Comparing the Three Prior Crises
Swaran Singh
Xi Jinping Imposing ‘New Normal’
Yuan-chou Jing
PLA Incursions Change Status Quo
Shao-cheng Sun
Media Coverage of Crisis Lacking Context
Xi’s Third Term and Invasion Timeline
Amrita Jash
China Eyes Lead in ‘New World Order’
Jabin T. Jacob
Jerome Keating
Blockade, Not Invasion, Seen Likely
Ruei-lin Yu
Civil Defense in Taiwan
Leo Lin
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Fu-Kuo Liu
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STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Special Edition Number Six, published March, 2023, under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.
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As the year 2022 comes to a close, we reflect upon the events that have so drastically changed the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, and the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. The Russia-Ukraine war, though it is playing out a continent away, has had a tremendous impact on the security calculus closer to home. Perhaps the most impactful development to have had a direct effect on the future of Taiwan security, however, is the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, instigated by Beijing in response to a high-level US official paying a friendly visit to Taiwan. We have therefore dedicated this latest special issue of Strategic Vision to examining the impact of China’s reaction and how to move forward from here.
We begin with Swaran Singh, who does a deep dive into how this most recent Taiwan Strait crisis compares to its three historical predecessors, and what this may imply for the security of Taiwan. Yuan-chou Jing examines the consolidation of state power behind China’s new supreme leader, Xi Jinping, and how the now-constitutional philosophy known as Xi Thought does not bode well for peace in the region.
Jabin T. Jacob provides an analysis of how Taiwan, as the next most important target of the Chinese regime, sits on the front lines of a grander conflict, the stakes of which are no less than control over redrawing the new world order. Amrita Jash offers her perspective on Xi’s recent feat securing himself a third term as president, and whether this might be perceived as a countdown to invasion.
One of the many provocations in the crisis has been Beijing’s willingness to change the rules, including regularly dispatching military assets to cross the median line in the Taiwan Strait. Shao-cheng Sun looks at how this represents a unilateral changing of the status quo, and will become the new normal. While media coverage of the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis was intense, now that it has died down, Jerome Keating points out that most of this coverage lacked the appropriate degree of historical context.
While speculation of a full-scale assault by the PLA is rife, Ruei-lin Yu makes an argument for how a far more likely scenario would be China enforcing a limited blockade of Taiwan, at least in the initial days of the assault. Finally, Leo Lin looks at the structure and effectiveness of Taiwan’s aging Civil Defense system.
Articles in this periodical do not necessarily represent the views of either the TCSS, NDU, or the editors
The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis brought with it a new status quo across the Taiwan Strait, and its effects will be felt for years. We hope this investigation of its causes, particulars, and effects will aid in the important work of analysts, officials, and all of our other readers who rely on Strategic Vision for a thorough coverage of a diverse set of perspectives on the events shaping our region and impacting our security.
Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu EditorThe year 2022 saw Taiwan once again become the focal point of US-China contestations. As part of their ongoing technology and trade war, August 2022 saw a rather melodramatic visit to Taipei by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, to which Beijing responded with brinkmanship, threatening a regional crisis of sorts. The visit was melodramatic because it was not officially confirmed until Pelosi landed in Taipei. The news of her visit appeared to have been leaked to the media in order to gauge the response from Beijing, but this came at the cost of raising regional anxieties.
For China, the visit provided a perfect excuse to unleash its largest-ever military exercise across the Taiwan Strait, showcasing a virtual four-day blockade that included at least a dozen missiles fired toward the island, five of which landed within Japan’s exclusive economic zone (see Figure 1 on page 51). While the Beijing authorities were issuing their third White Paper on Taiwan, the US Congress was initiating the review process for its Taiwan Policy Act 2022. The latter marked “the biggest overhaul of Washington’s policy on Taiwan in nearly 40 years,” according to Matt Fulco, a Taipei-based freelance journalist, referring to the historic Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.
This episode has been dubbed the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, though this remains a contested for-
mulation. Tensions have since subsided—thanks partly to the continuing Ukraine crisis and the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic—yet it has left an indelible impact not just on the trilateral Taiwan-China-US relationship, but on other regional stakeholders as well. Chinese President Xi Jinping in October formalized his third term in office and is now expected to reinforce his increasingly assertive Taiwan policy, describing Taiwan’s integration into China as an “unstoppable … historic mission,” requiring “all necessary measures” including “the use of force,” according to Beijing’s White Paper.
Before making any judgments on whether this August 2022 episode of Chinese brinkmanship can indeed be called the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, or on what its regional implications will be, it is important to briefly recall the essential elements of the last three Taiwan Strait crises.
The first crisis of 1954-1955 was a continuation of the fervor of Communist China’s “liberation” and consolidation of control over what had been Republic of China (ROC) territory on the mainland. It involved nine months of intense shelling of the offshore islands. This happened just a decade after the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, and Washington was threatening to do the same to China if they refused to negotiate an end to the Korean War. As pointed out by China analyst Gordon Chang, despite this tough talk, thenPresident Dwight Eisenhower was labeled a “weak president” for pushing back against his advisors who wanted to use the Taiwan Strait Crisis to precipitate a war with China.
photo: Matthew Bruch
This crisis saw China seizing several islands, including the Tachens and Yijiangshan, while the US Seventh Fleet evacuated 30,000 civilians and soldiers from these islands to the ROC redoubt on Taiwan. The US Congress passed the 1955 Formosa Resolution authorizing the president “to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.” It has never been invoked, however.
The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 saw the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) resume bombardment of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu islands. This crisis is often linked to Beijing’s disastrous Great Leap Forward and to Mao Zedong’s bravado, which put off Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and contributed to the Sino-Soviet split in late 1950s. Nevertheless, the White House “refused to issue a public statement indicating that it would defend Quemoy,” while the
military was proposing “atomic strikes” as a possibility, according to RAND’s Morton Halperin, who authored a now-declassified study on the 1958 crisis.
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis took place well after the US-China entente of the 1970s. The leadership in Beijing was triggered by Taiwan’s first democratic elections, as well as by ROC President Lee Teng-hui’s June 1995 visit to the United States, where he addressed 3,000 alumni at New York’s Cornell University, his alma mater. Beijing was furious that Washington had allowed a sitting ROC president to set foot on American soil, even while several US Congressmen were pressing then-President Bill Clinton to allow President Lee to make another visit, this time to attend a conference in Alaska in September 1995. China’s president at the time, Jiang Zemin, issued angry statements and authorized missile tests and forward deployment from Fujian province facing Taiwan. The United States responded by deploying its largest force to the region since the days of the Vietnam War.
The difference between these past events and the current period is the relative state of military capability. Years of double-digit defense-budget growth,
and the development of anti-access and area-denial strategies, has arguably enabled China to stand up to US forces. Politically, many countries—including the United States—have switched official recognition from the ROC to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the unprecedented rise of China has since continued unabated. The tensions of August 2022, therefore, took place at a time when China has come to be the world’s largest trading nation (and has been for over a decade), and is on its way to becoming the world’s largest economy, which will happen by 2030 according to some economists’ predictions. This means that tensions between the United States and China—the world’s largest and second-largest economies and defense spenders—have implications way beyond the Taiwan Strait.
The first marker of US-China animosity over Taiwan in 2022 is that their relationship has moved from one of general rapprochement to one on the verge of confrontation. In the midst of the Ukraine War, in which Russia has begun issuing nuclear threats, the US National Security Strategy of October 2022 mentioned China
55 times, calling it “America’s most consequential challenge.” This is because, in addition to its unprecedented economic growth, China’s rapid military modernization has resulted in the PLA fielding the biggest navy in the world by number of hulls, including two aircraft carriers deployed in the region, making Washington all the more cautious.
Since then-President Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy, US naval deployments in the region have increased substantially. Of the 149 US Navy ships operational around the world, 59 are in the IndoPacific region. December 2016 saw then-presidentelect Donald Trump making an unprecedented direct phone call to his ROC counterpart Tsai Ing-wen. This
was followed by visits to Taipei by senior officials in the Trump administration, including the US health secretary. This is where the visit by Pelosi—third in line for the US presidency and with a history of calling out the Beijing regime for its many human rights violations—was bound to trigger a reaction in Zhongnanhai.
The last such visit to Taipei by a US House Speaker was by Newt Gingrich in 1997. This visit, held in the aftermath of Third Taiwan Strait crisis, was not only well publicized, but preceded by a three-day visit to Beijing—a Beijing whose leadership at that time was very different than it is today. In the late 1990s, the PRC government was far more concerned with growing the economy and joining the international fraternity of nations than reclaiming what are perceived to be lost territories. In contrast, the ascendency of Xi Jinping has precipitated a growing sense of revanchism and a new, hardline “wolf warrior” style of diplomacy, all backed by the economic and military might that Xi inherited. Outlining his vision of the future at the 20th Party Congress on October 16, Xi mentioned Taiwan 21 times, calling the annexation of Taiwan a “historic” and “unshakable” commitment to China’s complete “reunification” and to “give firm support to patriots in Taiwan who desire reunification.”
