Estonian Defense Forces Annual Report 2021

ESTONIAN DEFENSE FORCES

ANNUAL REPORT

ESTONIAN DEFENSE FORCES ANNUAL REPORT 2021

TO THE READER

LT. GEN. MARTIN HEREM Commander, Estonian Defense Forces

For the Estonian Defense Forces, 2021 was probably the most intense year of the last 30. It started in the middle of a wave of the pandemic and meant having to constantly adjust to keep the virus from denting our readiness for battle while retaining enough operational leeway to fulfill our objectives. With the advent of the coronavirus vaccines, we faced a difficult decision. The vaccine mandate established in the second half of the year for the entire Defense Forces kept cases to a minimum in the EDF – far under the average incidence for the population. True, dozens of people could not continue their service because of it, but the EDFʼs vaccination requirement allowed us to preserve operating freedom for fulfilling our tasks.

In May, the EDF unveiled its planned budget cuts as directed by the Cabinet. They were designed to increase the leanness and effectiveness of our organization and focused on maintaining military capability and allowing new capabilities to be developed. The cuts were met with a media backlash, and we found ourselves frequently accused of waging an assault on our traditions and symbols. Over time, there were more and more questions in the vein of ”what is the Defense Forces preparing for?”

”What war are you talking about?” A year later, probably no one who would ask such questions. It is not that we were prescient –we just took our duties seriously.

A midst the public criticism, it was sometimes hard to understand when people were genuinely expressing doubt and fear and exercising their freedom of speech and conscience and when it was disingenuous, or an information op from a hostile country. In 2021, we probably saw all of these more often than ever before. And before the year was out, we actually found ourselves in a war, without realizing it – a hybrid war orchestrated by Russia and Belarus against Western values.

Although as of this writing there is no smoking gun that proves that the migration operation against Latvia, Lithuania and Poland prepared the surface for an escalation of the war against Ukraine into a conventional operation, it does appear that this was the case. But the hybrid operation failed. So did the attempt to destabilize

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Western society in general through saddling our foreign policymakers with the migration problem and thereby creating favorable conditions for attacking Ukraine.

The Estonian state and Defense Forces showed spine and kept a cool head. We were the first to go to the assistance of Lithuania and Poland, because we saw the hybrid attack as a threat to our values and the unity of the region. We considered it our duty to support our allies. Although we moved smaller units, like teams and platoons, these were nevertheless strategic decisions.

In the situation, the existence and strength of our primary power was proved – our reserve force comprised of Estonian citizens with a will to defend their country. Despite several reservist training being cancelled, reservists assembled voluntarily anyway. In fact, we often found ourselves explaining to reservists why we were not involving them in national defense through reservist training. They certainly had the will and motivation.

For the first time in a long while, we deployed Defense League personnel on an international mission in Iraq, where they acquitted themselves like professional soldiers. The snap reservist training exercise Okas 2021 was a success like exercises before it, but its pace and complexity was at a somewhat higher level. And further, we took a major step forward in comprehensive national defense, developing cooperation with the Police and Border Guard in defending the state border. It can be said that we continued this ”operation” in logical fashion when we sent the unit in support of Poland.

None of this prevented us from continuing development of the EDF. We held the exercises we had planned, developed our defense plans and battle-readiness. We took part in international operations, exercises and other cooperation formats. We also addressed development of our capabilities.

We launched K9 self-propelled artillery training, procured naval mines, signed a procurement for anti-ship missiles, prepared for introducing the next capabilities to the EDF. Our analysis and competence supported the Estonian Cabinetʼs six-month

We were the first to go to the assistance of Lithuania and Poland, because we saw the hybrid attack as a threat to our values and the unity of the region. We considered it our duty to support our allies.

The future will tell whether it was ”preparation” or ”prevention”, but the sterner challenges for the Defense Forces probably still lie ahead.

project to merge the Naval Flotilla and Border Guard fleet after nearly 30 years of debate and discussions on the subject.

In December, the Estonian government, on the EDFʼs recommendation, decided to support Ukraine against the increasing military threat from Russia. This decision, too, prompted opposition and criticism, but the question of whether it was morally the right thing to do was surprisingly no longer brought up by critics. And yet the decision was based primarily on moral obligation. The question of what is the morally right thing to do came up nearly every month in 2021. Sometimes the criticism was so vocal that doubt was sown as to whether our decisions were the right ones.

But the facts and figures speak in favor of the decisions. The conscript attrition rate was the lowest in Estonian history and the number of people enlisting in conscription voluntarily was the highest ever. A record number of students entered the National Defense Academy in 2021. Although critics homed in publicly on the number of people leaving the service, it still does not appear to indicate a decline in morale or capability. The number of volunteers engaged in various activities grew in 2021 even when the escalation of the war in Ukraine was still beyond the horizon.

I know that the workload has increased and the mental strain on our personnel is huge. This is inevitable. In 2021, Russia showed the worst aggression of the last 30 years and we responded to it in a manner befitting a national defense force. The future will tell whether it was ”preparation” or ”prevention”, but the sterner challenges for the Defense Forces probably still lie ahead.

As Commander of the Defense Forces, I consider the state of the EDF and the steps for coping with future challenges to be good. To our servicemen and -women, I want to say two important things. First, we chose this profession ourselves in order to resolve much tougher situations than what we have seen so far. Second, in 2021, just like it has done in the past, the EDF took the important and necessary steps to be even better prepared for those situations. After all, that is the only way to prevent them. ||

photo by Sven Arbet

TERROR. The regime sees a rapid and strong response the most efficient for quashing any opposition.

SECURITY POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA IN 2021

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CENTRE, ESTONIAN DEFENSE FORCES

Russiaʼs 2020 constitutional amendments and the significantly stronger crackdown on civil liberties in the subsequent 18 months reinforced the regimeʼs autocratic grip on power.

Lethal force is currently used almost overtly to neutralize the domestic opposition. With the socioeconomic situation deteriorating, they have resorted to pressure and force to maintain control.

In 2021, Russia felt that it was the right time to probe whether Western might negotiate on wholesale changes to the current security situation in Europe. The armed forces were used as the main catalyst for these negotiations – action that confirms that Russia is undeterred in using its military to achieve political goals.

The strategic command-staff exercise Zapad 2021 also fell into the timeframe of the unusual buildup of forces, and it is this exercise that we will cover in detail in this article.

Russiaʼs view of the international situation is clearly shown by the updated national security strategy approved by President Putin in July 2021, which defines the perceived threats to the country, national interests and priorities in the fields of domestic policy, foreign policy and defense policy. The security strategy sees the world as having become polycentric (in contrast, the last version of the strategy, from 2015, saw the process as still ongoing), with new global and regional powers.

Police officers detain a woman during a protest against the jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in Khabarovsk, 6,100 kilometers (3,800 miles) east of Moscow, Russia, on Sunday, Jan. 31, 2021. Thousands of people took to the streets Sunday across Russia to demand the release of jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny, keeping up the wave of nationwide protests that have rattled the Kremlin. Hundreds were detained by police.

Igor Volkov

AP/Scanpix photo by

For Russia, the perceived military threats are mainly connected with NATO activity near Russian borders (which of course is directly conditioned by Russiaʼs own flouting of international law and conventions), including the establishment of military infrastructure, espionage, exercises involving the use of military formations and nuclear weapons against Russia, as Russia sees it.

Russiaʼs regional interests are focused above all on the ”near abroad” and exerting all facets of control over it. Under the new security strategy as well, Russia seeks to strengthen its influence in the ”post-Soviet space”. During 2021, Moscow also laid stronger emphasis than before on strengthening relations with this region, which includes (with a few exceptions) the current Commonwealth of Independent States.

Below, we chronicle Russian actions vis-àvis Belarus and Kazakhstan.

When it comes to consolidating the ”near abroad”, the core issue is Ukraineʼs Western-oriented, democratic agenda. Controlling the ”near abroad” and getting the West to acquiesce to it is Russiaʼs first step toward what it hopes will be a restructuring of the security architecture of all of Europe.

At the heart of this thinking is the belief that equilibrium between superpowers is only possible in the existence of accepted spheres of influence. In the Russian worldview, this ensures stability of security arrangements.

By now, Russia has become a kleptocratic dictatorship, a regime whose aging key players perceive a threat to Russiaʼs ”spiritual, cultural and historical traditions”

Controlling the ”near abroad” and getting the West to acquiesce to it is Russia’s first step toward what it hopes will be a restructuring of the security architecture of all of Europe.

described in the security strategy. These trends have come to a head in the last year and this attitude represents the deepening of Russiaʼs ”zero-sum” attitude to security.

In this zero-sum spirit; Russia presented an ultimatum in December 2021 demanding ”security guarantees”, which amounted to nothing less than calling for the end of NATO and which the West could not possibly accept in such a form.

RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES ACTIVITY IN 2021

2021 was a year of ramped-up activity for the Russian armed forces. In addition to the ordinary training and military operations in progress, it started massing forces in regions adjacent to the Ukrainian border. It was followed by the strategic exercise Zapad 2021 in the Western military district, which al-

lowed different types of arms and branches of the military to practice interoperability and one part of training for the purpose of military aggression.

The beginning of 2022 also continued to be an intense period for the Russian armed forces: early in the year, Article Four of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was triggered due to the unrest in Kazakhstan.

A noteworthy initiative in 2021 was the development of the professional reservists project in the Russian armed forces. When entering contractual reserve service, reservists are assigned to their wartime positions in their units. Besides their everyday duties, the reservist must take part in monthly two- or three-day exercises and a reservist training of up to 30 days each year. The reservist retains their salary for their civilian

Russian paratroopers walk before boarding Ilyushin Il-76 transport planes as they take part in the military exercises ”Zapad-2021” staged by the armed forces of Russia and Belarus at an aerodrome in Kaliningrad Region, Russia, September 13, 2021.

Scanpix/File Photo by Vitaly Nevar

Russia’s strategic goal in its relations with the West is to achieve a binding agreement for a sea change in Europe’s security architecture.

Defense Forces Annual Report 2020

position and he also receives an additional 12% of the salary of the position to which he was assigned in their unit.

In previous years, there was a cap of 5000 participants in the project, but this was raised to 100,000 in 2021. Compared to ordinary reservists who might attend reservist training once every three years, contractual reservists have much better training. In the event of actual staging, it reduces the time needed for the unit to train together.

According to publicly available sources, over 9,000 contracts have been concluded in the Southern and Central military districts as of 2021. Thirty companies have trained together in the Southern Military District. The recruitment of contractual reservists depends on the socioeconomic level of the region. In a number of places, it has not been possible to recruit the planned number of reservists.

As the project has been declared a priority, efforts are being made to stay on track: the representatives from the military units lobby for the project in business world, and it is planned to raise the monthly salary supplement from 12% to 24% among other steps.

TROOP MOVEMENTS TO THE UKRAINIAN BORDER

2021 saw many instances of movements of troops to the vicinity of the Ukrainian borders in an out of the ordinary manner. Although some units moved back by mid-summer, the movements that resumed in autumn were a continuation of the spring patterns.

A contingent from the 41st Army (Novosibirsk) was moved to Yelnya district, units of the 6th Army to the Kursk area, and, it is believed, the 58th Army, 49th Army (Stavropol), 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade (Ulyanovsk) and the 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment (Stavropol) (Vladikavkaz) to Crimea.

In addition, early 2022 saw units from the Eastern Military District begin to be moved to Belarus. The size of the forces sent to Belarus was noteworthy. The 35th Army (Belogorsk), 36th Army (Ulan-Ude), 29th Army (Chita) and Pacific Ocean units, including indirect fire and maneuver units, moved to Belarus.

At the time, it was difficult to assess whether the movements to Ukraineʼs borders and Belarus in 2021–2022 were a harbinger of the war now under way or whether it could have been a pressure tactic and deterrent.

RUSSIAN MILITARY UNITS MASSED ON UKRAINEʼS NORTHERN BORDERS, FEBRUARY 2022

CONCENTRATION OF RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES IN CRIMEA (UKRAINIAN TERRITORY ILLEGALLY ANNEXED BY RUSSIA)

MOVEMENTS OF RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES UNITS TO THE UKRAINE BORDER AND BELARUS

By now, Russia has become a kleptocratic dictatorship, a regime whose aging key players perceive a threat to Russia’s ”spiritual, cultural and historical traditions” described in the security strategy.

Theoretically, the activity served several purposes: pressure and/or preparations for the invasion of Ukraine; the completion of de facto absorption of Belarus, using Ukraine as a hostage to intimidate the West into accepting the ”security guarantees”.

The massive build-up of troops from all strategic areas on Ukraineʼs borders (including from Russiaʼs borders with NATO countries) exposes a contradiction in Russiaʼs threat assessment – why would it significantly weaken troop presence on NATO borders if it genuinely saw NATO as an offensive threat?

MOVEMENT OF UNITS TO KAZAKHSTAN

The unrest in Kazakhstan in early 2022 led the countryʼs president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, to turn to the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) on January 4 due to a threat to national security and Kazakhstanʼs sovereignty, which he said was caused by external interference (a condition for intervention by the CSTO).

The CSTO decided to send peacekeeping forces into Kazakhstan for a limited time on the basis of Article IV of the security treaty, to stabilize and normalize the situation in the country. Commander of the Russian Airborne Troops (VDV), Col. Gen. Andrei Serdyukov, was appointed head of the peacekeeping contingent. There were 2,095 personnel in the contingent.

