E stonian military magazine since 1919 S eptember 2022
NATO Military Committee Conference in Tallinn The Russian theory of controlled chaos Land robots on the future battlefield
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SÕDUR ‖ 3 Contents 6 NATO Chiefs of Defense to MadridimplementationdiscussofSummitdecisions 12 The colonel who got the century wrong 18 The Russian theory of controlled chaos 28 Land robots on the future battlefield 34 US Army next generation squad weapons 40 First in, last out 52 Narva 1704: The beginning of Russian siege warfare
Strategic
Translated by Luisa Translation Agency
2nd
Editor-in-chiefsodur@mil.ee Lt. Raiko Jäärats
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4 ‖ SÕDUR Defense
SÕDUR ‖ 5 Defense
6 ‖ SÕDUR Defense
A NATO Military Committee Conference will be held in Tallinn in September 2022 where the Allied Chiefs of Defense will discuss the implementation of the decisions on the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture, as made by NATO Heads of State and Government at the Madrid Summit in July 2022. For the first time, as invitees, the Chiefs of Defense of Finland and Sweden will also attend the conference.
ROB BAUER Chair of the NATO Military Committee Lieutenant General MARTIN HEREM Chief of the Estonian Defense Forces
NATO CHIEFS OF DEFENSE TO IMPLEMENTATIONDISCUSSOFMADRIDSUMMITDECISIONSAdmiral
uring the rotations, it becomes very clear to all of them where they will find themselves in a crisis, what they may face and what they have to do, having practiced it in exercises in summer and winter, in both hot and cold weather. This helps ensure that the units are highly prepared and can cooperate fully with Estonian units in crisis and in war. The United States, France and the United Kingdom have already exercised the rapid deployment of units to the Baltic States and Poland by air, sea and land. With pre-posi tioned armored equipment and ammunition, such rapidly deployed units will be even more effective and combat-ready. They will also be prepared for immediate defensive action, given prior training and exercises on the ground.
e are strengthening our for ward defenses in all operational domains. We are enhancing our eight battlegroups in the East. And we will increase the number of high readiness forces under the new NATO Force Model. This will provide a larger pool of high readiness forces in the land, maritime, air, space and cyber domains. We will also boost our ability to strengthen and reinforce with:
he unprovoked war launched by the Russian Federation against independent Ukraine in February this year leaves no country untouched. Without a doubt: a new era for global security has begun. It is crystal-clear that this conflict is bigger than Ukraine.
• More forward-deployed capa bilities, like air defense;
• Upgraded defense plans, with forces pre-assigned to defend specific Allies.
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SÕDUR ‖ 7 Defense
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The international rules-based order is under attack. And it is up to the free, democratic nations of the world to protect it.
• More pre-positioned equipment, and stockpiles of military supplies;
The war in Ukraine has a major impact on NATO’s collective security. The NATO Military Authorities have closely followed Russia’s pattern of aggressive behavior and initiated the largest reinforcement of our collective defense in a generation. At the Summit in Madrid, Allied leaders decided to adapt our posture even further to make sure we are ready to expect the unexpected.
• Strengthened command and control; and
The Allied Chiefs of Defence look forward to welcoming their colleagues from Finland and Sweden and are particularly pleased that their first historic participation in the NATO Military Committee Conference will take place in Tallinn. The accession to NATO of Finland and Sweden, with their impressive defense capabilities, will both enhance the security of the Baltic Sea region and the Baltic States and strengthen the Alliance as a whole. The ratifi cation of their accession is well on track and we look forward to giving them a warm welcome!
The Ukrainian government and peo ple continue to resist Russia’s brutal acts of aggression. Their courage is an inspiration.
During the NATO Military Committee Conference the Chiefs of Defence will also discuss ongoing NATO operations, missions and activities including the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Other topics on the agenda are the promo tion of diversity and innovation in Allied Armed Forces in order to support multi-do main operations and digital transformation.
For Estonia, this means developing, in cooperation with the Allies, a division-sized unit with a command structure ready to
defend Estonia in the event of conflict. The United Kingdom has decided to appoint an additional brigade for the defense of Estonia, with a NATO Force Integration Unit and some sub-units to be based in the country. It is important to note that this does not imply a permanent presence in Estonia of all the units assigned to the defense of the country, as this is not militarily necessary at the moment. The majority of units will be based in their home countries, but elements of the units with additional military capa bilities will rotate to Estonia during peace time and practice the defense of the country under realistic conditions on the ground.
In total, there are currently 3.2 million servicemen and women who serve this Al liance. They will do whatever it takes to protect the one billion citizens who live on Allied soil. Now, and in the future.
This is the first time since the Cold War that we have these kinds of plans with pre-assigned forces. These forces will work with home defense forces, and become familiar with local terrain, facilities, and pre-positioned stocks.
NATO and Allies have provided substan tial support to Ukraine since Russia’s ille gal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and will continue to provide military and financial aid and training for Ukrainian soldiers. This includes military capabilities, ammunition, secure communications, fuel, medical supplies, body armor, equipment to counter mines and chemical and biological threats and hundreds of portable anti-drone systems. All of this is making a difference on the battlefield.
EDF infantry fighting vehicle CV90 taking position during a field training exercise while a US Army HH-60M medical evacuation helicopter is taking off, at the central training ground near Tapa, Estonia, June 10, 2017. The main mission of EDF is to defend Estonian territorial integrity and to participate in collective defense with the Allies.
EDF photo by Sgt. 1st Class Ardi Hallismaa
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how he changes or how he moves up or down the social ladder.
It is important to understand that Putin’s conservatism is stored in his subconscious, in the foun dations that will hold a person in place throughout his life, no matter
he key to a psychologi cal portrait of Putin is to be found in the film “20 Questions to Vladimir Putin” by Andrei Vandenko. In response to Vandenko’s question “Have you changed during your life?” Putin crosses himself (some thing he very rarely does in public, except at ritual events in church) and says: “My friends from my childhood and youth say that I do not appear to have changed.”
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THE COLONEL WHO GOT THE CENTURY WRONG
The man who settled in the Kremlin in 2000 hung a portrait of Russian Emperor Peter the Great in his office. However, it was Yuri Andropov, a head of the Soviet KGB, who was his idol when he was young, and who remains his idol today.
On December 20, 1999, Putin re opened Andropov’s memorial plaque on the KGB building. The plaque was reinstated the day after Putin, at a meeting to mark the anniversary of the Russian security services, had said: “The group of FSB employees that we headed up while operating in the government was able to com plete its tasks in the very first stage.” Russia is now run by the institution of special services. Mr. Putin is merely the administrator of the will of the institution in whose name he rules.
To an outside observer of life in the Kremlin, Putin’s rise to power appears to have been accidental, the result of a conspiracy of ‘oli garchs’ orchestrated by those close to Yeltsin (Abramovich, Berezovsky, Yumashev, and others). However, there is also another conspiracy theory about Putin’s arrival in the Kremlin. In the USSR and after wards in the Russian Federation, the Cheka/NKVD/KGB/MB and finally the FSB made several at tempts to seize power and rid itself of any political control from above.
Russia 12 ‖ SÕDUR
In this response, Putin reveals his basic way of thinking. He is an out-and-out conservative. For him, it is important to not change. It is well known that conservatives subconsciously fear the future and do not want it to come, while seeing ideals and role models in the past. A reformer, on the other hand, fears the past and sees ideals and role models in a future that has yet to be created.
PUTIN’S AXIOMS OF STABILITY
VLADIMIR JUSHKIN Baltic Center for Russian Studies
The main objective of Putin’s nonEuclidean system is the self-perpet uation, for as long as possible, of the ruling class, i.e., the people acting under the ‘Putin’ brand, by keep ing them in power. The Russian autocrat does not want isolation for himself or his entourage, does not want their children and grandchil dren to sit in a gilded cage, does
power was again seized by ‘partyists’, the last of whom was Gorbachev.
In the recent history of the USSR/ Russia, the first clear-cut and indeed successful attempt of this nature was the appointment of KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov as the General Sec retary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in November 1982 following the death of Leonid Brezhnev. This was the moment the KGB as an institution finally came to power. However, Andropov died unexpectedly in February 1984, when
Over the past century, the Russian rulers’ perceptions of the world and their place in it have not changed in the slightest. No matter what Russia’s supreme leader is called ‒ emperor, secretary-general or president ‒ the
The political regime found its own identity: conservative values, imperi al self-consciousness, militarization, anti-Westernism, a particular path based on mythologized representations of history, the commemoration of the Great Patriotic War as the main glue that binds the nation together and the main method of legitimizing power. A consensus has developed around this, among both the elites and the masses.
Russia SÕDUR ‖ 13
The billionaires of the Kremlin and Lubyanka need a guardian who will not only give them the opportu nity to spend the money they have accumulated for themselves, their children and their grandchildren anywhere in the world, but will also secure conditions that allow them to inherit assets anywhere, but above all in Europe and America.
Throughout the 21st century, Rus sians have been indoctrinated to be lieve that they have suffered because Russia lost its empire. Russians feel hurt because everyone – Europe, America, Asia, the whole world –owes them something. People took this hurt seriously, seeking some big idea, some sense of belonging.
not want to and cannot spend more than at present on the arms race, as was the case in the Soviet Union.
THE AXIOM OF IDENTITY
ruler will always be convinced that the population under his control lives better than all the other peoples on the planet, and that those who claim otherwise are madmen (like Cha dayev), rebels (like Radishchev) or ‘foreign agents’ (Navalny and others).
THE AXIOM CORRECTEDOFERRORS
Putin and those close to him were mainly born in the early fifties. They chose their professions and began their careers under Brezhnev and Andropov. Having witnessed
Russian President Vladimir Putin wears a navy officer’s uniform while watching the tactical exercises of the Northern Fleet in the Barentsevo Sea from the “Karelia” nuclear submarine, April 6, 2000.
Scanpix photo by AFP
The regime is not exposed to any internal threats at present. In this form, relying on repression, it will be able to exist for decades, even if the economy continues to decline.
Museum of Russian Glory in temporarily Russian occupied Crimea, Ukraine, July 21, 2017.