This was followed by US President Biden slapping further restrictions on semiconductor exports to China; not only of its advanced chips used in super-
computers and artificial intelligence, but the whole range of advanced equipment needed to make them, as well as any knowledge from US citizens, residents, or green card holders. This is aimed at regaining the technological lead against China’s cutting-edge research and innovative technologies, from pharmaceuticals to defense research. Clearly, the nature and tools of international conflict are no longer the same as they were before.
For instance, in attempting to dwarf the PRC’s advancement in technologies, Biden’s restrictions on semiconductor exports to China empower Taiwan against its would-be attacker. Taiwan accounts for 63 percent of the global market share in semiconductor manufacturing and more than 90 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductors, including five-nanometer chips. This gives the whole world, including the United States, a stake in ensuring peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
Taipei remains especially dependent on America for chip designs and advanced manufacturing technologies, however.
photo: Desmond Parks
“ThegrowingcomplexityinUS-China tensions will continue to raise anxieties for Taiwan.”US Marines aboard the USS New Orleans prepare to board an MV-22B Osprey.
This not only alludes to a new sense of caution on the part of the United States, but it also redefines the opportunities and challenges for all other regional stakeholders, depending on their relations with China and the United States. China’s passiveaggressive brinkmanship does not follow the template set by the three previous Taiwan Strait crises, and may not mark a clear beginning and end. It appears to represent a new normal of our times. As the post-pandemic debate on economic decoupling from China has shown, the economies of the United States and the PRC remain too tightly intertwined, characterized by a multi-vectored and complex interdependence.
The growing complexity in US-China tensions will continue to raise anxieties for Taiwan. The recent past has seen a rise in PLA infringements into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone—one that Beijing has yet to even recognize. Based on a military assessment report that was presented to the Legislative Yuan on the eve of China’s 20th Party Congress, ROC Minister of National Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng predicted that the PRC would be capable of mounting a “full-scale” invasion of Taiwan by 2025.
Recognizing that fact at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution on October 17, 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in reply to a question about US policy on Taiwan, opined that “Beijing was determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline.” While he indicated US support for Taiwan’s ability to defend itself, he felt the need to reiterate his government’s commitment to the “one China” policy in the same sentence. This surely marks a drift from the days when Washington used wording of the sort found in the Formosa Resolution, or even the Taiwan Relations Act.
On the face of it, the August 2022 tensions in USChina relations bear little resemblance to any of the earlier episodes discussed. Nevertheless, given the increasingly global nature of the US-China rivalry, their episodic bouts of conflict—which are increasingly passive aggressive and relatively imperceptive—carries implications way beyond Taiwan, which remains the epicenter of US-China friction. b
by Yuan-chou Jing
The 20th national Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which determined if Xi Jinping would win an unprecedented third term in office, was held in mid-October. Before the high-level confab, maintaining a stable environment both domestically and internationally no doubt constituted Xi’s center of gravity. However, in ad-
dition to dealing with the challenge posed by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Shanghai, Beijing, and other cities, Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August provided Xi with another dilemma. Xi was obviously very upset about Pelosi’s visit, and decided to retaliate against both the speaker and her hosts by holding a large-scale military drill, shooting missiles into the waters surrounding Taiwan. This drill has broken the long-standing tacit military understanding in the Taiwan Strait, and, in the meantime, an unprecedented landscape being called a “new normal” was created by these circumstances.
During its Party Congress, the CCP approved amendments to its constitution, including the socalled “Two Establishes.” This four-character phrase means “to establish the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the party’s Central Committee and of the whole party” and “to establish the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.” This amendment was aimed at cementing the core status of Xi and the guiding role of his political thought within the party.
Xi Jinping thought cemented in Chinese constitution portends dangerous ‘new normal’ for Taiwan security
In addition, judging by the results of the reshuffle in both the Communist party and its Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi has undoubtedly become an unchallengeable supreme leader.
It is fair to say that a gray zone tactic in which the drills and drone harassment by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are executed simultaneously will be a regular approach used by China to coerce Taiwan. The most significant impact of China’s military drills on Taiwan has been to terminate a previous tacit understanding wherein the median line in the Taiwan Strait was respected by both sides, as well as to try and mount a big enough military threat to deter intervention by either the United States or Japan. All of the drill zones extended across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, and even intruded into Taiwan’s territorial sea. China abandoned the usual practice of using the median line of the Taiwan Strait as a buffer. In the future, it is anticipated that China will continue to unilaterally change the status quo as it attempts to create a so-called new normal which uses the contiguous zone, 24 nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline, to replace the median line as the extent
of its operations. This move will sharply reduce the strategic depth of Taiwan’s defense.
Beijing deliberately fired PLA missiles in an attempt to intimidate the island nation; some of them passing over Taiwan’s landmass and splashing down off the east coast (see Figure 1 on page 51). It was the first time for China to practice anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) tactics on the ground, and the purpose of this move was to send a political signal to the United States and Japan not to intervene militarily in Taiwan’s security affairs, as Beijing considers Taiwan a core national interest and an internal matter.
From this point forward, military drills and PLA activities that cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait can be expected, which is what Beijing leaders see as normalized military operations organized according to the changes in the situation in the Taiwan Strait. In addition to military drills, China has been using drones to harass Kinmen and Taiwan’s other offshore islands. Those military drills and drone harassment constitute psychological warfare and are an attempt to fatigue and frighten Taiwan’s military and civilian population. Moreover, since these exercises are
carried out in a realistic manner, they can be quickly transformed into an actual attack at any time, not unlike how Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine used the pretext of a military exercise to pre-position its troops, and therefore these drills should not be taken lightly.
Secondly, the results of military drills and the CMC reshuffle show that the PLA is still under the control of Xi. The PLA has adopted a strategy of brinkmanship, and is going to have to be careful to avoid having an accident that could precipitate a full-scale war. What’s more, Xi’s changes to the country’s laws and traditions not only allowed him to seize his third term at
the 20th National Congress, but it also suspended retirement rules and thereby allowed General Zhang Youxia to be promoted to first-ranked CMC vicechairman, despite him being 72 years old. In terms of
leadership, it appears that Xi, who is also the chairman of the CMC, has no problem fully controlling the gun.
Xi has called for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and he sees Taiwan as an indispensable part in accomplishing that rebirth. Some observers have expressed concerns that Xi’s unbridled ambition will lead to an attack by the PRC sooner, rather than later. Admiral Philip Davidson, for example, the former commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2021 that, “China’s aggression in the region” leads him to believe “its goal of seizing Taiwan is a more imminent issue.”
“I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years,” Davidson predicted. Given Xi’s consolidation of absolute power in China, and especially over the military, the PLA will become a mere extension of Xi’s power. It is speculated that Xi wants to effect the annexation of Taiwan by 2027—or at least force Taipei to sue for peace—as this would be the crowning achievement of his unprecedented third term as absolute ruler of China, as well as placing himself in good stead in preparation for a fourth.
Although Xi still pays lip service to the need for
a peaceful unification with Taiwan, the majority of Taiwanese people are too proud of their democracy and their freedoms to consent to be put under the rule of a communist regime, and thus reject the idea of a voluntary unification. This may disappoint Xi and push him to use military force against Taiwan instead. The bottom line is that the military drills in August were just the beginning of a renewed crisis for Taiwan’s security. The intensity of the crisis will increase, step by step, and may reach a peak before the 21st CCP National Congress.
At the same time, the United States might become more actively engaged in Taiwan’s military affairs. After the Russia-Ukraine war broke out in February, the United States suddenly vetoed the sale of 12 MH60R anti-submarine warfare helicopters without advance notice, on the grounds that Taiwan should focus on asymmetric weapons systems such as shorebased anti-aircraft missile systems, armed drones, and naval mines. It is generally believed that the lessons being learned from the Ukraine war have motivated the United States to seriously review Taiwan’s buildup
photo: Jeffrey Yale
of capabilities for asymmetric operations. Once again, the United States has learned from China’s military drills that the threat against Taiwan is real. It is expected that, from now on, Washington will engage actively in Taiwan’s security in areas such as military strategy, and weapons production and acquisition.
Taiwan’s operational plans must be re-examined. During the PLA’s military demonstrations against the Pelosi visit, the drill zones were located to the north, southwest, and southeast of Taiwan’s airspace and maritime territory. This demonstrates that the PLA navy and air force will quickly seek to win air and sea dominance during wartime. In addition, the test launch of short-range missiles and long-range firepower demonstrates the PLA’s capabilities to suppress or even destroy Taiwan’s coastal defense capabilities, thereby paving the way for an amphibious landing. Finally, the former median line is not a boundary for PLA fighter jets any more, meaning that Taiwan’s strategic depth has been reduced.
Taiwan’s strategic concept has long been conceived of as force protection, decisive battle in the littoral zone, and destruction of the enemy at the landing beach. In light of this new situation, the focus of military readiness should be shifted from the littoral zone or beachhead to incorporate training in urban warfare.