The large-scale movement of the units began on 7 January. A company from the Belarusian 103rd Guards Airborne Brigade and, from the VDV, units of the 45th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Kubinka), 98th Guards Airborne Division (Ivanovo) and 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade (Ulyanovsk) were deployed to Kazakhstan. Some elements came from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia.

The mission was to guard strategic sites such as Nur-Sultanʼs presidential palace, security institutions and general staff, Almaty Airport, and the TV station. By 19 January, all of the units had returned to their home bases.

The unprecedented movement of CSTO units – most of them Russian VDV units – to Kazakhstan on the basis of Article IV, characterizes expeditious decision-making and action by Russia in the event of a potential military conflict. Furthermore, it could be said that considering the short-term nature of the operation and the fact that most sites were guarded by Russian Airborne Troops, the units were

POSITIONS OF ELEMENTS OF THE 41ST ARMY (CENTRAL MILITARY DISTRICT) IN YELNYA NEAR BELARUS. PHOTOS FROM SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER 2021

Under the new security strategy, Russia seeks to strengthen its influence in the ”post-Soviet space”.

The Ryanair plane carrying a Belarus dissident was diverted to Minsk, Belarus, after Belarus flight controllers told the crew that there was a bomb threat against the plane, May 23, 2021. Scanpix photo provided by ONLINER.BY

moved to Kazakhstan above all to protect President Tokayevʼs regime, not to resolve the nationwide unrest.

DEVELOPMENTS IN BELARUS

Last year was characterized by continuing crackdown on civil society in Belarus, gradually deepening economic problems, a hybrid attack against Western neighbors relying on use of migrants; and increasing Integration and military cooperation with Russia. For the first time since independence, Belarus became a direct and immediate threat to its neighbors.

Incumbent Alexander Lukashenka was declared the winner in the presiden-

tial elections held on Aug. 9, 2020, which was followed by several months of major demonstrations that were brought under control by November 2020 and completely put down by spring 2021.

This did not bring the crackdown to a close, and by yearʼs end close to 1,000 political prisoners were in custody. Over 4,000 criminal cases were opened in regard to the individuals who participated in the protests, over 200 NGOs were closed and hundreds of websites and media outlets were branded ”extremist”.

The Belarusian KGB termed the repressions a ”cleansing”. President Lukashenka achieved a situation where the protests were effectively ended and there

was no longer direct threat to his power, but it is likely he lost a majority of support from Belarusian society.

The wave of repression and the forced landing of Ryanair flight FR4978 through the use of deception in Minsk, May 23, 2021, led to deepening political isolation of Belarus and a package of sanctions from several Western countries, accompanied by an economic downturn (according to official data, Belarusian GDP grew by 2% last year and inflation rose to 10%). The economic losses stemming from the sanctions were estimated by Belarusian authorities as running into hundreds of millions of dollars.

To counter growing external pressure and to break the political isolation, Lukashenka unleashed a hybrid attack on Lithuania, Poland and Latvia, using migrants from the Middle East. The number of migrants on the Lithuanian border

the two countries approved 28 integration programs.

As expected, the greater political and military integration and Lukashenkaʼs increasingly aggressive stance toward the West led to Belarus being involved in the military intimidation of Ukraine prior to the invasion. Lukashenka hinted at this on Dec. 2, 2021, announcing joint exercises for the next month or two to secure Belarusian borders.

RUSSIA’S ACTIVITY IN AFRICA

We have previously written about Russian influence increasing in Africa. In 2021, Russia increased clout in both the Central African Republic and Mali. Above all, Russia is focusing on countries ravaged by long conflicts as they represent a favorable medium for easily achieving maximum impact at a low cost.

started rising suddenly in June 2021 and in July, Lukashenka explicitly threatened to let loose a stream of migrants and drugs into Europe if new economic sanctions were imposed on Belarus.

The most intense attack was against Poland, which had to repel over 30,000 border crossing attempts from August to the first half of November 2021. Belarusian authorities facilitated the transport of migrants to the border, destroyed border infrastructure and guided and coerced migrants to cross the border. Poland, Lithuania and Latvia were forced to declare a state of emergency in their border zones and reinforce the border with their home guards. The intensity of the Belarusian hybrid attack abated by the end of 2021.

On the backdrop of these developments, in a situation where the Belarusian leadershipʼs foreign policy pursued orientation solely to Russia, the integration between Belarus and Russia that had started in December 2018 sped up and military cooperation between the countries became closer. On Nov. 4, 2021, the presidents of

Russiaʼs ”aid package” consists of economic assistance and arms, plus a deployment of a limited military contingent – for operating weapons systems, instructors for local army personnel, and so on. These functions are not necessarily performed by regular units in the national forces but by private contractors – called a chastnaya boennaya companiya or ChPK in Russian. Use of private contractors in sensitive conflict zones where the interests of several powers collide is a convenient solution that allows Russia to dodge political responsibility. The Wagner Group, associated with Russian special services, operates actively in over 12 African nations as a security provider and also organizes information operations, such as influencing presidential elections in Zimbabwe and Madagascar.

Wagner personnel have violated international human rights in both CAR and Mali, drawing sharp condemnation from the UN and coming under Western sanctions. Russiaʼs goal here is to lessen the Westʼs influence and displace the Western role in Africa. ||

The wave of repression and the forced landing of Ryanair flight through the use of deception in Minsk, May 23, 2021, led to deepening political isolation of Belarus and a package of sanctions from several Western countries.

A man sits in front of a portrait of Russian President Vladimir Putin during a demonstration organized by the pan-Africanist platform Yerewolo to celebrate France’s announcement to withdraw French troops from Mali, Bamako, Feb. 19, 2022. AFP/Scanpix photo by Florent Vergnes

ZAPAD 2021

The scenario pitted the Republic of Polesie (probably Belarus) and the Central Federation (likely Russia) against Nyaris, Pomoria and the Polar Republic (the West).

In the scenario, the Republic of Polesie responded to demonstrations orchestrated by the West and a partial occupation of its territory, which destabilized the situation within the country. Faced with such a situation, the confederation (Belarus-Russia) decided to respond with a military operation. The military operation had two phases: in the first (Sep. 10-12) Nyaris, Pomoria and Polar Republic attacked Belarus, including conquering a part of the territory and striking Russian naval units and vessels.

The first phase taught the Russian armed forces to mobilize and transport reserves to the frontlines and make preparations for a counterattack. In the second phase (Sep. 13-16) the main focus was on counterattack, including a great number of conventional actions.

According to the scenario, the 51st Army (corresponds to the 41st Army) and the 11st Tank Army (corresponds to the real-world 1st Guards Tank Army) was deployed on the territory of the Republic of Polesie – units of the 30th Army (corresponds to the 20th Army) were deployed on the territory of the Central Confederation near the boundaries of the Republic of Polesie.

The movement of units to the exercise area started in late July 2021. The active phase of the exercise took place from Sep. 10-16. The exercises involved the army, air force, combat engineer forces, logistics forces and CBRN forces from the Western Military District, and the Baltic and Northern Fleet. Foreign countries, including India and Pakistan, were also involved in the active phase under the aegis of international cooperation.

The bulk of the activity in Zapad 2021 took place on the Mulino artillery range in

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka delivers his speech as he attends the joint strategic exercise of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus Zapad-2021 at the Obuz-Lesnovsky training ground, Belarus, Sept. 12, 2021. BelTA Pool Photo via AP/Scanpix

EXERCISE. The scenario characterized the view of the leaders of Belarus and Russia that popular unrest was one part of the West’s strategy to weaken them.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CENTRE, ESTONIAN DEFENSE FORCES

THEATERS FOR ZAPAD 2021

THE ZAPAD 2021 SCENARIO

Nizhny-Novgorod Oblast, where maneuver defense and counterattacks were held in the active phase. The 31st attack landing brigade also took part in these maneuvers. In cooperation with an army air force brigade placed at its disposal, the brigade carried out a helicopter landing on 13 September to destroy the adversaryʼs reserves.

The helicopters were probably deployed from the Central Military District. The helicopters were also used for air support. Attack drones (Forpost-R), massive rocket and artillery fire, mine warfare and pioneer units were also introduced. As for actions in other areas, the airborne landing with equipment by a battalion-sized unit during night-time hours on 12 September at Kislovo training field in Pskov as noteworthy.

On 13 September, the most modern MDM-4M air assault vehicles were landed on Zhitovo training field in Ryazan for the first time. An airborne operation with unprecedented size took place in Brest, Belarus on Sep. 14, led by a battalion from the 76th Guards Air Assault Division.

The 76th Guards Air Assault Division also carried out an assault drill at the Pravdinsky field in Kaliningrad on Sep.15. This drill involved rocket brigades and in the course of the exercise, three Iskander-M missiles were fired on Sep. 13 (both ballistic and cruise missiles were fired). The Northern Fleet operated against a simulated adversary navy that had staged an amphibious landing on Kola Peninsula.

As for logistical support elements, a repair and recovery train based in Mulino should be highlighted; only the Western Military District currently has such a train, but it is planned to provide all districts with one in future. The 1th Guards Tank Army logistics Units held a special exercise to practice supplying electricity, food, fuel and other equipment to Russian and Belarusian units.

Most but not all Russian units returned to their permanent locations after the exercise. Specifically, it is known that Russiaʼs S-300 units remained in the Grodno region of Belarus about 4 km from the Polish border. Russian Su-30SM fighters also remained stationed in Belarus, at the Belarus Air Forceʼs 61st Fighter Air Base (military unit 54804 in Baranovich. These elements likely remained in place to establish joint Russian-Belarusian flight and air defense training centers.

During Zapad 2021, Russia practiced warfare against a technologically advanced adversary (NATO) while integrating the Belarusian forces with Russian forcesʼ operations. ||

ESTONIA’S NATIONAL DEFENSE IN 2031

The military part of the new national defense development plan (Estonian abbreviation: RKAK 2031) increases independent defensive capability and strengthens readiness to defend Estonia. By contributing actively to national defense, we send the message that Estonia will in any circumstance defend itself. Viewed in the sense of Estonia as a whole, national defense in 2031 will undoubtedly be even more comprehensive, clearer and well-trained. The role of the entire state and society and lessons learnt from various crises will be taken into account.

From the military perspective, our national defense will be technologically up-to-date and integrated with allies. The fundamental principle of Estonian capability planning will remain in effect: national units must be are equipped, armed, trained and manned for real-life activity.

FROM BUDGET CUTS TO CAPABILITIES

The road to the current development plan and the fundamental choices made began back in 2019. Then, prior to the decisionmaking phase in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic arrived in Estonia. As we know, one of the political principles of military national defense is that at least 2% of GDP is allocated for developing independent defensive capacity. Covid downgraded all economic forecasts significantly, though,

NATIONAL DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT PLAN UP TO 2031

▶ Over 8 billion euros is allocated for the military defense part of the development plan

▶ The wartime structure of the EDF will increase from 24,200 to 26,700 troops

▶ An additional 3,000 fighters will be involved in the territorial defense structure

▶ To make naval defenses more effective, long-range anti-ship missile battery will be procured

▶ The EDF will get from the Police and Border Guard a clear sea border protection remit and spill cleanup role, along with resources (ships, crews). The EDF will start to be responsible in real time for compiling a Recognized Maritime Picture conforming to military standards.

▶ NATO Broadcast and Ship Shore maritime communication architecture will be developed

▶ A possibility for Recognized Maritime Picture sharing between the Baltic states will be created.

▶ A multiple launch rocket system unit will be established

▶ The 2nd Infantry Brigade will be moved to armoured vehicles

▶ A battalion of 12 K9 self-propelled howitzers will be created in the 2nd Infantry Brigade

▶ Single-use mid-range antitank weapons will be procured for all infantry units

▶ Two air surveillance radar systems will be procured for the EDF and, with funding from the US, anti-aircraft radar systems and anti-aircraft control systems.

▶ Close to 2,200 vehicles and engineer equipment will be replaced

▶ Support tanks are being upgraded and CV9035 combat vehicles will be modernized

▶ Units serving on international operations will be equipped with separate sets of armaments and equipment

▶ The EDF will get a modern battlefield administration and control system

▶ The brigades’ reconnaissance capability will be increased and ISR (recon) battalions will be created

▶ The number of conscripts will increase to 4,000 by 2025

▶ By 2030, the number of active-duty personnel will increase to 3,846 and salary will be kept competitive

▶ A modern War and Disaster Medicine Centre will be established in Raadi near Tartu

▶ Ämari airfield will be renovated

TIINA UUDEBERG

Under Secretary, Estonian Ministry of Defense

NATIONAL DEFENSE. We are not in the business of putting together a paper army but a real one, and we intend to stay on this course.

and judging by that moment, existing defensive capability would have even had to be cut back. Thus, decision-making time was taken to allow for a more thorough assessment of economic trends. At the same time, a search was mounted for ways of cutting additional costs, including through different reforms.