Edgar Savisaar (L), Estonian Prime Minister, and Anatoly Sobchak (R), Mayor of St. Petersburg, during the Estonian negotiations with Soviet Union republics in Narva, Estonia, Dec. 11, 1991. In the background is Vladimir Putin, Chairman of the St. Petersburg City Council’s International Relations Committee. Scanpix photo
Secondly, there is no need to shut all mouths. The valves that regulate the steam outlet must be maintained so that the pres sure cooker does not explode.
Thirdly, check-in desks must be open at all airports. If you don’t like Putin, you can go any where you like and write “Putin is a dictator” in your blog.
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This has happened to all holders of absolute rule. In the end, each one of them ended up a hostage and also a victim of the reality they themselves created. It is not clear at this stage to what extent Putin is aware of this logic.
SPACE-TIMEPUTIN’S
In September 2015, Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama held a full-scale bilateral meeting on the margins of the 70th UN General Assembly in New York. The con versation took place entirely behind closed doors. Instead of the sched uled fifty-five minutes, they spoke for around an hour and a half.
It was then that Mr. Putin pre sented his vision of international problems. According to Alexei Venediktov, editor-in-chief of Ekho Moskvy, he explained the instabil ity of the modern world by the fact that the great powers had aban doned the Yalta-Potsdam system, within which each of them had its own zone of responsibility.
THE AXIOM OF AUTOCRACY
This axiom is a cruel one: sooner or later, the possessor of an autocratic resource will become a hostage of his own “vertical”. He will become a hostage of those who defend and inform him. Of those who prepare his decisions and communicate his ideas. Finally, of those who feed him.
the collapse of the Soviet Union, they drew some conclusions.
Firstly, the shop shelves must be full so that no one goes hun gry and there are no shortages.
In addition, the Kremlin needs a presence in Europe in order to play its favorite game: divide and rule, deconstruct, incite, and seek allies. In other words, this is a nor mal part of undercover actions. If the Kremlin leaves Europe, it will miss out on many of the bonuses.
Not long ago, it would have been a victory for Putin if he were to obtain from the West, in any ac ceptable diplomatic form, a twofold guarantee: that the West would not interfere in what goes on in Russia and, at the same time, that it would allow Putin to intervene wherever he deems it necessary (within the former Soviet sphere of influence).
Ideally, this should have been a return to something similar to the brief period of détente in Soviet-American relations that lasted from around 1972 (Brezhnev’s first meeting with Nixon) until 1979 (the entry into Afghanistan of Soviet troops).
THE “LISTKREMLIN’SOFDREAMS”
Shutterstock photo by Nikolay Mukhorin
one language to another when it comes to European values. This is why the attitude of the Russian people ‒ including the pro-Kremlin elites ‒ towards Europe is so complex. This means that they would like to live there and enjoy all the bene fits of European civilization, while discarding its underlying principles.
Scanpix photo by EPA
Soviet Union? Was Poland in the Soviet Union? No, it was not. But it was like a satellite state within the Warsaw Pact. You take responsibility there: let the EU take responsibili ty for order in its zone, America in its zone, and China in its zone.
The Soviet Union had a certain zone of responsibility in which law and order had to be ensured. Let us now divide the world again into zones of responsibility. The Baltic States no longer bother us, the NATO countries no longer bother us. But the former Soviet republics (except the Baltic States), roughly speaking, should be placed in our zone of responsibility and I guarantee you that there will be no drugs, no Islamists, no ter rorists. I will be responsible for law and order. Do you remember the
Russia SÕDUR ‖ 15
Russia is governed by people who are convinced that the world is ruled by power and money, and that mo rality and justice were invented to deceive the foolish. Putin’s mission is to secure Russia’s readmission to the club of great powers. He wants to return his country to the posi tion it held before the collapse of the Soviet Union. He believes that the strength of a country lies in its control over certain territories.
In return, Putin would give up trolling Western democracies, with draw from some (but not all) of the regions which are sensitive in terms of the West’s interests and which he entered for the sole purpose of making the West acknowledge his importance, agree to more construc tive dialogue on arms control, and develop trade and cultural rela tions in which he has an interest.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin (R) shakes hands with the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (L) during farewell ceremony in Kremlin, as members of the KGBThisMoscow,ontheadministrationPresidentialandgovernmentlookandapplaudinDec.31,1999.isthemomentthetookoverRussia.
Russia is undoubtedly a European country, but it is a completely differ ent Europe, with a different cultural code that requires translation from
RUSSIA ANOTHERASEUROPE
Biden reportedly gave Putin at Villa La Grange in Geneva in June 2021 around six months to prepare for constructive dialogue and to improve his foreign policy behavior.
KREMLIN BOSS WITH A TROUBLED CHILDHOOD
Russia 16 ‖ SÕDUR
Scanpix photo by Alexander Nemenov
Most military analysts wrote before the start of the campaign that a ground operation made no sense and therefore would not happen. The only exceptions were those who knew that, for the first time in history, the US intelligence commu nity had taken a different approach: a significant amount of intelligence
“The purpose of this war is war,” explains Vladimir Pastukhov, a Russian political scientist, publicist, and lawyer, and a senior fellow at University College London. “Those in Russia’s leadership who are quite rational and who are known as technocrats, who were once method ologists, who are trying to rationalize a long-term survival strategy for Russia, have developed the concept that war is a normal, healthy, and beneficial state for Russia. This war must be kept alive, constantly, like a slow fire on a burner. Now that they see the war as a slow fire, they want to put Russia on it, to boil it and produce a totally different cultural broth within the next 25 years. They expect that while they are burning on this slow fire, Europe will burn up completely and go to the dogs.”
It is now clear that the West’s written response (in which the US and NATO ignored key Rus sian demands) was the “trigger” for what Putin called “military and military technical measures”. But Putin is no military strategist. There were no objective prerequi sites for waging this suicidal war.
Russian intellectuals know only too well that Putin is a worthless person, incompetent at almost everything, not well educated, with no under standing of international policy, history, or the ideological debates in which he tries to participate.
Biden, meanwhile, giving Putin a chance to sit down with people of a totally different level of intel ligence, education, and political experience, was certainly aware of Putin's preparations for political suicide. In retrospect, we should have recognized his readiness for a military scenario in late December
2021 when Moscow’s ultimatum was presented to the West (the draft agreements with the United States and NATO countries to ensure the security of Russia and mem ber countries of the Alliance).
data were promptly unclassified and, in one way or another, made public.
A woman attends to a child as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin takes questions during a nationally televised town-hall style session in Moscow, Dec. 4, 2008. A new generation has grown up in Russia knowing only one leader their whole life.
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Russian society is increasingly mo bilized, which is why Mark Galeotti, a UK-based expert on Russian security affairs, uses the term “mobilization state” rather than “totalitarian state”. The idea, broadly, is to mobilize all the state structures and private instruments in Russia to achieve a common goal. According to Gale otti, Russia’s special services, such as the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Security Service
The war in Ukraine is just a brief episode for Russia in a longer struggle to change the world order.
By then, hybrid warfare and information confrontation had come to the fore in Russian mili tary thinking. In its discussion on
RUSSIA’S MILITARY DOCTRINE HAS CHANGED OVER TIME, COMPRISING A COMBINATION OF GREAT-POWER AMBITIONS AND AN ASYMMETRIC APPROACH.
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Russia’s military doctrine has changed over time, comprising a
Russia’s aggression launched on February 24, 2022 caught the world somewhat by surprise. This was despite the fact that Russia had already been rotating a mas sive contingent of troops near Ukraine’s borders since spring 2021, and the US had publicized intelligence reports to that effect.
Lieutenant Colonel (in Reserve) JAANUS SÄGI Headquarters, Estonian Defense Forces
non-military hostile measures, the report published by RAND in 2020 emphasizes Russia’s focus on infor mation action, which is followed by economic and diplomatic action.1
Russia 18 ‖ SÕDUR
combination of great-power ambi tions and an asymmetric approach. The current period is characterized by a central concentration of re sources, attempts to forge a new Russian national identity and a profound reorganization of the armed forces, together with the resump tion of major anti-West exercises.
hen the Soviet Union launched a massive military operation in Afghanistan in 1979, its speed, scale and sheer unex pectedness struck the West, while leaving no doubt as to what was happening. By contrast, a similar operation in Crimea in 2014 left the democratic world wondering what was going on. This was due to the skillful use of public diplomacy and information warfare, which comple mented the actions of local hench men and Russian special forces.
Moscow is convinced that it is already at war with the West, which involves economic, political and military action of varying intensity and scale. The use of hybrid mea sures is conditional on the exis tence of military capabilities, and the distinction between wartime and peacetime action, or between the use of “hard” (military) and soft power, is blurred at times.
CONSTANT CONFRONTATION AS THE NEW NORMAL
THE RUSSIAN THEORY OF CONTROLLED CHAOS
NEW WARFAREOLD
George F. Kennan, a former US ambassador to Moscow, described the reciprocal sabotage, disinfor mation and generation of political instability during the Cold War-era confrontation as “measures short of
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(FSB), and the Military Intelligence Service (GRU), are subordinated to achieving direct political goals.
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war” that do not cross the thresh old of military conflict.2 Whereas during the Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict Russia was able to play the role of an extra, its occupation of Crimea in 2014 and its intervention in Syria in 2015 were characterized by strategic surprise and an ability to exploit the opportunities creat ed, both militarily and politically.
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Soft power
making mechanism of the Russian armed forces was a key topic in the aftermath of the 2008 RussianGeorgian war. The experience of the West, in particular the US, in network-centric warfare was care fully analyzed. It was found that it is possible to successfully use strategic means to perform tactical tasks.
Russia SÕDUR ‖ 19 Galeotti’s scheme of controlled chaos
The situational awareness, coor dination and speed of the decision-
The practice of Western countries also showed that a new level of qual ity could be achieved by integrating
Presidential RossotrudnichestvoAdministrationForeignMinistryMinistryGeneralStaffofDefense
In his speech of 2019, the general introduced the concept of active de fense. In a nutshell, this term refers to a set of measures to ensure the preserva tion of pre-emptive strike capability, with activities taking place primarily in the phase preceding the military conflict and in the initial phase of the military conflict. This concept involves the idea that the implementation of appropriate measures can prevent a conflict from reaching the phase of direct military confrontation. This approach also allows for the very significant reduction, paralysis and inhibition of the adversary’s capabil ities, thereby creating the prerequi sites for a successful counter-attack.
