laws. This is in addition to illegal dealings by the Iranian State.

Rouhani’s statements and invitation to give the media more freedom angered the President of the legislative authority Sadiq Larijani, who harshly criticized the former. He described his statements as contradictory and considered them a form of defamation of and insult to the authority itself. He questioned Rouhani’s motives when demanding the Supreme Leader Khamenei to stand up to the media. However, he changed his position when he met media reporters and press journalists. Rouhani defended them and offered them protection.31 Iranian analysts see in Rouhani’s statements an indication that he wanted to win the press and media over to his side when the election is close, as he did in his previous presidential campaign.

The legislative authority’s criticism of Rouhani and his government was not limited to the subject of freedom of the press; it also criticized the government because it had not yet submitted a report to the legislative authority regarding “astronomical salaries.”32 In the aftermath of the leak of the “astronomical salaries” story, many Government managers resigned. One of them was the Director of the General Organization of Insurance in Iran, while others were fired by the President. The Finance Minister Ali Tayyip Nia announced that Rouhani had ordered a change of managers at the following banks: ‘Millet,’ ‘Saderat,’ ‘Al-Rafah,’ ‘Qard Hassan,’ and ‘Mahr Iran.’

After this discussion of the judicial authority crisis and the intervention by the Government, we can conclude that the judicial authority represents a stronghold in the Conservative movement and that the Iranian judicial body is involved in the political arena, which is not supposed to be the case for any judicial system. The political practices implemented by the President of the judicial authority or the prosecutors in Iranian provinces seem to be a normal pattern to the extent that the Iranian political environment does not criticize them.

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The Military Institution Introduction The Iranian military institution consists of three main divisions: The Regular Army, the Revolutionary Guard, and the People's Defense Forces, which are known as the ‘Basij’ with 545,000 members in its base. The General Leader of these forces is the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The Iranian army consists of the Joint Chief of Staff and four main forces: Ground Troops, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Seal of the Prophet Air Force Defense Headquarters.

The Revolutionary Guard was formed after the victory of the 1979 Revolution according to a decree from Khomeini that would create one body to join all the military forces. It was established at the time of the Revolution as support for the regime and to create a balance with the traditional army, which took a neutral position during the Revolution.

Estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London indicate that the Revolutionary Guard consists of 350,000 members, and it has its own special air, naval, and ground forces. They are not considered part of the military forces that the Iranian Jurist Leadership had. They are perceived as the main force and loyal guard of the Supreme Leader and the Iranian regime. However, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Washington estimates their numbers as not exceeding 120,000.

The Revolutionary Guard has four main branches: Ground forces, a navy, an air force, and air defenses. In addition, there is the Quds Legion, which has links with the Basij, which was founded in 1980 and consists of civil volunteers who are supported by the Revolutionary Guard. Its main objective is to enforce security inside Iran.

Many years later, other duties were assigned such as the suppression of protests and supporting Iran’s allies during wars.

The secretive nature of these forces and their presence in schools, universities, and governmental and private institutions makes it hard to calculate the exact numbers affiliated with it, although some reports claim that it consists of 2500 regiments, each with 300 members.

The Al-Quds Legion was founded during the Iraq-Iran war. It represents the intelligence unit of the Revolutionary Guard and is in charge of any military action outside the country, in addition to offering military intelligence support for pro-Iran countries and militias.

»»The Budgets of Revolutionary Guard and the Army The Revolutionary Guard forms a powerful internal body in Iran because of its loyalty to the Supreme Leader and not to the Iranian Government. One of its duties, as stipulated by the Constitution, is to protect the regime from any internal

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or external enemies. Since Mohammed Khatami’s presidency from 1997 to 2005, interventions by the Revolutionary Guard have increased in internal affairs and a number of threats have been made to exclude Khatami.

The Revolutionary Guard is not only a military institution that practices its political role, and is active inside and outside Iran, it has become an economic giant which controls a number of huge institutions and has complete economic power over many economic sectors. One of the disputes typical of the relationship between President Rouhani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is Rouhani’s attempts to limit the power of the Revolutionary Guard by cutting its budget.

In July 2016 Rouhani’s Government proposed amending the budget allocated for the Iranian military forces (the Army and Revolutionary Guard), namely cutting the Guard’s budget and increasing that of the Army. This suggestion was criticized by Mojtaba Zolnur, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in Parliament, justifying it by the different threats surrounding Iran, especially the threats coming from American officials, as well as cases of terrorism and terrorist groups, both issues that require not reducing the budget.

The defense budget submitted to Parliament by Rouhani in January 2016 included a re-distribution of the budget between the Army and the Guard, not only a reduction of the total amount. The Iranian defense budget typically increases every year at a rate of 2%-5%, but Rouhani’s 2016 budget suggested an increase in the Army’s budget of 15%, or 1.5-1,75 billion US dollars. He suggested decreasing the Revolutionary Guard’s budget by 16%, or 4.1 billion US dollars, as well as increasing the budgets of the Basij troops and the General Staff of the Armed Forces by around 400 million US dollars each.

Rouhani failed to pass this proposition through Parliament, as a result of either the political compromises taking place during 2016 or the threats he had received. He changed course, and in spite of his call to reduce the Revolutionary Guard’s budget in the 2016 General Budget, Rouhani granted them a phenomenal budget in the budget list for 2017, with a huge increase of 53% in comparison to the previous year, which amounted to 6.9 billion US dollars.33 This list is currently under review by the Iranian Parliament. Economic analysts have described it as having a military and security pattern. According to the list, the General Budget for next year is 371 thousand billion Tomans (99.7 billion US dollars) with a 39% increase in defense spending, which will be distributed as follows: The Ministry of Defense and its different institutions, such as the Social Security of the Armed Forces, the Information Security Organization, Research and Defense Studies, the Organization of Ideological and Political Affairs, the Malek Ashter Industrial and Defense University, and the Organization of Geographical Affairs, all received 2,299,909 billion tomans (5,075 billion US dollars).

The Revolutionary Guard’s forces and its institutions such as the Khamenei Representative Office in IRGC and Basij, the Information Security Organization, the Emam

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Al-Hussein University, and the National Guard University altogether received 240,545 billion Tomans (6.9 billion US dollars).34

»»Signs of Increasing the Guard’s Budget in 2017 There were a number of factors involved in changing Rouhani’s position of reducing the Revolutionary Guard’s budget, the most prominent of which are the following: Reducing allocations to the Revolutionary Guard in the 2016 budget, which was rejected and met with great condemnation by the National Security and Foreign Politics Committee, because most of its members are Revolutionary Guard Generals. This committee saw and still, sees, that Iran is exposed to many different threats, especially the crises happening throughout the region, as well as incidents of terrorism and terrorist groups.

The Revolutionary Guard represents Iran abroad, and it enforces the regime’s policies of expansion in the region, something that demands more financial support.

A couple of months separates Rouhani from the presidential elections; therefore, he would prefer to postpone his disagreements with the Revolutionary Guard and avoid any conflict with them in the meantime.

»»War Production During the mid-1990s, Iran showed great interest in building up its war industry. Some reports indicate that Iran has so far exported its domestic made weapons to more than 57 countries. Most of these countries are in conflict zones and wars in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. In addition, Iran exports different types of weapons to organizations and armed groups in the Ivory Coast, the Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Southern Soudan, and Uganda. Furthermore, affiliated movements in the region such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Shiite Muslims in Iraq.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Iran exported weapons to a number of countries with an estimated value of no more than 200 million US dollars 2010-2014.35 Over the last few decades, Iran has sought to rebuild its exhausted military system. It has also shown an ongoing interest in increasing its rocket power to include different missiles and involves any potentially useful country for that objective.

Observers of military manufacturing in Iran see that most of the war industry there reproduces Russian and Chinese weapons, or that the military technology of those two countries has to a certain extent an influence on the technical formation of the manufacture of weapons in the hands of Iranian experts.

Iranian Motives in the Increase of War Production Iran’s motives to develop its local war production can be summed up as the following:

1. The prohibition of exporting the imposed weaponry on Iran to different degrees since the 1980s outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian War, which formed a strong motive for Iran to develop its local abilities in maintaining and manufacturing weaponry.

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2. The comparatively old weaponry of aircraft and tanks, which Iran has in comparison to other armies in the region, especially the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Israel.

3. Iranian armaments strategy depends on the manufacturing local missiles in large quantities, even if most of which had limited destructive power or low shooting accuracy.

This is a strategy, which Iran gained during the Iraqi War by deeply hitting the enemy’s territories without causing human losses.

4. Fear of foreign forces’ pursuit of reaching the heart of Iranian regime poses a strong motive to develop militarization programs.36 5. Regional competition and creating a state of balance among nuclear powers such as Pakistan and India, besides, Turkey and Russia’s influence over the Central Asian States.37 6. Convincing the Iranian inside of the fundamental role that is carried out by the RG and the Military Institution generally in combating foreign dangers.

7. During the past six months, Iran declared the manufacturing and developing large number of weapons in order to supply different military units (navy, ground, and air) with the newest and most developed weapons.

8. In the following, we present a part of Iran’s recently announced military manufacturers of the past period, according to the military units, their specialties and uses: 9. The Navy’s Militarization Programs In the city of Bushehr, the ground forces affiliated with the IRGC launched, Natheri Frigate, which is considered the first frigate made of aluminum; 55 meters long, 14 meters and 10 meters long, and 13 meters height. The completion of this project took 14 months. It also has the feature of sailing in rough seas and helicopters taking off and landing easily on it.38 It also enjoys many sophisticated capabilities, mainly sailing amid severe weather conditions, and sailing 10 thousand kilometers without the need of fuel and its ability to carry 100 persons.

But the attached photo during the inauguration ceremony showed that it carries one civil helicopter, and nothing was noticed about its military capabilities.

Iran states this frigate is provided with the most recent equipment and devices and was designed according to the most modern international standards with Iranian expertise without the help of any foreign experts.

Recently Chief Commander of the Iranian Navy of the IRGC, the Commander, Ali Fadwi, stated that a new generation of Natheri frigates is being manufactured and that these will join the navy without announcing the dates. He said that these will form a turning point in the power of the navy of the IRGC. 39 As for the Iranian army affiliated, the Marines, they also presented their latest achievements in the war production. Research and Jihadist Institution, one of the sectors affiliated with the forces, recently presented their latest achievements which include the automated testing for floats prototype project, and ‘Thamen project’ for controlling

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system of exterior and air flames for battleships carrying rocket launchers, and the military ‘Radar LPI project’.

Also during the ceremonies, Radar ‘Dira’ Al-Bahar’ (Shield of the Sea) was launched by the instructions of the Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces. This functions by a system that locates moving objects and is provided by different systems against the electronic war through which it can monitor Iranian and Foreign fighters. They also revealed the… for testing the ability to survive in sea storms, as well as controlling maritime ships crash project, the electromagnetic civil defense radar project in the ships, and detecting enemy radar system.40 In the same ceremonies, the curtain was removed from 'Mirsad' project for machine stabilization which is about torpedo equipment model 46,41 that was announced by the Iranian official channels and issued neutral reports discussing what Iran announced about its military achievements.

As for the North fleet that is owned by the navy in the Iranian army, it was announced the joining of a bombing barge 'Subr' in the south waters and Oman sea, in addition to the joining of destroyer 'Sahand' to the forces.42

»»Drones Development Program Iran moved the curtain from a number of aircraft, such as jamming aircraft, which was displayed in a project for the latest ground forces equipment.

In addition to this aircraft, other aircraft were displayed which were designed for image detecting, and other provided with laser destructive equipment that can jam on image operations which other crafts take.43 As for the air forces, it displayed what was said to be the latest aircraft operating under the name 'Saeqa', which is a drone combat aircraft from the 'Simorgh' model.

Iranian Simorgh aircraft are considered the Iranian model of the American 'RQ170' aircraft, which Iran was able to take over after taking it down in 2011 after entering the country.

Iran says that it designed a model through using the reverse engineering technology to carry four smart missiles. It also announced that this strategic aircraft would be continued to be designed as Iran needs this type of aircraft.44 In the same context, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, during his visit to the production line and the drone aircraft exhibition affiliated with the IRGC, said that this kind of aircraft goes within the scope of rocket capacity, a very important sector among Iran's deterrence

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power. Therefore, Iran will not recognize any borders or limitations in order to develop this kind of aircraft, which participates in developing Iran's defense capabilities.45 From another side, the marine moved the curtain on the first drone aircraft that can operate suicidal operations. It was stated in the proclamation of the IRGC that this aircraft is capable of flying for 4 continuous hours, with 1000 scope. Among its features is that it can fly at different heights that vary between half a meter above sea level to 3000 feet.

The speed of the new drone aircraft is around 200 kilometers/hour and it can land on water.46 Moreover, it has been announced the launch of the first drone aircraft under the name 'Saher' which is designed by Iranian students.

According to the disseminated information about this drone aircraft, it can reach a field range of 1900 kilometers and its highest speed reaches 180 k/hour and it can fly for 10 continuous hours. Its duties include photographic imaging, monitoring traffic and executing military operations.47 Within the past few months, Iran announced the launching of a group of radar systems that were locally manufactured. The most important of which is the launching of radar projects and air navigation devices in Shiraz city. These models include two radar systems: 'Miraj 4' and 'Matla' Al-Fajr 3', and 'DME' system, as well as radar sensor system from the navigation family system.

'Miraj 4' is characterized by its controlling ability, launching initial warnings, long-range air surveillance, monitoring ground sites, and third detection. 'Matla Al-Fajr 3' is another system that was revealed. Air forces say that it is characterized by it high ability to detect, discover and identify targets ranging from 500 km. As for 'DME', it is one of the systems that aid the wireless navigation systems, which use civil airports and are manufactured for communication between the ground station and the control room in the aircraft.48

»»Rockets Program On another level, Iran also revealed information about a number of rockets; the most prominent is 'Zulfiqar' rocket which represents the latest of the locally manufactured rockets which reach a range of 750 kilometers; that was revealed in the military performance of the Iranian air forces in Bandar Abbas city, south-west of Iran, in concurrence with other military performances in Tehran and other cities.

According to 'Tasnim' Iranian agency, 'Zulfiqar' rocket is considered one of the most accurate of the locally manufactured rockets. This has joined the long-range Iranian ballistic missiles because it contains fission igniter warhead that can hit different targets on ground and airport tarmac.49

»»The Reality of Iranian Military Productions In spite of the huge publicity about Iran's military achievements in the last few months, it is hard to trust all the information published about the experiments, industries and war discoveries. A lot of uncertainty and mystery still enclose a lot of these industries. Some reports and information indicate that some of these industries are not even accurate. In the following, we present the most highlighted uncertainties about these achievements:

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1. Iran does not have advanced technologies, which are needed for manufacturing large numbers of weapons it talks about every now and them.

2. Not having sufficient information about the efficiency of most of these industries.

3. The inability of these military industries to compete with advanced weaponry systems which are owned by other countries in the region.

»»Future of Iranian Military Industries A number of reasons will lead Iran to continue spending on armaments and announcing more about its local industries, we mention the following:

1 Backsliding of the security conditions in a number of border areas and the continuing confrontations between the IRGC forces and the security forces against arms smuggling and drugs gangs.

2 Continuing National Liberation Movements in its confrontation with the Iranian security forces.

3 Iran's need to renew its military arsenal with new and advanced weapons.

4 The polarization state which the country witnesses and Iran's growing ambition to play a more effective role in crises which are taking place in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.

5 Refuse to sell advanced weaponry to Iran by weapon manufacturing countries, such as the United States.

6 Iran's interest in reaching the level of arms exporting countries »»Maneuvers and Training Projects It has become clear to the observers of the Iranian internal affair that a very important part of the many military maneuvers conducted by Iran focuses on the psychological and political aspects affecting those of whom Iran considers its adversary, whether inside or outside Iran. For the past six months, different Iranian military forces conducted a number of maneuvers, including the following: In the surrounding airspace area of Esfahan city, south of Iran, the Air Force ran a maneuver called 'Sixth Velayat Sky Commandos' in which different fighters, bombers, heavy and semi-heavy cargo aircraft, communication aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, aerial refueling, and other drone aircraft, participated in. The air forces also conducted ground penetrating radar operations to the hypothetical enemy at this phase.

The F14 and the Meg 29 fighters carried out training operations on air combat in the field combat situation during real war times. On the last day of the maneuvers, 6 'Meg 29' aircraft were able to carry out aerial tracing operations to locate the position of 'Krar', the drone aircraft in order to destroy a target with an air-to-air guided missile.50 It also used the advanced and locally manufactured bomb fighters 'Qased' in destroying specified targets. These fighters were able to destroy specific targets through the launch of 'Naser' missile, and laser directed bomb that weighs 200 pounds.51 The most important results of the locally manufactured bombs, missiles, and weapons… it was officially announced that the testing of these was successful by all means.52

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The second maneuver was the radioactive leakage. This maneuver was conducted by the Iranian army in Khashan Natanz and Aran in the midlands: i,e. areas where the nuclear reactors concentrate in Natanz, Arak, and Vrdo. In this regard, the official spokesperson, Ahmad Jawzi, said that these maneuvers aim at increasing the readiness of the forces to combat any possible attacks and to protect the nuclear reactors and abilities; besides coordinating the efforts between the police, security and the regime forces to ward off any dangers in the nuclear field.53 The Chief Commander of the Headquarters of Radioactive Defense in Kashan, Hamid Reza Ma'manyan, said that these maneuvers were conducted according to the standards of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization and under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the number of participants reached up to1300 persons who were supported by 200 more.54 The third maneuver is the 'Basij' which was conducted by the Mobilization Forces in Rebar, Karman province south-east Iran, with the aim of training on security ambuscades in border areas.55 The fourth maneuver which was called 'to Jerusalem' was also conducted by the Basij forces in 13 Iranian provinces in the participation of 84 regiments. Those who conducted the maneuver focused on doing operations that stop the enemy from entering inside cities, besides preventing the parachuting of soldiers; in addition to training on modern techniques to confront new threats and how to combat attacks done by ISIS.56 The fifth maneuver is the 'Great Maneuver of Rasoul Allah'. This was run by the navy forces in Iranian army in south-east the country. It covered around 200 square kilometers.

The objective of this maneuver, according to the Commander of Nave Forces, the Admiral Haidari, is to evaluate the readiness of the forces and test their ability levels. 23 troops of the ground forces participated and the focus was on armor and artillery weapons, the guerrillas, and fast response forces. The utilization of locally manufactured armors shaped a very important side to the maneuvers program.57 In these maneuvers, some of the new industries were displayed, such as 'Feryad', a new drone aircraft that is manually launched and reaches a range of 20 kilometers and flies for 45 continuous minutes.

The ground forces displayed 'Jamr' a device that is designed to combat hostile drone aircraft. Ground forces say that this device can fight drone aircraft within 3 kilometers and is able to take out any aircraft out of control before taking it down to the ground.58 On the third day of the maneuvers, the ground forces tested the suicide drone aircraft 'Raed 85', besides two other aircraft which carry the names of 'Shahin' and 'Eqab'; the first is used for fighting operations and has surface-to-air missiles. The second one is specialized in spying operations. The ground forces claim that this aircraft can fly up to 24 continuous hours.59

Iranian Navy Activities 1- Iranian patrol boats harassing US ships The marine force that is affiliated with the Iranian IRGC follows harassment policy with

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the American warships and obstructing its route. The forces question the American military activities near Iranian borders. This constant harassment was described by the United States as irresponsible and provocative and threatened to drown these boats in case of other reoccurrences.

In July 2016, five Iranian war vessels affiliated with the IRGC approached one of the US warships that carried one of the prominent Generals in US army who is in a one day visit across the Strait of Hormuz. The vessels are supplied with 'Tao' missiles and drew near the ship of around 560 meters.

The General Commander of the United States Army Central, who is supervising the war against ISIS, General Joseph Votel, addressed the news reporters on the board of the 'American USS New Orleans' saying that: 'the chance of having wrong calculations is big'. He also added that about 10% of the cases are described as unsafe, abnormal or unprofessional.

In August 2016, Iranian patrol boats in the Arab Gulf continued its fixed policy of obstructing the vessels, which cross over the international navigational lines in the Gulf, especially American Vessels.

A US defense official announced that four boats affiliated with the Iranian IRGC obstructed the way of an American destroyer in the Strait of Hormuz area. He said that two Iranian boats drew near almost 300 kilometers from the destroyer 'NETZ' in a very unsafe and unprofessional behavior. He added, 'the high speed and the closeness of the Iranian boats were annoying. This is when the commander of the destroyer changed its path.'

In September 2016, Iran continued its escalation of its navigational activities in the Arab Gulf Region through sending speedy patrol boats and middle-sized vessels constantly, with a wide increase of surveillance operations and obstructing American ships.

American vessels did not respond to these moves.

The most prominent incident of obstructing US ships route is noted through what 7 Iranian vessels did when they obstructed the route of the 'USS Fire-point Destroyer' in the Arab Gulf waters, at the time it was 91 meters away from one of the Iranian boats, which forced it to change its course to avoid any clash.

The Pentagon said that the American boats warned the Iranian side many times over a wireless connection, but to no avail, stating that this is the 31st times which dangerous confrontations as such between American and Iranian boats in the southern Gulf waters occurred.60 The Commander of the US 5th fleet, Bill Orben, stated that the number of the unsafe and unprofessional maneuvers of the Iranian boats in the first half of 2016 doubled from last year. He added that in spite of the limited power of the boats in comparison to the American military ships, their threats in the Arab Gulf were real.61 General of US Central Command in the Middle East and North Africa 'Stenkam' Joseph Votel warned that wrong calculations might cause a navy military combat with Iran in the Arab Gulf. He added that 'Al-Quds Legionary' affiliated with the IRGC did some

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provocative moves against US ships in the past period in the Arab Gulf.62

»»Trump Promises Iranian Navy a Harsh Response

Donald Trump: President of the United States

The newly elected American President Donald Trump’s threats against Iran were not only concerning his rejection of the nuclear agreement, but they also included other files such as his promise of a harsh response to any Iranian ship harassing US naval ships and boats in Arabian Gulf waters. These threats came when Trump, in front of his supporters in Florida during his electoral campaign, said, “when they surround our beautiful destroyers with their small boats and they start making signals which they are not supposed to be doing, they are then trying to control the waters with weaponry power.”

He demanded to re-enforce US military control to emphasize US power and its role as ‘World Leader.’63

In this regard, the American Magazine ‘Foreign Affairs’ sees in Trump’s new government a necessity that would tend toward counterattacking the threat which Iran poses, especially in the naval arena where the US enjoys supremacy. It also demanded red lines be drawn to guarantee any provocations by Iranian were not ignored, and to establish a more comprehensive policy regarding Iran to limit its expanding ambitions.64

»»Iranian Reactions to Trump’s Threats In response to Trump’s threats about the necessity of sinking Iranian boats in the Arabian Gulf if American ships were harassed, the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Mohammed Bagheri underestimated the importance of these threats. He considered that Trump’s impulsive statements during his electoral campaign, his threats to sink Iranian boats, and his inquiry about the condition of American sailors after they had been arrested and their boats took over; all came under the umbrella of Trump’s electoral propaganda.65 The former Commander of the Revolutionary Guard (IRGS) Mohsen Rezai announced that his country had no intention of fueling the conflict that had gone on from the start of the Revolution up to the present day and that his armed forces were considered an essential factor in the stability and security of the Gulf and also, that it would be normal if Iran’s reaction to any kind of attack were significant.

»»Signs of Iranian Harassment against American Warships The Washington Institute for Far East Policies claimed, in a report that was prepared about this issue, that the IRGC was increasing its provocations and harassment against US Marines in the region in coordination with fundamentalists from the Iranian regime.

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These provocations had a local political dimension that was directly addressing Hassan Rouhani’s Government, which was calling for stronger ties with the West.

This report also observed that fundamentalists in Iran need to renew their confrontations with America to justify their enormous budget allocations, which they receive annually for the military, intelligence and security purposes.66 Kalaf Kabshan, Chairperson of Eurasia Group and expert in Iranian Affairs said that in spite of the billions of dollars, which were pumped into Iran after lifting the sanctions, Tehran still sees in the United States a barrier that is stopping European and Asian banks from funding its projects.67 Some observers of Iran’s continued presence in international waters said that it was an attempt to keep away US Marines and distract their attention from Iranian ships carrying weapons and supplies to its allies in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. As a result of the intense surveillance by US marines on shipping, some Iranian ships carrying supplies to the Houthis last October had to return after being intercepted

by American warships; this was the 5th shipment of Iranian weapons to the Houthis which the US had prevented in eighteen months.

2- Iranian Strategy to Expand its Presence in International Waters During the second half of 2016 Iran increased its ships and fleets in international waters under different pretexts, such as protecting its vessels from pirates, developing relationships with other countries, ensuring these countries’ welfare in local, regional, and international waters, and guaranteeing the safety of marine navigation routes in free waters.

This expansion, which is in accordance with Iran’s larger plan of expanding regionally and internationally, is about consolidating Iran’s presence along the coastline of the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. This is the policy of the commander of the Iranian Navy Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, who announced last November that, “Our fleet, soon, will be surrounding Africa and sailing across the Atlantic Ocean.” As part of achieving this goal, Iran paid visits to and carried out joint naval maneuvers in Africa and Asia, for example in South Africa, Tanzania, China, Sri Lanka, and India.

Admiral Habibollah Sayyari also confirmed in his statement that the continued presence of Iranian naval fleets in free waters is part of the country’s policy of developing ties with every other country in the world. He added that sending these fleets to international waters aims to increase trust and cooperation between Iran and these countries. It also limits the policy of fear of Iran, ‘Iran phobia,’ which is a policy that some countries implement, and a fixed idea, which Iranian officials use, that is, “sending peace and friendship message all over the world.”

Sayyari added that his country had so far sent 43 fleets to international waters, which were accompanied by 3,800 trading ships and oil tankers. The 44th fleet visited Tanzania and South Africa.68

»»Iranian Ambitions in Building Naval Bases in Syria and Yemen: The General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Mohammed Baqeri revealed Iran’s latest ambitions when he said that Iran needs naval bases in different regions and that a day

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would come when it would need bases in Yemen and Syria or any other floating naval base. He claimed these bases would be 10 times stronger due to their nuclear capability and they would represent a “deterrent for enemies.”

One day after these declarations, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the naval forces to reinforce their presence in international waters and said he considered their existence clear proof of what he called “Iran’s efficiency” and its power.

Sayyari and Baqeri’s declarations are not the same as the almost daily ones Iranian officials used to make. Instead, they reflect a clear policy, not of a tendency to dominate, which is not new, but of a new means. This was the first time Iranian officials had spoken about naval expansion outside the Arabian Gulf, where Iranian naval movements can be understood as part of Iran’s direct security. The declarations about reinforcing Iran’s naval presence in international waters and about fixed or floating naval bases that exceeded Iran’s security in its regional waters were only to demonstrate Iran’s policy of expansion.69 The significance of these naval bases in Yemen and Syria is represented by Yemen’s proximity to the strategic trading location of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, which is considered one of the most important naval pathways. If Iran establishes a naval base in this country, it will give it unfettered access to the Red Sea. Furthermore, establishing a base in Syria would also contribute to Iran’s policy of expansion to include the Mediterranean Sea, which would make it easier for Iran to support its allies in Lebanon and Syria, as well as giving it the possibility of being near European coastlines.70 Iran’s expansion in regional and international waters irritated the former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who said that the greatest challenge facing the Middle East is the possible dominance of Iran in the region, which he described as “imperialistic and Jihadist.” He also demanded Washington to oppose Iran’s regional expansion and to act like a country.71 Some observers have difficulty visualizing Iranian naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the meantime because establishing them would require that these two countries are indeed capable of making this serious decision, which would allow the Iranian regime to establish military bases there. They say that the regime still has many obstacles and barriers to cross in order to be able to achieve its huge strategic ambitions. They also considered Mohammed Bagheri’s statement about the bases in Yemen and Syria to be nothing more than a propaganda speech that Iranian leaders usually make.72

»»Military Cooperation with Foreign Countries: First: Iranian-Pakistani Cooperation Political, security, and economic interests in Iran and Pakistan merge to an extent that has encouraged the two countries to get over the border tensions caused by opposition groups of the Justice Army, which took over a location in Pakistani territory to carry out its operations against the security forces and the RG. Pakistan’s anger over the IndianIranian agreement regarding the joint operation of the Iranian Chabahar Port has also been assuaged. Islamabad considers that this port might operate at the expense of Gwadar Port. In a meeting that brought together the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz

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Sharief and the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani in September 2016 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Rouhani stated that the two countries’ security was connected, stressing that they need to increase their cooperation in defense areas.

These calls were met by a quick response from Islamabad in October 2016. This is when Iranian naval forces carried out maneuvers with their Pakistani counterparts in Karachi Port, in which 43 Iranian naval squads and 4 fighters took part. These maneuvers focused on rescue operations and marine salvage in Pakistani regional waters.73 With regard to Iran’s participation in these maneuvers, the commander of the Iranian Navy Admiral Habibollah Sayyari said that the 43 squads completed their missions successfully in free waters.74 Second: Iranian-Chinese Cooperation After the Chinese economy had reached an advanced level in the ranks of the Great Powers, China realized the necessity of its military strength-keeping pace with its economic situation. Chinese leaders firmly believed that the military had a pivotal role to play in supporting China’s objectives and national interests.

Due to its interest in modernizing its weapons and army, and in rebuilding what had been destroyed since the Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, and due to the American sanctions, Iran wanted to strengthen its ties with China instead of using Western or American technology.

Iran hoped that Beijing would continue its supply of rocket technology and the necessary equipment to develop ammunition and arms factories, as well as the exchange of expertise in the nuclear field.75 This Iranian-Chinese military cooperation dates back to the 1980s when China offered weapons, ballistic and tactical missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran during its war against Iraq. Beijing helped to rebuild Iranian weapons, which Iran had owned since the Shah. The most advanced Iranian weapons were designed under Chinese supervision.

They also contributed to developing Chinese weapons such as the ‘Noor,’ which was developed from the Chinese ‘Ho 802’ and ‘Al-Naser’ missiles, and which was designed by the Chinese Hongdo Group.76 In recent years, Tehran has sought to strengthen its military relationship with China before signing more armament deals. These attempts were met with Chinese approval, which was made very clear in the declarations by Chinese military officials. The Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan told the commander of the Iranian Navy Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, who visited China in October 2014 that Beijing did indeed want to strengthen its military ties with Iran. On a number of different occasions, the Chinese Defense Minister said Iran was a strategic partner for his country, especially in crucial matters, and he emphasized the necessity of reinforcing and developing military and defensive cooperation between the two countries.

In the negotiations, that Iran held with the Six Major Powers in Vienna, China insisted over and over again on lifting the sanctions imposed on weaponry by the United Nations.

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In spite of the nuclear agreement, they confirmed the ban on Iran obtaining advanced weapons for the time being. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that both Russia and Iran would continue to make weapons deals according to the procedures of the United Nations Security Council.

In light of Iranian fears about a change in American policy toward Iran after Trump had become the new President in the White House, Iran had to increase its military alliances with its traditional allies such as the Chinese.

This Iranian military cooperation with Beijing was in accordance with China’s desire to have some leverage over Donald Trump, who had announced his interest in cooperating with Taiwan in the near future, which was in gross violation of the American-Chinese agreement to commit to China alone.

According to this close cooperation between the two countries, the Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Wan Chuan visited Tehran with a high-level group of military delegates and met his counterpart General Hossein Dehghan. Both sides discussed various bilateral regional and international issues.

Dehghan confirmed that this closer relationship and wide-ranging military defensive cooperation with China was one of Iran’s main diplomatic and defensive priorities. During the meeting, a military defense agreement between the two countries was signed that “reinforces the military defensive cooperation” and the “exchange of expertise in the military field, especially in training and counter-terrorism.”77 At the same time General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammed Baqeri announced the formation of a joint committee between Iran and China to commence work as soon as possible. Baqeris also considered the visit of the Chinese Defense Minister to Iran a huge turning point in the developing cooperation between Tehran and Beijing.78 During his meeting with the Chinese Defense Minister in Tehran, General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Mohammed Baqeri called for the signing and implementation of a memorandum of understanding between the two countries, giving his assurance that the defense relationships are in the best possible shape. He also announced Iran’s readiness to expand its military defenses to include carrying out mutual military maneuvers, referring to his country’s determination and will to improve the military relationship between the two countries to “a strategic level of cooperation.”79

»»Future Signs of the Military Relationship between Iran and China: 1. China occupying second place after Russia in exporting weapons to Iran, and through the agreements signed by Tehran to make public its cooperation with China after many years of secret operations due to the international prohibitions on Iran.

2. Iran hopes through developing its military cooperation with China to engage in new alliances even if this means playing the fight against terror card, which the Chinese Defense Minister referred to in his last visit to Tehran. He said that their cooperation in the fight against terror and other issues in the region were the reasons for his country’s military cooperation with Tehran.

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3. China seeks to achieve its objectives in the region and has shown its aspiration more than once to increase its military cooperation with Iraq and Syria. In this way, it says that there is the possibility of achieving this objective with Iran’s help, which enjoys unique and powerful relationships with these countries.

4. Some observers see in this ‘glasnost’ policy with China that Iran is sending a message to Moscow that Tehran is capable of forging new alliances if Russia breaks its promises and commitments; whereas others see this Iranian-Chinese cooperation as Iran attempting to cooperate with Moscow and Beijing in order to confront Washington and its allies in the region.

5. China’s ‘glasnost’ in Iran is part of China reinforcing its power over Asian countries.

6. Tehran sees in Beijing an international ally to increase its influence in the region.

Third: Iran’s Cooperation with the Sultanate of Oman As part of the international military cooperation between Iran and other countries, Iran intends to carry out joint maneuvers in the Arabian Gulf with the purpose of conducting training procedures in relief and marine salvage, as well as increasing cooperation between Iran and Oman during emergencies.

»»Iran and the Syrian War Until recently, Tehran claimed that it had not sent fighters to Syria, that its participation in the war was limited to sending experts and counselors as consultants to the forces of the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, and that it had not taken part in combat. However, after the deaths of many Iranian soldiers and officers who were sent into the war, Syria has been witnessing for the past six years, Iran admitted the deaths of senior military leaders and mourned them under the slogan “Jihad Duty.” The announcement of the deaths of soldiers and officers in Syria has become almost daily news in the media.

»»More than One Thousand Iranians Dead in Syria The latest statistics about the number of Iranians killed in Syria indicate more than 1000 personnel that Iran sent to fight in the war. This is according to the Head of the Institution of Martyrs and Veterans Mohammed Ali Shahidi Mohlati, although the Iranians confirm the numbers killed from the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and the Iranian army exceed the numbers stated in the media.

This is the second time an Iranian official has confirmed the number of soldiers killed in Syria since the previous list last September, where Shahidi announced that 400 Iranians had been killed; also killed were large numbers of fighters that Iran recruited from Afghanistan and Pakistan to support the Syrian

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Bashar Al-Assad regime. They are called ‘the Defenders of the Shrines of Ahl Al-Bayt’ in Iran in reference to the holy Shiite shrines in Syria.80 A large number of IRGC leaders have been killed in the last few years in battles in Syria including Ahmad Ghulami, Hossein Hamedani, Shafia' Shafi'e, Reza Ferzaneh, Dario Shadersti, Ishmail Haidari, Hadi Kabaf, and Abdallah Iskandari.81 The last of the senior RG leaders killed in Syria was Major General Gholam Reza Smajie. Smajie was killed in combat against the Syrian Opposition in Aleppo. He held the positions of ‘an official of operations in the RG headquarters in the east of Iran’ and ‘Command of the artillery regiment Naser 5th Brigade.’ He was also head of intelligence in an artillery squad and a missile regiment.82 Vast Criticism against the Regime for being involved in the Syrian War As a result of the increase in the numbers of dead in Syria, many Iranians launched a huge storm of criticism reflecting their anger about the role of the government and the IRGC in Syria. This wave of criticism included sarcasm about the phrases, which Iranian officials were using to justify their interference in Syria, such as: Linking the interference with Iran’s national security and deterring the threat of ISIL, in spite of the fact that ISIL does not carry out any military operations inside Iran.83 ‘Twana,’ which is an Iranian civil society website, interacted with the campaign and posted the number of the civilians killed along with those responsible for the killing. The site commented that: “Al-Assad’s troops are at the top of the list of causes of civilian deaths,” and that taxes and Iranian oil funds were being spent on murdering women and children in Syria.84 Some Iranian newspapers raised the subject of the numbers killed and the interference by the RG in Syria. For example, the ‘Bahar’ newspaper mentioned in one of its headlines that the recent developments taking place on the battlefields in Syria had caused an increase in the numbers of Iranians killed there. This number was increasing daily because of the Iranian military presence there.

The newspaper strongly criticized the Iranian strategy of protecting Bashar, which was based on two premises:

• Keeping national security threats away from Iranian borders.

• Preserving an axis of resistance in the region under Iranian leadership, while calling the Iranian regime to deal realistically with this matter.85

»»Calling on Rezai to Raise Morale This widespread criticism of the continued losses of Iranian militias in Syria forced the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to call on the retired General Mohsen Rezai, former leader of the IRGC, who suddenly appeared in public wearing a full military uniform.86 Some Iranian analysts considered that the IRGC had been deliberately spreading the news about Rezai taking over leadership of the troops in Syria with the purpose of raising the morale of Iranian officials after it had greatly declined because of the recent losses.87

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The Iranian ‘Fars’ news agency, run by the IRGC, questioned the reasons behind calling on Rezai. The answer came from General Rezai himself in a speech in which he expressed his sorrow and anger about the massive losses among the Iranian troops participating in the war. He threatened to take revenge on those who killed the soldiers and called them terrorists and Takfirists.

»»The Future of Iran’s Presence in Syria After the fall of Aleppo and concluding the agreement between Russia and Turkey about the evacuation of civilians and armed guerrillas from this historical city, Iran sensed danger in its future presence in Syria. This was reflected in statements by a spokesman from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, who warned that his country would not allow Syria to become a sharing of interest zone; he stated that any talk about this issue was worthless and supports the theory that Iran’s actions on the ground started with occupying Aleppo and ended with the evacuation agreement of civilians and fighters from the eastern parts of the city, and also evacuating the villagers from the Shiite Kafriya and Nabl. In spite of the effective role played by Russia and Turkey after taking the initiative in Syria and calling all the main conflicting groups to the negotiation table in Astana, Kazakhstan, Iran’s fear its role being downsized in spite of its calls for meetings increased.

Therefore, the future of Iran in Syria will fundamentally be based on the outcome of these negotiations, and in case of their failure, Iran will encourage both Russia and Bashar Al-Assad to continue military action through mobilizing the Idlib Front to guarantee its control over the largest area in Syria, thus ensuring the continuity of Al-Assad.

»»Change of Military Commands Last November the Supreme Leader and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Ali Khamenei issued two separate decrees to appoint Commander Ahmed Reda Bordestan, who was the commander in charge of the ground forces and vice-President of the Iranian Armed Forces, to replace Abdolrahim Mousavi, who was sacked from his position after only five months of being appointed on May 5th 2016 so that he could replace General Gholam Ali Rashid. In another decree, Commander Haidari was appointed the commander of the ground forces affiliated with the Iranian army.88 In December 2016, the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Revolution Ali Khamenei issued a decree to appoint General Gholamhossein Gheybparvar head of the Basij troops and general vice-President of the Armed Forces for Basij Affairs, as a replacement for General Mohammed Reza Naqdi, who was appointed an assistant for the cultural and social affairs of the IRGC. Gholamhossein Gheybparvar took leadership of the Emam Al-Hussein Base after its former leader Hossein Hamedani was killed in Syria. He also took leadership of the ‘Fajr’ guards in Fars province.89

»»Conclusions • In spite of Rouhani’s orientation toward decreasing the IRGC’s budget in 2016, he changed his plan to find a balance between the army and the guards and increased their budget in 2017, which reached a maximum of 6.9 billion dollars.

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• The objections by the Defense and Security Committee in the Iranian Parliament about the decrease in the IRGC’s budget in 2016 had a great impact on its increase in 2017. This committee saw that Iran was facing internal and external threats that demanded more support for the RG. • The RG assured its greater authority over that of the government and that it will be the right hand of the Iranian regime in its implementation of its foreign plans and expansionist policies in the near future.

• Through its continuous announcements about its war industries to establish a unique position among other regional powers, Iran aims to establish stability with nuclear powers such as Pakistan and India and to compete with Turkey and Russia in their influence in the Central Asian States.

• A large part of the ongoing Iranian training and maneuvers for years has focused on military and psychological aspects to stop whomever Iran considers its internal and external enemies.

• The harassment of American ships by IRGC boats has assumed a local political dimension that is directed towards Rouhani's Government, which demands stronger relationships with the West.

• Harassing the American ships in Gulf waters in order to escape from the observation of the American ships that imposed on the Iranian ships, which are loaded with weapons and supplies for its allies in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon.

• Iran’s plans for expansion in international waters are part of its larger expansionist policy.

• Iranian officials’ statements about the necessity of building bases in Yemen and Syria reveal the Iranian regime’s intentions for naval expansion beyond the waters of the Arabian Gulf.

• Iranian naval maneuvers in international regional waters could be understood from a straightforward security perspective. Enforcing Iran’s naval presence in international waters and establishing naval bases outside the national security zone and regional waters are both parts of Iran’s expansionist policy.

• Iran still encounters many obstacles and barriers in establishing bases in neighboring countries. Baqeri’s statements about his country's intention to establish bases in Yemen and Syria are only part of Iranian propaganda rhetoric which Iranian leaders often use.

• Tehran’s alliance with China, its second ally after Russia, is because of its wish to modernize its artillery, to be provided with missile technology and the necessary equipment to develop weapons and ammunition factories.

• Due to Iran’s fears of a change in American policies after the new American president Donald Trump gained power, Iran had no choice but to reinforce its military alliances with its traditional allies such as China and Russia.

• China has the second rank in weapon exportation to Iran after Russia, and after the Chinese Defense Minister's visit to the country, Beijing was able to restore its cooperation

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publically after many years of secret collaboration due to the international prohibition on Iran.

• Iran’s openness toward China is seen by observers as an attempt to send a message to Moscow that Tehran is capable of forging new alliances if Russia backs out of its promises and commitments. Other observers see in this collaboration an attempt to actively cooperate with Moscow and Beijing so as to be able to confront Washington and its allies in the region.

• Tehran sees in Beijing an international ally to increase its alliances in the region.

• The Iranian regime has been exposed to a major campaign of criticism at home due to its participation in the war in Syria and the large numbers of casualties in the RG and the army.

• Iran’s fear of a smaller future role in Syria can be seen in its attempt to disrupt the Turkish-Russian agreement, the detention of civilians, and linking the failure of the agreement with the evacuation of villagers from the Shiite villages of Nabl and Al-Zahra.

• If the Astana negotiations fail, the Iranians will turn to the Idlib Front to continue its fight in order to take control of a large part of Syria that would enable Al-Assad to continue his rule and to guarantee Iran’s influence in Syria.

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The Security File Introduction The Supreme Council of Iranian National Security is in charge of internal security and formulates defense and security policies within a general political framework that are specified by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The Council's other duties include the coordination of political, security, social, cultural, and economic activities that are relevant to defense and security plans. The Council consists of the Presidents of three authorities, judicial, legislative, and executive, as well as the President of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, an Official of Planning and Budget Affairs the Foreign and Interior Ministers, the Security Minister, and the Leaders of the RG and the Army.

According to the Iranian Constitution, the supervision of specific national security policies is the responsibility of the Supreme Council of Iranian National Security, along with the Ministry of Security, the Army and the IRGC. However, it seems that the appointment and specification of national security policies are only entitled for the IRGC which exploited the support and huge capabilities in implementing other agendas represented through the repression of those whom the Regime calls the Enemies of Revolution, also committing the most horrible atrocities and violations against non-Persians.

Repression of non-Persians Non-Persians, Kurds, Arabs, Balochis, Turkmen, and Azeris represent more than half the population of Iran, but for many years, the Iranian regime has carried out acts of repression and marginalization against them in an attempt to take these people away from their homes and integrate them with Persians in order to destroy their identities and subvert their cultures. The regime has not only subverted their cultures, it has also engaged in political and economic discrimination, as well as demographic.

Since the Revolution, the regime has forcefully reacted against ethnic and religious minorities who have demanded their rights. The absence of dialog between the Government and the non-Persian minorities has led to the emergence of political movements and various armed factions, a lot of which have engaged in bloody conflicts. Many of those killed were from these armed factions. However, it is remarkable that the regime has not dealt realistically with this, and the two parties have not met to discuss how their legitimate objectives can be obtained.

This repressive policy has continued to destroy all human rights, and bans the use of ethnic minority languages in schools and government departments, as well as repressing those demanding more political participation or economic, social, and cultural rights. They have also been subject to threats, arrest, and imprisonment.

Moreover, the children of these ethnic minorities have been deprived of jobs in the public sector, which has intensified feelings of injustice, marginalization, and oppression.90

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First: The Security Situation in Kurdistan-Iran In the past six months, Kurdistan province in Iran has witnessed a remarkable escalation in attacks by unknown armed men on public institutions and police stations; there have been fights between the IRGC and the security forces and liberal movements and those opposing the regime.

»»Announcing the Destruction of 'Cells' Planning Attacks In the last few months the Iranian authorities have spoken about confrontations with some armed men and killing them, as well as preventing other attempts which wanted to target a number of areas, as follows: The announcement by the Ministry of Interior about security members from the Ministry of Intelligence destroying a cell in the east of the country, which was carrying out serious, attacks and consisted of four men; one was killed and the three others were arrested; a large amount of explosives was seized along with them.91 In Western Iran, the killing of 12 cell members after a raid by the Iranian air force was announced; this cell was planning to cause explosions in areas in Western Iran until it was prevented from doing so.92 In the same province, Iranian forces said that it had destroyed a cell loyal to antiRevolution groups and killed 12 of its members, explaining that fighters and intelligence from the IRGC Al-Najaf Base in Kermanshah province had clashed with the cell. The commander said that three IRGC members were injured in the attacks. Large quantities of weapons and ammunition were seized.93 In another operation that Kermanshah witnessed, three men, ‘Takfirists,’ were killed.

The Commander of the Security Forces in that province, Montchehr Aman Elahi, said that a special squad of security forces clashed with three terrorists in a neighborhood in Kermanshah, which led to the killing of all the armed men, saying that the forces had found weapons: Kalashnikovs and explosive belts.94 In Sanandaj, the capital of Kurdistan province, a police station was attacked by unknown armed men with machine guns, which resulted in the injury of one police officer. After the attack, every town in Kurdistan was put on a high state of alert and police officers were stationed on the streets and in sensitive locations.

In Kermanshah, Iranian MP Heshmatollah Flaht Beshahl was the subject of an assassination attempt, which led to the loss of a number of his escorts. The Chief of the National Security and Foreign Politics Committee in Parliament Ala' Deen Brojrdi said that the failed assassination attempt was a pre-prepared terrorist plot. Brojrdi referred to the return of people who are against the Revolution to their activities inside Iran. He said that a clash between the IRGC and the anti-Revolution elements took place recently.95 In the Kiltchi area in Marivan city, IRGC troops succeeded in preventing an attack that was being planned by gunmen. This announcement by the IRGC said that these men were planning to carry out operations in the area, but they escaped after suffering severe losses. A number of guns were seized.96

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In another incident in Marivan, one officer was killed and three others were injured due to explosives being thrown at a police car by an unknown man riding a motorbike.97 The military faction of the Free Society and Eastern Democracy Group with all its members announced its responsibility the attacks targeting IRGC and Basij sites in Serdashto and Marivan cities. An announcement issued by the group said that it had killed no fewer than 26 RG and Basij members in different operations in the Gandharan area, Sardasht province, and in Kolgadr, Marivan.98

»»Protests on the Anniversary of the Assassination of the Leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party In another escalation, the Iranian Kurdistan Workers' Party organized a general protest on the occasion of the assassination of its leader Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou in the Austrian Capital Vienna in 1989. The party accused the IRGC of the assassination of Ghassemlou after he called for negotiations about the Kurdish cause. This party is considered the most important Kurdish opposition in Iran and has 70 years of political and combat experience. It has always invited Kurds to express their opposition to the arrests, assassinations, and oppression, except that the Iranian Regime has continued to pursue its members and calls them terrorists.99 In response to the general protest that the party called for, large Kurdish cities in Iran such as Sanandaj, Mahabad, Kermanshah, and Kamyaran witnessed sit-ins and shop closures. A few weeks before its call for this general protest, the PKK started a huge military campaign, which spread its troops throughout Kurdistan areas. This resulted in fierce combat with the IRGC, which led to the death and the injury of dozens of IRGC members, among which were senior officials. The PKK said that the objective of this campaign was to reorganize different social powers inside Kurdistan and to mobilize them to confront any future repression by the RG and security forces in the future.100 Second: The Security Situation in Al-Ahwaz Recently the Iranian Regime has continued its systematic repressive policy against the Arab minority. Al-Ahwaz and the surrounding Arab areas have witnessed a number of random arrests and raids. These practices against the Arabs are part of the Iranian authorities’ comprehensive security plan to repress any activities and demands for a long period of time.

1- Iranian Intelligence Establishes a University in Al-Ahwaz: To tighten its grip on the Arabs and practice more surveillance over their activities in Al-Ahwaz, in the north of Iran, the Intelligence and Security Department announced that the Ministry of Intelligence and Security was planning to establish a university of ‘Security and Intelligence’ in this city to control the political and cultural activities, and to develop security methods in order to cope with the levels of danger that exist in Al-Ahwaz province for Iranian security.101 2- Iranian MP's Discuss the Security Situation in Al-Ahwaz The National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in the Iranian Parliament

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dispatched a number of its members to Al-Ahwaz to discuss important security issues, focusing mainly on the movements that are against the policies of the Iranian regime among the citizens of that area. The committee admitted the overall expansion of these movements at large in Al-Ahwaz.

The committee made accusations against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of supporting and funding the separatist movements in Al-Ahwaz.102 In spite of the fact that Iranian officials are aware of the seriousness of the issues there, ranging from poverty to unemployment, to the spread of injustice, and their links with the acts of violence which Al-Ahwaz witnesses, they still accuse the Gulf States of supporting the Al-Ahwaz people and affecting the security and the stability of the country. Iran describes these movements, which demand human rights and an end to injustice, as ‘separatist groups’ who want to divide Iran on a national level. A number of these members were executed for their participation in military operations, which targeted the institutions of the Iranian regime in this province.

3- Raiding and Arresting Campaign in Al-Falahia in Al-Ahwaz In November 2016, troops from the security forces and the RG raided the houses of a number of citizens and arrested dozens of them in Al-Falahia in Al-Ahwaz in the east of Iran. The official website of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Al-Ahwaz stated that the arrests took place after the funeral of Al-Sheik Abdallah Ben Budir, Al-Sheikh of the Bani Tamem Tribe in this city, following accusations of attacks on security members and police cars in the province, as well as the seizure of a number of guns and weapons by the security members during their combat with the mourners.103 Six days after this incident at the funeral of Al-Sheikh Abdullah Ibn Budair, the Minister of Intelligence Mahmoud Alawi paid a sudden visit to the city of Abadan in the north of Al-Ahwaz to control the security situation there. To avoid any breaches in the security situation or any escalation of the protests and battles, the Minister of Intelligence called on the Arab tribal Sheiks in Abadan, Mohammerah, and Al-Falahia to cooperate with the security forces to ease tensions there.104

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4- Continued Obliteration of the Al-Ahwaz Identity and the People’s Removal from their Arab Homelands As part of the Iranian regime’s attempt to obliterate the Arab identity in Al-Ahwaz and to remove the people there from their cultural environment, the authorities continued its policy of raiding homes to confiscate all the satellite dishes under the pretext of fighting Takfirists and cultural invasion. The regime announced that it would persecute everyone working in this regard.