In the event of an invasion across the Taiwan Strait, the United States will likely take action to support Taiwan, if only to avoid losing the trust of its other allies in the Indo-Pacific region. However, to sidestep
a direct conflict with China, Washington is more likely to use the Russia-Ukraine war as a model for its intervention. That is, not to send in forces to intervene in a cross-strait conflict, but to impose international sanctions on China and, at the same time, to provide weapons and intelligence support to Taiwan’s forces. Therefore, Taiwanese need to learn lessons from the people of Ukraine and prepare to fight independently. Additionally, an intelligence-sharing and information-exchange mechanism with the US-Japan alliance should be developed and implemented as soon as possible.
Beijing’s violent response to the Pelosi visit is an indication that the China-US relationship is being redefined and dangerously impacted by the current so-called strategic competition. Because Xi has defined unification with Taiwan as a “core interest,” and given his belief that the United States is sending the wrong signals to the “separatist forces of Taiwan independence,” Taiwan is therefore being blamed for the mounting US-China tensions. This will push Xi to keep Taiwan at the top of his agenda and increase the urgency with which he pursues the island’s annexation. It would be foolish to expect this trend to subside, rather than to grow in intensity. Both Taipei and Washington must make preparations now if they don’t want to see a radical redrawing of the map of Asia before the end of the decade. b
As China has grown into a global economic power, it is not surprising that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) should engage in military assertiveness and provocations to support the regime’s interests. Another equally important aspect that receives considerably less attention is how the CCP has been able to shape international narratives.
This article uses the prism of what is being called the Fourth Cross-Strait Crisis—Chinese military exercises (see Figure 1 on page 51) in the wake of the visit by US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in August 2022—to examine how China’s actions are less about its military ambitions, and more about Beijing’s objective of controlling the international narrative about Taiwan, and reshaping
international norms themselves. The latest crisis has had the effect of normalizing Chinese military exercises and activity closer to Taiwan’s territory. This is a cause for worry, given the increased chance that such an exercise could be used as cover for a surprise Chinese attack against Taiwan.
There is also the risk that opposing military assets—those of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Republic of China (ROC) military—operating in such close proximity could lead to incidents and accidents that risk an escalation into full-scale war. On this point, it is worth noting India’s experience with Chinese transgressions across the Line of Actual Control between their two countries in 2020. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) achieved a degree of surprise and success by conditioning the Indian military, over many years, to tolerate large-
scale PLA exercises near India’s Ladakh every summer. Thus, when the COVID-19 pandemic hit, and the Indians were slow to mobilize according to their usual schedule, China was able to take military advantage of the situation.
Taiwan’s military, therefore, has to constantly stay on high alert due to China’s increased willingness to cross the median line, and to operate closer and closer to the ROC’s territorial waters and airspace. This ties up ROC resources, but it also degrades capabilities over the long term, which can be particularly consequential for the state of readiness of a smaller power like Taiwan.
At the same time, it is important to be mindful of information bias. Because the United States and Taiwan are open, democratic societies, we know a lot more about their plans and policies for dealing with China than we do about China’s plans and policies for dealing with them. This does not automatically imply, however, that the Chinese are in an advantageous position vis-à-vis either the United States or Taiwan.
Indeed, China’s military exercises in the wake of the Pelosi visit gave Western analysts a window into the minds of planners in Beijing on how they might be expected to launch a Taiwan attack. First of all, despite the so-called provocation of the Pelosi visit, the Chinese did not invade Taiwan. While China’s military capacities are growing, that is not the same as having the will or desire to actually employ a military option to take Taiwan. As much as CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping appears to be in a hurry to achieve the annexation of Taiwan, he still has to take into account domestic stability within China, the chances of military success, the international environment, and the potential for local resistance in Taiwan. All these factors have become more germane in the wake of the long, drawn-out Russian
invasion of Ukraine. It is in this context that the nonmilitary objectives of the Chinese provocations need to be considered. Decision makers in Beijing would surely have realized that PLA military exercises coming in the midst of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war would set off international concerns about a potential US-China conflict over the island. However, as
the African proverb warns us; when the elephants fight, the grass gets trampled, and the Chinese also appear to have calculated that Taiwan would end up with greater damage from the latest crisis than China itself. This is evident in three respects.
First, the frequent and unthinking references to China’s “reunification” with Taiwan in the international press already constitute a victory for Chinese propaganda, making it look as though “reunification” is a legitimate goal for the PRC and an inevitable outcome to the political stalemate in the Taiwan Strait. The only thing the rest of the world is then left objecting to is the manner in which such a union might be enforced. For the time being, violence is still frowned upon by the West, yet the Chinese have doubled down on their refusal to rule out the use of force. Beijing appears to be betting that its rising international political and economic clout will give it license to be brazen about the use of force, and is pushing the envelope with its latest military exercises.
Second, by framing the crisis as a US-China issue, the international community effectively undermined Taiwanese agency in the whole situation. This characterization shifts the focus away from questioning the legitimacy of CCP claims over Taiwan. These claims are actually fairly recent, with the PRC evincing no interest in controlling Taiwan until several decades
“Thefrequentandunthinkingreferences to China’s ‘reunification’ with Taiwan in the international press already constituteavictoryforChinesepropaganda.”
after its 1949 creation. Explaining away China’s bad behavior by claiming that Beijing is facing pressure from domestic politics, including grassroots expressions of nationalism, has the same effect.
Third, characterizing the crisis as merely a geopolitical one, or even a historical one, ignores the strong ideological drivers at play for the CCP. The Pelosi visit to Taiwan —and those by other delegations from several Western democracies, before and since—is a marker of the common democratic values and ideals that Taiwan shares with the United States and the rest of the free world.
The CCP, however, is a political party that sees democratic dispensations everywhere, especially in its neighborhood, as an existential challenge. One intent, therefore, behind the military response to the Pelosi was to declare CCP opposition to the liberal international order and to telegraph costs to those actors that seek to support Taiwan’s democratic identity, and this form of global order.
Thus, from a broader view, the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis was not an “avoidable crisis” precipitated by the Americans or the Taiwanese, but an inevitable one
whose foundations were laid by the peculiar worldview of the CCP. An argument has been made that Pelosi’s visit was less about supporting Taiwan’s international identity as it was about American domestic politics. This might well be true, but if so, it should also draw attention to how the CCP used the situation to promote its own domestic interests.
Indeed, it could be argued that the Pelosi visit was a useful distraction from a series of domestic economic problems that Xi was facing in the run-up to the 20th CCP Congress, held in October 2022. It gave the party an opportunity to whip up nationalist hysteria at home against the United States and Taiwan, even as the country was reeling from Xi’s Draconian zeroCOVID policy. The crisis was also a useful diversion given the record levels of youth unemployment and a housing-market crisis with hundreds of thousands of families around China facing uncertainty over when—or if—they will be able to move into properties for which they are already paying mortgages, but
which developers remain unable to complete.
Also important is how international attention to the crisis played into the hands of Chinese propagandists who are looking for precisely such opportunities to portray China at home as a powerful regional and global actor, and Xi himself as a colossus astride the world stage. This personality-centric approach supports his efforts at home to undermine institutional processes, just as he effectively managed to do at the 20th CCP Congress.
Thus, when Western media routinely conflates a country with its leader—Xi’s China, and Putin’s Russia, for example—this indirectly supports China’s attempts to undermine the processes and institutions in other countries, and strengthens the ability of governments to bypass the checks and balances meant to constrain their power, endangering both their own citizens as well as the international system. This centralization of power is now also affecting the democratic West—consider the unprecedented levels of social control exerted by governments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, for example. Given this level of centralization of power, it is inevitable that the personalization of foreign policy of the sort seen in Xi’s China will infect democracies as well, undermining the international liberal order when it happens.
Under these circumstances, it is both sensible and important to call China’s bluff and to challenge its narratives and framing of Taiwan. The importance of international legal regimes and norms, of alliance
relations, and of close partnerships between democracies in deterring bad behavior cannot be overstated. Smaller democracies must be defended, and larger democracies must be encouraged to defend them, as well as to stand up to authoritarian states at all times—with or without a crisis forcing their hand. The economic fallout of such assertiveness is inevitable, but the choice really is about short-term pain now versus still greater pain in the future. Equally important, narrative shaping—propaganda, in other words—is something that Taiwan needs to work on as part of its quest to retain its international status, and the stronger democracies of the world need to pay greater attention to this if they ever hope to influence the behavior of authoritarian powers. b
The wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. These are the words of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping who, giving the opening address at the 20th National Congress of the CCP on October 16, 2022, vowed that “Complete reunification of our country must be realized.”
Xi once again affirmed that China would never renounce the use of force to annex Taiwan, and that it reserves the “option of taking all measures necessary.” Xi gave greater prominence to the Taiwan issue than he did at the 19th Party Congress, which highlights not just China’s anxiety over its own progress toward this so-called reunification, but an undeniable growing momentum in Taiwan’s pro-independence sentiment. Security was the watchword in the 20th Party Congress report, with 91 mentions. National security has been described as the “bed-
rock of national rejuvenation.” Undoubtedly, in Xi’s third term, Taiwan will be the top priority both for China’s foreign policy as well as its military. Hence, the prominent query: Will Xi invade Taiwan during his third term?