The economic forecast for 2021 was surprisingly optimistic as the economy had withstood the pandemic and recovered very rapidly. To sum up, while looking for savings, for various reasons we arrived at a situation where the development plan actually made big forward strides in quite a few areas. We can say with pride that the Navy will gain quite a few new and significant capabilities, the 2nd Infantry Brigade will reach a completely new level, and the territorial defense being organized by the Defense League will become even more capable and precise in inflicting pain on a potential adversary. Indirect fire capability will become more regional and the firing distance will be longer – the Multiple Launch Rocket System is also important for its deterrent effect.

NAVAL WARFARE

One of the focuses of the development plan is naval warfare. Anti-ship missiles will be added to the arsenal for challenging an adversary at sea, and naval mines are also being procured. Besides existing mine countermeasures capability allowing allies

to keep shipping lanes open, mines and mine laying capability will give a way of limiting an adversaryʼs naval operations and also engage them directly with missile fire. Both projects will be implemented by 2023, if not this year.

For the EDF, it is extraordinarily important to have situation awareness on land, at sea and in the air. The fact that assets are being taken over from the Police and Border Guard – including sea surveillance radar systems – means that finally there will be a single entity with the obligation, means, abilities and flexibility to compile a Recognized Maritime Picture. In addition, it is important that we will start sharing Recognized Maritime Picture with Latvia and Lithuania. Hopefully, the same exchange will ensue with other Nordic countries.

It is not planned during this development plan cycle to replace the Navyʼs minehunters; they should last another 10 years in terms of service life. At the same time, such major capabilities require us to think even more moves ahead as to what the alternatives and possible solutions might be.

ON LAND AND IN THE AIR

Under the new national defense development plan, we will increase unitsʼ speed, protection and range of fire. The abovementioned MLRS uses highprecision ammunition with a high range,

From the military perspective, our

national

defense will be technologically up-to-date and integrated with allies.

Preparations for live fire exercise with a U.S. Army Multiple Launch Rocket System. EDF photo by Jarkko-Martin Pukki

allowing strikes on distant high-value targets. Its main functions on the battlefield are to suppress and destroy the adversary and eliminate possible threats before they become manifested. The range of the MLRS is sufficient to also support units based on Latvia if needed. Latvia and Lithuania both have the same plans. These are developments that will take Baltic military cooperation to a wholly new level.

The development of the 2nd Infantry Brigade has been noteworthy: the brigade will be armed with mobile artillery; in addition armoured transport vehicles will be purchased to replace trucks and the infantry battalions will thereby become mechanized units.

The anti-tank capability of territorial defense and brigades will increase, single-

use mid-range anti-tank weapons are being procured for all infantry units. Under the development plan currently in force, the EDF acquired new R20 assault rifles; under the forthcoming one we want to swap out machine guns and Carl Gustav anti-tank grenade launchers.

We are adding to our air surveillance and anti-aircraft systems. Additional air surveillance radar systems are being procured for the EDF and, with funding from the US, anti-aircraft radar systems and anti-aircraft control systems.

Close to 2,200 vehicles and engineer equipment are being replaced. Support tanks are being upgraded and CV9035 combat vehicles are being modernized.

The EDFʼs command and communication capabilities will also be

Alongside developing capabilities, battle readiness, will to defend and human resources questions are just as important.

strengthened, and modern battlefield administration and command system will be developed, increasing the imperviousness and security of the communication system and taking military communications to a new level.

We will continue developing EDF reconnaissance with both the necessary equipment and personnel.

The role of territorial defense in Estoniaʼs national defense is quite unique. It has a dedicated function and clear knowledge of the operation region. The goal is for territorial defense units to be smaller and more regional and local.

When the Defense Leagueʼs contingent in wartime structure increases to 9,500, more of these home guard volunteers will take part in territorial defense, fulfilling explicitly

military roles. Naturally, their equipment and weaponry will be exactly identical to the EDFʼs units being prepared. This will certainly help the Defense League have an even more significant place in the EDFʼs military structure, providing its specific knowledge.

Alongside developing capabilities, battle readiness, will to defend and human resources questions are just as important. In the near future, various activities have been at the centre of attention to make our decision-making and response capability even faster in all situations to ensure that national defense and its needs are known and supported in society and to make participation in national defense would be simple, interesting and motivating for activeduty troops, reservists and volunteers. ||

The procurement of K9 self-propelled howitzers has been one of the most important capability developments in recent years.

EDF photo by Cpl. Henrik Mütt

THE FIRST FULL YEAR OF THE PANDEMIC

LILLI GROSS Healthcare Specialist, General Staff, Estonian Defense Forces

Besides its everyday work defending Estonia, the Defense Forces also had to square off with the coronavirus pandemic. There was plenty of activity on this front both inside and outside the organization.

In early 2021, the 14-day infection rate per 100,000 people topped 600 (Dec. 30, 2020) and the vaccine had just become available for selected groups. Simultaneously with the new vaccines, the new British variant (alpha) reached Estonia in February. The strain, which was more transmissible than the variant before it, put such a burden on the state that the Health Board could not keep up with contact tracing. The wave of the pandemic was finally brought to an end by a lockdown.

The annual Exercise Kevadtorm (Spring Storm), the biggest of the year, was downscaled and subject to a few restrictions. The restrictions in place at that time (vaccine passes, rapid testing, masks) were used effectively at the exercise to prevent outbreaks.

Based on the lessons learnt from the first major mutation, other strains were also monitored throughout the year (South African, Brazilian, lambda). In the autumn, the delta variant that first reared its head in summer started spreading, restrictions lagged due to political events (elections) and by late autumn, hospitals were forced to again increase the number of beds reserved for covid patients and scheduled surgeries were postponed.

Here as well, EDF paramedics and medical equipment from wartime kits came in handy in amidst the shortage of health-

care workforce and medical equipment in hospitals and growing number of patients.

By the time delta, originally discovered in India, reached Estonia and escalated in autumn, the EDF had reached a vaccination rate of over 90%, and the vaccine appeared effective at preventing the spread of delta among the organization members. Vaccination rates among the July conscripts quickly rose to 95%.

In October and November, a certain rise in infection rates occurred in the EDF, which was to be expected, but due to the high vaccination percentage the wave quickly passed without major setbacks for daily training activities. As we entered 2022, the omicron strain was widespread.

In the context of all waves of covid, communication to EDF personnel regarding the situation was key. Information was disseminated at meetings, via or by emails sent out to all EDF employees and contractors. All year long, both mass testing and testing of symptomatic patients was done in the EDF to detect people with covid infections.

The expenses on lateral flow tests were noteworthy as a result. In 2021, a total of 39,000 rapid tests were ordered from the Central Pharmacy both for professional use and self-testing. In 2021, a total of 36,850 tests were administered. Every positive result was confirmed by a laboratory PCR test, which added about 50 euros per test to the budget.

A theme that was salient all year was vaccination, the only effective way of stopping the spread of virus. 2021 saw the

VIRUS. Isolation and other measures for preventing spread of infection, including timely and early vaccination, held off a potentially crippling wave in the Estonian Defense Forces.

COL. TARGO LUSTI Surgeon General of the Estonian Defense Forces

administration of both first and second doses of two-dose vaccines and the first booster shots.

The first vaccines arrived at the EDF in February, which allowed medics and troops heading out on international missions to be vaccinated in the first order. At the same time, risk groups and others to be prioritized for vaccinations were determined to ensure that the organization would remain sustainable.

An active period of vaccinations got going in May, when vaccines were approved for all age groups in Estonia. By the end of April, 1,187 of the EDF servicepersons had been vaccinated and by the end of July, the figure was 3,545. By the end of August, the vaccination rate in the EDF was 90%.

Vaccinations were provided consistently to both EDF staff and other institutions in the Ministry of Defenseʼs area of administration. At the same time, conscripts were also vaccinated. While the percentage of conscripts called up in January was 85%, the figure for the July wave was 95%. The October call-up included all fully vaccinated or partially vaccinated conscripts, which allowed them to begin the full extent of training immediately.

The Ministry of Defense area of administration was part of the whole. including a social media campaign headlined ”Pane õlg alla!” (Shoulder the responsibility). The Ministry of Defense covered news on vaccination in the EDF, highlighting the high percentage of vaccinated servicepersons and conscripts as a positive image.

Besides the figures it should also be pointed out that the real-life, nuts-and-bolts side of vaccination is more colorful and varied for EDF medics. It involved constant planning around vaccine shelf life, intervals between doses and duties of personnel and their state of health. Vaccination also meant ongoing consultation to allay skepticism and doubt in the new vaccine.

Under a request for professional assistance made by Minister of Health and Labor Tanel Kiik, EDF medics provided support for vaccinations of the population of Tallinn and carious communities in southern Estonia from August to September 2021. In Tallinn, 582 were vaccinated, and in southern Estonia, 57 people, totaling 639.

Besides our medics, volunteers from the Estonian Womenʼs Voluntary Defense Organization (NKK) provided assistance with registration, consultation and monitoring. The Ministry of Social Affairs vaccination steering group set the times

By the end of April, 1,187 of the EDF service members had been vaccinated and by the end of July, the figure was 3,545. By the end of August, the vaccination rate in the EDF was 90%.

The first vaccines arrived at the EDF in February. EDF photo by Sgt. 1st Class Ardi Hallismaa

and locations, which served the basis for planning activities.

On any given day, the vaccination team put in about six hours of work, plus time for transport, setup and packing up, including entering data into the digital patient registry. Twenty days of vaccination thus translated into 676 hours worked and 1541 km driven. The work at the Tallinn vaccination location was organized by way of internal work arrangements, i.e., it came at the expense of working time and the Health Centreʼs everyday activities, but the use of EDF medics at the southern Estonian vaccination location was feasible only on weekends, since medical courses took place on weekdays,

A positive aspect that should be mentioned is the EDFʼs support for vaccinating the population in general, along with visibility and assistance provided to the civilian population. The teams said talking to the public was positive: people were a delight to serve and grateful. Participants also noted the good cooperation with NKK members, with whom cooperation was smooth and who provided impeccable support. The biggest problem mentioned by medics was peopleʼs low interest in vaccination and the organization of how the location of the vaccination point was communicated in the southern Estonian region.

During all of 2021, the EDF continued to provide professional assistance to civilian hospitals in terms of both equipment and paramedics. West Tallinn Central Hospital was given 10 breathing apparatuses, two defibrillators, a monitor for 10 patients and 30 infusion pumps. East Tallinn Central Hospital received nine breathing machines, patient monitors for four patients, and five infusion pumps. Over the five weeks (weeks 44-48), when the spread of delta was at its peak, EDF paramedics helped out at both the North Estonia Medical Centre and Ida-Viru Central Hospital.

A key part of the plan to limit the spread of the virus is a workplace risk assessment, preparation of which began in January 2021, the goal being to determine the infection risks for each sector. At the same time, the EDF had only just started vaccinations and as said, EDF members in risk groups were given priority (medics, food service personnel, soldiers about to be deployed).

The risk assessment showed that risk level was highest among active-duty personnel, security personnel, medical

workers and conscripts; and lowest among support and administrative sectors.

In August, the risk assessment from the spring was reviewed and it was concluded that the situation (vaccines were now available for all) and legislation (the regulation on requirements for working environments impacted by biological hazards) had changed. Due to the wide spread of the novel coronavirus, the Cabinet of Ministers issued a regulation on 13 August requiring employers to guarantee the epidemiological safety of personnel in the work environment, above all through a certificate proving that employees had been vaccinated against COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2), recovery or testing employees for covid infection.

The new risk assessment evaluated the EDFʼs activities on the context of the duties imposed by law and individually for each base and building. The EDFʼs activity takes place largely in group format (training, exercises, staff work processes) which require constant contact between different servicemen and -women.

The obligation imposed by the regulation on employers to ensure lack of risk when coming into contact with others allowed the organization to require the corona pass from its staff members, proving either full vaccination or recovery. The corresponding directive, no. 162, was issued by the Commander of the Estonian Defense Forces on 31 August 2021.

The EDFʼs vaccine mandate set a precedent in Estonia, and other departments and institutions soon followed suit. It also resulted in a number of court disputes. In all cases, the courts sided with the EDF. The most significant rulings in 2021 were the two Supreme Court decisions published on 25 November, which found that courts had to review the content of the complaints filed in regard to the vaccination requirements established in the EDF. The administrative department of the EDF general staff was actively engaged in resolving the court disputes as 2021 ended. ||

A key part of the plan to limit the spread of the virus is a workplace risk assessment, preparation of which began in January 2021.

HYBRID ATTACK. Lithuania found itself forced to declare a state of emergency July 2, 2021, along its border with Belarus. A country that in 2020 accepted only 81 asylum seekers apprehended 470 illegal border crossers in June. The numbers soared into the thousands the following month.

REPELLING THE HYBRID MIGRANT ATTACK ON LITHUANIA AND POLAND

HEIKI SUURKASK Editor-in-chief, Sõdur magazine, Estonian Defense Forces

This crisis began in June 2021 with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenkaʼs decision to start recruiting human smugglers, drug traffickers and armed migrants to flood the borders of the EU countries that had criticized his dictatorship. As a result, the border guard administrations of Lithuania, Latvia and Poland were forced to close their frontier with Belarus in the face of thousands of illegal border crossing attempts. Through his actions, Lukashenka also managed to effectively close the border to domestic dissidents seeking refuge in the EU.

Migrants in Iraqi Kurdistan were offered ”legal” entry to the European Union and were charged 15,000 euros for visas, with an additional requirement of a large deposit in US dollars. Belarusian authorities were ordered to direct migrants arriving in Belarus to specific stretches of the border and coerce them to cross into the European Union.