The Ahwazis and observers put these repressive policies against Arabs down to the Iranian regime’s fear of spreading awareness among the people in these areas.105 This fear is apparent in a number of statements by Iranian officials, the last of which was reported by the official agency ‘IRNA’ about the previous Minister of Intelligence Haider Moslehi, who said that “the Wahabi strategy” in Iran was planning to change the ideology of the elite and the people in Al-Ahwaz province. He demanded that the Persian elite continues their efforts to address this phenomenon, which he called the “expansion of Wahhabism” in Ahwaz, considering the trend among young Arabs of changing their beliefs to Sunni Islam a grave danger to Iranian national security.106 Third: The Security Situations in Sistan and Baluchestan Despite owning large quantities of gas, oil, gold, copper, and uranium in Sistan and Baluchistan province, where there is a large population of Sunnis from the Baluchi race (north-east Iran), it is considered one of the most economically deprived provinces in Iran with a low economic growth rate, extreme poverty, a high unemployment rate, smuggling, and drug dealing included in the crises this province is suffering from.

As a result of the regime’s continuation of its policies of discrimination and marginalization against Baluchis, local resistance movements have continued their activities against the regime. In recent months, the movement has clashed with the IRGC and other security forces in a number of areas, especially border ones. The IRGC claims its clashes with the Baluchi Liberation Movement are mostly related to combating drug smuggling. Nevertheless, the RG denies the real reasons the Baluchis carry guns, such as ongoing executions of Sunnis, killing scientists, knocking down mosques, closing schools, oppression, injustice, and poverty.

1- Clashes and Arrests: The RG mostly justifies its clashes with the Baluch Liberation movement as a way of combating drug smuggling, to stop ISIL from encroaching on Iranian territory, and to eliminate the ‘Enemies of the Revolution.’ In order to continue with this, security officials in Sistan and Baluchistan province announced that the clashes taking place between armed men and Iranian police officers in the Mahestan area had resulted in the death of one armed gunman and an officer called Sadiq Amiri.107 The clashes took place from Sistan and Baluchistan province to the border city of Saravan, where the IRGC raided a camp of armed men, which resulted in clashes between the two parties; one IRGC member was killed and another injured.

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According to a report by the Youth Journalists’ website, the Public Relations Department in the IRGC announced that the Guards clashed with an opposition group on December 18th in Saravan city. Their opponents managed to escape the country.108 In another incident, the authorities in Baluchistan caught 13 Qurbaga Makran members who were accused of smuggling drugs. The Chief of Police in Sistan and Baluchestan General Hossein Rahimi said that Qurbaga Makran is considered the biggest drug smuggler in Eastern Iran. This smuggler started his activities in 1990 but stopped for fear of arrest for a short period. Then he continued his activities at the end of 2014. He continued, “This person was able to collect 800 tons of narcotics in Afghanistan and managed to sell them with his network of members in Tanzania, Somalia, Iran, and Arabian Gulf countries. He made a huge amount of money from this operation.” He also said that police officer had managed to catch this convict after six failed attempts, as well as seizing his property consisting of 76 houses in 8 cities, and 15 bank accounts.109 5- The Future of Mobilization in non-Persians Areas Internally, Iran has witnessed intensive mobilization in recent months among nonPersians in Al-Ahwaz, Kurdistan, and Baluchistan in the form of armed clashes with the security forces and the RG; this is in addition to organizing dozens of demonstrations and international conferences in order to put pressure on the Iranian regime to recognize the rights of these minorities.

The Iranian strategy towards Al-Ahwaz is based on changing the demographic map of the non-Persian population and to obliterate the identities of its own people in order to merge them with the Persian national fabric.

Since the triumph of the Revolution under the leadership of Khomeini in 1979, Iran has used several justifications to repress these liberation movements from spreading in provinces inhabited by non-Persian minorities. Sometimes it has accused them of forming alliances with foreign regimes, and of treason and spying for the West. At other times it has accused them of being drug dealers and smugglers, of spreading radical ideas, and of antagonizing the Jurist Leadership regime; these accusations against nonPersian people in Al-Ahwaz, Kurdistan, and Baluchistan have taken on a new dimension in the few past months after a number of the liberation movements in these areas were accused of working for the benefit of certain Arab countries.

The Iranian regime fears that the non-Persian people’s cause is now considered more dangerous as a result of the state of polarization and the new instability which the area is witnessing. This is apparent in the probability that this cause will attract huge support from Arab countries. As a result, Iran sees this as a ticking time bomb and a potential cause of a regional conflict.

Iran also fears that some regional powers might use the non-Persian people’s cause as a way to interfere in the situation there and to continue the conflict internally through providing financial, political, and media support for the liberation movements in these provinces.

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Recently, the movements representing the non-Persian people in Iran have conducted a number of meetings and conferences where they discussed the future of these movements and the struggle to get back their stolen rights. They concluded that no transformation or radical change in the ethnic minority crisis was possible, at least for the time being, without having a broad front that includes all the minorities with their different regions, affiliations, and languages. These calls for coordination and unity on a broad front increased the Iranian regime’s fears. So it started to intensify its repressive campaigns, to tighten its grip on the areas of unrest, and to search for new plans to stop any movements of that kind, knowing that these people on the fringes of Iran, and that if they were to decide on unity their confrontation with Iran would be extremely difficult.

Another issue is that 90% of Iran’s wealth comes from non-Persian areas, specifically from the Arab Ahwaz; therefore, any increase in the strength of the liberation movement will certainly pose a huge threat to the Iranian economy, and will subject it to more pressure and a state of national, political, and economic insecurity.

»»Future Scenarios in the Iranian Regime's Dealings with the non-Persians.

In light of the changes this area is witnessing, the increase in the activities of nonPersian populations and Iran’s fear of the transformation of the ethnic minorities issue into a crisis that might threaten the security and stability of the country, there are a number of scenarios about how the Iranian regime will deal with the non-Persian minority issue in the near future.

First Scenario: Responding to the Demands of the non-Persians This scenario depends on how Iran uses its security policy against the Liberation movements and those demanding ethnic minority rights. It also depends on the fact that ignoring this issue might lead the country into crises and dangerous conflicts, particularly in the areas where these people live such as Kurdistan, Baluchistan, and Al-Ahwaz. They are located near Iran’s borders and neighboring countries; an expansion of the tribes and nationalities from these countries might worsen the disagreements and ignite long-term conflicts.

Therefore, if this scenario takes place it remains subject to how much real political will there is in the Iranian regime, as well as its ability to convince the political and military movements which put their separation from Iran as one of their priorities to reconsider their demands, and to put on the negotiating table a future strategy that is acceptable to all parties and that guarantees the unity of the country.

Second Scenario: Establishing a Unified Front to include all the Movements Representing non-Persian People This scenario is based on establishing a national front or an organized coalition that includes all the non-Persian minorities (Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, Azeris, and Turkmen).

Judging from the realization of these minorities on the necessity of taking the issue of the 'Faith and Line Unity' as a pushing card to play on the Iranian Regime in order to change how it deals with the issue and to respond to their demands. Adopting this scenario, however, might lead Iran into a dangerous chaos of confrontations with armed groups,

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security forces, and the RG. The Iranian regime could also consider that this front aims to tear the country apart. As a result, Iran will tighten its security grip.

Third Scenario: The Iranian Regime Continuing its Policy of Security Dealings with non-Persian People This scenario is based on the Iranian regime continuing its security policies and following a repressive strategy and persecution against the non-Persian minorities justified by fighting Communist and Wahhabi movements, confronting foreign intelligence espionage, fighting drug smuggling, and fighting enemies of the regime.

Although the minorities’ demands are all legitimate, mostly they do not move beyond asking for removing injustice and marginalization, being allowed to participate in political life, and being given more freedom. However, the regime insists on rejecting these demands because achieving any of these aims will threaten Iran’s national security and tear the country apart.

What makes possible the Iranian regime’s ongoing security dealings regarding the demands of the non-Persians is its intensive security strategy against these ethnic minorities and its rejection of international invitations and reports by Human Rights Organizations which call for the cessation of oppressive practices against these people.

It also continues to accuse external parties (United States) and certain Arab countries of disturbing the security and stability in Iran.

»»The Human Rights Situation in Iran After Hassan Rouhani became President of Iran in 2013 his government did its best to clean up the Iranian regime for the international community and to get rid of the country’s records of human rights violations, although what actually happened during that time was contrary to expectations, especially with the number of executions of Iranians reaching a record high. This made Iran one of the leading countries in the world to execute its citizens.

During the second half of 2016, Iran continued its execution policy against ethnic and religious minorities and children, giving different reasons such as antagonizing the regime, corruption, drug trafficking and spreading radical ideas.

Various human rights organizations expressed their deep concern about Iran’s continual executions and said that the sentences were always handed out by courts,

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which lacked independence and neutrality. Most of them were for mysterious crimes or practices that are not supposed to be criminalized. A remarkably a high percentage of these human rights violations in this country are against non-Persians.

1- Executions of Kurds The most prominent of the executions Iran that have carried out in recent months was the mass execution of 22 Sunni Kurds who were charged with committing terrorist acts.

Among those executed was Hassan Amini, the principal of Eman Al-Bukhari School for Religious Sciences, the Mufti, and the Shariah judge in Sanandaj. The prosecution in Kurdistan province issued a statement confirming the execution was of those it called ‘Salafi Takfirists,’ who had committed terrorist acts almost four years ago: “The death sentences were carried out against civilians from a Takfiri terrorist group known as ‘AlTawhid’ and ‘Al-Jihad’ on Tuesday 2nd August 2016.”110 Sources very close to the families of those executed revealed that the convicts were subject to the most atrocious kinds of torture before their executions. One of the families confirmed to the Advocates of Human Rights Center in Kurdistan that when they saw their son’s body, the signs of torture were very clear. His arms and legs were broken and disfigured. Another family also said that the signs of torture were clear on the bodies; the arms and legs were fractured and disfigured. Most of the executed men had blackened faces and were covered with bruises.

Most of these men were arrested by intelligence services in Kurdistan during the period 2009-2011 and were kept in solitary confinement. Before their trial, they could not hire a lawyer to defend them, or even contact their families.111 The Iranian authorities carried out another mass execution against the Kurdish political activist Mohammed Abd Alihi, who was charged with ‘Al-Harabah’ along with five other prisoners convicted of drug trafficking. In Urmia prison in Western Azerbaijan in northwest Iran, Abd Alihi, who was affiliated with the Komaleh Party, was arrested in March 2010 after being pursued by RG intelligence. He was shot and taken to the hospital. A few hours later, he was handcuffed and taken to prison for investigations.

After many years of torture and detention, the Revolutionary Court in Mahabad sentenced him to death in 2014. After two years, the Diwan of the Supreme Court approved the verdict, which was in March 2016, and in August 2016 the sentence was carried out.112 Abd Alihi’s lawyer said that the court did not use law and justice against his client and he dismissed the idea that Abd Alihi had fired guns at the police.113

»»Kurds’ Anger at Executions in Kurdistani Iraq and Syria The execution of 22 Kurds sparked the anger of the Kurds in Kurdistani Iraq against Iran, in spite of local and international calls demanding the Iranian authorities organize a retrial and not implement death sentence against them. People in Iraq’s Kurdistan province denounced the ongoing oppressive practices by the regime against the Kurds in Iran, and demanded interference from international and human rights organizations to stop the oppression and the practices which aim to wipe out the Kurdish civil rights workers, activists, and thinkers in Kurdistani Iran by framing them with a number of

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charges and executing them. People demanded the Government in Kurdistan to interfere and demand that Tehran stops oppressing the Kurds.114 In Syria, the Kurdish National Council condemned the Iranian regime’s practices against Kurdish activists and civilians. A statement by the General Assembly of the Kurdish National Council in Syria declared that for a long time the Iranian regime had interfered in the region through its militias, which had become a stress factor and tended to spark crises in the region. It continued its criminal activities against the Kurds in Iran through mass executions of Kurdish activists. The statement also added, “The Kurdish people in Iran are demanding their national and democratic rights, except that the regime in its latest executions breached all international customs and laws.”115 2- Executions against Arab Al-Ahwaz Khuzestan in southeast Iran also witnessed executions. The provincial Judicial Department issued a death sentence against three people accused of being involved in a “terrorist act” that resulted in the deaths of three security officers, as well as an attack on the Earthquake Monitoring Center in Al-Hamidieh in the same province.116 Bander Bin Abbas, where the Arab minority live in southeast Iran, also witnessed a number of executions. The death sentence was handed out to two people in public in the city center. The men were charged with attacking a girl in 2014, photographing her, and threatening to post the photos online if she filed a complaint with the authorities.117 3- Executing Children and Teenagers Iran executed 75 children between 2005 and 2015; 13 children were executed just last year, according to Amnesty International, in spite of the fact that Iran is one of the countries signed up to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which bans the application of the death penalty against children.

Recently Iran executed a 19-year-old teenager called Hassan Afshar in Arak prison for “being charged with rape committed when he was 18.” Iran was also supposed to execute another teenager called Ali Reza Tajiki on August 3rd, 2016, but the execution was delayed because of international pressure on Iran. In a report about Iran, Amnesty International revealed that almost 160 teenagers have been sentenced to death, most of whom were under the age of 18. The organization also expressed its concern regarding the increase in the number of teenagers executed in Iran.118 4- Audio Recording of the Mothari Renews Debate about the 1988 Executions: The executions in Iran in 1988 brought the subject back as being the most debated in Iran, especially after the release of a recorded audiotape of Sheik Hossein Montazeri, who was Khomeini’s Deputy. On this recording, which his son Ahmed released, Montazeri warned the prosecutor, the vice-President, and representatives from the Ministry of Security and Intelligence in Evin prison, whom he called ‘the Death Committee,’ that these executions of political opponents were the worst criminal acts to be committed in Iran since the time of the Revolution. He also warned them that history would forever remember their names as criminals 119 Rouhani’s Government was embarrassed by the release of this audio footage, as the officials who were responsible for the mass

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executions in 1988 now held senior positions in the Government, including the Minister of Justice Mostafa Bour Mohammadi, who was one of the ‘Death Committee’s’ members.

The parliamentary vice-President Ali Montazeri demanded in a letter sent to the Minister of Justice Mostafa Bour Mohammadi that he explain the circumstances of the executions. This letter was met with a fierce wave of criticism from the Conservatives in Parliament, who demanded Montazeri’s expulsion from Parliament, although Montazeri had said that the purpose of the letter was to explain the circumstances of the executions in order to close this file for good.120 Five former MPs regretted the 1988 executions and considered the many recent executions of Sunni prisoners “solid proof of the unfortunate approach” the judicial authorities follow and their lack of commitment to the “power of law and justice.” These MPs said that the only way to get out of this current situation is through law and justice, and to allow for dialog.121 A media advisor for the IRGC Hamid Reza Moqadem Far accused Ahmed Montazeri of plotting with the CIA, MI5, and the Mujahedin Khalq Organization to spread the audio footage, explaining that the recording of Montazeri’s statements is proof of either his son’s naivety or his involvement with foreign intelligence agencies. He criticized some people for spreading the audio footage and considered it a distortion of Khomeini’s image and an attempt to bring back to life the Mujahedin Khalq Organization, which lost many of its members due to these executions.

»»The Trial of Montazeri’s Son Three days after the release of the audio footage, the Clerical Court summoned Ahmed Montazeri and charged him with spreading the Islamic regime’s secrets and with strengthening the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the Mujahedin Khalq Organization.

Ahmed Montazeri denied the charges and said that the audio footage did not contain anything new, which was not mentioned in his father Hossein Ali Montazeri’s documents about the 1988 executions. The audio with Sheik Montazeri's voice stressed that it had nothing to do with strengthening the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the Mujahedin Khalq Organization and that the reason for the tension between Tehran and Riyadh was because the attack on the Saudi Arabian Embassy had happened without punishing the attackers.122 In November 2016, Clerics Court sentenced Montazri with 21 years of imprisonment, the court then amended the sentence to 6 years because of his old age, furthermore, he had a brother killed in Iraq-Iran war.123

»»Reactions after the Rejection of Montazeri’s Trial A week after Montazeri’s trial 151 political and human rights activists issued a joint announcement in which they strongly criticized the trial and confirmed their solidarity with him. They said that Montazeri’s trial was not fair because the Clerical Court was not legal and they promised to use all means possible to prevent the verdict.124 Six clergymen stated that the verdict of the Clerical Court regarding Montazeri was proof of

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this miscarriage of justice and a violation of the law, as well as being against basic human rights, Iranian Law, and the foundations of doctrine and jurisprudence.125 5- Executions in Iran and their Future It seems that the grave statistics about executions in Iran, especially the drugs-related ones, have raised the concern of Iranian officials. A member of the legal and judiciary committee in the Iranian Parliament Abu Al-Fadel Abu-Turabi said that the executions so far were for drug dealers and smugglers, and did not end up with the expected result. He said that a plan to reduce death sentences for drug crimes was proposed in Parliament and submitted to different specialized centers to give their opinions. Abu-Turabi stressed that there should be a strict limit on executions for drug crimes and that this punishment should only be for armed gangsters who smuggle drugs systematically. He also stressed that he does not agree with a full cancellation of the death sentence for drug crimes, but it should be limited.126 The Iranian Minister of Justice Mostafa Bour Mohammadi said that the death sentence cannot be canceled, although he admitted that this punishment has not been effective in recent years. He said that executions couldn't be canceled because there are a number of saboteurs in the country who cannot be controlled except through executions, noting that this issue is under Islamic control and meets with a lot of support from Iran’s judiciary.127 The head of the legal and judiciary committee in the Iranian Shura' Council Allah Yarm Alkashai also called for a restricting the death sentence and stopping executions on a large scale to reduce its disadvantages, pointing out that members of the committee had studied a proposal for reducing the death sentence for drugs crimes. He said that due to the negative impact, which the death sentence has on the convicted person’s family, the legal and judiciary committee in Parliament was working on changing the laws concerning the execution of drug criminals. This means that the proposal will not include all convicts, but only those related to drug crimes.128 As a result of these ongoing demands, the Iranian Parliament recently voted on a bill that called for replacing the death sentence with another one for cases of drug smuggling, but for keeping the death sentence for cases of armed drug smuggling.

For other cases, other penalties were specified. This proposal will be discussed by a specialized committee and then voted on for a final time in Parliament.

According to the suggested amendments, alternative penalties for drugs cases will include prison sentences of 25-30 years or life in prison instead of execution if Parliament approves this law permanently.129 It is worth pointing out that these procedures are only about restricting the death sentence in relation to drug crimes, but not for any other crimes. This clearly shows that Iran will continue its execution policy in other areas in the near future. The objective of these procedures and decisions is to reduce the criticism Iran is exposed to from human rights organizations.

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Some observers who hoped that the period after the nuclear agreement would witness a change in Iran’s attitude toward the horrible human rights situation in the country perceived it as a total failure, as a year and a half after the nuclear agreement, no changes have taken place. Instead, things are further deteriorating.

In spite of the harsh criticism from local and international human rights organizations about the human rights situation in Iran, the regime takes the view that these executions are the only preventive measure to push any internal danger that might threaten the survival and continuation of the regime. Furthermore, Tehran is afraid of any coalition that might exist among opposition movements and their future unity. Therefore, it has escalated the executions and increased repressive practices in case of this.

»»Iran and ISIL After many questions being raised about ISIL not carrying out any operations against Iranian targets in spite of the apparent enmity between the two sides, a number of Iranian officials released statements about frustrating any ISIL operations in different areas in Iran, without giving any evidence or information to prove these claims.

In the past six months, a lot has been heard in the media about exposing cells affiliated with ISIL in many areas, especially near the border. In this context, the Minister of Intelligence Mahmoud Alawi talked about destroying an ISIL cell that was led by one of the leaders of the organization in the west of Iran and striking them a painful blow through complex intelligence operations in coordination with secret agents and security forces. Alawi thinks that carrying out terrorist attacks at different gatherings and in religious areas in the heart of the country is one of the objectives planned by those ‘terrorists.’ He announced the killing of four armed men and the arrest of a number of them, along with the seizure of a large quantity of explosives, equipment, suicide belts, weapons, and hand grenades.130 In the same context, the Iranian Minister of Intelligence Mohammed Alawi revealed that more than 1500 Iranians were planning to join the ranks of ISIL, except that his Ministry gave guidance and advice to a number of them while arresting others to prevent them from joining terrorist groups. He stressed the need to raise awareness in young people, and to guide and warn them about the dangers of these groups.131 The leader of the ground forces affiliated with the Iranian army Major Ahmed Reza Bordistan said that “a dismantling of a terrorist cell took place in the west of the country and that its members were those who had joined ISIL in Syria, received their training and come back to Iran to carry out terrorist operations.” He said that security forces killed two of them. Bordistan accused ISIL of sending a number of its elements

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to Iranian territory, especially the cities of Naft Shahr and Qasr Shirin, as well as to eastern parts of the country.132

»»Rezai Claims that ISIL Wanted to Target Friday Prayers, which Ministry of Interior Denies Statements by officials continued to reveal ISIL plans to launch attacks inside the country. What was most significant about this was the claim by the Secretary General of the Expediency Council and former leader in the RG Mohsen Rezai about ISIL’s intention to carry out a suicide attack in Tehran; the attackers were supposed to be provided with bombs for the attack during Friday prayers, but they were arrested by security forces and the IRGC mid-way between Hamadan and Tehran.

The first reaction to Rezai’s statements came from Hossein Zu Faqari, assistant to the Minister of the Interior for Intelligence and Internal Security Affairs, stating that “it is possible that we encountered situations like this in the past, but recently we have not received any reports about it.” He added, “Takfiri groups have many times sought to execute destructive attacks in the country, but all of their attempts were failures thanks to our security forces and intelligence operations.”133 Zu Faqari, who denied Rezai’s claims, was harshly criticized, so he changed his statement when he said that destabilizing Iran through targeting Friday prayer locations was one of ISIL’s programs in late 2015, saying that his statements were not against Rezai. Then he confirmed that the Ministry of the Interior did not have any new information, stating that ISIL was planning to target mosques where Friday prayers take place.134 An assistant at the Strategic Investigations of National Security in the Ministry of Intelligence announced that security forces were able to seize around two tons of explosives in Garmsar in Semnan province, Northern Iran. He said that ISIL members were planning to cause explosions in at least ten locations in Iran.135 In spite of the widespread publicity, the war, and the enmity in the Iranian media toward ISIL, Tehran has not been exposed to any attacks by that organization, and it went a long time without attacking Iraq or Syria. In Syria, ISIL fought the Free Army and targeted the revolutionary forces, but they avoided any clashes with the IRGC and the militias affiliated with it such as Hezbollah, or with other sectarian militias, which are common on Syrian soil; this proves that ISIL and Iran have a close relationship.

»»Restrictions on dual nationality holders: The Iranian regime has sharply escalated the campaign of harassment and arrests, which it began a few months ago against citizens with dual nationality, with those detained facing various unconvincing accusations, including espionage. The campaign began in March 2016 with the arrest of Homa Hoodfar, a Canadian-Iranian university lecturer, who was released after a few months of detention; she claimed that during this time she had been repeatedly tortured by IRGC personnel, to force her to confess to false accusations made against her. Next, in August 2016, Abdolrasoul Dorri-Esfahani, an Iranian-Canadian member of the negotiation team that had negotiated the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with six major world powers, was arrested on charges of receiving

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funds from US and British institutions in exchange for sensitive financial and economic information about Iran. Esfahani, who was the chief financial officer for Iran in the nuclear deal negotiation team, had enjoyed a distinguished career, working at the Iranian defense ministry following the 1979 ‘Islamic revolution’. He then went on to work in the US, where he served as a member of a US Treasury committee and headed the body responsible for investigating the Iranian funds seized by Washington during the period of US sanctions before he emigrated to Canada.136

»»Tehran’s motives in raising the issue of dual citizenship: There are several reasons for Iran’s decision to put pressure on dual nationals, including: 1. Economic motives: To prevent dual nationality holders, especially Americans, from competing with investments controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Last October, the Iranian judiciary sentenced Iranian-American businessman Siamak Namazi, the former head of strategic planning in Iran’s Crescent Petroleum Company, to ten years’ imprisonment, along with his elderly father Mohammed Baqir Namazi, the former head of the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF). Siamak Namazi had previously worked for several years as a consultant in Iran, encouraging foreign companies to invest in the country.137 Iranian observers believe that the arrest and imprisonment of the Namazis, father, and son, was intended to send a deterrent signal to other wealthy dual nationality holders in the worldwide Iranian diaspora, in order to dissuade them from assisting foreign companies to invest in the country; in addition, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps wished to discourage possible competition with its own massive economic power base.

This theory received further support in November last year, when Hussein Ali Haji Dlidjani, a member of the regime’s Planning Commission and of the parliamentary budget and accounts committee, directed new accusations at ten prominent Iranian company directors with dual nationality, accusing them of posing a grave risk to Iran’s national interests and of selling the country to foreigners.

Dlidjani accused high-level company directors and decision-makers with dual nationality of inflicting a level of damage on Iran so immense that it was almost impossible to repair.

Amongst those accused of this grave allegation, he named Mohammad Reza Khavari, the former Executive Director of the Melli Bank, and Sirrus Nasseri, a member of the team that took part in earlier nuclear negotiations during the Khatami government, as well as Abdolrasoul Dorri Esfahani, as mentioned above.138 2. Security motives: The IRGC uses these measures against dual nationals as a means of preventing foreign businesses from challenging its own monopoly in Iran; it justifies this approach by claiming that dual nationals pose a risk to national security. To indicate the seriousness of these supposed concerns over security, Tehran’s Chief Prosecutor, Abbas Jafari Dowlat-Abadi, recently announced prison sentences of 10 years apiece for six defendants convicted of espionage and cooperation with the US administration, including Siamak Namazi and his father, as mentioned earlier.

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Abadi said that the 10-year prison sentences issued against the defendants, with the other four named as Farhad Abdullah Saleh, Kamran Qaderi, Nizar Zakka and Ali Reza Amdwar, most of whom held dual nationality, were justified because they were convicted of espionage and cooperation with the US administration. Abadi further indicated that the judiciary in Tehran is still investigating a number of very important files concerning sensitive security and economic issues related to the defendants, including Baqir Namazi and his son.

According to the sentences delivered, the court also ordered Baqir and Siamak Namazi, Farhad Abdullah Saleh, Kamran Qaderi, Nizar Zakka and Reza Amdwar to pay a collective total of $4.8 million to the Iranian state, asserting that this was the amount of money they had been paid by ‘hostile states’ to implement their projects in Iran.139 Contrary to the widespread belief that the restrictions on citizens with dual citizenship were aimed to embarrass Rouhani’s government, undermine its credibility and diminish its popularity, the evidence actually suggests that the Rouhani administration has been directly involved in implementing this policy, as demonstrated by remarks from the Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi, who announced recently that his ministry had sacked 39 senior officials with dual citizenship or holding ‘American Green Cards’. Alavi added that the 39 officials in question were among 79 senior ministry officials who were interrogated by intelligence officers about their nationality.

The minister further stressed that his ministry would sack any official holding any dual citizenship, or indeed any citizenship other than Iranian, offering those with dual citizenship a stark choice between giving up their citizenship of another country to become solely Iranian citizens, or continuing with dual citizenship; in the latter case, he asserted, they would receive notification that they were no longer able to continue to work for the intelligence ministry.140

»»Fire incidences: Vital economic sites are exposed to a series of fires: Over the past six months, a series of fires in locations across Iran has sparked heated public debate, due to the fact that the blazes have targeted sensitive facilities central to the Iranian economy. The fires also exposed the weakness of Iran’s emergency services, due to the excessive time is taken to extinguish the blazes; they also embarrassed the regime, as a result of the confused and contradictory statements made by officials about the causes of the fires.

»»The most important of these fires: On 6 July 2016, a massive blaze broke out following an explosion in Tower Number 8001 of the Abu Ali Sina complex, located in the special economic zone in Khomeini Port in the city of Mahshahr in Al-Ahwaz, southwest Iran. Although the blaze was extinguished the next day, another blaze then broke out in one of the reservoirs in the same tower, with the blazes causing heavy losses estimated at millions of dollars. Overlooking the Arabian Gulf, the city of Mahshahr (or Bandar-e Mahshohr in its native Ahwazi Arabic name), located near Abadan city, is the center of most of Iran's petrochemical industries. An armed Ahwazi Arab resistance movement calling itself the ‘Hawks of Al-Ahwaz’ claimed responsibility for the explosion, which triggered the fire.

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The Hawks of Ahwaz movement said in a written statement, copies of which were distributed in the town of Bandar-e Mahshohr the next day, that the Iranian regime’s ‘inhumane excesses and ongoing arbitrary policies denying the rights of Arab people of Ahwaz’ had left them no option other than to respond with the ‘massive and seismic’ attack on the plant, which they considered to be a blow ‘against the [Iranian regime’s] repressive policies’, adding that they would continue to target the regime’s economic centres in Ahwaz for as long as these injustices continued.

Less than 48 hours later, also in Mahshahr, another huge fire broke out in another unit in Imam Khomeini Port, engulfing part of the petrochemical unit which is primarily involved in manufacturing plastic materials, although firefighters managed to quickly extinguish the blaze.

During the same 48-hour period, four people were killed or injured by explosions in two pipelines near the city of Bushehr in the Gnawa region.141 Elsewhere, a massive fire broke out at one of the petrochemical stores in the Beeston petrochemical complex in Iran's Kermanshah region, causing considerable material damage.

Yet another blaze broke out in the control room of the Ports and Maritime Organization in Assaluyeh region, the main artery for regional imports and exports and a vital hub for attracting Iranian and foreign investors, while a separate blaze caused severe damage to the chemical waste storage unit at Imam Khomeini Port, which overlooks the Arabian Gulf.142

»»Multiple regime narratives on the causes of continuing fires: Observers speculate that these installations were subjected to arson attacks, as a reaction by the ethnic minority groups in Iran to the regime’s policies of marginalisation, persecution, arrests, imprisonment and torture, which are exacerbated against minorities due to the racial discrimination prevalent in the Iranian society. The majority of the Iranian public believes that the regime-controlled media efforts to conceal the news about most of these fires can be considered as evidence of the regime’s efforts to hide important details, particularly in relation to the damage inflicted on oil installations, and many Iranians have suggested that these facilities were likely attacked. Meanwhile, Iranian regime officials have offered various, often conflicting, accounts for the reasons behind the fires, summarised as follows:

• Ahmad Mahdavi, the Secretary-General of the Federation of Petrochemical Industry Professionals, believes that the fires recently experienced in the Assaluyeh area, are signs of a probable future oil disaster in this region, and says that these areas lack the necessary safety procedures and designated equipment. He confirmed that the fires, which affected a number of petrochemical complexes, were due to negligence by the human resources within these complexes.143 • Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh said that the reason for the frequent fires that occurred in the petrochemical facilities was the lack of adequate investment in the field of "health, safety and environmental" protection, and the companies’ lack of interest in doing so.144

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• Secretary-General of the Supreme Council of the Virtual Domain, Abul- Hassan Firuzabadi, said that cyber-attacks were likely to be the main cause of these fires.145 Civil Defence Chief Gholam Reza Jalali rejected the hypothesis that cyber-attacks are the reason for the incidents at the petrochemical facilities, although he stressed that the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia pose a threat to Iran in the cyber sector, adding that these countries are making great efforts to target the online infrastructure of Iran.

He declared that the weakness of the safety services structure had led to the recent blazes in the petrochemical plants, and called for the creation of strong safety services in Mahshahr and Assaluyeh, and by those involved in carrying out the oil extraction in Ahwaz.146 In light of the Iranian regime’s oppression of ethnic minorities and denial of their basic rights for decades, these minorities may continue to target locations of economic importance and sensitive sites, in order to express their outrage at this gross injustice and at the deteriorating economic and security situation affecting their already impoverished areas, particularly the regions of Ahwaz, Kurdistan and Baluchistan.

»»Conclusions The past six months have seen a significant escalation in the attacks by insurgents against some Iranian government institutions, as well as against the forces of the Revolutionary Guards and the army, particularly in the provinces of Kurdistan and Baluchistan.

Iranian authorities continue their policy of random arrests and raids in a number of areas of Ahwaz.

There are new Iranian plans to censor courts on Ahwazi political and cultural activities.

Iranian officials have resumed their habitual attempts to blame others rather than examine the reasons and motives for the armed resistance movements; they are now pointing the finger at Saudi Arabia, accusing it of supporting and financing these oppressed groups.

The Revolutionary Guards often justify their clashes with the Baluchi liberation movements by falsely invoking the fight against drug smuggling, claiming that they are preventing the penetration of "Daesh," into Iranian territories, or claiming that they are targeting non-specific "enemies of the revolution," although they never refer to the actual reasons behind the insurgent movements, which are primarily due to poverty, unemployment, repression, and marginalisation.

The Iranian regime is fearful of uprisings against it by the long-oppressed non-Persian ethnic groups in Iran due to the state of polarization and the new regional balances, particularly since these groups are now receiving considerable support from the peoples in Arab nations. This is causing grave concern within the regime, which views this subject as a ticking time bomb and a possible central issue contributing to a region-wide conflict.

The Iranian regime also fears that some regional powers are using the grievances of Iran’s non-Persian peoples as a pretext to incite turmoil and to move the regional conflict

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into Iran itself through the provision of financial, political and media support for the liberation movements in these troubled regions.

A high proportion of the human rights violations and oppression carried out by the Iranian regime within Iran are perpetrated against non-Persian peoples and religious minorities in the country.

Iran has concluded that pursuing its long-time policy of executions of activists, whom it misrepresents as criminals, has not produced the desired result.

In order to mitigate the international criticism of the executions, Iranian regime officials took the initiative to call for the commutation of the death penalty for drug-related offenses, though not for other crimes.

The limited discussion on the reduction of the death penalty for drug-related offenses proves that the regime intends to continue its policy of executions in the other regions for the foreseeable future.

Despite the widespread use of ‘War on Terror’-style propaganda by the Iranian regime’s media and the declarations that the regime is supposedly combating Daesh, Iran has notably not been exposed to any attacks by the terrorist group.

Economic and security motives lie behind the Iranian regime’s arrests and imprisonment of citizens with dual nationality in Iran. The primary economic motive is to prevent those with dual nationality from competing economically with businesses and investment led by the Revolutionary Guards, with the security issue used as a pretext by the Revolutionary Guards to prevent foreigners from entering the country supposedly in order to thwart the security threat they pose.

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Economic part In this part of the strategic report on the economic factors during the second half of 2016, we will focus on three main themes, which reveal the macroeconomic indicators and which helped to shape the Iranian economy in the covered period.

We also examine the effects on the vital sectors of the economy and measure the impact on Iranian citizens’ livelihoods, exploring the progress and possible future trends for each of the three themes.

The first theme addresses the most important economic indicators for Iran during the past six months, suggesting possible scenarios for future economic growth in Iran based on these indicators. The second theme refers to the evolution of the banking sector in the year following the nuclear deal and to possible upcoming changes in Iran’s exchange rate by the end of 2017, while the third theme measures the standard of living of Iranian citizens and the degree to which the regime’s policy has been influenced by the economic variables to date and in the future.

»»First Axis: Iranian economy indicators and future scenarios Introduction Iran's economy during the second half of 2016, experienced a range of different economic variables, some of which were positive, such as the ability to almost double oil exports, and attaining the ability to re-attract investments in the global energy companies, many of which had avoided investment in Iran for fear of being affected by the international sanctions imposed on the country. Along with the increased investment in the non-oil sector geared to the local consumer, and the increasing exports of non-oil merchandise, other sectors, including airlines and tourism, also achieved remarkable growth, with the government already formulating a plan to make the tourism sector a primary source of foreign income for the country's future, in addition to enabling Iran to restore part of its funds frozen abroad, estimated at tens of billions of dollars.

The past six months have seen some of the negative economic variables divided into internal indicators, such as the deterioration of the exchange rate and the loss of a significant portion of its value, which resulted in worrying implications for inflation and a reduced purchasing power for citizens, along with lower rates of consumption and production.

The Iranian government also raised the amount offered in cash support for thousands of families in recent months in the context of removing subsidies for millions of families in order to reduce government spending and unveil economic austerity policies during the next phase despite the continued record high rates of unemployment in recent months, as this policy contradicts with the economic

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status quo. Meanwhile, several obstacles continue to impede foreign investment, despite the government's implementation of new policies to support its growth plans.

Without confronting and eliminating these obstacles, while targeting high growth rates, without an accurate determination of how to finance these plans and the absence of a unified strategic vision between the political leadership and the religious leadership of Iran on the increasing economic growth mechanisms, in addition to the continued financial corruption that hampers growth efforts and economic reforms. Besides the internal indicators and the foreign challenges indicators that have occurred during the past few months, such as Iran's dependence on oil revenues, reference may also be made to creating a higher risk if prices did not go up, and the failure of the "OPEC" efforts to increase prices after the installation of the oil production size of the Member States. Furthermore, Iran was planning to produce a much higher volume than the existing frozen production, in addition to the negative impact of Trump's success in the US elections on the investments coming to Iran and the volume of trade exchange between the state and its foreign partners. A further aspect is the return of the strained economic relations between Iran and the countries of the outside world as a result of the disagreements in the foreign policy of the state and its interference in the armed conflicts in the region.

We will separate and analyze the following economic changes experienced by Iran over the past months, both positive and negative groups, and then project scenarios for the path of economic growth in Iran in the near future based on the economic changes experienced by the Iranian economy recently. This enables us to build more than one future scenario according to the quality of these variables and the strength of its impact on the course of economic growth for Iran.

»»Positive signs during the last six months and their economic repercussions Iran has been able to almost double the size of its oil exports by the end of 2016 after the lifting of the oil embargo following the nuclear deal and the doubling of financial revenue and was able to re-attract major investments from prominent energy companies after those investments were lost during the period of the sanctions. One of the most prominent returnees in 2016 is the French energy giant " TOTAL " with its first international investment in the energy sector since the lifting of sanctions, followed by the company "Shell". After six years from ceasing its operations in Iran, "TOTAL" signed one of the main items of the agreement with an investment of $ 4.8 billion for the development phase 11 of the South Pars field in partnership with the China National Petroleum Corporation and "Petro pars" of Iran, an agreement that is supposed to be completed in early 2017.

This bold step taken by the ”TOTAL” will encourage other energy companies to proceed with the investment in the energy sector in Iran as long as international conditions are favorable.

Iran, upon introducing a new model for the agreements of oil and gas known as the "Iranian oil contract", will enable foreign investors to enter into a partnership with Iranian companies and offers the best incentives as opposed to previous purchase transactions.

This represents a motivational step to attract investors to work in this sector, and it is

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expected to come with good results. Iran is also focused on new contracts and requires the completion of a large number of the projects using the local workforce in order to cope with the high unemployment crisis amid Iranian young people, particularly university graduates, who are associated with the highest rate of unemployment in the Iranian society.

Investments also increased in consumer-related non-oil sectors such as at industry level. Iran is a massive and growing consumer market requiring large investments in order to meet the consumer market needs and fill the productivity gap in the market, with many of its factories either operating on a part-time basis or suspending their operations.

They are reliant on foreign investments for advancing their development, which depends on the extent of the government facilities provided to investors and the improvement of the investment climate for attracting foreign capitals and the increasing integration of the Iranian economy into the global economy.

The exports of non-oil-related merchandise also grew by 6% during the first half of 2016 compared to the same period in 2015,147 accounting for $ 4.35 billion during the first seven months of 2016, according to official data.

Some sectors, including airlines and tourism, have seen a remarkable growth recently, with a significant increase in the number of flights expected in the near-term following the end of a crisis over an agreement on passenger transport with the US aviation authorities, which ended at the end of 2016 with Iran’s purchase of almost 200 civilian passenger aircraft from the American Boeing company and the European Airbus firm. 148 The Iranian air travel sector is expected to be revitalized after the United States allowed Airbus to sell 106 civilian passenger aircraft to Iran, with both domestic and overseas flights expected to increase, as Iran restores flights to some of the world capitals after a long period of lacking the necessary planes and equipment. Similarly, Iran’s hotel sector also expects to see a sharp increase in bookings together with a surge in direct and indirect employment in the tourism sector.

The Iranian government is banking heavily on growth in the tourism sector, with a plan in place to make tourism the leading sector in terms of income generation via foreign currency by 2025. The government has already taken concrete steps towards achieving this objective , investing in a renovation programme in order to update a number of the country’s ageing hotels, as well as investing in the aviation sector and implementing a maritime tourism transport programme in collaboration with neighbouring countries in the Gulf, particularly the Sultanate of Oman, so as to allow tourists to travel by boat between the ports of Chabahar in Iran and the Omani capital of Muscat, which began operating at the end of 2016.

The government is hoping that growth in the tourism sector will help to reduce the country’s dependence on oil and gas, as well as help to boost its foreign currency reserves and increase employment in the areas of tourism and related services, thus helping to alleviate the current unemployment crisis.

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Finally, Iran's central bank has been able to recover part of the funds previously frozen in overseas banks. The overall sum is estimated at the US $30 billion, the bulk of which is still frozen in European, American and Asian banks. When the Iranian government is able to restore the remainder of the funds frozen overseas, estimated to be between the US $100 and 150 billion, this will boost the level of the country’s cash reserves and help to strengthen the stability of the domestic currency and as well as fund local development plans if the capital is used wisely.

Over the past six months, however, a series of obstacles and negative economic indicators have emerged that may pose challenges to achieving the targeted economic growth; some of these are internal indicators, while others are of external nature.

We start with the challenging internal indicators. The first of these is the constant deterioration of the Iranian Riyal currency exchange rate, particularly in 2016, which has lost 17 percent of its value, coupled with the negative repercussions of this on the Iranian economy. The fall of the local currency's exchange rate against foreign currencies has led to an increase in the cost of imported goods, particularly in the case of manufacturing equipment and modern technology, thus hindering the renovation plans for the local industry, which has suffered the worst effects of the economic sanctions imposed on Iran for many years in this sector.

Secondly, the deterioration of the exchange rates has an additional negative impact on citizens, with the resulting rising inflation halting economic growth, resulting in decreased consumption levels and a declining purchasing power among citizens, adversely affecting the families already suffering due to a limited income, with the production rates also falling as a result. During 2016 alone, the Iranian Toman lost around 17% of its value by year-end compared to the beginning of the year.

Thirdly, the primary victim of the deteriorating exchange rate is represented by the government’s austerity plans to raise direct cash support for a large proportion of Iranian households in recent months.149 This support was intended to compensate families by increasing subsidies for some essential goods such as bread, electricity, and fuel, and to compensate for the decline in their purchasing power. It is worth mentioning that the direct cash support from the government was the primary cause of the decline in poverty rates in Iran until 2013, after which the poverty rates rebounded when the support was reduced. It is likely, therefore, that Iran will see a further increase in poverty rates in the near future with the government planning to completely eliminate the planned subsidies in a bid to reduce expenses.

This trend for an austerity government is likely to have an inevitable negative effect on future growth rates since the fall in income means further reduced consumer spending and a consequent drop in the production rates leading to an increase in commodities on the market and a spiral of recession. This was indeed the government’s greatest concern for the Iranian economy throughout the economic sanctions period.

Fourthly, Iran continues to suffer from high unemployment rates with over 12.5 percent of the country’s workforce out of work as of the end of 2016. This follows a brief

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improvement on the record unemployment levels over recent years, with the number of unemployed individuals increasing by a further 700,000 by the year-end.

This rate is the highest recorded in the past five years, with continuing public discontent over the low number of jobs available for the country’s young people; indeed, helping to create more job opportunities for young workers was one of key election promises of President Rouhani in his first term. Nevertheless, around 7 million Iranians are currently unemployed, with most of them being young people with university qualifications.

Furthermore, several obstacles continue to impede the foreign investment that the Iranian government is banking on in order to raise economic growth rates and advance development in various sectors, and particularly in the energy sector. Despite the government’s best efforts, these obstacles continue to deter foreign investors, with the government being unable to successfully address them and to achieve the desired growth.

Among the most prominent obstacles to attracting direct investment are the poor rates of exchange for foreign investors, with both the official and black market exchange rates increasing the cost of doing business, leading to faltering financial budgets and additional economic burdens for potential investors.

In addition, differences remain in the strategic foreign investment visions of the government and the state’s religious leadership, with the government’s objective to attract foreign direct investment curtailed to some degree by the sixth Five-Year Development Plan (2015-2020), which is supervised and shaped by the objectives of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who prioritizes a need for an increased reliance on a “resistance economy”. The basis of Khamenei’s “resistance economy” is to encourage the resumption of efforts in order to make Iran entirely economically self-reliant, by implementing this isolationist strategy, which is unwelcoming to foreign investment in sectors such as energy, and industry that desperately requires more urgent investments compared to other sectors.

The investment requirements of the oil and gas sector are estimated at around $200 billion, a sum which is not available to the Iranian government without foreign aid if we disregard the technical and technological shortcomings of this sector. The lack of investment in this area will hinder economic reforms and the implementation

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thereof is becoming steadily more difficult because of the aging technology currently being used, which is left over from the years of economic siege. Iran’s oil and gas sector requires years of research and development funding in order to bear real fruit and to become a reliable industry, with the biggest loser of the current system being the Iranian economy, which is suffering as a result of the conflict between rival political approaches in Iran, one led by Iran's Supreme leader, and the other led by President Hassan Rouhani.

In the same context, the unrealistic targeted growth rates are to be particularly observed, both in the next government budget and in the sixth Five-Year Plan. The upcoming budget sets the target growth rate at 7.7%, while the Sixth Development Plan sets it at 8.5%, with neither determining the means of financing this wildly optimistic rate. This has been a recurrent problem in the case of previous Iranian governments’ budgets, which failed to recognise that it is not sufficient to rely on finance from the proceeds of foreign investment alone since the volatile nature of Iran's political relations with other nations and major powers are dependent on foreign investment as a basis for an unrealistic and implausible method of financing.

Finally, the ongoing financial corruption in Iran is severely impeding development efforts and drains billions from the country's wealth in a number of ways, including massive tax evasion, which is estimated to account for annual losses to the treasury of between 20 and 30 thousand billion tomans (between US$6 billion - US$9 billion), a significant sum particularly when considering that tax is a major source of revenue for the government budget, as well as for the state finance expenses.

Corruption continues to be endemic in Iran, with Transparency International’s latest report rating the country at number 131 from a total of 167 countries worldwide in terms of corruption.

Other methods of financial corruption include illegally established commissions conducting deals with foreign companies estimated to be billions of dollars worth, as well as bribery and embezzlement, with senior officials up to the level of government ministers involved in embezzling billions and paying massive bribes. Such cases are occasionally covered by the Iranian media, including: 1- The issue of astronomical salaries for government officials during 2016, with the current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani accused of paying salaries to government officials which are allegedly more than 10 times the average of a conventional salary, with one Ministry of Health official reportedly receiving a monthly salary of 200 million Tomans (US$60,000). These allegations are a particularly sensitive aspect for Rouhani’s government since he led a major campaign in order to address the corruption of the previous government under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with Rouhani forced to apologise and vow an investigation of the alleged corruption after being severely embarrassed when facing the same scandal.150 2- A number of relatives of the state’s religious leaders, including the son of Ali Khamenei, have been involved in corruption-related cases, with Mojtaba Ali Khamenei, the son of the Supreme Leader, facing unofficial allegations for embezzling an estimated 1.6 billion Euros in oil revenues; the monies were reportedly deposited in his bank

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account by the Central Bank of Iran in 2011, although following revelations about the case, the scandal was quickly hushed up, with no formal action taken against him.

3- Another case involved the head of the Iranian Judiciary, Sadiq Larijani, who was accused of receiving bank transfers to his account exceeding US$310 million from 63 different bank accounts, with the funds reportedly representing financial guarantees paid by the defendants in court cases. When MP Mahmoud Sadeqi demanded that the head of the Iranian parliament’s economic transparency commission open an investigation into the involvement of Larijani and a number of state officials in the controversial case, Iranian police surrounded his [Sadeqi’s] home at night and arrested him over unspecified allegations by order of the judiciary.

4- Another controversial case involved the prominent Iranian businessman Babak Zanjani, who was accused of embezzling large sums of up to $2.7 billion in state funds in the form of commission within a network involving several former government officials during the former government of President Ahmadinejad. Zanjani was subsequently sentenced to death for his involvement in the case, with a large number of those allegedly involved also arrested. The case is still underway due to the large number of defendants involved, including companies and government banks and financial institutions.

5- The form of corruption known as "Shandiz", in which officials with state-backed real estate companies have been accused of embezzling imaginary funds, with the amount to date estimated at US $27 billion; those affected have demanded the return of their stolen money or of the apartments for which they have received only a fraction of the price.

6- Another scandal involved loans from the state-run Provident Fund for educationalists which has provided credit facilities for loans worth 8,000 billion Tomans ($2.4 billion), with the indictments targeting IMF officials who have reportedly received massive bribes in exchange for credit facilities.

These are only a few of the many cases of massive state corruption exposed by the press in recent years.

The continued prevalence of financial and administrative corruption in Iran and the lack of any adequate and serious efforts to confront it continues to hamper the state’s efforts to increase the rates of development, particularly in the light of the lack of transparency and of accurate data and information, with the government being involved in large-scale cover-ups of many incidences of corruption, which are only disclosed when they become a useful tool for putting pressure on political opponents, and between competing political blocs in the country; this shows that there is no real political will to tackle the widespread corruption, with no serious steps being taken in order to do so.

The most important external challenges likely to affect Iran’s future economic growth rates are focused on three important aspects: Firstly, reference is made to the need to stabilize oil export revenues after stabilizing the country’s oil production levels from the beginning of January 2017 at a level of 3.8 million barrels a day, according to the agreement with the OPEC. This decision was made despite

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the absence of rising prices in the form desired by those responsible, as was the decision to stabilise the oil production volume, which is contrary to Iran’s plans to increase the oil production to more than 4 million barrels by the end of the Iranian year, that is to say in March 2017, with this measure intended to support growth and increase cash income.

Oil prices may not rise as expected after a decision to reduce the production at the end of November last year, particularly since a number of countries, including Libya and Nigeria, did not participate in the decision to reduce the production at the time, being more concerned with the security conditions which temporarily affected the oil output; these countries may increase the production rates as soon as the security conditions improve.

In this case, the resulting increase in the global oil supply means that the price of oil will fall once again and that OPEC’s decision will be a major success.

Secondly, the election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States of America will affect Iran's economy directly and indirectly, through financial restrictions on Iranian companies, which have financial dealings outside the country, and the expected imposition of new sanctions. Washington is also studying the possible introduction of legislation in order to impose higher fines on international companies doing business with Iranian firms in which the Revolutionary Guard own more than 25 percent, an escalation of the existing policy, which imposes fines on firms dealing with Iranian companies in which the Revolutionary Guards’ holdings exceed 50 percent.

The US Congress has also extended the existing sanctions on Iran, some dating back to 1996, which will certainly exacerbate the existing challenges for Iran in relation to the trade exchange rates between Iran and the outside world, as well as potentially impeding foreign investment in Iran for fear of US sanctions, with the growth rate of future investments expected to be inevitably affected by losing capitals after Iran was able to attract investors relatively well after the nuclear deal, particularly in the fields of conventional and renewable energy.

One of the supporting indicators to these expectations in recent months is the declining level of trade between Iran and the US during the month of November 2016 after Donald Trump won the presidential election. Trade declined by as much as 80 percent in the previous month, falling to $9.7 million compared to $51.5 million dollars in the month of October of the same year, according to the US Census Center.

The future scenario for foreign investment in Iran will be influenced by its relations with the world and how these influence the regional and global environment, particularly in the case of the international companies associated with the US financial system and the energy industry in the United States, the largest producer and consumer of energy in the world.