This question has been on the lips of analysts and policymakers throughout the international community, especially given the backdrop of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. This has been further exacerbated with increased interactions between Taiwan and the United States in terms of arms sales and highprofile visits, which Beijing denounces as “interference by outside forces.” With tensions around the island intensifying, speculation is rife about China’s own invasion of Taiwan.
A new report claims that some in the US intelligence community assess that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could attack Taiwan as soon as 2024, presum-
ably around the January 2024 elections. Others anticipate that Xi may attempt to take Taiwan by 2027, on the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Along similar lines, in 2021, the Republic of China (ROC) Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng remarked that China will be ready to mount a full-scale invasion of Taiwan by 2025, stating that by that date, “China will bring the cost and attrition to its lowest. It has the capacity now but will not start a war easily, having to take many other things into consideration.”
Some analysts suggest, however, that Xi is not likely to launch a costly military operation to unify Taiwan for the next five years as China is currently suffering from a weakened economy. Others predict Xi will take a wait-and-see approach during his third term, in the event there is new leadership in Taiwan in 2024. This only adds to the ambiguity of China’s action plan on Taiwan.
What is evident is that China’s recent military maneuvers in uncomfortably close proximity to Taiwan, while not full-scale, nevertheless lay bare Beijing’s intentions. This has been strengthened with the resolution endorsed at the 20th Party Congress, with a new mandate added to the military section of the
Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party on “opposing and containing Taiwan independence,” making it the first such direct reference to Taiwan in the basic law. In addition, the new composition of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) under the chairmanship of Xi Jinping, who secured his third term both as party leader and CMC chairman, has a strong Taiwan bearing. The appointment of General He Weidong as the second-ranked vice chairman of the CMC is crucial as he served as the former commander of the Eastern Theatre Command, which oversees Taiwan and the East China Sea. He is also reported to have planned the military exercises around Taiwan in response to the August 3, 2022, visit to Taiwan of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.
Beijing responded to Pelosi’s visit by taking eight countermeasures against the United States, with the PRC foreign ministry calling it “a serious violation of the one-China principle.” But what really made headlines was the PLA’s military response. The PLA Eastern Theatre Command conducted joint combat exercises and training in the waters and airspace over Taiwan, as well as conducting a series of ballistic missile launches—for the first time since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996 (see Figure 1 on page 51). More importantly, PLA aircraft and warships set a new precedent by repeatedly crossing the median line—an unofficial barrier midway between the two countries that has been tacitly observed by both sides for decades.
photo: Allison LotzAccording to the ROC Defense Ministry, an unprecedented 68 Chinese fighter jets and 13 warships crossed the median line on August 5, clearly changing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Given this context, the key query that demands significant attention is: how soon, and under what pretext, can China be expected to use force?
actions are aimed at deterring the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces, so they are legitimate and necessary … both as a response to the major provocation of the US side and the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.”
Furthermore, the PRC also released its first White Paper on Taiwan in more than 20 years. The document, titled “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” pointedly mentions that “External forces have encouraged and instigated provocative actions by the separatist forces; these have intensified cross-strait tension and confrontation and undermined peace and stability in the AsiaPacific region.”
In looking back at history—the CCP’s past actions such as intervention in the Korean War, the 1962 War with India, the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict on the Ussuri river, and the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War, to name a few—two common motivators are evident: a focus on national interests, and a penchant for strategic signaling. This also applies in the Taiwan case. PRC leaders’ paramount consideration when choosing whether or not to use force is based on protecting China’s national interests, which in this case is ostensibly its territorial sovereignty. Taiwan, which the PRC has deemed a “core interest,” has been denoted as “an inalienable part of China.”
This objective is well-coordinated with the two key strategic tasks of the PLA. The first is to deal with a wide range of military threats (including Taiwanese independence), and to effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China’s territory. Concomitant with this task is to resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland. The second motivator is to signal an adversary to change its behavior through the use of intimidation—to either deter or compel the adversary to behave in a certain way. In this case, the military activities were a clear signal to both the United States and Taiwan, and an attempt to deter them from taking any action that might hinder or challenge Chinese interests. According to the PRC foreign ministry: “The
In addition to these two motivators, the Chinese leaders’ behavior in response to the Pelosi visit was influenced by the catalytic effect of the PRC’s ascending status as a great power, and the need to project that power.
The PLA’s joint military operations near Taiwan also highlighted the calibrated use of force. That is, applying the Goldilocks principle of getting it “just right:” keeping it below the threshold of war but raising the risks of escalation. China’s actions therefore illustrate, to the careful observer, the amount of risk that Beijing is willing to take on Taiwan. It is clear that China has limitations, as there is yet no guarantee of Chinese success. Invariably, the military exercises served as a litmus test for the PLA to take stock of its own operational capabilities and combat readiness. This showcase of hard power by the PRC further proves that China under Xi Jinping has departed, both in theory and practice, from Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum, “hide your strength, bide your time.”
The PLA’s sword-rattling demonstration offered some clarity, allowing analysts to better assess Beijing’s current level of motivation on the Taiwan issue. First, China is no longer avoiding the possibil-
“Themilitaryexercisesservedasalitmus test for the PLA to take stock of its own operationalcapabilities.”
ity of real combat over the island. This highlights that CCP leaders may no longer hold out hope for a peaceful unification. It also suggests that the PLA today is both willing and prepared to engage in combat with other militaries if the situation demands it, to wit: the ROC and American armed forces. For instance, even before Pelosi’s visit, in January 2022, the PRC ambassador to the United States Qin Gang issued a stern warning, threatening a “military conflict” over the status of Taiwan. This threat was reiterated in the CCP White Paper, which states, “we will not renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures.” China’s attitude seems clear: war is now only a matter of time.
Second, Xi is resolute in his desire for unification and will not give up his quest to rule over Taiwan. “Never before have we been so close to, confident in, and capable of achieving the goal of national rejuvenation. The same is true when it comes to our goal of complete national reunification,” the White Paper reads. Xi has made Taiwan a priority on which
there can be no compromise. This is exemplified by Beijing’s hardened official position, as testified by the PLA’s recent military exercises.
Third is the Xi Jinping factor, which has become synonymous with an assertive and aggressive China. As argued by Suisheng Zhao, a professor of Chinese politics and foreign policy at the University of Denver, Xi has relied on brinkmanship to pressure Taiwan into accepting his unification ultimatum. This puts into perspective that there remains no confusion: to Xi, the “Taiwan question is China’s core national interest and essentially non-negotiable, important enough to go to war if pushed,” explained Zhao. While there is no doubt that China will continue to use coercion to attempt to deter independence forces in Taiwan, a worse-case scenario would see the PRC use military force in an attempt to annex the island. b
About the author
Dr. Amrita Jash is an assistant professor in the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal Academy of Higher Education in Manipal, India. She is author of the book The Concept of Active Defence in China’s Military Strategy. US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, left, and ROC President Tsai Ing-wen pose for photographers during Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.In response to US Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted several waves of military exercises that began on August 4, 2022. This latest Chinese military coercion against Taiwan has been dubbed the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. During the crisis, Beijing launched provocative military exercises, punitive economic sanctions against Taiwan, and canceled dialogues with the United States. On August 3, foreign ministers from the Group of Seven (G7) countries expressed their concern about China’s “threatening actions” which risked “unnecessary escalation.” This article explores the 2022 Taiwan Strait Crisis by examining China’s reactions to Pelosi’s visit, Taiwan’s response to China’s threats, and the future of crossstrait relations.
On July 19, The Financial Times reported that Speaker Pelosi would visit Taiwan in August. The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that if she went through with her planned visit, China would take determined and forceful measures. A week later, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) warned that they would not stand idly by. When Chinese President Xi Jinping held a phone call with US President Joe Biden, he asked Biden to prevent Pelosi from making the trip. President Biden responded that Congress was
an independent branch of government, and that he would not intervene. Biden advised Xi not to take provocative actions if the visit happened.
However, before Pelosi even arrived on Taiwan, the PLA took several military actions in an attempt to deter her from setting foot on the island. These included conducting military drills across multiple theater commands. On July 28, China began testing Taiwan’s defenses by sending drones over Taiwan’s offshore islands. By August 1, China had placed the PLA Eastern Theater Command on high alert.
Nancy Pelosi’s delegation landed in Taipei on August 2, stating that their visit was in honor of US support for Taiwan’s democracy. The US ambassador in Beijing, Nicholas Burns, was called to the PRC foreign ministry around midnight, to receive an official protest. Beijing suspended or canceled a series of planned bilateral exchanges with the United States.
Economic sanctions were levied against the Republic of China (ROC). More than 2,000 Taiwanese food products were suspended from importation into China. Beijing also suspended exports of natural sand to Taiwan. Actions taken against the United States included canceling three military meetings, planned for
the second half of 2022. The PLA conducted large-scale military actions around Taiwan. Chinese missile tests were targeted around Taiwan’s territorial waters (see Figure 1 on page 51). Chinese naval ships and airplanes passed across the median line in the Taiwan Strait. On August 4, the PLA held live-fire rocket and missile launches. Joint military operations were performed from August 4 to 7. An aggressive disinformation operation accompanied these military actions to exaggerate China’s military capabilities.
