"Politics and Society in Belarus" 2017 (2)

POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN BELARUS. COLLECTED WORKS OF EHU POLITICAL SCIENCE GRADUATES. 2016, ISSUE 2.

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UDK 32(476)(082) P 14 Politics and Society in Belarus. Collected Works of EHU Political Science Graduates. 2017, issue 2.

Research Council: Dr. Andrei Stsiapanau; Dr. Tatsiana Chulitskaya; Dr. Uladzislau Ivanou; Dr. Wolfgang Sender Translation from Belarusian into English: Alena Lenkevich Style Editing and Proofreading: Kevin Reiling Design and Layout: Ihar Nazaranka Publication Manager: Darya Trus P 14 Tatsiana Chulitskaya, Uladzislau Ivanou and Andrei Stsiapanau, editors. Politics and Society in Belarus. Collected Works of EHU Political Science Graduates. Issue 1, Vilnius, EHU, 2017.

This is a joint publication of the Department of Social and Political Sciences of the European Humanities University and Belarus Country Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

This publication has been made possible thanks to the financial support of Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Sole responsibility for facts or opinions expressed in this publication lies with the authors.

The European Humanities University and the Kinrad Adenauer Foundation assume no responsibility either for the information contained in the publication or any subsequent use of it.

ISBN 978-609-8220-00-1 (electronic version) ISBN 978-609-8220-01-8 (print version)

UDK 32(476)(082)

INTRODUCTION............................................................................4

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Katsiaryna Andronava STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN BELARUS.......................................................................................5

Aliena Zhebryk ELECTION OBSERVATION IN BELARUS: ANALYSIS OF GENESIS, SUBSTANCE, AND FUNCTIONS...............................31

Yana Ustsinienka THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEENCIVIC ORGANISATIONS AND THE STATE IN BELARUSIAN HIGHEREDUCATION POLICY: ARE CHANGES POSSIBLE?.......................................................45

POLITICAL SCIENCE PROGRAMMES AT EHU..........................64

KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION, BELARUS COUNTRY OFFICE........................................................................................67

CONTENTS

Aliaksandr Autushka-Sikorski EXTERNAL RENTS, MACROECONOMIC POPULISM, AND REGIME SURVIVAL IN CONTEMPORARY BELARUS...............19

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

INTRODUCTION

EHU continues its cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and we are happy to present the second collection of works of young EHU political scientists titled “Politics and Society in Belarus”. This time we offer you outcomes of research in political sociology, political economy, civil society, and election observation.

Students (and graduates) have chosen innovative political science topics that have largely been unexplored in Belarus: phenomena of apoliticism and its forms within an authoritarian regime, macroeconomic populism, the interrelation between the state and civil society in higher education policy, etc.

The goal of cooperation between EHU and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation is promotion of research in the field of political science, and Belarusian unofficial political science in general.

The collected articles were chosen among the most interesting, successful, and innovative student final papers of the EHU MA Program “Public Policy” and BA Program “Political Science and European Studies”. We would like to stress once again that for the Political Science programs at EHU as well as for Konrad Adenauer Foundation the most important demand on political science is its connection with Belarusian issues and Belarusian political reality.

That is why the topics of the articles are focused on unfamiliar and sometimes marginalized topics of the Belarusian political sphere.

In sharing with you this collection of works we share with you also the theoretical and practical outcomes of political science at EHU. The very possibility to conduct this research, to obtain proper outcomes, and to share them with you is due to the university’s location in Vilnius, where in the atmosphere of academic freedom young researchers have unique opportunities for their research.

This collection is intended generally for European and Belarusian politicians, activists, political scientists as well as those who are interested in alternative positions on Belarus.

S T R U C T U R E O F P A R T I C I P A T I O N B E L A R U S

P O L I T I C A L I N

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Abstract. This article analyses in brief features of political participation in non-democratic regimes, including in weak democracies, from the perspective of a participation intensity approach. The main part of the article includes a description of the dynamic model method useful to understand the approach as well as its application to the case of Belarus. The cornerstone of the approach is the concept of political apathy and its subtypes.

It is of importance because of the features of the political field in regimes discussed. Special attention is paid, to deformations of the forms and types of political participation related to these features, the reasons behind their formation, their essential nature, and their significance.

Keywords: political apathy, political participation, political culture, political attitudes, political mobilization, political boycott, rational ignorance, absenteeism

INTRODUCTION

This article continues the research of political participation in non-democratic regimes, including in weak democracies, from the perspective of a participation intensity approach. The object of the study is the intensity of political participation in a non-democracy and weak democracy regimes. The study focus is political participation intensity of Belarusian citizens.

The following methods were applied in this work: adaptation of theoretical concepts from the distinct fields of political science, economics, and sociology; analysis of secondary data (results of opinion polls); and the dynamic model method, which allows for the study of movement among communities if the external parameters of the model logic change.

KATSIARYNA ANDRONAVA STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN BELARUS

Katsiaryna Andronava – MA in Public Policy, International Secretariat of ABF Belarus.

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Structural transformations of the electorate can be presented as a multidimensional model in the following dimensions: the degree of freedom, the degree of tension in society (which reflects crisis in the economy, politics, and in the social sphere), and the degree of mobilization.

The significance of the topic in question is rooted in the fact that the study of political apathy, especially in non-democracies and weak democracies, is not fully developed. At the same time, the group of politically apathic citizens is the least predictable and studied, which makes it difficult to forecast the level of support of certain positions of the group if external conditions change.

Therefore, theoretical reasoning and adaptation of the concepts and approaches existing in the democratic framework is of immediate scientific value while analysis and monitoring of the group is of practical value.

Over the course of work carried out for BA and MA theses a method sufficient for an approach to political participation was developed which allows for forecasting citizens’ movement among groups if the socio-political conditions change.

This work focuses on the phenomenon of political apathy. Political apathy is understood as a special type of political participation existing in public affairs and is the opposite of being politically active. We distinguish among three types of political apathy: rational ignorance, boycott, and top-down exclusion.

In this work (Андронава 2014, 2016) the term of political apathy was defined as follows (applied to non-democracies, or weak democracies, in which the field of political participation exists): political apathy is a passive civic position, (actual or imagined) indifference to political processes and issues, and avoidance of participation in political life. In J. Rosenau’s classification (Жирар 1996: 73–74), political apathy corresponds to two types of citizenship – apathetic and self-centered. When compared to Durkheim’s anomie and suicide (Дюркгейм 1897), political apathy is synonymous with political suicide.

In terms of political apathy, democratic and non-democratic (weak democratic) countries have several significant differences.

The first difference is that of the practice and experience of democratic governance and participation. Another difference is the availability and occurrence of such a type of participation as quasi-participation creating significant obstacles for determining the quantity of citizens with political apathy in general and of the different types of political apathy in particular. It should create a feeling of broad support by the public at large which enables the support of regime legitimacy.

Political participation is understood as a process – as certain actions of certain citizens and groups in the political field.

Two types of political participation are distinguished: deliberate autonomous participation and mobilization of quasi participation (coerced, compulsory or stimulated participation).

Political participation of citizens is a category of a country’s political culture which is understood as “particular distribution of orientation models of the population of a certain country in relation to political objects” (Алмонд, Верба 2014: 30). The phenomenon of political culture is related to different aspects of life and the history of citizens and is a product of the “psychocultural” approach to the study of political phenomena (Эрме 1995: 122). The concept of political culture is directly related to the concept of political orientations – “attitudes to the political system and its different components as well as to one’s self in the political system” (Алмонд, Верба 2014: 28). Acceptable orientations can change if the external objective conditions change, therefore the existing behavior model “remains effective until the objective conditions of the environment supporting it change significantly” (Жирар 1996: 73–74).

In a democratic industrialized country, it is believed that the civic culture (mixed political culture, or the relationships of representatives of different political roles in a certain society or

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P O L I T I C A L PA RT I C I PAT I O N I N NON-DEMOCRACIES (WEAK DEMOCRACIES)

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country) should belong mostly to the participant ideal type of political culture. That is, a significant part of citizens should play the political role of a participant. Here the individual is a representative of all three types of political culture – parochial, subject, participant – and, depending on the circumstances and context, acts according to one and plays a political role (of a parishioner, subject or participant, respectively) (Алмонд, Верба 2014: 18–51).

There are three types of political apathy:

1. Political apathy as rational ignorance and the free rider position. (Бьюкенен 1997: 256–259). The free rider position is a strategy in which the concepts of profit and expenses are of importance. The free rider does not participate while his/her costs of non-participation are less than his/her costs of participation. If conditions change (that is, in a situation of higher costs of nonparticipation than of participation), the person in the position who follows this logic takes measures to begin to participate, but only while conditions hold. In Rosenau’s classification we find this type of political apathy called self-centered citizenship (Жирар 1996: 73– 74). In Durkheim’s classification, it corresponds to altruistic suicide because the individual sees a reason for being beyond politics.

2. Political apathy as boycott or absenteeism. Absenteeism is a boycott position according to which the citizen does not believe that his/her participation or non-participation is able to change something and thus refuses to carry out his/her civic duty.

Absenteeism is a particular manifestation of a person’s political freedom, a sign of protest, and a feeling of predictability and meaninglessness in politics. This type of political apathy is evidence of the illegitimacy of authorities and broadcasts a conflict between citizens’ expectations and real governmental policy, which can be seen as a “time bomb” (Механик 2010: 75–78). For this group with political apathy then the main factor of participation is the potential for real influence on politics. In Rosenau’s classification, this type of political apathy is called alienated apathetic citizenship (Жирар 1996: 73–74). Durkheim’s boycott is a selfish suicide occurring because people see no point in politics.

Rosenau classifies this type as a passive form of apathetic citizenship, which he describes as pure apathy; indifference to politics; rejection of efficiency of joint actions and mistrust in institutions; and the absence of interest in public affairs, and stimulus and/or resources to develop. “Passivity becomes the mode of life due to absence of necessary resources for political activities as well as due to lack of self-confidence” (Жирар 1996: 80). Top-down exclusion, according to Durkheim, is anomic suicide, wherein the individual is disorganized and has no tools to attain feasible goals (Дюркгейм 1897).

The approach to analysis of structural changes in the electorate (Андронава 2016) is centered on the dynamic model method, which allows for explaining the structural shifts that have occurred already as well as their forecasting.

Based upon the activation factors of each type of political apathy, an idealized model was created, premised on the idea that citizens can be conventionally divided according to level of participation into four groups: participants, subjects, parishioners (categories of modified traditional classification of political roles developed by Almond and Powell) (Алмонд, Верба 2014: 26–51), and a group with political apathy.

The ideal types of political culture are distinguished as follows: parochial, subject, and participant. The parochial type is a primitive mode of citizenship – “parishioners” are not involved in politics, hardly understand it, and vote “by inertia” if minimally influenced. The subject type is a traditional mode of citizenship where the population is passively involved in politics, accepting authorities and obeying. “Subjects” obey the law and the government passively but do not participate in active political efforts. The participant type

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3. Political apathy as top-down exclusion. Information inequality in a post-industrial society is reflected in a government’s capacity to limit access to information and the tools of its analysis (e.g., because of political education and ideology). This political apathy results from isolation and lack of information and tools for analysis or powerful top-down control.

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demonstrates the capacity and necessity for the population to participate in politics. “Participants” are citizens actively participating in the political process (Алмонд, Верба 2014: 26–51).

Consequently, the structure of the electorate and its intensity transformations can be rendered as a multidimensional model in the following dimensions: the degree of freedom, the degree of tension in society (which reflects crisis in the economy, politics, and the social sphere), and the degree of mobilization.

The degree of freedom is directly related to the level of development of the civic community because the indicators of political participation – accessibility of the political field to various political actors and individuals, the possibility of participating without being afraid of repressions, freedom of assembly, speech, agitation, meetings, the possibility to have real results, etc. – characterize mature democracies with a developed civic community. If all the above requirements are satisfied, we would consider the degree of freedom sufficient. If at least one is not satisfied, we would consider it insufficient.