The advent of the Trump presidency has ushered in a state of anticipation and uncertainty for foreign investors, with no clear vision of what the overall joint work plan will be at the end of the period of the deal signed by the US with Iran in mid-2015, which has eased sanctions on Iran for the time being. There is also uncertainty over what new sanctions may be imposed and approved by the Congress on Iran; what is clear, however, is the hostility declared by Trump to Iran, and his desire to further escalate this matter; it

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appears very likely that the Trump administration will impose more severe sanctions on the Iranian economy, or even cancel the nuclear deal with Iran.

In this unclear climate, foreign investment will be delaying the implementation of already concluded agreements and the beginning of actual work on the existing deals.

Some oil and gas companies may resort to the tactics of delays and evasion in order to escape the market in a timely manner, including those such as France’s petrochemical giant Total and Malaysia’s Petronas, which decided to return to investing in Iran after the easing the sanctions initially imposed in 2004; both of the aforementioned companies had agreed to develop Phase 11 in the South Pars gas field.

The two companies’ procrastination coincided with the deterioration of the relations between Iran and the West following the 2004 sanctions, with the agreements not working out as initially planned; Iran eventually had to hand over the project to the National Oil Company of China in 2009, but the latter failed to achieve the desired progress, withdrawing its participation at the end of 2012, with Total deciding to try again in 2016 following the lifting of the sanctions.

Third: Economic relations between Iran and other nations are once again strained due to Iran’s foreign policy position and increased interference and military intervention in regional conflicts in some Middle East countries, including its ongoing support for armed groups listed as a terrorist.

The continuation of these tensions suggests that the indirect obstacles impeding the growth of the Iranian economy are likely to persist, including problems with overseas bank transfers to and from Iran from, although these have theoretically already been lifted in accordance with the 2015 JCPOA. This is likely to lead to the further international isolation of Iran as it grapples with its domestic problems and loses out on foreign investment to its overseas competitors, with the depletion of financial resources likely to curb its ability to continue its involvement in regional military conflicts. Furthermore, despite the lifting of international sanctions over a year ago, the level of international banking transactions with Iranian banks remains modest, and it is certainly not commensurate with the size of the Iranian economy.

In the beginning of 2017, the British company BP, one of the world's largest oil companies, announced its official withdrawal from deals on the Iranian market, in which it had been set to help develop oil and gas fields. This was a significant decision and had some impact on Iran’s deals with BP’s two biggest competitors, Royal Dutch and Total, with many predicting that smaller foreign oil and gas companies could follow BP’s lead.

The reason given by BP for its withdrawal was that this was a purely commercial decision, with the company citing the possibility of larger investment revenues in other regions internationally. Unofficially, however, the real reason behind BP’s decision was political; with 40 percent of the company owned by American shareholders, and Americans accounting for 30 percent of its employees, Iran’s prohibition on American citizens’ involvement in Iranian business activities, the company was placed in an awkward situation.

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»»Two future scenarios With reference to both the positive and negative indicators mentioned above, we conclude that there are two possible scenarios for the progress of the economic growth in Iran in 2017; the first is to suppose that the Iranian economy will continue to grow at the current rate based on a number of observations, while the second scenario assumes a possible decline in the economic growth rates due to the presence of a wide range of challenges which may impede the economic development.

The first scenario: According to this scenario, we expect a high economic growth rate to be achieved in Iran over the course of 2016 to continue at rates ranging between 4 percent and 4.4 percent, reaching a possible growth rate of 4.6 percent over the course of 2017 with a decline in the fiscal deficit of the budget also predicted by the World Bank.151 This can be achieved if the Iranian government is able to overcome the political and economic challenges hindering increased growth, and the economy continues to grow at the rates it formerly achieved in 2016 without encountering any irreversible factors.

Achieving this objective would also bring about a surplus in the balance of trade as a result of increased oil exports, bringing them up to the previous pre-sanctions level of around 3.8 million barrels per day.152 This would also entail an increase in non-oil exports

Data Source: Central Bank of Iran

This scenario is based on a number of factors, predominantly among which is an increase in foreign investments, particularly in the energy sector, as well as raising fiscal revenues if oil prices increase after the implementation of the OPEC agreement reducing the production levels which came into force in January 2017 and if all the members adhere to their commitment to freeze production without any increase. This also requires a number of other conditions, including an increase in the export of oil and gas products and the development of petrochemical industries and of more oil and gas fields after the agreements signed by the Iranian government, which followed the lifting of the international sanctions in the beginning of 2016. Deals between the Iranian oil and gas sector with major companies such as France’s Total , the Anglo-Dutch corporation Shell, Britain’s BP, and Italy’s Eni, along with the presence of other major international companies in Iran may encourage other international firms to invest in the country’s energy sector, particularly with the introduction of new oil contracts issued by the government in order to provide more incentives in order to attract investors to this sector.

Toman Exchange Rate to US Dollar

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with higher investments, taking advantage of lower overseas export costs following the lifting of the longstanding commercial and banking sanctions, particularly with the European Union, an important Iranian trade partner for the export of carpets, oil, and spare parts. Iran also needs to import large quantities of manufacturing equipment, along with technological expertise and hi-tech products, in order to ensure an increase in non-oil exports, boost economic growth rates and increase foreign currency earnings.

Hypothetically, attracting more foreign investment in Iran’s oil sector and increasing its non-oil exports is possible on the condition that the country overcomes the current domestic and external obstacles to attracting foreign investment and resolves the obstacles impeding bank transfers to and from Iran; achieving this depends on improving the political and economic ties between Iran and other nations, and particularly with the United States during the coming period.

Achieving this would promote the restoration of the remainder of the funds frozen abroad and provide opportunities for economic growth, particularly if the funds are invested in productive projects, thus increasing the production rates in order to help in operations, as well as stimulating the labor market and stabilizing the local currency.

The second scenario Unlike the first scenario, the current scenario is expected to see a reduced economic growth in Iran over the course of 2017 compared to the same period in 2016 based on a combination of negative indicators monitored during 2016, and particularly in the second half of 2016; this scenario, predicted by the International Monetary Fund, visualizes growth rates of between 3 percent and 3.5 percent.153 The IMF reached this assessment following a visit to Iran by a delegation of the IMF at the end of 2016 after a break of two decades. During the visit, the officials suggested that the Iranian government should request funding loans from the IMF. This scenario foresees negative GDP growth rates in Iran, with this assumption based on the existence of a set of significant risks and challenges that may pose difficulties for the chances of increasing Iran's economy growth rates in the short term if the government is unable to overcome them. These serious problems pose significant challenges in a number of vital domestic sectors, in addition to the external challenges which are no less important in the degree of influence on the Iranian economy.

Based on the current scenario, a range of domestic challenges is likely to affect the future growth rates, including the existence of a number of obstacles impeding the direct foreign investments which the Iranian government considers to be the most important basis of growth, as well as the deteriorating exchange rate and its negative impact on economic and social conditions, along with the increase in inflation rates and financial defaults for companies and manufacturing facilities, high unemployment and continuing financial corruption, all of which hinder the growth and economic reform efforts.

The government seems unlikely to formulate the necessary plans and solutions to these crises in the near future, with the recession continuing in the industrial and consumerist sectors, and with increasing numbers of factories either closing or operating at reduced

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capacity. This, in turn, reduces the chances of lowering the unemployment rates in the near term, unless the government takes serious steps to reopen the factories that have suspended production and to provide financial support to the manufacturers facing difficulties in order to boost their production.

Besides the domestic challenges, other external challenges contributing to the likelihood of this scenario will affect future growth rates, most notably the threat of Iran's dependence on oil revenues if prices do not rise and OPEC’s efforts fail in increasing current prices after the introduction of an oil production cap by the member states including Iran. Other factors are the negative impact of Trump's success in the US elections on the investments coming to Iran and the low volume of trade with the outside world.

Increasing tensions in the political relations between Iran and other countries as a result of the Iranian regime’s armed intervention in regional conflicts will result in further economic pressure, with this intervention also further adding to the increased spending outside the country's borders and waste of financial resources on activities which will not benefit the local economy or the Iranian citizens, and will exacerbate the crisis of the fiscal deficit instead of being used in order to drive economic growth.

»»Second Axis: the Iranian banking system exchange rate a year after the nuclear deal and the direction of future progress.

Introduction

The power of any 21st-century economy is measured by several parameters; amongst the primary measures are the power and sophistication of the country’s banking system, the level and effectiveness of services provided to citizens and domestic and foreign investors, and the volume of financial and technical assistance and facilities available.

In Iran’s case, we are talking about the banking system of a country that has been under economic sanctions for many years, leading inevitably to greatly reduced strength and efficiency in its banking system, whose foreign activities were effectively suspended, leaving this sector wholly dependent on its domestic financial services and unable to send or receive funds outside Iran.

After the signing of the nuclear deal, Iran’s banking sector was freed from the restraints, which had limited it under the terms of the nuclear agreement signed on paper. This does not mean, however, that everything that was signed would be applied on the ground. That is why the conditions of this vital sector, more than a year after the nuclear agreement was implemented, need to be evaluated to determine the extent of its development and to try to anticipate the future course of its movements. These areas are covered in this report. It should also be noted that despite the agreement, the domestic currency exchange rate in Iran declined in the second half of 2016, leading to a crisis with both economic and social repercussions, despite the increase in state revenue from foreign exchange and the achievement of a surplus in the trade balance following the resumption of oil exports. Economically, this was theoretically supposed to lead to currency reevaluation even if Iran’s currency declined against others. At least Iran is not like China, which reduced the value of its currency deliberately to increase the

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competitive advantage for its export market.

We can conclude that the pace of decline in Iranian currency has not subsided in the period since the signing of the nuclear deal, with several factors influencing the stability of the currency market, which is linked to the structure of the Iranian economy rather than to the nuclear deal. This is what we will analyze in detail in this report, which will next attempt to anticipate what the Iranian Tomans exchange rate may look like at the end of 2017.

First: The banking system: More than a year has passed since the Joint Action Plan came into force (the comprehensive Joint Action Plan nuclear agreement) between Iran and the group of five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. This plan lifted the ban on the international banking deal with Iran's banks and the possibility of transfer to and from it internationally. Iran has been eagerly waiting for this matter because it desperately needs to attract foreign investment, which it relies on as a major foundation to fund the sixth- Five-Year Development Plan, as well as to take over energy export revenues to new markets. The markets recovered after the lifting of the oil export ban, especially the European markets, which stopped trading for the bank with Iran during the period of sanctions. During this time, the International Trading System, “Swift” for Iranian banks, was decommissioned.

Despite the lifting of the international embargo on dealing with Iranian banks since the beginning of the previous year, the practical reality is seen in the routine warnings issued to international banks, particularly major European banks, over dealings with their Iranian counterparts, and in the Iranian regime's fears of falling under prospective US financial penalties in the event of resurgent tensions in relations between Iran and the United States.

Among the most prominent achievements of the nuclear deal for Iran in the financial sphere was the opening of a number of European banks’ branches in Tehran, along with the reciprocal opening of branches of Iranian banks in Europe. This followed a series of negotiations between Iran and several European countries on reestablishing banking relations. Valiollah Seif, the Governor of the Iranian Central Bank, led these on Iran’s part with Iranian banks subsequently opening branches in Greece, Germany, France, Austria, Hungary, and other European countries, although the transactions are still confined to small banks.

The major financial institutions and corporations in the United States are still unwilling to cooperate with Iran despite attempts to reassure the White House before the end of former President Barack Obama’s term in office, with the US Treasury Department issuing new business guidelines in October 2016 which aimed to facilitate financial transactions in dollars between Iranian and American financial institutions. This allowed US banks and financial institutions who were previously banned from dealing with Iran to conclude some deals there in dollars, on the condition that remittances did not enter into the US financial system. In addition to this, another step was taken by the US Treasury Department in the same month to lift a complete ban on financial transactions

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with Iranian companies controlled by individuals included on a list of US sanctions.

Despite attempts by the previous administration to reassure American companies and institutions, many remain reluctant to enter the Iranian market, and inevitably this hesitation and caution will increase in the future in the event of Trump adopting a hardline policy towards Iran that could further escalate tensions between the two nations.

Second: The Iranian currency's exchange rate against the US dollar: When the nuclear agreement initially came into force in January 2016, i.e. over a year ago, the US dollar was equivalent to 3,000 Iranian Tomans (approximately equals to 10 US dollars) as a result of lifting the oil embargo and increased oil exports, a primary source of foreign currency. To achieve the balance of trade surplus, it is assumed theoretically that increasing dollar reserves with the Iranian government would result in a rise in the value of Iranian currency against the dollar, particularly as dollars become available in Iran again after shortages caused by the economic blockade. When one follows the actual exchange value of the dollar against the Iranian Toman, however, we find that this logical economic interpretation does not apply in this case, with one dollar equivalent to 3,170 Tomans in October 2016, and 170 Tomans more than the dollar value in January of the same year.

One month after that in November, the Toman’s value fell further, with one dollar standing at 3,220 Tomans, with another decline in the New Year. This all took place despite the previous sanctions against Iran having been lifted a year earlier and Iran seeing a sharp increase in dollar reserves. What were the reasons for this continuous decline, and what does the future hold for the Iranian currency in light of these changes?

We seek to answer the following:

• The reasons for the deterioration of the exchange rate, despite an easing of sanctions.

There are several reasons for the continued decline of the Iranian currency exchange rate despite the passage of more than a year since the nuclear deal was implemented.

Some of these reasons are due to external factors, while others are the result of the existence of structural problems and internal crises afflicting the Iranian economy and reflected by extension on exchange rates.

First: the existence of a series of cumulative exogenous variables: At the beginning of 2017, the dollar curve continued to rise against Tomans, with the dollar hitting a new record high against the Iranian currency, reaching 3,300 Tomans per dollar. This crisis has old and cumulative roots, which led to the current exchange rate; its sources are not the result of activities over recent days or months or the last year alone. Since the 1990s, Iran has gone through several transformations and changes in the exchange rate, which has been greatly affected by political tensions with the world powers, primarily the suffocating economic blockade imposed by the USA in the ‘90s.

This was followed by international sanctions at the beginning of the second millennium, the draconian sanctions imposed by the West in 2012 in response to the regime’s development of its nuclear program had a strong effect on the currency exchange rate,

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with the greatest impact caused by the imposition of a ban on Iranian oil exports, the backbone of the Iranian economy and by far the largest source of foreign currency for many years after the US blockade. Every political or economic crisis has affected the Iranian currency's exchange rate against the dollar, and by extension against other foreign currencies.

Exchange rate of Tomans vs. dollars from 1992-2016 (Data Source: Central Bank of Iran) The previous graph shows the large spikes in the official exchange rate over the 24-year period from 1992 to 2016, with the Toman first showing a significant rise against the dollar after 2001. The sharpest rise, of 430 percent in total, was seen between 2001 and 2003 as the US sanctions intensified, soaring from a rate of 143 Tomans per dollar, which it had maintained for the previous nine years, to hit 785 Tomans per dollar within two years.

The dollar continued to rise in value while the Toman continued falling, reaching 1,200 Tomans to the dollar in 2012 as the European sanctions were implemented. Thereafter, the Toman’s value fell even faster, reaching almost 2,500 Tomans to the dollar in 2013, an increase of 108 percent in one year, coinciding with the imposition of Western sanctions on Iranian oil exports.

Second: declining state reserves of foreign currency: Affected by the tense political relations with the West over more than two decades, there has been a commercial blockade over the same period, which intensified at the beginning of 2012 with the ban on oil exports, the main source of foreign currency for Iran, and the simultaneous drop in non-oil exports to European countries, in addition to the continuation of the freezing of Iran’s overseas funds and assets estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Although there is no confirmed official data on the volume and development of Iran's foreign currency reserves in recent years, various international sources indicate that it ranged between 115 and 125 billion dollars in 2015, while statements from the Minister of the Iranian economy in December 2016 indicated that the volume of Iran’s foreign reserves stood at around $100 billion, meaning a sharp fall in foreign reserves at a rate of between 15 and 20 percent in 2016, a major decline in just one year.

Third: the historic presence of more than one exchange price in Iran: There is more than one exchange rate in Iran, there is a fixed-rate government exchange rate and the free market exchange rate, with the second being the one more widely referenced after the introduction of a ban on foreign dealings with state-owned enterprises in March 2013. The free market exchange rate was the first of a series of measures taken by the Iranian government to control the tumbling exchange rate and the elimination of the parallel market. The government plans to activate the second phase of its program to introduce a unified exchange rate in March 2017 when banks will deal only on the basis of the free market price. It is worth mentioning that Iran was set to introduce

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a unified exchange rate during the nineties but the policy was suspended, thus opening the way for the return of the parallel market.

Fourth: the growing role of the parallel market in Iran: The increasing role of the parallel market in Iran means that the government has been unable to tighten control over exchange rates to accommodate the difference between the two prices due to the lack of government-owned banks able to meet the demand for foreign currency. This has led to a situation in which requests for foreign currency are directed to the parallel market rather than state-owned banks to meet the needs of foreign exchange but at a price higher than the official price.

The difference between the two rates can rise to around 20 percent and sometimes more, reaching a dollar exchange rate on the free market of around 3,900 Tomans to the dollar at the beginning of 2017 after remaining at approximately 3,500 Tomans to the dollar over the previous seven months.

Fifth: dependence on unstable sources of foreign currency and the continuation of banking restrictions: Given Iran’s increased dependency on the fickle and unstable source of oil export revenues as its primary means of obtaining foreign currency, the government and state are more likely to suffer financial instability, especially after the decline in oil prices two years ago, leaving the government with a budget deficit. This situation is likely to worsen, particularly if the decrease in foreign currency revenues coincides with continuing increased military spending in regional armed conflicts.

The continuing restrictions and obstacles imposed on bank transfers that are still in place affect exchange rates to some degree and increase the cost of obtaining foreign currency, ultimately significantly raising the price. These restrictions also lead to delayed access to the funds obtained from oil exports and pressure on the dollar reserves, with rising imports in return after the easing of international sanctions.

Sixth: Rising imports: The easing of the international embargo since the beginning of 2016 led to increased pressure on Iran’s foreign reserves to make up for years of deprivation, both at the individual level to meet the needs of various commodities and at the level of manufacturers whose production technology became outdated, leaving them unable to upgrade their production facilities by introducing new equipment to enhance manufacturing rates.

Seventh: Economic recession: The economic recession has led to long-term stagnation in manufacturing, forcing many manufacturers to either cut back or end their operations for long periods, with nonoil exports falling and foreign currency sources drying up. As a result of the recession, the domestic economic growth rate continued to be negative in 2012 and 2013 before recovering slightly in 2014, although only at a modest rate of growth.

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Eighth: Increased liquidity (cash flow) in recent years: Liquidity is a key factor in maintaining a state’s financial stability, affecting both inflation and currency values. In June 2016, the level of cash flow in Iran was 29 percent higher than the same period in 2015, although the growth rate did not exceed 4.5 percent. This higher than average cash flow, exceeding the economic growth rate, led to rising prices and declining currency values.

Ninth: Extreme vulnerability of the Iranian currency market to fluctuating external events: The Iranian currency market is affected by a number of external factors, the latest of which is the impact of Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential election.

Trump is known for his strong opposition to Iranian regime policy, leading to increasingly pessimistic predictions about the future of the Iranian economy following his election win due to his repeated threats to cancel the nuclear deal.

Threats such as this have a strong negative impact on the influx of foreign investment into Iran, increasing concerns among foreign investors who are fearful of being subjected to possible American financial penalties. This is an issue of major concern to investors since Trump’s presidency, and as such has had a significant impact on the Iranian economy.

On the other hand, Trump’s success has boosted hopes and optimistic forecasts for the performance of the US economy, which in turn has reflected directly on the US dollar's strength globally against other currencies, including the Iranian one. Certainly, after the disclosure of his protectionist policy concerning American industry and manufacturing, along with the elimination of some trade agreements, this deprived the US Treasury of tariffs and increasing competition in foreign markets for American products. This, along with other similar economic trends, has strengthened hopes for a stronger US economy and has reflected positively on the American stock exchange, and in rising dollar values against other global currencies, certainly including the Iranian Toman.

• Attempting to analyze the possible future direction of the Iranian banking system and currency exchange rates… where to next?

In regards to developments in Iran’s banking system, we can say that the Iranian government succeeded in making some progress in this sector after the nuclear agreement, and was able to increase the financial facilities provided for local companies and manufacturers, as well as closing a large number of non-performing ‘phantom’ bank accounts. The government was also able to open branches of some Iranian banks in Europe, as well as opening branches of some Western banks in Tehran to facilitate rising rates of business transactions with European countries, especially in Eastern Europe.

However, progress is limited since Iran is only dealing with smaller banks, with the larger European banking institutions still holding back from involvement despite improving trade relations with Iran following the nuclear deal, not to mention the complete absence of major American banks. Thus, the future growth and development in this sector and its openness to the world needs more time and depends on the improvement in Iran's relations with the USA in the first place.

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The cancellation of restrictions on Iranian bank transfers is unlikely to happen in the near-term due to pressure from the United States, reinforced by the presence of Trump at the helm who is still threatening to cancel the nuclear deal and continues to threaten Iran with more sanctions, in addition to the US Congress extending the previous sanctions on Iran, some dating back to 1996, towards the end of 2016.

The year that passed after the easing of sanctions on Iran, has proved that the United States remains the most powerful arbiter of the global financial system, with the ability to switch between the implementation of certain provisions of international conventions such as the nuclear deal, for example, meaning that the nuclear deal has become – as it was described by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei - just ink on paper.

The official dollar-Toman exchange rate by the end of the fourth quarter of 2017 could reach 3,400 Tomans per dollar using mathematical models based on average prices in the recent period, according to predictions made by the ‘Trading Economics’ site on global economic variables.154 Meanwhile, another scenario predicts that the Toman’s value could fall even further, positing a possible exchange rate of 4,900 Tomans to the dollar by the end of 2017.155 The decision of Iran's central bank to unify the exchange rates by the end of Iran’s fiscal year in March 2017, after allowing some banks free circulation of foreign currency in December 2016, will enhance the prospects for unification of the exchange rate at a low value for Tomans against the US dollar in the future.

Other indicators point to Tomans’ value declining further in the short term: these include the American economic policies adopted by the Trump administration, which boost the chances of a stronger US economy and increase the strength of the dollar against foreign currencies, in addition to raising the US Federal Reserve interest rate on the dollar in December 2016, meaning a strong likelihood of further increases in the interest rate on the dollar during 2017, which will further enhance the strength of the dollar against the Iranian Tomans and other foreign currencies.

On the other hand, we note that Iran’s hope of increasing its foreign currency reserves depends on to a large degree on oil prices returning to the levels seen two-and-a-half years ago. If this does happen, it may take time until the prices recover to their previous levels, with many variables affecting the possibility of it occurring; depending on an unstable source to provide foreign currency reserves to finance state expenditure is a major risk.

It is ironic that at the beginning of 2017, before the start of the new fiscal year (2017/2018), Iran had already briefly broken through the previous dollar exchange rate barrier of 3,300 Tomans before the Toman slightly regained its value, settling slightly below this figure. If Iran is determining the budget for the 2017-18 fiscal year on the basis of a 3,300 Toman per dollar exchange rate, how is it likely to look by the end of this period?

It’s also noteworthy that Iran’s continuing and increasing military expenditure on engagement in a number of regional conflicts beyond its borders is rapidly eroding the country’s remaining currency reserves, putting further pressure on future exchange

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rates if the volatile regional situation endures, and Iran continues to fund and engage in military conflicts on varying fronts in nations including Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.

Finally, it must be noted briefly that the economic and social consequences of a future decline in the Iranian currency exchange rate would highlight the economic consequences of falling exchange rates during a period of constantly rising inflation rates due to the high cost of imported goods and imported raw materials, which would also be reflected unfavorably in product prices on the market.

This decline also affects levels of domestic investment and increases financial costs, especially given the need to import foreign manufacturing equipment and to convert foreign investors' profits abroad. On the other hand, however, the exchange rate depreciation will offer positive export opportunities and a greater price advantage to offer a competitive edge for Iranian exports.

As for the social consequences of rising inflation, the falling real value of income and of consumers’ purchasing power, especially with modest growth rates and the suspension of production by many manufacturers resulting in high unemployment, rising inflation and reliance on imports to meet domestic requirement, is increasing the suffering of Iranian citizens, especially when the most basic commodities such as medicines and other essential items must be imported.

»»Third Axis: Iranian citizens’ standards of living - what comes next?

Iranian citizens suffered greatly during the periods of economic sanctions, which had a massive negative effect on the quality of life; after getting their hopes up for greater prosperity as a result of the nuclear deal, they are now finding that this optimism was misplaced and largely illusory. Although many Iranian politicians, led by the current president, Hassan Rouhani, promised great improvements in living conditions in the wake of the nuclear deal, Iranians are finding a year after economic sanctions were lifted, that standards of living are declining rather than improving, with 2016 seeing a drastic downturn.

As in any nation, citizens’ standard of living is affected by a wide variety of factors which interact to shape the living standards for the population. These include variables such as inflation rates, employment, growth in manufacturing and service sectors, and levels of government spending and investment in domestic and foreign sectors. Based on developments in these variables, we can provide a clearer picture of developments in Iranians’ standard of living after the nuclear deal and explore the possible direction for citizens' standard of living in 2017.

First: Future economic conditions and their impact on citizens' living standards: Here, we will focus on a number of economic variables, which affected events during the past year, focusing on the second half of the year, before analyzing the economic and social repercussions on the lives of citizens in Iran: 1- Two significant events occurred during the past six months which will inevitably have drastic consequences on citizens' living standards in the future if the government fails to take action to remedy the social situation; these were the government’s cancellation of

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financial subsidies for thousands of the poorest Iranian citizens, which were withdrawn in order to reduce the general deficit budget of the government, and the deterioration of the Iranian Toman’s exchange rate against foreign currencies.

The withdrawal of the aforementioned subsidies from over 200,000 Iranian citizens during the second half of 2016-won consent from the Iranian parliament which plans to expand the cancellation of subsidies to millions more. Implementation of this policy was previously postponed more than once for fear of popular anger but was recently approved with the approaching end of the first term of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.

The cancellation of financial subsidies paid to some 200,000 Iranian citizens will lead to a decline in living standards and increase the suffering of the poorest members of Iranian society.156 Expanding this program to remove financial support available to many fourmember families who rely on this money to live, will adversely affect at least one million people in the country.

Although this policy provides the government with additional financial resources, it has serious social consequences, increasing the suffering of the poorest families, while reducing the rates of consumption and aggregate demand for goods and services, and increasing the chances of a recession and the resulting negative effects for the market as economic growth slows down generally. The provision of direct cash support subsidies, introduced following the cancellation of subsidies for energy and bread in late 2010, was directly responsible for reducing the poverty rate in Iran from 15 percent to 9 percent between 2010 and 2013 on the basis of an estimated poverty line of $5.5 per day. Removal of this support means that poverty levels are likely to return to levels even worse than before.

The second event, which will certainly adversely affect living standards for Iranian citizen, is the aforementioned steep deterioration of the Iranian Toman’s exchange rate over the last few months in 2016 (the recent deterioration in the price of Iranian Tomans is part of the series declines which began with the second millennium and worsened in 2013 with the entry into force of ban on export of oil). It will be followed by the deterioration of the domestic foreign exchange rate against the rising price, inflation, and the high cost of imported goods, as well as the rising cost of raw materials involved in local manufacturing, and it will reflect on greatly increased prices of products.

The most profound impact will be on the poorest members of Iranian society, particularly with rising prices for staple foodstuffs and basic goods, such as food and medicine; high prices and a lack of any locally manufactured alternatives will lead to greater illness and increased morbidity and mortality rates in such difficult living conditions. The government will ultimately be forced to intervene to subsidize these goods financially again or face public anger which may develop into physical violence.

2- There are officially nearly 5 million unemployed young men in Iran from a total of seven million unemployed, with average unemployment rate rising in recent months by more than 12%, meaning that Iran now ranks among the nations with the highest unemployment rates regionally, in 22nd place out of 25 countries, with Iranian

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authorities predicting that unemployment levels will continue to rise, reaching 13 million within the next ten years.157 This reveals the government's inability to change the course of the unemployment rate over the past year and the need for it to take action to tackle it in the coming months, assuming they do not actively rise in this period.

The high unemployment rate is also intensified by the ongoing crisis in manufacturing.

Once the largest employment sector in Iran along with agriculture, many factories and companies are shutting down as their equipment and products become obsolete and outdated after years of economic blockade, leaving Iranian producers even more unable to compete with cheaper goods smuggled from abroad.

Also, many of the factories and other manufacturing facilities still operating are running at less than 20 percent of their production capacity as a result of the increase in debt and financial problems, as well as obstacles in bank transfers faced by 70% of Iran’s domestic industries. According to Iranian officials, increases in the debts owed by state-owned companies in areas such as housing and construction to private sector lenders have exposed many businesses to the risk of bankruptcy or mass redundancies, which would further increase the unemployment rate as well as exacerbating the existing housing problem.

The lack of funds is also leaving Iranian workers in some sectors like manufacturing and construction facing greater risks as employers cut back on safety and security measures, leading to a situation where an average of five individuals are being injured or killed daily in work-related accidents.

3- as a result of the introduction of ill-conceived monetary policies in the second half of 2016, inflation is expected to increase in the coming period, with the amount of currency issued by the central bank at the end of September 2016 being 30 percent higher than the sum issued in the same month in 2015.158 As a result of increasing the GDP of Iran in the same year by no more than 4.5 percent, while increasing the currency in circulation approximately sevenfold, the rate of economic growth reflects the economic mismanagement of the country, and will inevitably lead to rapidly rising prices and of course to increasing poverty among the already poor and the dwindling middle classes, along with the collapse of the value of individuals’ savings.

The inflation rate recorded during the second half of 2016 stood at around 11 percent compared to the same period of 2015; even though this is high, it is still better than the highest rate Iran reached in 2012 when it recorded an all-time record inflation rate of 45 percent. The country is also witnessing steep rises in the costs of residential rents, and of food, especially imported foodstuffs, affected by declines in exchange rates.

4- The issue of housing, in general, is becoming a major crisis in Iran, particularly plaguing citizens on a low income, with Iranian workers spending an average of 60 percent of their basic salary on housing,159 according to Hadi Abavi, the Secretary General of the Trade Unions Congress in Iran. Due to these exorbitant costs, workers are forced to

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seek additional work to meet the remaining requirements of life for themselves and their families. This, in turn, exacerbates the crisis of rising government debt to the benefit of the private sector in the housing sector, with this increase impeding the ability of private companies to complete construction projects and worsening the real estate crisis on a large scale. As a result of this worsening housing shortage, rents are likely to continue to rise, increasing the suffering of the already poor and the evermore-straitened middle classes to extreme levels in the coming period. If the government fails to intervene rapidly to increase public spending on reconstruction and housing, as the next year's budget has allocated 18% of the expenses for the reconstruction and construction (about 60 thousand billion Tomans, or $18 billion) to address this crisis that is squeezing the citizens and draining their already low income, it may take years of hard work to resolve this crisis and to ameliorate the worst of the negative effects, and their repercussions on citizens' living standards.

Second: The new budget plan and its possible impact on a citizen in the future: The Iranian government’s new budget plan for 2017 contains a number of points indicating that it will adversely affect citizens’ standard of living when compared to the budget of 2016, as the level of government spending is not commensurate with the size of the state's resources.

While the total expenditure for the 2016 budget was $96 billion, this was limited due to the low oil prices at the time, and because Iran was still struggling to increase the volume of its oil production after concluding the nuclear deal. However, the budget for 2017, totaling $97 billion, increases this sum by only one billion dollars on the previous year (also, if we note that the government’s figure is based on the official rate for the dollar set by the government at 3,300 Tomans per dollar, although the free market value per dollar currently stands at 3,900 Tomans, meaning the real value of the budget falls to $82 billion); this means that the budget was devised solely on the basis of austerity according to an economic crisis blueprint. This is despite the fact that the current economic outlook is certainly not worse than last year, which saw oil prices fall to below $40 per barrel, while the government has worked to increase oil export levels and open new markets after years of sanctions, increasing oil production volume by the end of 2016 by more than 1.5 million barrels, while the price per barrel rose from $40 to $55 by January 2017.

These factors meant that the government should have been able to provide an expanded budget to help confront the economic crisis and to significantly increase the expenditure for the 2017 budget compared to its 2016 predecessor in line with the increased financial resources of the state in this period. The new budget, however, is far smaller than the financial resources that should be available, which raises questions about the state’s spending outside the expenditure announced in the state budget. All this comes at the cost of achieving the improvements in Iran’s economic and social wellbeing which are supposedly the government top priority, particularly after Iran’s emergence from a year-long arduous economic siege which has already had a grave impact on the living standards and real income of citizens and on rates of investment, as well as causing worsening unemployment.

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To make it clear by what level the state's resources have increased in the 2017 fiscal year compared to 2016, we should assess the oil and gas export revenues, in addition to tax revenues, corporate profits and revenue from Iranian public sector facilities.

Oil export is the primary revenue source; according to the lowest estimates, Iran exported almost two million barrels in 2016 at an average price of $45 a barrel. On this basis, the income from oil exports during the year would amount to US$ 32.8 billion. At the beginning of 2017, Iran exported at least 2.2 million barrels at a supposed price of $50 a barrel (with the price currently standing at the US $55.50 per barrel and OPEC planning to increase this to more than $70 by the end of this year) thus, the total oil revenues during 2017 can be calculated at $40.1 billion. This represents an increase of $7 billion compared with the previous year and is expected to increase if the price of oil maintains or exceeds its current levels.

Expected domestic tax revenues in the 2016/2017 budget reached 149 thousand billion Tomans (around $45 billion at an exchange rate of 3,300 Tomans per dollar) while the projected tax revenues in the next fiscal year's budget amounted to 157 thousand billion Tomans ($ 47.5 billion at an exchange rate of 3,300 Tomans per dollar), a 5 percent increase on the tax revenues for 2016.

In other words, the next budget revenues would be at least $ 87.6 billion in oil revenues and taxes only, without calculating the revenues from gas exports, petrochemicals, and other commodities, which Iran is famous for exporting. While the budget revenues of last year were $77.8 billion (calculating the oil export revenues and taxes), the next budget from oil and tax revenues has only increased by 12.5% on last year's budget revenues.

This was not reflected in an increase in the size of the budget and directing these resources to increase public spending and adoption of a growth-based economic policy.

In addition to budget austerity, there is no effort to ensure impartiality in spending or development on various parts of Iran in terms of allocations and distribution of budget to ensure that all provinces have equal development and guarantee a decent standard of living for all the citizens. The capital Tehran holds the largest percentage of the budget allocation, while other areas inhabited by ethnic minorities remain marginalized and deprived; Sistan and Baluchistan province, for example, receive no more than 1 percent of government revenue, despite almost three million Baluchi people living there in desperate poverty.

The direct result of this lack of justice in the allocation distribution for urban development is an increase in rates of internal migration from disadvantaged areas to developed urbanized regions in Iran, which further increases pressure on the facilities and services in these regions, ultimately reducing the general quality of services provided to all residents of these areas.

Conclusion: From the aforementioned data, we conclude that there are serious flaws in the management of Iran’s state revenue management, meaning that the government is incapable of improving the people's living standards, which commensurate with the size

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of the Iranian economy, instead of imposing an austerity budget and spending on offbudget items. With little or no difference between the 2017 budget and its predecessor, and despite the massive changes affecting the Iranian economy after the easing of sanctions, restoring the volume of exports oil abroad and in surging global oil prices during the year, are expected to increase revenues compared to last year.

This austerity budget shows that despite an increase in revenues, there are massive, undeclared expenditures outside Iran’s official budget, primarily in regional military conflicts, which are very well known to the Iranian people and indeed the peoples of the region. Instead of increasing investment and expenditure to improve the living standards of the people and reduce unemployment, that saw a rise by over 12 percent during the second half of 2016, the austerity budget will exacerbate a continuing decline in living standards, resulting in even greater unemployment levels, as is already being seen, without any noticeable changes during the first half of 2017.

In conclusion, including the large number of negative economic variables that have been clarified previously, all the data points to real and worsening problems, which plague the lives of Iranian citizens. This reflects an economic policy by the Iranian government which will see a declining state role in the economy, despite the great potential shown by the Iranian economy, suggesting a downwards trajectory and worsening living conditions for the majority of Iranians if no positive action is taken to avert this and if the government fails to intervene urgently to correct the current situation.

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‫‪ENDNOTES‬‬ ‫‪ - 1‬فرهنگ‪ :‬وظایف واختیارات رییس جمهور در قانون اساسی ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/JKR4CIZ‬‬ ‫‪ - 2‬منتديات موقع الميزان‪ :‬علي الخامنئي السيرة والمسيرة ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/SLD6M‬‬ ‫‪- 3‬فرانس ‪ :24‬من هو الرئيس اإليراني الجديد‪HTTP://CUTT.US/CVC ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 4‬دفتر حفظ ونشر اثار ايت الله على خامنه اي‪ :‬بیام نوروزی به مناسبت اغاز سال ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/0HUSR ۱۳۵۹‬‬ ‫‪ - 5‬مجله گلبرگ‪ :‬آغاز هفته دولت وبزرگداشت شهیدان رجایی وباهنر شهریور قم ‪ ،1385‬شماره ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/TC99W 78‬‬ ‫‪ - 6‬ديبلماسي‪ :‬أولويتهاي إيران در مجمع هفتاد ويكم‪HTTP://CUTT.US/QNW2F ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 7‬فارس‪ ،‬روحانی‪ :‬ایران به همه تعهدات خود در برجام عمل کرده است‪ 10 ،‬ابان ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/SXTSQX 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 8‬راديو فردا‪ :‬حسن روحانی‪ :‬هیچ‌کس نمی‌تواند دستاوردهای برجام را به هم بزند‪ 27 ،‬ابان ‪1395HTTPS://GOO.GL/WJVMOI‬‬ ‫‪ - 9‬ايسنا‪ ،‬پیام کیهان به ترامپ‪ :‬ما را از شر برجام خالص کن‪ 23 ،‬ابان ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/FI5TDL 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 10‬افتاب‪ :‬ستاري‌فر‪ :‬برجام‪ ،‬اقتصاد إيران را مقاوم تر كرد ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/O9AFE‬‬ ‫ی از زبان‌ معاون وزیر نفت‪HTTP://CUTT.US/1KLF ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 11‬انتخاب‪ :‬ویژگی‌ قراردادهای‌ جدید نفت ‌‬ ‫‪ - 12‬مشرق‪ ،‬واکنش بانک‌های ملت وسپه به خود تحریمی نهادهای انقالبی‪ -‬سازندگی‪« :‬دستور بانک مرکزی است‪-‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/MMIB‬‬ ‫‪ - 13‬محمد جواد جق شناس‪ :‬هوشمندي روحاني د ترميم كابينه‪HTTP://CUTT.US/JOBGI ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 14‬دنیای اقتصاد‪ :‬محمود گودرزی چرا استعفا داد؟ ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/3K9FZ .1395/07/28‬‬ ‫‪ - 15‬باشگاه خبر جوان‪ :‬ایران وکره جنوبی در شب عاشورا بازی می کنند‪ ۱۳ .‬مهر ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/LPYR4 .۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪ - 16‬بازتاب‪ :24‬پاسخ فانی درباره حذف درس حسین فهمیده‪HTTP://CUTT.US/AZ5WY ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 17‬جهان صنعت‪ :‬نفت قربانی تسویه حساب های سیاسی‪ 10 ،‬آبان ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/5H3JS 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 18‬شهروند‪ ،‬عضو هیأت‌رئیسه‪َ :‬م ْج ِلس به صورت دربست به وزرای پیشنهادی رأی نمی‌دهد‪ 2 ،‬آبان ‪.1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://SOO.GD/WM6M‬‬ ‫‪ - 19‬جام جم‪ ،‬حجاریان‪ :‬روحانی به اصولگرایان تمایل پیدا کرده است‪ 23 ،‬مرداد ‪HTTP://SOO.GD/FCIX 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 20‬دنياي اقتصاى‪ ،‬دشواری‌های اقتصادی دولت وچند نکته‪ 8 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/LJSJJK 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 21‬كيهان‪ ،‬ترجیح نامزد اجاره‌ای به نامزد اصالح‌ طلب تا سال ‪ 19 ،1400‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/BOJKVG 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 22‬عصر إيران‪ ،‬توصیه کریمی قدوسی به روحانی‪ :‬دیگر کاندیدا نشوید‪ ،‬از شما به خیر واز ما به سالمت‪ 25 ،‬مهر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS: //GOO.GL/I5DAF3‬‬ ‫‪ - 23‬آفتاب‪ ،‬این آقایان رییس‌جمهور بعدی ایران نمی‌شوند ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/YUVTJ8‬‬ ‫‪ - 24‬دويتشه فيله‪ ،‬حمایت دولت از تشکیل فراکسیون بلوچ‌ها وکردها در َم ْج ِلس‪ 15 ،‬نوفمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/EQ6TBU‬‬

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‫‪ - 25‬ايسنا‪ ،‬نامه علی مطهری به رئیس جمهور درباره قانون‌شکنی در مشهد‪ 30 ،‬ايان ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/9LWAZB‬‬ ‫‪ - 26‬فارس‪ ،‬دستور رییس جمهور به وزیران کشور ودادگستری در پاسخ به نامه علی مطهری‪ 1 ،‬آذر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/9QW54V‬‬ ‫‪ - 27‬شاخه سبز‪ ،‬وزير كشور دستور بررسی علت لغو سخنرانی مطهری را صادر كرد‪ 1 ،‬اذر ‪ 1395‬ص‪3‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/IFKUJL‬‬ ‫‪ - 28‬بي بي سي فارسي‪ :‬استاندار خراسان رضوی‪ :‬لغو سخنرانی مطهری بر اساس مکاتبه بااطالعات سپاه بود‪ 2 ،‬اذر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/E96I7L‬‬ ‫‪ - 29‬شرق ديلي‪ ،‬توقف بازداشت نماينده تهران‪ 9 ،‬اذر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/OGI4DF 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 30‬نسيم‪ 102 ،‬شکایت دولت از ‪ ۱۲‬رسانه‪ 19 ،‬ابان ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/11HGQM 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 31‬نسيم‪ ،‬خودتان شفاهً ا یا کت ًبا بارها گفته‌اید که چرا با فالن روزنامه وسایت برخورد نمی‌کنی‪ 17 ،‬ابان ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/1UNH5U‬‬ ‫‪ - 32‬بي بي سي فارسي‪ ،‬اژه‌ای‪ :‬دولت گزارشی درباره حقوق‌های نجومی به قوه قضائیه نداده است‪ 23 ،‬ابان ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/10Y5UP‬‬ ‫‪ - 33‬صحيفة سبق‪" ،‬روحاني" يؤجل خالفاته مع الحرس الثوري ويمنحه ميزانية تاريخية للتوسع اإلجرامي‪ 10 ،‬ديسمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://MOBILE.SABQ.ORG‬‬ ‫‪ - 34‬األمن والدفاع العربي‪ ،‬زيادة التمويل العسكري في ميزانية حكومة روحاني بنسبة ‪ 70‬بالمئة ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/1Y9TKD‬‬ ‫‪ - 35‬زمان نيوز‪ :‬ایران چه تسلیحاتی را میتواند صادر کند‪HTTP://CUTT.US/WZGZP ،‬‬ ‫‪- 36‬الجيش العربي‪ ،‬أنواع األسلحة اإليرانية ودواعي التس ُّلح ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/WS0943‬‬ ‫‪- 37‬عصام المجالي‪ ،‬رسالة ماجستير‪ ،‬تأثير التسلح اإليراني على األمن الخليجي منذ انتصار الثورة في ‪ ،1979‬جامعة مؤتة‪ ،‬صص‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/S0BEQW .45-46‬‬ ‫‪ - 38‬فارس نيوز‪ ،‬نخستین"شناور تندرو برد بلند بالگردبر" ساخت سپاه رونمایی شد‪ 23 ،‬شهريور ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/4JZK5C‬‬ ‫‪- 39‬تسنيم‪ ،‬العميد فدوي‪ :‬جيل جديد من فرقاطات "الشهيد ناظري" هو قيد التصنيع‪ 8 ،‬نوفمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/CG56AW‬‬ ‫‪ - 40‬دنياي اقتصاد‪ ،‬عملیاتی شدن سپر دریایی ارتش در مکران‪ 9 ،‬ابان ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/LXUV 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 41‬األمن والدفاع العربي‪ ،‬إيران‪ :‬تدشين منظومات بحرية جديدة واإلعالن عن خطط مستقبلية‪ 29 ،‬نوفمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://SDARABIA.COM/?P=41347‬‬ ‫‪ - 42‬العالَم‪ ،‬القوة البحرية اإليرانية تستعرض أحدث إنجازاتها‪ 29 ،‬نوفمبر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/WSP5TV 2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 43‬تسنيم‪ ،‬إيران تزيح الستار عن طائرة تشويش من دون طيار‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/OAJ62G – 1-8-2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 44‬آرمان امروز‪ ،‬رونمايي از پهپاد دوربرد "صاعقه"‪ 11 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/6TN0LJ 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 45‬آفرينش‪ ،‬براي دفاع از خود حد ومرز ومحدوديتي نمي‌شناسيم‪ 11 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/NSRKDI 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 46‬مواقف‪ ،‬أول "طائرة مس َّيرة انتحارية" تدخل الخدمة في القوة البحرية للحرس الثوري‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/1ET1JQ .‬‬ ‫‪ - 47‬تسنيم‪ ،‬أولین پهپاد ساخت دانش آموزان ایرانی با نام ساحر رونمایی شد‪ 2 ،‬اذر ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/ONMM 1395‬‬

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‫‪The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec.2016‬‬

‫‪ - 48‬جام جم‪ ،‬رادار ایرانی «مطلع‌ الفجر ‪ »۳‬رونمایی شد‪ 1 ،‬ابان ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/NDHHXZ 1395‬‬ ‫كيلومترا‪ 21 ،‬سبتمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 49‬تسنيم‪ ،‬إيران تكشف عن صاروخ "ذو الفقار" الذي يبلغ مداه ‪750‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/LVI4HU‬‬ ‫‪ - 50‬فارس‪ ،‬انهدام پهپاد توسط جنگنده میگ ‪ 28 ،29‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/VFNW7P 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 51‬ايلنا‪ ،‬شلیک موشک نصر وبمب قاصد‪ /‬انهدام اهداف زمینی توسط جنگنده‌های اف‪ 28 ،۴‬مهر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/CD90VZ‬‬ ‫‪ - 52‬الف‪ ،‬تست مثبت بمب‌ها وموشک‌های ایرانی‪ 28 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/DPE8P5 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 53‬وكالة ايسنا‪ ،‬آغاز رزمایش پدافند پرتویی «حضرت روح‌الله» در کاشان‪ 4 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/FXMRWX 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 54‬صحيفة كيهان‪ ،‬إيران تُجرِ ي مناورة في الدفاع اإلشعاعي‪ 26 ،‬سبتمبر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/KYPHRU .2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 55‬اطالعات‪ ،‬برگزاری رزمایش بزرگ یاوران انقالب اسالمی در رابر‪ 2 ،‬ابان ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/ZM9DED 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 56‬نسل فردا‪ ،‬رزمایش بزرگ "الى بیت المقدس" برگزار شد‪ ،‬ص‪ 15 ،2‬ابان ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/XWPU 1395‬‬ ‫‪- 57‬األنصار‪ ،‬انطالق مناورات “محمد رسول الله (ص)” الكبرى للجيش اإليراني‪ 11 ،‬ديسمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/7UMJKE‬‬ ‫‪ - 58‬األمن والدفاع العربي‪ ،‬الجيش اإليراني يزيح الستار عن طائرة مس َّيرة جديدة تُط َلق يدو ًّيا‪ 12 ،‬ديسمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/3GLHHR‬‬ ‫‪ - 59‬األمن والدفاع العربي‪ ،‬الجيش اإليراني يزيح الستار عن طائرة رعد االنتحارية‪ 13 ،‬ديسمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/5AYUOA‬‬ ‫‪ - 60‬شرق ديلي‪ ،‬رویارویی ناوشکن آمریکایی با شناور نظامی ایران‪ 17 ،‬شهريور ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/TXFZAN 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 61‬جام جم‪ ،‬تهدید قایق های تندرو ایران در خلیج فارس بسیار واقعی است‪ 18 ،‬شهريور ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/I7EGMZ 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 62‬عصر إيران‪ ،‬فرمانده آمریکایی‪" :‬اشتباه محاسباتی" ممکن است سبب درگیری نظامی با ایران شود‪ 10 ،‬شهريور ‪.1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/RT6DXV‬‬ ‫قاس على أي مضايقة إيرانية للبحرية األمريكية‪ 10 ،‬سبتمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 63‬رويترز‪ ،‬ترامب يتوعد ب َردّ ٍ‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/OTMXSW‬‬ ‫‪64 - IRAN'S GROWING NAVAL AMBITIONS, WHY IT WANTS NAVAL BASES IN SYRIA AND YEMEN‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/KGVXVW‬‬ ‫‪ - 65‬روسيا اليوم‪ ،‬رئيس األركان اإليرانية‪ :‬تهديدات ترامب مج َّرد مزحة‪ 10 ،‬نوفمبر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/ELHRAZ 2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 66‬صالح حميد‪ ،‬ماذا تريد إيران من تصعيد تهديداتها في المياه الدولية‪ 29 ،‬نوفمبر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/4WNDVI 2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 67‬دينا جمال‪ ،‬زوارق تتح َّرش بسفن حربية أمريكية‪ ..‬هل يستمر اللعب اإليراني بـ”النار” في الخليج‪ 7 ،‬سبتمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/RK0WJA‬‬ ‫‪ - 68‬فارس‪ ،‬حرکت ناوگروه ‪ 44‬نیروی دریایی ارتش به طرف اقیانوس اطلس‪ 21 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/KPKKYL 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 69‬أحمد يوسف أحمد‪ ،‬رسائل الهيمنة اإليرانية‪ 6 ،‬ديسمبر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/E8NSGV 2016‬‬ ‫‪70 - IRAN'S GROWING NAVAL AMBITIONS, WHY IT WANTS NAVAL BASES IN SYRIA AND YEMEN‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/KGVXVW‬‬ ‫‪ - 71‬اليوم برس‪ ،‬ألول مره‪ ..‬إيران تكشف عن ضرورة إقامة قاعدة عسكرية إيرانية في اليمن‪ 26 ،‬نوفمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/ZCIDML‬‬

