U.S. INTERESTS

Stances of Other External Players

France

France has historically supported Morocco’s policy stances in the UNSC, meaning that any resolution that does not accord with Moroccan interests will almost certainly be vetoed. There are multiple reasons for this. Firstly, France and Morocco have long enjoyed close ties, whereas France’s fraught colonial history with Algeria colors its relations with the Polisario. Additionally, Morocco demonstrated its unwillingness to brook any softening of French support in 2014, when it temporarily suspended its counterterrorism and judicial cooperation with France due to France’s criticism of its human rights conduct in the Western Sahara. France is also concerned that if it deviates in its support, Morocco could respond by permitting increased migration into the south of Europe through Morocco.

Spain

As the former colonial power in Western Sahara, Spain has a longstanding interest in the conflict. There is a robust civil society in Spain that supports the Sahrawi cause, and lobbies to the Spanish government on their behalf. However, the strength of Spain’s support for the Sahrawis has waxed and waned, dependent on whether conservative or left-leaning governments were in power. Regardless, Spain has never taken a strong stance: former Minister of Foreign Affairs Miguel Nadal best characterized their position as one of “active neutrality.”

Russia

Russia has interests with all parties to the conflict, and has historically walked a neutral path in the UNSC. While it has recently been trying to strengthen its diplomatic ties with Morocco, it also has a longstanding relationship with Algeria which dates back to the Cold War. Also, Russia’s tensions with the United States and France in Syria have been known to affect its vote in the

The Moroccan government has funded various develoipment projects in Western Sahara, such as this dairy farm in the deserts outside Laayoune. Source: Ben Brenner.

Council. In short, Russia has no specific agenda that it is pursuing; its unrelated interactions with the relevant parties are usually determinative of its posture in the UNSC.

U.S. INTERESTS

The State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ (NEA) 2018 Joint Regional Strategy set forth the following elements of the Bureau’s strategic goals for the Middle East and North Africa region: 37

• Enhance security, stabilization, counterterrorism, and conflict resolution;

• Promote inclusive economic growth, socio-economic development, open markets, and increased U.S. exports; and

• Improve governance, strengthen democratic institutions and processes, and support an engaged civil society.

• Security: Maintain and deepen U.S. security and counterterrorism partnerships with re- gional partners;

• Stability: Promote and enhance the region- al stability necessary for inclusive prosperity and opportunities for U.S. businesses;

• Resolution: Encourage conflict resolution processes and prevent resurgence of violence; and

• Respect: Promote internationally recognized standards of human rights and international law, and support for humanitarian aid.

Subsequent sections discuss these assertions in more detail.

Interest I: Security

U.S. security partnership with Morocco serves as the linchpin of U.S. regional security efforts.

The conflict’s ceasefire status quo accommodates this security partnership; U.S.-promoted efforts relative to the Western Sahara conflict should be calibrated to minimize disruption of the U.S.-Moroccan partnership, and open opportunities for further U.S.-Algeria collaboration.

The United States has a significant security in- terest in maintaining and promoting cooper- ation with the countries in North Africa perti- nent to the Western Sahara conflict—Morocco and Algeria.

Security encompasses not just counterterrorism but also power projection in the region. From a security perspective, the Mediterranean has been effectively a NATO “lake” since the 1950s, with close U.S. partners decisively controlling the entrances to the region. 38

This hegemony denies the ability of rival pow- ers to threaten NATO’s southern front, limits the reach of destabilizing transnational flows or groups, and increases regional prosperity by fa- cilitating trade.

U.S.-Morocco Security Partnership

The Western Sahara conflict’s status quo accommodates the long-standing, close geostrategic partnership between the United States and Morocco.

While U.S. interests ultimately support the con- flict’s resolution, the current, unresolved status quo has facilitated maintenance and develop- ment of the U.S.-Moroccan security relation- ship.

The Moroccan monarchy is a key partner in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts, especially in preventing attacks on the Strait of Gibraltar and in the broader Sahel. This close security rela- tionship was formalized with the Bush Admin- istration’s designation of Morocco as a Major Non-NATO Ally (one of only 18) in 2004. 39

The United States also has a primary security interest in maintaining access to the Mediterra- nean through partnership with Morocco. While Morocco is not a NATO member, the Kingdom’s borders represent NATO’s southern flank, and hold a key position for shipping routes and en- ergy supplies for Europe and the world. As such, the region serves as the primary route of U.S. power projection into Southern Europe and the Western Mediterranean region.