We understand crisis as a development stage of a system during which its components can no longer interact due to their internal divergence. The more “failures” there are, the deeper the crisis can be considered.

In this work, mobilization is considered a tool that allows for the engagement of citizens in, and disengagement from, political participation. The more tools are used, the more concentrated they are and the greater the scope and level of mobilization.

This model is dynamic because it provides for movement among the groups studied if the external parameters change.

Setting out different levels of parameters it is possible to model different situations and single out structural shifts in the model (transformation) based on theoretical knowledge (Андронава 2016).

During a study carried out for a previously conducted

STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL PA RT I C I PAT I O N I N B E L A R U S

Belarus, with other post-Soviet countries, had all the preconditions for the development of populism: unorganized, broad and immobilized masses, a lack of political institutions through which the masses could be represented, mistrust in these institutions, general institutional weakness, a lack of democratic tradition, and difficult economic situation with a nascent national identity and apathetic political culture (Шуленкова 2009).

Iryna Shuliankova views, correctly it seems, the case of Belarus as “classic populism”. Populism is a political strategy for a charismatic leader avoiding political institutions typical for democratic systems and in which he appeals to the “people” directly.

Another understanding of populism is “emphasis on the slogans and promises unrealistic but popular in a certain situation to attain certain political objectives” (Малько 1994). Foremost, it is a means to win over broad masses by appealing to their mood, needs, and problems.

Regarding Belarusian political institutions, the notion of incapable political parties is extremely important to the populist to resurrect it in the minds of the electorate. The populist uses certain psychological “links” of the masses: complicated issue – people’s needs and expectations – pompous slogan and simple solution– establishment of national political institutions – certain officials guilty of failure – greater decline of confidence in institutions and even greater attraction to a strong leader.

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unpublished work, it became obvious that the political crisis has a limit when the underperformance of government institutions results in paralysis of the system, including the paralysis of the judiciary and law enforcement. In this situation, freedom turns into lawlessness extending beyond the limits defining the concept of freedom, and the model becomes deformed and ceases to function as presented.

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This is an endless cycle in which “failure to resolve day-to-day issues is used to achieve status as a fighter for people’s interests” (Баранов 2011: 84–92).

The greatest problem with this political situation is that it is perceived as a fact of life, and thus the problems related to the narrowness of the public field and lack of leverage with authorities are not considered by the people to be problems requiring immediate resolution. Elections in Belarus, like in other authoritarian countries, do not perform the function of recruitment or determination of policies but they are important to legitimate retention of power.

The image of civil activist requires special analysis in the Belarusian situation. In the official rhetoric, political activists are discredited. They are smeared and connected to different negative images, their actions are presented as the actions of disruptors, “enemy agents”, external enemies, and just “a bad lot” (БелТА 2014). Political apathy is also made equivalent to “subversion” (Мартинович 2011).

The reason for the aggressive stance is that the populist works with the masses. The elector most convenient to him/her is the average human being – “it is the human being as much as s/ he does not differ from the other and mirrors the common type” (Ортега-и-Гассет 1930). A paradox has occurred in the case of Belarus, where the “new masses” have given way to the “similarity of the old masses” which do not produce ideas but support the leader’s ideas.

The negative image of a political activist, the prescribed model of an “ideal citizen” participating as much as requested, and the ideology supporting the system result in the fact that existing forms of political activities either correspond to the official line completely and are sanctioned by it or are terminated with by any means necessary, often violent. In other words, the autonomous type of participation in such a system either conforms or is terminated, which creates the preconditions for a boycott position, and mobilization is used by the authorities to legitimize the official line. Given this, political apathy can be masked as quasi-

As Alexander Malko writes, “today, electors and the public at large obtain information about the policy line and political information on the basis of the political leader’s assurances and oaths. Primary information flows barely remain available to most citizens. The information vacuum is only for the benefit of populism, to ‘carry water for it’. Democracy is not only pluralism but also critical awareness of the people who can make decisions consciously only in these conditions” (Малько 1994: 111).

According to IISEPS (НИСЭПИ 2015) data, the main motive to participate in the 2015 presidential election in Belarus was traditional, reflecting obligation. This response is reflected in 31.7% of the population. An important aspect is that “from the psychological point of view, transition from agreement to trust amounts to the generalization of the person’s position, which changes the motivation structure” (НИСЭПИ 1999; 84).

In total, the rational motives such as “I aspired for changes”, “I wished to preserve the current state of affairs”, “I liked the candidate’s programme”, and “I am inspired by the political party” account for 27.3%.

The irrational “my friends and family voted, so I voted as well” accounted for 6%. In addition, around 4% noted the influence of administrative leverage: “my employer (management at the place of my studies) requested” and “I received a reward (for the employer or at the place of my studies)”. Around 2% selected “other” or “I don’t know” (НИСЭПИ 2015). It means that we can state that approximately 12% of citizens are parishioners and demonstrate quasi-participation.

In total, according to the IISEPS’s data (НИСЭПИ 2015) 71% of Belarusian citizens participated in the election.

In terms of underlying reasons for abstention from voting, 7.7% of respondents said that “the voting will not change Belarus,

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participation existing in a combination of model parameters (the degrees of freedom, mobilization, and crisis).

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therefore I have not voted”, 7.3% responded, “I was not impressed by any of the candidates”, and 4% selected the following response: “I decided to protest (boycott)”. Each variant provides evidence that the boycott of the election was deliberate and well-considered, though for different reasons (mistrust / lack of a candidate / desire to protest) (НИСЭПИ 2015). In total, relative to population size, the percentage of boycotters was around 17% 1 . It is important to stress that under democracy citizens should be able to participate as well as boycott elections (Ровдо 2015), however the success rate of a boycott strategy is very low (Силицкий 2001) and a significant effect can be achieved in the case of a strong, consolidated opposition having significant electoral support (Frankel 2010).

More generally, around 8% (НИСЭПИ 2015) are “free riders” (responses including “I was too busy” and “I forgot”). Parishioners who did not demonstrate quasi-participation and appeared in the “excluded top down” group amount to approximately 2% (НИСЭПИ 2015) (responses including “none of the people I know voted, therefore I didn’t vote as well”, “other”).

An analysis of opinion polls allows for the belief that political passivity and the tendency to “appease” are uniformly distributed throughout society. Differences are only shown in the population of Minsk and among citizens with higher education, however the first group is also the main “supplier” of “free riders” (which can be seen from the correlation of the percentage of people planning to vote and of people advocating boycott) (НИСЭПИ 2015).

Somewhat more “free riders” are in the groups with secondary education and with vocational education (around 12%) as well as in large cities (around 16%). In the other groups, free riders amount to approximately 10% except for the older demographic group (60 years and older) (НИСЭПИ 2015). It is of interest that according to the same data some supporting boycott intended to vote, while at the same time support for boycott is high in small towns and in rural areas (15–20%) which, nevertheless, are ready to demonstrate a high turnout (about 80%) (НИСЭПИ 2015).

1 While a respondent could select several answer options in the poll, the total percentage of all motives of participation/non-participation equals 110.5%. To determine, therefore, the percentage of the population (100%), it is necessary to divide the percent corresponding to the motive by 1.105, or in this case (7.7 + 7.3 + 4)/ 1.105 = 17.19…

According to the statistics above, around 28% of Belarusian citizens demonstrate political apathy today. Taking into consideration quasi-participation and use of administrative leverage as well as the problems that can follow at the workplace or at university in case of abstention from elections, a significant part of the “parishioners” will shift to the group of the “excluded top down” in the case of mobilization decrease and a significant part of the group of the “subjects” will shift to boycotter in case of crisis deterioration with the same degree of freedom. In addition, if the crisis deteriorates the group of “free riders” will in part shift to the group of “participants”. If the degree of freedom increases, the group of boycotters will shift to the group of “participants”.

According to statistics (2015) today’s structure of political participation in Belarus looks as follows: “subjects” – 31.7%, “participants” – 27.3%, “parishioners” – 12 %, “free riders” – 10%, “boycotters” – 17%, and “excluded top down” – 2%.

In systems like Belarus’s, socio-economic and political issues exist side by side because the political sphere is much smaller than the social sphere in society and socio-economic protests are perceived as more “safe”. Consequently, if a large group of citizens is unhappy about a problem represented in the socio-economic rhetoric, the protest has a higher support potential than that within the political discourse. In 2017, Belarus witnessed events which allow for testing the hypothesis and to analyze how political apathy changes and is reflected in these conditions (for example “social parasites” tax on the under-employed). Separately, we intend to determine transformations in electoral behavior that occur if the discourse changes from socio-economic to political.

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CONCLUSION

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1. Алмонд Г., Верба С. (2014) Гражданская культура: политические установки и демократия в пяти странах, Москва: Мысль.

2. Андронава Е. (2016) Трансформации политического участия в Украине в условиях кризиса (2013–2015) Вильнюс: ЕГУ.

3. Баранов Н. А. (2011) Популизм как фактор политической экстраординарности (на примере Республики Беларусь), Экстраординарность, случайность и протест в политике: тематическое и методологическое поле сравнительных исследований, Краснодар: Кубанский гос. ун-т.

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11. НИСЭПИ (1999) Молодежь и гражданское общество: белoрусский вариант, Минск: Изд-во В. М. Скакун 12. НИСЭПИ (2015) Голосование по обязанности и в надежде на перемены. Available at: http://www.iiseps.org/?p=3872 (access date: 3 March 2016).

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X A O E O

T E R N A L R E N T S , C R O E C O N O M I C P U L I S M , A N D G I M E S U R V I V A L I N N T E M P O R A R Y B E L A R U S

Aliaksandr Autushka-Sikorski graduated from the European Humanities University (Vilnius, Lithuania) in 2011 with a Bachelor degree in Political Science and European Studies.

He received his MA in Political Science from Central European University (Budapest, Hungary) and a second MA in Public Policy from European Humanities University. Aliaksandr currently works as an analyst at the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies.

Abstract. This paper takes a look at the basic economic conditions that are crucial for the increase of protest attitudes and the possible democratization of the authoritarian regime in contemporary Belarus. The paper analyzes economic policies of Belarus that have led to the establishment of the social contract between the state and society in Belarus as well as sources that are used to finance these policies. Based on findings, a model to estimate possible outcomes of potential change of economic policies (in case of economic crisis) is built.

The results of the model simulation show that ceteris paribus economic crisis has a limited impact on the increase of protest attitudes and possible democratization of the authoritarian regime. However, in the case of deep economic crisis few strategies may be used for the further democratization of the regime or its replacement. A result of the model simulations is that these strategies are formulated to be used by the political opposition in Belarus.

Keywords: macroeconomic populism, economic crisis, social contract, transformation of authoritarian regimes.

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ALIAKSANDR AUTUSHKA-SIKORSKI EXTERNAL RENTS, MACROECONOMIC POPULISM, AND REGIME SURVIVAL IN CONTEMPORARY BELARUS

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INTRODUCTION

Since 1991, the quasi-socialist model of the economy that is largely implicit in the expansionist model of accelerating economic growth, administrative price regulation, the rejection of broad privatization, and the introduction of many social programs to ensure the internal legitimacy of the regime remains largely unreformed in Belarus. In fundamental economic works this type of economic policy has been called “macroeconomic populism”, and in most countries (primarily in Latin America) where it was applied the “lifetime” of such a policy usually did not exceed 5 years due to rapid accumulation of internal imbalances and macroeconomic instability.

In Belarus, however, macroeconomic populism has been successfully applied for more than 20 years. The possibility of its maintenance is determined primarily by energy subsidies from Russia, as well as many loopholes that allow the Belarusian authorities to receive non-economic profits. This type of maintaining macroeconomic stability and ensuring economic growth is inherent in rentier states.