Beijing admitted that the military drills were conducted in response to Pelosi’s visit. In early August, the PRC conducted a series of provocative naval and air exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan. In the weeks following her visit, PLA military activity around Taiwan remained tense. This was due to continuous visits by American politicians to Taiwan. The increased frequency of PLA aircraft and ships crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait indicated that China would no longer respect the status quo
Beijing’s strong military reaction signaled that China is prepared to use force against Taiwan. The
PLA fired missiles targeting seven areas of the waters surrounding the island. This included the far side of Taiwan facing the Pacific—a region through which US naval vessels often navigate, as a move to prepare a military blockade.
These military exercises had the following objectives. First, they were intended to undermine support for ROC President Tsai Ing-wen among Taiwan’s public. President Tsai would pay the price for seeking closer relations with the United States, Beijing hoped. Second, the exercises were part of Chinese deterrence and signaling efforts toward Washington and Taipei, demonstrating how capable and determined Beijing was to exert control over the island. Third, these exercises allowed the PLA to practice various military operations against the ROC military.
President Tsai signaled that people in Taiwan would not shy away, but would also not provoke China. While some Taiwanese people called on the Biden
administration to engage US forces in response to PLA exercises, these requests reflected only a minority view. However, most Taiwanese suggested that the United States and Taiwan work together to strengthen bilateral security relations and solidify Taiwan’s international support.
Both major political parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), presented themselves as guardians of the status quo. The opposition party, the KMT, argued that it could deal with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to lower the risk and preserve cross-strait stability. As ruling party, the DPP’s response to Beijing’s pressure was to strengthen Taiwan’s relations with the United States and Japan.
Taiwan’s military was on high alert, tasked with monitoring the situation closely. During the PLA exercises, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that its missile defense capabilities were activated. The armed forces continued to assure the
public that the ROC military had everything under control. They emphasized that the situation was being monitored, and Taiwan was strong and prepared. They would not back away from a fight.
The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) portrayed the events as proof of China’s military aggression and as evidence that Beijing was attempting to unilaterally change the status quo. The finance ministry appealed to the international community to stand with Taiwan, just as they have been supporting Ukraine against Russia’s military invasion.
Ryan Hass of the Brookings Institution, writing about his recent visit to Taiwan shortly after the Pelosi trip, reported finding a lack of creative thinking about Taiwan’s defense reforms or a sense of urgency among the elected and appointed officials, opposition party leaders, business executives, public intellectuals, and members of civil society he met. While military
planners and government policymakers pointed to plans to raise Taiwan’s defense spending in 2023, they uniformly seemed to favor a mix of conventional and asymmetric defense investments. According to Hass, “Most also acknowledged that Taiwan’s war reserve stockpiles are inadequate and that Taiwan must increase its supplies of fuel, food, medicine, and critical munitions.”
By learning lessons from the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, Taiwan’s top leaders have grudgingly become aware that the people of Taiwan must play a part in their own defense. Still, they continue
This crisis occurred on the eve of 20th National Congress of the CCP, at which Xi Jinping retained his hold on power for an unprecedented third term in office, after having changed the PRC Constitution in 2018 to remove the term limits on his office. In a speech at the opening ceremony on October 16, Xi said that China would work for peaceful unification with Taiwan, but that it reserved the right to use force. “This is directed solely at interference by outside forces and a few separatists seeking Taiwan’s independence,” Xi warned.
Under Xi, Beijing sees Washington as moving away from its “One China” policy and coming dangerously close to an official relationship with Taipei. In Beijing’s view, public discussion of stationing US military forces on the island, and repeated assertions from President Biden that the United States is willing to defend Taiwan, all provide evidence of this shift.
to hope that the United States and the international community will do more to deter the Beijing regime from trying to take the island by force.
Beijing created the tensions in the Taiwan Strait with its provocative military exercises surrounding Taiwan. Even in the aftermath of the exercises, China’s military pressure on Taiwan remained strong. The impact of the crisis has only served to strengthen the US government’s resolve to counter China’s challenge of Taiwan.
The Biden administration has deepened unofficial ties with Taipei and is preparing to help build Taiwan’s defense so that it can deter a PRC military move. The United States is concerned that the shifting military balance of power in China’s favor will make a military invasion of Taiwan more likely. This crisis incentivized the ROC government to actively coordinate with Washington. This impulse has deepened private coordination between senior US and Taiwan officials.
Domestic factors in China, Taiwan, and the United States have played a key role in creating this crisis. China’s reliance on nationalism puts pressure on the regime, risking its self-proclaimed status as defender of China’s unity. What social media the CCP allows is already grumbling about Beijing’s weak response. In the United States, maintaining a defiant approach against Chinese aggressiveness has bipartisan backing. The people of Taiwan’s deepening identification as Taiwanese, rather than Chinese, will continue to upset leaders in Beijing, which will make managing cross-strait relations difficult.
Tensions in the Taiwan Strait could see another upsurge if Congress passes the Taiwan Policy Act, which would provide security assistance for Taiwan, a provision that has significant bipartisan support. This is despite the fact that the Biden administration pulled some of the strongest proposals in the bill, such as mandating senate confirmation of Washington’s rep-
“IfZhongnanhaibelievesthatTaiwan’s leaderswillcontinuetoresistavoluntaryunificationwithChina,thenthey will most likely make good on their oft-reiterated promise to annex the islandbyforceofarms.”
resentative to Taipei, renaming the representative office in the United States, and designating Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally.” Despite these omissions, Beijing is widely expected to use passage of the bill as an excuse to take a more aggressive stance on Taiwan.
If Zhongnanhai believes that Taiwan’s leaders will continue to resist a voluntary unification with China, then they will most likely make good on their oft-re-
iterated promise to annex the island by force of arms. If statements made by Xi Jinping are to be believed, this means it will be an all-out invasion of Taiwan. The ROC government certainly does not want a war, but if we take Xi Jinping at his word, they had better start preparing for one. b
This past October, Xi Jinping set out to claim an unprecedented third term as president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Then, in November, the United States held its midterm elections, and Taiwan held its nine-inone elections. In Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) came away with the lion’s share of the mayoral seats, and an expected American “red wave” failed to materialize.
As journalistic discussion shifted focus to these and other news events, the news cycle turned—as news cycles do—and commentators ceased their breathless coverage of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August visit to Taiwan, and of the Chinese missile exercises that were held in a fit of Beijing pique in reaction to it (see Figure 1 on page 51). At the time, pundits had dubbed it the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, which raises the question: How does one define a Taiwan Strait crisis?
According to the record, there have been four Taiwan Strait crises. Most people living in Taiwan today are of an age to remember perhaps the last two, namely the one in 1995–1996 when the country was electing its first president by popular vote, and most recently the August 2-3, 2022, Pelosi visit. Was either a true crisis? The feeling among the citizenry was not one of fear. True, the PRC used both occasions to flex its military muscle, posture, and shoot missiles over or around the island, but was either a crisis? This needs a closer look.
Since Pelosi’s visit, Xi Jinping got his third term, and the aforementioned elections in Taiwan and the United States began to dominate the headlines. In
short, enough water had passed under the bridge in such a short time that one might legitimately ask why Speaker Pelosi’s visit commanded so much attention. At the time, there was certainly no shortage of ink spilled by pundits, with a majority panning the timing and the advisedness of her visit, as well as criticizing the speaker herself.
Here are a few samples. On August 3, Stephen McDonell, BBC’s China correspondent (still based in Beijing), aptly stated that Pelosi had put the ball firmly in Xi Jinping’s court, pointing out that war “would be disastrous and smart minds in the Chinese capital know it.”
On August 16, Craig Singleton, a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, lambasted the speaker, calling her visit an “ill-timed gambit” that had backfired. Writing in Foreign Policy, Singleton opined that the visit’s “destabilizing effect was entirely predictable and completely preventable.”
On August 22, Christopher Twomey, writing in War on the Rocks, predicted that “The Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis is Just Starting.” Twomey concluded that this latest crisis will come to be seen as another step in the corrosion of US-China relations, in large part by supporting the perspective, on both sides, that their competition is primarily a military one.
And of course, the editor of Xinhua News could not pass up the opportunity to promulgate Beijing propaganda. On August 24, the outlet offered “Some Facts
about Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan.” Eleven such “facts,” were listed but “Fact Number 1” set the tone and said it all by averring that “The one-China principle is the political foundation of China-US relations.”
One can only presume that the Xinhua editor felt it unnecessary to consult with the US State Department on this assertion, or else he is blissfully unaware of the vast difference in meaning and implication between the PRC’s “One China” principle and Washington’s “One China” policy. In brief: the former is the delusion that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, while the latter is the diplomatic acknowledgement of China’s position that there is only one government of all of China. These two admittedly homophonic terms denote very different concepts, and deliberately conflating them like this is nothing short of propagandistic sleight of hand.