Russian soldiers pray inside the Umayyad mosque in Damascus, Syria, Sept. 14, 2018. Scanpix photo by Marko Djurica
old hardware systems with new information technology capabilities. This can be accomplished without the need for expensive new techno logical equipment, which can save a great deal of money and resources.
preparing to leave the country. Hav ing achieved the partial paralysis of Ukraine, Russia deciding to launch a full-scale invasion came as a surprise.
To assess the development of Rus sian military thinking, one should certainly mention General Gerasi mov’s speeches in 2013, 2016, 3 and 2019. Since Crimea was annexed in 2014, the first of these attracted a great deal of attention in terms of the creation of the subsequent frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine. The 2013 speech, published as an article, has often been called “Gerasimov’s doctrine” even though it was the General’s speech at the General Staff Academy on topical military issues.
It attracted a lot of attention around the world because of the events in Ukraine. Several of the general’s points of emphasis on information confrontation were implemented in the latest Russian military doctrine, approved in December 2014 4
“DOCTRINE”GERASIMOV'S
Scanpix photo by Vadim Ghirda
By the beginning of February 2022, Ukraine had lost around a quarter of its gross national product due to the Russian military threat, with investors withdrawing their foreign investments and embassies
vital priority. Media coverage of the “limited military operation” indicates that aggressive control of the media, the eradication of free media and the criminalization of alternative views since 2014 have resulted in the gov ernment’s near-total dominance of the information space within the country.
Russia 20 ‖ SÕDUR
THE INFORMATION SPACE IN MILITARY DOCTRINES
Russian President Vladimir Putin has frequently referred to the security of the country’s information space (which includes the cyber sphere) as a
To a greater or lesser extent, this concern is reflected in Russia’s Mil itary Doctrine of 2014, the National
Russia’s “little green men” standing near a Ukrainian army base in Perevalne, Crimea, Ukraine, March 19, 2014. Back then the West was still wondering what was going on.
The lessons learned from the recent conflicts in Ukraine and Syria and the shifting geopolitical balance are reflected in the National Security Strategy adopted in 2021. 5 It can also be called, with some reserva tions, the Strategy for Information Confrontation. The document pays significant attention to Russia’s specific spiritual and moral values and their entrenchment, as well as to the so-called falsification of history.
Security Strategy of 2021 and the Information Security Doctrine of 2016. The latter attaches the utmost importance to resisting informational and psychological influences in order to prevent the use of information technologies to provoke conflict, while ensuring strategic deterrence.
STRATEGY FOR CONFRONTATIONINFORMATION
In 2021, the State Duma passed a bill banning the equating in Russia of the Soviet Union to Nazi Ger many. In April 2022, legislative amendments were also introduced to the Administrative and Criminal Codes. The latter steps are seen in the context of reducing the influence of
Russia SÕDUR ‖ 21
The West was firmly nominat ed as the main threat to Russia’s internal and external security. The 2014 Military Doctrine also identified private armed forces as a factor in modern-day conflicts, whereupon they have been widely used in eastern Ukraine, Syria and several conflicts on African soil.
Scanpix photo by Denis Kaminev
While the Military Doctrine of 2000 reflected the lessons learned from Chechnya and Kosovo and mentioned the West as a potential adversary, the 2010 doctrine reflected the results of the Russian-Georgian war, as well as the experience of the Gulf War. The 2014 doctrine com bined the lessons learned from the North African Color Revolutions and from action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and was used, with a hand ful of additions, in the Russian inter vention in Syria that began in 2015.
People from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the territories controlled by pro-Russia separatist governments in eastern Ukraine, watch Russian President Vladimir Putin’s address at their temporary place in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, Feb. 21, 2022. Putin said he would decide later whether to recognize the independence of separatist regions in eastern Ukraine, which he did, and which launched the war with Ukraine.
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the West, i.e. countering Westerniza tion in Russia. The views of history go beyond the traditional narratives of the victory in the Great Patriotic War and World War II to include the roles played by Alexander Nevsky and his uncle Andrei Yaroslavich during the Mongol-Tatar invasion.
Monument to Yevgeny Primakov on Smolenskaya Sennaya Square facing the building of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, Russia, Nov. 2, 2019. Primakov is considered to be the father of Russian foreign policy and has had a great impact on Russian military thinking. Shutterstock photo by Igor Litvyak
PRIMAKOV’S DOCTRINE AND ITS INFLUENCE
The development of Russian mili tary thinking in recent decades has been underpinned by Primakov’s doctrine, the implementation of which has been refined over time in the context of developments in operational art and the availability of resources. In short, it can be charac terized as an asymmetric confron tation with the West. Information warfare, or non-linear warfare, is nothing new, but the development of information and communication technologies has had a tremendously powerful impact on this sphere.
Scanpix photo by AFP
From Russia’s point of view, the Color Revolutions have demonstrated the potential for mobilizing internal opposition, as well as the dangers
SÕDUR ‖ 23 Russia
Still shot shows Russian Channel One Editor Marina Ovsyannikova holding a poster reading “Stop the war. Don’t believe the propaganda. Here they are lying to you” during on-air news by Anchor Yekaterina Andreyeva, Russia’s mostwatched evening news broadcast, in Moscow, March 14, 2022. This was a Russian information operation targeting the West.
Yevgeny Primakov, who became Russia’s foreign minister in 1996, formulated Russia’s objectives for achieving a multipolar world order acceptable to Russia, which have since come to be known as “Primakov’s doctrine.” In contrast to the confrontation during the Cold War, the doctrine envisaged the use of asymmetric responses to avoid direct confrontation and costly competition. This approach has enabled Russia to play a far greater role in world politics than its current economic and social situation should otherwise allow.
INASYMMETRYWARFARE
When observing the development of defense policy and military think ing, Russia’s foreign policy objectives should be viewed in a broader con text. The notion of “near abroad” introduced in 1992 by one of the formulators of Russian foreign policy, Professor Sergei Karaganov, and the use of Russians living there as part of so-called active mea sures are still relevant in the cur rent information confrontation.
Russia’s military doctrine places emphasis on pre-war activities in which extensive use is made of infor mation tools to achieve the objectives. Weakening and disrupting the ad versary in the run-up to an imminent military conflict create preconditions for achievment of the objectives using the least military force.
1) Russia’s Hostile Measures. Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against NATO in the Contact, Blunt, and Surge layers of Competition. RAND, Santa Monica 2020.
3) In his speech delivered in 2016, General Gerasimov stated that political objectives could be achieved with little military impact, having first reduced the economic and military potential of the adversary through informational and psychological action. Supporting the internal opposition, using special forces in addition to sabotage, would be essential in this.
Arguably, Gerasimov had been opposed to wider military action in 2014 and is said to have preferred a campaign lasting a few weeks to paralyze air defense and critical infrastructure. Such possible mis calculations will, unfortunately, add weight to future military deception (Russian: маскировка), which is why it would be very wrong to under estimate the potential adversary.
of governments being overthrown without significant direct military influence. Russia’s cyber-attacks, in terference in elections and support for radical movements have posed serious challenges to the democratic world.
Reliance on so-called active measures and military deception enabled Russia to succeed in occupy ing Crimea in 2014, which triggered Russia’s current aggression against Ukraine. It should not be forgotten that Ukraine is just a brief episode
in the long war Russia is waging to change the world order. There is a real danger that Russia will be tempted to continue to use military influence in situations that could be resolved by other means.
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in Moscow, Russia, April 21, 2022. Scanpix photo by Russian Presidential Press Service
2) Kennan used the term in his lectures, and it covers the full gamut: sabotage, diplomatic influence, intelligence operations, proxy wars in Asia, Africa and Latin America, assassinations, coup plotting and sometimes direct military support, such as the Soviet Union’s military support for North Vietnam to fight US forces.
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According to Russia, it was in a pre-war conflict with the West even before the invasion of Ukraine. Understanding this came with great difficulty and pain in the Western world, which operates by different rules. Allegedly, (former) top Western politicians have been paid off and various alternative movements that can sow confusion have been financed for years.
4) Russia’s military doctrines: the Basic Positions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved on November 2, 1993; the Military Strategy 2000, approved on April 21, 2000; the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved on February 8, 2010, and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved on December 25, 2014.
Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine has led to discussions about the ineffectiveness of the Russian war machine and the invalidity of General Gerasimov’s ideas. Ukraine’s will to fight, the government’s ability to consolidate with the people, and the West’s real help were underesti mated. At the same time, it cannot be said that the special services were not present at the beginning of the war: the fight against diversionary groups in Kiev yielded the greatest victory of the first week of the war.
5) The previous National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation dates back to 2015.
Discussions and considerations about land robotics on the future battlefield no longer belong solely to the science and technology communities. This topic, which in most NATO countries has been confined to an academic exchange of ideas, has become an element considered in all serious, long-term capability development.
• It reduces the weight of vehicles (at least halving it, based on current examples), which in turn increases mobility.
We understand well the bene fits that UAVs provide. Situational awareness without having unmanned eyes in the sky is almost unthinkable. Reaching out to places hundreds or thousands of miles away with unman ned vehicles provides an opportunity to project your forces and engage the enemy in a different manner than be fore. Unmanned flying assets, drones, and loitering munitions have become an integral part of waging war today and have been a game-changer.
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Lieutenant Colonel (in Reserve) STEN ALLIK CD&E Director, Milrem Robotics
There are unlikely to be any partisans for a “robotics-free bat tlefield” anymore. In fact, they have not existed for a couple of decades. Unmanned aerial vehicles with different levels of autonomous functionalities, which today are an integrated part of any advanced military force, are proof of this –and the level of autonomy is being developed even further all the time.
LAND ROBOTS ON THE FUTURE BATTLEFIELD
• It reduces height (by at least one third), thus increasing survivability.
In a generic manner, unman ning land platforms provides the following benefits, even with out a high level of autonomy:
• Removing the human element from a system allows more risky manoeuvers to be made, as hu man lives are no longer at risk.
technology does not yet correspond to the ideal, where autonomous ground robot systems fight quasiindependently side by side with manned or other unmanned systems. However, maybe the desired effectiveness is already in place? To understand this, we must first make a distinction between the unmanned aspect and the auto nomy aspect so that we can bet ter see the existing benefits.