At the same time, the imbalances intrinsic to the economy of the rentier state and the use of macroeconomic populism have led to macroeconomic instability, the financial crisis of 2011, and the economic crisis of 2015 in Belarus. The consequences of the crises grossly violated the main principles of the “social contract” between the state and society in Belarus, and established numerous disproportions impeding the restoration of the status quo of the social contract in the short term.

In this regard, our research interest is aimed at the analysis of possible initial economic conditions, which in the long term may lead to an increase in protest activities and pressure on the government with a view to democratizing the political regime.

The research part of this work uses a simulation model based on game theory. The main papers that serve as the theoretical basis for this work include the theory of macroeconomic populism, in particular the work of Rudiger Dornbusch – “Macroeconomic

ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF BELARUS: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE POLITICAL REGIME

The specifics of economic policies in Belarus can be explained with the concept of macroeconomic populism, which is understood as a set of expansionary economic measures aimed at increasing the growth rates of a particular state while ignoring the negative consequences of these measures: rising inflation and external debt, instability in domestic markets, etc. Macroeconomic populism was applied by the authorities of Argentina (Dornbush, Edwards 1989), Chile, Peru, and Brazil (De Castro, Ronci 1989), countries of the Middle East (Farzageran 1997), and the authorities of several post-socialist countries (Auslund 2005).

The set of measures applied in the framework of macroeconomic populism as a whole most often differs for all countries that apply it. However, for all countries that apply macroeconomic populism the main “rule” of macroeconomic growth remains: the redistributive policy of increasing the incomes of the population while ignoring negative economic consequences.

The coming to power of Alexander Lukashenko marked the curtailment of restrained attempts to reform the Belarusian economy undertaken in the early 1990s and the preservation of the Soviet quasi-socialist model of the economy, primarily oriented toward state regulation. The folding of market reforms was characterized by a return to a state-centered management of the economy based on “five-year plans”, a lack of stimulation of entrepreneurship, the renationalization of banks, and a transition to stimulating the

21 ALIAKSANDR AUTUSHKA-SIKORSKI EXTERNAL RENTS, MACROECONOMIC POPULISM, AND REGIME SURVIVAL IN CONTEMPORARY BELARUS

populism in Latin America” (Dornbush, Edwards 1989). The theory of the political business cycle uses the work of William Nordhaus (Nordhaus 1990). Modeling the baseline conditions necessary for the growth of protest activities is informed by the work of James Davies (Davies 1962), Daron Acemoglu, and James Robinson (Acemoglu, Robinson 2005). Analytical reports of IPM Research Center and statistics provided by the World Bank databank are used throughout this paper.

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economy through the expansion of the money supply in line with a policy of macroeconomic populism. Despite significant inflation, macroeconomic instability and, devaluation, from 1996 to 2011 the growth rate of the Belarusian economy was quite high – in the range of 3-11%. A sharp decline in GDP growth rates occurred only in 2009, when the Belarusian economy grew by only 0.2% because of the impact of the global economic crisis.

Such economic results were achieved through expansionary monetary policy aimed at subsidizing state-owned enterprises, financing low-performing agricultural sector, and increasing the volume of housing construction. Similarly, owing to the continued production and release of the Belarusian ruble, there was a significant increase in wages. Wage growth in Belarus for many years outpaced the growth of labor productivity. (Крук, Пелипась, Чубрик 2006: 6) If in 1996 the average wage in Belarus was about $100 per month, by the end of 2010 this figure was brought to $500.

Practice shows that macroeconomic populism in the long term is an unstable policy: eventually the accumulation of internal and external imbalances leads to budget deficit, hyperinflation, and significant external debt. For example, macroeconomic populism in Chile “held out” for three years; the life span of macro-populism in Peru was about 5 years. In Belarus, however, the macroeconomic populism policy in Belarus has been stable for almost 20 years.

The source of stability of macroeconomic populism in Belarus is the attraction of significant profits from non-economic activities. Among the directions of “filling” the Belarusian budget at the expense of external rents the most significant are Russian oil and gas rent, the cost of which in Belarus in different years was subsidized at anywhere from 10% to 20% of GDP; trade asymmetries within the supply of goods across the BelarusianRussian border (Pikulik 2010); external borrowings, including debt cancellations by Russia; the ability to pay for oil and gas (and other) supplies from Russia through barter schemes (Rawi 2004; Balmaceda 2006); smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol and sugar; and the sale of weapons (Pikulik 2010).

The policy of macroeconomic populism in Belarus has been used to ensure broad support for President Alexander Lukashenko by the Belarusian population. The use of a redistributive incomeraising policy, broad welfare programs, and the provision of a high level of employment has made it possible to form a “social contract” in Belarus between the state and society. The essence of the social contract in Belarus has been to “exchange” political loyalty of most of the population for guarantees of a small, slowly growing, yet stable level of income and employment security (Гайдук 2009).

In addition, the electoral calendar in Belarus followed the logic of the political business cycle (Nordhaus 1975) in which important economic indicators – primarily real wage growth rates – were raised before the presidential and parliamentary elections (Крук, Пелипась, Чубрик 2006). The use of the political business cycle by the Belarusian authorities has become an important predictor of broad support for the candidacy of Alexander Lukashenko in presidential elections (Автушко-Сикорский 2012).

The social contract between the state and society in Belarus, despite its seeming stability, has been broken three times. At root, the reason for infringement was economic instability caused by the accumulation of imbalances inherent in the economy operating within the logic of macroeconomic populism. Violations of the social contract by the state occurred in 2009 and 2011 (devaluation of the Belarusian ruble, financial crisis and then another devaluation).

The third time the social contract was violated was in 2015 after the economic crisis began in Belarus.

The economic problems of 2011 and 2015 caused massive protests in Belarus and were accompanied by a significant drop in the electoral rating of President Alexander Lukashenko. Even though riot police easily suppressed the protests, they showed that in cases when the authorities violate the social contract, the

23 ALIAKSANDR AUTUSHKA-SIKORSKI EXTERNAL RENTS, MACROECONOMIC POPULISM, AND REGIME SURVIVAL IN CONTEMPORARY BELARUS

P O L I T I C A L R AT I O N A L I T Y O F MACROECONOMIC POPULISM POLICIES IN BELARUS: INCOME POLICY AND SUPPORT TO THE R E G I M E B Y T H E P O P U L AT I O N

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population (at least a significant part of it) is ready to stop supporting the Belarusian authorities. Given that the basis of the social contract in Belarus is the economic and social benefits provided to the population, the question arises: what kind of economic conditions in the future can lead to an increase in social tension and an increase in protest activity which seeks to democratize the regime?

In fact, the situation that has developed following the violation of the social contract in Belarus can be described by the Davies curve, illustrating a proposed condition of the emergence of socio-political crisis and revolution (see graph below).

Graph 1. Davies curve (Davies 1962: 6)

According to Davies, “revolutions in authoritarian regimes do not arise with the continued preservation of a low standard of living in an authoritarian state, but when a long period of economic and social development is replaced by a sharp and short period of decline in the well-being of citizens <...> when citizens’ expectations for economic growth are replaced by frustration from awareness current reality” (Ibid).

According to Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (Acemoglu, Robinson 2005), the most likely situation for revolution is economic crisis in which the decisions of the authorities cannot be credible anymore. The immediate cause for revolution is not the economic crisis itself, but a secondary shock following the economic

The Davies curve concept and the theory of revolution preconditions by Acemoglu and Robinson seem to be relevant to the current socio-political situation in Belarus as the government’s decisions following economic crises has never been credible; instead of communicating to society a solid and confident economic policy to overcome the consequences of the crises and ensure economic growth, Belarusian authorities blamed external actors and forces, internal enemies, and even society itself for the economic crisis. The latest tax invented by Belarusian government, the “social parasite tax”, has in fact clearly shown that authorities are ready to impose additional tax burdens to finance the budget deficit even if this burden seems to be unjustified and worsens the economic conditions of low-income citizens.

Following an economic crisis, depending on the situation, the authoritarian regime may choose one of three strategies: redistribution (“bribery” of the population), repression, or democratization, which is necessary to increase the credibility of the regime and dampen protest moods. The “crossroads” of choice are formed depending on the ratio of costs and benefits as follows.

Acemoglu and Robinson’s model presupposes the existence of elites (“rich” citizens) and citizens with medium and low income (“poor” citizens). Let μ be some of the resources that become unavailable to citizens after the revolution, while the remaining part of the resources can be distributed as a public good. Then μ* will denote some critical “cost” of the revolution, after which the balance of resources available for common use is less than the amount of resources that citizens have before the revolution. The variable μ^ will indicate the number of benefits that citizens have before the revolution.

In this case, θ will denote the total amount of resources that elites have. Elites here can be represented simply by “rich citizens” and officials in power (incumbents). If θ > ρ, where ρ is the amount of resources that the poor have, it is a model of exclusive authoritarianism aimed at supporting “loyal groups”, as opposed to

25 ALIAKSANDR AUTUSHKA-SIKORSKI EXTERNAL RENTS, MACROECONOMIC POPULISM, AND REGIME SURVIVAL IN CONTEMPORARY BELARUS

crisis (the second “fraud’ on the part of the authorities), or the growing level of inequality between the poor and the rich.

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an inclusive model of authoritarianism based on the inclusion of broad masses in the policy of redistribution of wealth. Since almost always the nominal number of citizens in the “rich” and “poor” groups is unequal the number of “rich” individuals will be denoted by the variable δ.

However, in any situation, the elite does not remain outside observers, but rather has the means to influence the behavior and incentives of the broad masses. Thus, to reduce the level of social tension due to dissatisfaction with the level of resources available to poor citizens, authorities can offer more resources. This implies a policy of redistribution and a reduction in the amount of resources that the “rich” have in favor of the “poor”. In this situation, the poor will receive the amount of resources equal to: (1.1) μ’ = θ – ρ(τρ (θ – δ) – (1– δ)C(τρ) ; where τρ is the level of the tax paid by the poor, and C(τρ) is that part of the budget that is formed from taxes collected from the poor.

Then:

If θ ≤ μ, elites remain in power without the need for a policy of redistribution or democratization. This is due to the lack of social tension due to discontent with the unequal allocation of resources between the poor and the rich.

If θ > μ, the potential for revolution is limited. In this case, if for the value μ* the condition μ* = (1.1), then 2.1) If μ > μ*, elites do not democratize and set a tax in the amount of τp to redistribute the level of benefits sufficient to reduce protest moods. This is because the costs of revolution are greater than the level of resources that citizens receive through tax cuts.

If μ < μ*, and the inequality μ ≥ (1.1) holds,

If μ < μ*, and the inequality μ ≥ (1.1) does not hold, a revolution occurs. This is because citizens benefit more in the process of the revolution than they do when the level of taxes is lower.

Considering the possible directions of the vectors of the motion of the variables θ, τp, C(τp), ρ and the interconnectedness of the direction of the vectors, we model the distribution of the µ’ values with allowance for the change in the variables of the model (1.1).

Graph 2. Probability of µ’ to meet certain value. All variables in equation (1.1) were randomized in [0; 1] interval.

As can be seen from the distribution of model results, the number of cases in which we have µ’– and, therefore, the policy of redistribution does not yield results (conditions 2.2 and 2.3. above) and the regime democratizes or a revolution occurs – is very small. This shows the sustainability of the policy of redistribution in

27 ALIAKSANDR AUTUSHKA-SIKORSKI EXTERNAL RENTS, MACROECONOMIC POPULISM, AND REGIME SURVIVAL IN CONTEMPORARY BELARUS

Then any redistribution of benefits is unimportant for citizens, and to prevent a revolution authorities democratize. Citizens lose less (or as much) than they can receive after redistributing part of their exclusive goods in their favor, plus retaining part of their own previous resources (in other words, they receive benefits equal to (θ + μ^ - μ)).

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authoritarian regimes within the framework of the model described above.

In what kind of cases does the situation of a low µ’ (when authorities tend to democratize if revolution occurs) appear?