By Aug. 7, 4,112 people had been detained, after which there was a slight respite. As of Nov. 9, 2021, the country of origin of the border violators broke

down as: 2,811 from Iraq, 204 from the Democratic Republic of Congo, 147 from Syria, 134 from Cameroon, and 101 from Afghanistan, among other countries. In early August, attempts to Latvia from Belarus were detected, although a major crisis there was averted.

On 26 July, close to 50 kilometers of barbed wire allocated from Estonian Defense Forces reserves was loaded onto trucks in Estonia for transport to Lithuania. In total, the amount of wire provided by Estonia would be close to 100 km. The EDF also sent two unmanned aerial vehicle crews to Lithuania for a period of time starting August 1, and later a third, to support Lithuania in repelling the hybrid attack.

”Our duty as allies and friends is to help the Lithuanians in every way possible,” said Maj. Gen. Veiko-Vello Palm, who saw off the consignment to Lithuania in his capacity as deputy Commander-in-Chief of the EDF In October, the EDF sent two military police officials and a service dog along with dog trainer to Lithuania for a period of time to strengthen security at Medininkai detention centre.

UAV team of the Estonian Defense Forces investigates map with Lithuanian Border Guard service member.

EDF photo by Sgt. Siim Verner Teder

Migrants in Iraqi Kurdistan were offered ”legal” entry to the European Union and were charged 15,000 euros for visas.

Poland also offered assistance to Lithuania. In early August, migrants began crossing from Belarus into Poland, which prompted a push by Poland to speedily reinforce the border. As of Nov. 11, Poland had recorded a total of 32,000 attempted border violations, of which approximately 3500 occurred in August, 7700 in September and 17,300 in October.

Estonia also decided to commit forces to support Poland. On the morning of Dec. 1, elements of the core group of the EDF task force departed Tallinn, Tapa and Paldiski bound for Poland. These forces began providing support to help Poland repel the hybrid attack on national security and combat the illegal migration via Belarus. The Estonian task force cooperated with the 18th Mechanized Division of the Polish Defense Forces. The name of the Estonian task force, Wisent, denotes a European bison, which plays an important part in Polish culture, symbolizing strength and power.

Estoniaʼs support for Poland was in the form of combat engineer and observation operations and recording

of audiovisual material. The core of the about 70-strong Estonian contingent was comprised of a platoon formed from the Scouts Battalion combat engineer platoon, and also included about 20 reservists. The task of the Estonian combat engineer platoon was to build and repair border barriers, the UAV crew began fulfilling observation assignments in the border region, while camera crews provided support in recording audiovisual material and a support element ensured logistical support for the task force.

After close to a month in Lublin Voivodeship, the members of the EDF task force returned to Estonia at yearʼs end. During the mission, the combat engineer platoon along with the Polish 18th Mechanized Division helped clear brush in the border area and install wire along 22 kilometers of the border.

”Itʼs very important for the Polish people that we are not alone in repelling the Belarusian hybrid attack and securing the border, but in the company of our friends and allies,” said the commander of the 18th Mechanized Division, Maj. Gen. Jarosław Gromadziński. ||

The name of the Estonian task force, Wisent, denotes a European bison, which plays an important part in Polish culture, symbolizing strength and power.

COMBAT CAMERA TEAMS GET THEIR FIRST TASTE OF ACTION ABROAD

☞

COMMUNICATION. In December 2021, two combat camera teams were among the units temporarily deployed to Poland. It was a litmus test for Cyber Command’s Strategic Communication Center (STRATCOM), because in the past, such teams had been used only within Estonia for media operations and support at exercises.

land, these reservist media professionals had a way of experiencing first-hand what to that point had been seen in the international media only through footage filmed from the Belarus side.

The hosting unit makes sure the combat camera teams, or CCTs, are linked up and interfaced to support the unit in media ops. The importance of CCT capability for NATO allies is underscored by a comment from Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki at a press conference – to repel a hybrid attack, Poland needs weapons that can be used in a propaganda war where the adversary resorts to use of migrants and disinformation.

The first CCTs were assembled from active-duty service members and other staff at STRATCOM and reservists. The National Defense Academy and the Defense League also picked up the slack. One aspect that proved a little tricky was involving the centreʼs reservists, since the exact date for shipping out was not known at the time of the call-up. Nevertheless, about 10 reservists responded in short order to the centreʼs call for support for Poland.

At first, the CCTs were to be manned in approximately twoweek rotations, an important factor when using reservists. After all, the reservists trained at the STRATCOM have day jobs at Estonia media outlets as reporters, photographers and camera operators and long absences from their everyday duties would not be conceivable. This time around, the CCTs included journalists from Estonian Public Broadcasting and Postimees newspaper.

The keen interest from the journalists in the reserves undoubtedly also stemmed from the fact that Poland was very protective of its information space and had prohibited media access to the border zone. Through joining the CCTs bound for Po-

COMBAT CAMERA TEAMS

Three-member tactical units consisting of a lead reporter, photographer and videographer that are able to record, edit and transmit photo and video footage to EDF units, allies and media outlets, accompanied by descriptive information and interview/ commentary.

Preparations for the deployment of the CCTs started with existing contacts at the Polish Ministry of Defense. The CCTsʼ potential future assignments were coordinated sector by sector with the ministry and operations staff. Our message to NATO allies from the beginning was that the CCTs would be sent to a cooperation exercise with the primary function of supporting Polish communication activity and also serve a public relations purpose for Estonia. Polandʼs clear interest was to show that it was not alone in repelling the attacks from Belarus.

After the decision by the Polish operations staff to assign the Estonian contingent to the southern area of the Polish-Belarusian border, the coordination with the public affairs officer of the 18th Mechanized Division resumed for using the CCTs in the border zone. The capabilities of the Estonian CCTs were verified, and coordination measures and the nature of the assignments ahead were agreed. The planned operating area of the CCTs in the Wisent (European bison) unit was in the Polish-Belarusian border zone in Lublin Voivodeship.

The formation and preparation of the teams was led by a sergeant from the STRATCOM who had just returned recently from serving as an public affairs NCO in Mali. The preparation differed from the usual as it included R20 rifle training for reservists who had not previously used this weapon. Mastering the use of photo and video equipment did not require separate effort. The Cyber Command provided the teams with the logistics and IT support they needed. The EDF General Staffʼs Strategic Communication Department briefed the teams on the power dynamic and trends in the information conflict.

The 18th Mechanized Division gave the Estonian teams a warm welcome, and the importance of their arrival was also stressed by the commander of the division, Maj. Gen. Jarosław Gromadziński at a meeting with the Estonian contingentʼs reconnaissance and preparatory group. He noted that the local population in the divisionʼs area of responsibility in eastern Poland supported

LT. COL. GEORGI KOKOŠINSKI Commander, Strategic Communication Centre, Cyber Command

the armed forces in repelling the attacks from Belarus; at the same time, the division did not have its own organic information warfare units.

The first tasks for the CCTs were related to signaling the arrival of the Estonian contingent. The 18th Mechanized Division commission photo and video material of the Lithuanian-Polish border crossing and their arrival at the places they were stationed. A key difference between the EDF and the Polish Defense Forces lay in the choice of social media channels employed. Whereas Facebook is the most important social media channel in Estonia, with over 600,000 users, Poland uses Twitter to reach its target audiences.

As a result, the CCTs also changed the output: 10-15-second video clips better geared to Twitter were produced for Polandʼs use. The segments intended for PR in the Estonian direction were about 50% longer.

As they oriented and adjusted to the rhythms, the CCTs fulfilled different assignments showing cooperation between Poland and Estonia in strengthening the border, including the Estonian combat engineer platoon at work building border fortifications. In addition, specific sites were filmed and the service and everyday conditions for the Polish soldiers were portrayed. The tour of duty of the first CCTs also included covering the visits of the Polish president and defense minister in the border zone and, during the run-up to the Christmas holidays, greetings from Polish soldiers sent to their families back home and to Polish society in general.

All of the Polish OPSEC – operation security – rules had to be followed, which unlike the ordinary exercises and training imposed heightened requirements on the CCTs. For example, the exact locations of the units or their operating area could not be disclosed. Defense forces members could not be identifiable in the audiovisual material, unless they were designated spokespersons.

During their service period, the CCTs did not manage to capture migrants actually attempting a crossing, even though they had the technical capability to do so. That was because most of the attempts were made during nighttime hours. Nor were the CCTs explicitly assigned to capture migrant activity.

The footage from the Estonian unitʼs CCTs was widely used on the social media channels used by Polandʼs defense sector – at the political/strategic, operational and tactical levels. Estonian CCTs drew encouragement from the fact that the video footage they produced was broadcast on Polish TV with millions of viewers. Photo galleries and video news segments on Wisentʼs activity also made it back to Estonia at the same time. The footage was used to produce news segments for Estonian Public Broadcasting and other media channelsʼ news programs.

The CCTsʼ stint in Poland gave the STRATCOM notable interoperating with one of Estoniaʼs most important allies. Both sides learned from one another. While the EDF was able to put its operating principles, procedures and specialized equipment in the field of strategic communication to the test, the cooperation has led Poland to consider developing a similar capability within their own armed forces.

Upon returning from the cooperation exercise and drawing its conclusions, the teams highlighted that the one basis for the success of special unit is a sufficiently fast and stable internet connection. It is extremely important because of the large volumes of the audiovisual material being recorded and edited and there is usually a limited timeframe for filing it to the client. These aspects will be taken into account by the Cyber Command as a whole in planning the next exercises and operations.

As a result of the good rapport, cooperation and exchange of experience, Poland has taken concrete steps to establishing CCTs with photo and video capability for at least some of its brigades and divisions. It has already started recruiting personnel with the relevant skills. The creation of the CCTs will support rapid dissemination of messages in information warfare, which has by now become a conventional part of conflicts.

As a token of gratitude for the good execution and smooth cooperation, the 18th Mechanized Division gave Cyber Command STRATCOM the unit’s commemorative coin.

The experience of the Cyber Commandʼs first CCTs has been taken into consideration in planning subsequent deployments of CCTs. The objective of STRATCOM is to provide valuable experience to a broader segment of personnel. Alongside active-duty and reserve troops, conscripts also have an opportunity here – they can undergo specialized training as reporters, photographers or videographers. ||

Photo by Task Force Wisent

The tour of duty of the first CCTs also included covering the visits of the Polish president and defense minister in the border zone and, during the run-up to the Christmas holidays, greetings from Polish soldiers sent to their families back home and to Polish society in general.

EXERCISE. From March to June 2021, the American-led Exercise Defender Europe was held, aimed at evaluating and demonstrating the operational readiness of NATO allies and partners and interoperability on a large scale.

EXERCISE SWIFT RESPONSE 2021 GIVES THE AIR FORCE’S CAPABILITIES A WORKOUT

LT. COL. MARK TRUBOK Commander, Ämari Air Base, Estonian Air Force

The exercise was divided into several stages and one of the most important in which the EDF and Air Force took part directly was Exercise Swift Response 2021. The main emphasis of the exercise was on airborne landing operations by combat units in two operational directions: the northern part of the region – Estonia – and the southern part – Bulgaria and Romania. The airborne landing operations involved a total of 7,000 fighters with combat equipment and military personnel from 11 countries were involved. In Estonia, close to 1000 troops and 30 units of combat equipment were landed.

The airborne landing of the battalion-sized unit was followed by movement from the landing site to the operation area. It should be mentioned that only a few

hours were planned between the landing operation and the tactical movement. This particular aspect made the exercise unique, complicated planning, and intensified work at the Air Force command points.

The differences to ordinary troop movements practiced many times in the past became apparent. It should be mentioned that the number of aircraft necessary for the landing operation and ensuing movement operation was over 30. Also significant was that about one-third of the aircraft arrived in Estonia directly from the US.

Third, the landing was planned for the night-time hours; and fourth, the most complicated task – nine C-17 type transport planes were moved to Estonia, which involved an unprecedented amount of coordination: above all, procedures in Estonian airspace and then landing, post-landing and pre-flight procedures in Ämari.

Besides the above; the fact that the availability of C-17 transport planes for supporting the landing was subject to

time limits: five hours + two hours as an reserve being established for support for the airborne landing operations. This type of limit was established to optimize the use of strategic aircraft in terms of time and allow combat activity to flow at a fast operational pace.

A bit of explanation and figures are necessary to give laymen an idea of what the Air Force actually has to contend with.

Letʼs assume that the fundamentals and/or preconditions for planning were wrong/mistaken or if the special equipment for servicing the aircraft had failed or the service personnel had fallen ill (the exercise was held during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic) – then a subsidiary goal of the exercise – the rapid movement of units –would have gone unfulfilled.

After that, rapid action would be required in ordinary peacetime conditions and that would have meant that refuelling operations alone would have taken about 14.5 hours.

Based on the above, it should be stressed that because of the large scale of

RESOURCES USED

▶ close to 80 Air Base troops;

▶ close to 20 different units of specialized equipment;

▶ about 500,000 litres of aviation fuel.

the exercise and its specific profile, all of the responsibility was placed on the shoulders of the Estonian Air Force, since air procedures could not be carried out under supervision of civilian air traffic controllers or pursuant to civilian flight rules.