• It alleviates the human burden. Battles are long and exhausting, but the ability to keep up the operational tempo is the key to imposing your own battle plan.
If we add automated informa tion collection and distribution, then we can say that the operatio nal potency is in place in existing technology without even talking about autonomy – which is to
say, Artificial Intelligence (AI).
number of NATO countries have already launched or are set to launch programs to learn about and understand the effecti veness of land robotics technology and its operational implications.
But what about ground robotics? It seems that the military unders tand their potency, but the available
Another benefit of unmanning systems is efficiency. How many men are needed to carry one wounded comrade? Usually, four! As oppo sed to just one operating a CASE VAC Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), which can evacuate several casualties at once. At least two are needed to carry a 50 cal machi ne gun – instead of one operating an armed UGV. These may seem banal examples, but projecting this onto the battlefield translates into
A
REMOVING THE HUMAN ELEMENT FROM A SYSTEM ALLOWS MORE RISKY MANOEUVERS TO BE MADE.
Weapons SÕDUR ‖ 29
Milrem THeMIS carrying ammunition and supplies during
in a less visible way, if so desired. The robots know the area of opera tion “by heart” based on the Digital Twin and previous exercises.
ADDER Remote Weapon Station mounted on THeMIS, Jan. 29, 2021. Milrem
We can place these examples in the context of the war in Ukraine, add other use-cases, and thus consider the operational benefits that already exist.
The “beauty of the game” of ground robotics is that the cases described above are already possib le today. There is no need to wait until more autonomy is developed and applied. Thus, it is essential to understand the effects that unman ning land platforms providesas well as the effects AI adds to capabilities.
It should also be taken into consideration that unlike more traditional technology, auto nomy will never be perfected. It is constantly being developed and improved, it is “learning,” and this fact leads to other dynamics, require the appropriate approach.
In addition to the technical challen ges, you have to change the crew or provide supplementary training. With ground robotics, you simply need to change the payload and download the necessary skills – and off it goes…
• Deliberate defense on semi-closed terrain. UGVs present an oppor tunity to utilize terrain that is too soft to carry the same capabilities in manned vehicles. Unmanned weapon systems use a number of defensive positions for dynamic
defense; resupply is pushed down to a single machine gun, carried by the UGV, which allows respon siveness etc. to be maintained.
One of the characteristics of unmanned ground robots is that they are modular. It takes time to transform an armored vehicle from serving anti-tank purposes into an engineering platform, or to trans form a support vehicle (CASEVAC, resupply, etc.) into a fighting vehicle.
• An urban environment. A robotic spearhead executes a harsh offen sive operation while other robotic systems secure the flanks in order to enable the human component to execute decisive actions. CASEVAC and last-mile supply are executed mostly by unmanned systems.
The adversary, the situation, the mission, and the environment change all the time. What could be more desirable than having the opportu nity to design the best capability set needed for success – and leaving the adversary the difficult task of finding out what the next design is of the forces they have to fight against?
Some examples:
EMPLOYMENT OF GROUND ROBOTICS REDUCES THE NEED FOR PERSONNEL AND ALLOWS HIGH READINESS TO BE SUSTAINED FOR LONGER, WITH FEWER COSTS AND IN A LESS VISIBLE WAY.
AI, which enables autonomous functions in which direct human in tervention is not needed all the time, adds additional layers on top of un manned vehicles. Once it is possible to delegate at least some functionalities to AI, the number of people directly involved in “robotic engagement” will be able to be reduced even further.
But this is all mathematics, and quite simple to understand. Adding the central command, a common operational picture for both man and machine etc., creates comp lexity but also an enormous number of opportunities. The question is: What is the technology that enab les this, and does it already exist? The short answer is yes. The more challenging question is: What is the full picture of the operational po tency of ground robotics, including both unmanned and AI aspects?
Potency is not a simple multip lication of low tactical-level effects – it is much more than that. The challenge is that this overall potency is not reflected in current doctrines or operating instructions. This does not mean that ground robotics are not applicable to current methods of fighting – they are, and they are well suited to it. But this new techno logy provides other opportunities.
• Military tensions require a very high level of long-term readiness and responsiveness. However, the employment of ground robotics reduces the need for personnel and allows high readiness to be sustai ned for longer, with fewer costs and
Weapons 30 ‖ SÕDUR
increased efficiency and enhanced effectiveness among your soldiers.
very detailed requirements-based acquisition processes need a certain degree of reconsideration. Otherwise a situation will develop wherein the time between defining the require ments and delivering the result will be too long and the systems will be outdated, per se. Technology deve
Planning and acquisition processes have to take into account that techno logy develops rapidly. Flexibility and the dynamic definition of require ments provide agility. In addition to this, cooperation between industry
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THeMIS mounted with remote heavy machine gun shooting at live fire exercise in Netherlands, July 5, 2022. Royal Netherlands Army photo
during a patrol in Gao, Mali, Nov. 10, 2019. The UGV was tested by Estonian Defence Forces during operation Barkhane. EDF photo
The current capability deve lopment and acquisition process is designed to integrate technologies that have already been perfected and which only need updates from time to time. But autonomy is constantly changing and evolving. This means that the current, rather slow, and
lopment is simply too fast, and on both sides: ours and the adversary’s.
Weapons
THeMIS, Milrem photo Milrem TYPE-X Robotic Combat Vehicle, June 10, 2021. Milrem photo
We can paraphrase a well-known saying and state: “Never send in a man when you can send in a robot.” Human beings will always be part of the battlefield, on both sides, and between the frontlines. All this comp rises complexity that the development and integration of robotic ground systems has to take into account. It must do so, and we know that robotic systems are developed by all par ties, including adversary. Ethics are the basis of our societies, and every employment of novel technology has to meet fundamental principles.
identification, are areas in which it is not too early to establish a fra mework. In the end, it is a question of integrating and deploying assets within the alliance’s framework and with the greatest effectiveness.
But at the end of the day, it is people who decide on its employ ment and who not only provide a framework for the execution of any task, but who also have to fight against it. Thus, ground robotics is not only about how we can use it, but what the best means of fighting against it are. And there, man alone may be in the weaker position.
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Milrem photo
The symbiosis of technological development, intellectual work, and pragmatic boots-on-the-ground tes ting provides the best and fastest way of arriving at and, most importantly, understanding the point at which the integration of ground robotics into capabilities has to be achieved. Something which seemed to be so far off in the future a couple of years ago is now here, and those who unders tand that and dare to take risks will have a remarkable advantage.
and the military needs some rethin king. Not that there is any fundamen tal dysfunctionality at present – but will it meet future requirements?
If we consider that autonomy is permanently developing, coope ration between the military and industry must be closer and cover all phases: development, produc tion, integration, employment. The nature of ground robotics leads to a situation where the regularity of updates is not counted in years, but in months, or even weeks and days.
Robots “grow” with their users, and industry will be the facilita tor and partner in this process.
Royal Netherlands Army soldiers testing Milrem THeMIS, May 14, 2019.
combat. Now, then, is the right time to address the challenge that will arise sooner rather than later – operatio nal and technical rightandCommunications,interoperability.engagements,resistancetoelectronicwarfare,downtosimpleFriendorFoe
The right moment is to start integrating ground robotic systems into force structure is a question of understanding the benefits it provi des now and those it will provide in the future. An increasing number of NATO countries have launched and are continuing to pursue their Robotic and Autonomous Systems programs, where ground robotics is an integral part of robotic-enabled
THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENT ROBOTIC SYSTEMS www.milrem.com
Weapons 34 ‖ SÕDUR
Compared to the polymer-cased cartridges of General Dynamics and Textron Systems, they were significantly lighter, but required a completely different reloading system. The General Dynamics weapon was a bullpup solution (with the magazine behind the triggering system) and a belt-fed weapon was not even offered as a machine gun.
2nd Lieutenant RAIKO JÄÄRATS Editor of Sõdur magazine
The construction of the cart ridge is conventional, with a steel cartridge base. This is necessary in order for the cartridge to withs tand the 80,000 psi of gunpowder gas pressure generated in the case during firing. The higher pressure allows the required initial ve locity to be achieved with a short 13-inch barrel. At the same time, it reduces the life of the barrel, which is around 12,000 rounds.
US ARMY NEXT SQUADGENERATIONWEAPONS
This announcement marks the most important decision in the field of handguns in the last fifty years, setting the course for the next half-century. It is also a sign that 27 months of extensive testing of prototypes from three different armaments manufac turers have come to an end.
I
The SIG 6.8x51 FURY does not look all that different from existing cartridge types. The first thing that you notice is that it is made from two different metals, which is why it is referred to as a hybrid munition.
The new automatic rifle is known as the XM5 and the new machine gun as the XM250. The letter X in the nomenclature of the weapons of the US Armed Forces indicates that it is still a prototype. When these weapons eventually enter service, they are likely to be designated the M5 and M250.
Within the framework of the program, unique weapons from three diffe rent armaments manu facturers were tested. The Sig Sauer solution differed from its competitors in that it was the least innovative, so to speak. The cart ridge they developed was not the only one with a polymer casing, and the automatic rifle was based on the already proven MCX Spear mo del, the use of which is no different from that of the AR-15/M4/R20.
The Next Generation Squad Weapon Program of the US Army began with the development of a bullet of the ideal shape and weight. It was found that, at an effective range of 610 m, the optimum caliber for sufficient penet ration at distances of up to 1,200 m is 6.8 mm if the bullet leaves the barrel at an initial velocity of over 914 m/s.
n a press release on April 19, the US Army announced that they had signed a ten-year fixed-price contract with Sig Sauer for the supply of new auto matic rifles and machine guns.
THE NEXT GENERATION
The Textron weapon had many more moving parts, and different training was needed to use it. It
A HYBRID CARTRIDGE
These requirements were imposed on defense industry companies par ticipating in the program. The ranges of potential adversaries' weapons and the durability of their body armour were taken into account when devi sing these requirements.
has been speculated but is uncon firmed that plastic cartridges, for example, could not withstand tests under extreme conditions. The weapons had to be operational in both desert heat and Arctic cold.