Coming back to the equation (1.1) it happens when the following conditions are met:

• τρ – tax paid by poor – is high,

• C(τρ) - that part of the budget that is formed from taxes collected from the poor – is high or

• θ (amount of resources owned by rich) is much higher than ρ (amount of resources owned by poor) while δ (amount of rich) is very small.

The results of the simulation testify to the fact that ceteris paribus the probability of the emergence of a situation in which the regime moves towards democratization or revolution is possible is limited to cases when:

• there is a serious economic crisis (in which the redistribution of resources is impossible) and there is a collapse in income,

• authorities impose a high level of taxes on poor citizens, or when the burden of indirect taxation (for example, costs of public services) significantly increases or

• there is a case of a significant increase in income inequality between rich and poor.

CONCLUSION

Looking at the model above we can conclude that ceteris paribus the most appropriate strategy for opposition political forces in Belarus can be either an emphasis on income inequality between ordinary citizens and “elites” (officials, police, etc.), or a significant “expectations management” which will include, first, the promotion of the idea that without the democratization of the regime or its replacement economic problems will only grow. Otherwise, owing to the high level of stability of political regime through implementation of preemptive authoritarian practices and the flow of external rents from Russia, the political situation in Belarus leaves no forum for internal political forces outside of the current political regime.

1. Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2005) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press.

2. Auslund, A. (2005) The economic policy of Ukraine after Orange Revolution. Eurasian Geography and Economy, 46, No.5, pp. 327353.

3. Davies, J. (1962) Towardы a Theory of Revolution. American Sociological Review. Vol. 27, no.1. P.6 4. Dornbush, R., Edwards, S. (1989) Macroeconomic populism in Latin America. National bureau of economic development. Working paper No. 2986.

5. Nordhaus, W. (1975) The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42, 169–90.

6. De Castro, P.R., Ronci, M. (1989) Sixty years of populism in Brasilia. NBER working paper.

7. Farzageran, M.R. (1997) Macroeconomic populism in Iran. DUT working paper.

8. Pikulik, A. (2010) Comparative Pathways of Belarus and Ukraine (1991-2007). PhD thesis. Department of Political and Social Sciences of European University Institute. P.172.

9. Автушко-Сикорский, А. (2012) Политико-деловой цикл, или политическая экономия доверия президенту. Белорусский институт стратегических исследований. http://belinstitute.eu/ images/doc-pdf/sa_04_2012_ru.pdf 10. Крук Д., Пелипась И., Чубрик А. (2006) Основные макроэкономические взаимосвязи в экономике Беларуси: результаты эконометрического моделирования. Минск, Исследовательский центр ИПМ.

29 ALIAKSANDR AUTUSHKA-SIKORSKI EXTERNAL RENTS, MACROECONOMIC POPULISM, AND REGIME SURVIVAL IN CONTEMPORARY BELARUS

LIST OF REFERENCES

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11. Социальные контракты в современной Беларуси. Под ред. К. Гайдука, Е. Раковой, В. Силицкого. (2009) СПб.: Невский простор.

B : , O

S E R V A T I O N A N A L Y S I S S U B S T A N C E , N S

Aliena Zhebryk is a graduate of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Political science and European studiesâ&#x20AC;? BA programme at the European Humanities University. She graduated from the Belarusian State Economics University with a focus on economic cybernetics (Belarus). The scope of her academic interest includes election observation and participation of civil society in public affairs. She is employed as an analyst at a Belarusian IT company in Minsk.

Abstract. The article conducts genealogic analysis of key periods of the establishment and development of the institution of election observation in Belarus, in particular the evolution of approaches to determining its essential character. The article provides an overview of the current configuration of election observation, determines active entities (partisan, civic, and progovernment observers), and covers their tasks and objectives.

The data for the study were obtained in interviews with experts and observation campaign leaders as well as through analysis of secondary data. From the interviews conducted it was possible to collect information that is unavailable publicly and to be able to see the big picture of the operation of election observation institutions. It is possible to conclude that election observation in Belarus is polyfunctional. At the same time, it was determined that each observation entity completes its own objectives and performs relative functions depending on the type of observation being conducted. Despite significant differences in approaches to observation by partisan and civic representatives participating in the process, at the polling stations they act more as allies in the context of the scale of procedural violations by the authorities. At the same time, pro-government observation is increasingly used to legitimise the results of elections, in part through the discrediting of work done by independent observers.

Keywords: Belarus, election observation, voting, political participation, nondemocratic regime, partisan observation, civic observation.

31 ALIENA ZHEBRYK ELECTION OBSERVATION IN BELARUS: ANALYSIS OF GENESIS, SUBSTANCE, AND FUNCTIONS

E L E C T I O N O I N B E L A R U S O F G E N E S I S A N D F U N C T I

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INTRODUCTION

Belarus is the only European country in which the head of state has remained in power for more than twenty years (since 1994). This, even though the head of state is elected by the people directly on the basis of universal, free, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot, according to the Constitution. At the same time, according to reports made by the international community and relevant rating agencies (e.g., Freedom House), for most part of this period Belarus has been regarded as a not free and nondemocratic (Freedom 2017) country in which basic political and civil rights are absent or systematically violated. In this context, the institution of election observation takes on particular importance because it is a tool to assess the legality and legitimacy of electoral processes and their results.

In transitional political regimes, election observation as an institution acquires additional functions. Specifically, it is not limited to the procedural recording of electoral violations but is also a political mobilisation tool. On the one hand, it assists the authorities in mobilising its adherents for a mostly formal â&#x20AC;&#x153;proofâ&#x20AC;? of election compliance with all the standards and confirmation of the candidates being elected (re-elected most often) at that time. On the other hand, it enables the opposition to mobilise its partisans and citizens who are prepared to observe the election from the point of view of its correspondence to that national legislation as well as to resist the recording of obvious violations that can affect the recognition of the election result (or at least articulate violations publicly).

Election observation permits citizens to independently assess established national electoral practices. As the experience of transitional regimes demonstrates, national organisations and coalitions created for election observation can, in due course, become the foundation for democracy promotion using alternative methods (e.g., to monitor government efficiency, fight against corruption, advocacy, civic education, etc.). In other words, national civic election observation in new democracies or transitional regimes can provide for technical improvement of the electoral

Taking these factors into consideration, the article intends to examine the establishment of the institution of election observation in Belarus, trace the evolutions of approaches to determining its nature while laying out the functions of the institution. The study data were obtained from interviews with experts and leaders of observation campaigns as well as from the analysis of secondary data.

S TA G E S A N D S U B S TA N C E O F E S TA B L I S H M E N T O F T H E INSTITUTION OF ELECTION O B S E RVAT I O N I N B E L A R U S

In the establishment of the institution of national election observation in Belarus one can talk about the following development stages as well as their main characteristics according to objectives, observation entities, and their relationships:

Stage 1: 1994-2000 – election observation in Belarus was mostly partisan.

Stage 2: 2000-2003 – civic election observation, along with partisan observation, emerges and forms.

Stage 3: 2004-2006 – institution of election observation evidences a split between partisan and civic observation and pressure by authorities on independent observers increases (criminal cases and activist arrests).

Stage 4: 2006-today – large-scale pro-government observation emerges in addition to partisan and independent observation.

As Silitski mentioned, in the early-mid 2000s Belarusian activists intended to follow “best practices” which resulted in the

33 ALIENA ZHEBRYK ELECTION OBSERVATION IN BELARUS: ANALYSIS OF GENESIS, SUBSTANCE, AND FUNCTIONS

process while stimulating the development and consolidation of the civic community and democratisation processes. Conversely, it may assist authorities in creating the appearance of active citizens and organisations and thus assist in the stabilisation of authoritarian institutions.

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fall of nondemocratic regimes in other countries. In particular, he example of Yugoslavia was useful when official voting results differed from the results of independent observation which resulted in mass protests that led to the fall of Milošević’s regime (Silitski 2003). The example of Ukraine was useful as well where in 2004 information about election fraud was one of the catalysts of protests during the Orange Revolution.

However, election observation as an element of defending the results of an election works when the country is moving towards democracy: society has the proper frame of mind, the civic community has a broad network of institutions, and the pro- government elite feels fatigue and fear of opposition forces. In Belarus, nothing of the kind is happening. The authoritarian regime is not liberalising but, on the contrary, consolidating using more and more complicated tactics, including pressure on the civic community in general and on election observers in particular. Consequently, election observation in Belarus could not and still cannot deliver results like those seen in Yugoslavia.

E S TA B L I S H M E N T O F T H E INSTITUTION OF ELECTION O B S E RVAT I O N I N B E L A R U S I N 1 9 9 4 2000: CONCEPTS OF ACTIVE AND PA S S I V E O B S E RVAT I O N

Upon declaring independence in Belarus and other countries of the former Soviet Bloc, partisan observation was established and employed when observers – members of political parties – were directly involved in the work of election committees.

Specifically, they were able to participate in vote counting. At first, observers were mostly activists related to the Belarusian Popular Front Party who were not organised in a certain single observation system. The year 2000 was the formal end of the stage when the new Electoral Code of the Republic of Belarus came into effect, limiting the powers of election observers (including their ability to participate in vote counting).

It is at that time when, in addition to party officials, civic

Despite attempts by the organisations to act as a coalition during the observation campaign, joint actions were not always successful. For example, the Belarusian Helsinki Committee stood alone to a certain degree and implemented its own observation campaign in addition to participation in the joint campaign (Булгакаў 2006: 312).

This division among civic organisations continued in 2001 when other entities appeared declaring their intention to carry out independent observation of the presidential election publicly (e.g., Association of Civic Unions Assembly with Alies Bialiatski as its head). Numerous organisations that were members of the Assembly, including Frantsishak Skaryna Belarusian Language Society (BLS), Belarusian Students’ Association, the Human Rights Centre Viasna, and Legal Aid to People and Centre of Human Rights, articulated their intention to participate in election observation as well. In attempting to prevent the establishing of parallel entities of independent civic observation, the CCC initiated negotiations with the Assembly to create a single system of independent civic election observation called the Civic Initiative “Independent Observation” (Булгакаў 2006: 313).

The heads of the Initiative were the actual head of the CCC Myechyslaw Hryb and the head of the Assembly and Viasna Alies Bialiatski. The Independent Observation Initiative declared

35 ALIENA ZHEBRYK ELECTION OBSERVATION IN BELARUS: ANALYSIS OF GENESIS, SUBSTANCE, AND FUNCTIONS

activists began to demonstrate interest in election observation. In particular, the first national systemic election observation campaign was organised and carried out for election of the deputies of the 2nd House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus (15 October 2000). The campaign organisers were two civic entities – the Central Coordination Council (CCC), established in the autumn of 1999 and the Human Rights Centre Viasna. The CCC included several organisations: the Belarusian Helsinki Committee (BHC), the Belarusian National Club of Voters, the Belarusian Free Trade Union, Lev Sapieha Foundation, the Belarusian Women’s Information and Coordination Centre, the Belarusian Initiative Centre, and the organising committee of the Free and Democratic Elections movement (Булгакаў 2006: 312).

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the following as its objectives: to establish a viable network of independent non-partisan election observation throughout the country, to ensure openness, public exposure, and transparency of the election process, and communicating actual voting results to the Belarusian and international civic communities.

Regarding the substance and functions of election observation over the period mentioned, it is possible to talk about two competing civic-observation concepts from among which the Belarusian civic activists endeavored to make their choice. One of those is “passive observation” based on the idea that the observer is not an immediate participant of the election process – that s/ he is not entitled to interfere with elections. As a result, the main objective of the observer was to register procedural violations. The adherents of the approach stressed their equidistance from the authorities as well as from opposition entities. This approach to election observation was wholly in agreement with the approach of observers sent through international organisations (the OSCE, in particular) whose activities are limited, as a rule, to registration of violations exclusively. On the basis of violations detected, conclusions are made concerning the democratic nature of the election process which can theoretically influence the legitimacy of the candidates elected. Such “passive observation” corresponds to the description of the CCC’s activities to a significant extent.