‫‪The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec.2016‬‬

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‫‪ - 72‬خالد عكاشة‪ ،‬إيران والبحث عن النفوذ االستراتيجي البحري‪ 10 ،‬ديسمبر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/JNOEN5 2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 73‬جام جم‪ ،‬رزمایش مشترک دریایی ایران وپاکستان آغاز شد‪ 10 ،‬مهر ‪HTTP://SOO.GD/1Z3I 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 74‬جمهوري إسالمي‪ ،‬دريادار سياري‪ ،‬ماموريت ناوگروه چهل موفقیت آمیز بود‪ 15 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/RHLMS6 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 75‬موقع مقاتل‪ ،‬مصالح جمهورية الصين الشعبية وأهدافها في الشرق األوسط ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/IXMKB‬‬ ‫‪ - 76‬المنتدى العربي للدفاع والتس ُّلح‪ ،‬إيران والصين‪ :‬أسرار مذهلة‪ 12 ،‬أكتوبر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/GOXFJW 2010‬‬ ‫‪ - 77‬خبرنكاران جوان‪ ،‬امضای توافقنامه دفاعی امنیتی بین ایران وچین با حضور وزرای دفاع دو کشور‪ 24 ،‬ابان ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/KP8NH‬‬ ‫‪ - 78‬تسنيم‪ ،‬ایران وچین "کمیسیون مشترک همکاری‌های نظامی" تشکیل دادند‪ 24 ،‬آبان ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/YMR2O 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 79‬فارس‪ ،‬أمادگی ایران برای برگزاری رزمایش مشترک با چین‪ 24 ،‬ابان ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/0ELHI 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 80‬شروع الين‪ ،‬بيش از «يک هزار نفر» إيراني در سوريه شهيد شده‌اند‪ 2 ،‬اذر ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/NDLA9 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 81‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬واکنش سپاه به گزارش‌ها از «شکنجه ومرگ» یک عضو سپاه اهواز‪ 21 ،‬مهر ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/TOYQ 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 82‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬یک «فرمانده ارشد سپاه پاسداران» در درگیری‌های سوریه کشته شد‪ 6 ،‬آبان ‪1395HTTP://CUTT.US/O9UCO‬‬ ‫‪ - 83‬صاد‪ ،‬ارتفاع عدد القتلى من قيادات الحرس الثوري اإليراني في سوريا‪ 28 ،‬نوفمبر ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/EJMML 2016‬‬ ‫ُّ‬ ‫التدخل اإليراني في سوريا‪ 17 ،‬سبتمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 84‬ميكرو سوريا‪ ،‬حملة واسعة من نشطاء إيرانيين ضدّ‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/FWNAIU‬‬ ‫‪ - 85‬شام‪ ،‬من كثرة القتلى اإليرانيين في سوريا‪ ...‬الصحف اإليرانية بدأت توجه االنتقادات لحكومتها‪ 29 ،‬أكتوبر ‪2015‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/YQ96O‬‬ ‫‪ - 86‬أورينت‪ ،‬غضب إيراني من أداء روسيا في معارك حلب وخامنئي يستدعي رضائي‪ 13 ،‬مايو ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/DIQOWM‬‬ ‫‪ - 87‬حملة واسعة من نشطاء إيرانيين ضدّ التدخل اإليراني في سوريا ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/FWNAIU‬‬ ‫تغييرا محدودً ا في القيادة العليا للجيش‪ 20 ،‬نوفمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 88‬الخليج الجديد‪ ،‬خامنئي ُي ِقيل موسوي و ُيجرِ ي‬ ‫ً‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/AOEY59‬‬ ‫‪ - 89‬وكالة تسنيم‪ ،‬انتصاب سرتیپ "غالمحسین غیب‌پرور" به ریاست سازمان بسیج‪ 17 ،‬اذر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/R0W8RN‬‬ ‫‪ - 90‬عائشة احمد المري‪ ،‬االقليات في إيران‪ ..‬أزمة وطن أم أزمة مواطنة؟‪ ،‬مجلة آفاق المستقبل‪ ،‬العدد ‪ ،5‬مايو ‪2010‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/EZZF5B‬‬ ‫‪ - 91‬إيرنا‪ ،‬یک تیم تروریستی توسط وزارت اطالعات در شرق کشور متالشی شد‪ 2 ،‬اذر ماه ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/6TGDR‬‬ ‫‪ - 92‬اطالعات‪ ،‬هالکت ‪ ۱۲‬تروریست با پشتیبانی آتش سنگین هوانیروز‪ 15 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/AAMRUF 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 93‬وطن امروز‪ ،‬هالکت ‪ 12‬تروریست در درگیری با سپاه پاسداران‪ 14 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/QBWTWH 1395‬‬ ‫‪- 94‬عصر إيران‪ ،‬پلیس‪ :‬کشته شدن ‪ 3‬تکفیری در درگیری مسلحانه در کرمانشاه‪ 26 ،‬مرداد ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/HDED1B‬‬ ‫‪ - 95‬فارس‪ ،‬بروجردي‪ :‬محاولة اغتيال النائب "فالحت بيشه" َّ‬ ‫مخطط إرهابي‪ 10 ،‬يوليو ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/V3CXEK 2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 96‬ايلنا‪ ،‬حمله ناکام تروریست‌ها به منطقه «گلچی در» شهرستان مریوان‪ 20 ،‬مهر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://SOO.GD/HWHR‬‬

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‫‪ - 97‬تسنيم‪ ،‬پرتاب شیء انفجاری به داخل خودروی گشت پلیس در مریوان‪20 ،‬مرداد ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/IDSXHG 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 98‬إذاعة فردا‪ ،‬شاخه نظامی «کودار» از کشته شدن «شماری از اعضای سپاه» خبر داد‪ 21 ،‬مهر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/F8MIX‬‬ ‫‪- 99‬العربية‪ ،‬كردستان إيران‪ ..‬تصعيد مس َّلح غير مسبوق‪ 12 ،‬يوليو ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/RV5BRF 2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 100‬أورينت‪ ،‬ديكتاتورية فرس إيران‪ ..‬قمع في الداخل واعتداء في الخارج ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/L9RM77‬‬ ‫‪ - 101‬الوطن الجديد‪ ،‬إيران تنشئ جامعة للدراسات األمنية واالستخبارية في األحواز‪ 5 ،‬نوفمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/2MGZL5‬‬ ‫‪ - 102‬سابق‪ ،‬مزاعم األمن اإليراني‪ :‬حراك األحوازيين "تكفيري" مدعوم من السعودية‪ 15 ،‬نوفمبر ‪HTTPS://SABQ.ORG 2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 103‬المرصد‪ ،‬قوات األمن والحرس الثوري تداهم منازل األحوازيين‪ 19 ،‬نوفمبر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/ZCJG3C 2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 104‬وكالة تستر‪ ،‬وزير المخابرات اإليرانية يزور األحواز للسيطرة على األوضاع األمنية‪ 29 ،‬ديسمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/REEBGD‬‬ ‫‪ - 105‬الوئام‪ ،‬السلطات اإليرانية تبدأ حملة مصادرة األطباق الالقطة من مدينة شاور باألحواز‪ 10 ،‬أكتوبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/AETBDR‬‬ ‫‪ - 106‬وزير المخابرات اإليرانية يزور األحواز للسيطرة على األوضاع األمنية‪ ،‬مصدر سابق‪.‬‬ ‫‪ - 107‬صحيفة اطالعات‪ ،‬شهادت یک پلیس در شهر مرزی مهرستان‪ 26 ،‬ابان ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/TCXOH 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 108‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬نیروهای سپاه در منطقه مرزی سراوان با گروهک تروریستی درگیر شدند ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/RMQON‬‬ ‫‪ - 109‬عصر إيران‪ ،‬شناسایی ودستگیری ‪ ۱۳‬همدست قورباغه مکران‪ 28 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/JUKXSZ 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 110‬جام جم‪ ،‬اطالعیه دادگستری کردستان در خصوص إعدام عوامل تکفیری وسلفی‪ 13 ،‬مرداد ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/03PZP2‬‬ ‫‪ - 111‬إيران برس‪ ،‬زندانیان اهل سنت قبل از إعدام وحشیانه شکنجه شدند‪ 25 ،‬مرداد ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/EB3LVB 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 112‬إيران تعدم ‪ 5‬سجناء بينهم السياسي الكردي محمد عبد اللهي ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/8XQXCK‬‬ ‫‪ - 113‬راديو زمانه‪ ،‬محمد عبدالهی وپنج زندانی دیگر إعدام شدند‪ ۱۹،‬مرداد ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/SY5J8X 1395‬‬ ‫والسنَّة تثير انزعاج المجتمع الكردي‪ 8 ،‬أغسطس ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/JNQ4 .2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 114‬إعدامات إيران للكرد ُّ‬ ‫‪ - 115‬ال َم ْج ِلس الكردي ُي ِدين اإلعدامات الجماعية بحقّ النشطاء الكرد في إيران ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/PJVBJA‬‬ ‫‪ - 116‬عصر إيران‪ ،‬إعدام ‪ 3‬نفر درخوزستان به جرم عملیات تروریستی‪27‬مرداد ‪HTTP://SOO.GD/9AO7 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 117‬اعتماد‪ ،‬دو متجاوز به عنف در بندرعباس إعدام شدند مرداد ‪،1395‬ص‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/YNXHBG 4.28‬‬ ‫‪ - 118‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬عفو بین‌الملل‪ :‬یک نوجوان دیگر در ایران إعدام شده است‪ 13 ،‬مرداد ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/INQFVU 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 119‬العربية نت‪ ،‬إيران تطلب حذف وثيقة ت ُِدينها بسبب آالف اإلعدامات بشهرين‪ 10 ،‬أغسطس ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/UGLD6‬‬ ‫‪ - 120‬الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬لعنة صيف اإلعدامات تطارد كبار مسؤولي النظام‪ 31 ،‬أغسطس ‪2016HTTPS://GOO.GL/ZX4GSL‬‬ ‫‪ - 121‬المرصد‪ ،‬نواب سابقون يصدرون بيانا يعتبر إعدامات ‪ 1988‬عار على إيران‪ 24 ،‬أغسطس ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/XOQ2NJ‬‬ ‫‪ - 122‬إيران سكوالريسم‪ ،‬احمد منتظری به جاسوسی وتبانی با عربستان ومجاهدین متهم شد‪.7/9/1395 ،‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/JKGM3K‬‬

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‫‪ - 123‬خبر فارسي‪ ،‬احمد منتظری به شش سال زندان وخلع لباس محکوم شد‪ 9 ،‬آذر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/HND4M3 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 124‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬بیانیه ‪ ۱۵۱‬فعال سیاسی ومدنی در اعتراض به حکم زندان منتظری‪ 14 ،‬آذر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/ZELCU‬‬ ‫‪ - 125‬إذاعة فردا‪ ،‬شش نواندیش دینی‪ :‬حکم احمد منتظری دهن‌کجی به عدالت است‪ 10 ،‬آذر ‪HTTP://SOO.GD/CI4H 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 126‬تسنيم‪ ،‬ابوترابی‪ :‬إعدام‌‌های مواد مخدّ ر نتیجه مطلوب نداشته است‪ 27 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/EYXKDO 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 127‬دنياي اقتصاد‪ ،‬پورمحمدی‪ :‬مجازات‌ إعدام کارآمد نبود‌ه است‪ 8 ،‬آبان ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/GXOZLC 1395‬‬ ‫‪24 - 128‬ساعت‪ ،‬مجازات إعدام را در حد زیاد اجرا نکنیم‪ 16 ،‬ابان ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/PHKWD 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 129‬بي بي سي‪َ ،‬م ْج ِلس ایران بایک فوریت طرح جایگزینی إعدام برای مجرمان مواد مخدّ ر موافقت کرد‪ 3 ،‬اذر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/HK6O‬‬ ‫‪ - 130‬تسنيم‪ ،‬جزئیات جدید از انهدام هسته وارداتی داعش‪ ،26‬مرداد ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/SW9NXS 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 131‬جام جم‪ ۱۵۰۰ ،‬جوان ایرانی‌را از پیوستن به داعش‌منصرف كرديم‪ 5 ،‬شهريور ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/OENXZN 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 132‬اعتماد‪ ،‬دو ایراني پيوسته به “داعش” به هاكت رسيدند‪ 12 ،‬مرداد ‪ 1395-‬ص‪HTTP://CUTT.US/DYDY 2‬‬ ‫‪ - 133‬راديو فراد‪ ،‬وزارت کشور ادعای رضایی درباره عملیات “داعش” در ایران را تکذیب کرد‪ 10 ،‬مهر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/FZJLK‬‬ ‫‪ - 134‬مشرق‪ ،‬ذوالفقاری‪ :‬صحبت‌های بنده در مقابل سخنان رضایی نبود‪ 10 ،‬مهر‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/YDTOFS 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 135‬خبر أونالين‪ ،‬کشف ‪ 2‬تن مواد منفجره در گرمسار‪ 25 ،‬ابان ‪1395HTTP://CUTT.US/CTRP‬‬ ‫‪ - 136‬النبأ‪ ،‬مزدوجو الجنسية والتغيير الناعم في إيران‪ 29 ،‬أكتوبر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/UQW2YD 2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 137‬راديو آزادي‪ ،‬سیامک نمازی وپدرش هر یک به ده سال حبس محکوم شدند‪ 18 ،‬أكتوبر ‪2016HTTP://CUTT.US/0LXMR‬‬ ‫‪ - 138‬وطن امروز‪،‬بیش از ‪ 10‬مدیردوتابعیتی منافع کشور را به خطر انداخته‌اند‪ 27 ،‬ابان ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/1XS9H 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 139‬رجا نيوز‪ ،‬جزئیات جدیدی از حکم محکومیت ‪ ۶‬جاسوس آمریکا در ایران‪ 28 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/8OY02Z 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 140‬النبأ‪ ،‬مزدوجو الجنسية والتغيير الناعم في إيران‪ 29 ،‬أكتوبر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/UQW2YD 2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 141‬مهر‪ ،‬آتش سوزی پتروشیمی بندرامام خمینی مهار شد‪ 16 ،‬مرداد ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/3ZORYA 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 142‬تسنيم‪ ،‬آتش در انبار ضایعات پتروشیمی بندر امام خاموش شد‪ 26 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/6HWHFX 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 143‬خبرگزاری مهر‪ ،‬احتمال فاجعه بزرگ نفتی در عسلویه‪ /‬دالیل وقوع سلسله حوادث‪12 ،‬مرداد ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/1BR4AN‬‬ ‫‪ - 144‬أبرار اقتصادي‪ ،‬دلیل آتش سوزی های متعدد در صنعت پتروشیمی‪ 13 ،‬مرداد ‪ ،1395‬ص‪HTTP://CUTT.US/RIE3X 4‬‬ ‫‪ - 145‬اطالعات‪ ،‬بررسی احتمال حمله سایبری در آتش‌سوزی‌های اخیر‪21 ،‬مرداد ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/3PTLMW 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 146‬تسنيم‪ ،‬حمالت سایبری دلیل آتش‌سوزی پتروشیمی‌ها نبوده است‪ 24 ،‬مرداد ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/USYL9Z 1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 147‬وكالة أنباء اسنا‪ .‬إیران تحقق نموا فی صادرات السلع غیر ال ِّن ْفطية‪ 9 .‬أكتوبر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/P9RLL5 2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 148‬بضغوط من الواليات المت َِّحدة األمريكية ُأ ّجل تنفيذ الصفقة مرات عديدة‪ .‬وتمتلك الواليات المت َِّحدة حقّ تصنيع أجزاء من طائرات‬ ‫وبناء عليه ال تستطيع "إيرباص" بيع الطائرات إال بموافقة أمريكية‪.‬‬ ‫"إيرباص" األوروبية‪،‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫‪ - 149‬قدس‪ ،‬یارانه ‪ 30‬میلیون ایرانی امسال قطع می شود‪ 3 ،‬شهريور ‪HTTP://GOO.GL/ZMZS5V .1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 150‬مركز المزماة للدراسات والبحوث‪ .2016 .‬ملفات الفساد التي أثارت ضجة في إيران‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/4WVBM2 .‬‬ ‫‪151 - THE WORLD BANK, OVERVIEW. 2016.HTTPS://GOO.GL/N240WA‬‬

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‫‪ - 152‬توصلت "أوبك" إلى اتفاق تاريخي بنهاية نوفمبر ‪ 2016‬يقضي بخفض اإلنتاج بما يعادل ‪ 1.2‬مليون برميل شهر ًّيا‪ ،‬وستوقف إيران‬ ‫إنتاجها عند ‪ 3.8‬مليون برميل يوم ًّيا َو ْفق هذا االتفاق‪ ،‬وهو المعدَّ ل الذي اتُّفق عليه لمستوى إنتاج إيران ما قبل العقوبات الغربية عليها‪.‬‬ ‫‪153 - IMF.2016. IMF STAFF COMPLETES 2016 ARTICLE IV MISSION TO ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF‬‬ ‫‪IRAN. HTTPS://GOO.GL/8NQO3I‬‬ ‫‪154 - TRADING ECONOMICS. 2017. IRANIAN RIAL FORECAST 2016-2020.‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/L12FXV‬‬ ‫‪155 - RESEARCH, PLANNING AND BUDGETING DIVISION ECONOMIC RESEARCH UNIT. 2015. FOR‬‬‫‪EIGN CURRENCY MARKET IN IRAN OVERVIEW & FORECAST. HTTPS://GOO.GL/68MEMK‬‬ ‫‪ - 156‬قدس‪ ،‬یارانه ‪ 30‬میلیون ایرانی امسال قطع می شود‪ 3 ،‬شهريور ‪HTTP://GOO.GL/ZMZS5V .1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 157‬وكالة أنباء فارس‪ ،‬تأیید بیکاری ‪ ۷‬میلیونی در صحن علنی َم ْج ِلس‪ /‬پیش‌بینی بیکاری ‪ ۱۱‬میلیون نفری تا سال ‪ 7 ،۱۴۰۰‬مهر‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/JMZYPA،1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 158‬همشهري أونالين‪ ،‬بانك مركزي‪ :‬نرخ تورم به ‪ 8.8‬درصد رسيد‪ 5 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/VWWJ6Q ،1395‬‬ ‫‪- 159‬مركز الخليج العربي للدراسات اإليرانية‪ 60% .‬من رواتب عمال إيران تنفق على السكن‪ 15 .‬ديسمبر ‪.2016‬‬

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ARAB AFFAIRS INTRODUCTION

Axis One: The Future of GCC-Iranian Relations in a Troubled Region

W

hile GCC-Iranian relations have diversified in the past few decades amid cold feelings and tension, particularly in late 2016, there were recently some alarming indicators concerning Iran’s future behavior towards the GCC in the post-nuclear deal stage with the P5+1 during 2015 and the second half of 2016. Certain facts indicate an escalation in the pace of Iran’s interventionist nature towards some Gulf States, particularly Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and its Gulf neighbors, Iraq and Yemen, as well as burgeoning disputes between the two sides regarding some controversial files, principally in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.

In addition, the lack of any international deterrent increases the risk of ill-considered behavior by Iran that may occur in this security troubled and politically fragmented regional environment. There is also the risk of complex and growing crises, as well as increasing conflicts that involve regional and international sides, and non-state organizations like (ISIL) and other armed groups. This is notwithstanding what this region represents that is of crucial importance for the global economy due to its major role in the global oil market in terms of production, exportation, and oil reserves.

Therefore, this article seeks to review the causes and motives of Iran’s interventionist behavior toward some of the Gulf States to illuminate the correlation between this approach and the nuclear deal. This article also attempts to observe the dimensions and features of relations between Iran and the GCC, including the trends during the second half of 2016, and to explore the future path of Gulf-Iranian relations and their outcomes.

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First: Determinants of Gulf-Iranian Relations First of all, the determinants of relations between two or more international units, or between one international unit and a group of other international units provide a set of variables that can cause the external political behavior of any of these units and their influence on their mutual foreign relations, as well as determining the course of their prospective relations. Despite the different classifications of internal and external determinants and the degree of their impact on foreign policy behavior and international relations, they provide a distinctive character for foreign policy. The interaction and complexity of these variables lead to the formation of a specific pattern of external political behavior, and then the configuration of international relationships. In other words, the more an international unit maintains relative and non-relative capabilities along with a cognitive component, the more this unit will be able to carry out an effective and influential foreign policy toward other international units. Furthermore, if those other international units do not own the same relative capabilities, there will be an unbalanced relationship and a tug-of-war between cooperation and conflict, particularly if these units are involved in any of the complex crises and far-reaching conflicts in the region.1 According to the figures from and foreign policy analysis by foundations for international units, there are prominent determinants for Gulf-Iranian relations: 1. The State Geo-Strategic Determinant The state geo-strategic determinant plays a pivotal role in defining and circumscribing its foreign policy and international relations through a natural interaction between its geographical components and political system, and in what impact it will have on its foreign policy toward other international units.2 Geographical factors have major importance in determining their impact on the relations between two or more international units; a state’s geography has a significant impact on the nature of the external behavior of that state, which reacts according to other states’ external behavior to compose the phenomenon of relations between these countries.3 The diversity, location, and extent of a state’s natural resources may have a more serious effect on its decision-makers, also providing them with a number of alternatives and options. In this regard, Napoleon Bonaparte said, “The leader cannot afford a foreign policy except what is dictated by the country’s geography.” Therefore, geographic location affects state policy; it determines the movement of its essential framework and the nature of threats that it may encounter.4 The Gulf region consists of eight states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, Iraq, and Iran) located in a unique geographical area. This region is of great importance. It also comprises several islands of military and economic importance, and whoever controls them can control the sea-lanes toward the Indian Ocean and into the Gulf, as well as Strait of Hormuz, the only exit for Gulf oil exports to the rest of the world. The Strait of Hormuz also connects the Arabian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea; the US Department of Energy estimates that this strait yields 16.5 to 17 million barrels of oil per day or about 20% of the global oil demand and about 40% of the nautical oil transported for global trade. The Arabian Gulf also extends to Southwest Asia,

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and to the closest point, the Indian Ocean comes to Central Europe and Asian Russia.

Therefore, the Arabian Gulf is considered the core of the Middle East. The Arabian Gulf connects directly with the Euphrates River, along which Syria and the Mediterranean Sea can be reached. Turkey and the Black Sea can be accessed via the Tigris River, as well as Iran and the Qazvin Sea, and from there to Russia through natural causeways, or to Afghanistan.5 Given Iran’s geographical location in the Gulf region, we can see that Iran has a strategic advantage through its domination of vital sea-lanes, an ancient theory that political scientists called the “Core of the World”. If this location lends great importance to the whole region, it has granted Iran a distinctive and strategically important position, as a bridge connecting the Arabian Peninsula, China, India, and Southeast Asia. In other words, Iran is regarded as the key to the Middle East. Iran has always been considered part of a global tug-of-war due to its geo-strategic location and regional influences. The main objective of the Iranian ruling elite is to maintain Iran’s status of excellence in the context of changing the balance of power.

On the other hand, “The Fifth Development Plan of Iran” in 2003 within the framework of the “20th Horizon” Charter identified the peculiarities of Iran’s foreign policy in general, and toward the Gulf region in particular, by selecting the first vital area of Iranian politics to transform Iran by 2025 to “The first center regionally within a group of geographically nearby countries of sectarian and dogmatic elements as the Arab Gulf Countries, Iraq and Yemen,” countries that are entered in the Iranian dictionary as “The Shiite Full Moon.”6 Also, the recent statement by Khamenei’s advisor on international affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, that “The southern coast of Iran, the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and Ajman, are the most important strategic borders to form the Shiite full moon,” is transparent evidence. These countries are first in the field of Shiite geopolitics for several reasons:

A. The geographical proximity of these countries.

B. The sectarian compositions of these countries include Shiites, which traditionally, in religious terms, or politically, pledge allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader, and it is estimated that they make up 55-60% of the population in Iraq, 20% in Syria, 30% in Yemen, 25-35% in Lebanon, and 55-60% in Bahrain.7 2. The Oil-ECHO Determinant Iran is an important trading partner for some Gulf States, predominantly for the United Arab Emirates; for example, Iranian statistics indicate that there are about eight thousand Iranian companies engaged in commercial activities in the UAE, and at the level of bilateral trade relations in 2011 the UAE’s exports made up about 31% of the total Iranian imports. Iran has become the third largest export market for the UAE, receiving nearly 11% of its total exports.8 The latest estimations indicate that the total oil production by the GCC amounts to 16.23 million barrels per day, while the oil reserves amount to 496.6 billion barrels.

Natural gas production is 303.5 billion cubic meters annually and there are natural gas reserves consisting of 41.838 billion cubic meters. Iran’s oil production is almost 4.2

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million barrels per day, with reserves amounting to 137 billion barrels; its natural gas production is about 146 billion cubic meters annually, and its natural gas reserves amount to 29 thousand billion cubic meters.9 In other words, Gulf oil is still the main source for many Western countries’ economies, which is reflected in the national security strategies of all these countries, which insist on securing their sources of oil and its methods of transportation. This issue was the first part of American national security strategy, especially in the years after the US invasion of Iraq, followed by British national security strategy in 2003, which also included the need to protect energy sources. Finally, this energy security issue was integrated into the European Union’s foreign policy in 2006. Furthermore, NATO’s decision to establish a center specialized in energy security during the Chicago summit in 2012 reveals the western countries utmost attention toward this case. This means that since the United States assumed responsibility for protecting and preserving Western interests in the Gulf region, the main objective of the US was to ensure the flow of oil from the Gulf region to the United States and Western countries in general, without any constraints and at a reasonable price. This required implementing security policies that would maintain the security of the oil-producing countries, whereby Western countries, and especially the US, would generally pay more attention to the Gulf region; this is inconsistent with Iranian policy, which opposes any Western presence in the region, considering that the security of the Gulf is the responsibility of its eight bordering countries.10 Despite many estimations and views which indicate the United States may be capable of obtaining energy self-sufficiency in the years to come, the most important expectations were of the US Energy Information Administration in mid-January 2013, which revealed an increase in crude oil production in the United States during 2013 and 2014 amounting to 1.61 million barrels per day from shale oil production. If this anticipated increase is added to the increase in US crude oil production of 2.48 million barrels a day since 2008, then the total increase will total approximately 4.09 million barrels per day. However, this does not mean that the West will be using mostly Arabian Gulf oil, at least not in the near future.11 3. Sectarian Links and Population Increases These connections are represented by the relationship between Iran and the Shiite sect in the Gulf States, as Iran is deemed to be the largest Shiite state in the world. Their geographical proximity also makes transportation and communication between Iran and the Gulf States more possible. The two regions also have demographic and social links, whereby many Gulf families are of Iranian origins, such as in Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE.12

4. The US Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its Impact on the Regional Balance of Power The issue of imbalance in the balance of power is one of the Gulf region’s main dilemmas; this imbalance has three levels: First: The imbalance between the Gulf region and the world as a whole; with vital global interests lying in this region, it will remain one of the most important areas of international competition, especially in light of the delicate security situation that the

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Gulf States suffer from, a matter that makes the Gulf region a place of polarization, where regional players seek to dominate and other international players to intervene.

According to the structure of regional interactions, three interactive roles can be distinguished by three powers: A. Pressing Power: The United States, NATO, the European Union, and Russia.

B. Anti-Power: (Iraq in the past and Iran currently).

C. Balancing Power: The Gulf States.

If the role of each Constraining and Anti-Power is not clear, the role of the Balancing Power is beginning to make progress, although it has been absent during most of these interactions. This chaotic situation has increased after the changes and events in the Arab world since 2011, including a decline in the role of the most important and influential states such as Egypt.13 Second: The imbalance between the six Gulf States and Iran on human and military levels. The military forces of all the GCC States number approximately 363,600 active troops, compared to 532,000 troops in Iran. This disparity in military capabilities between the Gulf and Iran is a result of variations in population; estimates indicate that the GCC population does not exceed 50 million, while the population of Iran stands at 75.2 million people, according to the Statistics Committee website in Iran.

Third: The imbalance between the GCC countries themselves, where Saudi Arabia is the largest country, two are medium-sized countries, the Sultanate of Oman and the UAE, and three are small countries, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait.

This state of imbalance is reflected in the policies of the Gulf region’s players. The tremendous oil wealth of the Gulf States and their inability to defend themselves militarily means they continued to rely on Western international powers to protect them through bilateral security agreements after the war of the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. Furthermore, four Gulf countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE) signed the strategic Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with NATO in 2004, which entails the cooperation between these countries on many security issues, thus granting them the option to defend themselves through mobilization, regional alliances, military neutrality, and international alliances.14 The Gulf States’ position contradicts the Iranian vision in terms of Gulf security; Iran believes that the Arabian Gulf is a closed lake, and bears the responsibility for the regional security of the states bordering it. Therefore, any foreign presence - according to Iran’s vision - is a straightforward threat to the security of the Gulf; in other words, the presence of any other state in the eight states bordering the Gulf, which are (the GCC, Iraq, and Iran). For example, Iran refused to recognize the content of Damascus Declaration as an Arab formula for the security of the Arabian Gulf in 1991.15 Before 2003 the third player, Iraq, was a major threat to the Gulf States as a whole and to Kuwait in particular since the Iraqi invasion in 1990, but Iraq’s removal from the regional stability equation after the US invasion in 2003 led to a change in the Gulf’s regional balance of power. With the disbanding of the Iraqi army, the decline in the economic performance of the state, and the enduring absence of security, Iraq has become an area of polarization between

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the regional powers. Moreover, one of the main results of the US invasion was that this buffer country (Iraq) turned into an arena that attracted the interests of regional players who wanted conflict, which had repercussions not only for Iraq, but for the neighboring countries in general, and particularly the Gulf States.16 Second: Gulf-Iranian relations, heading where?

The political analysis that attempted to ascertain the direction of Gulf-Iranian relations over a period of six months (June to December 2016) and their projected scenarios required looking into the progress of GCC-Iranian relations since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. This was with regard to the strategic bi-annual report period, during which the region witnessed: A. A notable intensification of conflict and friction between the region’s countries.

B. New Russian-Iranian-Turkish alliances and the convergence of bilateral interests, despite the historical differences.

C. Regional and international campaigns to confront ISIL and liberate the occupied towns in Iraq and Syria.

D. The Russian-Iranian seizing of Aleppo by the excessive application of heightened military force via land and air missile strikes to resolve and contain the crisis and shifting the internal balance of power in favor of their strategic ally [Bashar al-Assad].

Furthermore, to accomplish tangible gains on the ground, and to force the opposition to accept this fait accompli before the new US president Donald Trump took power in January 2017, thus signaling a new era for the Oval Office.

Accordingly, the Gulf-Iranian relations will be divided into three main phases, the most recent period being broadly studied in the third phase.

First Phase: Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979 This period witnessed both calm and tension between the Gulf States and Iran.

The strained relations were, in fact, a consequence of Iranian efforts to gain regional sovereignty over the Gulf region. The evidence for this is as follows: A. Iran’s occupation of Mohammerah, the capital of the Arab region of Ahwaz in 1925.

B. Iranian interference in Bahrain, the consequent intervention of the United Nations, and the 1970 referendum in Bahrain, the results of which showed the people’s desire for Bahrain’s independence and its own Arab identity. In the aftermath, Iran responded by occupying three UAE islands: Minor Tunb, Greater Tunb, and Abu Musa in February 1971 according to an agreement with the British administration. Despite all efforts to restore these UAE islands peacefully, any attempts up to the present day have not produced a positive result.

C. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi attempted to put in place a defense pact with the Gulf countries in the region, but the idea did not succeed.17 The calm that persisted between the two sides during that period was because these events took place during the Cold War era (1946-1991). The conservative regimes on both sides of the Gulf marked radical Arab nationalism and Communism as a serious threat.

The Gulf and Iran players sought to ensure the security of the Gulf to secure energy, the

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primary source of their economies. Also, the Shah tried to enter Western alliances, as well as relations with Israel and Turkey, to address the Nazarene expansion that was taking place at that time. Saudi-Iranian coordination was a conspicuous feature of these Gulf-Iranian relations, where the relationships were associated with the so-called ‘Parallel Pillars Policy,’ in other words, the Western countries’ reliance on Iran and Saudi Arabia to maintain their interests in the region.18 Second Phase: During and After the Iranian Revolution, 1979 This period witnessed increased tension between the Gulf States and Iran because of the Iranian leaders’ adoption of policies and slogans that posed a threat to the security and stability of the Arabian Gulf States after the 1979 revolution. Slogans such as “Exporting the Revolution” were intended to spread Shiism outside Iran’s borders, particularly to the neighboring countries and region, hence starting uprisings similar to the Iranian Revolution, as well as fighting the US-connected Muslim rulers who rejected the Revolution. The former Iranian leader Khomeini declared in a speech on Feb. 11th 1980 that he was going to export the Revolution to neighboring countries and the whole region, according to Article 154 of the Constitution of the Revolution, which stipulates, “Iran should work to establish the government of truth across the globe and protect the legitimate struggle of the oppressed people anywhere.”19 The Gulf States later realized during this period that the revolutionary doctrine of the Iranian regime posed a threat to their actual existence in addition to its [Iran’s] desire to export the Revolution as a mandatory duty. Moreover, using religious discourse as a vital tool, because they [Gulf States] contain an important Shiite component that may respond, in addition to the geographical proximity to the Iranian environment, also for geopolitical and strategic reasons.

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) increased the Gulf States’ fears and anxiety; Iraq was also very cautious of this new Iranian movement, due to the Iraqi Shiite population and Iran’s previous insistence on occupying Iraqi territories, which the Algiers Accord ordered to be returned to Iraq in 1975. Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries distanced themselves during the early stages of the war in order to oppose it, they exposed some of Iran’s violations, and some of their oil tankers were vulnerable and unprotected in the face of Iranian military attacks. Then came the so-called “Theory of Umm Al-Qura” declaration as an immediate reaction to the failure of the “Exporting the Revolution” principle, which proposed turning the city of Qom into the religiously venerated and spiritual capital of the Islamic world instead of Makkah. These variables were key catalysts for the emergence of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. Another catalyst was the assassination attempt on the Emir of Kuwait by Shiites in the mideighties, one of “Exporting the Revolution” policies.20 Tehran later favored adopting a sort of political moderation during the reign of Hashemi Rafsanjani from July 28th, 1989 until one year prior to the end of Mohammad Khatami’s reign in 2003, which coincided with the US invasion of Iraq in April of that year. This political moderation was represented by improving and promoting relations with the six Gulf States, and by visits from the foreign ministers of Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in 1991, followed by the mutual visits by the late King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz

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– Crown Prince at that time – to Tehran, and the Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani to Riyadh, respectively. 21What counted as a great leap forward in the progress of GulfIranian relations was Rafsanjani’s desire to stop “Exporting the Revolution” and to adopt a policy non-interference in Iran’s internal affairs of State, as well as to strengthen the ties of cooperation with neighboring countries. Also part of this “Policy of Neutrality” approach was the rejection of Iran’s support for Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1991; many of the GCC-Iranian meetings were confirmations of this approach. In these circumstances, Rafsanjani stated, “We feel that there is no reason to trigger any kind of dispute with the countries in the southern arena of the Gulf,” although following Rafsanjani’s statement in June 1994 Iran announced it would not abandon the islands and refused international arbitration. Iran’s actions to expand control over those islands were an obstacle to the overall normalization of Gulf-Iranian relations during that era.22 During Khatami’s presidency, in 1997 relations between Iran and the Gulf States witnessed an unprecedented improvement, and there appeared to be a shared conviction to continue these relations. Moreover, it was an important time in terms of the cessation of the Gulf States’ complaints about Iranian interference in their internal affairs, particularly with regard to Tehran’s retreat from “Exporting the Revolution” and its adoption of policies of moderation and openness, as the tone of dialogue between these civilizations improved. Also contributing to these enhanced relations between the two sides were mutual visits at the highest levels, including a call from Iran’s Defense Minister of the time, in order to develop a joint security strategy to achieve strong and sustained security in the region, also emphasizing that the ending of the US military presence in the Gulf Region would reduce tensions. Furthermore, Iran would not object to signing a security defense treaty with the Gulf countries.23 Third Phase: After the Fall of Saddam Hussein’s Regime in 2003 Tensions reappeared in Gulf relations after the Conservatives gained power in 2004, when the former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the elections, with his conservative movement controlling the Iranian Parliament and starting to implement expansionist policies in an unprecedented fashion. In addition, there was a revival of Shiite geopolitics, which promoted intervention in order to serve Iranian interests in three critical areas. The first included Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Gulf States because of their geographical proximity and the acquisition of Shiite communities there. It also included a return of the “Exporting the Revolution” principle.

This new and unprecedented increase in tensions in Gulf-Iranian relations involved several new regional, international, and sequential variables.

The First Variable: The removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 from the regional arena.

The former Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein’s regime, was an obstacle to Iran’s ambitions in the region as a whole; he started a war that lasted eight years with Iran, which damaged its defenses and military capabilities, and weakened it on an economic level, and which paved the way for Iran to take an expansionist initiative that intervened in Iraqi affairs as soon as Saddam’s regime was gone in 2003. Iran aimed to become the

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primary player in Iraqi internal affairs; this opportunity could not be bypassed in terms of its projects and plans, and maybe more than the direct occupier [the U.S.A.] itself, exploiting the US preoccupation of being a “direct occupation power,” as in Iraq, when the Gulf States was concerned about the Iranian expanded influence in it [Iraq] after the US invasion 2003. Iran took full advantage of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and of the spreading chaos in Iraq; as such Iranian expansionism posed a security dilemma for the Gulf States because of its role in perpetuating the security problem in Iraq through its support for certain armed militias both financially and military. One issue that worries the Gulf States with regard to Iran’s plans is its aim to promote sectarianism in the region, which would destabilize the security of these countries.24 The Second Variable: The outbreak of the so-called “Arab Spring” in early 2011.

The “Arab Spring,” which erupted in five Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria) contributed to producing a successful time for Iran regarding many Arab countries’ internal affairs and their fear of revolutions alike. Furthermore, there was concern among regional and international players about this revolutionary movement and its impact on their interests in the region. Consequently, Iran stepped into this chaos in support of these revolutions, particularly in Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, considering them an “Islamic awakening” inspired by the political mobility of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. However, when these revolutions reached its traditional Syrian ally, Iran intervened to halt the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime.25 Syria is of major importance for Iran, as it serves Iran’s overall strategy in the region by acting as a vital link between Tehran and Hezbollah.

Syria also provides Tehran with secure corridors to send armaments to Hezbollah in Lebanon in order to redress – according to Iranian strategy – the Arab regional strategy, which aims to reduce the increased geopolitical power of Iran.26 Third Variable: The signing of the nuclear deal with P5 +1 in 2015.

If the first variable demolished the obstacles facing Iran and its plans, and the second one granted an opportunity to intervene in troubled countries with a Shiite population, the third variable provided an economic boost for Iran as a result of the lifting of economic sanctions, which had put a significant restriction for a long time on the implementation of its expansionist strategy. Also, the US recognition – and international also – of the Iranian regime’s legitimacy came with a pledge not to assist any Iranian opposition, and with the acceptance of Tehran as a prominent regional power in the Middle East; all of this comprised a serious response from the United States and the international community to Iran’s positions and demands. Therefore, these three variables provided Iran with the crucial opportunity, the finances, and the international recognition to expand and intervene in the region’s countries’ affairs in a manner that stoked peace and security in the region and increased tensions with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).27 The Iranian regime’s interference extended to the internal affairs of the GCC countries throughout both of Ahmadinejad’s terms in office, particularly the second one. He stated during the first era that “the Islamic Republic is the flag bearer of Islam and [its] global missionary,” adding, “An Islamic Revolution happened through the martyrs’ blood in Iran, and the wave of Islamic revolution will soon include the entire world,” which raised concern in the (GCC) countries again.

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What underlay the high levels of tension during Nejad’s terms in office?

• Strengthening Iran’s nuclear capabilities to increase the uranium enrichment levels at the Natanz facility and heavy water production at the Arak facility.

• Supporting Bahraini Shiites, including the Shiite ‘Wefaq Society’ to incite riots in the Kingdom in 2011.

• Providing total support for and assistance to the Shiites in the Qatif Region of Saudi Arabia to incite riots there in late 2011.

• The provocative visit by Ahmadinejad in 2012 to the UAE’s ‘Abu Musa Island,’ which warped the facts and asserted Iran’s sovereignty.

• Establishing Iranian spy cells in most Gulf countries (a number of these espionage networks were dismantled, in Bahrain in 2010, in Qatar in 2011, in Kuwait in 2010 and 2012, in the United Arab Emirates in 2013, and in Saudi Arabia in 2013).

• Unprecedented Iranian incursions into neighboring Gulf countries (Iraq and Yemen), as well as into Syria and Lebanon, financially, militarily, and through other means, which threatened the security and stability of the Gulf Region.28 When the reformist President Hassan Rouhani took the helm in June 2013, this increased the hope in the countries of the region in general and the Gulf in particular that they would be able to establish stable relations with Iran according to the principle of good neighborliness. Shortly after Rouhani’s victory, however, he remarked, “To improve relations with neighboring countries at all levels is a key priority, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is possible to convert rivalry between the two countries to a mutual respect. The neighboring countries and the Arab countries are our fraternal allies, and Saudi Arabia is a fraternal ally and neighboring country that has historical, cultural and geographical ties with Iran.” Those remarks do not reflect a fundamental shift in relations toward key conflict issues between the GCC countries and Iran, such as: A. Achieving transparency and positive intentions toward the Iranian nuclear program by ensuring that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), rather than the Iranian regime, is the only official entity entrusted to confirm that this program is peaceful.

B. The issue of the three UAE Islands.

C. The Gulf-Iranian stance on Arabian Gulf security.

D. The problem of the Iranian nuclear program.

E. The Iranian regime’s threats to impede navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

F. Iranian interference in the GCC countries’ internal affairs.

G. Iranian interference in the neighboring Gulf countries.29 Although Saudi Arabia plays a critical role in promoting regional and global security alike, Gulf-Iranian relations cannot be reduced solely because of Iran’s relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as five other countries are also having problems with Iran.

These include Iranian interference in Bahrain’s affairs, as well as the UAE, where the three islands (Minor Tunb, Greater Tunb, and Abu Musa) remain under Iran’s rule, with the regime still refusing to resolve this issue through international arbitration.30

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Rouhani’s remarks on Iranian interference in the (GCC) countries’ affairs did not express any new sentiments; perhaps the clearest iteration of Iran’s overall foreign policy stance towards its neighboring countries, particularly during Rouhani’s presidency, was offered by the Iranian ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danaii, who said, “Iranian foreign policy is [already] drawn and is principled, and cannot be changed. In other words, Iranian policy towards the neighboring countries, including the GCC countries will not contain a significant change.”31 This stance has become apparent through Iran’s persistence with its interventionist policies toward the internal affairs of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. It can also be added that: • The continuity and complexity of the Gulf-Iranian conflict.

• Intensifying Iranian incursions into the neighboring Gulf countries, to the extent of de facto occupation.

• The destruction of Saudi diplomatic premises in Tehran and Mashhad in 2016, which led Saudi Arabia to sever ties with Iran.

The strained relations between the two sides have endured since the beginning of Rouhani’s presidency, but the provocative nature of the Iranian regime’s political discourse and behavior has taken a qualitative turn for the worse in conjunction with the negotiations launched by the West over Tehran’s nuclear program, which resulted in the signing of an agreement between the two sides in early July 2015. The nature of the political discourse emanating from senior Iranian political and military officials toward the Gulf States in recent months appears to show a notable shift in the Tehran decisionmakers’ perceptions of the role that could or should be played by Iran in the region.

Observers of this situation cannot explain this approach, and Iranian interventional behavior toward some of the (GCC) countries, without linking this as a dependent variable to the entrance of the six world powers into the nuclear program negotiations with Iran, greatly boosted Tehran’s confidence on the basis of its greater power.32 Iranian regime officials have made a number of notable statements in this regard, the foremost of which was an announcement by former Revolutionary Guards commander and military advisor to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that “Our western borders do not end at Shalmaja on the western Al-Ahwaz borders with Iraq, but [extend] to southern Lebanon, and this is the third time that our influence has reached the Mediterranean coast.”33 Some political analysts in the Gulf Region have warned that the Arab countries, and particularly the GCC countries, would pay the price of a nuclear deal between Iran and the six world powers. While it is not unusual for Iranian regime officials to periodically issue such bombastic statements, it is striking that Tehran has recently escalated its hostile rhetoric toward some Gulf countries after maintaining balanced relationships with them for decades, moving from verbal grandstanding to interventionist actions. The most prominent example of this is the official Iranian authorities’ tendency to take unilateral action, by allowing domestic oil companies to expand their exploratory activities in the ‘Dura’ oil field shared by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. This led to threats of renewing earlier disputes over this field and to the possibility of a political and diplomatic crisis between Iran and Kuwait, which was only averted by Kuwait’s spirit of responsibility and concern for their good-neighborly relations.34

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The last few years have seen many indicators of Iranian interference in the internal affairs of some Arab Gulf States, reflecting the discrepancy between the Iranian regime’s declared policy narrative and its actions on the ground. In this context, Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa stated that his country had seized quantities of explosives smuggled in naval boats coming from Iran in July 2015, which were “sufficient to remove Manama from existence.”35 In addition, the Kuwaiti judiciary indicted 24 people, in what became known in local media as the “Abdali Terrorist Cell,” for “communicating with the Republic of Iran and Hezbollah which worked to carry out hostile acts against Kuwait by bringing and making explosives and machine guns, and listening devices without a license and with intent to commit crimes.”36 Third: GCC-Iranian relations during the second half of 2016 From the beginning of June 2016 until the end of December in the same year, GulfIranian tensions reached a peak in statements and political behavior concerning a number of contentious issues, including the occupation of the UAE islands in 1971, the destruction of Saudi diplomatic premises in Tehran and Mashhad in 2016, and regional protests against the death penalty issued by Saudi Arabia against Shi’ite cleric Nimr alNimr. As a result of these tensions, the Saudi authorities severed diplomatic ties with Iran, since which relations between the two countries have been strained at best.

The biannual report period witnessed a new surge concerning some issues: 1. Ongoing Saudi Arabia-Iran conflicts Since the severing of diplomatic relations between the two nations, which clearly affects the region’s security and stability, this conflict has continued to rage for several reasons: A. The Iranian regime’s ambitions and its desire to implement its plans at the expense of Saudi Arabia’s security and stability.

B. Iranian attempts to lead the Islamic world through its expansionist Shiite project.

C. Saudi Arabia’s ability to thwart the Iranian regime’s ambitions and plans, to detect and expose them in front of the regional and international community.

D. Mutual accusations of interference in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, with Iran, accusing Saudi Arabia of supporting the Sunni population, while Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of supporting the Shiite population.

• A number of issues have exacerbated the level of conflict between the two countries: A. Saudi Arabia using the Iranian opposition card: The Iranian regime expressed resentment at the participation of Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the chairperson of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, in the Conference of the Iranian opposition in Paris in July 2016. The senior Saudi official’s participation in this event also showed that Saudi Arabia has cards which can be utilized in its increasing struggle with Iran, and was intended as a message to Tehran that “Riyadh can do the same as you do,” which reportedly made Iran rethink its policies and reopen files such as the investigation into the attacks on Saudi diplomatic premises.37 B. Saudi-Iranian differences toward regional crises: Conflicts were taking place in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon prior to the election of President Michel Aoun in Lebanon in late October 2016. While Iran accused the Saudi authorities of being responsible for the

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opposition in Syria, and for the Sunnis in Yemen and Iraq, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in return accused Iran of backing Shiite operations against Sunnis in these four countries with money, weapons, and fighters in order to implement its expansionist plans in these nations and to launch the construction of its supposed empire.38 C. Saudi-Iranian differences over the Hajj pilgrimage: Saudi Arabia and Iran disagreed on the proper ways to ensure the security and safety of pilgrims carrying out the Hajj pilgrimage to Makkah during the negotiations hosted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with more than 70 countries around the world signing memorandums of understanding in order to ensure the security and safety of pilgrims. Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia prevented the Iranian Delegation of Hajj Affairs from signing the MoU for Iranian pilgrims.

• The main differences concerning the Hajj pilgrimage were as follows: 1. The issue of transferring Iranian pilgrims to Saudi Arabia after the suspension of direct flights between the two countries, which numbered nearly 150 flights a month, with the Iranian delegation demanding that the paragraph in the MoU concerning civil aviation be reworded so that the transport of pilgrims could be divided between Iranian and Saudi airlines, a measure contrary to international regulations.39 2. After the Iranian regime insisted on issuing visas for its pilgrims from inside Iran and in light of the severed diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia suggested as a compromise measure that the visas could be issued through a third country, a suggestion strongly rejected by Iran, which considered this an affront to its regional and international prestige, along with the suggestion that electronic tracking could be used to enable the Iranian Hajj Affairs department to print visas for pilgrims in Iran.

3. The Iranian delegation insisted that clauses should be included in the MoU to allow Iranian pilgrims to establish gatherings for a ‘Camille’ prayer and a ‘Baraa’ ceremony, as well as a ‘visit prayer,’ although the Saudi authorities asserted that such gatherings would hinder the movement of other pilgrims from the Islamic world, as well as being designed to divert the Hajj from its primary purpose as a religious duty, and to be used as an effort to politicize the Hajj through the chanting of slogans such as “Death to America” ​​and “Death to Israel.”

These issues have not yet been resolved, with the Supreme Leader actively escalating the tensions over them through his message to the Saudi leadership on September 5th 2016, which went far beyond acceptable standards of political discourse, with Khamenei stating, “Rulers of sedition who framed the Islamic world in internal wars and killed and wounded innocent people by establishing and equipping evil Takfirist groups to manipulate politicians and do not know God.”40 One day after this controversial outburst, the Mufti of Saudi Arabia Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh responded by accusing Khamenei of opposing Islam and using his speeches to incite hostility with the Sunni community, saying, “Khamenei’s attack on Saudi Arabia and [violence towards the] Saudi procedures of Hajj season is not surprising for those,” adding, “We must understand that those are not Muslims; they are the sons of the Magi, and their hostility to Muslims is ancient, and specifically against Sunnis.”41

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While Iranian regime officials continue their offensive comments and the exchange of accusations between the two countries also continues, the indicators suggest that Saudi Arabia successfully organized and managed the 2016 Hajj, with the sacred annual pilgrimage ending without any problems. The Iranian regime remained uncharacteristically silent on this, with many Iranians having been prevented from attending the pilgrimage in 2016 not by the regime but by strict procedures implemented

by Saudi Arabia, thwarting the Iranian regime’s plans to politicize and exploit the Hajj to spread chaos and sedition. This showed the success of Saudi Arabia’s firm rejection of Iran’s efforts to impose conditions that would have introduced politics and sectarianism into the pilgrimage by including ceremonies and rituals far beyond those which are part of the Hajj, part of the Iranian regime’s effort to disrupt the event and incite sectarian divisions under the false pretext of “internationalizing” the event, which already brings pilgrims from all around the world, but in reality cynically using the sacred pilgrimage as a tool in the regime’s efforts to export “Khomeini’s Revolution.” Other Iranian pilgrims who entered Saudi Arabia through a third country were welcomed like all other pilgrims, with only the Iranian regime’s efforts to mar the sacred event stymied.

While Saudi Arabia’s success in foiling Tehran’s efforts to politicize the Hajj pilgrimage was widely welcomed by Muslims worldwide, the Iranian Supreme Leader’s rage at being thwarted in this objective was made clear by his unprecedented outburst against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as seen above.42 • The Iranian stance behind the assassination attempt of Sabhan: Despite denials by the Iranian regime, Iran is a longstanding master in ordering the assassination of various nations’ ambassadors. Iraqi Shiite militias, including the ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq,’ the ‘Majame’ Akram al-Kaabi,’ and particularly the ‘al-Sadr Al’wal Brigade’ militia led by Murtaza Abboud al-Lami, attempted to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Iraq Samer Sabhan in August 2016. This was a lethal retaliation for a simple statement by Sabhan that Iraq should retain its own identity and unity, in accordance with the confirmed Arabian political vision for Iraq’s Arab identity. In response to this statement, the Secretary General of the ‘Abu Fadl Abbas’ Shiite militia called for the immediate assassination or expulsion of the Saudi Ambassador to Iraq, the clearest possible indication of Iranian involvement. Despite this, the Iraqi government remained silent toward these serious threats, in light of the Iranian regime’s stated wish at the beginning of 2015 that it did not want to see the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which were severed after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

This followed years of Iranian regime attacks on various countries’ diplomats and diplomatic premises, beginning with the attack on the American Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, and also including the assassination of Kuwaiti diplomat Najib al-Rifai in Madrid in 1982, as well as the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran in August 1987.