“The introduction of the 6.8 mm XM5 will, in the near future, answer the question as to what will happen if every soldier is given a precision rifle to use,” says Major Risto Pärtel, Chief of Armament, Estonian Defense Forces. “The US procurement of new handguns is a successful example of a modern acquisition approach where the desi red capability is achieved through re search and development, rather than
Weapons SÕDUR ‖ 35
through the acquisition of products already available on the market.”
The pistol grip and trigger system are more or less identical to the M4/R20. An R20-trai ned soldier would be able to use the weapon without difficulty.
The 6.8x51 mm cartridge is similar in size to the 7.62x51 mm cartridge, allowing existing 7.62 rifles to be converted to the new caliber where necessary. The US Armed Forces have stressed that the 6.8 mm cartridge is not being introduced to replace the 5.56 and 7.62 NATO standard ammunition, which will remain in use. However, it opens up the possibility in the more distant future that the US and NATO will use only one caliber in the case of squad weapons.
But there are also some diffe rences. The stock of the weapon can be collapsed or folded on its
The XM5 is a 6.8 mm caliber AR-15 type handgun, but it comes with certain innovations com pared to the current M4 used by the US Armed Forces. The XM5 is actually a military variant of the Sig Sauer MCX Spear already on the market. As with the EDF
THE XM5 AUTOMATIC RIFLE
R20, reloading is performed with a short-stroke gas piston.
side. This is possible thanks to the recoil spring, which is not located in the lower part behind the lock as in AR-15 systems, but in the upper part inside the gas cylinder rod. This is somewhat similar to the recoil spring of the AK47.
In addition to the standard charging handle at the rear of the AR-15-type weapon, there is folding charging handle on the left of the receiver that does not move during firing. This allows a right-handed shooter to load the weapon while ai ming, and it makes it much easier to clear any malfunctions while firing.
The lower part of the weapon is almost identical to the lower part of the M4/R20. The fire selector, magazine catch and lock catch buttons can be used by both the left-handed and right-handed.
Weapons
XM5 rifle was developed by SIG SAUER with direct input from U.S. warfighters to provide more power, distance, and accuracy to replace the current M4 rifle platform. SIG SAUER photos
“The lighter weight of the XM250 and its ability fire single shots makes the weapon to handle more like an automatic rifle than the machine gun,” says Pärtel.
He adds that the 6.8 mm XM250 machine gun will replace the cur rent 5.56 mm M249 machine guns and that a tender has been an nounced to find a solution so that the 7.62 mm M240 machine gun can be used with a 6.8 mm cart ridge via a simple change of barrel.
THE XM157 FIRE CONTROL
The XM5 has a 13-inch (33 cm) barrel and is slightly heavier than the M4, weighing 3.8 kg without a suppressor. The effective range of the rifle is up to 518 metres. At this range, it can penetrate helmets and body armour. The weapon uses 20-round magazines, and the combat kit is likely to come with 140 rounds. In comparison, the M4 has 210 rounds in its combat kit.
THE XM250 MACHINE GUN
The belt of the machine gun is loaded from the left and the shells exit from the right. The technical rate of fire is 800 rounds per minute. In addition to automatic firing, it can also be used for shooting in semi-auto matic mode with single shots. On the top of the machine gun is a full-length Picatinny rail for aiming devices.
This is why Vortex Optics has come up with a solution that com bines both a laser rangefinder and a ballistic computer, which always automatically places the aiming dot in the right place, and all the shooter has to do is point the gun at the target and pull the trigger.
Weapons
“Today’s weapons are generally capable of firing very accurately, with less than one minute of arc (MOA), but external factors such as wind, temperature and hu man error can cause inaccurate shooting,” says Major Pärtel.
“Just as today’s cars come with various driver aids, which is to say electronic solutions, the aiming device of the XM157 has sensors that measure temperature, air pressu re, angle of fire and inclination, which, in combination with a laser rangefinder, make corrections to the aiming point in each parameter so as to coincide with the desired
While the combat kit of the 5.56 mm caliber M249 machine gun in the US Army includes three 200-round belt pouches weighing 9.4 kg, the XM 250 machine gun is likely to be equipped with four 100-round belt pouches weighing 12.3 kg. More accurate shooting compensates for the lower number of rounds. The total weight of the machine gun and ammunition remains about the same.
bang that cannot be suppressed), but to mask the flame and sound trail and to guide harmful gunpow der gases away from the shooter.
The XM250 machine gun weighs just 6.8 kg with a suppres sor and bipod, being over two kilos lighter than its M249 pre decessor. The weapon has a 465 mm quick-changeable barrel that moves back and forth to compensa te for recoil while firing, ensuring more accurate shooting results.
The new weapons ‒ both the XM5 and XM250 ‒ already come with a suppressor as standard. SIG SLX suppressors are designed not so much for maximum suppression of gunshot sound (a bullet travel ling at supersonic speed creates a
Weight of cartridge/bullet 30.8/8.7 g
Effective firing range 518 m 500 m
The new sight replaces the M68 red dot sight, M150 fixed sight and SCO adjustable magnification sight used on current US Armed Forces weapons. The laser rangefinder module also integrates a visible and infrared laser, eliminating the need for separate aiming lasers such as the AN/PEQ 15 and 16.
The first weapons are planned to be operational in 2025 and should be in use among all com bat units of US Army in ten years. It is quite likely that in the future several other NATO countries will switch to the same caliber, which is sure to influence the decisions of third countries when choosing new squad weapons.
XM5
guns to cover the needs of its com bat units. The 5.56 and 7.62 caliber weapons will remain in service for rear and support units. The deal is worth around USD 4.5 billion.
Initial bullet velocity 914 m/s 900 m/s
Pressure of gunpowder gases 80,000 psi 55,000 psi
SIG SAUER photos
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Weight of loaded magazine 629 g 497 g
Weight without sight (with suppressor) 3.8 kg (4.47 kg) 3.32 kg Magazine capacity 20 rounds 30 rounds
Over a ten-year period, the US Army plan to purchase 107,000 automatic rifles and 13,000 machine
Caliber 6.8 mm
Barrel 330 mm 363 mm (13 inches) (14.3 inches)
Length in shortest position 609 mm 797 mm
THE FUTURE
The contract allows for the pur chase of up to 250,000 rifles in total,
if needed, should the US Marines and Special Forces also opt for this rifle. The targeting equipment contract also allows for the purchase of up to 250,000 pieces of equip ment over a ten-year period and is worth around USD 2.7 billion.
Total length (with suppressor) 866 mm 880 mm (914 mm) (1020 mm)
Weight of combat kit 8.8 kg 7.7 kg (with suppressor, (270 rounds) without sight, 140 rounds)
take the batteries out of the sight, it is similar in performance to the Trijicon 1-8x28 VCOG sight used on the Estonian LMT precision rifle. Its innovations lie precisely in its electronics and modular design.
XM250 light machine gun is based on the SIG MG 338 machine gun, which houses the powerful .338 NM cartridge, which in turn is based on the LWMMG 338 experimental machine gun manufactured by General Dynamics.
Major RISTO PÄRTEL Chief of Armament, Estonian Defense Forces
EDF R20 manufactured by LMT Defense is very similar to XM5. Both AR-type rifles have free-floating reinforced M-LOK handguard, full-length Picatinny rail on top, ambidextrous fire control, bolt-catch, and mag release.
Weapons SÕDUR ‖ 39
he new betterrespectsweaponryAmericanisinmanysomewhatthantraditional
T
EDF photo
Commentary
weapons, but not to the extent that we should feel bad about using LMT automatic rifles. The effective range of the R20 is quite sufficient on our semiclosed terrain. The higher quantity of ammunition in the soldiers' ammo pouches ensures better sustainability if used wisely.The majority of NATO countries will continue to use the current 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm caliber rifles and ammunition for some time to come. This will also give us a greater opportunity to exchange ammunition with other countries in the event of war. What happens next? Will the defense forces switch to 6.8 mm in the future? I think the advent of the new caliber of the Americans will enrich and increase our future armament acquisition options. Many armaments manufacturers are sure to start manufacturing new 6.8 mm rifles and upgrade kits for old rifles, and the range of suppliers of this ammunition will expand.Itisnot impossible, for example, that we will start converting 7.62 mm precision rifles or machine guns to 6.8 mm, which would be much cheaper than buying a completely new rifle. A dual-caliber rifle system would create the possibility of training with cheaper 7.62 mm ammunition and, if necessary, going into battle with the more efficient 6.8 mm ammunition.
ALAN CHRISTOPHER SHEPPARD
FIRST IN, LAST OUT
History 40 ‖ SÕDUR
I think I can lay claim to being the first member of the NATO alliance to conduct infantry training for the Estonian Defense Forces. I was part of a group of 14 Royal Marines known as the Baltic States Training Team. This group was, historically, the first team to conduct serious military training for former Soviet Bloc countries.
I am a former Royal Marine Commando who, back in 1994,
On investigation, I came to realize it was part of the former Soviet Union, which explained why I knew nothing about it. My inter est was piqued. At the time, I had served 20 years in the Royal Ma rines and all my service had been in a Rifle Company or a training job as a Platoon Weapons Instructor.
M
History SÕDUR ‖ 41
was employed in the NCO and officer training wing at the Com mando Training Center in the UK. I was a Platoon Weapons Instructor, 1st class and was vol unteered by my boss to attend an interview for some job in Latvia called the Baltic Battalion Project. “Hell, where’s Latvia?” I thought.
Alan Cristopher Sheppard (2nd R) teaching small unit tactics to a platoon that is going to be deployed to Iraq, attached to the US Army, near Klooga, Estonia, April 21, 2005. Since 1995 Sheppard has taught infantry skills to thousands of Estonian soldiers. EDF photo
I have traveled far and wide with the Royal Marines, from the Arc tic to the Antarctic. I have seen operational service in Northern Ireland and in the Falklands war. You do not need to go to war to
Said specialization forms part of the Royal Marines, whose function is to train and maintain infantry standards throughout our Corps. The Corps and everyone in it highly value this branch, which also has a mem ber of the Small Arms School Corps attached to it to ensure continuity of standards and cross training and development within the British Army.
any of our first train ees had been Soviet conscripts, now free and wishing to serve in the professional Estonian, Latvi an and Lithuania armies. This all started for me in 1994 and ended with my retirement in January 2022. It was due to a strange quirk of fate, or something I jokingly refer to as the “Longest Tour in NATO.” I think there are a lot of lessons to be learned from my experiences, which are often ignored by those who think that they are always the first to offer assistance, even to this day.