Another concept – “active observation” – was based on more active engagement of observers in the election process.

It was believed that they were not only to register violations but also to try to prevent them. This concept was adopted by the Independent Observation campaign. When the adherents of the first approach, speaking about election observation, attempted to avoid associations with any active measures, the adherents of active opposition to falsifications reacted differently. It was obvious even from the symbols of the campaign in which the Independent Observation included the word “control” 1. “Active observers” did not hide their connections to opposition political parties.

1 The official logo of the Independent Observation civic initiative <http://goo.gl/asG1Xf>

At the same time, in the case of Belarus, the importance of differences between both of these two concepts cannot be overstated. In practice, most observers did not go deep into such theoretical aspects. Moreover, in intending to decisively counteract the very idea of independent election observation authorities contributed to levelling the differences and did not permit them to grow into serious organisational cleavages.

DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION O B S E RVAT I O N A N D P R A C T I C E I N 2004-2006: FURTHER DIVISION OF PA RT I S A N A N D C I V I C O B S E RVAT I O N , PRESSURE BY AUTHORITIES

From the mid-2000s, election observation in Belarus continued to function as partisan and civic, in which its overall configuration was determined by a number of internal factors and events. Firstly, following the experience of previous observation campaigns, a civic association â&#x20AC;&#x153;Partnershipâ&#x20AC;? was established.

Its stated goal was the creation of a dedicated broad structure of civic election observation with a significant number of observers at polling stations and their active participation in the election process. Its establishment resulted in discontent among leaders of the Belarusian opposition who aspired to create their own active national (partisan) observation system.

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The Partnership and party leaders declared a roughly similar number of observers whom they were prepared to dispatch to polling stations (3,000) (OSCE/OHDIR 2006: 20). Thus, it is possible to talk about the appearance of a cleavage concerning observation between Belarusian political (partisan) and civic public persons.

Secondly, starting from 2004, pressure on civic-community structures that could observe (they observed previously or had sufficient authority and experience to observe) increased. For instance, in 2003, a criminal case was opened against the BHC (Viasna 2004). The activities of the Partnership collapsed. The initiative was dismantled by the secret services during the 2006 presidential campaign. The leaders of the Partnership were charged with violating part 2, article 193 of the Criminal Code (membership in an unregistered organisation encroaching upon the citizens’ rights) (Вясна 2006) and were given different sentences. (Mikalaj Astreika was sentenced to two years in prison, Tsimafiei Dranchuk up to a year. Enira Branitskaja and Aliaksandr Shalajka were sentenced to half a year in prison.)

Thirdly, in connection with nondemocratic regime consolidation, civic and partisan activists themselves were less confident that observation could influence elections and their results in Belarus.

As a result, the functioning of election observation during the period discussed was marked with struggle and contradictions within the Belarusian pro-democracy community (civic vs. partisan observers’ initiatives) as well as by increased pressure by the authorities on observers. In the context of the latter, the issue of the very capability to organise mass election observation in Belarus arose.

At the same time, another component of the national observation institution – pro-government observers – developed and was strengthened during the period. They were nominated by the Belarusian civic associations and political parties openly loyal to the incumbent authorities (Belaya Rus, Belarusian Republican Youth

C U R R E N T C O N F I G U R AT I O N O F THE INSTITUTION OF ELECTION O B S E RVAT I O N Currently, the institution of election observation in Belarus preserves the previous shapes and divisions of partisan, non-partisan, and pro-government campaigns. At the same time, it is possible to single out active entities as well as their tasks and objectives.

Non-partisan / civic observation

In 2008, the joint campaign of human rights organisations Viasna and the BHC, “Human Rights Defenders for Free Elections”, positioning itself as politically unbiased, began its activities. This initiative operates within the concept of “passive observation”, as confirmed by its stated objectives: election observation and election assessment from the point of view of Belarusian legislation and international standards of free and democratic elections as well as informing the Belarusian public and international community about observation results 2. The number of campaign observers reaches 450 persons (Viasna 2015). Considering the functions, the civic observation campaign monitors and assesses the election process, registering its observations in reports relevant to international organisations, but not recognised by Belarusian authorities.

Partisan observation

In parallel with the Human Rights Advocates for Free Elections, in 2008, the Right to Election partisan observation campaign, adhering to an “active observation” strategy, began its work. The campaign included eight political and civic organisations, including the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF Party), the organising committee of the Belarusian Christian Democracy (BCD) party, the Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Hramada), the Movement for Freedom (MFF) civic campaign “Tell the Truth”, Belarusian Green

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Union (BRYU), Belarusian Women’s Union (BWU), Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus (FTUB), etc.). Their activities are related to legitimising voting results.

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party, the organising committee of the Belarusian Liberal Party of Freedom and Progress (PFP), and the Belarusian Radio and Electronic Industry Workers’ Union (REP) 3. During the electoral campaigns, party members provide up to 1,300 observers (Права выбару 2015).

A substantial difference between non-partisan and partisan observation is that independent observers declare their nonpartisanism and political non-bias. From a formal perspective, the independent observer should not be interested in who wins an election while engaged in monitoring compliance with procedures. Partisan observers are interested in their candidate’s victory and their work involves a significant degree of bias. In practice, at Belarusian polling stations independent and partisan observers act as allies rather than as antagonists. This is related to the scale of procedural violations that make it difficult (if possible, at all) to separate from discrediting a particular political opposition candidate.

AUTHORITIES’ STRUGGLE AGAINST INDEPENDENT O B S E RVAT I O N T H R O U G H E L E C T I O N L E G I T I M I S AT I O N

Belarusian authorities understand the pragmatic significance of election result recognition by the international community. For instance, the head of the Central Commission for Elections and National Referendums (CEC) Lidziya Yarmoshyna openly supported cooperation with the OSCE to ensure financial and economic support of Belarus by international organisations (БелТА 2012). Although major attempts of CEC officials are aimed at cooperation with international observation missions, independent national observers remain under scrutiny as well. While independent (partisan and non-partisan) observation is not widely conducted, non-recognition of election results even concerning procedural issues is considered a potential threat to the country’s external image and internal loyalty. As a result, independent observers and 2 Human Rights Advocates for Free Elections: https://elections2016.spring96.org/be (accessed on 25 July 2017).

3 Right to Elect: http://pvby.org/about/

Mass presence of pro-government observers at polling stations. Pro-government public associations and political parties provide a significant number of observers, which enables the Belarusian authorities to speak about involvement of civil society in the electoral process. At the same time, the results of such observation are not formalised. For instance, in one expert interview attention was given to the fact that, despite having numerous observers of Belaya Rus and the BRYU at the 2010 election (approximately 30,000 and 20,000 observers, respectively), no summary statements were provided by the organisations either in the form of press releases or reports.

Support of election committees’ work. As noted in the reports of independent observation (Вясна 2015), pro-government observers often stand against independent observers, effectively discrediting them. For instance, if an independent observer declares violations or submits requests to the committee, pro-government observers make counter-requests in which they demonstrate the inconsistency of such requests.

Preparation of complaints concerning independent observers to justify their removal from polling stations. At the 2015 presidential election and 2016 parliamentary election, there were documented cases of independent observers’ removal upon the submission of complaints by pro-government observers. With reference to political activists, the Belarusian media reported on the dissemination of recommendations to counter the activities of independent observers. In particular, sample complaints were prepared and disseminated to pro-government observers (Белорусские новости 2015).

In addition to these relatively “complex” non-violent methods of observation and discrediting of observers, different forms of violence were used and continue to be used in Belarus.

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campaigns in Belarus remain the centre of attention for pressure practices by the authorities, causing a “standoff” of independent observers at polling stations. Some of the tactics employed by the government are further described below.

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For instance, prior to the beginning of early voting in the 2001 presidential election, destructions were carried out of civic associations participating in independent observation (in particular, the BHC, the Belarusian National Club of Electors, and Lev Sapieha Foundation). An inspection on the basis of information about “facts of violations in the field of business and taxation”, as a rule, ended with office equipment seizure and sealing of the premises. All observers sent by Viasna were stripped of their accreditation a day prior to the primary voting day. As a result, approximately 2,000 observers were unable to stay at polling stations (Булгакаў 2003: 316). It is possible to provide later examples of immediate pressure. Upon the 2012 parliamentary election, a group of independent observers was held (ЕГУ 2012). In 2015, shortly after the presidential election, the media reported on the summoning of independent observers to the police (Белсат 2015).

It is clear that independent election observation campaigns in Belarus remain at the centre of the authorities’ attention. To discredit them, a variety of violent (symbolic and physical) means are used.

It is obvious that pressure on independent (partisan and civic) observers and their juxtaposition with mass loyal observation are additional tools of the legitimisation of election results.

CONCLUSION

Regarding the timeframe of the establishment and development of the institution of election observation in Belarus, the institution was not strictly regulated prior to passing the Electoral Code in 2000. From the point of view of substance, primary partisan observation concentrated on the support and protection of the interests of a certain candidate or party. In the following stages, national observation campaigns arose with civic organisations participating and these campaigns were charged with active mass involvement and citizen mobilisation.

At the same time, the idea of “passive observation” stood out significantly with its task of registering procedural violations.

Theoretically speaking, civic observers favoured the passive approach and partisan observers and some civic observers

Based upon the analysis conducted, it is possible to conclude that election observation in Belarus is polyfunctional.

At the same time, each observation entity has its objectives and relevant functions depending on which observation type (partisan, civic or pro-government) it follows. At the same time, division into partisan and non-partisan observation in the context of a procedurally complicated nondemocratic regime in Belarus is quite formal in practice. Pro-government observation is then used increasingly actively to legitimise elections results, including by discrediting the work of independent observers.

LIST OF REFERENCES 1. Freedom in the World (2017) Belarus. Available at: https:// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/belarus (access date: 25 July 2017).

2. Сіліцкі, В. (2003) Адкладзеная свабода: посткамуністычны аўтарытарызм у Сербіі і Беларусі. Available at: http://vitalisilitski. org/sites/default/files/Silitski-Adkladzenaja_svaboda.pdf (access date 25 July 2017).

3. Булгакаў, В. (2003) Палітычная гісторыя незалежнай Беларусі. Available at: http://kamunikat.org/usie_knihi. html?pubid=6627 (access date: 25 July 2017).

4. OSCE (2006) OSCE/ODIHR Final Report. Presidential election, 19 March 2006 Republic of Belarus. Available at: http://www.osce. org/odihr/elections/belarus/19395?download=true (access date: 25 July 2017).

5. Вясна (2004) «ТАСИС»: Уголовное дело против БХК повредит отношениям с Евросоюзом. Available at: http:// spring96.org/ru/news/7862 (access date: 25 July 2017).

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favoured the active approach. This divide was one of the reasons for an institutional cleavage between partisan and non-partisan observation.

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6. Вясна (2006) Амерыканскае аддзяленне праваабарончай арганізацыі Amnesty International абвясціла аб правядзенні акцыі міжнароднай падтрымкі арыштаваных актывістаў грамадзянскай ініцыятывы па назіранні за выбарамі “Партнёрства”. Available at: https://spring96.org/ru/news/9836 (access date: 25 July 2017).

7. Вясна (2015) Итоговый аналитический отчет по результатам наблюдения на выборах Президента РБ 11 октября 2015 г. Available at: http://spring96.org/files/misc/ itohovyi-analiticzeskii-otczet-po-rezultatam-nabljudenija-kampaniipravozaszczitniki-za-svobodnye-vybory.pdf (access date: 25 July 2016).

8. Права выбару (2015) Выніковая справаздача 12 кастрычніка 2015 г. Available at: http://pvby.org/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/prava-vybaru-report-n6-bel1.pdf (access date: 25 July 2017).