For that reason, coordination of all ground-air-ground flight information, including vertical and lateral dispersion, had to be take place under the supervision of air operations centre specialists – civilian participants did not have the powers, ability or competencies to engage in these activities.

Allied aircraft landed at Ämari Air Base at night.

EDF photo by Sgt. 1st Class Ardi Hallismaa

To sum up: this type of exercise demonstrates that the Estonian Air Force, in cooperation with its allies, is capable of supporting operations of this size with a fairly short lead time. It should also be noted that all C-17 aircraft were service in five hours and 23 minutes even though one piece of refuelling equipment experienced a failure at the worst possible time.

As inevitably happens in aviation, the weather also affected our plans and the airborne landing was postponed by 24 hours. ||

▶ A couple weeks before the airborne landing, a support teams of logisticians arrived in Ämari.

▶ The necessary activities were coordinated on the spot, and in cooperation with Air Base planners, various options were tabled in case poor weather prevented the landing operation from going ahead.

▶ The following principal efforts had to be made beforehand:

▶ Nine C17+ planes arrived in Estonian airspace as a joint formation.

▶ Once in Estonian airspace, another six C-130 aircraft were added to the detachment, which took off from other European countries to reinforce the landing operation.

▶ Tactical verification of the transport planes had to be ensured in the landing area to ensure that the landing would go safely and without miscues.

▶ Immediately after the landing in central Estonia, the air detachment had to be disbanded once again with nine C-17s routed to Ämari and six C-130s to Lithuania.

▶ Upon arriving in Ämari airspace, the aircraft had to be directed the Air Base landing area.

▶ In Ämari, the aircraft had to be landed at three-minute intervals.

EXERCISE’S OPERATIONAL MODEL

2ND

CONFIRMATION OF TRAINING GOALS

Use of the IFVs for each operation had to be very carefully planned to leave enough resources of key importance for the next actions.

This exercise allowed identification and elimination of the kinds of shortcomings that arise when commanding multiple units on real terrain. In spite of the fact that the exercise again was held at the central training ground, which does not exactly offer varied terrain, several valuable lessons were learned from commanding a larger number of troops, and having to interoperate with different partners offered additional value.

Three maneuver battalions of the 2nd infantry brigade are trained in the 2nd Infantryʼs peacetime Kuperjanov Infantry Battalion. Every three years, a new set of personnel replaces the one before it. In 2021, it was time for the 22nd Infantry Battalion to take their place in the rotation, and they were also the ones evaluated in the course of the exercise.

A positive evaluation attests to good training and fighting ability. Although the battalionʼs command consists of National Defense Academy personnel, who were away from the unitʼs direct training every day, Kevadtorm 2021 showed that sufficient interoperability and rapport are fostered by the current practice where as many of the unitʼs wartime commanders as possible are in lead roles during the unitʼs training period.

At Kevadtorm, one Scouts Battalion company was under the command of the 2nd Infantry, with CV 9035 infantry fightning vehicles. Their involvement prompted excitement and also meant some challenges to solve, because the strategy of using such vehicles is not an everyday occurrence and required practice.

For example, a company-size unit was placed at our disposal but they could only be used for a limited number of kilometers.

The existence of the infantry combat vehicles offered a good opportunity for deception, making the adversary think the company was in a different location. One combat vehicle driving around was enough to mislead the adversary while the rest of the company patiently hid in the forest. The adversary only learned the actual location and the brigadeʼs plan when it was already too late.

As Exercise Kevadtorm drew near, as the planning became more intense, the 2nd Infantry learned that the Poles and French would also support us. The Poles would be enact a classical reconnaissance unit while the French would bring high-tech capabilities – electronic warfare units.

Everyone had a good understanding of the Polish role, and cooperation with the unit went smoothly during the exercise. The addition of the French EW unit at the most fast-paced time at first seemed like an additional burden that might potentially only be a headache. The actuality was something else. The French were the ones who gave a good assessment as to where the adversaryʼs units were, and they could do this in real-time if needed. So while we were a little skeptical about how to insert the EW units into the equation at the last minute, the support we received from them quickly proved to be of critical importance.

In spite of the limited combat space, we were able to learn a few things from Kevadtorm 2021 – both from our own unitsʼ perspectives and that of the partners involved – before the brigade is set to practice functioning of its full force at Siil 2022. ||

INFANTRY BRIGADE. Exercise Kevadtorm (Spring Storm) 2021 was the most recent major exercise where units were not only stationed at command posts but operated on open terrain with their actual personnel.

ENSIGN JULIUS KOPPEL Civil Affairs Officer, 2nd Infantry Brigade

A reserve service member of the 22nd Infantry Battalion prepares to repel enemy attacks during exercise Spring Storm 2021. EDF photo by Junior Sgt. Mark-Erik Tölpt

ALLIES. Since 2017, when the first forces from NATO´s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) were deployed to Estonia, thousands of soldiers and officers from the UK, Denmark, France and Belgium have integrated with their Estonian colleagues, standing firm to deter any adversary and being ready to contribute to the collective defense of Estonia.

FIVE YEARS OF ENHANCED FORWARD PRESENCE IN ESTONIA

BJORN MALMQUIST Public Affairs Officer, NATO eFP Estonia

The mission has presented some unique opportunities to conduct training in a physical environment and conditions that most Allied soldiers have never encountered before. Not only is more than half of Estonia covered with forests; but peat wetlands make up nearly a quarter of the terrain. The summers can be quite warm and humid and during the winter, extreme cold can set in for days on end.

”The Danish units that have been deployed to Estonia have learned a lot from their Estonian counterparts about fighting and maneuvering in the forest and brush, where low visibility and obstacles have to be taken into account for ambush tactics and defensive positions,” says Lt. Col. Thomas Fogh, who served as the Commander of the Royal Danish Army contingent in Tapa and Deputy Commander of eFP Estonia in 2020-2021. ”For my soldiers, this was a very rewarding and valuable experience, and I can safely say that it has brought about changes in our tactics, techniques and procedures.”

”Being in Estonia gave us both time and space to rethink old ways of facing challenges,” says Lt. Col. Dean Canham, commanding officer of the 1 Mercian Battlegroup, deployed to Estonia last year. ”Apart from the primary task of integrating into the Estonian 1st Brigade in Tapa, we were also able to experiment with new things.

Having the same personnel for six months – a captive audience if you like – gave us a very good opportunity to be inventive and make progress in our operations.”

”Our participation in eFP has given us a very good opportunity to practice interoperability with our Estonian and UK colleagues,” says Col. Eric Mauger, the commander of the French forces deployed to Estonia 2021-2022. ”Nearly 300 soldiers and officers, drawn from the artillery, infantry, cavalry and engineer regiments across the French Army were stationed in Tapa, including the Leclerc battle tanks, and this composition fit very well within the Battlegroup and the Estonian 1st Brigade. It was both an honor and a privilege to be part of Estoniaʼs defense. Our deployment also gave us a very good opportunity to be focused on our training, both within our ranks and even more importantly, with our Estonian and UK partners.”

EASY ACCESS TO TRAINING

Constant training is the hallmark of any credible military force and the eFP Battlegroup in Tapa is no exception. But whereas UK, Danish and French forces based in their homelands have to plan exercises long in advance to get access to training grounds such as the Salisbury plains in the UK or Canjuerz in France, the troops in Tapa have

easy access to the 119-square-kilometer Central Training Area (CTA) situated close to the base.

”While the UK provides great training facilities, our presence in Tapa gave us additional opportunities to test our abilities in a very different environment,” said Lt. Col. Jim Hadfield, Commander 5 Rifles Battlegroup and CO of eFP´s Battlegroup in Estonia in 2020 in an interview with Baltic Amber last year. ”In Tapa, we could arrange exercises on short notice - it´s no exaggeration when I say that my officers could contact their counterparts in the Estonian 1st Brigade and by the end of the day our units would be out in the woods doing combined maneuvers or other exercises.”

From 1957 to 1992, the CTA was part of a bigger training area used by the Soviet Army. Today, Estonian and Allied troops conduct exercises there, including Exercise Hedgehog, last held in 2018, the annual Exercise Spring Storm, and Exercise Winter Camp - a two-week-long exercise focusing on winter warfare.

Temperatures plummeted during Winter Camp in early February last year, hitting a low of well under minus 20 degrees Celsius, on top of heavy snowfall that covered the CTA (and much of the rest of Estonia). These extreme conditions presented new challenges for the armoured infantry of the 5 Rifles Battlegroup and the Queen´s Royal Hussars Regiment and their Challenger 2 Main Battle tanks.

”Itʼs definitely a new experience for a lot of the commanders out here and the crews, weʼre learning an awful lot from the Estonians about how they use their vehicles, and weʼre trying to adapt it that with our heavier tanks, we can do the same, and support them in such a good way,” said Cpl. Chris Barrowman of the 5 Rifles in an interview with Estonian Public Broadcasting during Winter Camp.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CROSS-BORDER EXERCISES

The proximity of the CTA in Tapa and the relative ease with which the Allied soldiers and their Estonian colleagues can set up both small and large scale exercises is not the only benefit that the military units enjoy: every year soldiers from Tapa take part in exercises both in Lithuania and Latvia, where the largest training facility in the Baltic states is located in Ādaži, near Riga. There, soldiers from the eFP Battlegroup, along with their Estonian counterparts have taken part in various activities such as the large-scale exercise Furious Axe, where

The exchange ceremony of NATO eFP UK units at Tapa military base, March 25, 2021.

EDF photo by Cpl. Oliver Turp

the interoperability between Estonian and Allied units was validated in 2020.

eFP troops have also participated in Exercise Iron Spear, an armoured gunnery competition hosted by the eFP Battlegroup in Latvia. In Lithuania, units from the eFPs in Estonia and Latvia have taken part in exercises such as Iron Wolf, held to certify the ability of the Lithuanian Army´s mechanized infantry brigade Iron Wolf to operate with other NATO units.

The opportunity to conduct multi-national exercises and training does not only entail moving heavy equipment over the borders of the Baltic states; the permanent

presence of NATO Air Policing units in Estonia and Lithuania also offers opportunities to strengthen cooperation and enhance integration between the various elements of NATO forces in the region. A good example is the biannual Furious Wolf exercise, where Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTAC) from various NATO countries come together and work with the fighter pilots stationed at Ämari Air Base in Estonia and Šiauliai Air Base in Lithuania.

”Furious Wolf is a great demonstration of the unity and cooperation between the different NATO forces,” said former eFP Estonia Commander, Col. Paul Clayton,

The permanent presence of NATO Air Policing units in Estonia and Lithuania offers opportunities to strengthen cooperation and enhance integration.

during one phase of the March 2021 exercise in that was conducted in the town of Rakvere in Estonia. JTACs from Estonia, UK, Lithuania and other NATO forces were situated in the medieval Rakvere Castle, directing simulated operations with Italian and German Eurofighters coming from the bases in Lithuania and Estonia.

STRONGER TOGETHER

”The training opportunities we have had here in Estonia have in many ways brought about changes in the way we approach warfare, both on this unique terrain that is the Estonian forest and bogs and in extreme

weather conditions that we sometimes encounter here,” says Col. Dai Bevan, the current Commander of eFP Estonia. ”Throughout the years, we have learned a lot from our Estonian counterparts, and I also know that they have learned from this experience as well. But the ultimate benefit from all of this is the constant integration and ever-increasing level of interoperability between the UK, French, Danish and Estonian military units that have trained here together since 2017, in order to present a combat-credible force that is capable of deterring an adversarial force and defend Estonia.” ||

The cooperation of Allied units during exercise Winter Camp 2021.

EDF photo by 1st Lt. Marina Loštšina

ALLIES. Just like the Royal Tank Regiment, the UK military unit that now leads the NATO Battlegroup in Estonia, the French contingent is now fully integrated into the Estonian 1st Infantry Brigade, becoming part of Estoniaʼs national defense plan.

AN HONOR AND A PRIVILEGE TO

BJORN MALMQUIST Public Affairs Officer, NATO eFP Estonia

Having completed two eight-month missions in 2017 and 2019, the French Army is now contributing troops to the NATO Battlegroup in Tapa, Estonia, for a period of 12 months, alternating with the Danish contingent.

”Our participation in eFP gives us a very good opportunity to practice interoperability with our Estonian and UK colleagues,” says Col. Eric Mauger, Commander of the French forces in Estonia, and Deputy Commander of NATOʼs enhanced Forward Presence.

The current French contingent is drawn from the artillery, infantry and en-

gineer regiments across the French Army.

”We have nearly 300 soldiers and officers in Tapa, where the Battlegroup is located, and the composition of our contingent, including the Leclerc battle tanks, fits very well within the NATO Battlegroup and the Estonian 1st Brigade,” says Mauger. ”It is both an honor and a privilege to be part of another countryʼs defense. Our deployment in Estonia also gives us a very good opportunity to be focused on our training, both within our ranks, but even more importantly with our Estonian and UK partners. This mission is also important; we are in a geo-strategic location and our main task is to deter any adversaries. We do that by being ready and being prepared to contribute to the defense of Estonia.”

Estonia was the first country to support France on Operation Takuba in Mali, by sending members of the Estonian Special Forces to participate.