TRAINING NEVER ENDS
I eventually served 24 years in the Royal Marines and now 23 years in an Estonian uniform. I have served in a multitude of EDF institutions and am now a member of the Estonian Defense League ‒ the volunteer citizen army.
example, joined the Norwegians on a very successful tour of Lebanon. Now our aim was established and we could formulate our train ing objectives and standards. This being before the era of the laptop, we put together hard-copy lessons to cover all of the subjects to be delivered from our block syllabus of instruction. This filled many boxes of hard copy which you could now put in your pocket in CD format. This instruction came, among other things, from field manu als dealing with individual skills, weapon lessons and platoon tactics. These manuals are based on tried and tested methods but are always open to amendment should we learn something new in training or on operations. I later realized that many armies do not have these manuals,
Scanpix photo
MISTAKES.Estoniansoldiers
The aim of our mission was first and foremost to train each group to operate as an infantry platoon. Then, we were to train them to train a company of volunteers in an infantry role in their own countries, which is to say, to train the trainers. These trainers were all sergeants and officers who would fill the platoon and company leadership positions, ready for handing over for mission training with the Nordic countries before deployment. Estonia, for
I now knew where Latvia was! This was in August 1994, and as I later found out, the Bal tic company was forming up to learn English at the same time.
The Baltic Battalion project was initiated by Nordic countries; these soldiers were trained by UK Royal Marines, had American uniforms and Soviet weapons.
History 42 ‖ SÕDUR
THE HARD WAY
I have always been very careful to teach the basic skill of the du ties of a sentry ever since. The last words my father, a World War II veteran, said to me as I left home to join up were, “You never finish training.” This is very true, and I met with many who thought, “I know that, I never need to practice it, do it again or improve that skill.” They were always poorly trained.
I was once on a fighting/prob ing patrol in the Falklands war in an enemy battalion position. The Argentinian sentry we encoun tered had clearly not been briefed/ trained properly, and because of his failure we took out six of his troops (their casualty report then being intercepted by our Y troop). The information gained ensured a very successful attack by 42 Commando Royal Marines a few days later.
THOSE WHO TEACH MUST ALSO BE ABLE TO DO, AND THOSE WHO SUPERVISE MUST HAVE THE KNOWLEDGE TO KNOW WHAT THEY ARE LOOKING AT AND CORRECT
be a good soldier, but it proves the effectiveness (or otherwise) of your training. It also produces personal and collective lessons, and I found as a trainer a firm conviction to pass this training on to others.
I was volunteered for the Baltic States Training Team and, after a suc cessful interview, I joined a 14-man team which consisted of a five-man HQ element and three training teams of three members each. Each team nominated to train 30 men from each of the three Baltic States centrally in Adazi in Latvia. I would join the Estonian platoon, and this quirk of fate would change my life.
of the Baltic Battalion loading ammunition in Adazi training ground, Latvia, 1995.
which leads to a lack of standards and loss of control over a training system. I would learn this the hard way when I changed uniforms.
We landed in Latvia on Nov. 17, 1994 to do a recce of the Adazi base and the training areas we would use for our lessons. We were waiting in our C-130, complete with our red
Those who teach must also be able to do, and those who supervise must have the knowledge to know what they are looking at and correct mistakes. If not, then no matter how good the manuals and lessons are, the results will be minimal. Field Marshall Rom mel once said that the British Army has the best manuals in the world, so thank God they do not read them!
NCOs and junior officers are thoroughly and arduously trained in the field by “doing”, which is to say, completing realistic missions and tasks. This rigorous method also matures them as they climb the promotion ladder, and makes them respect those beneath them.
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland also contributed to the Baltic Battalion Project in the form of training for battalion staff. A Royal Marine colonel was in overall charge of both groups.
The Royal Marines, I am sure, had learned this the hard way and now religiously focus on training and maintenance of standards, ensuring that lessons are continually learned and that training is adjusted accord ingly. It may amuse some to know that we copied many individual skill lessons and training methods from the Germans in World War II. We certainly copied their ap proach to small-unit leadership.
The failure of top leadership to have these more junior leadership skills and experiences, rather than just those they learnt in the classroom, leads to what I can only describe as staff officers who do not respect those who do the fighting and see planning as the “be-all and end-all.” Keeping that in mind helps to understand how and why we do what we do.
History SÕDUR ‖ 43
THE TIME WARP
We were taken to a former Soviet sports hotel and had one whole floor to ourselves. It was basic, to say the least, but we always adapt to our surroundings and just got on with it. It was a time warp ‒ no restau rants, no pubs, people just drinking in ordinary shops, since every shop sold alcohol, and crazy shops at that, full of all sorts of things, but never anything you actually wanted.
Baltic Battalion badge with its moto in Latin “Strength in unity”.
History 44 ‖ SÕDUR
Land Rover ready to drive off in, and I marveled at the Soviet jets still parked there. Our distinctive Land Rover would later serve as an ATM for the Latvian police on Fridays, until we got wise and refused to pay any fines without supporting tickets.
Adazi had a large and suitable polygon, so we were happy. The area was littered with remnants of Soviet occupation. Russian helmets and gas masks were scattered ev erywhere, along with other detritus. Many buildings were covered in murals of Soviet accomplishments and images of Lenin. This I found both surreal and fascinating.
The streets were grey and dis mal but the people held their heads high, which impressed me. I found the whole situation in triguing, and even lost weight. I realize now, writing this, that so much has changed so rapidly for the better these last 25 years!
“WE KNEW NOTHING”
History SÕDUR ‖ 45
years later, “We thought we knew so much, but we knew nothing.”
We later found out the sewage system had been linked up to the drinking and washing water as their final departing joke. We also had to make sure that we had suitable accommodation for ourselves and the Baltic company that would soon be joining us. This I will only describe as a drama which my boss eventually resolved, but only then because we had a strong memorandum of understanding!
“You are doing God’s work,” said Warren Christopher, the United States Secretary of State, on a visit to us.
IT WAS HARD WORK FOR ALL, BUT MANY SOLDIERS TELL ME IT WAS THE BEST THING THEY EVER DID.
The Presidents and Chiefs of Defense of three Baltic countries attending the first military parade of the Baltic Battalion in Adazi, Latvia, 1995. The Baltic Battalion is considered to be the most successful cooperation project of Baltic countries. The Battalion had its own flag that bore the upper colors of three Baltic countries.
During this period, we got many visits from very senior military and political departments, includ ing the second-in-command of the British Foreign Office and his delegation (our sponsors), the most
This mission was accomplished in three weeks. We identified all of the areas needed to meet our training goals and were good to go on Day One of meeting our soldiers in January 1995.
We would travel each day to Adazi in an old people-carrier which was held together with tape and wires. The driver thought he was at the wheel of a Lamborghini, and would overtake vehicles by veering into oncoming traffic, barely making it. I thought it would be a dumb way to die, so we got a new driver.
The camp itself and the Latvian officers reminded me of the Soviet army, which is understandable, as it was the model they knew ‒ they had merely changed uniforms. The camp was pretty broken, literally, as it had been intentionally sabotaged by the departing Soviet army.
It was a very rewarding expe rience for the trainers and train ees alike. It was hard work for all, but many soldiers (then and now) tell me it was the best thing they ever did. Every week they felt they had grown, and we could see that growth, which as trainers gave us that clichéd warm fuzzy feeling!
equipment had been donated, so certain items were lacking. Howev er, this we had no problems with, as training can overcome shortag es, but not the other way round.
Squad and platoon training followed, which can also be defined as small-unit tactics. These in cluded live-fire exercises. This was done with what you could carry in any weather conditions. It should also be mentioned that all of our
We had a cold winter and a hot summer that year. It was great training weather. We completed our training with three platoons opposing one another in a 10-day exercise operating from patrol bases.
We met our platoons and launched into training. We started with phys ical training and weapon and field craft skills. This was initially met with astonishment by the soldiers who had served in the Soviet army, since they thought they were already experienced in such things. To quote one officer, who told me this many
Our team was the first to train former Soviet soldiers since the breakup of the USSR. However, I never thought of them as for mer Soviet soldiers ‒ just pressed men who had to conform to a system not of their choosing.
History 46 ‖ SÕDUR
senior American four-star general in this part of Eastern Europe, and our own major general from the Royal Marines, to name a few. They were all astounded by the positive attitude of the Baltic soldiers, many of whom had a background in the Soviet Army, and their enthu siasm for this new style of training. They were also surprised that we were capable of doing so much with so little. Our equipment, as mentioned, was all donated, and our soldiers slept two men to a blanket during the Arctic winter in the field that year.
In September of that year, we had a passing-out parade on the main parade square at the Adazi camp. Top diplomats from far and wide attended, but more importantly, it drew the heads of the three Baltic States together to stand side by side. It was a military and political success!
Scanpix photos
General Johannes Kert, the Chief of Defense of the EDF, also visited us. He fully understood the project and was its strongest Estonian sup porter. Sadly, he was soon removed from his position and was unable to see the project through. This would later cost me and the proj ect dearly, and make an already hard job ten times harder still.
Baltic Battalion Estonian soldiers during a rest period on field training day in Adazi training ground, Latvia, 1995. Many of these men were former conscripts of the Soviet Army and were shocked by the level of professionalism of Royal Marine infantry training.
With pride they watched as their soldiers marched past them and took their salute as free, unit ed Baltic soldiers. Now older and wiser, I realize what a privilege it was to see President Lennart Meri of Estonia and his fellow presidents that day, together for the first time in their newfound independence.
FREEDOM ISN’T FREE
I remember standing in front of a grocery store in British uniform. The store could be best described as a former Soviet PX now run as a ci vilian shop by the former wife of the
“We knew you Americans would come,” she said.
I arrived in Paldiski, Estonia, on my 38th birthday to supervise and assist with the training that was about to be conducted by the platoon for their company.
I would need another article to do it full justice! Suffice it to say it was again a fascinating expe rience. It was a great pleasure to see Estonians training Estonians with such competence, and in such a unique landscape as a former secret Soviet submarine base.
The platoons were now ready to return to their respective countries and train their first volunteers. One member of each three-man team was asked to go with them. I was requested by my boss to vol unteer. I immediately said yes.