Morocco has also consistently been a close and cooperative counterterrorism partner to the United States in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

Today, Morocco co-chairs the Global Coun- terterrorism Task Force (GCTF), leads the U.S.-funded Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), and takes a leadership role on deradicalization/CVE via Mohammed VI’s Institute for the Training of Imams.

Morocco is a member of the U.S.-led Global Co- alition to Defeat ISIS and has contributed F-16s from its air force to carry out airstrikes against

the group in both Syria and Iraq in cooperation with the coalition. 40 While Morocco was a major point of origin for ISIS foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), the Kingdom has been broadly coopera- tive with the United States in efforts to prevent radicalization and repatriate, prosecute, and re- habilitate FTFs. 41 In response to this threat, Mo- rocco criminalized mobilization to join ISIS in 2015 and has subsequently proactively moved to arrest identified returning fighters immediately upon their return. 42

Morocco also plays a key role in NEA-articulat- ed strategic goals to “advance relationships with our partners that advance security through sta- bility and counter extremist ideologies.”

Focus areas for ongoing U.S.-Morocco coopera- tion center on counterterrorism cooperation— including taking a lead role on countering vio- lent extremism (CVE) and religious moderation initiatives, as well as ongoing efforts against al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other Salafi jihadist groups.

Overall, the Western Sahara conflict has not hin- dered security cooperation between the United States and Morocco. U.S. efforts relative to the conflict should work to minimize disruption to this cooperation.

U.S.-Algeria Partnership

The United States maintains security cooperation with Algeria, but not at the same level of U.S.-Morocco partnership.

Algeria has demonstrated willingness to main- tain counterterrorism cooperation, intelligence sharing, and arms sales with the United States, albeit at a much lower level than the Moroc- co-U.S. bilateral relationship. “U.S. bilateral aid in FY2018 comprised $1.3 million for Interna- tional Military Education and Training (IMET) and $0.8 million for Nonproliferation, Antiter- rorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NA- DR).” 43

Soviet support for Algeria during its war of inde- pendence contributed to deep Russian-Algerian relations in the present day that have always out- weighed U.S. relations with Algiers. “Between 2015 and 2018 Algeria imported $4.1 billion in arms from Russia, $797 million from China, $646 million from Germany, and $27 million from the U.S.” 44

Although Algeria proudly identifies with the Non-Aligned Movement in the Cold War, its be- havior since independence has revealed a clear preference for Russia as a defense partner. Alge- ria’s alignment with Russia makes any form of comprehensive American security cooperation challenging. China is also an economic partner to Algeria, particularly on infrastructure proj- ects.

After 9/11, the U.S. and Algeria increased co- operation on counterterrorism. However, tense relations between Morocco and Algeria relat- ed to several issues including the stalemate in Western Sahara have precluded progress toward Maghreb integration; the border remains closed between Morocco and Algeria.

Algerian investment in security and stability contributes positively to U.S. security. But de- spite cordial relations, Algeria’s continued close alignment with Russia, refusal to recognize Is- rael’s right to exist, and continued suspicion of U.S. and NATO intentions prevent a deeper lev- el of cooperation that would bring the relation- ship on par with that of Morocco.

The United States has an emerging economic partnership with Algeria, which could prove lu- crative and prosperous for U.S. businesses. U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks to- taled $3.6 billion as of 2018. The United States and Algeria have one of the largest trade vol- umes in the region, driven mainly by Algerian hydrocarbon exports and sale of services by U.S. businesses. Additionally, Algeria has sought to transition from a centrally planned to a free market economic model. While progress on eco- nomic reform remains slow, Algeria represents a potentially large and lucrative market for U.S. business.

may bolster U.S.-Algeria security cooperation efforts, such a possibility is speculative and should not be considered a key motivator for U.S. policy on the matter.

Interest II: Stability

The status quo of UN-administered ceasefire has facilitated both relative stability in Northwest Africa and economic partnership between the U.S. and Morocco.