9. БелТА (2012) Демократия БДИПЧ ОБСЕ – очень хорошо организованная бюрократия. Available at: http://www.belta. by/opinions/view/demokratija-bdipch-obse-ochen-horoshoorganizovannaja-bjurokratija-1808/ (access date: 25 July 2016).

10. Белорусские новости (2015) ПРАВО ВЫБОРА. Государственные идеологи создают свою сеть «наблюдателей». Available at: http://naviny.by/rubrics/ opinion/2015/09/18/ic_articles_410_189786 (access date: 25 July 2016).

11. ЕГУ (2012) Среди задержанных в Беларуси наблюдателей за выборами – студенты, выпускница и преподаватель ЕГУ. Available at: http://www.ehu.lt/ru/news/pokazatj-statjju/ sredi-zaderzhannh-v-belarusi-nabljudatelej-za-vborami--studentvpusknica-i-prepodavatelj-egu- (access date: 25 July 2016).

12. Белсат (2015) Независимых наблюдателей вызывают в милицию. Available at: http://belsat.eu/ru/news/nezalezhnyhnaziralnikau-vyklikayuts-u- militsyyu/ (access date: 25 July 2016).

H E R E L A T I O N S H I P E T W E E N C I V I C R G A N I S A T I O N S A N D T H E T A T E I N B E L A R U S I A N I G H E R E D U C A T I O N O L I C Y : A R E C H A N G E S O S S I B L E ?

Yana Ustsinienka is a graduate of the MA in Public Policy programme at the European Humanities University. She graduated from Francisk Skorina Gomel State University specialising in public administration (Belarus). The scope of her academic interest includes education policy, administration of higher education, and civil society participation in public policy. One of the founders of the Brotherhood of Organizes of Student Self-Governance (BOSS), she works as a project coordinator in Belarusian non-profit organisations aimed at citizen engagement in urban development (Centre of Regional Development “Gomel Democratic Forum”, and International Public Association “Ecoproject Partnership”).

Abstract. This article is dedicated to the analysis of cooperation of state and civic organisations (COs) in higher education policy. The scope of the study was selected because of interest in changes taking place in intersectoral relations prior to and upon Belarus’s accession to the Bologna process. The author has the objective of determining the nature of intersectoral relations and the degree of COs’ engagement in public policy. To that end, the article considers the actors of the higher education field, analyses practices of engagement and interaction between the state and the COs, and assesses and forecasts the architecture of intersectoral dialogue.

The theoretical basis of the study includes works by Alan Fowler, John Keane, and Gabriel A. Almond, who demonstrate the features of civic organisations, engagement and interaction of the civic community and state as well as works of Belarusian experts Uladzimir Dunaeu, Uladzimir Matskievich and Viktar Charnou concerning civic organisations’ functioning and the development of Belarusian higher education. The article is based on an analysis of

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T B O S H P P

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results of expert interviews, polls of representatives of civil society working in the field of higher education as well as case studies, regulations, media materials, web portals of government institutions and statistics publications of 2010–2016.

The conclusion is that governance principles in higher education had not changed prior to and upon Belarus’s accession to the Bologna process. The government makes decisions in a closed, centralised manner according to its ideological narrative.

Current legislation and practices in higher education institutions (HEIs) are unfavourable to COs’ participation in higher education policy. Despite the limitations, these organisations strive to influence the field and use different tools, mostly addressing international institutions and public opinion (via social networks). Engagement and interaction of state and civic organisations under current nondemocratic conditions will depend on many aspects related to the political narrative and situation. A possibility exists that until 2018 the nature of intersectoral relations could change towards greater openness but the degree of COs’ engagement in public policy will likely remain the same.

Keywords: civil society, civic organisations, higher education, higher-education policy, Bologna process.

INTRODUCTION

If public policy in democracy is characterised by participation of various stakeholders, including public associations (PAs) [1], in Belarus it is closed and centralised. At the same time, the change of context and, in particular, the complication of the economic situation forces the Belarusian government to promote changes (or at least imitate their promotion). In the field of higher education, the focus of this article, an “entrepreneurship” of a kind is observed: the attraction of international students and investments, rendering feebased services, and in the political field, inclusion in international education initiatives – the European Higher Education Area (EHEA), in particular. The last of these has attracted the attention of Belarusian public and civic organisations to higher education policy. Thus, in 2011 representatives of the Belarusian third sector

The article examines and analyses the relationships of Belarusian state and civic organisations in 2010-2016 from the commencement of the country’s EHEA accession process. The scope of the study includes the practices of engagement and interaction between the state and civil society prior to and upon Belarus’s accession to the Bologna process (May 2015).

Qualitative partially structured interviews with six experts and civic activists in higher-education policy are employed in the study as is a quantitative poll conducted among the representatives of five organisations (Belarusian Students’ Association (BSA), Youth Human Rights Group “Students’ Council” (SC), Center for Development of Students’ Initiatives (CDSI), Belarusian Independent Bologna Committee (BIBC), and Brotherhood of Organizes of Student Self-Governance (BOSS)). In addition to collected data, media and open source analysis and case studies were used.

The case study method enabled to examine and analyse separate cases of engagement and interaction of civic organisations and the state. To that end, individual campaigns and events carried out by the organisations whose objective had been to influence higher education policy were selected.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ACTORS I N H I G H E R E D U C AT I O N P O L I C Y I N BELARUS

In the context of Belarus, the main actor in higher education policy is the state represented by such bodies as the president, parliament, government, and others. This category can also include state universities as well as coordination and

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and education experts established a specialised organisation, the Belarusian Independent Bologna Committee (BIBC), whose objectives included studying correspondence of the Belarusian higher education to EHEA principles and, upon Belarus’s accession to the Bologna process, monitoring of compliance with the roadmap (ГБК 2015). At the same time, it is necessary to note from the beginning that the issues of higher education are a priority of the Belarusian third sector.

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other councils developing recommendations on issues related to higher education (e.g., National Public Students’ Council under the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Belarus). In a democratic political system, it is believed that civic organisations should be an equal actor in any field of public policy. However, transfer of this norm into the political environment in Belarus results in the division of organisations into two unequal groups. The first one includes governmental non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) characterised by loyalty to the current authorities receiving in exchange the possibility to act in a mode of preferences. The other group includes civic organisations forced out from the field of higher education acting autonomously in opposition to authorities.

In general, current Belarusian legislation and practices at HEIs are unfavourable to civic organisations participating in higher education policy. Thus, in accordance with article 2 of the Education Code of the Republic of Belarus, political parties and civic associations with political objectives are not permitted to be created and operate at educational institutions. In practice, it means that any organisations looking to operate legally must obtain a permit to work at universities.

As a result, only GONGOs are able to establish chapters and operate at higher education institutions. Effectively, the appearance of the presence and activities of civic organisations is created, however de facto these organisations are not independent actors, established as they are indirectly through decisions of government institutions (e.g., Public Association “Belarusian Republican Youth Union” (BRYU), the National Public Students’ Council under the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Belarus (Students’ Council), National Council of Chancellors of Higher Education Institutions (Council of Chancellors)) or operate under conditions of institutional independence when their projects are implemented only upon approval and documentation provided by university administrations (e.g., the Students’ Union of the Belarusian State University Public Association).

In discussions on the main GONGOs operating in the field of higher education in Belarus, the BRYU and public councils

In the opinion of some experts interviewed, the organisations discussed above endanger Belarusian COs: “De facto, government institutions gain certain experience and prepare strategies which, in my opinion, will force civil society to move to the absolute periphery”, one of those interviewed mentions. The reasons for moving out from international dialogue rest not only with the GONGOs but are also reflections of changes in the policy of some foreign organisations that redirect their efforts to work with the GONGOs. At the same time, studying the activities of these organisations one can conclude that they do not intend to participate in the national higher-education policy, limiting themselves only to demonstrating an obligatory loyalty.

Those Belarusian civic organisations autonomous from the state and HEI administrations striving to represent civic interests in the public sphere make efforts to participate in resolving issues in the field of education. In this study, the following organisations were selected for review: BIBC, BSA, SC, CDSI, and BOSS. As the analysis demonstrates, the main areas of work of the above COs are education, rights and interest advocacy of target groups, assistance in self-organisation, offer of internships, participation in CO operation as volunteers as well as through assisting in employment. The majority of these organisations have worked for 4-5 years, have members (from 15 to 75 persons), and are staffed by volunteers (5 to 100 persons). Only one of these organisations has paid staff. To carry out objectives related to higher education policy, Belarusian COs use various tools, including sending official correspondence; in-person visits; holding of and participation

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(Council of Chancellors, Students’ Council, etc.) should be included.

According to the National Statistics Committee of the Republic of Belarus, the BRYU had 466,903 members as of 2014, and the organisation was represented by 12,063 chapters throughout the country (including chapters in all HEIs in the country) (Медведева 2015). Student councils were established and operate on the basis of regulations approved by representatives of HEI administrations or by the Ministry of Education; the Council of Chancellors operates on the basis of presidential decree (Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus No. 71 of 08/02/2001).

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in public events and campaigns; preparation of alternative reports for international organisations and making use of their support; dissemination of information; creation of coalitions; and analysis of issues. These tools have been employed while holding various public campaigns, examples of which can be found in Table 1. The analysis of campaigns allows for the examination of forms and possibilities of civic organisation participation in higher education.

Case

Period

Campaign objective

Student 02.2015 – Dormitories for 24 06.2015 Hours campaign

Cancellation of the closing time at student dormitories of Belarusian universities

Students Against campaign (BSU) [7]

12.2015

Cancellation of feebased retaking of tests and examinations at BSU; engagement of the administration, university teachers, and students in decision making at HEIs

Dance for Reforms event

02.2016 – 06.2016

Raising awareness of the necessity to make changes in higher education with a flash mob (dancing outside HEIs)

Student Silence event

11.2016 – 12.2016

Raising awareness of passivity, lack of solidarity among students with a flash mob (taking photos with a poster)

Event to collect Novembersignatures to December 2016 cancel mandatory job placements (“distribution”) in Belarus

Refusal of mandatory job placement (“distribution”) upon graduation from vocational and higher educational institutions by collecting signatures on the zvarot.by web site

Projects of the Independent Bologna Committee

Reforming the higher education system in connection with accession to the EHEA

12/2011-present

Table 1. List of projects / civic campaigns in the field of higher education in Belarus in 2011-2016.

Source: summary information from the websites of these initiatives policy.

To analyse engagement and interaction of state and COs criteria developed by the director of the International Business Leaders Forum Ros Tennyson (Теннисон 2003: 5) was adapted and applied to a Belarusian context (please refer to Table 2).

Criterion

Assessment tools

Accomplishing planned objectives of initiatives/ campaigns

Availability of an objective clearly articulated and stated.Availability of facts of changes and their expression (e.g., in regulatory documents).

Recognition of an issue importance by the public

Availability of feedback from beneficiaries. It can be demonstrated by engagement in the initiative, signing appeals, a public statement of the issue importance (including by repost and likes in social networks [2]).

Feedback from governmental institutions

Availability of reaction to actions and representatives of the initiative (e.g., replies to an appeal, public statement).

Inclusion of the issue on the agenda (stage 1 of public policy cycle)

Availability of a public statement by governmental officials, politicians concerning the existence of an issue, and necessity of its resolution.

Continuation of the work of initiatives/ campaigns and/ or stability of engagement and interaction results

Availability of the active group of and initiative/ campaign. It can be demonstrated by holding events, updating information on websites, and in social networks.

Decision-making concerning the issue, preservation (non-amendment) of the decision made.

Table 2. Criteria to Assess Engagement and Interaction of COs and State Source: generalisation and adaptation of Tennyson’s criteria (Теннисон 2003).

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A N A LY S I S OF ENGAGEMENT AND I N T E R A C T I O N O F S TAT E A N D C I V I C O R G A N I S AT I O N S DURING PUBLIC C A M PA I G N S I N H I G H E R E D U C AT I O N

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Accomplishing planned objectives of initiative/campaigns.