The US also confirmed the discovery of an Iranian plot to assassinate the then-Saudi Ambassador to the United States and current Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir in October 2011 as well as the attacks on the Saudi diplomatic headquarters in Tehran and Mashhad in 2011.43

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2. The growing Iranian threats towards Bahrain Iranian interference in Bahrain has been continuous since Manama’s sovereign decision to withdraw citizenship from the Shiite cleric Issa Qassem in late June 2016 over his call for and support of riots at the Pearl Roundabout in 2011. As well as plotting to overthrow the leadership in Bahrain, the Iranian regime has strongly rejected the decision announced by Bahrain, acting as though Tehran were a guardian for another independent state component, with Quds Force commander General Qassem Suleimani issuing statements which directly reject Bahraini sovereignty and which are considered to constitute direct interference in the internal affairs of a UN member state, when he said, “Issa Qassem is a red line; to [withdraw citizenship from] him means to set fire to Bahrain and the region, and mistreating him will be the beginning of a bloody uprising in Bahrain, and will lead to the fall of its regime.”44 These statements have no legal or diplomatic standing, but reflect the Iranian regime’s policy; they are not an expression of personal sentiment by General Suleimani, but a demonstration of the Iranian regime’s ambitions in the region. They offer compelling evidence of Iran’s direct intervention in the internal affairs of its neighbors and show clear support for Bahraini insurgents to mobilize against the Bahraini regime, proving definitively that Iran has been behind the periodic public disturbances, which have taken place in Bahrain since 2011.

3. The escalation in UAE-Iranian differences A primary determinant of political relations between the UAE and Iran is the situation of the conflict over the three islands Greater Tunb, Minor Tunb, and Abu Musa, which were taken control of by Iran after the evacuation of British troops from the Gulf in 1971. Another issue affecting the status of Iranian-UAE relations is the Iranian regime’s interventions in the affairs of the UAE’s Gulf neighbors and fellow GCC member states, which threaten the security of the Gulf, and which led the UAE to reduce the status of diplomatic relations with Iran to the level of chargé d’affaires rather than a full ambassador.

As a result, bilateral relations have been strained. In this context, in June 2016 the UAE rejected the passage of an Iran-Oman gas pipeline across its territory, extending from the Iranian Hormozgan province to the port of Sahar in Oman. The 400-kilometer pipeline consists of two parts, with the initial 200-kilometer ground pipeline in Iran itself extending from Rodin to Mubarak Mount in Hormozgan province in southern Iran, whilst the subsequent 200-kilometer stretch connecting the Mount Mubarak pipeline to the Omani port of Sahar runs under the Gulf. The pipeline, estimated to cost $1.5 billion in total, will allow Iran to export around 28 million cubic meters of gas to Oman over a 15-year period.

The UAE leadership is aware that the Iranian regime needs the UAE more than the UAE needs Iran, and that it would be easy for the UAE to find an alternative trade partner to replace Iran, which accounts for only 7.5 percent of the total volume of the UAE’s annual trade figures; Iran relies far more heavily on the UAE for the import of goods, although with goods shipped via the UAE accounting for 29 percent of its total imports, this means that Iran would have difficulty in finding an economically viable commercial alternative to the UAE, particularly given its geographic proximity, with the Emirates’ ports being the closest and cheapest for Iran.45

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Fourth: Conclusions of the biannual strategic report period After reviewing the history of Iranian-Gulf relations generally and relations between the two sides during the period of the biannual strategic report, in particular, there are several conclusions: A. Tehran’s interventionist behavior toward some of the Gulf States and countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon indirectly affects and is affected by, Gulf security, meaning that everyone suffers from the impact. The entire region’s security is impacted by this.

A number of indicators show that these events have seen a qualitative upward trend in terms of controversial issues affecting all the aforementioned aspects (the UAE Islands, Gulf security, and the Iranian regime’s intelligence activities in the Gulf, as well as its intervention in other states’ internal affairs, including the nuclear file), with the emergence of new conflicts during this period. These include the intervention crisis in Bahrain, the tensions over the Hajj pilgrimage and associated statements by the Iranian Supreme Leader, and increasingly hostile Saudi-Iranian and UAE-Iranian relations, all as a result of recent events in the region and Iran’s strengthening its regional presence.

Variables affecting these relations include the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings of 2011, followed by the nuclear deal between Tehran and the West in July 2015, during which Tehran revealed its hegemonic aspirations, based on the regional expansion of its greater power.

B. In general terms, Iran’s interventionist policies saw no reduction during the Rouhani era, especially during the period covered by this strategic report; on the contrary, they increased significantly. Changing faces in Iran’s government has little impact; the president is not the primary decision-maker in the Islamic Republic. Iran has strived to attain its strategic objectives since the theocratic regime first came to power in 1979, whether a Conservative or Reformist president has been the titular head of government, and has always aimed to become the dominant regional power. In other words, periods of calm within the regime will always be followed by periods of tension, particularly towards the neighboring GCC nations. The regime has never changed the cornerstone of its policy and constitution, which is to play a dominant regional role rather than following any principles of good neighborliness or cooperating in regional security through respect for other regional nations’ sovereignty and independence; Iran does not intend to abandon its interventionist policies. The level of negative Iranian influence in the Gulf Region became notable in Rouhani’s era, as it did during the era of one of his predecessors, Mohammad Khatami, while Hezbollah was founded in Lebanon during the presidency of Rafsanjani. Iran’s system of governance is based mainly on loyalty to the Supreme Leader; one example of this is Abu al-Hasan al-Sadr, who was nominated and strongly supported the presidency of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who even said of al-Sadr, “This is my son.”

When differences arose between Khomeini and this adoptive “son,” however, al-Sadr fled the country, seeking political asylum in France.

C. The GCC countries have adopted a consistent policy toward Iran during the report period based on mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs, as well as repeatedly calling for the establishment of positive and cooperative relations. The GCC member states adopted this policy in an effort to contain Iran, to achieve regional

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stability, and to resolve any problems or crises threatening this stability. It was felt that this would enable both the Arab Gulf States and Iran to rationally overcome and negotiate their differences so as to move away from mutual hostility and toward a state of regional coexistence, convergence, and cooperation, and avert exclusion and marginalization in the regional security arrangements, particularly in light of the region’s crucial geopolitical ​​ importance and sensitivity of various related issues, not only for the regional countries but for the entire world.

D. Many reasons underlie the increasing instability and escalation of tensions in GCCIranian relations, forcing the GCC member states to formulate possible options and alternative scenarios of how to deal with Tehran in the upcoming phase, particularly given the regime’s insistence on its unchanging policies towards the Gulf countries, which have triggered many crises in the region. The development of these problems and tensions in Gulf-Iranian relations indicates that Iran bears primary responsibility for this situation due to its constant persistence in adopting a hostile and demeaning stance toward fellow regional nations, and continuing with its interventionist policies and escalation of tensions with the Gulf States, despite the tireless efforts of the latter to express goodwill toward Tehran and to display their readiness to develop relations and resolve contentious issues through diplomacy and dialogue.

E. Proof of the GCC countries’ goodwill is not required; the member states have shown complete flexibility towards Tehran on many issues, only to repeatedly encounter hostile Iranian policy in response, with Iran more interested in pursuing its project of regional hegemony in its efforts to dominate the resources of the region and threaten other regional countries. Bearing this in mind, achieving any improvement in GulfIranian relations depends on Iran taking positive qualitative steps in its policy towards neighboring countries, especially the GCC member states, and requires concrete policies, beginning with putting an end to Iranian interference in the GCC member states’ affairs generally and Bahrain’s in particular. Furthermore, Iran must reach a satisfactory settlement over the Occupied UAE Islands, taking into consideration the GCC’s insistence on the UAE’s absolute right of ownership over these territories. Tehran also needs to show a genuine intention to end the crisis over its nuclear program crisis, with 12 months already having passed since the interim agreement with the P5+1 countries.

F. In order to resolve mutual differences with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, the Iranian regime would have to implement changes in its policy towards them, with the current differences representing an insurmountable impediment to developing positive relations. The primary issues requiring changes in Iranian policy to resolve these problems are: 1. The conflict over the three UAE Islands.

2. Gulf-Iranian tensions over Arabian Gulf security.

3. The Iranian nuclear program crisis.

4. Iranian threats to obstruct navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

5. Iran’s interference in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ affairs, and Iranian intervention in the neighboring Gulf countries.

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Fifth: The Future for Gulf-Iranian relations In light of the previous conclusions, as well as the rapidly changing regional and international developments, and taking into account the multiplicity and complexity of the files and issues of cooperation and conflict between the GCC countries and Iran, it is difficult to predict the direction of these relations accurately; however, it can be estimated through three possible scenarios for Gulf-Iranian relations in the foreseeable future: First Scenario: Breakthrough in relations This scenario is based on mutual dialogue between the Gulf nations and Iran through official periodical communication channels in terms of key issues of dispute already mentioned. The Gulf perspective sees this scenario as achievable, but the possibility of bringing about this scenario remains limited so long as there is little sign of a sincere desire on Iran’s part to give priority to the principles of good neighborliness and the attaining of mutual interests, or to abandoning expansionist and hegemonic aspirations and projects. At present, Iran’s continuing with its expansionist project and its current policies in the region, along with regional and international events that have been helpful to the regime’s objectives, mean this scenario will remain excluded.

Second Scenario: Full conflict This scenario is based on an escalation in tensions between Iran and the GCC States precipitating further imbalance in mutual relations and reaching the extent of a full military clash. Although the possibility of this scenario has increased, particularly given the Iranian misconception that the Gulf States cannot stand against its ambitions due to inequality in terms of military power and human resources, and the problems caused

by Tehran’s control of Baghdad and interference in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria, not to mention its numerous affiliated Shiite militias and its sectarian influence on segments of the Gulf communities, it is still less likely since the foreign policies of the Gulf States are based on avoiding the use of military force wherever possible and resolving regional and international disputes by diplomatic and political means. There are also international restrictions in place to deter any intemperate behavior on the Iranian regime’s behalf, which include: 1. Maintaining the safety of sea-lanes in the region.

2. Increasing the military capabilities of the Arabian Gulf States and alliances established

by Saudi Arabia, such as the Arab Coalition and the Islamic Coalition.

3. The continuity of the new US administration’s commitment to Gulf security.

Third Scenario: Tension and cooperation This scenario represents the continuation of the current situation, which characterizes the volatile relations between the two sides before and during the period covered by this report, which ranged between convergence and cooperation at some times and high levels of tension and hostility at others. This scenario seems most likely, with the region still troubled by tensions between Iran and regional states over various issues, especially in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Generally, there are regulations which should direct the future course of Gulf-Iranian relations in order to achieve a resolution of these issues

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which is mutually satisfactory for both parties and which contributes to strengthening the Gulf region’s security and stability and enhancing the welfare of its nations’ peoples.

The greatest onus in achieving this scenario, however, is on Iran, which has continuously sought to achieve and expand regional dominance and influence beyond the rules and norms of international relations. In order to achieve this scenario, the Iranian regime must meet the following conditions: 1. Working constructively with mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

2. Respecting territorial sovereignty and recognized borders.

3. Respecting the rules of sea-lanes and rights of passage, especially in the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

4. Halting the provocative statements of some officials, which include hinting at the possibility of using force.

The most important factor in deciding the form of future relations between the Iranian regime and the GCC States will be the willingness or otherwise of Iranian decision-makers to develop positive relations with the Gulf capitals. If the Iranian regime is willing to make goodwill gestures in order to establish positive cooperation with these states, especially as Iran’s interests are restricted to strengthening its relations with the neighboring Gulf region, this would allow Iran to expand and enhance its relations on both the regional and international levels, due to the high status and significant credibility of the GCC countries both in the Arab region and globally.

Second Axis Iran’s Role in the Neighboring Gulf Countries Iraq and Yemen INTRODUCTION

Iran has played an active role in the region generally and in neighboring Gulf countries such as Iraq and Yemen specifically since the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq.

As a result, these two countries (Iraq and Yemen) have become isolated from regional political and security developments; this is not to mention the massively increased Iranian presence and influence there. This is apparent in a number of ways, including the positions adopted by the Iraqi leadership during the second half of 2016, represented by Iranian demands to integrate the Tehran-affiliated Shiite militias into the Iraqi army, and the procrastination by the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen in ending their armed control of Sanaa. Also apparent in Yemen is the formation of a ‘parallel government’ by HouthiSaleh that is clearly intended to challenge the legitimate government of President AbedRabbo Hadi Mansour. All these scenarios demonstrate different aspects of the Iranian regime’s central role, which have resulted from changes in the internal balances of power in Iraq and Yemen, as well as from other regional and international events.

Limits of the Iranian role in Iraq and Yemen, its challenges and consequences during the biannual report period:

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First: Iraq as a springboard for Iran’s expansionist strategy The US invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in May 2003 provided a critical opportunity for the Iranian Republic to implement its sectarian plans, taking advantage of the US role as a ‘direct occupation’ power. Thereafter, Iran extended its influence massively inside Iraq, becoming the political frontrunner in the Iraqi arena, especially after the outbreak of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011. The Iranian regime not only formed militias and Shiite-affiliated groups in Iraq to implement its agenda, it went further, shaping the Iraqi regime and incorporating Shiite militias into the Iraqi army to strengthen its military foothold, with its militias playing a central role in the ongoing battles in Iraq to liberate Iraqi territories from the terrorist organization ISIL, most recently in Mosul.

There were several motives for Iran’s incursion as a key player in the Iraqi arena: A. The sectarian dynamic in Iraq.

B. Iraq’s status as one of the Shiite crescent countries.

C. Geographical proximity to Iran.

D. A strategic springboard into the region.

E. Preventing the emergence of a new united Iraq.

F. U.S. policy in Obama’s era.

Zalmay Khalilzad, the former US Ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan, and US Ambassador to the United Nations from 2007 to 2009 wrote an article reflecting how Iran had become a key player in Iraq through its political, military, and cultural incursions.

Khalilzad admitted, “The US think tanks are almost convinced about the loss of Iraq to the Iranians.” The late chairperson of the Expediency Council Hashemi Rafsanjani said, “If Iraq and Iran united, they would have the first word in the region.”46 The third phase of the Iranian regime’s Shiite expansionist doctrine – after the first two, namely deployment and politicization – is the ‘Militarization of Shiism,’ a term describing the militarization of Iraqi and other Arab Shiite populations, being trained, equipped, and prepared to become both formal and informal groups of fighters.

During the second half of 2016, Iraq witnessed a tactical shift in the Iranian regime’s strategy and its own military capabilities as Tehran moved to the full ‘Militarization of Shiism’ within the neighboring Arab nation, enabling the Iranian-backed militias there to reach the stage of imposing proxy rule via arms, with Iraq now in a state of readiness for full occupation through its lack of ability to confront the Iranian militias militarily. That is the main axis of Iran’s external actions, and what remains for the Iranian targets are details or relatively straightforward procedures revolving around this strategic behavior.

This is the highest level of Iranian plans being affected, whether detailed strategic plans or political practices, future plans for the Shiite community, diplomatic, informational, and economic, etc.47 The ‘Integration of Shiism’ or the Shiite militias’ integration in the existing regimes legitimizes their nature and provides official cover for their activities in the implementation of the Iranian Supreme Leader’s orders. This was the reason behind Iran’s pressure on the Iraqi government to integrate its proxy Shiite ‘Popular Mobilization

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Forces’ (PMF) militias within the Iraqi army (see table below), which was a key focus of repeated messages from Tehran to Baghdad in recent months. Iran regularly warned Abadi’s government of the possible dire consequences of the battle of Mosul without changing the status of the PMF militias, warning that failure to integrate them would encourage Iraqi and international parties to dissolve them. Tehran’s constant warnings ultimately drove Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi to issue a formal decision on July 26th 2016 integrating the PMF militias into the Iraqi army, and led the Iraqi Council of Representatives to approve the ‘Popular Mobilization Authority Act’ on November 26th the same year, with 170 deputies of the 208 who attended the session voting in favor.

This new legislation means that the PMF militias are now a single military entity within the Iraqi Armed Forces under the command of the General Commander of the Armed Forces, and consisting of an appointed leadership, general staff, and combat brigades, to be subject, along with its affiliates, to the endorsed military laws.48 The passing of the Popular Mobilization Authority Act led to negative repercussions both inside Iraq and abroad due to its provision of legal and official cover for the PMF’s crimes, with the militias’ actions now having full legal authority as part of the country’s official armed forces. This legislation allows the PMF militias’ members to claim military ranks within the Iraqi army and will contribute to its degradation, making the country’s armed forces increasingly wholly sectarian in nature. In this context, it is worth mentioning the statement by Hadi Al-Amiri, the leader of the Badr Brigades, a prominent PMF militia responsible for multiple crimes and ethnic cleansing, who boasted in August 2016 that the PMF militias had become stronger than the regular Iraqi army.

The Popular Mobilization Authority Act will be a major factor in fueling wider regional conflicts, with the legalizing of the Iranian regime’s influence in Iraq and its official integration into the Iraqi army giving the militias legal

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cover to move into Syrian territory (where many are already present, albeit unofficially) under the false pretext of prosecuting ISIL. This in turn will drive several regional parties to deem the PMF a transnational militia engaged in proxy wars on Tehran’s behalf, which will contribute to further ratcheting up levels of sectarianism in the region, revealing the success of the Iranian regime’s efforts to ‘institutionalize’ the conditions of its allies in Iraq and its tools of strategic influence there. The main risk of this legislation and its consequences will be in turning the Iraqi military into the main party in the future ShiiteSunni conflict. Moreover, the fact that the Iraqi military is now shaped and governed by sectarian considerations eliminates any endeavor aiming to turn it into a national institution uniting all Iraqis, effectively aborting any efforts to turn Iraq into a unified state of equal citizenship for all.49 1- Shift in Iran’s strategy from integration to empowerment Iran not only integrated the armed militias with the Iraqi regime but is also seeking to enable them to expand their geographical scope and bring new areas under their influence in order to become the main player and primary controller in the Iraqi political arena. To this end, the Iranian regime has been supporting the Shiite Mobilization Forces with money and weapons to control Mosul. Operations to bring Mosul under their control began immediately after the Iraqi government’s official statement on the morning of Monday, October 17th, 2016, although the city had been under occupation by the ISIL since June 2014. Mosul is the last Iraqi city under ISIS control, with the terrorist group already driven out of Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, Beiji, and Sinjar. The PMF’s central role in liberating Mosul was emphasized in a statement by senior Iranian official Ali Velayati, the President of the Center for Strategic Studies in the Iranian regime’s Expediency Council, who said on September 16th 2016, “If not for the Popular Mobilization next to Fallujah liberating forces, it would not be liberated from ISIL.” The Commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, General Qassem Suleimani, visited the Nineveh city borders in August 2016 in order to prepare for the Mosul battle and was already participating in the beginnings of the fight before moving to the battle of Aleppo.50 At the time of publication, the battle for Mosul has so far lasted over four months, contrary to many predictions that it would be resolved within weeks given the tens of thousands of troops and militia members involved and the massive military superiority of their arsenal of weapons compared with those of the ISIL group.

This has led

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many experts and specialists to question the reasons for the prolonged crisis, especially in light of the horrendous humanitarian conditions, with more than 200,000 residents from the city fleeing their homes by December 2016 and over 68,000 being registered as permanently displaced by the UN up to that time.

It is apparent that the main problem lies not in the liberation of Mosul, but in the ‘next day strategy’ or post-ISIL phase for control of the city between the parties involved, with the city and region being subject to very different and contradictory political projects. In this context, the Iraqi parliament voted on September 26th, 2016 to maintain Nineveh’s unity within its historical borders, and prevent any efforts to change its legal and administrative status. The battle of Mosul has already spiraled into several other battles, causing massive destruction; these developments further complicate the already complicated efforts to achieve stability in Iraq, with reconstruction hampered as many of the displaced people fear returning to their homes and cities due to well-founded fears of persecution by the Shiite militias, which are already responsible for multiple human rights violations. Although it is likely that the battle will ultimately succeed in ridding Mosul of ISIL, domestic and regional tensions mean that this tactical success could quickly be transformed into a strategic setback.51 At the Iraqi domestic level, the leaders of the main political factions have put forward three projects, although none of these is likely to be implemented, despite the support of the Iranian regime and the US administration for certain projects: 1. The Sunni Project: Based on converting Nineveh into an independent territory comprising several provinces to maintain Nineveh as an entity in order to ensure that it will not be divided due to national and ethnic conflicts. The region includes several provinces after converting the districts of Tall Afar, Makhmour, and Nineveh Plains into provinces, then turning Mosul into a province and the regional capital.

2. The Kurdish Project: Close in nature to the Sunni project, this would turn Nineveh into several provinces, and implement Article 140 of the Constitution, which requires resolution in the disputed areas. Moreover, this would determine the population of the border areas with Iraq’s Kurdistan region in case they decide to remain in Nineveh or continue as part of the region through a referendum to be supervised by the United Nations, after which Nineveh would be converted into a region. This project is consistent with the Americans’ objectives.52 3. The Shiite Project: This project, adopted by Abadi’s government and the Shiite Mobilization militias, and backed by Iran, would see Mosul maintain its pre-ISIL status.

This has been rejected by the Kurds and is considered impossible, while the Sunnis see it as a precursor for returning to the previous problems that caused the emergence of ISIL in the first place. According to this project, which led Iran to support Abadi, the Iraqi army would control these areas, meaning in reality that they would be under the de facto control of Tehran’s proxy militias.

However, resolving the problem through any of these projects is unlikely to happen because they are contradictory with regard to Iraq’s interests and visions. Consequently, the dispute over the establishment of a Sunni region has flared up again, whether to

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exclude this option or to find another formula to maintain the unity of Iraq. Furthermore, the Kurdish President Massoud Barzani has demanded a new arrangement that would allow the creation of three provinces for ethnic minorities in Sinjar, Tal Afar, and the Nineveh Plain, as well as the formation of a domestic administration that would take into account the diversity of the population, giving them the choice of staying within the current administrative boundaries or joining the Kurdistan Region.53 This problem is not only political but military as well because the Kurdish Peshmerga forces have played a prominent role in the battle of Mosul after taking control of the northeastern and southwestern areas of the city. The battle to liberate the ‘Qayyarah’ area near Mosul showed the important role the Peshmerga have in providing logistical support and securing corridors; this role became clear in the battle of Mosul, especially as the Peshmerga forces’ positions were closer and better than the Iraqi army was at positioning. At the beginning of September, the Peshmerga forces were 12 and 25 km away from Mosul, when the Iraqi army units were about 50 km away. Also, the Peshmerga do not instill fear in the people of Mosul as the Popular Mobilization militias do. It is doubtful that the battle of Mosul will be won without the critical involvement of the Peshmerga. It is also difficult to imagine this role without a clear political agreement, which requires mutual trust, and nothing indicates the availability of a sufficient amount of it [trust] yet.

Away from its internal conflicts, Iran also has interests in post-ISIL Mosul as part of a wider ambition to weaken the Sunni groups, and determine the future of Tal Afar in western Mosul. As well as being home to the Shiite Turkmen, Tal Afar will possibly provide Iran with a location on either side of the intersection of the Kurdish areas, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Furthermore, it will enable Iran to open a land corridor to Syria and the Lebanese Hezbollah, being well aware that the Anbar Road is fraught with dangers. The Iranian regime encourages the participation of the Popular Mobilization in that battle, under the pretext of protecting the Turkmen Shiites and Tal Afar people in Mosul in order to have a large presence in the battle, which is considered by some politicians in the Iranian regime, before the Baghdad politicians, to be decisive in determining the nature of Iran’s influence during the next phase. In other words, allowing Popular Mobilization militias to participate heavily in the battle of Mosul is an opportunity for the Iranian regime to convert its political influence in Iraq into actual field control.54 On the other hand, it does not seem that Turkey is interested in playing a key role in the battle of Mosul, which Turkey considers part of its security area in the north of Iraq.

Moreover, whoever has the upper hand in Mosul will have the upper hand in Iraq in the near future; Ankara knows this very well and fears that Iran or Kurdish opponents of Turkey will gain the upper hand in Mosul. Therefore, Turkey desires military involvement in the battle of Mosul, based on what was approved by the Turkish Parliament with a majority of 298 votes out of 396 at the end of September 2016 to allow the Turkish military to intervene in Syria and Iraq. This new Act of Parliament authorized Turkish armed forces to use force in Syria and Iraq and to take action if there are any risks related to Turkey’s national security. In addition, the Turkish Parliament voted overwhelmingly to extend this Turkish military mission for one more year in order to continue its military

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operations in Iraq and Syria. This extension will allow the Turkish military to move and carry out all military operations until the end of October 2017 outside its borders, especially in Iraq and Syria.55 Iran is aware that the Peshmerga’s contribution to the battle of Mosul will consolidate the presence of the Irbil Government in the city’s vicinity and facilitate the deployment of its defenses in the disputed territories, as well as facilitate trade and economic communication with Turkey. The Popular Mobilization militias are aware that the Sunni powers’ return to Nineveh will reinforce the position of those Maliki’s government tried to confront in recent years. Tehran clearly wants to keep Turkish influence out of Iraq and Kurdistan as part of its policy in Syria.56 The participation of the Popular Mobilization militias in the battle of Mosul has geostrategic importance for the Iranian regime, as it confirms for all the players in the Arab, regional, and international arenas that it used the US occupation of Iraq to serve its own interests and increase its territorial gains. This was particularly the case for “Iran’s path toward the Mediterranean,” which emerged in 2014 in a plan, which the Iranian regime had worked on three decades ago to create a corridor through Iraq and Syria linking Iran with the shores of the Mediterranean in order to give Tehran greater influence in the region. This corridor begins in Baquba-Diyala province, the nearest Iraqi city to the Iranian border, and toward Shirqat city in Salah-Uddin province, which the Shiite militias dominated in September 2016. Then it extends to Tal Afar and Sinjar, which were controlled by the ‘Be Ka Ka’ forces from Syria from November 2016, crosses the border between Iraq and Syria at Rabia, and goes through ‘Qamishli’ and ‘Ain Alarab’ (Kobani) down to Afrin, which are areas controlled by the Kurdish people’s protection units. The Iranian regime believes the corridor is “in the right place.”

The Iranian corridor to reach the Mediterranean will not only promote the Shiite Crescent, which Iran has been working on for decades, but it will also change the nature of Iran’s presence in the entire Arab world. The British Observer quotes Martin Chilov, the Middle-East Affairs Administrator, “Iran is working hard to achieve this geostrategic objective,” whereby it can move goods and people along that corridor, which is guarded by its own forces or other affiliated forces in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.57 Aleppo is also a critical area for the completion of this corridor, as Tehran has frequently invested its efforts there and mobilized thousands of troops to control the city. Chilov added that securing Aleppo is an important stage in the corridor project, which passes the Shiite towns of Nabl and Zahra, then the outskirts of Homs, and on to the Syrian coast, the stronghold of the Alawites and secured by Russia.

Prolonging the crisis has other reasons, including those related to the intended complexity of the relationship between Irbil and Baghdad concerning the issue of Peshmerga-liberated areas. Iranian-backed Abadi is sticking to the Peshmerga’s withdrawal from the liberated areas, which is based on the agreement between the federal government and the Kurdish forces, and which includes “an explicit clause for the Peshmerga forces’ withdrawal from the liberated areas after the liberation of Mosul to their locations pre-operations.” Massoud Barzani, President of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, refused to cede the liberated areas and confirmed his agreement with the US not to withdraw from the areas that the Kurdish Peshmerga forces liberated from ISIL, declaring

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that these forces lost 11,500 killed or wounded in the battles against the organization.58 In addition, there is the fear of Tal Afar and conflicting parties during the post-ISIL phase, especially the Iranian-backed Shiite Mobilization forces. Turkish Foreign Minister Mouloud Tchaouc Ihsanoglu said that his country would take security measures if the Shiite Mobilization forces made any threats to Turkey’s security, adding: “We insist on protecting the rights of our Turkmen brothers in Tal Afar.”

Otherwise, ISIL benefited from all these incidents, as well as methods of combat, including: A. Laying mines on the five bridges over the Tigris River.

B. Setting fire to oil wells to obstruct incursions and to prevent jet fighters from hitting their targets.

C. Burning the eastern villages to prevent Kurdish forces from advancing.

D. Suicide car bombs.

E. Benefiting from some open ports on the Syrian border to get reinforcements and support, which boosted its defenses.

The nature of the battlefield also provided four approaches: A. The southern approach, which starts from south of ‘Qayyarah’ and extends along the river to the city of Mosul, and is controlled by the Iraqi army.

B. The eastern approach, which starts from the territory of the Kurdistan region and is controlled by the Peshmerga forces and some national Sunni Mobilization forces.

C. The western approach, which starts from Tal Afar and is controlled by the Popular Mobilization forces.

D. The northwest approach, which starts from the areas surrounding Mosul’s dam; it is considered a suitable area for mobilization, and is controlled by the Shiite Mobilization forces.

The military objective is to retain some areas not occupied by troops to force ISIL to withdraw toward the Syrian border.59 2. The Challenges of Iran’s role in Iraq Despite the developments in Iraq during the second half of 2016 that were in the interests of Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, it is difficult to ignore many of obstacles that hinder the Iran’s role there, such as: A. The deteriorating economic situation in Iran, despite the lifting of international sanctions, and the high costs of Iran’s involvement in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, especially in light of the disparity between Iran’s liberalist society and the religious authorities, which reflects negatively on Iran’s role in Iraq and the wider region.

B. Iran’s influence, its militias associated with sectarian practices, accusations of repeated human rights violations, crimes, and demographic changes against the Sunni population, as well as differences with the Kurdish parties. All of this will lead to the emergence of a ‘Denial sectarian’ movement inside Iraq composed of various factions, especially if it receives anti-Iranian international and regional support. This is to be expected during the post-ISIL phase to prevent Iran’s growing role, which considers Iraq as a starting point for the rest of the region.

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C. The next stage could lead to a power struggle in Iraq between the political forces and Shiite armed militias, who consider themselves the only holders of power and influence in the fight against ISIL. Moreover, regaining control over cities and regions that were controlled by ISIL that has large military capabilities on ground, which deploys chaos and restore the international intervention in Iraq. This could lead to the emergence of powerful movements and national opponents to Iran’s role and presence in Iraq.

D. The possibility of a divergence between the Iraqi Government and Iran, in light of the need to put in place the declared program of Abadi’s Government, as well as the terms of the political agreement that this Government was based on, including its promise not to allow regional interference in Iraqi affairs, and to restore stability in Iraq’s foreign relations.

E. Despite the United States’ acceptance of Iran’s presence in Iraq, in light of the security crisis with ISIL the US position will be reshaped to curb Iran’s role in Iraq or the wider region due to opposition by Republicans in the US Congress, pressure from the pro-Israel lobby, a Republican winning the US Presidency, and the strategic relations between the United States and the Arabian Gulf.

F. The Saudi’s orientation, especially after the accession of King Salman bin Abdul Aziz, is to cooperate with Qatar and Turkey on counter-terrorism, which emerged with the Saudi’s leadership of the Arab-regional coalition against the Houthis in ‘Operation Decisive Storm,’ and which attracted regionally important states such as Pakistan. Also, this was a call to form a Sunni axis in the region to counter Iran’s growing role, given the decline of Arab influence.

3. The future of Iran’s role in Iraq and the expected trends The bottom line is that Iran’s role is growing in Iraq, contrary to Syria, where its role is declining. Iran’s role in Iraq did not grow due to its [Iran’s] power, but because of internal, regional, and international variables that paved the way for it. Iran’s role in Iraq is generally negative, and the “infinite conflicts” are clear evidence that these conflicts resulted in a fragmented state [Iraq, and the occupation of vital cities by ISIL, Mosul still being under ISIL control. Moreover, there is a lack of a strong national army representing Iraqi unity; Iraq has turned into a hotbed for terrorists from various countries in the region, and politically Iraq has lost its unity. There are calls to split it into three separate entities, and the bloody sectarian conflict between Iranian participants has also completed the economic impoverishment of Iraq.

When ISIL’s control of Iraqi cities and territories has ceased, it is expected that Iran will consolidate its role in Iraq in a manner that achieves its interests and serves its objectives on various political, security, and religious levels for its regional expansion. This is in light of the international variables and orientations adopted by Rouhani’s administration. It is possible, according to facts, for Iran’s role in Iraq to take on multiple dimensions: A. The Political Dimension: Due to the direct Iranian presence, and the Iraqi movements’ need for Iran’s support to stay in power, Tehran will play a political role by influencing the political process and government’s orientation, as well as working to achieve a balance between the religious allied parties, supporting them to control Iraqi State institutions

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and excluding the influence of national powers that oppose Iran’s role in Iraq.

It is expected that Iran will keep the Iraqi government in a state of being unable to separate from Iran’s influence, as well as seeking to attach the position of the Iraqi Government to Tehran’s one [position] regarding Arab issues and developments. Iran will also have an effect on Iraqi Arab, regional, and international relations regarding what happened when Iraq declared its position with Iran during ‘Operation Decisive Storm,’ which was led by Saudi Arabia against the Houthis in Yemen.

In light of Iraq’s major position in Iran’s strategy in the region, not only on a political level but also on a religious one, it does not seem that Iran intends to miss any opportunities in Iraq. The events in the region have encouraged Iran to pay Iraq more attention, such as ISIL’s control of large parts of Iraq demonstrating the importance of Iraq’s security for Iran, due to its [Iraq’s] prominent role as a defensive line. There was a similar situation Syria, where Iran’s inability to declare a divine victory in Aleppo after gaining control of it at the end of December 2016, and the differences over Syria between Russia, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the slump in oil prices, were all signs confirming that Iran will not abandon, at least partially, its gains in Iraq. In exchange, the continued sectarian policies in Baghdad will lead to “infinite conflicts” in Iraq, and thus the scenario of the tribal ISIL-led uprising against al-Maliki – which came in response to their anti-sectarian policies – will be repeated, and which raises fears of an “Iranian coming era” that may start in Iraq.

These fears are rooted in the significant Iranian moves in the region, whether in Syria, Lebanon, or Yemen.

B. The Security Dimension: The security crisis and the escalation of ISIL’s role in Iraq have shown the nature of Iran’s multifunctioning security role. Since the beginning of the crisis, the direct presence of Iran’s security and intelligence agencies has emerged in Iraq; they began their field deployments on the pretext of protecting religious places and shrines, and to help the Iraqi security agencies confront ISIL. • It is expected that this presence will remain during the next phase with certain justifications: 1. Reorganizing Iraqi security forces.

2. Providing security and intelligence agencies with consultations to counter terrorism.

3. Protecting religious shrines.

In addition to the direct security presence in Iraq, the Iran-linked Shiite militias represent an indirect security presence for Tehran in Iraq. This dimension will give more momentum to Iran’s influence in the course of future events in Iraq.

C. The Religious Dimension: Iran’s attempts to control the Shiite religious authorities in Iraq, thus reducing the effects of Arab-oriented clergies or those who do not recognize the principle of the Jurist Leadership. Furthermore, to consolidate the influence of the Iranian-origin clergies, through suppressing the religious seminaries “Hawzas” in Najaf in favor of Iranian seminaries of Qom.

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Second: The future of Iran’s role in the Yemeni crisis Since the start of the Arab Spring in early 2011, Yemen has witnessed conflicts of control between the various political forces, a deterioration of security in all provinces, a deterioration of the economy, and a low standard of living. The situation also worsened on all levels with the Iran-backed rebels coup over the legitimacy of Yemen’s rulers headed by Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and their control of the capital Sanaa in September 2014 by force in order to destabilize the internal forces and impose their political choices on Yemen and the future of the crisis through Iran’s support with money and weapons and its alleged plan of regional expansionism. Since that date, the crisis has become more complicated, and its regional influence has increased, particularly Iran’s influence, thus forcing the rebels to refuse the negotiations and initiatives put forward during the second half of 2016 to settle the crisis unless the Houthis become an entity in the new Yemeni equation. So, will the Houthis continue with their confrontations to lead Yemen into a civil war, or will they all approve stability and a national partnership, with all parties accepting the UN envoy Ismail Ould Sheikh’s recent initiative? What are the external influences on the Yemeni crisis? And, what are the features of the political landscape in Yemen in the future?

1. Yemen’s geostrategic importance for Iran Yemen has geostrategic importance at the southern entrance of the Red Sea and its [Yemen’s] control of one of the most important shipping lanes in the region. The Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, through which oil tankers go to the Red Sea, bound for the Suez Canal directly to the main markets in Europe and the United States. As well as ‘Mede’ Port, which has been sought after by the Iranian-backed Houthis more than once and who still control it in various ways, Yemen has borders with some Gulf countries, for example Saudi Arabia, the Gulf ‘core of unity,’ and the main anti-Iranian areas in the region.60 Iran gaining a foothold in Yemen reinforces its regional presence and helps it control the main entrances and exits to the international oil trade. Strategists and scientists say that whoever has oil is like a gold treasury owner, and whoever controls the corridors crossing other countries is like the owner of the key to this treasury. Since we are talking about the Gulf, its oil resources, and its neighbor Iran, the Gulf’s oil tankers, in order to transport oil to the West for example, need to use international sea-lanes from the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Aden, through the Strait of Bab el Mandeb to the Red Sea, and finally the Mediterranean. Iran has realized the importance of this strategy, Hormuz is already under its control, and it is constantly trying to force Bab al-Mandab under its control; proof of this is Iran’s support for the Houthis’ last attempt to take over Sanaa, if it were not for ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ led by Saudi Arabia.61 2. Iran’s strategy in Yemen Iran’s strategy in Yemen included several options such as the Houthis in the north and the armed movement in the south; it began with a search for a self-governing authority in Saada, and for a mini-state on the border with Saudi Arabia. Then, with the aim of creating a military organization parallel to the state, similar to Hezbollah as a state within a state, it wanted the armed movement in the south to be part of that organization.

However, the former Saleh regime, through its alliance with Iran and direct or indirect

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military coordination on the ground, provided a new opportunity to fully control Yemen, which is what happened in the Houthis’ coup in Sanaa on September 21st, 2014.

Therefore, Iran put Yemen as the first vital area in its expansionist strategy and supplied the rebels with tons of arms shipments through Eritrea against former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in order to implement its [Iran’s] strategy there. The Yemeni Revolution created an opportunity for Iran to implement its plans in Yemen, so they increased the arms shipments for the Houthis to become a powerful force in Yemen and to gain access to power and carry out Iran’s plan, which had also supported their former coup attempt in Sanaa. Moreover, the Iranian MP Ali Reza Zakani declared Sanaa as the fourth Arab capital to extend the Iranian Revolution. This led Saudi Arabia to respond to an official request from President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi after leaving Yemen in March 2015 to intervene to save his country from Houthi-Iranian aggression and to recover towns seized by the Houthis. Consequently, the Arab military coalition appeared and liberated 70% of Yemeni territory from the rebels. Since he took the helm in February 2012 until the time of this report, President Hadi has called on Iran not to interfere in his country eight times, most recently on October 7th, 2016. In early November 2016, US sources confirmed that five weapons shipments from Iran, which would have helped the Houthis’ war against the people and the legitimate government in Yemen, had been seized.62 Constantly, the Brigadier General of Basij Mohammad Source: http://cutt.us/RTnD2 Reza Naghdi stated in September 2016, “The banner of the Islamic Revolution is flying in Yemen along with Syria and Iraq.” Also, Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran’s Supreme Leader’s advisor, confirmed in October 2016 that Iran would not remain silent, and would not hesitate in supporting its allies in Yemen, pointing out that Iran had provided support for Yemen as much as possible, and would continue to do so. Also, there were statements from religious leaders Hussein Nouri Hamedani and Sheikh Nasser Makarem Shirazi on November 11th, 2016 that the Houthi group was under Iranian control in the region to counter their adversaries in the Middle-East, and that their country would not hesitate in providing all forms of support for them.63 Moreover, a spokesperson for the Revolutionary Guards told the Fars news agency that the Houthis in Yemen had Iranian missiles and that they had attacked positions belonging to the Yemeni army with an Iranian-made missile named ‘Zilzal 2’ on November 5th, 2016.64

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3. Increasing Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen According to its strategy, Iran sought to create a state of instability by bombing the military in order to change the balance of power in Yemen, the result of which was a living “Tragic Reality” and Yemen being on the brink of a systemic collapse and endless conflicts.

This is especially in the light of the failure of international and regional efforts to hold peace talks between the parties involved in the crisis up to the date of the publication of this report.

Iran’s support for the Houthis is clearly reflected in Yemen during the second half of 2016: A. Disabling the negotiations option: Negotiations were initiated between the rebels and Saleh’s party along with the Abed Rabbo Hadi party in Kuwait in April 2016 and continued until July 2016 with no results. Especially with Saleh-Houthis’ insistence to act as the so-called “Blocking Minority,” in an attempt to clone Hezbollah’s experience in Lebanon. These negotiations were conducted before the basic conditions for a peaceful settlement of the conflict had been confirmed, which demonstrates their ‘maturity.’

Houthi-Saleh considered that were standing firm in the face of coalition air attacks and still controlled Sanaa, believing that they were at the ‘fruit-picking’ stage. The coalition countries realized that they had exhausted every possibility and that international legitimacy and the Security Council resolutions had allowed them to retake Sanaa and stop the Houthi expansion through air strikes for more than a year and a half. However, the remaining task was no longer possible using the same methods and the same tools, and it cannot be said that the liberated areas were completely returned to legitimate forces. Thus, the coalition countries preferred to continue negotiations while they failed to declare Houthi-Saleh the Yemeni Supreme Council.65 B. Rejecting the international and UN initiatives: The doors of the UN and international initiatives are still closed, because of Houthi-Saleh not getting the green light from Iran, and then rejecting the solution and settlement initiatives for the crisis and ending the state of conflict in Yemen, including the US initiative on August 25th 2016, which suggested “forming a national unity government with the participation of the Houthis and delivering heavy weapons and ballistic missiles for the state, as well as evacuating the Houthis out of Sanaa.” This initiative was accepted by the Yemeni state and the Arab coalition to resolve the crisis and a return to security and stability in Yemen despite its deviation from the references of the political solution (the GCC initiative and executive mechanism, the result of the national dialogue, UN resolution No. 2216). This initiative also required the rebels first to recognize the elected Hadi Presidency, and then to hand over their heavy weapons and withdraw from the cities and institutions, prior to their participation in any government.66 When the Houthi-Saleh alliance got the green light from Iran for responding to the most important requirement for the Houthis, which was to form a joint authority before embarking on their withdrawal arrangements and handing over their heavy weapons before the recent initiative, which the UN envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Sheikh put forward on October 25th, 2016, despite President Hadi’s refusal on several items:

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First: Recognize President Mansour Hadi as transitional President with limited powers, and select new a vice-President, as agreed by all political parties.

Second: Form a military and security supreme commission to oversee the Houthis’ withdrawal from the cities and handing over their heavy weapons.

Third: Form a national unity government to be shared equally between the legitimate coalition and the Houthis, and the insurgents start to withdraw from the areas specified under category ‘A’: Sanaa, Taiz, and Hodeida, within one month.

Fourth: Amendment of the Federal Constitution draft, according to the agreement that took place during the national dialogue conference, no longer than one month after signing the settlement agreement.

Fifth: Elections must take place under international supervision a year after the agreement is enforced.67 This initiative has revealed a number of controversial issues and complexities in the crisis: First: The contrasting positions between the internal parties and regional players alike in this crisis. The way that the Yemeni parties dealt with this initiative seems in the eyes of observers to raise more than one question about their seriousness about reaching a peace agreement to end the war in Yemen. The Hadi Government rejected the plan and confirmed their full adherence to the Gulf initiative, its executive mechanism, the national dialogue outcomes, and relevant UN resolutions, particularly decision No. 2216.68 Moreover, they considered it as a chance for the coups and an input to appoint Vice-President for the Republic that has the president powers to transfer the executive power to Houthis and to make the presidency in Yemen symbolic or partial, as in Lebanon.

Second: How to apply this initiative, in order to gradually exclude President Hadi and his deputy Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar from the political scene, while there is no mention of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthis’ commander Abdel-Malek al-Houthi, who are facing strict international sanctions. The first requirements to resolve the political impasse lie, in the estimation of experts and observers, in a clear future position for both President Hadi (who has international recognition of his legitimacy to rule) and former Presidents Saleh and AbdulMalik al-Houthi (who control the political capital and several provinces in the country).

It is known that the solution to this conflict is no longer in the hands of the Yemenis alone, but also with the coalition countries led by Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Iran (political and strategic supporter of the Houthis) on the other hand. It does not seem, according to the points

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of view of many experts, that Riyadh will accept any peace plan in Yemen that does not provide an acceptable long-term partner on its southern borders, and which guarantees it a clear role in the political future of Yemen to preserve security and stability. Moreover, confronts the Iranian scheme and deters the arsenal of ballistic missiles, as well as, Iran’s ambitions and expansionist projects.69 On the other hand, there are many opinions that see the initiative as a compromise which gives each side its demands for the sake of security and to maintain its legitimacy, and which rejects the Houthis’s project to eliminate the ruling institution. The initiative states that the Houthis have to pull their fighters out of the main cities, Sanaa, Hodeida, and Taiz, and hand over their weapons. There were points of difference between the negotiators, but the withdrawal of militias and arms achieves the desired domestic peace, and proves the legitimacy of the governmental forces, which is also a way to measure the seriousness of the Houthis and the reality of their position, which cannot be known by the promises of their representatives in the negotiations. The international envoy’s ideas required the Houthis to create a buffer zone with Saudi Arabia, through the withdrawal of all gunmen inside Yemeni territory bordering Saudi Arabia beyond thirty kilometers to prevent justifications of engagement and aggression.

C. Take Unilateral Arrangements: The failure of the negotiations resulted in Saleh-Houthi taking unilateral steps to complicate the crisis by forming a coalition ‘the Supreme Council of Yemen,’ headed by Saleh Al Samad, on July 28th, 2016. The council consisted of ten members (five Houthis and five for Saleh) and started its operations on August 15th, 2016 in order to manage the country’s political, military, security, economic, administrative, and social affairs.70 This unilateral move was considered as a clear violation of the country’s constitution, which was approved by the Houthis in February 2015. There were talks in Kuwait, and even a UN Security Council decision to settle the conflicting parties’ differences politically, as well as the terms of the Gulf initiative and UN Security Council Resolution No. 2216, which calls for “all Yemeni parties to refrain from taking unilateral actions that could undermine the process of political transition in the country, and invite them to stop all actions that included within the scope of legitimate government power.” Moreover, this reflects the Russian support for the Council, despite its constitutional breach, for the Yemeni problem to become an international playing card, and it seems that Moscow has found the Yemeni card to be a trump card in Syrian affairs. In addition to the United Nations’ and the UN Security Council’s abandonment of resolving the region’s affairs, and the powerful Iranian influence in Russia, there was the Russian veto against Ismail Ould Sheikh Ahmed’s Vision, which was backed by the Arab coalition, America, and Britain.

Since that time, the two parties’ visions have diverged (the legitimate government and Houthi-Saleh) beyond the borders in terms of calming the situation and their demands to solve the Yemeni crisis; therefore, the legitimate government led by Hadi was summoned to:

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• Talks on September 21st, 2016 about the transfer of the Central Bank of Sanaa controlled by Houthi-Saleh forces to Aden, in order to restore the authority of the country’s financial decisions, which was rejected by the Houthis because it would, according to economists, strangle them financially and economically, and about preparing for the internal battle for the liberation of the capital Sanaa and disarmament the Houthis of weapons through which they conducted their war, recruited fighters and bought tribal and military loyalties.71 • The desire of the legitimate government to launch a new currency, because the foreign currency reserves at the Central Bank in Sanaa, which are controlled by Houthis, fell to $700 million due to the Houthis squandering about $4 billion of central bank reserves on military operations against the legitimate government. There was a move to cancel all the stolen money that the militias possessed after the deficit grew as a result of declining government revenues and a lack of economic exports in Yemen as a result of the war led by Houthi-Saleh’s forces, and to control the central bank and the foreign exchange reserves. The state also faces being unable to maintain its legitimacy by continuing to pay employees’ salaries in the public sector, in the military institutions, and securing the needs of its citizens. All this is in light of the significant decline in many Yemeni expatriates’ salaries. Moreover, there is an almost total absence of investments or production in general because of the state of destabilization in Yemen.72 Saudi Arabia, the leader of the Arab coalition in Yemen, did not stand by as a spectator, and called for the two parties to negotiate, where the Arab coalition also called for a comprehensive political settlement in Yemen on September 26th, 2016 and not just a truce, as the Houthis proposed on September 25th, 2016, but a ceasefire on Saudi Arabia’s borders in exchange for halting air strikes launched by the coalition on the Houthis. The Saudi embassy in Washington also submitted a proposal for a peaceful settlement, which included four items: A. The withdrawal of forces from Sanaa and other vital cities.

B. The transferal all heavy weapons and missiles from ‘Ansarullah’ and its allies to a third party.

C. The formation of a national unity government.

D. Respect for the security, integrity, and inviolability of international borders.73 4. The results of Iranian support for the Houthis From the start of negotiations and the National Dialogue in March 2013, which continued until the end of the second half of 2016, no significant progress was made, as each party was seeking to attract the others onto its land. Therefore, the legitimate government delegation continued to confirm the need for delivering heavy and medium weapons for the legal government, and for the rebels to withdraw from the cities and their consequent control of the state and its institutions. There was also the need for a resumption of the political process by discussing the draft constitution. In contrast, the Houthi-Saleh delegation was calling for the formation of a unity government that included the rebels in an attempt to copy the experience of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which was rejected by the government. In brief, the legitimate government delegation prioritized a withdrawal, while the Houthi-Saleh delegation wanted to form a national

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unity government. The legitimate government delegation wanted UN resolutions to be put in place, and the Houthi delegation wanted new grounds for negotiations, based on the dismissal of UN resolutions, and to establish a new legitimacy.

Package of challenges is against the resolve of crisis, including: A. The Houthi-Saleh belief that a new reality on the ground will occur when forming the political supreme council.

B. The Houthi-Saleh refusal to hand over their weapons.

C. The ability of the new US Administration headed by Donald Trump to support consultations which can rebuild confidence between the parties of the conflict.

D. The sectarian and religious nature of the crisis has complicated matters and helped terrorist groups to gain supporters to fight on the battlefronts and a favorable environment for expansion, especially after their taking control of large parts of Hadhramaut province and other parts of Shabwa and Abyan provinces.

Some evidence confirms that the rebels would prefer not to negotiate, except when necessary, and on the condition of not losing their political goals, slogans, and principles regarding their eternal struggle. Therefore, negotiation, peace, and coexistence seem ​​to be their secondary priority, while ideological and sectarian objectives are their first and last priority, and any agreement with them is only an interim solution.

Houthis has been always disabling truces and commitments through position such as: A. Refusing to commit to the Gulf initiative signed by Saleh and other political powers in November 2011.

B. Refusing to commit to the outcomes of the National Dialogue, which lasted from March 2013 until January 2014.

C. The decision on the division of territories, which was issued in February 2014, and which included naming six territories within the framework of the Federal State, as agreed in the National Dialogue, where the fifth territory included Saada, Sanaa, Thamar, Omran, and Azal regions, but the coup attempt in 2014 broke all these agreements.

D. The partnership and peace agreement on September 21st, 2014, and its security protocol, especially the issue of disarmament.

E. Evading international resolutions such as Resolution No. 2216 and trying to overcome this resolution to show their coup was a struggle against aggression, although their aggression was categorized as war crimes in Omran, Damaj, and Sanaa less than seven months before ‘Operation Decisive Storm.’ The insistence on the decisiveness of these international resolutions as a platform for any essential negotiated solution is necessary, but it should be noted that the negotiations, peace, and homeland are secondary values ​​ in the Houthi mindset, which still insists on the Iranian model.