History SÕDUR ‖ 47
“But I’m English!” I replied, in a most offended voice.
HMS Sandown (now an Estonian vessel ‒ the EML Admiral Cowan) visited Paldiski, the first NATO ship ever to do so. The crew and I laid wreaths in the Tallinn military cem etery to fallen British service mem bers who died in support of Estonia’s War of Independence (1918‒1920).
man who had once been the Soviet Naval Quartermaster. I was ap proached by one of the few Russians there who spoke English. It turned out she was an English teacher whose husband was a submarine officer.
POSTSCRIPT
preoccupied with indulging our selves in worrying about nothing.
History 48 ‖ SÕDUR
Soldiers from the Estonian Company, Baltic Battalion, participating in predeployment training in Paldiski, Estonia, 1995. The “peace-keeping training” was a cover up to give Baltic soldiers westernized military training; but it was a very successful cover up that led many in EDF to believe that “peace-keeping” and war fighting were separate things.
I had the pleasure and honor of meeting an Estonian lady who had been made a Member of the British Empire by the United Kingdom for her efforts in maintaining these graves during the Soviet occupation. She died the following year, but it is gratifying to know that she had been thanked by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines personally.
I may have imparted some mil itary knowledge, but I also learned much and continue to do so. I was taught how lucky we were to come from a place that had so much more, and how we take things for granted ‒ so much so that we are
I was reminded what freedom is, and that freedom is something you do not fully appreciate until you have lost it. I saw the sheer ecstasy of freedom gained in those who had only recently shaken off their shack les of occupation. It was a wakeup call to me about our complacency in freedom seeming so obvious and eternal ‒ which it is not.
When I now see the large military presence at these graves on Nov. 11 each year, I wonder whether they fully appreciate what happened in the early days of the first and now second periods of independence.
EDF photo by Tõnu Noorits
Soldiers from the Estonian Company, Baltic Battalion, checking results at a shooting range near Paldiski, Estonia, Sept. 8, 1998. Each Baltic country contributed to the Battalion with one infantry company and one support company.
The aim of the Baltic Battalion Project was to provide an example of westernized infantry training to be used by the host countries. It provided all of the training for individual-level, squad-level and platoon-level skills and drills to enable a rifle company to be formed and trained by our initial trainees under our supervision. Staff
Scanpix photo by Tiit Blaat
History SÕDUR ‖ 49
The lack of coherent drills and skills offered by the main EDF ensured that the British skills and drills became de facto rather than de jure and were still used. So it continues to this day and has spread to the many parts of the EDF, but watered down and unsupport ed, both systematically and with the correct reference manuals.
The memorandum of under standing we had was for the Baltic Battalion. It should have been for the Baltic Brigade, with a further
What was unexpected, poisoning the development and leading to the eventual demise of all this training effort, was the fact that these stand alone institutions did not crossfertilize legally or systematically into the main defense forces, but were dissolved and incorporated by them.
This was initially very successful, earning many plaudits from the once skeptical Nordics and Americans. In my opinion, they expected the project to fail at this stage of its development. Eastern European countries were not expected to perform well on missions, but could be used in minor roles. However, with this training, they outshone those they were attached to and were ultimately utilized as the spearhead in the infantry role.
training was conducted centrally in Adazi by our Nordic members so as to provide a Battalion HQ.
It has become an individualeffort training system led by soldiers, NCOs, and officers with this experi ence, not a systematic training system with measurable standards led by J7. This is the only way I can describe it.
This would have constituted natural military progression from our point of view if the Estonian company of the Baltic Battalion had become an Estonian battalion and the training methods had been used to train new Estonian soldiers in our way of doing things. The opposite happened ‒ these methods were immediately replaced by EDF methods based on a conscript model.
1998 Baltic States Training Team
1997 UK
Scanpix photo
intent that the training should be introduced over time throughout the Baltic Defense Forces. This decision should have been made at the Ministry of Defense and gov ernment level between the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom.
This failure ensured that they fought against us rather than with us to improve the situation. The Soviet military had a low skill set for its infantry, so we were anathema to them. We ought to have changed that mindset, but we failed to do so.
In particular, these junior officer platoon commanders understood that they needed to have well-trained individual soldiers, well-trained squads, and capable squad leaders
Is it possible to ensure mission success when you cannot quantify what your soldiers can and cannot do until they are commit ted to the battlefield?
1977 3 Commando Brigade HQ
1978 NP8901 Falkland Islands
1979 1985 42 SkiMountainNorwayFalkland(NorthernCommandoIreland,IslandsWar,Articwarfare,andMilitaryinstructorscourse)
1975 41 Commando (Malta)
1986 1989 Commando Training Centre (Platoon Instructor grade 2, Recruit Training Team, All arms Commando course training team)
1990 1993 42 Commando (Jungle warfare course, Northern Ireland)
Alan SheppardChristopher
1996 loaned to the Estonian Defense Forces.
1999 2022 service in Estonian Defense Forces and Estonian Defense League
There are many pieces of the jigsaw out there to improve this situation. I would recommend a training partnership with the United Kingdom to formulate and standard ize training, because you have to ask yourself this question: “Can we integrate our guys with your guys if their standards are different?”
2022 retired, voluntary member of Estonian Defense League
The greatest loss in all this was neglecting to influence the higherechelon officers who eventually called all the shots. Many of them (if not all) had earned their ranks in the former Soviet military. They needed to be convinced, but they were not, as they went ignored by us. This was an enormous mistake on our part.
THE LESSON OF HAVING CORRECTLY TRAINED INFANTRY WAS LEARNED WHEN THE ESTONIAN SCOUTS BATTALION STARTED DEPLOYING COMPANY-SIZED UNITS TO AFGHANISTAN.
1994 Commando Training Centre (Platoon Instructors course grade 1, Officers and NCOs training wing)
Battalion started deploying com pany-sized units to Afghanistan.
Senior management serving as commanding officers and their sub ordinate staff throughout a brigade on operations would have convinced them of the value of having correct ly trained infantry. This lesson was learned when the Estonian Scouts
1994 1996 Baltic States Training Team
History 50 ‖ SÕDUR
Estonian Platoon, Baltic Battalion, marching in formation and led by 1st Lt. Ants Ojasoo, Platoon Commander, at the Adazi training ground, Latvia, 1995.
1974 Joined Royal Marines
for a platoon and company to suc ceed. I hope these officers become top decision-makers and then put more effort into infantry training standards and field leadership.
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NARVA 1704: THE BEGINNING OF RUSSIAN SIEGE WARFARE
y its nature, siege war fare is a form of total warfare, one which takes place in a limited area between a small number of the besieged and an overwhelmingly powerful besieging force, and which is based on the principle of “the end justifies the means.” In a siege, the besieging force attempts to separate combatants from non-combatants and to win the support of the local population in order to compel the besieged to surrender. A siege often results in widespread destruction of the city, civilian casualties, a humanitarian crisis and criticism from the international community.
Due to its destructive nature, the siege doctrine is underestimated in mi litary planning in Western countries. In contrast, Russian armed forces have successfully used sieges in Ukraine to achieve their strategic objectives.
The war in Ukraine, which, like World War I, was meant to be over “by Ch ristmas,” has shifted from maneuver warfare to positional warfare because of morale, logistics and supply issues.
B
Thus the bombing of civilian targets by Serbian forces during the siege of Sarajevo (1992-1996) led to international condemnation and the intervention of NATO forces in the Yugoslav civil war. Massive artillery fire by Russian troops during the siege of Grozny (1999-2000) killed
2nd Lieutenant (in Reserve) KAUR LILLIPUU Historian, Tallinn University
MODERN SIEGE WARFARE
During the war in Ukraine, Russian indirect fire on civilian infrastruc ture has been widely reported, which leads to the conclusion that its aim is to psyc hologically influence the popu lation rather than to accomplish strategic military objectives.
The siege of Kiev by Russians in the early phase of the war failed because of a strategic miscalculation of the population’s disposition. As a result, Russian troops were ina dequately equipped and the rear of
an estimated 200,000 people, which caused the local Russian community to take the side of the Chechens.
In modern warfare, fighting in urbanized areas is gaining increasing importance. However, instead of street battles like in Stalingrad, armed conflicts are taking on the character of sieges, as the examples of Ukraine and the Middle East show. This why Army Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Armed Forces, believes that siege warfare is here to stay.
Unlike the World War I, the war in Ukraine is being fought in settlements instead of trenches. Although mo dern cities lack massive fortifications, the conditions for siege warfare in the urbanized landscape are largely the same as in the 18th century.
However, trenches have been replaced by tanks and fighting vehicles, and the function of indirect fire is performed by bombers and naval forces in addition to artillery.
History 52 ‖ SÕDUR
The international community condemned Syrian government forces for carrying out a chemical attack during the siege of Ghouta (2013-2018). In Iraq, Prime Minis ter Dr. Haider Abadi lost the 2018 parliamentary elections due to the siege of Mosul (2016-2017), which caused the destruction of 75% of the city and the deaths of 11,000 people.
SÕDUR ‖ 53
Photo by Salvador Busquets
It is fitting, therefore, to look at the beginnings of the art of the siege in Russia in the early 18th century, when Russian siege troops passed their “matriculation exam” at the fortresses in Narva and Tartu.
The Ukrainians turned the tables with bold counter-attacks and the arming of civilians (which, in histo rical terms, is nothing exceptional), forcing the Russians to abandon their siege of Kiev. The Russians chose to accept a tactical defeat in Kiev and to redirect their forces to the Donbass front, which, because of its terrain, is better suited to fighting in the field. However, there, too, sieges play arguably the most important role.
The fortification and besieging of strategically important settlements is known to have begun around 8000 BC, when the city of Jericho was fortified with a stone wall. However, the golden age of siege warfare only arrived on the battlefields of Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries with the spread of bastion fortresses. As armies avoided engaging in field
18TH CENTURY SIEGES
battles with each other, wars took on a siege character, the two most stri king examples being the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) with 115 sieges and the Great Northern War (1700-1721) with 70 sieges.
History
A very accurate model showing the Siege of Barcelona in 1714 during the War of the Spanish Succession. The systematic Vauban-style approach to the breached wall was achieved through the use of zig-zag shaped approach trenches and three parallel trenches. Russian forces used similar tactics in Narva, Estonia, during the Great Northern War in 1704.