Availability of an objective clearly articulated and stated was established in four of the initiatives examined. Thus, in the videos Dance for Reforms, participants declared a need for changes in higher education and in the appeal mandatory job placements system were discussed [3] (zvarot.by 2016). At the same time, speaking about goals met, only one organisation, the Belarusian Independent Bologna Committee, had managed to achieve changes in higher education policy. In 2012, at the Summit of EHEA Education Ministers, the Belarusâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s accession application was rejected as a result of a report prepared by the BIBC. On second submission of the application in 2015, Belarus was accepted on a provisional basis with a roadmap of reforms prepared in consideration of the BIBCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s suggestions.

When looking at campaigns that accomplished their stated objectives, it is possible to mention the Student Dormitories for 24 Hours campaign that operated not at the national but at the local level. Its activists influenced amendments to the Residing at the Student Dormitory of a Higher Education Institution Regulations related to the 24-hour access of students to dormitories at the HEI level. However, the relevant national regulation was not amended and penalties were still issued for those who were late with no acceptable excuse (Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus No. 269 of 05/04/2013). It is not possible in this case then to speak about complete accomplishment of campaign objectives.

Recognition of an issue of importance to the public. All campaigns examined are characterised by recognition of their issues as important to the public. It is obvious from the reaction in social networks and participation in events organised by activists.

The greatest number of reactions had been registered during the Students Against campaign. In the social network VKontakte 2,077 persons had noted that they had been against fee-based retaking of tests and examinations.

Activists collected 2,515 signatures under the appeal to BSU [4] and 1,055 signatures under the appeal to the Ministry

Regarding “feedback from governmental institutions”, any reaction of government representatives to COs’ events, actions or initiatives was examined. The most typical reaction by the government was restricting demands stated, attracting loyal associations or using sanctions. At the same time, government institutions had intended formally not to violate their own rules. As an example, when submitting appeals to government institutions (Students Against and anti-job placement campaigns), appellants received responses within the time ensured through legislation. The Student Dormitories for 24 Hours campaign requested and received an analysis of access to student dormitories by the Ministry of Education even though the rules remained unchanged.

When looking at the tactics of engaging loyal organisations, the case of the Students Against campaign was interesting when the issue articulated had left the HEIs. At a meeting with the Student Council, the Minister of Education criticised the Students Against movement and said that it was necessary to control social networks (TUT.BY 2015). At the same time, the BRYU, the Council of Group Presidents, and other GONGOs held the I Am Part of the BSU campaign in VKontakte which called on students to support the university and not tarnish its reputation through the internet.

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of Education (БДУ 2016). The campaign registered about 2,000 subscribers of the campaign in social networks and about 200 people participated in a peaceful gathering organised by the campaign.

In four cases, Belarusian initiatives were supported by representatives of foreign and international organisations. Students from other countries participated in the Student Dormitories for 24 Hours and Dance for Reforms campaigns (participating in the flash mob); the Students Against campaign was supported by such organisations as the National Union of Students in Norway (NSO 2015), Free Federation of Student Unions in Germany (FZS 2015), European Students’ Union (ESU 2015) as well as representatives of the Council of Europe (OДБ Брусель 2015). The success of the BIBC’s actions was based on international communication.

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Cases of direct pressure on campaign participants were also noted. In the three cases analysed, intimidation, conversations with students concerning “undesirability” of cooperation with COs, situations where activists were held by authorities and the use of sanctions (expelling from HEIs for academic failure) were noted.

Inclusion of the issue on the agenda. Here public statements by politicians and public officers concerning an issue raised by the public and the need for its resolution were taken into consideration. The analysis demonstrated that none of the organisations were able to get an issue onto the agenda. At the same time, it is possible to mention indirect influence on looking at issues of reform in the education system in the case of the BIBC when the initiative influenced rejection of Belarus’s accession to the EHEA in 2012 and subsequently was able to get Belarusian authorities to agree formally to a reform roadmap.

Continuation of the work of initiatives/campaigns and/ or stability of engagement and interaction results. At present, only the BIBC, among the campaigns and initiatives examined, continues to operate. The main areas of its activities include participation in and holding of international events, monitoring roadmap implementation, preparation of suggestions concerning law making in the field of higher education, etc. Additionally, activists of the Students Against campaign began to renew the oldest student organisation in Belarus, the Belarusian Students’ Association (BSA) (i.e., its institutional formalisation).

In all cases examined the relationships between the state and COs had not been those of partnership and had followed either the “confrontation” model manifested in pressure put on participants (Students Against, Dance for Reforms, Silence of the Students campaigns) or the “disregard” model when the governmental institutions had nominally demonstrated preparedness to respond to collective, individual appeals but had not included the issues in the agenda (Student Dormitories for 24 Hours campaign, collection of signatures to cancel job placement, partially the Students Against campaign). With the exception of the BIBC, none of the initiatives accomplished their stated objectives.

Another popular campaign tool is the use of modern technologies (communication with the public via social networks).

Social media sites had enabled the Student Dormitories for 24 Hours, the Students Against to unite persons concerned, to amplify activists’ voices (in the latter case, to collect 2,515 signatures under the students’ appeal to BSU’s chancellor). The Students Against campaign actively shaped public opinion.

At the same time, the Belarusian state used tactics to react to attempts to influence the field of higher education. Struggle for public opinion by creating structures substituting civil society was one of those. The I Am Part of the BSU movement that attempted to force posts of the Students Against group out of the news feed of VKontakte [5] could be an example in the case.

ANY POSSIBILITY FOR DIALOGUE?

Taking into consideration the current configuration of relations between the state and civic organisations in Belarus, avoiding confrontation and indifference is not considered realistic.

At the same time, some factors able to produce changes exist.

In the first place, the state could agree to a dialogue in higher education policy if civic organisations and their campaigns change the focus of their activities from the fundamental and systemic (e.g., violation of academic freedoms) to technical issues (e.g., equipping universities). Another factor is the possibility of receiving international technical assistance. If international institutions (donors, creditors) insist on COs’ participation, relationships between COs and the state could change. Additionally, in the opinion of the interview respondents, the following factors could have importance for

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When examining campaign tools used by activists several deserve consideration. The first one is the appeal to the international community. In one of the cases (BIBC), this appeal helped to influence policy. In other cases, however, the use of the tool resulted only in having external institutions paying attention and criticising violations.

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recognising Belarusian civic organisations as stakeholders in higher education policy: а) the overall political narrative in recognising civil society entities determined by the president’s political will; b) personal relations and connections (acquaintances, relatives) at government institutions; as well as c) the maturity of civil society.

In the opinion of experts polled, Belarus’s accession to the Bologna process has not changed the modality of relations between the state and civil society. Moreover, experts stated that a nondemocratic country is able to “adapt” the Bologna process to its own needs and to the Belarusian education model: “The Belarusian regime has autarchy and the country’s isolation as its top priority. [...] While this narrative is not rejected by the regime, it does not accept <...> another doctrine of the country’s development. And it means that the Bologna process is against the narrative, so it can be simulated”. As examples of adopting EHEA principles and “integrating” them into national contexts controversial from the point of view of democracy, the cases of Russia and Ukraine were those “in which not everything is ideal concerning the implementation system and students’ and lecturers’ rights” [6].

The capability of the Belarusian state to “adjust” EHEA requirements to its own vision could be assisted by the absence of the practice of exclusion or use of sanctions against countries involved in the Bologna process for violating its obligations. Owing to this, Belarus can ignore process standards and not comply with the terms of the roadmap, carrying out instead some technical changes without extending institutional autonomy of HEIs and developing academic freedoms.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERSECTORAL R E L AT I O N S H I P S

The reluctance of the Belarusian state to lose control over higher education and the education and upbringing of citizens generally as well as a lack of exclusion practices or use of sanctions against countries of the Bologna process for violating their obligations will most probably promote preservation of the

Scenario 1. Classical. Within this scenario, COs’ participation in politics would remain limited at least due to absence of complete information about what is happening in the field and due to the state’s reluctance to engage the public in the decision-making process. This scenario describes current practices of the state’s monopoly on public policy. As of June 2017, the draft Education Code was not presented to the public and civic organisations did not participate in its preparation. At the same time, according to the BIBC’s expert analysis, no principal progress in the implementation of the roadmap concerning the social dimension of higher education, academic values, establishment of an independent quality-control agency, etc., was observed (ГБК 2017).

Scenario 2. Nominal liberalisation. Regarding the deterioration of the economic situation, the Belarusian state could begin developing partner relations with some of the COs to raise financing from international organisations that often provide grants on the condition of participating in projects with public associations (Устиненко 2017). In this case, the state would declare the importance of engaging public associations in joint work, invite their representatives to discuss issues, and create a different appearance of partner relations. In other words, the authorities would resolve current issues using methods expedient for them.

Scenario 3. Control. Changes in the policy of the international organisations which would be prepared to support projects implemented by the authorities/HEIs without COs’ participation [7]. In turn, the Belarusian state would continue to create and develop the GONGO movement as well as exclude civil society from the Belarusian public space and international dialogue.

To maintain control over entities and to increase control over the field of higher education COs would be subject to latent pressure, discrediting by GONGOs, etc.

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current relationship between the state and COs. The state likely will not cooperate with civic organisations limiting itself to minimum engagement and interaction (e.g., invitations to participate in formal events). Nevertheless, it is worth examining other scenarios of possible development of intersectoral relationships (until 2018).

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Scenario 4. Remission. This scenario is similar to the previous. The main difference is in the degree of activism of civic organisations. A growing number of civic initiatives and campaigns could change the practice of the state’s communication from conflict to disregard. The authorities would comply with legislation (e.g., concerning timely and complete answers to appeals) but ignore the COs’ comments and suggestions at the same time. As in the nominal liberalisation scenario, an appearance of changes in the policy and intersectoral relations would be created.

Implementation of one of the scenarios suggested will depend not only on the events in the field of higher education but also on other factors – the political, socio-economic situation or intersectoral communication in general – not examined in this article.

It is possible that several scenarios would materialise at the same time. The Belarusian state would hardly abandon its control over the education system and development of the GONGO movement but, at the same time, could make efforts to regulate relations with civil society. However, the practices of governing the field, engaging stakeholders in the decision-making process and in implementation of the decisions made, would remain the same.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is possible to state that the governance principles of the field of higher education had not changed both prior to and upon Belarus’s accession to the Bologna process. The government still makes decisions in a closed, centralised manner according to its ideological narrative. Belarusian civic organisations interested in participating in higher education policy use various tools to that end but their role remains insignificant. An analysis of the campaigns carried out by COs in 2010-2016 demonstrates that the Belarusian authorities do not intend to cooperate.

In intersectoral relations the state strives to remain within formal limits to specifically not violate legislation as well as to demonstrate contact with the public (e.g., at events organised by a third party, including foreign institutions). At the same time, the contacts are conditioned by the intention to establish a partnership

Discussing possible scenarios of development of the relations between the state and civic organisations, a possibility exists that until 2018 the nature of intersectoral relations could change towards greater openness but the degree of COs’ involvement in public policy would likely remain the same.

LIST OF REFERENCES 1. European students’ union (ESU) (2015) ESU calls on protection of academic freedom and student rights in Belarus. Available at: https://www.esu-online.org/?news=esu-calls-on-protection-ofacademic-freedom-and-student-rights-in-belarus (access date: 15 July 2017).

2. Указ Прэзідэнта Рэспублікі Беларусь ад 08.02.2001 № 71 «О республиканском Совете ректоров учреждений высшего образования». Available at: http://laws.newsby.org/documents/ ukazp/pos04/ukaz04329.htm (access date: 12 July 2017).

3. Офіс за дэмакратычную Беларусь (OДБ Брусель) (2015) Как достичь академической свободы и институциональной автономии для белорусских университетов? Available at: https://by.odb-office.eu/ekspertyza_/vysh-adukacyja/kak-dostichakademicheskoy-svobody-i-institucionalnoy-avtonomii-dlyabelorusskih-universitetov (access date: 15 July 2017).