It seems that the UN delegates’ initiatives were unable to achieve a breakthrough in the crisis, due to the state of non-acceptance of toward the initiative’s terms. While the crisis continues, and Yemeni blood is still being spilled, three major cities in Yemen (Sanaa, Taiz, and Hodeida) are still under Houthi siege. Ould Sheikh presented what he called “new proposals” for the Yemeni President at the end of December 2016 and not “a solution map.” The proposals called for not compromising with the powers of President

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Hadi as elected president, for ending the coup, for the withdrawal of militias, and for the handover of arms, according to the three terms of reference adopted by the legitimate government (the GCC initiative, results of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, and UN Security Council Resolution No. 2216). Moreover, this item must be signed before moving to the second proposal, which represents a political pathway and includes the appointment of a vice-President and the formation of a national unity government. The guarantor for the government to enforce these proposals is the Quartet UN Peace Committee in Yemen, and the guarantor for the Houthis is the Sultanate of Oman.

Ould Sheikh has forgotten that the Houthis defaulted when Resolution No. 2216 was issued and rejected it, because it was issued under Chapter No. 7, which means that the Security Council has the right to use any means, including force, to enforce the Resolution after exhausting all peaceful means through ambassadors and international envoys.

Ould Sheikh invitation for Houthis to the first Geneva Conference was a clear recognition for them as an entity, on condition for Houthis to recognize the UN resolution, and they did recognize that in the United Nations General Assembly session in 2015. After that, everyone was surprised, including Ould Sheikh, when the Houthis declared their rejection of Resolution No. 2216 at the first Geneva meeting. The second meeting that was held in Swiss Biel ended in the same way as in Geneva, as the consultations hosted by the State of Kuwait lasted for nearly three months without making any real progress on the ground to enforce Resolution No. 2216. Even the withdrawal from the three main cities in Yemen (Sanaa, Taiz, and Hodeida) was not achieved; also, the Houthis provocations of and threats to the neighboring countries did not stop, no political prisoners were released, and the handover of weapons, the return of looted funds, and the withdrawal to Saada did not happen.

5. Developments in Yemen in favor of legitimacy The control of one conflicting party and its expansion in geostrategic and geopolitical areas at the expense of the other party in a crisis may give it the ability to impose conditions and change the balance of power in its favor. While the total area of ​​Yemen is 587.881 km², the legitimate government controls nearly 399.794 km² of that area, the Houthi-Saleh militias control nearly 176.252 km², and the remaining area is being fought over by the two parties, which amounts to approximately 11,835 km² in separate areas in the country. The legitimate wider control is not limited to the main part of ​​ Yemeni territory, but it controls strategic areas and provinces such as Hadhramaut in the southeast of the country, and Marib in the northeast because of its large oil reserves that supply the whole country.74 After a long period of procrastination by the Houthi-Saleh faction in accepting the international resolutions related to the settlement of the Yemeni crisis, ending their control of Sanaa, and handing over their weapons to the state, the legitimate government launched a military operation at the end of December 2016 called ‘Golden Spear’ to regain control of Hodeida, Taiz, and Sanaa from the Houthi-Saleh militias, where the legitimate forces succeeded, along with the Arab coalition that was supporting the military operations, getting back some important cities in the coastal region of Thabab-

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Taiz that had been under Houthi control. In addition to Alkhazzan, the Omari and Central Mountains, and Owaid and Nuba, the legitimate forces entered Nahim, Taiz, Albaida, Alwazeia Front, and Albarh on the main road linking Taiz and Hodeida. Then, in Aliari city near Ajdah in western Taiz, the legitimate forces surrounded an Omari camp where the Houthis were stationed, which forced some leaders of the Houthi-Saleh forces to join the ranks of the legitimate forces after vice-President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar called for the military leaders to join them in confronting the Houthis and to restore legitimacy.75 The legitimate forces took control of the city of Mokha on the west coast in Taiz governorate; this strategic port shifted the internal balance of power in the conflict in favor of President Hadi and his legitimate forces. In other words, controlling Mokha will cut a major supply route for weapons for the Houthi-Saleh forces; this is one of the most important sea lanes to be used for smuggling and will lead to a reduction in the suffering of the people of Taiz by opening a new outlet for them. Also, opening the road toward the port of Hodeida is to take control of the entire coast of Yemen, including its borders with Saudi Arabia, and if the legitimate forces carry on and take control of the port of Hodeida itself, the Saleh-Houthi militias will become trapped on the ground and at sea, thus becoming squeezed more and more.

The liberation of Mokha, which is located 96 kilometers from the city of Taiz, is important for controlling the legitimate forces at the strategic port on the Red Sea 72 km away from Bab al-Mandab port. The Yemeni national army controls the city Mokha, which overlooks the most important transport routes (the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and East Africa), thus enabling the Yemeni government to secure an international corridor through which more than 1,000 ships pass per day. Moreover, securing the western coast of Yemen from Mokha to Mede port in the west of the country will prevent the smuggling of weapons, and the empire of the Houthi-Saleh in Mokha will also vanish.76

source: http://cutt.us/8pY5q

Source: http://cutt.us/AprG

Based on the above, several scenarios can be predicted for the future of Yemen: A. The return of conflict: The return of widespread conflict will occur, especially in light of the Houthi-Saleh’s realization that they can still make gains on the ground by controlling Sanaa, and their announcement of the Supreme Council of Yemen. Despite their loss of the strategic locations of Hodeida and Taiz with the resumption of ‘Operation Decisive Storm,’ this scenario requires huge financial costs and new political calculations under the direction of the new US administration.

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B. Continuing negotiations and launching initiatives: This scenario assumes that the crisis in Yemen can be resolved in a truce through international pressure on all parties to accept the UN envoy’s initiative. However, this will depend on how serious the parties are about the conflict in light of the rebels’ unwillingness to accept the international resolutions. This scenario is unlikely.

C. The political solution: This solution will follow the legitimate forces’ military successes and strategic victory, making the Houthi-Saleh forces think about handing over their weapons to the state and ending their control of Sanaa after the legitimate forces’ control of many cities and strategic areas. Observers agree that the liberation of Mokha is an important milestone on the ground, which opens up a new phase to complete the liberation of the remaining areas still under the control of Houthis. Once control of Taiz and Hodeida is restored, this means three ports (Mokha, Hodeida, and Salif), as well as the strategic Bab al-Mandab, will have been lost by the Houthis, in other words, the loss of their control of all seaports and Sanaa.

Third axis The future of Iran’s role in the Syrian crisis… A rise or fall?

INTRODUCTION

Resolving the internal crisis between the conflicting parties and their regional and international allies at the expense of one of them will never calm down the crisis. The most important phase in the history of internal or international crises and wars is the so-called the ‘next step.’ Each side out of the victorious parties will make political and strategic calculations to maximize their gains, even at the expense of other members of the winning team. Iran and Russia, whose interests coincided in Syria, backed the Syrian President Bashar Assad’s Regime with money and weapons to win the battle, and strongly intensified their support since the beginning of June until the end of December 2016 to break the opposition using excessive force by land and air on Aleppo. Consequently, Aleppo fall before receiving the new US president Donald Trump got into power in Jan. 20th, 2016.

When the battle had still not finished, the Syrian Regime announced on December 22nd, 2016 its control of Aleppo along with Russian-Iranian support to change the balance of power in Syria. Then, there were differences between Russia and Iran which broke out over the Russian-Turkish agreement to end hostilities in Syria at the end of December 2016 without Syria or Iran being present in a manner that made observers of Syrian affairs ask questions about possible ways of ending the crisis in Syria. Whether because of the escalating disputes over the involved parties’ roles in the Syrian conflict, similar to the Hezbollah militias or because of the increasing possibility of an agreement between Moscow and Washington under the new US President’s administration, these may not correspond to Iran’s interests. Moreover, Iran’s expansionist strategy in the region will be impacted by the Russian orientations and the new US president trends that will be on the contrary of his predecessor toward Iran.

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First: The axes of Iran blocking for political settlement to the Syrian crisis States not interested in the political settlement of a crisis usually go to the military option to resolve it in favor of strategic partners to implement regional and international agendas. In this context, Iran has used the military option to bury the Syrian Revolution and the ongoing crisis for Assad’s benefit. The Iranian Republic’s position was also made clear through the announced political trends at the previous Geneva conferences as well as its unlimited military support for the Assad Regime during the second half of 2016 to take control of Aleppo and to end the crisis for several reasons in order to block any political settlement: 1. The Political Axis: This point can be considered central to Iran’s policy, because Iran sees Bashar Assad as a red line that cannot be crossed for ideological reasons, in addition to privileges granted by Assad for Iran’s influence in Syria. Therefore, Iran defends Assad’s Regime at all international forums, as Syria is considered a strategic objective for Iran, as it lies on a direct sectarian route that extends from Iraq, through Syria, to Lebanon, and then to the Arabian Gulf. Moreover, this expansion project evolved in Ahmadinejad’s era with the inauguration of the ‘fifth development plan’ within the framework of the (Twentieth Horizon), which was founded on a sectarian basis to allow Iran by 2025 to be “in first place regionally at all levels.”77 Iran realizes that the fall of Bashar Assad will cause dangers for its borders, and it will lose a key ally and a strong card to use against the West and Israel, while its success will make Syria subject to Iran as in Iraq. If that happens, the scope of Iran’s influence will extend from Western Afghanistan to Beirut, which in turn will radically shift the balance of power in the region and bring about Iran’s dream to be the dominant power in the Arabian Gulf. This new situation would allow Iran to force the major international powers to abandon any thoughts about destroying Iran, due to the fact that its influence, which is expanding gradually, may pose unpredictable risks, and give greater legitimacy to the Regime inside Iran or other countries in the region.

In connection with the above, Syria serves Iran’s broader strategy in the region; it represents a vital link between Tehran and Hezbollah, which is considered one of the most important results of the Iranian Revolution. They are considered members of an axis of resistance against Israel and Western ambitions in the region. Syria also provides Tehran with defenses for its arms corridors to Hezbollah in Lebanon on the one hand, and addresses – according to Iran’s strategy – the Arab regional axis, which is designed to contain the expanding geopolitical power of Iran on the other hand. Syria is at the heart of Iran’s strategy, and the Iranian leader Ali Khamenei said in August 2016 “If we do not fight in Aleppo and Samarra, we have to fight in Kermanshah and Tehran.”78 Iranian thinker Mehdi Tayyip also said in 2014 “If we attack the enemies and they want to take either Syria or Ahwaz, the priority will be for Syria, if Syria survives, we can restore Ahwaz, but if we lose Syria, we cannot keep on Tehran.” Then Mohammad Ali Jafari said in November 2016, “Iran alone decides the fate of Syria, and the major powers have to negotiate with them to determine the fate of countries in the region including Syria.” These statements are evidence of its strategy, so Iran did the following:

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1. Rejected the Turkish operation launched by Ankara on August 24th 2016 in Northern Syria in Jarablos to protect the Turkish border, and to cut the road to the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party in order to control Jarablos and prevent them from joining the Kurds in Syria’s northwest in Afrin region, which is considered a strategic threat to its national security.79 2. Rejected the truce agreement signed by the US and Russian powers in September 2016 to establish a ‘truce’ between Assad and the opposition factions to stop the war, which was introduced on the first day of Eid al-Adha on September 12th 2016, and ended on September 19th 2016 due to US-Russian differences about the list of terrorist organizations and identifying moderate opposition and armed opposition, as well as the simultaneous withdrawal of Bashar Assad’s and opposition forces from the strategic road of Castelo.

3. Stood against the political process adopted by Russia and Turkey at the end of December 2016, which caused a conflict with the Russians, who do not mind Assad’s exclusion from the first international understanding with the United States for a political solution to the Syrian situation. Iran qualifies information about the presence of Hezbollah in Syria, the Syrian state post-war, its efforts to restore the Assad regime.

Iran also is not accepting any Kurdish canton or self-management in Syria. The reason is that Iran afraid of the Iranian Kurds who are erased from the Iranian political scene, to do similar political demands. And, restoring Assad’s influence in Syria, means the Iranian hegemony on the borders of Assad’s state.80 This refutes the responses of the former Commander of Revolutionary Guards Major General Hamedani (killed in Syria in October 2015) on the question of the Iranian people, “Why did we go to Syria?” which was published in November 2016, and that “Syria is the first country to officially recognize Iran’s Revolution and closed the Iraq-Mediterranean oil pipeline during the Iraq-Iran war, which inflicted heavy losses in Iraq, thus Syria sacrificed its gains, as they got huge profits from transit and transmission of oil through its territory. Syria also provided Iran with ammunition, after many countries did not deliver our purchased weapons under the pretext that the revolution will fall. Also during the Iran-Iraq war, Syria gave us a missile, while no country gave us, at a time that Syria had agreements with the Soviet Union and disabled these agreements for Iran.”81 2. The Military Axis The Iranian military role manifested in Syria through waged sectarian militias from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, resulting in a growing Iranian influence in Syria. Iran also had control over the decision of Assad’s regime through deploying these militias in Syria to fight against the Syrian people under the sectarian slogans and committed brutal massacres against them. These militias took over the Al-Qusayr countryside west of Homs, the majority of the border with Lebanon, and the outskirts of Damascus. They also participated in the battles for Aleppo and the surrounding countryside and tried to buy off militia thugs to weaken ‘the Syrian Arab army’ in order for its military force to reign supreme in Syria. Initially, Iran’s fight in Syria was described

by Ali Khamenei as immigration, Jihad, and defending ‘Ahl Albeit,” He also said that the

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door of the martyrs was open again. He then summarized all these terms as a “war on the infidels” in October 2016.82 The total number of Iranian forces in Syria is estimated to be than 70,000, including the Guard’s elite forces (8,000-10,000), the army (5,600), the Iraqi militia (about 20,000), the Afghan militias Fatimiyoun (15,000-20,000), the Lebanese Hezbollah (7,000-10,000), the Pakistani militias Zaynabioun, and from other countries (5,000-7,000). The most important point according to internal reports by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the remaining troops in the Syrian army number fewer than 50,000 soldiers, and the forces of the Revolutionary Guards are greater than the Syrian forces, so they dominate the scene there.83 source: http://cutt.us/c3SRl

Iran did not stop there; Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Falaki announced the formation of cross-border Shiite military forces called the ‘Shiite Free Army’ in Syria. According to Falaki, the Shiite Free Army consists of the Fatimiyoun Brigade, the Zaynabioun Brigade, the Haidarioun Brigade with Iraq’s Shiites, and Hezbollah, which are divided into the Lebanon Shiites and other Shiites in Syria. Most of the Hezbollah members in Syria are descended from the Damascus Shiites, Nabl and Zahra. All of these Shiite military brigades form the Shiite Free Army led by Qassem Suleimani.84 Thus, Iran’s interference in Syria and its rejection of a political settlement has taken on “a sectarian character,” and it does not hesitate to show its sectarian goal in coming to Syria.

Second: The Inconsistency of Iranian-Russian interests in Syria “In politics, there is no lasting friendship or lasting enmity, but there are permanent interests, wherever the interests of two or more States consist, the relationship will be strengthened, and if not, the relation will experience tension.” Consistent with this rule, the Russian-Iranian interests conflicted in Aleppo at the end of December 2016 despite the convergence and agreement between the two countries to break the opposition and bury the Revolution before Trump, but Russia has ruled out Iran and Assad of the negotiations with Turkey on cease-fire in Aleppo, this provoked Iran, so it worked to block this agreement repeatedly, to inform Moscow that any future agreement must pass from Tehran. In other words, Russia’s disregard for Iran is also a message for Tehran that Moscow’s role in Syria is not as the role of America in Iraq, but to serve its interests, not to hand over Syria to Iran.85 Russia has long been a concern with the demise of Syria as Russian politicians acknowledge that the waiver of Syria will bring about heavy economic losses and cancellations of investment, as well as major military contracts signed with Damascus; thus losing its’ strategic advantages within the region. Russian-based investments in

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Syria amounted to $19.4billion, and opportunities to export goods to Syria with an annual average of $1.1 billion86 are in place. Russia also has infrastructure, energy and tourism companies based in Syria; for example, the natural gas company Astroa Trans Jazz, which implements projects worth $1.1 billion dollars and has established a plant 200km east of Homs. Astroa Trans Jazz also provides the technical support for the Arab Gas Pipeline project. Moreover, the TAT Naft Russian Energy Company also has a project with the Syrian national oil company, as it does with other companies within the steel, transportation, nuclear energy and agricultural equipment fields; its’ opportunity to participate in the reconstruction projects of Syria are estimated to be $60 billion.87 Additionally, Russia has armament contracts with the Assad regime - estimated to be worth $4 billion in 2011 - and Syria is ranked seventh internationally amongst the top buyers of Russian weapons. Between 2000 and 2010, Russia sold weapons worth $1.5 billion to Syria and exported 17% of the total global arms exports annually. The Middle East accommodates 16% of those exports - the second-largest market for Russian arms after South-East Asia.88 Due to the Syrian crisis, Russia will lose both these economic and military contracts as it is in favor of the Russian economy; they will lose the economic value for the waiving $9.8 billion of the total Syrian debt to the Soviet Union, amounting to $13.4 billion. Russia has preferred Syria for some time, since the loss of the Libyan card and the size of Russia’s economic losses resulting from the fall of the regime; as Russia did not take any spoils from the Libyan war, only the reconstruction contracts.89 Moscow fears it will be held out of a new political equation, with Russian decision makers considering Syria to be the last card of the region since losing Libya. A Russian presence in Syria ensures them to be an influential figure in the new equation within Syria and the region on a whole. If the political map is re-arranged to maximize the strategic advantages, it ensures its’ old dream to restore the Tsarist Russia glories of the Mediterranean. Russia also realizes that the demise of the Syrian card will exclude it forever - in the context of the European and US balance of power and the framework of distribution regarding roles and spoils.90 An observer of the Russian scene believes that Moscow will not alter its’ position towards the Syrian crisis, utilizing political maneuverings in different directions despite the international pressures exerted upon them. This indicates that Russia is seeking to avenge the indignity of receiving criticism - since the fall of Iraq and up until Libya’s demise - thus confirming its’ international prestige. This attitude reflects the keenness of President Putin to confirm his worth as Russia’s leader and not as a weak state under the American hegemony. Therefore, Putin will inevitability take a strong position to defend Russia’s vital interests, thus maintaining its’ foothold and strategic platform for its’ interests in the certain region.91 Furthermore, Russia aims to maintain the Tartus naval base, which has a significant strategic and military importance along the Mediterranean coast. This base is one of Russian’s key naval bases; it is a crossing gate for the region and a foothold for Russia in the Mediterranean. Upon realizing the strategic advantages of Tartus, the former Soviet

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Union signed an agreement with Syria in 1971 during the Cold War to build a Soviet military base in Tartus to support the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean.92 The priority of this base declined amongst Russian politicians with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, yet gained priority again during the first decade of the new millennium. The new leaders’ strategies aimed to restore relations with old allies and create new allies within the region; such as Putin and Medvedev, who have led Russia since the beginning of the new millennium.93 Therefore, it is not surprising that Moscow will protect its’ base in Tartus, particularly since the Ukraine threatened to close the Sevastopol base - the largest foreign Russian base on the Black Sea - because of differences between the two countries; thus limiting Russia’s future role within the region.94 It was expected that the Kremlin would state its’ dissatisfaction on 29 December 2016 regarding the Iranian’s behavior during the battle of Aleppo and beyond; as Tehran had worked to show its’ control on the battle as it primarily took to the ground through its’ allied militias. At that point, Tehran attempted to record their military achievements in Aleppo by employing and amplifying the militias’ role - shown by Qassem Suleimani’s presence in the Citadel of Aleppo – and, in return, downplaying Russia’s military role that relied on air strikes; however, the decisive factor was on the ground. Iran also attempted to derail the agreement after its’ collusion with ISIL in Palmyra and their militias’ aggressive campaign against innocent populations in ‘Wadi Barada’ in the Damascus countryside, as well as the continued shelling of towns and villages in rural Aleppo areas.

Third: The Iranian-Russian contentious issues on Syria The Russian-Iranian dispute manifested during the agreement between Russia and Turkey on 27 December 2016, which displaced civilians and revolutionaries from Aleppo without Iran or its’ ally Assad be aware; as Russia holds the political decision in Syria and the allies are purely for implementation. Iran tried to block the evacuation in Aleppo and the Russians threatened to open fire during the evacuation process that included the Iranian and Assad regime militias. Thus, Russian warplanes targeting the Iranian militias in the al-Rashideen area acts as a message for Iran to implement the decisions taken by Russia; Iran then complied with Moscow’s desire, thus revealing the Russian pressure on Iran and showing them to be a secondary player in Syria. However, the mullahs of Iran felt their influence in Syria was declining in favor of an alliance between Russia and Turkey - contrary to what was planned by the Iranians since the military intervention early in the conflict, i.e., to transform Syria into an Iranian influence as they had done in Iraq. In addition, part of this scheme was to give the Syrian conflict a pure sectarian dimension, as was the Lebanese Hezbollah’s military intervention.95 Iran expressed its’ anger at the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2328, provided

by Russia on 26 December 2016, which guaranteed the protection of civilians from violence; Tehran has recognized that the events were going against their own interests.

Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary-General of the Supreme Council of the Iranian national security, stated that such a decision would pave the way for more tension in Syria and benefit the terrorists. This became the first incident of Russian-Iranian disagreements.

Having pushed Iran to one side, the Russian positions rolled on after the battle of Aleppo

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to confirm that the city will not be left in the hands of the Syrian regime, militias of Iran or even for the Lebanese Hezbollah. While Tehran was hoping to address a speech of ‘divine victory’ that confirmed the dominance of Iran over Syria’s future - attributing the victory achieved in Aleppo to the Iranian militias exclusively - instead Aleppo is now besieging Iran and driving it into a corner.96 Iran considers its’ interest in the military escalation and continues to fighting until they change their demographic composition by concluding agreements on excluding militants and their families from the cities and certain regions (due to military pressure and siege activity) to be replaced by the original Shiite inhabitants; from Idlib to Damascus and the Lebanese borders. This explains the attempts to ignite the situation and violate the ceasefire agreement.97 The Russian-Turkish agreement showed confusion, and resulted in the Syrian Foreign Minister, Walid Muallem, visiting the Iranian capital on 30 December 2016 to meet with his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, to discuss the content of the agreement and its impact on the Syrian regime, as well as the Iranian role. This is because they involved two ironies, which largely concerned Syrians and Iranians: First, only Russia and Turkey completed the agreement, despite the strong Iranian role in the Syrian equation; Second, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mouloud Ihsanoglu, stressed the absence of any role for Assad in Syria’s future and his call to Iran to put pressure on their militias to respect the ceasefire agreement is a clear reference to the so-called Hezbollah.98 The Iranian-Russian status shows an escalating dispute since the Russian’s intervened in the Syrian crisis; whether through the issue of Assad’s continued power, the future of the Iranian militias, the Russian relationship strategy with Israel, or the Iranian ambitions in obtaining naval port in Syria. This change of pattern by the Russians when dealing with Iran is based on their international interests with the United States, the West, Israel, and Turkey; meaning that the decision is in Russia’s hand and Iran are only implementing.

Thus, Russia suggests a need to curb Iran’s growing role in Syria and paves the way for this by buying the loyalty of thugs and turning them from the Iranian side to the Russian through the offering of money and weapons. Russia has also managed to attract various military arms, such as the Quds Palestinian Brigade in Aleppo and the Desert Falcons militia deployed in the Alawite areas of the Syrian coast.99 Among the Iranian-Russian disputes in Syria are: A. The dispute over the future of Iranian militias in Syria - The most prominent major dispute between Russia and Iran is the future of the Iranian militias in Syria. This issue has forced Iran to kill the Syrian people in Damascus and its’ countryside, as well as Homs and Aleppo. Iran is seeking to consolidate its influence by cloning dozens of sectarian militias like Hezbollah - to ensure its’ sectarian project. This collided with Russia’s interests, which are far from the Iranian religious ideology. Thus they refused to fight sectarian battles on the one hand, nor the presence of undisciplined sectarian militias along the borders of Israel. Therefore, Russia facilitated Israel in targeting Hezbollah leaders through a security agreement between Moscow and Tel Aviv. Iran then planted Hezbollah in

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southern Lebanon to blackmail Israel and push them to enter into negotiations. After Iran converted the conflict from Israel to the sectarian conflict (Sunni-Shiite), the region gave orders to Hezbollah to end the conflict with Israel. The Iranian officials state that Russia is not pleased with Hezbollah’s presence in Syria. Therefore it deals with the Iranian militias per the Israeli vision and its’ understanding with Washington DC on the vital task of militias in alliance with Russia in Syria or with Washington in Iraq.100 When Iran tried to escape the Russian orders, Russian fighter planes targeted the Iranian fighters on the ground; resulting in the deaths of high-ranking officers and the bombing of more than one Almolouk barrier near Homs, Khanasir and north of Aleppo. The pace of the Russian bombing targeted the headquarters of IRGC and the Hezbollah militia in the villages of Nebl and Zahra, yet Russia has recognized this and justified that it was their error. Therefore, they targeted the al-Nujaba Iraqi Shiite movement in Mount Azzan (south of Aleppo), as well as, a barrier for these militias on the Khanasir road in Aleppo, this indicates the depth of differences and settled accounts to take over Syria.101 B. The Iranian-Russian dispute over Assad’s survival: This point formed the most sensitive and influential part of the relations between the two nations; Iran believes that the survival of Assad is a red line that cannot be bypassed, at least as it appears in the Iranian political statements of the media and the suffering of heavy losses to maintain the regime. However, Russia does not adhere to the Assad regime and does not mind his departure - the first international understanding with the United States for a political solution to the Syrian file. Iran is now convinced that Moscow was using Assad as a card to gain new interests and is working to replace Assad with someone that ensures its’ interests in Syria and the region and that the differences relate to the date of his departure before or after the transitional period. Iran has stated on more than one occasion that there is no consensus with Russia regarding the future of Assad. Tehran is betting its’ the long-term military solution to impose the survival of Assad, while Moscow seeks to have a limited time intervention and looks to involve Washington and regional countries to reach a solution that maintains all its’ interests.102 C. Dispute over Iran’s sectarianism in Syria: Since the Khomeini era of 1979, he stressed the Shiite characters of Iran and began to deploy Shiism in the region based on the Shiite central. Tehran also focused its’ strategy to establish military arms that have aided its’ expansion into Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen through doctrinal links by facilitating the involvement of many Shiites to defend the Assad regime. Those Shiites fought against the Sunni majority, which led to the sectarian conflict to create an expansive Shiite entity that exceeds Iran’s national borders; stretching from Iran to Lebanon, including Iraq and Syria, to ultimately re-establish the Persian Empire. Russia insists upon the possibility of establishing a federal republic and is aware of the Iranian concerns to expand in the region, as well as its’ rival not exceeding Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Russia knows that Iran is orbiting American politics, especially in cooperation over decades regarding Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and is also aware of America’s complicit position with Iran in their nuclear program. Also, the Iranian media insulting America is just a local media consumption, while the official Iranian position towards the US strategy is clear in the Middle East.103

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D. Disputes over the nature of the relationship with the Gulf States: The goals of Russia differ from Iran in terms of the nature of relations with the Arab Gulf countries and the world in general. Russia looks forward to solid political and economic relations with the Arab Gulf states. Conversely, Iran increases its’ state of hostility with the surrounding Arab nations with more interventions, harassments, and abuses, as well as conjuring up issues that stand in a region on the edge of tension and confrontation. It is known that the Gulf States own the solution of the Syrian crisis and that the role of these States is necessary to reach understandings and agreements between the regime and major influential powers in the Syrian opposition factions. Therefore, Russia could be an accepted mediator, while the presence of Iran could complicate any efforts to resolve the crisis.104 Fourth: Aspects of Russian-Iranian differences in Syria Military: The Russian-Iranian dispute worsened during the last month of 2016, thus reflected in the Russian air force targeting the Iranian militia that attempted to disrupt the Russian-Turkish agreement in Aleppo. Tehran previously attempted this when Iran attempted to sidle out of Russian orders and the Russian pilots targeting the Iranian fighters on the ground, resulting in the deaths of high-ranking officers; the air force bombed more than one Almolouk barrier near Homs, Khanasir and north of Aleppo.

The pace of the Russian bombing campaign targeted the headquarters of the IRGC and Hezbollah militia in the villages of Nebl and Zahra; Russia has recognised this and justified that it occurred in error, going on to target the Alnujaba Iraqi Shiite movement in Mount Azzan (south of Aleppo) and a barrier for these militias on Khanasir road in Aleppo - thus indicating the depth of differences and the settlement accounts to take over Syria.105 Russia bought the loyalties of thugs and turned them from the Iranian side to the Russian by offering money and weapons, as well as attracting various military arms such as the Quds Palestinian Brigade in Aleppo and the Desert Falcons militia deployed in the Alawite areas of the Syrian coast. Thus, the Iranians respond by attempting to disable the ceasefire agreement and block any political settlement in Syria.

Security: Iran attempted, through its’ intervention, to restore the role of a police officer by way of an understanding with Washington and Moscow; they pledged to transfer the struggle against Israel to sectarian conflicts, depending on its’ military arms (Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Popular Shiite Mobilization, and Houthis in Yemen). Then, it prompted Hezbollah to the south of Lebanon to improve conditions for negotiations with Israel and attempted to control the border in the Golan area to protect Israel and pressurize it at the same time to reap regional and international gains. Israel agreed with Russia with regards to Syria maintaining its national security and targeted Hezbollah in Damascus countryside and Quneitra; thus, killing prominent leaders of the party.106 Politically: Russia knows that Iran orbits American politics - especially in cooperation for decades in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria - and is aware of

the American’s complicit position with Iran in its’ nuclear program. In addition, the Iranian media insulting America is just for local media consumption, while the official Iranian position towards the US strategy is clear in the Middle East.

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understanding, there was an agreement on common data dictating a political solution in Syria for the Syrians alone, meaning the removal of any future role for Iran in Syria.107 Economically: Tehran has since been trying its’ intervention with the Assad regime to launch a direct maritime line with Syria; to increase trade exchanges between the two countries, as shipping is the main source of global economy. Where sea-lanes play an important role in the formation of this trade movement - and due to its importance Iran is seeking the Mediterranean Sea to diversify their sources of income. Therefore, they need to control Damascus and the borders between Syria and Lebanon to ensure their access to the Mediterranean and the finance of its militias. Therefore, the Iranians do not accept settlements that will end the Syrian war as it would be considered an abandonment of Iran’s regional ambitions. Thus, the Russian-Israeli-US understandings came to curtail due to the role of Iran in Syria.

Fifth: The Iranian escalation boundaries with Turkey on Syria Iran and Turkey have succeeded over the past six years to neutralize their differences over the conflict in Syria, even though these differences are not marginal as they stood next to one another at the conflict parties - in parallel with the breadth of these differences. However, when an international and regional supportive trend appeared to reach a political settlement for the Syrian crisis, disputes were brought back to the forefront again, which was evident during the trilateral Turkish-Iranian-Russian talks on 20 December 2016; or through the Turkish-Russian bilateral negotiations that ended with a declaration of a cease-fire, where the differences had reached such a high extent that the existing policy no longer had any importance or relevance - especially in Tehran and Ankara. However, that does not mean that the Iranian escalation against Turkey will reach an unprecedented phase, especially since Tehran cannot risk entering into an open conflict with Turkey in Syria - at least at the current stage.108 Hence, it is more likely that Iran will adopt a so-called ‘policy of waiting’ until foreseeing what will accrue in the Astana negotiations of 23 January 2017 and the meetings of the Geneva 4 which will take place on 8 February 2017. This is because it is concerned currently with maintaining relationships with both Turkey and Russia until the positions of the new US President will be clear with regards to the nuclear deal, or accusations to Iran of supporting terrorism; despite senior Iranian officials welcoming the Russian efforts to cooperate with Turkey to strengthen the chances of success of the Astana negotiations that aimed to enhance the ceasefire agreement reached on 20 December 2016. Also, by agreeing on the basic themes in upcoming talks that will take place in Geneva on 8 February, this does not negate the many fears inside Iran concerning the consequences that can be imposed by the high level of current understandings between Russia and Turkey, or the potential shifts in Russia’s policy towards Syria.

The Russian-Turkey cooperation in the fight against ISIL in Albab City ascends the Iranian fears, given that it can broaden the scope of the Turkish influence inside Syria; particularly with reports indicating that Turkey is seeking to ensure the preservation of its’ military existence in Albab city, even after the end of the military operations launched by the

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‘Euphrates Shield’ forces which received Russian support in air strikes against ISIL sites.

This suggests, per the vision of Tehran, that Turkey is trying to adopt the same policies that have already been pursued in Iraq, which is based on the consecration of the military role in Syria to preserve gains achieved by either the ‘Euphrates Shield’ or to expand the scope of security and political understandings with Russia.109 Here, one can state that Iran was keen to adopt a ‘policy of waiting’ when dealing with those understandings, due a fear of consequences that can be imposed, that cannot deny its’ strong need to maintain strong ties with the two countries; especially as a situation that may escalate with Trump’s arrival to the White House. Indicators began to emerge with some lawmakers hinting for an act that would ensure the State Department include Revolutionary Guards within the terrorist organizations – those that threaten the security of the world.

Sixth: Absence of US variables in the Syrian crisis While Russia has become the most influential figure in the Syrian equation throughout the crisis in general (and during 2016 specifically), the American role declined in turn.

The era of American hegemony in the Middle East ended during the reign of former US President Barak Obama, who adopted a principle based on two main axes: First: The former American president believed that America’s strength stems from inside cohesion, rather than international relations, of its foreign authority.110 Also, the US national security does not pass within international politics but is reinforced by a strong society; such as the ‘Obama Care project.

Second: Obama’s political beliefs seek to actively contain the states, which were considered to be quarreling until shortly before he entered the White House; enemy states such as China, Iran, and Russia, which have been allowed to move in the region.

Many important meetings and conferences regarding the Syrian crisis have taken place without the United States; the latest was the Iranian-Turkish-Russian trilateral meeting, held in December 2016. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that the RussianTurkish-Iranian trio-frame would be the most effective way to solve the Syrian crisis, discussing the ‘failure’ of the United States and the international support group for Syria., whilst also stressing the importance of the United Nations in resolving the Syrian crisis. The United States has tried to play down its’ absence from the trilateral meeting in Moscow over the Syrian conflict, stating that it was ‘not ignoring’ the issue and that it does not reflect a decline in America’s influence in the Middle East. Remarkably, the lack of any Arab or Gulf side at the meeting indicated that the Arab parties are ineffective in resolving Arab crises, either in global nor regional meetings.111 The Israeli strategic ally of Washington DC in the region selected its’ tactical long perspective over four red lines and these will not move without an intervention into the Syrian multilateral conflict:

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A. Preventing Assad forces from approaching the ceasefire lines in the occupied Golan; B. Preventing Hezbollah and Iran from exploiting the war in Syria to smuggle sophisticated weapons, especially missiles into southern Lebanon to support the military arsenal of Hezbollah; C. Preventing the positioning of armed groups fighting Assad forces and his allies near Golan; D. Preventing the Russian intervention in the Syrian war from obstructing the movement of the Israeli army from achieving the three previous objectives.

In the past, Israel succeeded in forcing its’ opponents or competitors not to skip the four abovementioned lines during the Syrian conflict. As an observer who does not interfere in the events except for procedures required by the red lines, the Israeli air force launched several raids on Syrian army sites near Golan under the pretext of preventing the arrival of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. Tel Aviv announced on 28 November 2016 that its’ warplanes raided a site for ISIL in the south of Golan, yet the Israeli military stated that the raid was a response for ISIL targeting the army near the ceasefire line.112 More importantly, Israel seized a recognition from Russia of its’ interests in Syria, where Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in his speech before the United Nations in September 2016 that ‘Russia recognises the right of Israel to defend its’ interests in Syria’, as evidenced by the Russian reaction to the Israeli attacks against the Syrian army; that Israel’s estimation was true and that Russia would not stand against Israel’s freedom to work on the Syrian front. These measures have enabled Israel to achieve several key objectives until the latter half of September 2016: First: The absence of a cost component because of achieving its’ goals without the need for large-scale military intervention in conflict with Syria; Second: Pushing Hezbollah to focus on the Syrian front to help Assad instead of directing great interest in Front of the conflict with Israel; Third: Israel’s ensuring of Iran’s preoccupation to defend its’ interests in the Arab region, instead of seeking to produce nuclear weapons, and then Israel becoming an observer to win new allies from the regional and international powers involved in the Syrian conflict, with them being the only regional power that does not drain in the conflict; this enables a long-term strategy to reap big gains when reorganising the influential regional powers in the area.113 Israeli analysts have been questioned over Syria’s future, and the observer position of Israel will remain unchanged until the end of the first half of 2017 at least. Then, it will draw lines between Russia and the United States to end the Syrian conflict, especially with Trump’s trend to adopt a conciliatory policy with Russia on this file. Also, Israel is waiting for steps to be taken by Iran in other conflicting areas (such as Yemen), and whether they are moving towards more pressure on Arab countries. This offers Israel more space to move closer to these countries being threatened by Iran, even exploiting Turkey to achieve this penetration - as Ankara was standing against Assad and his allies.

Alternatively, Iran would only strengthen its’ position in Syria and restore confidence

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with the West by giving up its’ sensational policies to stabilize the region, going on to put pressure on the Arab countries.114 Seventh: The future scenarios of the Iranian role in Syria.

Usually, future scenarios for any international roles in internal crises would be drawn considering the orientations of the crisis parties towards each other, the power cards possessed by each of the parties and the regional and international relations. Also, their visions to achieve the greatest gains and influence within a ‘state of crisis’ and whether it allows unequal parties to gain a share of the power and influence in the new equation. In this context, the Iranian role in the Syrian crisis waits for three scenarios: First Scenario: The escalation of the Iranian role in Syria It is likely that the Iranian role in the Syrian equation will escalate after the fall of Aleppo to achieve its’ objectives and expansionist ambitions at the expense of Syrian interests; as Syria is a key part of the sectarian plan to restore Iran’s imperial. There are indicators for this scenario to be achieved: A. Holding cards that can be moved and affected, Iran still controls the battlefield on the ground through armed military militias (Shiite Free Army: Brigades of Zaynabioun, and Haidaraon, Fatimyoun, Hezbollah, Abu-Fadel Abbas, ‘Asaeb Ahl Alhaqq’, ‘national defence’ militia (estimated to be 80,000) and cloned from Basij; B. The Iranian strategic visions with leaders working hard to implement these visions through a variety of institutions, using power tools, in a manner making them able to earn and buy loyalties from some political and intellectual leaders based outside the Shiite mainstream, especially from the leftists and liberals. This exploits the differences in some of the representatives with the Islamic current and disagreements with leftist and liberal forces with Arab regimes, as well as the need for those leaders to offer material support which would expand its’ influence in the Arab elite sector; C. The Arabian inaction state and visions variations, especially in conflict zones such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. If Arabs continue to deal with threats from Iran with hesitation, it is expected not only to expand in Syria, but the Shiite militias will intervene into more Gulf States. Iran aims to direct its’ control within the region, especially when it controls the second-largest oil reserve in the Iraqi region, and the largest armed human mass (Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Alawites in Syria, and Houthis in Yemen). The Iranian forces would move freely from the east until the Syrian coast on the Mediterranean Sea, thus establishing its’ presence in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

These Iranian cards are not enough for implementing the demographic composition change plan for the people and the Syrian territory, by continuing to conclude agreements on the militants and their families escaping from the cities and certain regions - due to military pressure and siege - and replacing the original inhabitants with Shiites (from Idlib to Damascus and the Lebanese borders). This explains the attempts to ignite the situation and violate the ceasefire agreement, as this plan requires special capabilities on regional and international levels.

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Second Scenario: The Iranian role fortitude This scenario indicates the arrival of the Iranian project in Syria and the permitted regional and international extent, as the Iranian role stands in fortitude throughout the Syrian-liberated territories by Shiite militias without progress through regional pressures, such as Turkey or Russia. However, this scenario is also unlikely, as the Iranian dictionaries do not contain the so-called ‘principle of stability’. The Iranian project is expansionist, especially in the presence of a clergy at the top of the Iranian regime to return them to their Persian glories, and this is contrary to Russian and Turkish interests.

Third Scenario: Demise of Iran’s role This scenario - the most likely one - indicates the demise of Iran’s role in Syria and prevents Iran from making any strategic progress after Aleppo, turning it into a circle that surrounds Iran and its gains achieved in Syria since the outbreak of revolution in 2011; as a result of the Turkish-Russian alliance against the Iranian plans upon feeling that Iran’s desire to declare victory and strategic control on influential areas contradicted with Russian interests. In addition to the outbreak of the Iranian-Russian differences, in which Russia will not allow Iran to expand its’ interests in Syria, the Iranian authorities realise that Russia owns possibilities and has a relative capacity to be a key player in the control of political and military equations in Syria – more so than Iran, who do not enjoy the same Russian military and political capabilities. The strategic understandings between Russia and Washington DC are based on protecting Israel’s security and to not compromise the oil’s security. This explains the launching of Russian’s hand in Syria, while Iran complies on ground to Russia. Iran is facing difficult choices: if it confronts Russia, it will get into confrontations with everyone and will respect whomever maintains its’ relationship with Moscow to avoid big losses in Syria and the region, even if that leads to more hostilities in the Arab and Islamic societies.

The Iranian-Russian differences in Syria revolve around the future and survival of the Iranian militias in Syria and Iran’s desire to obtain access to the sea; where Iran adopts ideological project towards demographic changes to evacuate Sunnis and resettle Shia in some areas. While the Russian project was not as ideological as the Iranian targets, Russia has realistic political objectives presented by its’ influence on the Syrian coast.

Russia now has a foothold in the Middle East at the expense of the United States, as the Russians hoped to obtain US concessions on international issues such as Ukraine, the missile shield, the lifting of economic sanctions and differences between the two countries towards the region. Russia does not consider Saudi Arabia an enemy; for example, it intends to give the Sunni Arabs opponents a stake in the government in Syria, thus keeping its’ relationship with the Arab countries and Turkey. However, Iran is actively trying to undermine the participation of the Syrian opposition. Add to this the differences and historical crises between the two countries, and the lack of confidence given in the short period in which Iran allowed Russian fighter planes to use its bases to bomb the Syrian opposition sites. The priorities of Russia in its’ international alliances are not consistent with a strategic partnership with Iran. For instance, Russia does not support Iran’s accession to Shanghai security organization, as China and Kazakhstan - the two

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strategic partners for Russia - are opposed to joining Iran for private international political considerations. Moreover, the relationship with these two countries is much important for Russia than the relationship with Iran and strong ties with Iran at the expense of the Arab countries in the long-term could hurt its’ relationship with the Muslims Sunni citizens.

It is not the differences with Russia alone what undermines the role of Iran in Russia, but many additional factors. For instance: A. The US variable, with the new President Donald Trump’s arrival to the White House on 20 January 2017 and what can be posed by his stance against the nuclear deal with Iran and its’ project; B. The nature of the new US administration which rejects the pattern of Obama administration in dealing with Iran and its’ expansionist project; C. The role of Iran in Syria being isolated from its’ social incubator, unlike the case for Lebanon and Iraq; D. The bloc of movements under one command after the fall of Aleppo, thus it can withstand any attack; E. The huge financial cost that is required by the Iranian project considering the Iranian economy deterioration, despite the lifting of economic sanctions.

Although the meeting of Russian, Turkish and Iranian foreign ministers concerning Syria on 12 December 2016 pointed out the position of Turkish policy toward Damascus, and Ankara’s position consensus with Tehran for the need to give a priority to counterterrorism and not to overthrow the Syrian regime, the three parties differed on Hezbollah. Where the Turkish Foreign Minister called to cut support from it as a necessity, to ensure the ceasefire agreement in Syria, his Russian and Iranian counterparts did not share the same opinion. Lavrov stated that the presence of Hezbollah in Syria is illegal and came at the request of the then-Syrian government. Zarif said (with a smile) to his Turkish counterpart, ‘Iran respects Ankara’s positions, including the position toward Hezbollah’, but stressed that this position is not shared.

Finally, if mentioning the foregoing games theory, we can see that Iran is the losing party in Syria; it did not just lose a huge financial cost when eliminating the opposition and control of Aleppo, it also lost the lives of generals and fighters of military and non-military forces. Aleppo was also trapped in turn, before losing the Sunni world due to the sectarian war against all Sunnis; not only in Syria but in targeted countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and other Arab and Islamic countries. The US overlooked the Iranian expansion, which has ended with Obama’s departure; all these issues will make Iran besieged. Such a position could weaken Iran but, at the same time, will make them take aggressive and violent steps and this is what may be seen in other Arab countries.