Siege warfare has always had an important place in Russian warfare.
The siege of a single fortress could last from a few months to several years; for example, the Ottoman Empire besieged the fortress of Heraklion on Crete for as much as 20 years in the mid-17th century. Sieges thus lengthened the duration of wars, as neither side was able to gain sufficient superiority over their opponent to conclude an acceptable peace treaty, and this in turn made warfare a costly endeavor in terms
the front was not secured. Also, the assault columns lacked sufficient resources to completely encircle the city of 2.5 million inhabitants.
THE VAUBAN SYSTEM
It is possible that Vauban’s sys tem was also applied in Russia, but the Ingrian campaign of the Great Northern War (1700-1704) reveals a number of deviations in the behavior of Russian siege troops. Historians have attributed these deviations from the Vauban system to the improvisatory talents of Peter the Great, but it is likely that Westernstyle military drills were not yet sufficiently ingrained in the Russian regular army and that this resulted in the use of different methods.
the fortress had to be defended after capture. In Russia, on the other hand, heavy artillery fire was used, and fort resses were only prevented from being reduced to rubble if Russian siege troops ran out of ammunition or if cannon barrels were no longer usable.
History 54 ‖ SÕDUR
In Vauban’s system, artillery fire was used judiciously so as not to cause undue damage to the walls, as
RUSSIAN SIEGE TROOPS SET OUT TO BESIEGE THE NARVA FORTRESS IN 1700 WITH VIRTUALLY NO PREPARATIONS.
Russian siege troops also made numerous assaults, often on walls that had not yet been breached, which exhausted the garrison of the fortress, but resulted in numerous casualties for the besiegers, with an average
The two major differences between the French and Russian sieges were the use of artillery and the attitude to casualties. Artillery fire was used for both military and psychological purposes: breaching the fortress walls (creating an ope ning for storming troops to enter the fortress) weakened the defense of the fortress, and bombing town buildings lowered the morale of the civilian population and put pressure on the fortress commander to surrender.
of maintaining the armies. France, for example, spent 75% of its bud get on the army during the reign of Louis XIV, while in Russia this proportion rose to 96% in 1705.
of one quarter of the siege troops killed, but according to a common superstition among Russian soldiers, a soldier killed on the battlefield would wake up three days later in his home village from an enchanted dream.
Between 1701 and 1703, Russian cavalry raided Estonia and Livonia,
THE EFFECT OF SURPRISE
In order to speed up the siege process, engineers began to streamline siege activities. The Marquis de Vauban, a Frenchman whose name is his torically associated with the ideal siege, was the most famous such engineer. His method is charac terized by a systematic approach to the walls of a fortress, through the use of zig-zag shaped approach trenches and three parallel trenches.
Vauban estimated that, in theory, applying his method would shor ten the siege process to 48 days, but in reality it proved even more effective, since in the War of the Spanish Succession 40% of sieges lasted for less than two weeks.
As with any form of combat, the success of a siege is determined by preparation and the effect of surp rise. While the Elector of Saxony had his artillery moved unnoticed through Poland to the Swedish border two years before the start of the Great Northern War, Russian siege troops set out to besiege the Narva fortress in 1700 with virtually no preparations. Overconfidence cost them dearly, and a lesson was learned. Immediately, preparations were made to exact revenge.
Swedish forces in Estonia had been so weakened by spring 1704 that Russian siege troops under Peter the Great began to besiege both the Narva and Tartu fortresses at the same time. Although Russian troops had been operating in the surroun ding area for some time, the Narva fortress had not made the necessary preparations. The walls were in a poor state of repair, the garrison was undermanned and food supp lies were lacking. Nevertheless, the fortress was considered one of the strongest on the eastern frontier of the Swedish Empire, consisting of six bastions surrounded by a dry moat.
During the parallel siege of Narva in early June, the Russians learned from prisoners of war that a Swedish rein forcing force was expected to arrive from Tallinn. Taking advantage of this knowledge, some of the Russians dressed in blue coats and pretended to fight the other Russian troops, thus luring the Swedes out of the fortress to help who they thought were their
Scanpix photo
IN THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY, THE RUSSIAN ARMY WAS PLAGUED BY RAMPANT DESERTION, CAUSED BY NON-PAYMENT OF WAGES, MALNUTRITION AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES SPREADING.
Having arrived close to the Narva and Tartu fortresses, the Russian besieging troops blockaded the roads leading to the fortress and
THE SIEGE OF NARVA
“Capture of Narva by Peter the Great, 1704”, oil on canvas by Alexander Ivanovich Sauerweid (1783-1844), Moscow, Tretjakov Gallery. A 19th century propaganda painting showing Peter the Great protecting the Narva inhabitants while Russian forces are trying to loot the city. During the Great Northern War, Narva was the biggest fortress in Northern Europe.
History SÕDUR ‖ 55
commandeered provisions from the surrounding villages for the troops and their horses. The Russians began to approach the Tartu fortress in early June from the directions of Ropka, Tähtvere and Ülejõe. Initially, the main direction of attack was from Ropka, where the terrain allowed the besiegers to dig trenches right up to the fortress. However, Tar tu’s defenses were strongest there.
In early July, the Russian com mand realized that the current direction of attack would prolong the siege and decided to break off all activities from the direction of Ropka and focus instead on the northern and eastern sides of the fortress, where the wall had mostly collapsed due to artillery fire, but which had not yet been attacked due to the surrounding marshland. During the seven-day drumfire in preparation for the assault, the Russians threw more than 5000 bombs at the Russian Gate and the city of Tartu, reducing most of its churches and buildings to rubble.
THE SIEGE OF TARTU
The terrain around the fortress was marshy to the north, steeply sloping to the east, where it met the fast-flowing Narva River, and with a deep valley surrounding Narva to the south. The fortress was only unpro tected to the west, where the terrain was flat. The fortress of Tartu, on the other hand, was in an unsuitable location in terms of fortification, as the surrounding terrain of hills and valleys gave the besiegers conside rable advantages. Instead of bastions, the northern and eastern sides of the fortress were protected by a slender medieval wall, as an attack from this direction was considered extremely unlikely due to the marshy terrain.
The Swedish Lion Monument to commemorate the Battle of Narva in 1700, Narva, Estonia. The monument was erected in 1936 and was destroyed by Soviet forces in 1944 and re-erected in 2000. Scanpix photo by Aldo Luud
terrorizing peasants and robbing them of their livestock, and burned the Swedish army’s granaries. Due to weak administrative power, the state was unable to feed the army, so the troops lived off the land on which they were stationed. As plundering was considered objec tionable in the Russian heartlands, Russian troops had to obtain food supplies from enemy territory.
The assault on Tartu began on the evening of July 12, when a Russian unit of three companies was sent across Emajõgi River by pontoon bridge to clear the breach in the Russian Gate of barricades. The Swedes countered with heavy fire, as a result of which both sides had to engage fresh reinforcing forces in the battle. The fortress of Tartu surrendered in the early hours of the following day after an assault that had lasted for seven hours.
By mid-July, Narva had run out of food, and trophy flags from the siege of Tartu were hoisted in the Russians’ trenches to demoralize those in the fortress. Morale and discipline were also a problem for the Russian siege troops, which is why on July 20, Peter the Great declared in his order of the day that insubordination would be punishable by death. In the early 18th century, the Russian army was plagued by rampant desertion, caused by nonpayment of wages, malnutrition and infectious diseases spreading in the siege camps due to poor sanitation.
By July 30, the Russians had extended their trenches to the attack positions, and the breaching of the Victoria and Honor bastions began. Incessant bombardment continued until August 9, and a series of fires, followed by confusion and looting, broke out in the town during this period. A service was held in the Rus sian camp before the assault, which, based on descriptions, was charac terized by an elated atmosphere as if a celebration were about to begin, with the rest of the troops envying the storming party. “Forlorn hopes” (volunteers who were willing to take on such a risky task) were used in the first column of the storming party.
“Swedish victorious over the Russians at the Battle of Narva, Estonia, Great Northern War, 1700”, hand-colored woodcut of a 19th century illustration. Estonian and Finnish regiments of the Swedish army also participated in battle. Scanpix photo
With the increasing effectiveness of firearms, the construction of fort resses gradually lost its importance and meaning in the 19th century, as witnessed in the Baltic region by the Bomarsund fortress in the Åland archipelago. This fortress had been built on the orders of Barclay de Tolly and was designed to withstand a long siege, but 20 years of work was undone in just four days in 1854 by a British naval and infantry attack. The era of fortresses and their sieges had come to an end. Until now.
History 56 ‖ SÕDUR
The Victoria and Honor bastions on the northern side of the fortress were chosen as the main directions of attack. Batteries were positio ned on the right bank of the Narva River, where they were protected from the garrison’s allies. Although the terrain around the fortress was stony, the Russians were able to dig their trenches fairly quickly, as the commander of Narva fortress had forbidden the garrison from firing on the Russian positions in order to save ammunition.
as the ladders had to be light in order to be carried into battle. However, the lightness made the ladders springy, and the rungs were so far apart that shorter soldiers had difficulty climbing them.
own. The deception was soon unco vered, but several Swedes were taken prisoner, from whom the Russians obtained new information about the situation at the Narva fortress.
Cowardice was punishable by death in the Russian army in the 18th century. Ascending the stor ming ladders required courage,
Unlike the siege of Tartu, the as sault on the Narva fortress was swift. The storming troops were suppor ted from trenches by hand grenade launchers introduced in the siege of Tartu, and the Honor bastion was seized in just 45 minutes, with the Victoria bastion falling 10 minutes later. The Swedes retreated from their overwhelming opponents to the Hermann fortress, and the Russians’ assault descended into looting. After the fall of the Narva fortress, the Swedes lost all initiative in driving the Russians out of Livonia.
The task of the first wave was to create a bridgehead for the rest of the troops at the breach, but it suffered heavy losses in doing so. Generous rewards were therefore offered to these volunteers: officers usually received a promotion and soldiers could earn as much as a year’s pay. Penal units made up of soldiers who were serving disciplinary punishment or who it was thought would lose their nerve in battle were assigned to carry storming ladders at the front of the first column.
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