4. Пастанова Савета Міністраў Рэспублікі Беларусь от 05.04.2013 № 269 «Об утверждении положения об общежитиях и типового договора найма жилого помещения государственного жилищного фонда в общежитии и признании утратившими силу некоторых постановлений Совета Министров Республики Беларусь». Available at: http:// www.pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=C21300269 (access date: 13 July 2017).

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with international organisations rather than to find forms of engagement and interaction with national NGOs.

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5. Агенція журналістики даних (2015) Студентів, що боролися з корупцією в університеті Шевченка, відрахували. Available at: http://texty.org.ua/pg/news/textynewseditor/read/62069/ Studentiv_shho_borolysa_z_korupcijeju_v_universyteti (access date: 17 июля 2017).

6. TUT.BY (2015) Министр образования о студенческих протестах: «Может, нам нужно быть более агрессивными?».

Available at: https://news.tut.by/society/476901.html (access date: 16 July 2017).

7. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2013) Working with civil society in foreign aid. Possibilities for southsouth cooperation. Available at: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/ china/docs/Publications/UNDP-CH-Working%20With%20Civil%20 Society%20in%20Foreign%20Aid.pdf (access date: 11 July 2017).

8. National Union of Students in Norway (NSO) (2015). NSO is appalled by the violations against academic freedom in Belarus.

Available at: http://www.student.no/nyheter/belarus/ (access date: 15 July 2017).

9. Freier Zusammenschluss von StudentInnenschaften (FZS) (2015) Solidarity Statement with Students in Belarus. Available at: http://www.fzs.de/en/aktuelles/news/346516.html (access date: 15 July 2017).

10. zvarot.by (2016) Подпишись за отказ от обязательного распределения в ВУЗах и ССУЗах! Available at: http://zvarot.by/ ru/podpishis-za-otkaz-ot-obyazatelnogo-raspredeleniya-v-vuzax-issuzax/ (access date: 13 July 2017).

11. БДУ (2016) 10% всех студентов I и II ступени обучения БГУ. БГУ в цифрах. Available at: http://www.bsu.by/ru/main. aspx?guid=247521 (access date: 15 July 2017).

12. Медведева И. В. (ред.) (2015) Дети и молодежь Республики Беларусь. Статистический сборник, Минск:

13. Грамадскі Балонскі камітэт (ГБК), Ad hoc камісія Беларускай нацыянальнай платформы Форума грамадзянскай супольнасці Усходняга партнёрства (2017) Отчет о мониторинге имплементации дорожной карты реформирования высшего образования Беларуси (октябрь 2016 – январь 2017). Available at: http://bolognaby.org/index. php/issledovanija-analitika/639-monitoring-implementatsiidorozhnoj-karty-reformy-vysshego-obrazovaniya-belarusi-oktyabrdekabr-2016 (access date: 20 June 2017).

14. Грамадскі Балонскі камітэт (ГБК) (2015). Дорожная карта по проведению Беларусью реформы системы высшего образования. Available at: http://bolognaby.org/images/ uploads/2015/12/Roadmap-Belarus-ru.pdf (access date: 9 July 2017).

15. Праекты ў Беларусі пры фінансавай падтрымцы Еўрапейскага саюза (2015). Разработка подходов к гармонизации комплексных стратегий интернационализации в области высшего образования, исследований и инноваций в ЕС и странах-партнерах / ГАРМОНИ. Available at: http:// euprojects.by/ru/projects/Culture-Science-EducationandYoung- People/development-of-approaches-to-harmonization-ofcomprehensive-internationalization-strategies-in-highe/ (access date: 17 July 2017).

16. Теннисон, Роз (2003). Практическое руководство по партнерству. Available at: http://www.unpei.org/sites/default/files/ PDF/awareness-raising/Partnering-Toolbook-Russian.pdf (access date: 17 July 2017) 17. Устиненко Я. (2017) Государство и гражданское общество: существует ли диалог в политике высшего образования? (I). Available at: http://nmnby.eu/news/ analytics/6295.html (access date: 20 July 2017)

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Национальный статистический комитет Республики Беларусь.

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NOTES

1. Civic organisations (COs) are understood as all nonprofit and non-governmental organisations outside of the family in which people self-organise to care for public interests in the public sphere (UNDP 2013: 123).

2. The analysis covered such social networks as VKontakte, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter. This allows for the analysis of activity of campaigns/initiatives on those platforms as well as for the calculation of the number of mentions, likes, and reposts of these campaigns/initiatives.

3. The civic campaign does not oppose governmental mechanisms of graduate support in employment and guaranteeing first employment. In their opinion, the system of guarantees for graduates should be based on the equality of rights through which each graduate is able to select if s/he wishes to use the guarantee of the first workplace by the government or to seek employment independently (zvarot.by 2016).

4. 10% of students of with 1st and 2nd degrees at BSU (БДУ 2016).

5. Manifested in mass reposting of the post which had called upon event participants to support the university and also to change their avatars (photos on their personal pages). The participants, as a rule, had been the members of controlled student entities (BRYU, Council of Group Presidents, Student Council of Education Quality, etc.).

6. A situation involving the expulsion of two students from T. Shevchenko Kyiv National University (Ukraine) who had created an organisation to fight against corruption and abuse of law called ShevaPil. Within six months of the organisation’s operation, its founders had been expelled for “academic failure”. Involvement of the Direct Action trade union was not effective in their defense (Агенція журналістики даних 2015).

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7. Currently, the Ministry of Education and two state HEIs are implementing an EU project called Harmony, Development of Approaches to Harmonise Complex Internationalisation Strategies in Higher Education, Research, and Innovation of EU and Partner Countries, aimed at bringing the system of higher education closer to the EHEA (Праекты ў Беларусі пры фінансавай падтрымцы Еўрапейскага саюза, 2015). Initiatives related to creating business incubators at institutions whose budgets provide for re-equipping HEIs exist as well.

POLITICAL SCIENCE PROGRAMMES AT EHU

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P O L I T I C A L S C I E N C E P R O G R A M M E S A T E H U

The European Humanities University (EHU) is a nongovernmental university in the field of liberal arts, established in Minsk in 1992. Due to repression of academic freedoms, the university was forced to terminate its activities in Minsk in 2004 and subsequently renewed its operations in Vilnius (Lithuania). EHU is the only Belarusian university operating in an environment of real academic freedom. Approximately 1,000 Belarusian students study humanities and social sciences in BA, MA, and PhD programmes at EHU.

Almost 3,000 individuals have graduated from EHU since its establishment in Minsk in 1992. Of these, two-thirds have graduated in the Vilnius period. According to a recent poll, 62.2% of graduates reside in Belarus permanently, having returned there upon completing their studies at EHU. 83.3% are employed full time and their employment is fully or partially related to their field of studies at the university. Most graduates are employed in the private sector (64.6%) as well as in non-governmental organisations (17.4%) and Belarusian government institutions (10.1%).

The political science programmes at EHU have been implemented within different academic departments and units during different periods of its existence. While in Minsk the FrenchBelarusian Faculty offered education in the sphere of political science. Upon relocation to Vilnius, Svetlana Naumova, Anatoliy Kruglashov, Andrei Kazakievich, Victor Martinovich, and Andrei Stsiapanau participated in the work, heading and managing the political science programmes.

Currently, two political science programmes function at EHU. At the BA level, we offer high- and low-residence programmes for World Politics and Economics (a successor of the Political Science and European Studies programme). It is an interdisciplinary programme that prepares specialists in the field of political and economic sciences. The programme was established by and is offered in cooperation with Vytautas Magnus University of Kaunas

At the MA level, we offer a political science programme in public policy. The objective of the MA programme is to train specialists in the field of public administration, civil society management as well as professional activities at international and national civil society organisations. The programme was jointly created with the Faculty of Public Administration at Leiden University (Netherlands) and ROI, the Dutch Institute for Public Administration. Programme graduates are awarded an MA degree in political science.

In addition, the department offers a PhD programme in Philosophy.

The period of studies in the high-residence BA programme is four years, while the low-residence BA programme is a fiveyear programme. The period of studies for the MA programmes is a year and a half. The period of studies in the high-residence PhD programme is four years or one year in the case of external learning.

The core academic staff of the Political Science Programmes of EHU includes professor Tatiana Shchyttsova; professor emeritus Ryhor Miniankou, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences; Anatoli Mikhailov, PhD â&#x20AC;&#x201C; member of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences; associate professor Andrei Stsiapanau, PhD; associate professor Victor Martinovich, PhD; lecturer Tatsiana Chulitskaya, PhD; and lecturer Uladzislau Ivanou, PhD. Visiting lecturers of the department include professor Vyachaslau Paznyak; professor Aliaksandr Kavaliou, Candidate of Economic Sciences; and Ina Ramasheuskaya, MA â&#x20AC;&#x201C; an expert at SYMPA/BIPART.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE PROGRAMMES AT EHU

(Lithuania). It trains political scientists and professional analysts to be able to comprehensively interpret and analyse, compare and evaluate, theoretically describe, and simulate economic and political processes in global and regional contexts. Graduates of the World Politics and Economics programme are awarded a BA degree in political science with an additional specialization in economics. The studying process is balanced between the political science and economics disciplines.

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More about activities and news of the EHU political science programmes on the Internet:

POLITICAL SCIENCE PROGRAMMES AT EHU

https://www.ehu.lt/be/ https://www.facebook.com/polscienceEHU

Freedom, justice and solidarity are the basic principles underlying the work of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS). The KAS is a political foundation, closely associated with the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU).

In our European and international cooperation efforts we work for people to be able to live self-determined lives in freedom and dignity. We make a contribution underpinned by values to helping Germany meet its growing responsibilities throughout the world.

We encourage people to lend a hand in shaping the future along these lines. With more than 80 offices abroad and projects in over 100 countries, we make a unique contribution to the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and a social market economy. To foster peace and freedom we encourage a continuous dialogue at the national and international levels as well as the exchange between cultures and religions.

Human beings in their distinctive dignity and with their rights and responsibilities are at the heart of our work. We are guided by the conviction that human beings are the starting point in the effort to bring about social justice and democratic freedom while promoting sustainable economic activity. By bringing people together who embrace their responsibilities in society, we develop active networks in the political and economic spheres as well as in society itself. The guidance we provide on the basis of our political know-how and knowledge helps to shape the globalization process along more socially equitable, ecologically sustainable and economically efficient lines.

We cooperate with governmental institutions, political parties, civil society organizations and handpicked elites, building strong partnership along the way. In particular, we seek to intensify political cooperation in the area of development cooperation at the

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KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION, BELARUS COUNTRY OFFICE

K O N R A D A D E N A U E R F O U N D A T I O N , B E L A R U S C O U N T R Y O F F I C E

KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION, BELARUS COUNTRY OFFICE

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national and international levels on the foundations of our objectives and values. Together with our partners we make a contribution to the creation of an international order that enables every country to develop in freedom and under its own responsibility. Currently Konrad Adenauer Foundation runs its Belarus office in Vilnius (Lithuania).

The main task of the KAS activities towards Belarus is the support of those forces that are working for the creation of a free, democratic and lawful Belarus that is going to have its place among the European Community of states. To this end, the Foundation organizes educational events and consultations, dialogue and information programs in neighbouring countries, in Germany, and in Brussels. htttp://kas.de/belarus http://www.facebook.com/kasbelarus https://twitter.com/KAS_Belarus

NOTES

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ГЕРАСІМЕНКА А. ПАЛІТЫЧНЫ ЎДЗЕЛ І ІНТЭРНЭТ-ПЛАТФОРМЫ: ЯК НОВЫЯ КАМУНІКАЦЫЙНЫЯ ТЭХНАЛОГІІ ДАПАМАГАЮЦЬ БЕЛАРУСКІМ ГРАМАДСКІМ АКТЫВІСТАМ

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