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‫‪ENDNOTES‬‬ ‫‪ -1‬د‪.‬أحمد يوسف أحمد ومحمد زبارة‪ ،‬مقدِّ مة في ال َعالقات الدولية‪( ،‬القاهرة‪ :‬مكتبة األنجلو المصرية‪ ،)1996 ،‬ط‪ ،1‬ص‪.80‬‬ ‫‪ - 2‬راسل هـ‪ .‬فيليدوج‪ ،‬أتزل بيري‪ ،‬الجيوبوليتيكيا‪ ،‬ترجمة يوسف مجلي‪( ،‬القاهرة‪ :‬دار الكرنك‪ ،)1981 ،‬ط‪ ،1‬ص‪.63‬‬ ‫د‪.‬علي الدين هالل‪ ،‬بهجت قرني (محرران)‪ ،‬السياسات الخارجية للدول العرب َّية‪( ،‬القاهرة‪ :‬مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية‪،)1994 ،‬‬ ‫‪-3‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ط‪ ،1‬صص ‪ 31‬ـ‪.32‬‬ ‫‪ - 4‬راسل هـ‪ .‬فيليدوج‪ ،‬أتزل بيري‪ ،‬الجيوبوليتيكيا‪ ،‬مرجع سبق ذكره‪ ،‬ص‪.65‬‬ ‫‪ - 5‬د‪.‬أشرف كشك‪ ،‬ال َعالقات الخليجية اإليرانية‪ :‬الواقع وآفاق المستقبل‪( ،‬المنامة‪ :‬مركز البحرين للدراسات الدولية واالستراتيجية والطاقة‪،‬‬ ‫دراسات)‪ ،‬مارس ‪ ،2014‬ص‪ ،9‬متاح على الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/CAQQW:‬‬ ‫‪ - 6‬فادي عيد‪ :‬البدر الشيعي باإلقليم‪( ،‬بوابة إفريقيا اإلخبارية‪ ،‬مركز الت َّيار الحر للدراسات السياسية واالستراتيجية)‪،21/1/2015 ،‬‬ ‫متاح على الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/BYQ0O :‬‬ ‫‪ - 7‬د‪.‬ناصر العمرة‪ ،‬ود‪.‬محمد العبدة‪ ،‬وأحمد الصويان‪ :‬خريطة الشيعة في العالَم ‪ -‬دراسة عَ َق ِد َّية تاريخية ديموغرافية استراتيجية‪( ،‬القاهرة‪:‬‬ ‫مركز الرسالة للدراسات والبحوث اإلنسانية‪ ،‬ط‪ ،2012 ،)3‬ص‪.144‬‬ ‫‪ - 8‬سامية عبد الله‪ ،‬المقاطعة االقتصادية‪ ..‬سالح خليجي جديد في الصراع المحتدم مع إيران‪ ،‬الراصد اإلعالمي للمقاالت‪1/6/2016 ،‬‬ ‫متاح على الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/T5X53 :‬‬ ‫‪ - 9‬دول َم ْج ِلس التعاون‪ :‬لمحة إحصائية‪( ،‬األمانة العامة‪َ :‬م ْج ِلس التعاون لدول الخليج العرب َّية)‪ ،‬العدد الرابع‪ ،‬قطاع شؤون المعلومات ‪-‬‬ ‫إدارة اإلحصاء‪ ،‬مارس ‪ ،2014‬ص‪-‬ص ‪ ،19-20‬متاح على الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/GU4L :‬‬ ‫‪ - 10‬د‪.‬أشرف كشك‪ ،‬ال َعالقات الخليجية اإليرانية‪ :‬الواقع وافاق المستقبل‪( ،‬المنامة‪ :‬مركز البحرين للدراسات الدولية واالستراتيجية‬ ‫والطاقة)‪ ،‬مرجع سبق ذكره‪ ،‬ص‪.11‬‬ ‫‪ - 11‬وليد خدوري‪ ،‬تداعيات زيادة انتاج ال ِّن ْفط األمريكي‪ ،‬العرب َّية نت‪ ،27/1/2013 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/GQ0M‬‬ ‫‪ - 12‬مستقبل ال َعالقات الخليجية‪-‬اإليرانية بعد االتفاق النووي‪ ،‬مركز الروابط للبحوث والدراسات االستراتيجية‪ ،‬المركز اإلعالمي‪،‬‬ ‫‪ ،4/10/2016‬متاح على الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/K9LIZ :‬‬

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‫‪ - 13‬د‪.‬أشرف كشك‪ ،‬ال َعالقات الخليجية اإليرانية‪ :‬الواقع وافاق المستقبل‪ ،‬مرجع سبق ذكره‪ ،‬ص‪.12‬‬ ‫‪ - 14‬بول سالم‪ ،‬العراق بعد عشر سنوات على الغزو األمريكي‪ ،‬صحيفة الحياة‪ 31 ،‬مارس ‪.2013‬‬ ‫‪ - 15‬محمد صادق الحسيني‪ ،‬الخليج بحرية مغلقة واألمن اإلقليمي مسؤولية الدول المتشاطئة عليه‪ ،‬مجلة آراء حول الخليج ع ‪ 41‬فبراير‬ ‫‪ ،2008‬ص‪.37‬‬ ‫‪ - 16‬عيد‪ ،‬محمد‪ ،‬أثر أحداث ‪ 111‬سبتمبر على الترتيبات األمنية الوطنية والجماعية في منطقة الخليج العربي ‪( ،1990-2007‬جامعة‬ ‫القاهرة‪ :‬كلية االقتصاد والعلوم السياسية‪ ،)2011 ،‬صص ‪.111-134‬‬ ‫‪ - 17‬عرفات جرغون‪ ،‬ال َعالقات الخليجية اإليرانية‪ :‬الصراع‪ ،‬االنفراج‪ ،‬التوتُّر منذ عام ‪ 2003‬إلى حدود عام ‪ ،2008‬دار العربي للنشر‬ ‫والتوزيع‪ ،‬ط‪ ،1‬ص‪.46‬‬ ‫التوسعية‪ ،‬مركز الروابط للبحوث والدراسات االستراتيجية‪،‬‬ ‫‪ - 18‬ال َعالقات الخليجية اإليرانية‪ :‬االستقرار في مواجهة الثيوقراطية ُّ‬ ‫‪ ،23/1/2017‬متاح على الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/R0LVZ :‬‬ ‫‪ - 19‬د‪.‬صباح الموسوس‪ ،‬ود‪.‬محمد السعيد إدريس (مشاركان)‪ ،‬ود‪.‬عبد الله فهد النفيسي‪ ،‬وأ‪.‬عبد الله الطنطوي (محرران)‪ :‬المشروع‬ ‫اإليراني في المنطقة العرب َّية واإلسالمية‪( ،‬القاهرة‪ :‬دار البشير للتوزيع والنشر‪ ،‬ط‪ ،2015 ،)1‬ص‪.102‬‬ ‫‪ - 20‬منصور حسن العتيبي‪ ،‬السياسة اإليرانية تجاه دول َم ْج ِلس التعاون الخليجي (‪( ،)1979-2000‬جامعة القاهرة‪ :‬كلية االقتصاد‬ ‫والعلوم السياسية‪ ،‬رسالة دكتوراه)‪ ،2004 ،‬ص‪.66‬‬ ‫‪IBID. P. 70 - 21‬‬ ‫‪ - 22‬ماجد صالح الديحاني‪ ،‬ال َعالقات الخليجية اإليرانية بعد أزمة الخليج الثانية (‪( ،)1999-2002‬جامعة الدول العرب َّية‪ :‬معهد البحوث‬ ‫والدراسات العرب َّية)‪ ،2004 ،‬ص‪.56‬‬ ‫‪ - 23‬صالح عبد الرحمن المانع‪ ،‬ال َعالقات الخليجية اإليرانية إبان فترة حكم الرئيس محمد خاتمي‪ ،‬الكويت‪ ،‬مركز دراسات الخليج والجزيرة‬ ‫العرب َّية‪ ،1999 ،‬ص‪.64‬‬ ‫ُّ‬ ‫ُّ‬ ‫التوغل اإليراني والصراعات الال متناهية في العراق‪ ،‬مركز الخليج العربي للدراسات‬ ‫التوغل اإليراني في الدول العرب َّية‪،‬‬ ‫‪ - 24‬سلسلة تقارير‬ ‫اإليرانية‪ ،‬تاريخ النشر‪ .22/6/2016 :‬متاح على الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/7FR1D :‬‬ ‫‪ - 25‬د‪.‬محمد بن صقر السلمي‪ ،‬استراتيجية إيران تجاه الثورات العرب َّية‪ :‬تكتيك جديد يستثني سوريا واليمن‪ ،‬العرب َّية‪،12/4/2015 ،‬‬ ‫متاح على الرابط‪ ، HTTP://CUTT.US/7M0Q9 :‬باإلضافة إلى أثر ثورات الربيع العربي على المشروع اإليراني ‪ ،3/3‬ملفات‬ ‫إيرانية‪ ،‬مركز المزماة للدراسات والبحوث‪ :‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪ - 26‬محمد عباس ناجي‪“ ،‬االنكماش‪ :‬مستقبل الدور اإلقليمي اإليراني بعد الثورات العرب َّية”‪ ،‬السياسية الدولية‪ :‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/VPVBA‬‬ ‫‪ - 27‬د‪.‬أشرف كشك‪ ،‬االتفاق اإليراني الغربي‪ :‬المصالح تتصالح‪ ،‬موقع مركز البحرين للدراسات االستراتيجية والطاقة‪ ،‬بتاريخ ‪ 27‬نوفمبر‬ ‫‪ ،2015‬على الرابط التالي‪ANALYSISR/BH.ORG.DER ASAT.W :‬‬ ‫ُّ‬ ‫التدخالت اإليرانية في شؤون مملكة البحرين ودول َم ْج ِلس التعاون لدول الخليج العرب َّية‪ ،‬نماذج خالل عامي‬ ‫‪ - 28‬د‪.‬أشرف محمد كشك‪ ،‬رصد‬ ‫‪ 2011‬و‪ ،2012‬تقرير غير منشور‪ ،‬مركز البحرين للدراسات االستراتيجية والدولية والطاقة‪ ،‬عام ‪.2012‬‬ ‫‪ - 29‬د‪.‬أشرف كشك‪ ،‬ال َعالقات الخليجية اإليرانية‪ :‬الواقع وآفاق المستقبل‪ ،‬مرجع سبق ذكره‪ ،‬ص‪.16‬‬ ‫‪IBID. P. 17 - 30‬‬ ‫‪ - 31‬عبد الوهاب بدرخان‪ ،‬دالالت فرصة روحاني وآفاقها في الداخل والخارج‪ ،‬صحيفة الحياة ‪ 23‬يونيو ‪.2013‬‬ ‫‪ - 32‬محمد بدري عيد‪ ،‬مستقبل ال َعالقات الخليجية‪-‬اإليرانية بعد االتفاق النووي‪ ،‬مركز الجزيرة للدراسات‪ ،8/10/2015 ،‬متاح على‬

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‫الرابط‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/MZC7GS :‬‬ ‫‪ - 33‬وكالة فارس لألنباء‪ 17 ،‬مايو ‪.2015‬‬ ‫‪ - 34‬جهاد الخازن‪ ،‬نحن سندفع ثمن االتفاق مع إيران‪ ،‬صحيفة الحياة اللندنية‪ ،‬العدد ( ‪ 17 ،)19158‬سبتمبر ‪.2015‬‬ ‫‪ - 35‬وزير خارجية البحرين‪ :‬المتفجرات المه َّربة من إيران تكفي إلزالة المنامة‪ ،‬موقع دوت مصر اإللكتروني‪ 10 ،‬سبتمبر ‪ ،2015‬متاح على‬ ‫الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/5XBJC :‬‬ ‫‪ - 36‬محكمة كويتية تؤ ِّيد إعدام متهم في قضية “خلية العبدلي”‪ ،‬الخليج أونالين‪ .21/7/2016 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/JE82E‬‬ ‫‪ - 37‬تجاذبات ال َعالقات السعودية‪-‬اإليرانية‪ ،‬تقرير الحالة اإليرانية لشهر يوليو ‪ ،2016‬الرياض‪ ،‬مركز الخليج العربي للدراسات اإليرانية‪ ،‬ص‪.64‬‬ ‫‪ - 38‬التوتُّر السياسي في ال َعالقات السعودية اإليرانية‪ ،‬تقرير الحالة اإليرانية لشهر أغسطس ‪ ،2016‬الرياض‪ ،‬مركز الخليج العربي‬ ‫للدراسات اإليرانية‪ ،‬ص‪.33‬‬ ‫‪ - 39‬برس تي في‪ :‬أوحدی‪ :‬عربستان مسئله حج را سیاسی کرده است ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/RK0GR‬‬ ‫‪ - 40‬کیهان‪ ،‬شجره ملعونه آل‌سعود لیاقت اداره حرمین شریفین را ندارد‪ 17 ،‬شهريور ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/PKTNIJ ،1395‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/4RBSJH‬‬ ‫‪41 - THE WASHINGTON POST, SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN ACCUSE EACH OTHER OF NOT REALLY‬‬ ‫‪BEING MUSLIM, 7/9/2016: HTTPS://GOO.GL/7MVNFJ‬‬ ‫‪ - 42‬تصاعد السجاالت السعودية اإليرانية‪ ،‬تقرير الحالة اإليرانية‪ ،‬لشهر سبتمبر ‪ ،2016‬الرياض‪ ،‬مركز الخليج العربي للدراسات اإليرانية‪ ،‬ص‪.28‬‬ ‫‪ - 43‬وكالة فارس‪ ،‬پیروزی‌های مشترک ایران وعراق در مبارزه با تروریسم آل‌سعود را هراسان کرده است‪ ۲۰ ،‬شهریور ‪،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/5BCTKL‬‬ ‫‪ - 44‬وكالة أنباء فارس‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/1UL4AP :‬‬ ‫وكالة أنباء مهر‪HTTP://SOO.GD/WHBL :‬‬ ‫‪ - 45‬صحيفة ابرار اقتصادي (ص‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/FSVZGS:)4‬‬ ‫‪ - 46‬صحيفة شرق‪ ،‬برنامه‌ريزي جنگ ‪٨‬ساله در راستاي اهداف استعمارگران بود‪ ،‬شمارة ‪،9/8/1395 ،2716‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/T5ZGOI‬‬ ‫‪ - 47‬طلعت رميح‪ ،‬عسكرة التش ُّيع‪ ،‬الراصد اإللكترونية‪ ،‬العدد ‪ ،10/1/2016 ،51‬متاح على الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/JGBKY :‬‬ ‫عربي‪ ،16/11/2016 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪ - 48‬برلمان العراق ُي ِق ّر قانون الحشد الشعبي بغياب ُّ‬ ‫السنَّة‪ ،‬األخبار‪ّ ،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/ULUAL‬‬ ‫‪ - 49‬أحمد عدلي‪ ،‬مأسسة الطائفية‪ ..‬تداعيات إدماج الحشد في الجيش العراقي‪ ،‬مركز دراسات المستقبل‪ ،29/11/2016 ،‬متاح على‬ ‫الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/MS6WC :‬‬ ‫‪ - 50‬آرمان أمروز‪ ،‬جنتي يتوجه إلى العراق‪ 29 ،‬شهريور ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/IW5A5E ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 51‬آرمان أمروز‪ ،‬جنتي يتوجه إلى العراق‪ 29 ،‬شهريور ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/IW5A5E ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 52‬مستقبل معركة تحرير الموصل بالعراق والدَّ ور اإليرا ِن ّي‪ ،‬تقرير الحالة اإليرانية لشهر أغسطس ‪ ،2016‬الرياض‪ ،‬مركز الخليج العربي‬ ‫للدراسات اإليرانية‪ ،‬ص‪.26‬‬ ‫‪IBID. P. 27 - 53‬‬ ‫‪IBID. P. 28 - 54‬‬

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‫‪IBID. P. 29 - 55‬‬ ‫‪ - 56‬جهان صنعت‪ :‬نبرد موصل وهشدار‌هایی به مقامات عراق‪ 28،‬مهر ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/KNSN ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 57‬موقع نامه‪ ،‬انگلیس‪ :‬ایران نقش مهمی درعراق دارد‪ 28 ،‬م‪8‬ر ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/BERNA ،1395‬‬ ‫‪.IBID - 58‬‬ ‫‪.IBID - 59‬‬ ‫‪ - 60‬عبدة سيف القصلي‪ ،‬اليمن‪ ..‬األهمية االستراتيجية واألطماع الدولية واإلقليمية‪ ،‬نشوان نيوز‪ ،‬تقارير وتحقيقات‪،14/7/2010 ،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/VVOMK‬‬ ‫‪ - 61‬مركز الخليج العربي للدراسات اإليرانية‪ ،‬التوغل اإليراني والصراعات الال متناهية في اليمن‪ ..‬هل ما زال اليمن سعيدً ا؟‪ 21 ،‬يوليو‬ ‫‪ ،2016‬تقارير‪HTTP://CUTT.US/3C64K ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 62‬وكالة أنباء اإلذاعة والتلفزيون‪ ،‬اتهام ارسال سالح از ایران به یمن بی اساس است‪ ۰۵ ،‬شهريور ‪HTTP://SOO.GD/ ،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪BZ7K‬‬ ‫‪ - 63‬ارنا‪ ،‬المرجع مكارم شيرازي‪ :‬حرب اليمن اختبار للبشرية ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/XWDFP ،09/11/2016‬‬ ‫‪ - 64‬صحيفة آرمان امروز‪ ،‬عربستان بايد اشتباهات خود در يمن را بپذيرد‪ 11 ،‬آبان ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/TJDCO ،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪ - 65‬مركز الخليج العربي للدراسات اإليرانية‪ ،‬التوغل اإليراني والصراعات الال متناهية في اليمن‪ ..‬هل ما زال اليمن سعيدً ا؟‪ 21 ،‬يوليو‬ ‫‪ ،2016‬تقارير‪HTTP://CUTT.US/3C64K ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 66‬وكالة فارس ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/Q466MD HTTP://SOO.GD/27UA‬‬ ‫‪ - 67‬صحيفة آرمان امروز‪ ،‬استقبال إيران از آتش‌بس يمني ‪ -‬يمني‪ 27 ،‬آبان ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/T5HRY ،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪ - 68‬فردا نيوز‪ ،‬منصور هادی طرح صلح یمن را رد کرد‪ 8 ،‬ابان ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/B2XPTG ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 69‬الف‪ ،‬الف‪ ،‬ادعای سخنگوی ائتالف عربستان علیه یمن درباره ایران‪ 13 ،‬مهر ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/6ZVTO3 ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 70‬وكالة تسنيم‪ ،‬چه سرنوشتی در انتظار طرح کری درباره یمن است؟ ‪HTTP://CUTT.US/7QZ5V‬‬ ‫‪ - 71‬ايسنا‪ ،‬انتقال بانک مرکزی از صنعا به عدن وإصالحات در دولت مستعفی یمن‪ 29 ،‬شهريور ‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/،1395‬‬ ‫‪WPPLXB‬‬ ‫‪ - 72‬مهر‪ ،‬امیر عبد اللهیان‪ :‬سکوت دنیا در قبال جنایات سعودی در یمن غیر قابل توجیه است‪۱۰ ،‬شهریور ‪،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://SOO.GD/WBKZ‬‬ ‫‪ - 73‬تسنيم‪ ،‬السفارة السعود َّية في واشنطن تنشر مقت َر ًحا للتسوية السلمية في اليمن‪،30/8/3016 ،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://BIT.LY/2BBK48Q‬‬ ‫‪ - 74‬اليمن‪ ..‬تَقدُّ م للقوات الشرعية في محور باب المندب‪ ،‬شرق أوسط‪ ،‬سكاي نيوز‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/ ،31/12/2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪YHMEFT‬‬ ‫‪ - 75‬اليمن‪ ..‬تَقدُّ م قوات الشرعية في صنعاء ونهم وتعز والبيضاء‪ ،‬العرب َّية نت‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/CHQ866 27/12/2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 76‬مراقبون‪ :‬تحرير مدينة المخاء يرجح كفة “الشرعية” في اليمن‪ ،‬إرم نيوز‪HTTP://CUTT.US/PFSAD ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 77‬المركز العربي لألبحاث ودراسة السياسات‪ ،‬إيران في أفق عام ‪ ،2025‬وحدة تحليل السياسات | ‪ 01‬مايو‪،2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/UKL3K‬‬ ‫‪ - 78‬وكالة تسنيم‪ ،‬تسنيم‪ ،‬ایران وروسیه متحدین اصلی دولت وملت سوریه هستند‪ 19 ،‬مهر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪ - 79‬انتخاب‪ ،‬واکنش ایران به ورود تانک‌های ترکیه به سوریه‪ ۰۴ ،‬شهريور ‪HTTP://SOO.GD/U07R ،۱۳۹۵‬‬

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‫‪ - 80‬مصطفى تركي‪ ،‬الصراع الروسي اإليراني على سوريا‪ ..‬تقاسم نفوذ أم تصفية حسابات‪ 1 ،‬ديسمبر ‪ ،2016‬بلدي نيوز‪،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/BJX6Z‬‬ ‫‪ - 81‬وكالة فارس‪ ،‬سخنان منتشر نشده شهید همدانی درباره دالیل حضور ایران در سوریه ‪،۹۵/۰۸/۱۶‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/QFFSH‬‬ ‫السوري‪ ،‬الجزيرة نت‪HTTP://CUTT.US/WTV07 ،16/12/2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 82‬الميليشيات الطائفية تتصدر المشهد ُّ‬ ‫‪ - 83‬أبعاد الدور اإليراني في معركة حلب الدائرة في سوريا‪ ،‬تقرير الحالة اإليرانية لشهر أكتوبر ‪ ،2016‬الرياض‪ ،‬مركز الخليج العربي‬ ‫للدراسات اإليرانية‪ ،‬ص‪.50‬‬ ‫‪ - 84‬إذاعة فردا‪ ،‬یک فرمانده سپاه‪ :‬تشکیل ارتش آزادی‌بخش شیعی به رهبری سلیمانی‪.۲۸ ،‬مرداد‪۱۳۹۵.‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/HSXBHD‬‬ ‫‪ - 85‬راديو فردا‪ ،‬مخالفت روحانی با درخواست آمریکا برای توقف پروازهای جنگی برفراز شمال سوریه‪۱۵ ،‬مهر ‪،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪HTTPS://GOO.GL/RKCKIO‬‬ ‫‪ - 86‬حمزة عماد الدين موسى‪ ،‬روسيا‪ :‬عن الموقف الروسي ضدّ الثورات العرب َّية في ليبيا وسوريا‪ ،‬نور سورية‪.20/3/2012 ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 87‬عاطف معتمد‪ ،‬ال َعالقات العرب َّية الروسية في ّ‬ ‫التحوالت الدولية‪ ،‬ورقة عمل في‪ :‬ملتقى ال َعالقات العرب َّية الروسية‪ ،‬مركز الجزيرة‬ ‫ظل‬ ‫ُّ‬ ‫للدراسات‪ ،‬الدوحة‪ ،‬قطر‪.2009 ،‬‬ ‫‪.IBID - 88‬‬ ‫السورية؟‪ ،‬الرياض ‪.3/2/2013‬‬ ‫‪ - 89‬بينة الملحم‪ ،‬هل تَغ َّير الموقف الروسي من الثورة ُّ‬ ‫‪ - 90‬هاني شادي‪ ،‬روسيا والربيع العربي‪ .‬مصالح ومخاوف‪ ،‬مجلة الديمقراطية‪.1/4/2012 ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 91‬لماذا تستميت روسيا في الدفاع عن قاعدتها في طرطوس؟‪ ،‬أخبار الخليج‪ ،‬ترجمة‪ ،‬أورينت برس‪.1/7/2012 ،‬‬ ‫‪.IBID - 92‬‬ ‫‪.IBID - 93‬‬ ‫‪ - 94‬تساؤالت حول ما إذا كانت روسيا تملك مفاتيح ّ‬ ‫الحل في سوريا‪ ..‬مخاوف من خسارة نفوذهم في الشرق األوسط والقاعدة البحرية في‬ ‫المتوسط وعميل موثوق لصناعاتها الدفاعية‪ /‬كارين دي يونغ‪ ،‬الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬ترجمة‪ ،‬واشنطن بوست‪.1/7/2012 ،‬‬ ‫‪ - 95‬تركي مصطفى‪ ،‬مظاهر وآليات ونتائج الصراع الروسي‪-‬اإليراني في سوريا‪ ،‬بالدي نيوز‪ ،23/12/2016 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪:‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/YXCVM‬‬ ‫‪.IBID - 96‬‬ ‫‪ - 97‬راشد صالح العريمي‪ ،‬حلب تحاصر إيران‪ ،9/12/2016 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/J5AE8 :‬‬ ‫السوري لحقوق اإلنسان‪ ،31/12/2016 ،‬متاح على‪:‬‬ ‫‪ - 98‬اتفاق وقف النار يربك مشروع إيران بربط سوريا والعراق‪ ،‬المرصد ُّ‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/FEINQ‬‬ ‫‪ - 99‬من بوتين لـ«خامنئي»‪ :‬روسيا ً‬ ‫أول أيها العجوز‪ ..‬وسوريا لن تكون العراق‪ ،‬مركز الروابط للبحوث والدراسات االستراتيجية‪،‬‬ ‫‪:26/12/2016‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/SWEPB‬‬ ‫‪.IBID - 100‬‬ ‫‪ - 101‬تركي مصطفي‪ ،‬الصراع الروسي اإليراني على سوريا‪ ..‬تقاسم نفوذ أم تصفية حسابات‪ ،‬بالدي نيوز‪:31/12/2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/HO6D‬‬

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‫‪ - 102‬صفقة اإلجالء بحلب تكشف عن خالف روسي إيراني‪ ،‬أسوشييتد برس إنترناشيونال‪:20/12/2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/B0LIZ‬‬ ‫‪ - 103‬مظاهر وآليات ونتائج الصراع الروسي‪-‬اإليراني في سوريا‪ ،‬مركز الدارسات والبحوث االستراتيجية‪:1/12/2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/OGQP‬‬ ‫‪ - 104‬تركي مصطفي‪ ،‬الصراع الروسي اإليراني على سوريا‪ ..‬تقاسم نفوذ أم تصفية حسابات‪ ،‬بالدي نيوز‪:31/12/2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/HO6D‬‬ ‫‪ - 105‬دالالت قصف الطيران الروسي على قواعد إيران وحزب الله في حلب‪ ،‬الدرر الشامية اإللكترونية‪:30/11/2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/GNKN5‬‬ ‫‪ - 106‬راشد صالح العريمي‪ ،‬حلب تحاصر إيران‪ ،9/12/2016 ،‬متاح على الرابط‪HTTP://CUTT.US/J5AE8 :‬‬ ‫‪ - 107‬تركي مصطفي‪ ،‬الصراع الروسي اإليراني على سوريا‪ ..‬تقاسم نفوذ أم تصفية حسابات‪ ،‬بالدي نيوز‪:31/12/2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/HO6D‬‬ ‫‪ - 108‬نضوج الخالفات‪ :‬حدود التصعيد اإليراني مع تركيا حول سوريا‪ ،‬مركز المستقبل لألبحاث والدراسات المتقدمة‪،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/QKML0‬‬ ‫‪.IBID - 109‬‬ ‫‪ - 110‬عقيدة أوباما أم استراتيجية الواليات المت َِّحدة؟‪ ،‬نظرة في كتاب «عقيدة أوباما‪ ..‬االستراتيجية األمريكية اليوم»‪،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/EGPLT‬‬ ‫‪ - 111‬روسيا وتركيا وإيران تتفق على رؤية للتسوية بسوريا‪ ،‬اجتماع وزراء خارجية روسيا وتركيا وإيران انتهى بإعالن مشترك بشأن تسوية‬ ‫محتملة في سوريا‪ ،‬الجزيرة نت‪،‬‬ ‫‪HTTP://CUTT.US/4EUZQ‬‬ ‫‪ - 112‬سعيد عكاشة‪“ ،‬المراقب الرابح”‪ :‬مستقبل “الخطوط الحمراء” إلسرائيل بعد معركة حلب‪ ،‬مركز المستقبل لألبحاث والدرسات‬ ‫المتقدمة‪HTTP://CUTT.US/4HGEN :22/12/2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪.IBID - 113‬‬ ‫‪.IBID - 114‬‬

‫‪The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec.2016‬‬

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS INTRODUCTION

The Future of American-Iranian Relations in a Changing World

T

he Bush Administration classified Iran as part of the Axis of Evil (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea). It believed that the United States should apply pressure on the Iranian regime and favored threatening the use of a military option against the Iranian nuclear program.

On the contrary, with arrival of the Democratic Barack Obama in the White House in 2009 the United States policy toward Iran changed.

Obama sought engagement with Iran without preconditions and led successful negotiations for a nuclear deal intended to dismantle Iran’s nuclear capabilities. In July 2015, Iran signed a comprehensive agreement on its nuclear program with the P5+1 Group.

In this report, we will discuss the AmericanIranian correlation during the Obama administration in the second half of 2016, the impact of this policy on Iran’s strategy in the Middle East region, and finally US-Iran relations after the succession of the Republican Donald Trump to the United States Presidency.

The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec.2016

159

First: The American-Iranian relations during the Obama Presidency.

During the Obama era, US-Iran relations received a boost, unlike during that of his predecessor George W. Bush, who adopted a confrontational and offensive policy against Iran because of their different views about the United States’ internal and foreign policies.

On succeeding to the US presidency, Obama adopted two major strategies:

1. He tended to focus on the United States interior in order to implement his ideas, which were akin to moderate Socialism.

He believed that the American strength is through unity and internal development rather than international relations, external superiority, and involvement in conflicts outside its borders. He also believed that the United States national security does not come about through international political channels but through a strong society based on equality and quality services for all people such as the health project ‘Obama Care.’

Obama cut military spending and withdrew from hot spots around the world such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and urged countries to defend their homeland security and sovereignty without direct intervention from Washington. During Obama’s two terms in office, the limited American military involvement in international conflicts came into effect in order to save American lives and money.1 His major focus was on American society and its problems such as immigration, healthcare, education, and the environment. Obama faced serious criticism over his foreign policies from elite US politicians; however, he won two terms of presidency.

2. During his presidential campaign, Obama advocated direct negotiations with America’s adversaries and a policy of containment toward the countries in the Axis of Evil – as classified by the Bush administration. On his inauguration, Obama brought Iran to the table and finally reached the nuclear deal on the Iranian nuclear program, which paved the way for Tehran to resume its status in the international community.

As a result, the United States removed sanctions imposed on Tehran and released tens of billions dollars of Iran’s frozen assets in the United States.

This is clear evidence that Washington had made concessions in order to reach this agreement and come up with the joint statement that outlines the following:

a. Iran is required to reduce its nuclear facilities and limit the level of uranium enrichment at 3.67%. b. Convert the Fordo facility – the most important enrichment facility – into a physics, nuclear, and technology research center. c. Install no more than 5060 centrifuges.

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d. Provide the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors with access to any suspicious site and military installations in coordination with Tehran. e. Stop building nuclear plants working on heavy water. f. Iran will not be able to transfer any equipment from one nuclear plant to another for 15 years. g. Implement an embargo on the importation of any materials used in the ballistic missiles program for eight years. h. An arms embargo for five years. i. Develop a mechanism to restore sanctions within 65 days in case Tehran fails to comply with the accord.2 Iran’s Benefits from the Nuclear Deal a. Iran’s frozen assets will continue to be so for another eight years and the travel ban on most personnel and commissions that participated in the nuclear program for five years.

However, all sanctions will be terminated when the IAEA verifies Iran’s implementation of its key nuclear commitments.

b. Oil exportation will be fully resumed at the time the deal comes into force. c. Resumption of relations with the United States through President Obama’s friendly letter to the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in April 2016, in which he expressed his best wishes and hopes for the birth of a new coalition. This move toward Iran was suspicious and worrying in light of Iran’s failure to fulfill its commitments to the IAEA and its persistent violation of human rights inside Iran. In other words, the American silence toward these Iranian practices reveals secret collaboration and conformity between both sides.

In fact, Obama tended to lessen the American presence in the international arena and adopted a policy of understanding and containment of US rivals. This paved the way for Iran to be a major player in the Middle East and to take control of four Arab countries, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. In fact, the Obama administration’s foreign policy contradicts the beliefs of Republicans, who promote a key American role in the world, getting involved in all international affairs, and deterring regional powers.

Second: The American-Iranian relations timeline during the second half of 2016.

1. On Jul, 17th,2016, two American diplomats released a secret document about the Iranian nuclear deal that stated that Tehran can continue its nuclear program immediately after the end of the Obama Presidency. The Associated Press reported that this document is a secret appendix to the nuclear deal, which allows Iran to replace more than five thousand old centrifuges with 3500 state-of-the-art ones in 11-15 years, which would decrease the time needed for Iran to develop nuclear weapons from one year to six months after installing the new centrifuges.

2. The Obama administration rejected a draft law introduced by Congress to disclose the accounts of Iranian high-ranking officials (the Supreme Leader, members of the Expediency Discernment Council, the Minister of Intelligence, Chief of the Revolutionary

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Guard’s (RG) Intelligence, and high-ranking RG officers such as Commander of the AlQuds Division Qassem Suleimani and others) under the slogan, “Transparency of the riches and property of Iran’s leaders.” The American administration justified its rejection of the draft law, saying that it would hurt the United States’ credibility in front of the P5+1 Group and Iran because it would entail American violation of its nuclear deal commitments and lifting of the sanctions imposed on Iran.

3. In essence, the draft law was binding to the US government. It demanded to reveal the sources of income and channels of expenditure of high-ranking Iranian officials through a comprehensive report prepared by the American Department of Treasury within nine months after passage of the law.3 4. On the contrary, the Obama administration never reacted to the demands from sixty American Congressmen to freeze arms deals with Saudi Arabia totaling $1.15 billion dollars. The Obama administration justified this position – as pretended – as a response to the Arab coalition’s airstrikes under the leadership of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, leading to the deaths of many Yemeni civilians 4.

1. This American condoning of Iran was confirmed by the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif in a meeting with former US Secretary of State John Kerry on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meetings in September 2016. Zarif said that he had received American promises to urge European countries to enhance trade relations with Iran and especially European banks.5 This policy opened the door for Iran to invest and export its oil freely without obstacles after suffering $160 billion in oil-frozen assets; nevertheless, the unemployment rate was 13.5% of the total population, which is 2.2 million people. In order to overcome this social problem, the Iranian government needs to create 800 thousand jobs annually.

2. US-Iranian relations are fluctuating. There are several points of disagreement between both sides that are still unresolved on Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the harassment of the Iranian boats of the American ships in the Arabian Gulf. This resulted in an unusual move by the Democratic administration to evade the Republicans’ accusations about the nature of the relations between the Obama administration and Tehran’s leaders. With the approach of the end of his presidency, President Obama extended decree number 12170, dated 11/14/1979, concerning the state of emergency in the US following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Consequently, Obama extended the non-nuclear and non-terrorist activities-related sanctions for one year on Tehran for what he stated in his executive order, “Although the historical nuclear deal assures a peaceful Iranian nuclear program, there are certain Iranian behaviors and policies that oppose the American interests in the region. Iran is proceeding in posing an unusual serious threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”

3. Decree 12170 was issued by President Jimmy Carter thirty-six years ago. The Department of the Treasury was ordered to freeze Iranian assets in the United States, including their accounts in American banks and their branches abroad. Five months later, Carter announced the severing of diplomatic relations with Iran and an embargo on exporting American goods to this country, including food and medical products. After 162

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that, an embargo was also imposed on the importation of Iranian products to the United States. Since then, every consecutive US President has tightened sanctions on Tehran.6

4. The American House of Representatives held a session to discuss extending sanctions on Tehran, which were supposed to end on 12/31/2016 – unless extended – for another ten years until December 31st, 2026, especially those related to its nuclear and missile activities. The law allows the imposition of trade, energy, defense, and banking sanctions on Tehran, which were imposed for the first time in 1996, targeted investments in its energy sector, and deterred its nuclear ambitions.7 Third: The impact of Obama’s doctrine on both the American and Iranian roles in the Middle-East region Obama’s distancing strategy from the regional crises paved the way for Iran and Russia to take the lead in the region. Iran found the time suitable to implement its plans and ambitions in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon.

In addition, Iran has occupied some Arab capitals and dispatched its militias to those countries to protect its gains and implement its plans in the region. Iran has also gone too far in its threats to the GCC countries through enabling the Shiite militias – under the slogan of political reform – to legalize Iran’s armament programs and make them a regional leverage on the GCC countries.

Former US President: Barack Obama

Below are the consequences of Obama’s doctrine on the American role in the Middle East compared to the growing Iranian role:

1. Paying a ransom to Iran to free American hostages.

In the middle of 2016, the US Department of State admitted to the Wall Street Journal, “The Obama administration dispatched an airplane loaded with $400 million to release American citizens detained by Tehran for espionage accusations and working against Iranian national security as an initial payment of a mutual deal amounting to $1.7 billion.”8 This information was confirmed by the current US President, the Republican Donald Trump during his presidential campaign, when he attacked Obama and the Democratic candidate at that time Hillary Clinton saying, “We knew after the acknowledgment of the Department of State that President Obama lied about the $400 million paid to Iran.” He added, “This money is not for the hostages, this is a ransom, in fact, he lied in public concerning this issue.” As a result, some congressmen presented a draft law that banned the Obama administration from paying any more money to Iran.9

2. The Iranian boats’ harassment of US Navy ships.

Statistics reveal that there have been thirty harassment incidents by Iranian boats against the US Navy ships in the Arabian Gulf starting from the beginning of 2016. The Iranian Navy also detained ten American sailors during the nuclear deal negotiations in 2015, but released them after a short time, which was described by the US press as

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“humiliating.” During the second half of 2016, the Gulf witnessed several other incidents:

A. On Aug. 8th, 2016 four Iranian RG boats approached the American destroyer U.S.S. Nitze in the Strait of Hormuz. The American response was confined to being “seriously concerned,” leading to the withdrawal of the American destroyer to de-escalate tension.

B. In October 2016 Iranian missiles targeted American warships at Bab Al-Mandeb and in the Gulf of Aden, which demonstrated the reality of Iran’s violations, which are threatening international security in international sea lanes.

1. Release of Iran’s Frozen Assets.

The Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced that his country received $36 billion for signing the nuclear deal, although there was a contradiction about the exact amount of Iran’s frozen assets resulting from international sanctions. Some Iranian sources said that the assets amount to $100-120 billion; nevertheless, the Iranian central bank denied these figures and announced that the exact number was only $32 billion in international banks, that only $29 billion would be released within 5-6 months, that there was $23 billion in Japan, Korea, and the UAE, while the other $6 billion was frozen in India.

Furthermore, the Iranian Finance Minister denied the $120 billion that was published by some Iranian news media and said that Iran’s frozen assets in oil revenues totaled around $35 billion, in addition to another $22 frozen in China in financial statements.10 Based on that assumption, Iran favored Hillary Clinton to win over Donald Trump because of her position toward the nuclear deal. Hillary was completely satisfied with the nuclear deal and spent a year and a half with her Chinese and Russian counterparts to reach the agreement, which is evident in her statement when she said, “The country that imposed heavy sanctions on Iran has succeeded in bringing it to the negotiating table. In fact, Barack Obama and John Kerry have reached the nuclear deal and halted the Iranian nuclear program without firing one bullet.”11 On the contrary, Trump adopted a hardline position against the deal with Iran when he announced – during has presidential campaign – that he would repeal the agreement with Iran as his top priority if he won the presidency. During his campaign, Trump raised many questions about the future of the nuclear deal and criticized it sharply saying it was “A bad deal,” and “Shame on Washington,” and “This disastrous deal.” Trump added, “Washington has given Iran everything for nothing; the nuclear deal has released $150 billion in exchange for nothing; the growing Iranian influence in four countries – Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon – is unacceptable.”12 In the same context, a spokesperson from the American Department of State Mark Toner said, “Based on Trump’s statements, the Iranian nuclear deal might be repealed.”13 However, the question arises here as to how can Trump repeal an agreement signed by five countries other than the US, four of which are members of the Security Council?

All Trump can do is increase monitoring Iran regarding uranium enrichment, ban the importation of nuclear materials, and impose sanctions. In addition, US partners in the Middle-East region opposing the nuclear deal can do no more than what they did before

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the agreement, such as attempting to influence the US Interior, challenging the nuclear deal, and building an anti-Iran coalition on all levels.

Moreover, Trump threatened to take decisive action against any Iranian ship that approaches US Navy ships in the Gulf. He also criticized Iranian interference in the affairs of other countries in the region and its ambitions to occupy Iraq. Previously, Trump said that Iran was supporting terrorism to destabilize the security of the Middle East, accusing it in his speech to the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) of being behind terrorist attacks in twenty-five countries and on five continents around the world. He also criticized the Obama administration for paying Iran to release American hostages.14 In the same context, Iranian political analyst and former diplomat Seyyed Hossein Mousavian said that the normalization of relations between Iran and the United States is not possible in the near future for many reasons:

A. The Iranian Supreme Leader and the Iranian people distrust the United States and its promises.

B. Some countries such as Israel and the GCC countries are moving their lobbies and making their utmost efforts to sabotage US-Iranian relations.15 Fourth: Possible scenarios for future US-Iranian relations After Republican Donald Trump became President of the United States on 11/18/2016, there are three possible scenarios for US-Iranian relations:

1. The continuation of the nuclear deal with the commitment of both sides and a nonconfrontational policy.

The Trump administration will respect the United States’ international commitments and stick to its nuclear deal obligations. In essence, the agreement is not a bilateral agreement between only these two countries; it is an agreement between the international P5+1 Group and Iran.

The other countries’ part of the agreement will not correspond to the American willingness to terminate the deal and adopt a military option, or even reconsider some of the articles of the agreement, which took ten years to reach. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs Frederica Mogherini said that the nuclear deal has been approved by the Security Council, which means that this is neither a bilateral nor a unilateral agreement, but a multinational agreement between the P5+1 Group and Iran.

2. Review of the nuclear deal.

Trump’s advisor for foreign affairs, Waleed Faris stated that the new administration intends to take the nuclear deal to Congress for review and amendment of its articles.

Iran’s fears arose after Donald Trump became President of the United States. President Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif sent cold congratulatory letters to the new US President, which increased Iran’s fears. On the other hand, the two American major parties – Democratic and Republican – both have something against the nuclear deal.

European-American companies also achieved nothing from the agreement as a result of

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a recession in the Iranian economy, slow economic growth, high unemployment, and the IRGC’s control of the entire Iranian economy.

In fact, the RG has used billions of the US-released dollars to fund militias and back Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria through its support of Hezbollah and the Afghani elements (Fatimiyoun), and the other militias in Iraq and Yemen.

3. A new stage of confrontation and a resumption of sanctions.

This is the most probable scenario. The programs and statements of the American presidential candidates reflected their foreign policies if won the Presidency. Most of Trump’s statements during his campaign indicated that this scenario would likely be implemented according to the slogan, “All options are possible against Tehran including the military option,” and a resumption of sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missiles and terrorist activities. It may also include some other Iranian organizations on the list of terroristsupporting organizations.

During his campaign, Trump said, “I will not tell you what I’m going to do with the disastrous nuclear deal.” Later he said that he would rip up the historical agreement negotiated by the Obama administration. “The deal is one of the worst agreements I have ever seen in my life. Iran is the biggest supporter of terrorism in the world that is now swimming in $150 billion released by the United States,” Trump said. He also threatened Iranian boats approaching American warships in the Gulf when he said, “If any military personnel of any country harasses our soldiers, we will destroy them.”

Hence, the Iranian options Zarif mentioned concerning the nuclear deal are limited and contradict his statements. The first statement by Donald Trump after he became President of the United States confirmed that the US would realign with its most important ally Britain, which had just withdrawn from the European Union not only on the Iranian nuclear deal, but also on several international issues such as the NATO, the Ukrainian situation, and re-stabilizing the oil markets. This alliance between both countries will stand against Iran’s ambitions, which aim – since the Khomeini’s Revolution in 1979 – to incite disorder and instability in the Middle East and target Arab political regimes.

EU-Iranian Relations INTRODUCTION

The European Union countries build their relations with other countries based on two variables, each country’s own foreign policy and one common foreign policy for the EU, as designated by EU organizations such as the EU Council16, the European Commission17, the European Parliament18, and the European Council.19 The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was the first step toward a joint security and foreign policy for the EU. The second of the three foundations of the Maastricht Treaty was approved in 199920, followed by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. This led to the establishment of a common EU foreign policy through the establishment of a permanent headquarters for the European Council, relocating the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs

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and Security Policies, and the establishment of a diplomatic body called The European External Action Service as a Foreign Ministry for the EU. The European Union’s vision for unifying its foreign policy relies on the balance between the European Confederacy, which is based on the ultranationalist concept, which means adopting a form of joint supremacy for the EU countries through ultranationalist organizations21, and the Confederate view, which is based on governmental and liberal beliefs, which means coordinating between the various countries’ national identities to come up with a common political policy that guarantees the interests of all the member states and enhances their positions in the international arena.

»»European foreign policy between the European Union Council and the European Parliament The EU policy-making process is divided between the European Union Council and the European Parliament. The EU Council is considered the European Foreign policy-maker as stated by the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. Article 14 of the treaty states that the Council is to make suitable decisions on international questions and identify the EU’s goals. The EU Parliament has the right to participate in the decision-making process with the Council. If the Parliament rejects any procedures, the Council cannot make any decisions, as stated by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.22 This is called “decision-making by groups.” The Treaty of Lisbon renamed this process, which has become “The ordinary legislative procedure,” whereby the Council receives approval from the Parliament before making any specific decisions of great importance. Hence, the European Parliament plays a major role in planning a common foreign policy for the EU, which has a big impact on European-Iranian relations.23

»»Limitations of the European Foreign Policy toward Iran The European Union is the biggest regional cooperative organization in the world. It has an independent entity away from its member countries. However, the EU has some limitations on its foreign policy toward Tehran, which differ from each country’s national limitations in approaching Iran as follows:

a. Economic Limitations The EU is the second biggest economy in the world after the United States. Its net income amounted to $16 trillion US dollars in 2015.

Iran was the fourth oil-producing country in the world before the embargo on Iranian oil exportation. It is also a major buyer of European products and a significant economic partner for the EU. The EU was the fourth biggest partner for Iran until 2012 after China, the UAE, and Turkey. Iranian exports to the EU amounted to 5.5 billion Euros, while its imports amounted to 7.4 billion Euros. Oil and other products represented 90% of European imports from Iran, which caused a sharp decline in the Iranian economy following the imposition of sanctions, and reduced the trade between both sides that had amounted to 12.8 billion Euros in 2012.

b. US Policy toward Iran The nature of the US-Iranian relations is considered an important factor. Despite its

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strategic alliances, the United States takes punitive actions against the D’Amato Law to strengthen financial sanctions against foreign companies investing more than $20 million in the Iranian oil sector, which is also known as the ISA (The Iranian Sanctions Act), which has been extended by the US Congress for another ten years. Iran considered this law as a violation of the nuclear deal. The positions of US Congress and the Obama administration were contradictory; John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, used the rights granted to him by the nuclear deal and repealed anything violating the agreement, which, according to the US administration’s point of view, saved the nuclear deal.24 On the other hand, the EU was committed to the agreement with Iran and rejected the new US President Donald Trump’s statements, but at the same time raised their fears of a resumption of US sanctions on Iran. In fact, the EU’s has attempted to adopt independent economic policies in recent years, although it has been working with the United Sates for many years on its strategy toward Iran.

c.The Iranian Nuclear Deal Iran’s commitment to the nuclear deal is an important determiner of EU-Iranian relations. The EU has been fully committed to the UN sanctions on Iran concerning its nuclear program since July 2010.25 With the release of information about Iran’s nuclear ambitions in the mid-1990s, the EU took certain measures to deter Iran’s nuclear program through freezing its funding and technology, and the imposition of trade, economic, and financial sanctions.

• On Aug. 12th 2010, the EU strengthened the sanctions on Iran. It banned any joint actions with Iranian oil or gas companies and prevented all member countries from giving insurance to the Iranian government. It also banned the exportation and importation of weapons and dual-usage products that could be used for uranium enrichment, as well as selling or transferring any energy equipment or technology used by Iran to search for and refine natural gas.

• In May 2011, the EU countries’ Foreign Ministers extended sanctions and included 100 new companies and individuals, including Iranian maritime companies.

• In October 2011, the EU included 29 individuals involved in human rights violations in the sanctions, increasing the number to 61 people.

• On Dec. 1st, 2011, the EU blacklisted 180 Iranian individuals and froze all new contracts to buy and transport Iranian crude oil, but allowed members states that had valid contracts to buy oil until 1st July 2012.26 In fact, the Iranian oil sanctions dealt Iran a severe blow and forced it to come to the table and negotiate the nuclear deal.

d. Iran’s interference in the affairs of Middle-East countries Following the eruption of the so-called Arab Spring Revolutions in 2011, Iran became a major player in the Middle East. Iran violated the Security Council resolution banning the export of weapons to Syria and Yemen. It is also participating actively in the war in Syria with its forces and militias, and inciting disorder in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and

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Yemen. Consequently, Iran’s actions and disregard of good neighborly conduct became intolerable for the EU and the international community.

The fourth Arab-European meeting at the headquarters of the Arab League in December 2016 was headed by the Tunisian Foreign Minister Khamis Aljinhawi on behalf of the Arab countries, and Federica Mogherini on behalf of the EU. They condemned Iran’s behavior and its presence on Iraqi soil.27 The EU representatives also expressed their concern about Iran’s interference in Arab countries’ affairs. They stressed that Arab-Iranian relations should be based on good neighborly conduct and non-interference in each other’s affairs, the respect of selfdetermination, independence, and settling conflicts peacefully in compliance with the UN Charter and international law.28

e. Iran’s Human Rights Record The imposition of European sanctions on Iran coincided with its bad human rights record following the Iranian presidential elections of 2009. On April 12th, 2011, the EU took measures (visa bans and freezing assets) against the individuals responsible for the deteriorating human rights situation in Iran, especially the executions of large numbers

of Iranians. These sanctions were extended in October 2011, March 2012, and March 2013, and were revised in April 2015 to include 83 more individuals and one organization.

In addition, the Foreign Affairs Council was held on March 23rd, 2012, who decided to impose an EU ban on the exportation of communications control technologies.

In 2004, Iran stopped negotiations with the EU concerning the human rights situation that started in 2002. In September 2013, The Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif expressed his willingness to resume negotiations in his meeting with Mrs. Katherine Ashton on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting.29

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These five factors determine EU-Iranian relations based on current events and the complicated decision-making process inside the EU. The EU Boosting Trade Relations with Iran and its Strategy toward this Country Following the nuclear deal in July 2015 and its practical implementation in January 2016, the international nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were repealed. The EU countries resumed their economic ties with Iran one after another. The following tables compare the amount of trade between Iran and some EU countries in September 2016 and the same month of 2015 before signing the nuclear deal: On January 18th, 2017 the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini announced that trade between the EU and Iran had increased by 63% in the nine months since the lifting of the sanctions imposed on Tehran.30 Despite the continuation of the banking obstacles between both sides and Iran’s sharp criticism of the agreement, this big and rapid development in trade relations between Tehran and the EU following the nuclear deal reflects the EU’s desire to do business with Iran.

»»The EU’s Strategies toward Tehran The EU-Iranian economic relations following the nuclear deal diminished the EU’s influence on Iran’s policies concerning its human rights record and regional practices. In fact, this open policy toward Tehran will remove the EU’s ability to play a major role in the international arena due to Iran’s violations of the Security Council resolutions related to violence in the Middle-East, which provoked the EU Parliament to release the so-called ‘EU Strategy toward Iran’ in 2016, which included several terms and conditions Iran has to comply with in order to maintain relations with the EU:

• Iran is required to play a major role in solving the political crises in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Afghanistan based on international law and the sovereignty of these countries.

• Cancel the execution sentences in Iran and review Article 91 of the Penal Law 2013 to stay the executions on people below 18 years old as a first step.

• Iran is required to carry out judicial reform with the help of the EU. • Iran has to take the necessary steps to create a transparent environment for international investments and fight corruption on all levels, especially related to the recommendations of the World Financial Group (FATF), and stop funding terrorist groups.

• Establish an efficient control system on European exports to prevent the dual-use of certain goods and technologies in a way that violates human rights or is against the EU.

• Establish trade and economic relations with its neighboring countries according to the principles of the World Trade Organization in order to set up a strong trade and economic bloc in the region – the EU can help establish this regional coalition.

• Observe the valid economic and financial sanctions not included in the nuclear deal.

Make transparent the activities of European companies in Iran.

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• Use the Euro as the official currency for dealing with Iran in order to prevent the US authorities from imposing sanctions – as happened before – against some European banks.

• Iran is required to sign a nuclear safety and security treaty with the suggestion of holding regional talks about it.

• Maintain air safety (air navigation) and provide technical assistance and basic needs for Iranian companies to be removed from the European blacklist.

• Take the necessary measures to protect the human rights of immigrants and Afghan refugees in Iran, including their right to a fair trial and equality before the law.

• Take the question of the multinational ‘Iranian-Europeans’ into consideration, as the arrests of these people hinder the rapprochement between the EU and Iranian society, and allow Iranian immigrants in Europe to travel freely to Iran, their original homeland.

• Iranian strategic interests should be implemented through the resumption of regional stability; hence, Iran has to avoid rivalry with major regional countries.

• Iran is required to cancel the death penalty for drug-related crimes, which will decrease the large numbers of executions in Iran.

• Iran is to join the UN Convention on the Rights of Children and review the trials of all guilty under-age children who have been sentenced to death.

• Iran is to fully cooperate with all UN procedures concerning human rights and allow international human rights organizations to carry out their missions.

• Iran is to comply with the EU principles on human rights, including human rights activists.

• Iran is to respect its commitments according to the Iranian Constitution; the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights; the International Covenant on the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; freedom of speech; and individual, social, and political rights. It must establish peaceful think tanks and religious and ethnic assemblies, end discrimination based on gender, language, religion, opinion, race, sexual orientation, or any other aspect including equality before the law, and establish equality in education, healthcare, and vocational opportunities.

• Iran is to review the Criminal Procedures Code of 2014 to guarantee a fair trial and rule out all confessions under torture.

• Iran is to guarantee the rights of religious and ethnic minorities and protect them by law.

Iran is to promote equality between men and women in all legal and civil matters, which means equal opportunities in all aspects of life; economic, cultural, social, and political.31 »»Opening an EU delegation in Tehran Following the announcement of the EU strategy towards Iran, the EU made moves to

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open an EU delegation in Tehran, which was expressed by Richard Howitt, designer of the EU strategy toward Iran when he said, “The nuclear deal was the turning point in our relations towards Iran. Despite our problems with this country concerning the recognition of Israel, democracy, and human rights, we have to open an EU delegation in Iran and resume talks about the human rights issues.”32 On the other hand, Iran’s Reformist movement believes that Iran cannot achieve any progress in the human rights field without harming its national sovereignty. However, the Conservative movement that is in power rejects negotiating with the EU on this issue, which was apparent in their position toward the visit of the German Finance Minister Sigmar Gabriel in October 2016, who announced the German and EU conditions for cooperation with Iran. Consequently, Gabriel’s visit turned into a political issue for the Iranian political elite, who rejected this visit and considered any meeting with Gabriel as a betrayal of the country. This was an accusation for Rouhani and his Government when the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Ali Larijani refused to meet Gabriel.33 Nevertheless, the Syrian crisis was a top priority for the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs in her talks with Iranian officials. This is considered the cornerstone of the EU’s strategy toward Iran because of the burden of the huge waves of immigrants from Syria to Europe.

Although the Russian participation in the war in Syria has undermined Iran’s role, the EU is certain that Iran is a major player in this crisis. Hence, the EU has used its conditions as a bargaining chip and compromised its position with Iran. In fact, the EU believes that opening an EU delegation in Iran will pave the way for stronger influence on Iranian policies on certain issues than that of the United States.

The EU’s statements about opening a delegation in Iran undermined Iran’s political maneuvering. They had no choice but to reject the EU’s suggestion, saying that it would be a center of espionage for the West in Iran.

In fact, Trump’s succession to the US Presidency revised Iran’s calculations. Tehran has turned to Europe more than ever. It believes that the European nuclear deal countries, along with Russia and China, support Iran against Trump’s tendency to resume sanctions on Tehran, although the British position is less warm than the other European partners due to the nature of the British-American alliance and the British Prime Minister Theresa May’s participation in the GCC Summit.

May announced her support for Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, and her commitment to a partnership with the GCC countries against the Iranian threat.34 Iran has called on Germany and France to put pressure on the United States to respect its nuclear deal commitments. In fact, with this increasing pressure from the US, Tehran is likely to agree to the EU’s conditions concerning the EU delegation in Iran, the Syrian crises, and the human rights situation.

Indeed, the EU’s strategy toward Iran turned within a month into cooperation with Tehran. It significantly influenced Iran’s relations with the EU member states immediately, which reflects the seriousness of the EU decision-making process within the framework

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of the unanimous European policies, especially regarding German-Iranian relations.

»»German-Iranian Relations Germany is committed to its EU allies.

It efficiently participates in the EU and NATO organizations, adopts unanimous EU policies, and complies with all its resolutions. It is the second biggest sponsor of NATO after the United States. It has the highest number of US military installations in Europe and the most short-range nuclear missiles. On the military and security levels, Germany is highly dependent on the United States; nevertheless, its economic capabilities give it a form of independence and power in the international arena.35

»»Aspects of German Foreign Policy toward Iran There are five aspects of EU foreign policy toward Iran. Germany has other aspects in its approach to Tehran as follows:

»»Mediation between Russia and the West Germany plays an intermediary role in the disputes between Russia and the West.

With the implementation of European economic sanctions on Russia due to its military intervention in Georgia and Ukraine, the German-Russian trade exchange rate decreased by 25%36 after reaching 50 billion Euros in 2015. The development of Russian-Iranian relations following the nuclear deal and their military cooperation on the Syrian crisis at the level of strategic relations boosted German-Iranian ties. Germany adopted a less tense position than its other European partners toward the joint Iranian-Russian cooperation in Syria.

»» The Recognition of Israel Germany stressed the recognition of Israel as a condition for normalizing relations with Tehran, which was strongly rejected by Iran. For Germany, this is a basic condition because of German-Israeli relations. Israel is Germany’s third trading partner after the United States and China. They have strong ties and cooperate on all African developmental projects, which is evident in the German Christian Democratic party’s beliefs – headed by Angela Merkel – that the security of Israel is a part of Germany’s national interests. It is a non-negotiable issue, as stated by Merkel in the Israeli Knesset.37

»»The Foundations of Germany’ Foreign Policy toward Iran Trade The German economy is the strongest in Europe. It represents 20% of the European economy and is the fourth biggest in the world after the US, China, and Japan. The quarterly report showed that the German economy had entered a strong stage of growth. The German growth rate increased from 1.2 to 2.1% in 2015, while in 2016 it was 1.8%.