SERVE HERE

The presence of French forces in Tapa is not the only example of military cooperation between France and Estonia. Since 2018, Estonian soldiers have taken part in the French-led operation Barkhane in Mali. Currently, a platoon of Estonian soldiers is there, contributing to force protection. Additionally, Estonia was the first country to support France on Operation Takuba in Mali, by sending members of the Estonian Special Forces to participate.

”Some of our soldiers in Tapa have taken part in the operations in Mali and they have been able to share their experience with the Estonian soldiers who also deploy to Mali,” says Mauger. ”We have organized special exercises for this purpose, so that when the Estonian soldiers

arrive in Mali they are rapidly integrated into the team.”

During his long military career, Col. Mauger has served as commander of the 93rd Regiment dʼArtillerie de Montagne (Mountain Artillery Regiment), and his operational experience includes deployments in Western Sahara, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali.

”This is my first time in Estonia and I must say I am really impressed with the level of professionalism and capabilities of the Estonian Defense Forces,” says Maurer. ”The French contingent will stay here until March next year, when the Danish forces arrive, and we will be back in 2023, to continue our involvement and contribution to the defense of Estonia.” ||

The arrival of French troops to Estonia at Ämari Air Base, March 9, 2021.

EDF photo by Sgt. 1st Class Ardi Hallismaa

The medal ceremony at Tapa military base.

EDF photo by Pvt. Karl Kraus

SCOUTS. Part of the 1st Infantry Brigade, the Scouts Battalion is an armoured infantry force with standing strike force capabilities.

ALWAYS POISED TO STRIKE

AIJA Commander,

To maintain battle readiness last year, we had to make considerable adjustments to how battalion membersʼ service: during the peak of the virus, personnel were rotated to reduce potential contacts.

On one hand, this certainly marked a change in routine and required rearrangements but also proved that, when needed, the Scouts ware ready to put personal interests aside in order to achieve a bigger goal. The around-the-clock service provided an opportunity for commanding officers to raise esprit de corps and keep the caliber of training as high as possible.

Last year saw the continuation of training exercises meant to test and maintain battle readiness and these confirmed that regardless of where they are or what they were doing, the Scouts are ready to pivot and arrive on the scene as soon as the signal is given. We are grateful for to our broader support structure for making this quick responsiveness possible –i.e. our families, who are still prepared to shoulder domestic duties when we have to go into ”battle”.

The Scouts also demonstrated their capacity for flexible and fast response at the exercise Okas 2021 reservist training. Long critical sections of state border needed to be reinforced with temporary barriers – a task complicated enough to necessitate calling on the Scouts Battalion to help. People were needed to build barriers in specific places as instructed by Police and Border Guard. A company-sized unit came together under combat readiness procedure and in a short time, equipment and men and women in vehicles were ready to start making their way toward Southern Estonia.

LT. COL. EERO

Scouts Battalion, 1st Infantry Brigade

A service member of Scouts Battalion fires a MG3 machine gun at Adaži training ground, Latvia.

EDF photo by Marina Loštšina

The Scouts also responded quickly to Polandʼs request for assistance and was ready to start travelling south without delay. Polish representatives said that the active-duty personnel from the Scouts Battalion and the units formed from volunteer reservists were of great use in repelling the hybrid migrant attacks from Belarus. Our Polish brothers-in-arms had nothing but praise for the work, skills and will of the soldiers.

Everyday cooperation with allies increases with each passing year. In 2021 as well, we fulfilled an important role in integration with the NATO combat group serving in Tapa, playing the role of the adversary at tactical training exercises and dispensing advice to allies how to operate successfully on the diverse and unfamiliar terrain in Estonia. Operating on both sides of the simulated conflict at various training exercises made a strong contribution to the development of the Scouts Battalion.

We improved our ability to quickly and effectively integrate into our ranks capabilities that the EDF had been lacking and to ensure command and communication. At a number of training exercises, our armoured infantry companies served as a strike force together with embedded UK tank units. Valuable experience was gained from exercise Kevadtorm (Spring Storm), where a Danish armoured infantry unit was embedded into Scouts Battalion.

an international environment played a role in the impressive result.

Although the main personnel in the Scouts Battalion are the same in both peacetime and wartime, we do also factor in the Scouts who continue their service in the reserve. Some of them once served as active-duty personnel in the Battalion, and others served there as conscripts. Last year, we managed to update the knowledge and skills of many of our reservists at the reservist training, teaching them the use of new assault weapons and infantry fighting vehicles.

In 2021, the full changeover to new weapons – something that was long awaited – took place. A total of 37 CV90Mk infantry fightninh vehicles that lacked turrets were rebuilt and soon all of the battalionʼs components will be using tracked armoured vehicles. The new vehicles will have night-time capability and shielded machine gun turrets. All of the vehicles will also have special equipment to support combat operations. The winner of the procurement contract will be required to provide lifecycle support service for the next seven years.

We must admit much work lies ahead: adjustments need to be made to tactics, training of soldiers, proficiency in vehicles, and finally to settling into their permanent operating mode. But I am confident that just as the infantry succeeded in making the quick transition from armoured personnel carriers to infantry fighting vehicles, the

The French contingent also made a contribution in pre-mission training, giving Scouts the necessary experience, and certainly contributed to a rapid and smooth orientation upon arrival in the theater of mission operations.

We also demonstrated the Scoutsʼ ability to quickly relocate and integrate into allied units as part of the Danish combat group in the international battalion taking part in the NATO Readiness Initiative.

The Scouts Battalionʼs armoured infantry company arrived in Denmark at night and by noon the next day they were ready to execute combat assignments within the Danish-led international battalion. The EDF logisticiansʼ and support unitsʼ professionalism and experience working in

adaptation to their new ”steeds” will not cause any trouble for the combat support units, either. The fact that the rebuild of the new vehicles into armoured vehicles for combat engineer, anti-aircraft, anti-tank and other support units is taking place in Estonia will simplify both vehicle development and later maintenance.

Last year cannot be called an easy one. Although from time to time we were disappointed that we could not organize gatherings and seminars in the necessary format and that the smaller scale of exercises did not confer the same level of learning experience, we see now upon closing the book on 2021 that we did manage to do everything we needed and a little bit more. ||

Scouts preparing 120 mm mortar rounds in exercise Teraskilp 2021.

EDF photo by Marina Loštšina

At a number of training exercises, our armoured infantry companies served as a strike force together with embedded UK tank units.

1ST LT. SVEN LUIK Commander, ESTGUARD-4 platoon, Estonian Defense League

The task of ESTGUARD-4 was to offer mobile force protection for NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) and partnersʼ personnel in the Greater Baghdad area as they provided instructors, advisers and support staff to Iraq security forces and government institutions. The mission took place from July to December 2021.

The mission of the NMI, established in July 2018, was to advise the Iraq security forces and government institutions to stabilize the country, help combat terrorism and prevent ISIS from returning. In early 2020, the Danish government contacted Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania requesting participation with a force protection group on the mission as part of the Danish company.

Since the EDF had a full plate elsewhere, the Ministry of Defense proposed that the Defense League take on the mission. The Commander of the Defense League accepted the offer and preparations began. As a result of the recruitment drive, close to 100 candidates from volunteer members of the organizations across Estonia applied. Since the platoon was to have 36 slots, candidates faced a thorough battery of tests (physical test, marksmanship, etc.) and were interviewed by the platoonʼs command.

The applicants were drawn from all 13 defense districts. A temporary unit called ESTGUARD-4 was formed after the mandate for the mission was received in January 2021. The selected members were given active-duty status and long and busy days of training began under the instruction of the platoonʼs command and Defense League instructors. The organization of the entire training took place using Defense League facilities and resources. The main location was at Männiku and the vicinity, and the Harju defense district infrastructure was used.

For the marksmanship camps, the platoon travelled to different training areas

A DEFENSE LEAGUE PLATOON’S DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ

in Estonia. The weeklong final exercise was held in the town of Võru and surrounding communities, where in spite of the challenging situation with covid, conscripts from the Kuperjanov Battalion and local key civilian representatives helped out. The strenuous but very successful final exercise was led by Cpt. Siim Saavaste (Valga County defense district).

The pre-mission training consisted of two main parts: infantry training and the deployment specific training. In six of the 16 planned weeks, the focus was placed on infantry training. That ensured greater parity in terms of the membersʼ ability levels, where they could act in lockstep, and prepared it for ”just in case” activities.

Infantry training was supported and organized by Christopher Alan Sheppard,

VOLUNTEERS. Estonians deployed to Iraq as part of the Danish-led force protection company, including Danes, Estonians, Spanish and Poles.

Estonian Defense League service members sitting in a helicopter in Iraq. EDF photo by ESTGUARD-4

who had previously trained the Estonian platoons that served in Operation Iraq Freedom. The specific training had two parts: the basic training organized by the military police and supplementary course organized by reserve Cpt. Andrei Ambrosʼs. Ambros had just returned from Iraq; where he had provided personal protection for an extended period for a private contractor. His knowledge and experience of local conditions allowed the unit to relatively easily hit the ground running when they arrived in the theater of operations.

As said, the Estonians deployed as part of the Danish-led international force protection company, including Danes, Estonians, Spanish and Poles. Quite shortly thereafter, because NMI was expanded, a force protection task force consisting of two

companies was established: an international company and a Spanish company. The platoon had great freedom of movement on the mission. The operation area was all of Baghdad (both the Green Zone and the Red Zone) plus Camp Taji and Camp Rustimayah. Personal protection assignments were carried out in 40 different locations. ESTGUARD-4 carried out a total of 308 protection assignments during the mission.

in general, the assignments are carried out in five stages. Actions were planned first at the platoon and at the squad level; the patrol checked over the equipment and readied vehicles for the assignment. Thereafter, advisers were provided with secure transport to the site in armoured minibus and SUVs, security was provided for their work on site and they were taken back to the base. The assignment concluded with equipment check and patrol feedback to identify areas for improvement.

The feedback gave the unit the capability of adapting and developing throughout the operation. It was especially important on the first half of the mission, where the unit changed or corrected its operation methods based on the feedback.

Besides personal protection, ESTGUARD-4 also carried out recon and QRF assignments. The quick reaction force assignments included support patrols where force protection unit(s) were outside of Baghdad. The aim of reconnaissance assignments mainly involved developing backup routes and updating data on obstacles (checkpoints and so on) along the route.

Feedback from the force protection platoon command and colleagues was very positive. What was significant was that the NMI command expressed the desire for the Estonians to serve on subsequent rotations. The platoonʼs success gave the Defense League members the ability to adjust quickly, understand the local conditions, and the calm and courage to engage in interaction. ||

Advisers were provided with secure transport to the site in armoured minibus and SUVs, security was provided for their work on site and they were taken back to the base.

FLEET. As individuals the virus had a big impact on us, but as an organization, not so much.

THE NAVY TRANSITIONS TO A DIVISION-BASED STRUCTURE

COMMODORE JÜRI SASKA Commander, Estonian Navy

The Navy was able to carry out the activities that were within our control. If anything was left undone, it was because an exercise or operation not in our remit was cancelled.

In the preliminary analysis for the National Defense Development Plan up to 2030, we described military capabilities needed for defending Estonia at sea and from the sea. The central weapons system for this purpose is the naval mine, the use of which is supported by other naval capabilities. These are anti-surface-vessel, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft capabilities. The foundation of military defense at sea comes down to our situation awareness and command capability. As a result of the preliminary analysis, procurement contracts for the purchase of naval mines and anti-surface missile systems have been signed.

Organizationally speaking, the biggest change of the year was the reinstatement of the Navyʼs staff and the transition to a division-based structure. In addition, the position of Deputy Commander of the Navy was created. The Deputy Commander is responsible for filling in for the Commander, and on a daily basis is in charge of the Navyʼs combat readiness. The everyday instrument of the Deputy Commander of the Navy is the Maritime Operations Centre, which incorporates the Communication and Surveillance Centre.

The Navyʼs 1st Division shoulders the function of waging mine warfare and includes the Divers Squad. The 2nd Division focuses on coastal defense; and the 3rd Division, on operational logistics. The Centre of Naval Education and Training continues as a separate entity.

A Lindormen-class minelayer EML Wambola (A433) takes part in the cooperation exercise of UK and Baltic navies.

EDF photo by Junior Sgt. Mark-Erik Tölpt

The 1st Division continues use of the symbols of the former naval mine ships division, while new insignia were created for the 2nd Division and the 3rd Division continues use of the existing Naval Base insignia. The Navy will have one flag – the warship stern flag.

The most fundamental of the changes in the Navyʼs structure is the creation of the 2nd Division, charged with training conscripts for all parts of the Navy, operating anti-surface weapons and surveillance systems on shore, force protection and harbor defense. The number of conscripts in the near future will grow to close to 300 conscripts per year, it is currently around 50.

In the beginning of the year, we took possession of the force protection patrol boats – the P01 Roland and P02 Risto. Although they are small and basic vessels, it has been quite time-consuming to get them ready for service. This has been due to the need for accreditation and installation of various communication and surveillance equipment. The intensity of the use of P01 and P02 shows how essential they are for us.

They have performed identifications at sea, hosted cadet practical training and transported personnel. The patrol boats have also given opportunities for calling at small Estonian ports and islands, something that was not possible before. The patrol boats are part of the 2nd Division and their main function is to provide force protection at sea.

NEW CAPABILITIES

Mine warfare is characterized by several old saws, like ”every ship makes a good minesweeper – at least once” or ”a naval mine is a poor manʼs missile”, as illustrated by events from the recent past.