U.S.-promoted efforts relative to the Western Sahara conflict should be calibrated to ensure stability of key regional partners and open additional economic opportunity.

NEA strategic goals focus on promoting “inclu- sive economic growth, socio-economic develop- ment” and other aspects crucial to the region’s stability.

Such stability is necessary both to facilitate cre- ation of economic opportunities for individuals in the region and for U.S. companies, and to pre- vent deterioration of state capabilities to detect, impede, and deter unlawful transnational be- havior such as smuggling, trafficking, and illegal migration.

Moroccan Stability

Stability of the Moroccan monarchy has significant implications for key international concerns, including migration. Morocco serves as an important counterbalance in a region beset by turmoil, including the failed state in Libya, ungoverned space in Mali, and popular unrest.

Despite the fact that the King makes all major decisions, Moroccan interviewees regularly cited the Kingdom’s role as one of the few “successful” democracies in North Africa, particularly when compared to other unstable situations in the re- gion. Interviewees also emphasized Morocco’s role as a “gateway” from Africa to Europe. Recent patterns of migration have given this role particular prominence, particularly in relations between the European Union and Morocco. Interviewees argued that the Moroccan govern- ment serves as Europe’s most reliable partner in management of migration flows. The Moroc- can government also plays a key role in policing transnational smuggling and trafficking.

In this context, Moroccan interviewees asserted an independence referendum on Western Saha- ra would threaten the monarchy’s stability and, through it, the stability of all North Africa and Europe.

Previous sections have discussed the centrality of Moroccan control over the Western Sahara to the monarchy’s legitimacy. Interviewees as- serted that an internationally mandated refer- endum on the territory’s independence would undermine the monarchy and destabilize the Moroccan state, posing severe ramifications for regional migration and trafficking efforts.

While the report cannot comprehensively assess such claims, they are nonetheless to be taken se- riously by U.S. and European policymakers. This topic may underscore French resolve to oppose any UNSC action they perceive as detrimental to the Moroccan monarchy’s stability.

U.S. Efforts to Bolster Moroccan Stability

The bilateral relationship between the United States and Morocco reflects the high priority the U.S. places on the monarchy’s stability.

In addition to annual development aid (which totaled $56 million in U.S. Fiscal Year 2018), Morocco is the recipient of a $450 million com- pact through the Millennium Challenge Corpo- ration. 45 The compact targets employability and land productivity to improve Morocco’s eco- nomic growth prospects.

security and terrorism investigations.” 46

Morocco also is a key U.S. economic partner in the region. According to NEA, over 100 U.S. companies “operate in Morocco, particularly in the renewable energy, infrastructure, aviation, and environmental technology sectors.” Trade between the countries has expanded significantly: “from 2005 to 2017, the total value of Moroccan goods exported to the United States increased from $445.8 million to $1.2 billion, and U.S. exports to Morocco have increased from $480 million to $2.2 billion.” 47

U.S. efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute must account for and work to minimize disruption to these stability and economic interests.

Algerian Stability

Similar to Morocco, Algeria remains a major security counterbalance. With the longest borders in North Africa, Algeria and its security forces are the linchpin in curbing transnational threats from trafficking, terrorism, and ungoverned space in the Sahara.

Algeria frequently refers to itself as a regional “security exporter” and views itself as the most competent security provider and leader. Recent popular unrest, and questions about the foundations of legitimacy in Algeria, have made political and military leadership wary of any rapid changes that could lead to destabilization.

Unlike with Morocco, the United States and Algeria do not have a deep bilateral relationship. The United States does not provide development or foreign assistance to Algeria, and only minor military assistance and arms sales. While the economic relationship between the two countries dwarfs the relationship between Morocco and the United States, the United States and Algeria do not have a free trade agreement, and economic relations remain limited to hydrocarbons and several other sectors.

However, unlike their counterparts in Morocco, the Government and Military of Algeria view the Western Sahara dispute as a minor issue that does not bear on the stability of their state. While support for self-determination is a foundational principle of the country, the Western Sahara conflict’s resolution or irresolution does not threaten Algeria’s stability or economic well-being.