Return therefore to Pelosi’s visit and examine what defines a crisis. In essence, all four crises have come about at the instigation of the PRC, and how its leaders have felt offended. This begs an examination of China’s motivation in each crisis.
The first two Taiwan Strait crises, the 1954-55 shelling of Kinmen and Matsu Islands and the 1958 shelling, again, of the same, could be explained as mere posturing, venting, and perhaps even taunting.
Given the fact that Chairman Mao Zedong’s October 1949 “invasion” of Guningtou proved to be a definite disaster; a shelling without a followup invasion hardly constitutes a crisis. Certainly,
people died and life on the islands was disrupted, but little else developed. No direct attack on Taiwan proper ever materialized. Mao did not have the navy for it.
The crisis in 1995-96, on the other hand, prompted some Taiwanese people to take their money out of banks, with others fleeing the island, but pundits again failed to make a simple comparative analysis as regards invading Taiwan proper. When the Allies planned Operation Overlord in June 1944, the Germans knew it was coming; they were aware of the buildup; they just did not know where it would be.
Since the Taiwan Strait is much wider than the English Channel, and since nations, including Taiwan, possess much better technology and satel-
lite awareness, there was no evidence of any buildup of an invasion force on China’s west coast. What then might constitute a real crisis between super powers? The April 1, 2001, Hainan Incident might fit the bill. An American EP-3 was operating about 70 miles from Hainan island when it was intercepted by two PLA J-8 fighters. One fighter got too close and collided with the surveillance plane, causing it to make an emergency landing on the island. The American crew members were held prisoner and interrogated for ten days, and released only after Washington penned a letter of apology to the PRC. Surely, this incident had the potential for escalation had it not been resolved so quickly.
A different face-off—with the potential to escalate to a crisis—takes place daily along the long stretch of the Himalayan border between India and China.
Sporadic fighting has been taking place along this frontier; a war was fought here in the past, and in a more recent clash, some 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese were killed. While both sides patrol the area, they are not issued military weapons, in the hopes of preventing a conflagration. As a result, soldiers have taken to brawling with stones, fists and clubs in these clashes. The area remains an ongoing source of contention.
What many pundits seem to miss on the cross-strait crisis is the reality of China’s fabricated claims. While China has no realistic claim to Taiwan, it still nonetheless chooses to be offended whenever it wants to be offended, and it will ignore matters that it wants to ignore. China hopes to acquire through intimidation and innuendo what it cannot achieve without resorting to war.
For example, no sooner had talk on the Pelosi visit died down than China again found a new reason to be offended. On December 6, Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly announced that Ottawa would
dispatch more warships to the Taiwan Strait to ensure that it “remains an international strait.” Beijing predictably responded with the usual protestations and reiterations of its claims to Taiwan.
China will continue to draw such lines and determine what it feels is worth precipitating another crisis. Yet, if ships can sail through the Taiwan Strait, a visit by a high-level US official like Pelosi is never going to be what tips the scale. Beijing will continue to use its salami slicing efforts to narrow the field of what ostensibly offends the PRC leadership, and why they should be placated.
It has been over 70 years since the 1949 establishment of the PRC, and Beijing still makes claims to Taiwan. However, time is working against China on this issue. If one looks at the figures of the National Chengchi University Election Study Center’s annual survey on Taiwan identity, fewer and fewer ROC citizens see themselves as Chinese only; the majority
“The status quo in the Taiwan Strait is constantlybeingchangedunilaterally byChina,notTaiwan.”
now identify as Taiwanese only. This means that there are fewer and fewer people keen to see some sort of political union with China, which in turn implies that Beijing is going to have to use military force to annex the island, since persuasion has clearly failed.
Pundits who write about Taiwan need to recognize this. The status quo in the Taiwan Strait is constantly being changed unilaterally by China, not Taiwan. It is Chinese military assets that regularly make incursions into Taiwan’s airspace, not the other way around. Yet pundits constantly offer the same nonsensical advice: Taipei should seek peace and stop raising cross-strait tensions. It would be far more helpful if such commentators—if they truly desired a peaceful Asia Pacific—did China’s leaders the honor of granting them agency, and demanding that they start to behave peacefully and responsibly.
“The
The following are two areas where pundits could more profitably research the Taiwan question. First, in the 1952 Treaty of San Francisco, Japan surrendered its sovereignty over Taiwan, but never named a recipient. Japan had been granted sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu from the Manchus in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. While the PRC has no legitimate claim to Taiwan, it could make a claim to Kinmen and Matsu, since those islands were never part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, meaning that they remained part of the Qing Empire, whose territories were later taken over by the ROC, and then the Communists. PRC strategists have avoided exploiting this difference for some reason.
people of Taiwan have freely electedtheirlegislatorssince1992,and theirpresidentsince1996.”
Photo: Chris BartlettSailors from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) man the rails. Nimitz and her battle group passed through the strait during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.
the United Nations; while UN Resolution 2758 gave the UN China seat to the People’s Republic, and expelled the followers of Chiang Kai-shek, it made no mention of Taiwan or of the millions of Taiwanese people who had been colonized by the Japanese, and whose sovereignty was being surrendered. That resolution never settled the issue of which government would represent the interests of the Taiwan people in the international body. The fact that the PRC claims this right, and the United Nations allows them to do it, is a cruel joke.
Meanwhile, some legal analysts interpret Taiwan as still being under the custodianship of the US military, as the chief victor in the Pacific War. This may be why former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently shared his view that China has no claim to Taiwan. The people of Taiwan have freely elected their leg-
islators since 1992, and their president since 1996. Does this not, in effect, constitute throwing off the one-party ROC state-in-exile, and exercising their “right of self-determination” as set forth in the UN Charter? An honest answer to this question and a fair accounting of the efforts of the Taiwanese people to nursemaid their country’s democratization would go a long way toward settling the question of who holds sovereignty over Taiwan—and it seems certain that isn’t China. Until the world stops paying lip service to China’s falsehoods and taking Beijing’s calculated outrage at face value, we can expect the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis to eventually be followed up by a Fifth, and a Sixth. In the words of Albert Einstein, insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results. b
Since 2013, the national defense strategy of the Republic of China (ROC) has been one of “innovative asymmetric warfare.” Taiwan’s military preparations have been driven by this strategy in particular since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war. Indeed, if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launches a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, asymmetric warfare—the so-called porcupine strategy—will be the best way to defend the island. Unfortunately, due to Taiwan’s limited defense budget, investing in asymmetric warfare will crowd out the needs of other defense affairs, in particular the high-profile, conventional platforms that are so often criticized in Taiwan’s security community as being useless acquisitions. If the PLA uses a different strategy to attack Taiwan, however—one other than a full-scale invasion—and the porcupine strategy reliant upon asymmetric weapons fails to work, Taiwan’s national
security will be in danger.
In order to register China’s displeasure at US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August visit to Taiwan, Beijing reacted by launching missiles into the waters surrounding the island in its biggest(and nearest-) ever live-fire drill in the Taiwan Strait area. The missiles were targeted at six military exercise zones (see Figure 1 on page 51) located on important sea lines of communication (SLOCs) around Taiwan, stimulating discussions about the possibility of a PLA blockade. This article will argue that such a blockade strategy would be more consistent with China’s national interests than a full invasion of Taiwan. The purpose is not to argue against the strategy of innovative asymmetric warfare, but to provide an
alternative scenario and food-for-thought for ROC military planners.
The argument advanced here relies upon a set of assumptions. First, the leaders of China still expect that they can effect a peaceful unification, but that they will not give up the option of using force to effect a military occupation if the stalemate drags on for too long. Second, Beijing is fully aware that the United States represents the biggest obstacle to annexing Taiwan. From their perspective, Washington recently has been playing the “Taiwan card” to undermine China’s peaceful rise. Third, the concept of the Thucydides Trap teaches us that a rising power inevitably threatens to displace a ruling one, the most likely outcome of which is war. To leaders in Beijing, the inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the rising power (China) must be prepared for war with the United States. In short, if the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) wants to unify with Taiwan, it is bound to go to war with the United States, and this war seems to be unavoidable.
In his timeless The Art of War, the master strategist Sun Tzu avers that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” If Chinese leaders wish to complete their “historical task of the reunification of the motherland,” i.e., to make Taiwan a part of China and govern it successfully, then a PLA attack on Taiwan causing heavy casualties on a massive scale is not the answer. For one thing, over 90 percent of the world’s most advanced chips are made in Taiwan, if Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and the island’s other chipmakers suffer heavy collateral damage from a PLA attack, this would, according to US
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, be “devastating” to the global economy, including China. Therefore, a prudent planner would find a way to unify with Taiwan with as few casualties as possible, truly serving China’s long-term interests. A blockade would be well-suited for this goal.
There are two main reasons cited by those who argue that China would not try to blockade Taiwan. The first is that the PLA does not have the ability to mount such a blockade effectively. The second is that blockade operations, by their very nature, take a long time
to be effective, during which time China will be vulnerable to international sanctions.