In the first Gulf War in 1991, Iraqi forces had laid 1300 sea mines right under the noses of the coalition, as it were, which significantly limited the coalition forcesʼ ability to operate at will and slowing the pace of the operation. Mines damaged two warships, which forced a halt to a planned amphibious landing due to the risk of higher casualties.

This reflected the US Navyʼs experience four decades previously off the eastern coast of North Korea; where a field of over 3,000 sea mines repelled Operation Wonsan in October 1950. The commander of the operation unit, Rear Admiral Allen E. Smith reported: ”The U.S. Navy has lost control of the seas in Korean waters to a nation without a Navy, using pre-World War I

weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.”

Mine-laying is tactical, but minesʼ effect is strategic. The main reason is the fact that principle of freedom of the seas is paramount, and thus impeding or diverting international maritime traffic has a direct influence on peaceful navigation. Without going into the details of international law of the sea, a naval mine affects all parties, even those without territorial waters or ships.

A good example was the recent accident involving a container ship in the Suez Canal, which set off a chain reaction of disruptions in global supply chains. Naval mines do something similar. The cause is different from an immobilized ship, but the result is the same.

Besides naval mines, the coming years will see delivery of anti-surface missile systems to Estonia. In autumn 2021, the Estonian Centre for Defense Investment signed a contract for procurement of Blue Spear weapon systems – part of the Gabriel anti-ship missile family. Besides influencing surface targets, Blue Spears can also hit land targets. The batteries will be controlled by the 2nd Division and their main function will be anti-surface countermeasures.

MERGING FLEETS

In the closing weeks of 2021, the Estonian Cabinet decided on merging the Police and Border Guard (PPA) and the Defense Forces vessels into a single fleet. This is a key step to shore up maritime security. As a small country, we do not have the luxury of having multiple fleets with a security orientation, with much overlap in their peacetime activities. Such an overlap would go against the principles of comprehensive national defense.

Various tabletop exercises and masterʼs theses and other research have demonstrated many times over that this was the right step. The need for this consolidation was first written about by German naval officers serving as advisers to the Estonian Navy back in 1996.

The essence of the Cabinet decision was: the PPAʼs four largest ships – the Kindral Kurvits, the Raju, the Valve and the Pikker – would be merged into the Naval Flotilla. The EDF was assigned the task of cleaning up spills and coast guard duties, and will support the PPA in responding to maritime rescue incidents in territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone. The Joint Rescue Coordi-

The ceremony of Estonan Navy’s 103rd anniversary.

nation Centre (JRCC) will share the same premises with the Maritime Operations Centre. JRCC is responsible for rescue at sea and the EDF will be in charge of sea surveillance, spill cleanup and guarding the sea border.

The ”Red Building” on the territory of the Miinisadam Harbor will be the location of the joint premises. What is important is that now, as a result of the changes, an official body responsible for maritime situation awareness – the EDF – has now been defined from the stateʼs perspective. This will create possibilities for more effective coordination and organization of the use of Estoniaʼs resources at sea.

years. That In itself is a badge of quality – of trust that has to be earned.

Human resources are our dearest asset and we have little of them. The last year was not a good one in terms of personnel. More people left the Navy than joined. Without going into detail by rank and service relationship, we must admit that we have to do better. To ensure sustainable personnel policy, our annual personnel turnover must first reach neutral or positive territory.

There has been much discussion of what the ideal of the future Estonian Navy member should be. Over these discussions, we have reached the conclusion that we need more areas of specialization

To manage the practical side of merging the fleets, various workgroups have been formed. They were to submit their proposals by March 2022. As a result of the merger, which takes place on 1 January 2023, the EDF will gain over 70 personnel. A new, fourth division will be established based on the PPA ships, its name yet to be determined.

NEW RESPONSIBILITIES

To simplify a bit, the reform will mean new tasks – many of them. It is very hard to simply ”absorb” the sudden increment in functions and capabilities. The Navyʼs main activity to this point has been raising the efficacy of mine countermeasures and situation awareness at sea. These activities directly support the contribution to NATO collective defense. We are adept at mine countermeasures, although this has been significantly affected by the protracted upgrade in capability undergone by the ships.

Our support for the personnel in the NATOʼs Standing Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG1) has always been highly regarded, and an indicator of that quality is the fact that we have been entrusted the command of the unit for the second time now. I am very proud of the fact that the Navy is the only branch of the EDF that has held the command of a NATO QRF unit. Now we are in that role for the second time in the last six

in our education system beyond the current two. We currently train officers who specialize in either equipment or tactics. Being a particularly technology-oriented branch of the military, we will need NCOs and officers with an electronics and IT education. Our personnel will still need knowledge of maritime operations and naval warfare tactics. The new capabilities we are procuring will also add complexity.

2021 was an interesting, fast-paced year for the Navy. The coronavirus had an influence on us, but not overly so. We completed the modernization of the Sandown-class minehunters, although there are some loose ends that need to be tied up. Sea surveillance made a big leap ahead, becoming the best source of information on what is going on at sea.

Two major procurements were signed for naval mines and anti-surface missile systems. Thanks to arms assistance from the US, various surveillance and mine countermeasures equipment was delivered. In regard to infrastructure, a new universal hangar was built at Miinisadam harbor complex, providing modern conditions for work and sport and also housing the Navyʼs relocated clothing warehouse.

I assure our valued Estonian naval personnel and friends of the Navy that while it wonʼt get any easier, itʼll be ever more interesting for sure! ||

Human resources are our dearest asset and we have little of them. The last year was not a good one in terms of personnel. More people left the Navy than joined.

anniversary. EDF photo by Mathias Väinsar

LIMELIGHT. For the Estonian Special Operations Forces, 2021 meant new tasks, as a result of which Estonian special operations became significantly more visible than in some previous years.

WHEN ARE SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS SUCCESSFUL?

Due to the increased attention on us, we find we have to reiterate the basic principles of special operations so that we would be on the same page with all units and ensure the success of future operations. Using principles articulated by renowned strategy thinker Colin S. Gray, I will explain how to use strategic capabilities effectively and purposefully.

Special operations exist in order to achieve a strategic effect on the battlefield. But success means creating conditions that ensure success, which can be categorized as follows: political need; domestic politics; achievable goals; strategy; flexibility (of thinking); lack of alternatives; the adversaryʼs vulnerability; technological support; tactical competence; reputation and history.

History has shown that special forces can be underused, overused or misused. Misuse usually leads to negative political repercussions, but successful special operations are a sign of professionalism on the tactical level and educated consumers at the strategic level.

The first condition for creating special forces capabilities and sustainability of such capabilities is political need. Special forces allow politicians to use forces conservatively, offer alternatives, a small tactical footprint, intrinsic secrecy and ability to carry out special operations in cooperation with local inhabitants. Estonian special forces carry out the TAAA (train, assist, advise, accompany) function by training, in field operations along with French special forces, Malian soldiers to fight with Estonian sup-

COL. MARGUS KUUL Commander, Special Operations Forces

Service members of U.S. and Estonian Special Operations Forces during an exercise in Estonia.

EDF photo by Special Operations Forces

port against the spread of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

Political need is undoubtedly not enough for success. A special force also requires favorable domestic policy, strategy and political culture. Practice has shown that the more effectively active conventional warfare takes place or the better possibilities are for it, the more competitive conventional forces are with special forces from the strategic perspective.

And so we get to the next key point, which is achievable goals. The guarantee of success is political and military leaders who understand the nature of special operations and are able to correctly assess what special forces can and could do and what not to do.

The above leads us to strategy. Admittedly, commanders with a conventional background will often, when preparing for intense combat, demonstrate ignorance of special forces, creating a situation where strategic capability started to be used incorrectly – i.e., tactically.

So flexibility (of thinking) enters the picture. Special forces have to be capable of supporting conventional forces but also must operate independently. Special

forces personnel must view every conflict with flexibility, seeing it as unique, not as dictated under some plan. Successful unconventional warfare requires a mindset that allows non-standard solutions to be found to problems. Thus, unconventional warfare requires non-traditional thinking and an element of surprise, which is the basis for achieving tactical success and often becomes defining for achieving strategic success. For that reason, to maintain success, special forces troops must avoid falling into patterns.

Special forces operations become the first priority when operations with conventional forces are prohibited for political reasons, ruled out, too expensive or considered unnecessary. It is important for politicians to be able to use special forces in a situation where there are no alternatives.

A vulnerability in the adversary is not a vulnerability if it cannot be exploited. Every adversary has weaknesses that special forces can take advantage of. An adversary who does not learn from mistakes and is not capable of protecting weaknesses is a good quarry for special forces.

On territory occupied by an adversary,

Successful unconventional warfare requires a mindset that allows nonstandard solutions to be found to problems.

special operations can be carried out with assistance from the local population, which is why special forces need every advantage they can get, including advantages conferred by technological support and special equipment. Strategic success depends on tactical feasibility. Numerical inferiority is compensated with special equipment and in the latterʼs absence a special-forces unit that is small in number can face disproportionately negative consequences.

Having strategic capability entails purposeful use that maintains the tactical competence native to special operations for executing strategic missions with a high level of risk. It is of key importance to understand the basic axioms and criteria for assigning special missions hat ensure special forces success at every level. Just as there are limitations and capabilities for convention forces, there are also limitations on special operations.

Reputation is important for special forces, because professional and effective units with a good reputation are held in awe and feared. A special forces unit with a good reputation can be used as a strategic deterrent to be reckoned with.

Historical experience suggests that special forces personnel must factor in variables that have an influence on success of a mission designed to produce a strategic effect. Here are the most important variables: degree of difficulty of the mission; secrecy; special aspects of planning special operations; specialized training for the mission; special equipment; experience needed for the mission; reaction time and standing readiness. This list helps give some understanding of how the operation area can be infiltrated covertly, how the special forces should operate in the area and exfiltrate from the operating area, if necessary by land, air or water.

Special forces can be useful if they are precisely in a supporting role for conventional forces, and for this, a middle path has to be found. Thus, special forces need a political and military framework and, in order for them to contribute, there needs to be a fit with the overall military strategy. There is a need to consider both domestic and foreign policy, which is affected by the peopleʼs will, because it is the people who decide whether the war being waged is ”good” or ”bad”. ||

The first platoon of conscripts who started their training in Special Operations Forces, 2021. EDF photo by Special Operations Forces

FEEDBACK FROM THE OKAS RESERVIST TRAINING

KAIRI KASEARU Professor of Empirical Sociology, head of the Center of Excellence for Strategic Sustainability, University of Tartu

ELERI LILLEMÄE National Defense Human Resources Survey coordinator, National Defense Academy

We are simultaneously also seeing various crises deepen – the pandemic, and security and energy crises. To adapt to the changes in the environment around us, it is important to understand and analyze readiness of human resources as the primary independent defensive capability. In the course of the human resources survey initiated in 2016, the attitudes, readiness and adaptation to military service of conscripts are analyzed each year, in order to provide information for making more informed decisions and organize management of the defense sector.

In terms of general defensive capability, reservists make up the largest part of national defense human resources. Reservists were surveyed at Exercise Siil in 2018, Kevadtorm 2019 and 2021 and most recently at the snap reservist training Okas in autumn 2021.

Will to defend and support for the existing reserve-based army is quite high among Estonians. The 2021 survey ”Public opinion of national defense” found that 84% of the population considers conscription necessary. Of the respondents to a feedback survey conducted among reservists participating at Okas 2021, 87% said they would ”definitely” or ”probably” participate in the defense of the country in the event of a threat.

We should take into account that reservist training exercises take place in their own time – and the socio-political context in autumn 2021 was an escalation of events along the Belarusian-Polish border and the third wave of the pandemic. The broader socio-political context of every reservist training is somewhat different, which in turn influences desire and possibilities to take part in a training exercise.

DIFFERENT FACETS OF FACTORS THAT PROMOTE PARTICIPATION AT RESERVIST TRAINING

Societal and national defense dimension

Conscientiousness

Worsening security situation in Europe

Social recognition

Reservist’s allowance

EDF promotion

Recognition dimension

Personal dimension

Unit cohesion

Opportunity to test yourself

Opportunity to meet comrades

Opportunity to step out from routine

Practical outcome for national defense

Clear information

Opportunity to implement civilian skills

Clear exercise’s goals

Employer’s positive attitude

Organizational dimension

Okas, the most recent reservist training, allowed reservists to make a practical contribution through reinforcing the national border. Events taking place in the region placed the training and its operations under particular scrutiny, distinguishing Okas from previous exercises. Participating reservists held this kind of practical contribution in high regard: 81% of respondents said the exercise would yield a clear practical result for the good of the country.

As expected, respondents felt the most important objective of the reservist training was the instruction in use of new military equipment, improving interoperability between units and raising efficacy of internal cooperation within the unit (93%). These objectives are grouped into the dimension of national defense development, alongside which the dimension of development of personal abilities that can be transferred to civilian life also can be highlighted (e.g. discipline, coping with stress, skills needed for action in a civilian emergency). As such, the reservist training fulfils two overarching goals for reservists: first, national defense and second, acquisition of skills that can be later applied in civilian life.

Although the reservists who participated in the survey consider the first to be significantly more important than the second, a deeper analysis of the results of the survey responses from Siil 2018 has brought out that the readiness to take place in reservist training is higher if the knowledge and skills acquired in the military field are perceived as a component in personal development.