Algeria’s current political unrest deserves comment. Although it is unclear when the current political transition will conclude and what leadership changes will result, our assessment is that changing the long-held position of supporting the Sahrawi people and insistence on not being a party to the conflict will continue through the transition. The Algerian political establishment remains primarily concerned with domestic issues and does not place a high priority on reassessing foreign policy. Additionally, with continued insecurity in Libya, northern Mali, and Niger, the Algerian security services remain concerned about border security and do not wish to see a change in conditions on their western border. We can expect that national security will remain Algeria’s primary interest and expect it to act to maintain the status quo. It does not currently consider the Polisario a destabilizing fac

tor in its security and thus a change in the status quo would be needed to prompt alternate policy.

Interest III: Resolution

Peaceful resolution of the conflict could improve U.S. partnerships in the NEA region and offer a wide range of benefits to U.S. interests in the region.

NEA strategic goals state that the bureau works to “encourage and enable national conflict resolution efforts,” in part to “prevent resurgence of violence” and to “assist persecuted ethnic and religious minorities.” 48

Previous report sections have examined how the status quo accommodates U.S. security and stability interests.

However, peaceful resolution of the conflict through the UN process would offer significant benefits for U.S. interests. These include:

• Supporting potential Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement, which could facilitate deeper U.S. security and trade relationships with both partners;

• Renewing feasibility of Maghreb integration, which could promote regional political, and economic stability, dismantle physical, social, and economic barriers, and unlock opportunities for the private sector;

• Renewing international confidence in UN conflict mediation and resolution efforts and their abilities to resolve intractable conflicts;

• Definitively addressing longstanding humanitarian concerns about conditions in the Tindouf camps;

• Reducing Tensions in Franco-Algerian Relations stemming from French support of Moroccan interests on the UNSC and residual Algerian resentment from the colonial period;

• Reducing Moroccan-Spanish tensions stem- ming from popular Spanish support for Polisario claims;

Diverting Moroccan military spending toward more productive socioeconomic development goals. 49

While the report has discussed how the conflict’s history and modern dynamics complicate resolution efforts, subsequent sections include recommendations for how the U.S. could leverage likely contingencies in the region to help facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Interest IV: Respect

U.S. policy should promote internationally recognized standards of human rights, international law, and humanitarian aid.

NEA strategic goals set forth that “respect for human rights…will lead to a more stable region.” 50 As represented in this goal, the United States has an intrinsic interest in promoting respect for fundamental human rights. Because human rights violations are a key point of distrust and disagreements, working to impartially guarantee human rights protections can improve the climate of negotiations.

Helping people achieve freedom and self-sufficiency is not only a U.S. moral obligation and a representation of U.S. soft power; it also contributes to U.S. security and prosperity by creating a more peaceful world.

The report recognizes that violations of human rights anywhere are corrosive of the norms guaranteeing them everywhere; as a result, the United States therefore has a legitimate interest in protecting the essential freedoms of all the people of the Western Sahara.

Deteriorating conditions at the Tindouf camps conflict with U.S. interests in human rights and humanitarian affairs and create risk of renewed hostilities.

oration of humanitarian conditions at the Tindouf camps.

Such conditions, along with seeming impotence of the UN process, have contributed to a growing atmosphere of concern and hopelessness in the camps, particularly among young Sahrawis.

Previous sections have discussed that Polisario officials and young Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps reported that frustration has reached a point where it is now possible that the Polisario could decide to return to hostilities against Morocco.

U.S. and UN efforts to improve humanitarian conditions in Tindouf support NEA policy goals and are important steps to facilitate peaceful conflict resolution.

At the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the international community collectively recognized that efforts to improve humanitarian conditions and advance sustainable development need to be aligned with efforts to promote peace and conflict resolution.

This humanitarian-development-peace nexus reflects the UN and World Bank “New Way of Working,” acknowledging that “Sustainable development and durable solutions to displacement are not possible without peace. Humanitarian relief, development programmes and peacebuilding are not serial processes: they are all needed at the same time.” 51

In this sense, U.S. efforts to address humanitarian concerns at the Tindouf camps can serve both to prevent the stalemate from deteriorating into open hostilities, and to help build conditions wherein negotiation efforts can take place.

Teammembers meet with the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior, which governs relations with what Morocco calls their “Southern Provinces.” Source: Lorraine Keeler.