In light of Germany’s attempts to create new markets for its products, Iran was an area of competition for EU countries. The German Finance Minister paid three visits to

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Iran; one in 2015 and two visits in 2016. He negotiated many trade deals with Iranian officials, including updating industries that were purchased in the 1970s and needed development. According to the statistics, Iran is the second economic partner for Germany outside Europe after the United States.

During the second half of 2016, Germany agreed short and long- term contracts with Iran, except for Siemens, concerning the establishment of a railroad for $1.7 billion.

However, some German economic delegates who visited Iran recognized that there were too many obstacles for investment or signing long-term contracts with Iran.

In fact, there are many obstacles facing German-Iranian relations.

A. Money laundering.

This obstacle damages the business environment in Iran and calls for more economic sanctions on Iranian banks, which prevents them from doing business with EU countries.

As a result, the Iranian President activated the FATF contract that was signed during the term of former President Ahmadinejad to combat money laundering. In fact, Ahmadinejad could not enforce the contract due to internal pressure, especially from the Revolutionary Guard Corps.

B. The human rights record.

The executions of 12-year old children, although Iran used to postpone them until the age of 18. Iran’s participation in war crimes in Syria was also a major obstacle facing German-Iranian relations, which made it difficult for Iran – as the German Minister Sigmar Gabriel said – to be a special economic partner for Germany.38

C. The American restrictions that were not influenced by the nuclear deal on American and international banks and financial organizations doing business with Tehran.

D. The EU has banned 80 Iranian personnel from traveling to EU countries or holding talks with them because of their involvement in terrorist activities and human rights violations.

Furthermore, the EU has banned doing any armament deals with Iran or exporting any equipment that could be used in Iran’s nuclear program. However, Germany aims to increase its trade with Tehran by up to five billion Euros during the next two years and by ten billion Euros in the next five years, as stated by Folker Teyler, Chief of the Trade Sector in the German Chamber of Industry. Indeed, trade between the two countries amounted to 2.1 billion Euros and rose by another 10% during the first half of 2016.39 »»Cooperation in the Energy Sector Iran intends to implement two stages of the Bushehr nuclear plant to generate electricity. The second and third stages save 22 million barrels of oil annually to produce the same amount of electricity generated by the reactor. The second stage produces 1057 Megawatts, while all other Iranian electricity stations generate 75,000 Megawatts, with a 6% increase in its annual oil consumption.40 So far, Iran exports electricity to Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan, and is planning an ambitious project to export electricity to Turkey and Europe after building twenty nuclear plants to produce electricity.

Germany has a long history of nuclear cooperation with Iran. It has state-of-the- art

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technology and respects deadlines. During the last six months of 2016, Germany and Russia competed to win the development contract for the Bushehr plant. Russia did not comply with the economic sanctions on Iran and continued its work in the Bushehr plant and other projects in Iran, ignoring the international pressure.

On the other hand, Iran sought to please Germany by granting German companies the privilege to develop the natural gas fields in Iran, especially Siemens, which suffered a decrease in its activities in this sector after buying a gas extraction unit from Dresser-Rand for $7.8 billion. Siemens welcomed this invitation from Iran, saying that it was committed to its obligations toward Iran during hard times but at the same time would comply with international regulations, using the same Russian company’s slogan.41

»»Banking Cooperation The United States dollar ban in Iran remained in place after signing the nuclear deal.

No decree was issued by the US to reassure EU banks that they would not be subject to a fine for having done business with Iran before September 2015. However, Some EU countries such as Germany gave Iranian banks permission to open branches in Germany.

Consequently, three Iranian banks, The Middle East Bank, the Persian Bank, and Sina Bank opened branches in Munich in Bavaria. 42Nevertheless, no German bank has opened a branch in Iran, despite the German Finance Minister Sigmar Gabriel’s official request during his first visit to Iran in August 2015. Wali Allah Saif, the Iranian Central Bank’s Governor, met this request with a cold response when he said, “Any German bank can open a branch in one of the free economic zones, and has to comply with the rules of the foreign economic facilities working in these zones.”43

»»Conclusions Based on the above, we can conclude the following, 1. The unanimous EU foreign policy is a major factor in determining the nature of the EU’s strategy toward Iran.

2. The EU Parliament, in particular, has the greatest influence on the EU’s strategy toward Iran.

3. The EU Parliament’s decision-making process concerning foreign policy complies with EU values even if it contradicts the economic interests of the EU member states.

4. There is a strong relation between the EU and Arab countries. Both sides hold regular meetings that can be used by the Arab countries to force Iran to comply with international law and respect the good neighbor policy with them, and stop escalating tension in the Middle East.

5. EU-Iranian relations are expected to improve due to the pressure exerted by the Trump administration on both sides.

6. Germany and France are expected to provide Iran with political support in relation to the nuclear deal in the face of Trump’s pressure and threats.

7. German commitment to the EU’s strategies could force Iran to improve its human rights record.

8. Trump’s growing pressure on Iran will improve the EU-Iranian rapprochement and the

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possibility of opening an EU delegation in Iran.

9. The EU’s strategies vary from one member state to another based on the political trend of the ruling party in each EU member state.

10. The European Socialist Leftist Parties are closer to Iran than the Right.

11. Russia-Iranian Relations For a long time, Russian-Iranian relations fluctuated between cooperation, rivalry, and a change of strategic priorities. In fact, the rivalry has been the dominant feature of RussiaIranian relations throughout history. However, these relations have recently strengthened since the succession of Hassan Rouhani to the Iranian Presidency and the achievement of the nuclear deal with Russia’s help and support. During the last few months, both countries have taken serious steps to improve relations in the economic and military sectors, as well as on other regional and international issues.

»»The Syrian Crisis Away from the Kremlin’s goals, Russia announced that its intervention in Syria was at the request of Bashar Assad and due to the approval of the Russian Union Council on delegating authority to President Vladimir Putin to use the Russian Armed Forces outside the country. Hussein Share’ati, the Iranian Supreme Leader’s advisor when he announced that the Russian intervention was at the request of Iran to save Assad’s regime in Syria, confirmed this announcement.

The Chief of the Think Tank Institute reporting to the Republican Guards (RG) Sa’adallah Zra’i asserted that Russia had sent its forces to Syria two days after the visit of an Iranian military delegate to Moscow.44 Iranian newspapers also reported from the Russian newspaper Gazeta about the role of the Iranian Al-Quds Militia Commander Qasem Suleimani in convincing Russian President Vladimir Putin to go to war in Syria and to halt the Syrian Revolution, although Putin is concerned about the future of Assad and feels that the situation in Syria has become disastrous and complicated.45 During the last few months, Tehran has created a new military position called ‘the political, military, and security coordinator with Russia and Syria’ and appointed Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary General of the Higher Council for Iranian National Security, to this position.46

»»Russian Bombers Use Iran’s NOGA Airport to Carry Out Strikes in Syria The Russian-Iranian military use in and political coordination on the Syrian crisis peaked when Iran gave permission for the Russian 2-22 m3 bombers to launch strikes in Syria using Iran’s Noga air force base in Hamadan. This step shocked observers of Iranian affairs, as this was the first time since the Revolution of 1979 that Iran had allowed foreign forces to use its military installations.

In fact, the Noga air force base was used by the Iranian regime to stop the attempted coup following the Revolution. At first, it was called the ‘Har Base,’ but later it was renamed Noga after the pilot Mohammed Noga, who was loyal to the Revolution, and who was killed in the war against the Kurds.47

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Contradiction about the Russian Military Presence in Iran The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian bombers had taken off from the Iranian air force base and destroyed five arsenals in Syrian cities. The announcement said, “The Russian long-range 3M23-TU bombers and the 34-SU fighters took off from Hamadan air force base and attacked ISIS and Al-Nusra Front in the cities of Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Idlib.”48 The publication of photos of the Russian bombers at Noga air force base in Hamadan and the press release by the Russian Ministry of Defense confused Iranian officials with their contradictory messages. Hours after the release of this news, the Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani said that the Russians’ presence at this base was temporary, which made the Iranian Chief of Staff respond by saying that Parliament had nothing to do with this affair, and the use of the base came about through a trilateral cooperation between Iran, Russia, and Syria to strike armed groups in Syria. He also criticized the Russians for revealing this secret information.49 The Secretary General of the Higher Iranian Security Council Admiral Ali Shamkhani confirmed this news and said that the Russian airplanes in Hamadan had come at the request of Iranian military advisors to provide air cover and logistical support for the war effort in Aleppo, saying that their presence was proof of Iran’s strength, not its subordination. He added that the aim of the press release about Russia’s use of the air force base was just to flex its muscles and introduce itself as a major player in the war in Syria.50 Chief of the National Security Committee in the Iranian Parliament Aladdin Brojardi asserted that the Russian use of the Noga air force base was for passage and refueling purposes only, which did not violate Article 146 of the Iranian Constitution, adding that the goal of the Russian airplanes there was to confront ISIS. Brojardi reappeared and confirmed that Article 146 prohibited the use of any Iranian base by foreign forces even for peaceful purposes, asserting that Russia had been using this base for a while in secret.51

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Some attributed this contradiction by Iranian officials to the disagreement between the two branches of authority about the Russian use of this air force base, which violated one of the basic principles of the Revolution and the Iranian Constitution, which is, “The rejection of any form of interference in the internal affairs of and the deployment of foreign forces in Iran.”52 Consequently, spokesperson from the Iranian Foreign Ministry Bahram Qasemi announced the suspension of Russian use of the Iranian air force base as an attempt by the Iranian regime to calm tensions inside the country; nevertheless, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Ali Larijani denied Qasemi’s statement – as reported by the Iranian news agency Farsi News – saying that the Russians were still using Noga air force base in Hamadan to launch air strikes in Syria.53

»»The Possibility of the Resumption of the Russian Military Activities in Iran Despite the contradictions by Iranian officials on this issue, the use of Noga air force base paved the way for more Russian-Iranian military cooperation. Iranian officials never denied the resumption of this cooperation such as Hussein Dehqan, a senior official at the Iranian Ministry of Defense, who criticized the Russians for revealing the secret agreement between the two countries. In an interview with the Kremlin-backed TV channel, ‘Russia Today’ Dehqan added that his country would give Russia permission to use Hamadan air force base at their request.54

»»Russian Motivations for Using Noga Air force Base 1. A Russian show of force and their ability to build new alliances in the Middle East.

2. Showing that the Russian bombers’ capabilities are equal to the American ones and that they know that the US used their strategic B-1B bomber against ISIS at Ain Alarab (Kobani), in the countryside east of Aleppo in 2014, and then again in the Syrian Manbij recently.

3. Imposition of the status quo of the world to ensure that Russia is one of the key players in the Middle-East region.55 4. In addition to the tactical and operational factors, the use of the Iranian Noga air force base as a Launchpad for Russian warplanes reflects the strategic development of both Russia and Iran. Knowing that this is the second air force base used by Russia in the Middle East after Hmeimeim to carry out its operations in Syria.56 5. The use of Noga air force base decreases the flight times of the Russian warplanes by up to 60%.

6. The Russian air force used to use 2-22m3 bombers starting from airports in the Republic of Northern Ossetia in southern Russia, as the Syrian Hmeimeim air force base was not ready for these warplanes, which are the largest bombers in the world.

Furthermore, the use of Noga air force base gives more security to the Russian planes compared to Hmeimeim air force base, which lies within the theater of operations in Syria.57 178

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»»Iran’s Motivations for Giving Permission for Russians to use Noga Air force Base 1. Iran’s military failure in Syria and the critical situation when confronting the Syrian opposition and other armed groups.

2. The Russian use of Noga air force base is considered a massive failure for Iran’s sectarian militias, especially in Aleppo.58 3. The killing of large numbers of Iranians and Shiite militias reporting to Tehran in the war in Syria.

4. Securing the Assad Regime in the face of the progress of opposition forces on the ground.

»»Russian-Iranian Disagreements The Russian-Turkish agreement about the evacuation of civilians and stranded gunmen in Aleppo revealed hidden disagreements between Russia and Iran. Several observers of Iranian affairs believe that the Russian-Iranian alliance in Syria was fragile and imposed by the regional conditions and the interests of both sides in this country.

After the Turkish-Russian agreement about the ceasefire and the evacuation of civilians and gunmen, Tehran noticed that Russia was starting to make agreements that violated Iran’s strategy in Syria, which is clear evidence that Russia had taken the lead in the Syrian conflict, and had become the savior of the Assad Regime in exchange for Turkish protection of the opposition’s armed groups.59 Iran denied any disagreement with Russia, although Russia’s warning about responding to any shooting during the evacuation process from Aleppo, even if the offender was from the regime’s armed forces or its militias, is evidence of disagreement between both sides.

The Russian-Turkish agreement about the evacuation of civilians and gunmen with the approval of the UN, and the Security Council Resolution concerning the deployment of observers in Aleppo increased Iran’s fears about its future in Syria; consequently, the RG refused entrance to international observers to Syria under the pretext of espionage.

It sought, with its proxies, to obstruct the Turkish-Russian agreement through creating obstacles and conditions such as the evacuation of the residents of Fo’ah and Kofriah, who were surrounded by the opposition forces. They also bombed a number of neighborhoods to obstruct the civilian evacuation from Aleppo and took civilian hostages.

»»Points of Disagreement Between the Two Countries 1. The Russian-Turkish agreement included the preservation of the Syrian Regime, but not of Bashar Assad, which was rejected by Iran. This is the most critical point of disagreement between the two countries. Bashar Assad is a red line for Iran, while Russia does not mind getting rid of him. This Russian position worried Iran and led it to believe that Moscow was using this issue to gain more benefits by exchanging Assad for another President who would guarantee Russian interests in Syria and the region.

2. The Russian position toward the future of Iranian militias in Syria; Iran was seeking to preserve its influence through the deployment of military proxies and dozens of Shiite militias such as Hezbollah based on the Iraqi model to help it enforce its expansionist policy.

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3. The immediate Russian exit from Syria and its attempts to find solutions to end the Syrian crisis will negatively impact Iran’s military forces in Syria. »»The Future of the Russian-Iranian Coordination on the Syrian Crisis Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Iran has improved its position in Syria. However, today Iran is not alone in this country. Russia cannot leave Syria as easily as Iran expected, especially after the big gains it made in Aleppo and the key role it plays in the Syrian crisis.

Russia succeeded in signing an agreement with Turkey about the evacuation of civilians and gunmen, and in bringing all the fighting parties in Syria to the table in Astana to find a final solution to this crisis.

Russian control of Syrian affairs and its disregard of Iran’s role provoked Iran when the Revolutionary Guards Commander criticized how Russia was dealing with Tehran on the Syrian crisis, saying that his country had made great sacrifices in Syria.

In fact, the Russian-Iranian positions on the Syrian crisis are growing apart, which is evident in the goals of each side. Moscow seeks to achieve certain strategic goals and to introduce itself as an influential superpower in the world, while Iran aims to expand its sectarian ambitions and dominate Syria, which was evident in the statements by Major General Mohammed Ali Jafari, the RG commander, when he said, “Aleppo as the first line of the Iranian Revolution.” The Iranians feel they are the most eligible side to take over Syria because of the billions of dollars they have spent and the thousands of lives they have lost in this country. In fact, Iran’s influence over the Syrian regime, the Syrian decision-making process, and the theater of operations would encourage the Iranians to turn against any one of its interests, even its strategic ally Russia.

Some observers believe that Russia cannot bully Iran and diminish its role completely, especially if the Astana meetings succeed with a total ceasefire in Syria.

»»Military Cooperation Russia sought to regain its share of the arms market after the decrease in oil prices and trade with Western countries due to the Russian occupation of the Crimean Peninsula, while Iran sought to improve its military power and technology due to the continuation of American sanctions and its inability to improve ties with the West, even after the lifting of the sanctions imposed on Tehran following the nuclear deal.

Russia and Iran made several agreements in the second half of 2016. They signed arms deals amounting to billions of US dollars to provide Tehran with state-of-the-art weapons and technologies. The frozen arms deals between both countries such as the S-300 defense missile systems, Kalashnikov machine guns, warplanes, and joint military exercises were completed by both sides.

1. The S-300 defense missile systems deal was completed.

The S-300 is a Russian-made long-range air defense missile system deployed to protect industrial and administrative organizations and military installations. It is manufactured by the Russian Almaz Scientific Industrial Corporation and has many versions of the same missile: the S-300P was designed for the Soviet air defense forces to intercept airplanes and Cruise Missiles, and was later developed in many versions to intercept ballistic missiles.60

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In December 2007, Iran signed a contract with Russia to purchase the S-300 missile system. However, due to the nuclear-related sanctions imposed on Iran, in 2010 the Russian President at the time Dmitry Medvedev put a hold on the arms deals with Iran including tanks, armed vehicles, large caliber artillery, helicopter gunships, warships, and missiles.

Three months before signing the nuclear deal, Russia lifted the arms ban against Tehran.

The Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree, which lifted the sanctions on selling S-300 missiles to Iran. After signing the nuclear deal in the Austrian capital Vienna in July 2015, Russia started handing over the missile systems to Tehran.

In August 2016, Iran’s Defense Minister Hussein Dehqan announced the completion of the Russian S-300 missile system deal and their deployment in their positions by Iranian air defenses.61 Iranian TV announced the deployment of the missile systems at Fordo nuclear plant near Qum city about 130 Kilometers from Tehran. On the contrary, the British Jane’s Defense Weekly Journal refuted Iran’s claims, saying, “Based on the satellite photos, Iran has deployed the missile systems at their air defense base in Afsariah district on the outskirts of Tehran.”62

2. Iran Receives the Kalashnikov 103 Machine Guns Iran also received the first shipment of Kalashnikov 103s from Russia. According to the Iranian Tasnim news agency, the new machine guns were handed over to a special unit in the Iranian army. The other Kalashnikov AK-103 version is one of the most popular and developed versions in the Russian Kalashnikov family. Only five countries have this weapon officially; Russia, India, Venezuela, Libya, and Namibia. Recently, some documentary films have reported that some Saudi military personnel have these guns.63 Some observers of Iranian affairs connect the Kalashnikov deal with the ongoing political and security instability facing the Iranian Regime in the provinces of Kurdistan, Baluchistan, and Ahwaz. They also link the deal with Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions and its state of preparedness for the upcoming elections next May to prevent a repetition of the events of the 2009 presidential elections, which were quashed violently by the Iranian Regime.

3. New Warplanes and Armament Deals Russia signed new armament deals to sell 48 SU-30 warplanes to Iran starting from 2018. Iranian officials also asked their Russian counterparts for permission to design this kind of aircraft locally using Iranian materials for cheaper prices64, which was confirmed by the Iranian Minister of Defense Hussein Dehqan, who announced that his country was ready to do business with any country that fulfilled its commitments to Tehran, except the United States and Israel.

The Russian SU-30 is a multi-task warplane provided with network radar and stateof-the-art smart weapons that enable it to engage with ten ground and air targets at the same time. It was designed by the Sukhoi Bureau and manufactured at the Erkotisc

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factory, which belongs to the Russian company Erkot for the military industry. The Russian air force deployed this new fighter in 2012.65 Deputy Commander of the Iranian armed forces Ahmed Riza Bordistan announced that his country was negotiating the purchase of new Russian warplanes to improve its air force’s capabilities.66 In November 2016 an Iranian parliamentary delegate held talks in Russia to make a $10 billion dollar agreement to buy T90 tanks, artillery systems, and helicopters.67 In this regard, Chief of the Asian Directorate at the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Iran had prepared a list of arms to buy from Russia. He added that the list included tanks, warplanes, weapons, and equipment that were included in the sanctions imposed on Iran and that Russia had to go the Security Council for approval to respond positively to Iran’s requests.68

4. Military Exercises Russian and Iranian forces conducted their first air exercises in Iran as part of the eighth international exhibition, which was held on Kish Island. Russia displayed a number of its warplanes, especially the new Sukhoi model.

In August 2016, Iran participated in an international military competition in Russia, where they agreed to conduct more military exercises and exchange advisors.69

5. Russian Navy Ships Dock at Iranian ports Russia dispatched an armada that included a Tatarstan warship, a Grad Soiz Esk frigate, and some other warships to the Iranian port of Anzali. The Russian Defense Ministry announced that the goal of this move was to strengthen international cooperation between the countries surrounding the Caspian Sea.70 In the middle of November 2016, some Russian naval units docked at the Iranian Bandar Abbas port. Russian officers and soldiers were allowed to enter Iranian territory and tour some military installations and tourist sites.71

6. Nuclear and Electrical Power Cooperation Following the completion of the Bushehr nuclear plant in September 2011, Iran considered Russia to be a strategic partner and signed new agreements with Moscow to build new nuclear plants.

In September 2016 Chief of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi announced an agreement with Russia to build the second stage of the Bushehr nuclear plant in Southern Iran. The agreement included the construction of two more nuclear plants for $10 billion in order to generate about 1400 Megawatts of electricity.72 According to Salehi, the first nuclear power station was supposed to start working by the end of 201673, while the second was supposed to start in 2017. Salehi also confirmed that these two plants would save 22 million barrels of oil annually from the amount used to generate electricity in power stations.74

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7. Cooperation in the Oil Field On Dec. 13th, 2016, the Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak visited Tehran as head of a delegation of 500 Russian personnel. He signed a memorandum of understanding, whereby the Russian Gazprom Corporation was given the go-ahead to develop two big Iranian oil fields, Jankoulah and Jashmah Khosh, near the border with Iraq.75 On the sidelines of the meetings, Novak announced that his country was prioritizing large oil projects in Iran, which reflected positively on the relations between the two countries.76 In addition, Iran granted five more oil fields to other Russian Corporations: Mansouri and Aab Taimouri were given to the Look Oil Company; Baidar Gharb went to Zara Bejneft, and the Tat Naft Company was given the rights to study the Dahlaran oil field.77 One day after this agreement, the Iranian Oil Minister Began Zanganah announced that the Russian Ross Naft Corporation was willing to participate with an Iranian company to develop the Iranian Azadkhan field and three more: Yaran, Kobal, and Bangastan.78 Furthermore, some Russian companies held talks with Iranian officials to buy Iranian oil, which was confirmed by the Iranian Oil Minister Began Zanganah when he said that Iran had agreed to sell 100 thousand barrels of oil to Russia. According to the Iranian Minister, half of this amount would be sold to Russia in cash, while the other half would be in exchange for technical and engineering services.79

8. Cancellation of Visa Requirements Between the Two Countries In a step to enhance their cooperation, the fifth Russian-Iranian Joint Committee agreed to facilitate the issuing of visas for tourists traveling between the two countries starting from 2017.80 The memorandum of understanding between both sides included a complete cancellation of visa requirements in three consecutive phases: The first is the cancellation of business and educational visas, the second is for tourist groups, and the third is the complete cancellation of visas between Russia and Iran.81

9. Cooperation in the Banking Sector For many years, banking transactions have been the biggest obstacle facing Iran in developing its trade relations with other countries. However, following the nuclear deal, the banking environment has become suitable for several countries, especially Russia, to open bank accounts and facilitate trade with Iran. The Russian Trade Bank and the Iranian Exports Development Bank made agreements to facilitate trade between Russia and Iran using their local currencies and to establish a joint bank to also facilitate trade.82

10. Cooperation in Space Russia and Iran agreed to cooperate on space-related issues such as the purchase of satellite images, launching satellites belonging to universities, and training astronauts.

Moreover, the Russians urged Iran to adopt the Russian GLONASS system in Iran, which is an equivalent to the US GPS system.83

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»»The Future of the Military and Economic Cooperation Between Russia and Iran The Russian-Iranian cooperation cannot be described as strategic. It is deemed necessary because of the internal, regional, and international conditions that have obliged the two countries to cooperate and improve their relations, which seem strong, but in essence are full of serious differences and disagreements.

Both sides are looking after their own interests. Iran is seeking to secure itself and improve its worn out military arsenal, as well as to acquire a strong ally outside Europe and the United States, at least temporarily. On the other side, Russia is seeking to open new markets to sell its military hardware in light of the severe drop in oil prices and the European economic sanctions imposed on it after its occupation of the Crimean Peninsula.

Despite their points of disagreement on the Syrian crisis that might diminish trust between the two countries, the economic, military, and industrial cooperation between Russia and Iran is expected to continue due to the need of each side for the other. In fact, they can overcome their differences and achieve these interests at least for the moment, although there is a state of mistrust between the two countries and fears of a breakdown in relations in the future. Moscow believes that Iran might sacrifice its relations with Russia if there is a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington, while Iran fears that Russia might do the same just to achieve its interests, which is evident in the S-300 missile system84 deal that was put on hold in 2010 and never completed until the nuclear deal was signed in July 2015.

»»Conclusions 1. Iran claimed that the Russian intervention in Syria was at the request of Tehran.

2. Iran’s permission for Russian warplanes to use the Iranian Noga air force base in Hamadan was a surprise for all observers, as this was the first time Tehran had given this permission to a foreign country.

3. The release of photos of Russian warplanes photos at the Noga air force base confused Iranian officials, who made contradictory statements because of this violation of the Iranian Constitution and values of the Revolution.

4. Russia deployed its warplanes in Iran to launch strikes in Syria, and to impose this status quo on the world to ensure it is one of the key players in the region’s crises and demonstrates its ability to establish new alliances.

5. The Russian use of the Noga air force base to launch strikes in Syria is evidence of the failure of Iranian forces and sectarian militias in Syria, especially in Aleppo and recognition of the inevitable fall of Bashar Assad without Russian intervention.

6. The Turkish-Russian agreement to evacuate civilians and gunmen from Aleppo was the spark for a disagreement between Moscow and Tehran.

7. After the Turkish-Russian agreement about the ceasefire and the evacuation of civilians and gunmen, Tehran felt that Moscow had started to make secret agreements that violated Iran’s strategy in Syria.

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8. The Turkish-Russian agreement included securing the Syrian regime, but not Bashar Assad, which was rejected by Iran.

9. Iran seeks to expand its influence in Syria through the establishment of military proxies and dozens of sectarian militias based on the Iraqi model.

10. Moscow aims to achieve some strategic goals, to preserve its gains in Syria, and find a way out of the crisis. As for Iran, its ultimate goal is to achieve its sectarian expansionist goals and make Syria another extension of its regime.

11. Iran has suffered serious losses in Syria and fears the failure of its future plans in this country. This might direct it to create obstacles to make the Astana talks fail by any means possible.

12. Russia seeks to restore its position in the military industry markets after the deterioration of oil prices and Western sanctions against it. This encouraged Moscow to do business with Tehran, which is eager to improve its worn-out military equipment.

13. In light of the refusal of many countries and international companies to do business with Tehran even after the nuclear deal, Iran favored cooperation with Russia and has made several agreements in the energy, oil, space, and banking sectors.

14. The Russian-Iranian cooperation cannot be described strategic. It is a relation deemed necessary due to internal, regional, and international factors.

15. Despite the points of disagreement between both sides on the Syrian crisis, their cooperation in the economic, military, and industrial sectors is likely to continue, at least at the present time.

»»Closure Iran’s internal policies deteriorated in the second half of 2016 due to the failure of its foreign policy and external trade. On an internal level, the political movements witnessed a state of tension between the Presidency and the Supreme Leader. Another confrontation also took place between the Islamic Shura Council, representative of Iran’s legislative authority, and the judicial authority on more than one big question.

Furthermore, the Iranian President stood his ground against the RG, which looks down on the Iranian regular army, and ended up with the court-martial of an RG commander. In the middle of all this rivalry between the authoritarian organizations in Iran, the Iranian citizens’ trust in their regime diminished massively after a series of financial scandals that involved every state-run organizations and Iranian political movement.

»»Security Iran witnessed an escalation of military operations carried out by Kurdish separatists in Western Iran. Destructive activities by Arab separatists in Ahwaz province increased with oil facilities and petrochemical factories being set on fire. The state of instability in border areas with Pakistan, Sistan, and Baluchistan province also continued.

The Iranian Regime sustained its policy of restrictions on Afghan immigrants, despite the need for their expertise in Iran’s labor market; however, the Iranian Government has never assisted them or improved their conditions as legal residents.

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»»The Military Iran continued its expansionist policy outside its borders and suffered big losses in lives and equipment, especially in the war in Syria, despite its reliance on Shiite militias from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Furthermore, the funds granted to these Shiite militias to support the war in Syria have deprived the Iranian people of Iranian assets that were released following the nuclear deal.

Iran also diminished its national pride and spirit of independence and non-submittal to greater powers by giving permission to the Russian warplanes to launch attacks in Syria starting from Noga air force base in Hamadan province, leading to a state of discontent in Iran.

During the second half of 2016, Iran received Russian S-300 missile systems and Kalashnikov machine guns, although it is worth noting that Iran’s armament deals with Russia were mainly for defensive weapons, which is evidence that Russia is restricting selling offensive weapons to Iran in the case of any expected conflicts of interests.

»»The Military Industry The capabilities of Iran’s military industries are suspect. Iran has never exported any weapons, which is evidence of their combat inefficiency. Furthermore, these industries were originally developed in North Korea and China, and introduced under Iranian names.

All in all, the Iran’s military exports have been limited to tens of millions of dollars in exchange for exporting light guns and ammos.

Iran has deployed its Navy in international waters. Iranian vessels docked at ports in East Africa and the Indian Ocean. They also sailed to the Syrian coast and the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Iranian speedboats in the Arabian Gulf continued their harassment of American warships but stopped these activities following Donald Trump’s succession to the US Presidency

»»Economics Iranian oil exports increased following the nuclear deal in 2016. Iran also succeeded in re-attracting large investments in its energy industry after the lifting of sanctions. The most prominent companies resuming their activities in Iran were the French Giant ‘Total’ followed by ‘Shell’ after a six-year break.

Non-oil exports reached just 6%, which reflects the low quality of Iran’s industries. There were insufficient agricultural products for local consumption, a shortage in the production sector’s funds, and an inability of Iranian banks to provide the necessary funds for struggling industries under the pretext of huge governmental debt for local banks.

Following the nuclear deal, Iran received funds from its frozen assets in the United States and from its oil exports to India.

The Iranian inflation rate has decreased, but unemployment remains high. The Iranian economy cannot provide the Iranian people with any improvements in their living conditions, as announced previously by the government.

The Iranian currency’s exchange rate deteriorated against the dollar. All prices have

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risen, which has become a great burden for Iranian citizens. The Iranian people have complained about the economic performance of Rouhani’s government, especially after the announcement that it had decreased the Iranian currency’s exchange rate against the dollar to support the budget deficit.

On a regional level, Iran integrated its Public Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the Iraqi military. It was apparent that the Iraqi political leadership was unable to control these forces after a request from Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi for the PMF to comply with the orders and regulations of the Iraqi military leadership.

»»The Military Iran went to war in Aleppo in Syria. Its strategy was based on the genocide and evacuation of the Sunni population in cooperation with the Assad regime. The international community condemned Iran’s war crimes, which became evident when Russian forces confronted Iranian militias to prevent them from carrying out more crimes. In fact, Russia used this to avoid international condemnation after its barbaric strikes and blockades and starvation policies in Syria. Nevertheless, the Turkish- Russian rapprochement implied a Russian tendency to limit Iran’s role in Syria.

In Yemen, Iran has continued its support for the Houthi rebels and deposed President Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, the Houthi-Saleh forces fell apart under strikes by legitimate Yemeni forces supported by the Arab Coalition.

»»On the international level Following the nuclear deal, European countries moved toward Iran and started significant business relations with this country. They made economic agreements and increased their political relations through mutual visits. However, the EU’s fears of the resumption of US sanctions have limited long-term contracts between Europe and Iran.

With the start of this EU strategy toward Iran, new conditions emerged to continue economic cooperation between both sides. However, Iran refused to comply with these conditions, which was evident when the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament refused to meet the German Economic Minister during his visit to Iran.

»»US-Iranian Relations Iran received large amounts of its frozen assets in the United States following the nuclear deal.

The US also allowed Iran to purchase civilian airplanes from American Boeing and European Airbus. However, the US Congress has extended the ISA law concerning the extension of economic sanctions on Iran for another ten years, which was another setback for Iran’s achievements during the Presidency of Barack Obama. Moreover, new statements and tendencies from the US prove that the time for compromise with Iran has passed.

»»Russia-Iranian Relations Russian-Iranian relations have reached a state of strategic partnership through their alliance in the war in Syria, Iran’s permission for Russian warplanes to launch strikes in Syria from the Noga air force base, military cooperation through armament deals, joint exercises, and the signing of long-term contracts to build the second and third stages of the Bushehr nuclear plant. Nevertheless, indicators of a Russian-Iranian break-up are apparent, especially in the Syrian crisis.

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‫‪ENDNOTES‬‬ ‫‪Martin S. Indyk, The end of the U.S.-dominated order in the Middle East, March 15, 2016, -1‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/dKHeE‬‬ ‫‪ -2‬حسين شبكشي‪ ،‬عقيدة أوباما‪ ،‬الشرق األوسط‪ 22 ،‬مارس ‪.2016‬‬ ‫‪ -3‬تسنيم‪ ،‬تسنيم‪ ،‬تهدید أوباما به وتوی طرح ضدّ ایرانی موسوم به شفافیت مالی‪ 1 ،‬مهر ‪ 1 ،1395‬مهر ‪،1395‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/4EQ6Nm‬‬ ‫عضوا من الكونغرس يطالبون أوباما بتجميد بيع أسلحة للسعودية‪،30/8/2016 ،‬‬ ‫‪ -4‬تسنيم‪ ،‬فورين بوليسي‪60 :‬‬ ‫ً‬ ‫‪http://bit.ly/2bZBKMy‬‬ ‫‪ -5‬شهروند‪ ،‬ظریف خبر داد‪ :‬تعهد آمریکا برای رفع نگرانی‌ها در مورد سرمایه گذاری در ایران‪ 5 ،‬مهر ‪،1495‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/8Btmjj‬‬ ‫‪ -6‬آفرينش‪ ،‬تمديد أوباما لحالة الطوارئ ضدّ إيران‪http://cutt.us/lmpdp ،‬‬ ‫‪ -7‬وكالة تسنيم‪ ،‬تمديد العقوبات اإليرانية لـ‪ 10‬سنوات يشير أن المعتمدين على أمريكا واهمون‪ 16 ،‬نوفمبر ‪،2016‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/ydGJaU‬‬ ‫‪ -8‬موقع الصحفيين الشباب‪ ،‬اوباما برای آزادی زندانیان آمریکایی در ایران ‪ 400‬میلیون دالر پرداخت کرد‪ ۱۳ ،‬مرداد ‪،- ۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪http://soo.gd/zxNW‬‬ ‫‪ -9‬بي بي فارسي‪ ،‬هل تدفع الحكومات فدية؟‪ ،‬آیا دولت‌ها باج می‌دهند؟‪ 19 ،‬مرداد ‪http://soo.gd/cjAE ،1395‬‬ ‫‪ -10‬وكالة تنسيم‪ ،‬رجال الحكومة يرون القوة فقط في الواليات المتحدة ‪/‬الحكومة تحدد مصير الـ‪ 36‬مليار دوالر المح َّررة إليران‪ 7 ،‬نوفمبر‬ ‫‪،2016‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/QiwUL1‬‬ ‫‪ -11‬زيتون‪ ،‬بازخوانی نظرات نامزدهای ریاست جمهوری امریکا چه کسی برای إیران بهتر است؟‪ 7 ،‬مهر ‪،1395‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/fCcF94‬‬ ‫‪ -12‬موقع الف‪ ،‬واشنگتن‪ :‬تعلیق توافق هسته‌ای ایران در دوران ترامپ محتمل است‪ ۲۰ ،‬آبان ‪،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/l7daX‬‬ ‫‪ -13‬برترين ها‪ ،‬ترامپ‪ :‬در کنار هم در برابر ایران می‌ایستیم‪ ۱۰ ،‬آبان ‪،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/TBh2h‬‬ ‫‪ -14‬صحيفة سياست روز‪ :‬تكيه برتار وپود پوسیده‪ 15 ،‬مهر ‪،1395‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/HdJypX‬‬ ‫‪ -15‬مهر‪ ،‬دبلوماسي إيراني سابق‪ :‬تطبيع ال َعالقات بين إيران وأمريكا في المستقبل القريب أمر مستبعد‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/4TZDv‬‬

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The EU Council: defines the general direction and priorities of the EU member states. It -16 brings together the EU leaders to set the EU’s political agenda. It represents the highest level between the EU countries and comprises Ministers of member states. It generally decides by unanimity or qualified majority 72, 27% of the total votes. It also requires the approval of the majority of member states that represent 62% of the total population of the EU. Each member state has a number of representatives based on its population. The leadership rotates between member states every six months. http://cutt.us/rMn1a The EU Commission: Allocates the general budget of the EU and oversees its implementa� -177 tion. It represents the EU in the international negotiations, has the right to sign agreements with other countries outside the EU, and has big authority in accepting new members. Each member state has one member and decision is based upon majority. http://cutt.us/rMn1a The European Parliament: Has some legislative rights, and supervisory and advisory respon� -188 sibilities. It oversees the activities of the EU commission and approves its members. It participates in the law-making process, ratifies the international agreements and new members, and has wide authorities in relation to the EU budget. It comprises of 751 members of all member states based on their population. People of each member state elect their representatives in the EU Parliament through direct elections each five years. http://cutt.us/rMn1a The European Council: is a meeting between the heads of states or governments members -19 of the EU and President of the EU Commission. The meeting is held 2-3 times a year to decide on the economic and political policies and draw the EU general policy. Usually headed by the member state heading the EU Council. Decisions are made by majority, and is not considered one of the administrative organizations of the EU. http://cutt.us/rMn1a ‫ كلية الحقوق‬،‫ العدد التاسع‬،‫ مجلة الفكر‬،‫ السياسة الخارجية لالتحاد األوروبي في نظريات ال َعالقات الدولية‬:‫حسين طالل مقلد‬.‫ د‬-20 .50‫ ص‬،‫م‬2013 ‫ الجزائر‬،‫والعلوم السياسية جامعة محمد خيضر بسكرة‬ .Ibid, p.54 -21 74‫ ص‬،‫نموذجا‬ ‫ البرلمان األوروبي‬:‫ دور المؤسسات فوق القومية في تعزيز تكامل االتحاد األوروبي‬:‫ حسين طالل مقلد‬-22 ً http://cutt.us/1TzWx ،‫ مجلة جامعة دمشق للعلوم االقتصادية والقانونية‬،‫ محدِّ دات السياسة الخارجية واألمنية األوروبية المشتركة‬:‫ د حسين طالل مقلد‬-23 .627‫ ص‬،2009 ،‫ العدد األول‬،25 ‫المجلد‬ .‫ تمديد قانون داماتو ومصير االتفاق النووي‬:‫ الجزيرة‬-24 http://cutt.us/3QJ5 ،‫ االتحاد األوروبي وإيران‬:‫ موقع الدبلوماسية الفرنسية‬-25 http://cutt.us/Xfa90

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‫ّ‬ ‫سجل العقوبات الدولية ضدّ إيران‪.‬‬ ‫‪ -26‬الجزيرة‪:‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/LBHiX‬‬ ‫ُّ‬ ‫التدخل اإليراني في العراق‪،‬‬ ‫‪ -27‬شبكة أخبار العراق‪ :‬وزراء خارجية الدول العربية ونظراؤهم من دول االتحاد األوروبي يرفضون‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/zktg‬‬ ‫‪ -28‬البوابة‪ :‬قرارات االجتماع المشترك لوزراء الخارجية العرب واألوروبيين‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/TE0Y2‬‬ ‫‪ -29‬موقع الدبلوماسية الفرنسية‪ :‬االتحاد األوروبي وإيران‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/Xfa90‬‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫‪ -30‬وكالة أنباء فارس‪ :‬االتحاد األو ُرو ّبي‪ :‬التبادل التجاري مع إيران ازداد ‪ 63‬بالمئة‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/o19l‬‬ ‫‪،European Parliament: REPORT on EU strategy towards Iran after the nuclear agreement -31‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/bw7Om‬‬ ‫‪ -32‬شيرازه‪ :‬تاسیس دفتر اتحادیه اروپا در ایران راهی برای نفوذ‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/IX4Zj‬‬ ‫‪ -33‬دویچه وله فارسی‪ :‬دفتر اتحادیه اروپا در تهران؛ جبهه جدید کشمکش‌های جناحی‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/dW5Ec‬‬ ‫‪ -34‬روسيا‪ :‬تيريزا ماي تتعهّ د أمام زعماء الخليج بمواجهة الخطر اإليراني‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/n0tp‬‬ ‫‪ -35‬مشرق‪ :‬ایران وآلمان؛ پس از برجام‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/kUDs‬‬ ‫‪ -36‬محمد حسن طاهری‪ :‬بررسی اهداف ومنافع روسیـه‪ ،‬ترکیـه وآلمـان در قبال یکدیگر‪ ،‬إيران‪ -‬يوريكا موسسه إيراني مطالعات أوروبا‬ ‫وأمريكا‪.۱۳۹۵ ،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/8Kco4‬‬ ‫‪ -37‬مالئکه‪ .‬حسن‪ ،‬روابط آلمان واسرائیل در دوره صدارت آنگال مرکل؛کلید فهم سیاست خارجی آلمان در خاورمیانه‪ ،‬فصلنامه تحقیقات‬ ‫سیاسی بین‌المللی‪،‬شماره هفدهم‪ ،‬سال‪،1392‬ص‪90‬‬ ‫‪ -38‬محمد حسن گاهری‪ :‬بررسی اجمالی پرخاشگری کالمی مقامات آلمانی علیه ایران‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/1McY3‬‬ ‫‪ -39‬دویچه وله فارسی‪ :‬خیز شرکت‌های آلمانی برای گسترش چشمگیر صادرات به ایران‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/U0Y6F‬‬ ‫‪ -40‬إيالف‪ :‬بدء أعمال البناء في مفاعلين نوويين جديدين في إيران‪ 10 ،‬سبتمبر ‪2016‬م‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/WH9L‬‬ ‫‪ -41‬المسوق العرب‪ :‬مجموعة سيمنس األلمانية تسعى للفوز بمشروعات في إيران‪،‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/f6cnS‬‬

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‫‪ -42‬هافينغتون بوست عرب‪ :‬بنوك إيرانية تفتح فروعً ا لها في مدينة ميونيخ‪.‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/46z7‬‬ ‫‪ -43‬وكالة أنباء شينخوا‪ :‬ألمانيا تفتتح ً‬ ‫بنكا في إيران لتسهيل التجارة‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/EkBOn‬‬ ‫‪ -44‬التدخل ال ُّروسي في سوريا كان بطلب من إيران‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/SyRJs8‬‬ ‫‪ -45‬وطن امروز‪ :‬حينما ترك الحاج قاسم كارتًا فوق طاولة بوتين‪ 15 ،‬أكتوبر‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/Nupx5‬‬ ‫‪ -46‬مركز تحقيقات راهبردي‪ ،‬ایران شمخانی را به عنوان هماهنگ کننده نظامی با سوریه وروسیه منصوب کرد‪ 25 ،‬خرداد ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪http://www.mtrd.ir/news‬‬ ‫‪ -47‬العربية‪ ،‬قاعدة همدان‪ ..‬خفايا وأسرار الحلف الروسي اإليراني‪ 2 ،‬أغسطس ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/owErf‬‬ ‫‪ -48‬عصر ایران‪ ،‬وزارت دفاع روسیه‪ :‬تایید حضور جنگنده های روسیه در ایران‪ 25 ،‬مرداد‪1395‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/lK43Wh‬‬ ‫‪ -49‬الشرق األوسط‪ ،‬تصريحات متباينة حول انطالق الطائرات الروسية من همدان‪ 24 ،‬أغسطس ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/3aDL63‬‬ ‫‪ -50‬جام جم‪ ،‬روس ها با اعالم خبر حضور جنگنده هایشان در همدان بی معرفتی کردند‪ 1 ،‬شهريور ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪http://soo.gd/dtPA‬‬ ‫‪ -51‬موقع انتخاب‪ ،‬بروجردی‪ :‬استفاده از پایگاه هوایی نوژه برای عبور هواپیماهای روسی وسوخت‌گیری است‪ 30،‬مرداد‪1395‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/pujHo5‬‬ ‫‪Scott Peterson، Behind Russia-Iran cooperation over Syria، a larger goal -52‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/JLi6nr‬‬ ‫‪ -53‬العربية‪ ،‬إيرن تكذب نفسها‪ :‬روسيا ال تزال تستخدم قاعدة همدان‪ 23 ،‬أغسطس ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪http://cutt.us/FhwdZ‬‬ ‫‪ -54‬الرياض‪ ،‬إيران تعتزم فتح قاعدة همدان الجوية مجدَّ دً ا أمام روسيا‪ 27 ،‬ديسمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/2L1krN‬‬ ‫‪ -55‬عمر صفر‪ ،‬لهذه األسباب تستخدم روسيا قاذفاتها في سوريا انطال ًقا من همدان‪ 19 ،‬اغسطس ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/OkuPtD‬‬ ‫‪ -56‬موقع بوستجي‪ ،‬قاذفات روسية في إيران‪ :‬خطوة تكتيكية‪ ..‬بأبعاد استراتيجية‪ 17 ،‬أغسطس ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/fCf611‬‬ ‫‪ -57‬روسيا اليوم‪ ،‬لماذا إيران‪ ..‬دوافع استخدام قاعدة همدان وفوائدها‪ 17 ،‬اغسطس ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/MIua8U‬‬ ‫‪ -58‬علي حسين باكير‪ ،‬دالالت استخدام روسيا قواعد عسكرية في إيران‪ 18 ،‬أغسطس ‪https://goo.gl/QJUnzD 2016‬‬

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‫‪ -59‬نون بوست‪ ،‬تقاسم للنفوذ أم نزاع هيمنة‪ ..‬مالمح الخالفات الروسية اإليرانية بحلب‪ 1 ،‬يناير ‪2017‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/yrN0vT‬‬ ‫‪ -60‬رسم ًّيا‪ ..‬إيران تكشف مها ّم صواريخ «إس ‪ »300‬الروسية على أراضيها‪ 30 ،‬أغسطس ‪https://goo.gl/WR16f6 2016‬‬ ‫‪ -61‬عصر إيران‪ ،‬وزیر دفاع‪ :‬سامانه موشکی اس ‪ 300‬به طور کامل تحویل ایران شد‪ 20 ،‬أغسطس ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/5gkvus‬‬ ‫‪ -62‬مشرق‪ ،‬ادعای نشریه انگلیسی در مورد محل استقرار «اس‪ »-300‬در ایران‪ 18 ،‬شهريور ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/VyMPon‬‬ ‫‪ -63‬روزنامه إيران‪ ،‬خرید کالشنیکف‌های جدید‪ 17 ،‬مرداد ‪http://soo.gd/fRjQ – 1395‬‬ ‫‪ -64‬بمساعدة روسية‪ ...‬إيران تنوي تطوير قواتها الجوية واتجاه إلنتاج الطائرات مح ِّل ًّيا‪ 28 ،‬يونيو ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/WnctWQ‬‬ ‫‪ -65‬الجيش العربي‪ ،‬إيران تجدد رغبتها في شراء مقاتالت جديده‪ 25 ،‬نوفمبر ‪https://goo.gl/lOvd1Q 2016‬‬ ‫‪ -66‬اطالعات‪ ،‬امیر پوردستان‪ :‬خرید جنگنده‌های جدید در دست اقدام است‪ 4 ،‬اذر ‪http://cutt.us/dgpyw 1395‬‬ ‫‪ -67‬سكاي نيوز عربية‪ ،‬إيران تطلب شراء أسلحة بـ‪ 10‬مليارات دوالر‪ 14 ،‬نوفمبر ‪https://goo.gl/Lyq7Oj 2016‬‬ ‫‪ -68‬المدن‪ ،‬صفقة أسلحة روسية‪-‬إيرانية بـ‪ 10‬مليارات دوالر‪ 14 ،‬نوفمبر ‪https://goo.gl/3MgcYj 2016‬‬ ‫‪ -69‬فارس‪ ،‬مباحثات إيرانية روسية إلجراء مناورات عسكرية مشتركة‪ 2 ،‬أغسطس ‪https://goo.gl/NAoZ0n 2016‬‬ ‫‪ -70‬تسنيم‪ :‬ناوگروه رزمی ارتش روسیه وارد آب‌های ایران شد‪ ۲۷،‬مهر ‪http://cutt.us/nx8wL ،۱۳۹۵‬‬ ‫‪ -71‬تسنيم‪ :‬یگان تحقیقاتی نیروی دریایی روسیه در بندرعباس پهلو گرفت‪ 28،‬ابان ‪http://cutt.us/AUXKJ 1395‬‬ ‫‪ -72‬إيران تشرع ببناء مفاعلين نوويين بتعاون روسي ‪https://goo.gl/SnW2DM‬‬ ‫‪ -73‬وكالة أين اإلخبارية‪ :‬إيران‪ :‬بدء تنفيذ المرحلة الثانية لمحطة بوشهر الكهروذرية‪http://cutt.us/RRrzX ،10/9/2016،‬‬ ‫‪ -74‬إيالف‪ :‬بدء أعمال البناء في مفاعلين نوويين جديدين في إيران‪ 10،‬سبتمبر ‪2016‬م ‪http://cutt.us/WH9L‬‬ ‫‪ -75‬سي إن بي‪ ،‬اتفاقيات نفطية بين إيران وروسيا ستبصر النور في يومين‪ 13 ،‬ديسمبر ‪https://goo.gl/VQWyUA 2016‬‬ ‫‪ -76‬مهر نيوز‪ ،‬تعاون إيران وروسيا االقتصادي تحت مجهر اإلعالم الغربي‪ 15 ،‬ديسمبر ‪https://goo.gl/vb7yyN 2016‬‬ ‫‪ -77‬تسنيم‪ ،‬جزئیات واگذاری ‪ ۷‬میدان نفتی ایران به شرکت های روسی‪ 23 ،‬آذر ‪https://goo.gl/xRzr6d 1395‬‬ ‫‪ -78‬مهر نيوز‪ ،‬شركة «روس نفت» ت ِ‬ ‫ُبدي رغبتها في العمل مع الشركات اإليرانية لتطوير حقل آزادكان‪ 14 ،‬ديسمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/Adaa5P‬‬ ‫‪ -79‬تسنيم‪ ،‬فروش روزانه ‪ ۱۰۰‬هزار بشکه نفت ایران به روسیه در مرحله نهایی شدن‪ 23 ،‬اذر ‪1395‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/TPTVWJ‬‬ ‫‪ -80‬الوفاق‪ ،‬إيران‪ :‬تفاهم افزايش همكاري دانشگاهی ایران وروسیه در مذاكرات مسكو‪ 28 ،‬نوفمبر ‪2016‬‬ ‫‪https://goo.gl/OuXbjZ‬‬ ‫‪ -81‬سبوتنيك‪ :‬إلغاء التأشيرات بين إيران وروسيا قري ًبا‪ 21 ،‬أكتوبر ‪2016‬م ‪http://cutt.us/VjDjP‬‬ ‫‪ -82‬الوفاق أونالين‪ :‬تأسيس مصرف إيراني‪-‬روسي يعتمد العملة الوطنية للبلدين‪ 16 ،‬سبتمبر ‪http://cutt.us/jqjh8 2016‬‬ ‫‪ -83‬إيرنا‪ :‬الفضاء هو المجال األوسع للتعاون اإليراني الروسي‪ 27 ،‬يوليو ‪https://goo.gl/vSjwSY 2016‬‬ ‫التحول في ال َعالقات الروسية اإليرانية ‪https://goo.gl/ygYoD‬‬ ‫‪ -84‬مركز الروابط للبحوث والدراسات‪ ،‬الشراكة اليقظة‪ :‬مسارات‬ ‫ُّ‬

‫‪The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec.2016‬‬

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The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec.2016