Factors that support participation in a reservist training are distributed on the personal and societal axis, but with greater internal differentiation. The personal dimension is related to the organizational dimension; and a recognition dimension is distinct under the national defense dimension.

The biggest obstacles to participation at a reservist training are clearly of a more personal nature and connected to civilian life; the main question is one of shortage of time as a resource – in other words, reservist training potentially comes at the

RESERVISTS. Today’s society is increasingly moving toward individualistic and neo-liberal values, which poses a challenge to the Defense Forces as an institution based on collectivist values.

SHARE OF RESERVISTS WHO ARE READY TO PARTICIPATE NEXT TRAINING BY THE ATTITUDE OF PEOPLE AROUND THE RESERVIST MAIN FACTORS THAT PROMOTE PARTICIPATION IN RESERVIST TRAINING

they receive a call-up and have to notify employers themselves.

Considering the important role of employers in the terms of the mindset in which reservists report to training, one development area would be to institute direct notification of employers that a training exercise is happening. This would allow the employer to be in the same information ”loop” as the employees.

Although family arrangements were perceived as less complicated that rearranging working life, family attitudes have a stronger influence on whether the reservist is ready to take part in the next training exercise. If family members take a positive attitude to the participation in the reservist training, close to 90% would be prepared to attend the next one, but if the attitude is negative, the figure is only 20%.

Willingness to participate is most influenced by the possibility of getting together with fellow reservists (88%) and sense of duty to country (73%), which express, respectively, cohesiveness of the unit and broader social cohesion and solidarity with oneʼs country. The Defense Forces is taking increasing steps to strengthen the identity of reservists.

For example, the Viru Infantry Battalion organizes various supplementary training exercises for its reserve unit commanders and elders and offers various units the possibility of regularly meeting and socializing. This fosters a sense of connectedness and belonging, which reinforces readiness to take part in the next reservist training and boosts the general will to defend.

expense of other activities that must be cancelled or postponed. Thus, there is a clear expectation that the Defense Forces will use the time invested into reservist training effectively.

The most widespread problems are related to employment: work obligations, leaving work duties unfinished and playing catch-up later, and attitudes from employers. If reservist training is held on short notice, it also means having to rapidly make alternative arrangements in family logistics, but reservists say aspects related to employment are a more significant obstacle than family life. Snap training exercises like Okas present employers with the main challenge of having to quickly make other arrangements, since reservists are required to report promptly to the staging area once

In summary, the reservists who take part in supplementary reservist training are aware of and understand the need for and purpose of the training and the motivation to participate is strongly anchored in cohesiveness as well as the state more broadly. Even so, reservistsʼ willingness, ability and possibilities to internalize the training into everyday life become the main determinants of actual readiness to participate.

Thus; the main challenge for ensuring sustainability of human resources in the defense sector is the question of how to preserve the main functions and values of the Defense Forces while acquiescing to the changes and shifts in values taking place in society.

The broad use of data based on scientific research in the EDF is attested to by the increasing interest in units in viewing extracts of data concerning them from the integrated study. This shows that the science is trusted and relied on for shaping their executive decisions. ||

The ceremony of National Defense Academy’s 98th anniversary in Tartu, Oct. 1, 2021.

EDF photo by 2nd Lt. Hans Vega Lehepuu

EDUCATION. The National Defense Academy is a unique educational institution in Estonia as it is the only one to confer the prerequisites for becoming a leader at a strategic level.

DEVELOPING LEADERS

Early in the year 2021, the National Defense Academy passed a vocational education quality assessment and institutional accreditation organized by the Estonian Quality Agency for Higher and Vocational Education, in the course of which an international expert committee

evaluated the functioning of the Academy, its processes, teaching and research activity and environment with respect to the Academyʼs own goals and development plans, legal acts and quality standards. The accreditation shows that we are on the right course and have done the right things.

BRIG. GEN. VAHUR KARUS Commandant, National Defense Academy

2021 was also a signal year for entering students, as we admitted a record number of new cadets to the army, navy and air force basic course of study – 94 of them. We accepted 23 new masterʼs-level students to the intermediate course of study. Close to 100 students from the EDF were accepted to various vocational courses of study; and over 2200 students passed through the Academy via various in-service training courses.

All of this places high expectations on the Estonian Defense Forces and the National Defense Academy.

Leadership skills are universal, and although we train leaders for the Defense Forces, there is no reason someone with leadership skills acquired from the National Defense Academy could not be a future business executive, chief of staff, minister or UN secretary general. Our goal is broader and should not be limited to just the Defense Forces.

The leaders produced by the National Defense Academy gain practical experience already in the course of their studies. Upon completing the studies, they become commander of a platoon or company or take command of a battalion or brigade as staff officer. True, the National Defense Academy does not train senior officers – this takes place at the Baltic Defense College or one of our NATO alliesʼ schools – but todayʼs cadets and intermediate/ masterʼs students are tomorrowʼs EDF generals and our role is to lay the foundation on which these senior leadersʼ leadership skills are based.

How do we do this? Each year we accept future leaders to professional higher education. We develop the knowledge and skills of our current EDF leaders in intermediate courses – masterʼs level study – and in-service training. Through the War and Disaster Medicine Centre, we contribute

to developing Estonian medical personnelʼs crisis management skills.

At the same time, we provide a base for research and development in the field of national defense – not just for show but with tangible outcomes.

In 2021, 51 high-level research articles were published, and 13 articles were submitted for publication. Our EDF personnelʼs doctoral studies have been successful. In December, Lt. Col. Taavi Laanepere defended his doctorate on the reservistsʼ service readiness. In February 2022, Maj. Artur Meerits defended his doctorate on the leadership skillsets of first-level military leaders and their impact.

In 2021 two active-duty EDF members became doctoral students. As members of international research groups, they will be dealing with research questions supporting development of capabilities. We took part in NATOʼs Science and Technology Organization, where our representatives served on five panels and 25 working groups. We also took part in three European Union research and development projects.

In 2021, six new R&D projects kicked off, ranging from the history of Esto-

Our role is to lay the foundation on which our senior leaders’ leadership skills are based.

Exercise Emajõe Kilp (Shield of Emajõgi river) at National Defense Academy, Tartu.

EDF photo by 2nd Lt. Hans Vega Lehepuu

nian military thought to development of high-precision attack capability.

In late 2021, the Cabinet greenlighted a project that, with support from foreign research institutes, defense contractors and allies, will start creating an electronic warfare research area of specialization in the Ministry of Defenseʼs area of administration. The development of this new and important field will become a real touchstone for the Academy and the entire EDF and drive development of capabilities.

With regard to the value of this R&D, readers will find in this yearbook an article on the National Defense Human Resources Survey that shows what we are doing well and where more development is needed when it comes to our conscripts and reservists.

Creating leaders is a long-running process. It doesnʼt happen in months and years but is a constant process that the entire EDF must support with its most valuable asset – people. That applies to students, teaching staff and support personnel alike.

The better our teachers and instructors, the better the people or leaders who will take up their positions in the units and get

NUMBER OF GRADUATES IN 2021

IN EACH COURSE OF STUDY

▶ Officer’s basic course 33

▶ Officer’s intermediate level course 21

▶ Senior NCO basic course 59

▶ Senior NCO intermediate course 29

▶ Senior staff NCO course 14

▶ Staff officers’ military basic course 45

▶ Reserve office course 92

▶ Battalion staff officer course 29

▶ Battalion staff officer course for specialists 29

▶ Battalion staff officer supplementary course 13

▶ Brigade staff officer course 17

▶ War and Disaster Medicine Centre courses (79 courses) 2146

▶ Language courses (12 course) 86

to work, and the greater the benefits we will reap in the future. It is important for the EDF to realize as an organization that our experienced and proved leaders will sooner or later take pass through the academy in the role of students and teaching staff. That will allow them to exchange and pass on experiences and best practices. Experienced teaching staff make the eyes of cadets in the basic course and intermediate-students to light up.

In addition, we have a unique position in the EDF where we can start grooming promising conscripts to become good leaders. I would impress on every platoon, company, battalion and brigade commander to look for those young minds and tell them about the possibility of becoming future leaders of our military and society.

The National Defense Academy is the school of Estoniaʼs leaders. As such, it needs the good stewardship of every one of us in the teaching profession and R&D. The better able structural units are to find those future leaders, the bigger the sample size and the opportunities to guide their quality. The higher the quality of the EDF personnel who enter the National Defense Academy, the more motivated and skilled our young lieutenants and captains will be.

The more lieutenant colonels ending their service as battalion commander opt for an academic career through doctoral study, the better and more systematic our knowledge and conceptions will become and the more at home our future leaders will be in the world of science and research. As a former brigade commander, I know very well what the state of our units is, but now is the time when everyone has to decide whether we should launch a significant change in recruitment and appointment of teaching staff or selfishly remain spectators of the deluge that comes after us. ||

CYBER DEFENSE –MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER

ber attacks cut off power or water to a city?

COL. JAAK TARIEN Director, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)

At the peak of the trend of working from home, an unprecedented amount of sensitive information was being transmitted between central servers and remote computers, something that has aroused keen interest from organized crime and state secret services. A number of exercises, conferences and courses were also forced to move to electronic formats, and the new dependence on virtual systems has gone hand in hand with an increase in cyber attacks worldwide.

Experts from CCDCOE have more and more to investigate, and as a result knowledge increases – the more we know about the cyber field and the more we share that knowledge with like-minded countries, the more effective collective cyber defense becomes.

The cyber attacks against Ukraine in late 2021 showed again how important it is to share and bolster knowledge and capabilities between like-minded countries. Cyber attacks have now become a natural part of hybrid warfare. I would even say it is one of the most complicated parts, because in a conventional war, we see the result with our own eyes – forces and equipment cross state borders. But what is our reaction when cy-

Last year, we continued organizing academic research, exercises and courses through an international interdisciplinary approach in four main fields: technology, strategy, operations and law. For a second year, we published a quarterly strategic report on cyber attacks, Recent Cyber Events: Considerations for Military and National Security Decision Makers, and in cooperation with US colleagues, released the first 5G supply chain report.

CCDCOE also continued one of its core activities – organizing exercises and courses with realistic scenarios that encompass the latest technologies and practices. For the 10th time, the technical Exercise Crossed Swords was held with the objective of integrating kinetic units and attacking cyber operations on the present-day battlefield.

The uniqueness of the exercise lies in the possibility of practicing both attacking, intelligence-gathering and situation awareness in the cyber domain in full. After

CYBER. The coronavirus pandemic in the last two years has had both positive and negative impacts in the field of cyber defense.

For the 10th time, the technical Exercise Crossed Swords was held with the objective of integrating kinetic units and attacking cyber operations on the present-day battlefield.

all, only by using modern offensive tools and technologies can a robust and lasting defense be built. The exercise was more all-encompassing than ever before and, in addition to the technical side, also incorporated a command element, bringing about 100 people together from 21 countries, both NATO and non-NATO.

At the peak of the latest wave of covid infections in April 2021, Exercise Locked Shields was held – the largest international cyber defense exercises, where in a first, the organizing team worked mainly remotely. Besides keeping close to 5000 virtualized systems in operation and over 4000 attacks, the teams had to practice reporting incidents, implementing strategic decisions, conducting digital crime investigations, solving legal problems and communicating with the media.

CCDCOE is known for having authored two analyses that have proved very influential around the world – the Tallinn Manual and the updated Tallinn Manual 2.0, which describe the application of international law in regard to organizing operations in cyberspace. Last year, at the request of our member states, we launched the drafting of Tallinn Manual 3.0, which attests to the great need to agree on common rules in the cyber domain.

The international cyber conference CyCon, which has been a meeting place for the cyber community for over 10 years, was held virtually last year with a slightly altered focus. With the desire to present the newest academic treatments in the cyber defense field and discuss innovative approaches, the conference introduced the difficult challenges facing cyber security in the EU and at the nexus of outer space and cyberspace, covering the role of disinformation in military operations.

CCDCOE also once again participated in the largest NATO cyber exercise, Cyber Coalition, disseminating operational, legal and technical knowledge in preparing scenarios. Both Cyber Coalition as well as the offensive capability exercise Crossed Swords, were led by the CR14 exercise and training centre established early this year by the Estonian Ministry of Defense to offer cyber security research and development activities for domestic and international partners.

This spring, the CCDCOE yearbook will be published for the first time, summarizing the most important achievements of 2021 and giving some idea of what the centre is working on this year.

Over 14 years, CCDCOE has grown to become the largest of the 28 NATO centers of excellence in terms of the number of member states and experts working at the centre. Thanks to consensus-based trust between member states forged through superb working results, member statesʼ financial contribution to the centreʼs budget has been growing each year since 2021. The centre has a motivated team and strong sense of cohesiveness and organizational culture. ||

Col. Jaak Tarien meeting Maj. Gen. Robert Glavaš, Chief of the General Staff, Slovenian Armed Forces. CCDCOE photo

Published by Strategic Communication Department, General Staff, Estonian Defense Forces

Produced by Strategic Communication Center, Cyber Command, Estonian Defense Forces

Edited by Heiki Suurkask

Design and layout by Ivo Sokka

Translated by Kristopher Rikken

ISSN 2613-4934