During the August show of military force, the PLA only dispatched around ten warships and a few dozen aircraft to encircle Taiwan—a relatively small part of China’s Eastern Theater Command (the PLA have five Theater Commands). They combined this with some precise guided missiles strikes by the PLA Rocket Force to achieve a certain degree of blocking of Taiwan’s SLOCs. By some accounts, these activities could be seen as the PLA successfully demonstrating the capability to effect a limited blockade.
In addition to the PLA Navy (PLAN) ships that would be dispatched to enforce such a blockade, Beijing
would doubtless beef up that force with China’s Coast Guard ships, as well as the fleets of fishing vessels that make up the maritime militia that has become notori-
be deployed to disrupt maritime shipping.
ous for harassing ships in the region on behalf of the PRC. On January 22, 2021, the PRC National People’s Congress passed a new law giving its coast guard license to demolish structures built by other countries on reefs claimed by China, and to use “all necessary means” against foreign vessels in waters claimed by China, including boarding and “inspecting” them. According to Ambassador Robert Blackwill and Professor Philip Zelikow, the bill would empower the PRC coast guard to create temporary exclusion zones “as needed” to keep other vessels from entering. The gray zone tools authorized by this law can
China currently has the world’s largest number of naval ships, the second-largest number of coast guard ships, and an uncountable number of fishing boats deputized as assets for its maritime militias. In addition to these, the PLA’s guided missiles, such as DF-21D and DF-26, can precisely hit targets at sea. In terms of capability, therefore, there is no doubt that China has the ability to conduct limited blockade operations. Admiral Sam Paparo, commander of the US Pacific Fleet, concurs, telling Nikkei Asia that “China certainly has the number of vessels, and the capability at sea to execute a blockade.”
As for international sanctions (or, to be more precise, Western sanctions), many are already in place. That is to say, even if Beijing does not launch a campaign to invade Taiwan, US sanctions currently on China have already been increasing gradually over the past few years, slowly acclimating the Chinese economy to being sanctioned. Moreover, the Russia-Ukraine war
“Chinahasknownfromthebeginning thatamilitaryconflictbetweenChina and the United States is doomed to occur.”photo: ROC MND
has taught Beijing how to prepare, adjust, and counter those possible sanctions. Unlike Russia, China has a vast domestic market and manufacturing industry, so the effect of international sanctions on China may be much more limited than they were on Russia.
If the PLA wants to launch Taiwan blockade operations, it will never follow the traditional form of a blockade, designated as an act of war that is regulated by international law. Rather, it would try to conceal its harassment of Taiwan’s maritime access. According to
an unnamed US official interviewed by Nikkei Asia, China could accomplish this by repeatedly holding constant military exercises that force civilian air and sea traffic to reroute to avoid areas of closure, and “through the repeated imposition of these kinds of closure areas, legally, safely, and in a way that would be extraordinarily difficult, either for Taiwan or the United States, to challenge and to counter.”
In The Science of Strategy, a key textbook for PLA officers, a strategic blockade is described as a way to
“destroy the enemy’s external economic and military connections, degrade its operational capacity and war-fighting potential, and leave it isolated and unaided.” If the generals planning the annexation of Taiwan follow the doctrine as laid out in this volume, the PLA can be expected to respond to escort operations and blockade running by carrying out precision strikes on selected ROC targets. In a worst-case scenario for the PLA, the US military would insist on helping Taiwan to carry out such anti-blockade
operations. Should this happen, Beijing would likely accuse the US military of ignoring Chinese warnings and entering Chinese (read: Taiwanese) territorial waters and airspace, then order the PLA to attack.
As mentioned earlier, China has known from the beginning that a military conflict between China and the United States is doomed to occur. It would
therefore be justifiable, in the eyes of Beijing leaders, for China to attack the US military for intrusions into China’s territorial sea and airspace. As long as the PLA does not attack targets outside of the blockade zone around Taiwan (the area of operations for the ostensible military exercise), Beijing thinks it will be procedurally difficult for the United States and its allies to declare war on China.
Meanwhile, China will declare to the world that US military support for Taiwan has failed, saying that instead of using international sanctions, the United States can no longer provide substantial help to Taiwan, so as to isolate Taiwan and completely destroy the Taiwanese will to fight. At this time, China will force a political negotiation and persuade besieged authorities to accept a “one country, two systems” accommodation. If the ROC govern-
ment accepts it, China will immediately provide sufficient food and resources to the people of Taiwan, thereby—in Beijing’s view—winning hearts and minds with its largesse.
After launching the limited blockade and controlling the SLOCs, China will also seek to control the information landscape. It will use propaganda, disinformation, cyberwarfare, and other tools in the hope of drumming up support at home while sowing fear and discord in Taiwan. During the military operations that followed the Pelosi visit, Taiwan experienced cyberattacks on at least four ROC government websites. Hackers also took over electronic displays at several 7-Eleven convenience stores on the island, as well as one at a train station in Kaohsiung, to display messages condemning Pelosi, it was reported in The New York Times. In other words, the PLA demonstrated that there will be a cyber component to any move against the island, and that ROC defense planners must expect China to conduct information operations against Taiwan.
Starting from encircling Taiwan through the deployment of vessels ostensibly conducting a military “exercise,” Beijing could leverage this limited blockade to force Taipei to make concessions, or use it as a precursor to a full invasion. China’s military strate-
gists see blockade operations as a strategic tool that gives them flexibility to tighten or loosen the noose around Taiwan’s neck, depending on Beijing’s specific objectives and the US response.
While Paparo admits that China has enough ships to execute such a blockade, he adds that the United States and its allies certainly have the capability to break it. Moreover, US President Joe Biden clearly stated recently that the United States will help in defending Taiwan, though he has provided no concrete details. It is clearly the strategic intention of the United States to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Keeping some measure of ambiguity is surely in the US national interest, but the United States must con-
Deputy Economics Minister Chen Chern-chyi was quoted in The Times as saying that the nation needs to stockpile reasonable stores of important supplies. “We have made preparations for food and for energy and critical supplies, including manufacturing supplies. We have a system — we do an inventory every month,” he said.
sider how it will respond if the US military is attacked by the PLA when it aids Taiwan. The result of this campaign will be critical in determining the regional, even the global political landscape of the future. It would therefore seem necessary for Taiwan and the United States to jointly discuss various levels of cooperation for different scenarios.
Meanwhile, Taiwan must stockpile critical supplies to prepare for limited blockade operations. ROC
“We want to ensure that we have a certain period’s worth stockpiled in Taiwan, including food, including critical supplies, minerals, chemicals and energy of course,” Chen added. Recently, the ROC Navy also made some quick adjustments in its shipbuilding plans to cope with the potential for a blockade. In addition to looking at strengthening the reserve forces, the ROC Ministry of National Defense has started to discuss the possibility of extending the duration of compulsory military service. As illustrated by the August PLA military drill, such changes are sorely needed. b
by Leo Lin
Since the Russia-Ukraine war began in 2022, the role of citizens in preparing for possible warfare across the Taiwan Strait has been a popular topic in Taiwan. This point was highlighted in August, after a visit to Taiwan by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, to which China responded by lobbing missiles into the waters surrounding Taiwan (see Figure 1 on page 51). With the death and brutality of a military invasion on full display in Ukraine, and China’s willingness to emulate Russia’s example underscored by Beijing’s petulant muscle-flexing exercises, more and more average Taiwanese civilians are seeking a larger role in their own defense—and their own survival—in the face of an increasingly likely war launched by China. To that end, it is worth conducting a brief overview of the civil defense options available in Taiwan, and evaluating whether they are up to the task.
Aside from traditional military preparedness, civil defense must be a key component of Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. Generally speaking, Taiwan’s current
laws allow citizens to participate in military operations in two ways. The first is to join military operations as a reservist. Of course, citizens must meet specific qualifications to serve as reserve military personnel and receive training. However, there is currently a critical shortage of reservists, with only about 300,000 who are combat-ready and who could conceivably join the battle on the front lines.
The second way is to volunteer their time in the field of civil defense. Taiwan’s civil defense law was enacted in 2001 to effectively leverage civilian volunteerism, develop self-defense and self-rescue capabilities for achieving disaster prevention and rescue in peacetime, and support military operations in wartime. However, this system is receiving much criticism of late, to the effect that most civil defense personnel are too old, and the training is insufficient. In addition, many people are confused about the role of civil defense in Taiwan. Foreigners often make the mistake of comparing civil defense in Taiwan to the US National Guard, or an American militia. It could
not be further from the truth. Since the law of the Republic of China (ROC) prohibits citizens from owning firearms, civil defense in the ROC is very different from the idea of civilian soldiers: rather, it is more about volunteers supporting government operations. The core formation and function of civil defense forces in Taiwan demands clarification in order to tackle some of this confusion.
There are three areas of civil defense in Taiwan that are often a source of confusion among citizens, as well as government officials. The first is the very meaning of the term civil defense. The English term refers to a group of people who, though not military, are trained to protect and help in an enemy attack or natural disaster. In contrast, the concept of civil
defense in Mandarin Chinese is often confusing. In some cases, it is mistakenly conflated with the term All-out Defense, which refers to military and administrative mobilization. Nor is civil defense a type of civilian armed force—there are no civil-military or paramilitary organizations in Taiwan. As mentioned, the current gun-control laws restrain all law-abiding citizens from owning firearms for all but a very few, tightly controlled purposes. Given these conditions, civil defense, in Taiwan’s context, refers to unarmed volunteers who assist with emergency preparedness and support military operations in peacetime and war. The National Police Agency under the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for civil defense matters. Another source of confusion is the organizational names. In a broad sense, “civil defense” assists with police and fire operations in peacetime, and supports military operations when at war. In a narrow sense, “civil defense” deals with air defense protection, air raid shelter management, and assistance in major disasters. Two similar names appear in relevant regulations, which translate to “Civil Defense Corps” and
“Thecurrentgun-controllawsrestrain all law-abiding citizens from owning firearmsforallbutaveryfew,tightly controlledpurposes.”
“Civil Defense Brigade.” The former appears in the “Civil Defense Act,” the primary law regulating civil defense missions. The term “Civil Defense Brigade” appears in the “Regulations on Civil Defense Corps Formation, Training, Exercise, Service and Support Military Service” and “Implementation Regulations of Formation, Training and Disaster Relief for Civil Defense Disaster Prevention and Rescue Groups, and Voluntary Disaster Prevention and Rescue Organizations.”
Civil Defense Brigades are essentially one of the subgroups under the Civil Defense Corps, and they have the following missions: Performing air raid disaster protection, assisting in the management and maintenance of air defense shelter equipment, assisting with rescues in major disasters, assisting in maintaining local law and order, and supporting military missions during wartime. For Taiwan, the term “mobilization”
refers to the entire country’s resources being mobilized to adapt to national defense needs and to deal with disasters and emergencies. Two major types of mobilization, also called “all-out defense mobilizations,” include “military mobilization” and “administrative mobilization.” Military mobilization, carried out by the Ministry of National Defense, is based on military objectives. Administrative mobilization, carried out by the departments directly under the central government and the local governments, focuses on integrating human, material, financial, and spiritual resources through the operation of administrative agencies.
According to the All-out Defense Mobilization Readiness Act, the Ministry of National Defense is in charge of military mobilization preparedness, whereas central and local governments carry out administrative mobilization preparedness. Here, civil defense falls under the category of “manpower mobilization,” under administrative mobilization preparedness. In Article 15 of the same Act, civil defense groups are considered as “military service support,” which is co-
Participants learn how to deal with protestors at the 2022 National Defense Mobilization and Disaster Prevention Exercise in Yunlin County.ordinated between the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior. In short, civil defense then falls under the category of “manpower mobilization” under “administrative mobilization.”
In terms of personnel formation, people seeking to join the civil defense volunteer forces have to meet some basic qualifications. They must be between 20 and 70 years old, and they must meet the following conditions: they cannot already be active military personnel or currently receiving military training; they cannot be military reservists, or replacement soldiers for military operations; moreover, they cannot be discharged substitute military servicemen. Because of these restrictions, civil defense groups are primarily made up of senior citizens.
The organizational formation of civil defense forces is stipulated in the Civil Defense Act. There are two main types of civil defense task forces: the Civil Defense Corps and the Special Protection Corps. The former is organized by municipal or county governments, and the latter is organized by the railway, road, port, airport, telecommunications, power, oil refining, water companies, and other publicly or privately owned enterprises or institutions. Civil Defense Corps include two sub-groups. One is a volunteer group made up of citizens called “The Civil Manpower Task Force” (CMTF). Another group is made up of government employees who are also part of the Civil Defense Corps.
Currently, local governments in Taiwan have formed 22 Civil Defense Corps, totaling over 90,000 people, in which over 70,000 people are volunteers in the CMTF. According to the “Regulations on Civil Defense Corps Formation, Training, Exercise, Service and Support Military Service,” the CMTF includes five brigades: civil defense brigades, volunteer police brigades, traffic volunteer police brigades, neighborhood watch patrol brigades, and mountain volunteer police brigades. Local governments provide civil defense groups with training to improve their ability to assist in emergency events.
Regarding training for the CMTF, there are three types of training. The first type is basic training, which is provided during the inaugural year of the mayor of a municipality or county, and an eight-hour basic training that volunteers receive once or twice. The second type is in-service training, designed for each brigade and station of the Civil Defense Corps once or twice per year. All group members are required to participate, and each training session lasts four hours. Finally, leadership and management training is designed for personnel with the rank of squad leader or above, and is conducted once per year, for four to eight hours each time. The courses include foundational training courses (such as national de-
fense education, basic knowledge of police duties and disaster response, and first-aid training) and self-arrangement courses (based on the needs of the local government). CMTF is also invited to participate in practice drills in conjunction with national defense and disaster rescue exercises.
In a broad sense, civil defense volunteers in CMTF support police and fire departments and assist in maintaining social order and safety, emergency preparedness, and relief work during peacetime. Some examples include assistance in anti-theft and antirobbery, guard duties, security duties, and police operations. During wartime, civil defense personnel support military operations. When war breaks out or appears likely, civil defense volunteers have missions such as assistance in the evacuation of people; distribution of goods; implementation of evacuation and control of traffic, lighting, and sound; assisting the military in the surveillance and reporting of air defense inspection, operations, and other related matters.
In Taiwan, two types of air raid warning systems have been adopted. First, Taiwan authorities have set up more than 1,400 air raid alarm stations nationwide. Most of these alarm stations can be controlled remotely, while some of them are operated manually.
The second way is through a mobile phone SMS alert system. Citizens within the coverage of cell sites can receive warnings from central authorities. This means that when the enemy enters Taiwan’s airspace, the Ministry of National Defense can issue an audible air raid alarm through the alarm stations, while simul-
taneously alerting citizens on their mobile phones. There are over 105,000 air defense shelters nationwide, with a capacity of more than 40 million people, or about twice the total population of Taiwan. Every year, Taiwan conducts drills, including the nationwide “Wan-An Exercise.” These simulations familiarize the public with the locations of air raid shelters so that in the event of war, people can quickly take refuge and reduce the casualty count.
There are many criticisms about the system as it currently operates. As mentioned above, one common complaint is that the civil defense members are, on average, far too old. Most younger people cannot be recruited due to the current laws barring reservists,
“One common complaint is that the civildefensemembersare,onaverage, far too old.”
and those in middle age generally have full-time jobs and families to look after, and don’t have the time or interest in dedicating what limited amount of free time they have to civil defense volunteer work. As a result, these groups are staffed mainly by retirees. A second criticism is that these volunteers do not receive sufficient training to give them the skills needed in an emergency. Civil defense members only receive between four and 16 hours of training every year, which is not nearly enough to respond to a life-anddeath situation. Third, another common charge is that many people who join civil defense groups have ulterior motives for doing so, such as building connections with influential government officials. In the past, it was not uncommon for a community’s civil defense groups to be dominated by members of the local gentry who wish to build up guanxi with local politicians and law enforcement officers, rather than an authentic desire to contribute to the nation’s defense.
Looking ahead, planners must seek ways to enhance civil defense in Taiwan. First, since civil defense teams are not expected to engage in active combat or urban warfare, the ROC government should focus on recruiting and training civil defense members. The government should actively encourage citizens to join local civil defense groups, using effective messaging as well as incentives. The selection and screening process must be reviewed, updated, and constantly revised. Moreover, local governments should provide their civil defense members with a practical training curriculum that reflects current and future needs. At the end of the day, it will be impossible for Taiwan to do any of this without allocating a much higher budget than what small amount is presently being spent on the current civil defense system.
A quantum leap in effectiveness could be achieved if the central and local governments were to decide to engage in partnerships with civil society, entrepre-
neurs, and non-profit organizations: those at home and abroad. Various non-profit organizations have strengths and resources that can provide more positive impacts on the nation’s overall civil defense efforts, not only for government-recruited volunteers but also for the general public. The central and local governments should raise awareness among its citizenry, as well as among the thousands of expats who live in Taiwan, through an ongoing series of public events and engagement activities, such as demonstrations of disaster-prevention, emergency radio communications, and combat first-aid training courses, for example. Publicizing those events will ultimately attract more citizens to participate in the civil defense effort.
Taiwan has a lot of work to do if it is going to build up its national emergency preparedness and civil defense to the point that it will be able to handle emergencies or—worse yet—possible warfare. Given that the current laws do not provide a legal basis to establish civilian military forces, or allow citizens to possess firearms, Taiwan must work on raising awareness and offering quality training opportunities for citizens to develop useful skills during peacetime and wartime. Public education is also a key to the success of building up an effective civil defense force. Improving the general public’s morale will make it easier for local governments to recruit qualified and dedicated volunteers to join these civil defense groups. The central and local governments must also open the door to working constructively with civil society organizations, both foreign and domestic, to introduce more resources and new perspectives that will build up Taiwan’s civil defense capabilities and resilience. b
