LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATION B: Resolution via Referendum With Independence

40 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATION B: Resolution via Referendum With Independence

An alternative resolution recommendation, supported by a smaller contingent of students in the course, is that the U.S. urge the UN PESG and Security Council members to issue a referendum with options for: (1) independence, (2) autonomy, and (3) integration, preceded by a period of territorial power-sharing – as captured in the 2003 Baker Plan.

A resolution to the conflict that neglects the Polisario’s interest of self-determination by not including an option for independence and ignores international law sets a dangerous precedent for U.S. policy. Additionally, supporting a resolution that grants Moroccan sovereignty prematurely is not the most durable solution to this conflict. The risks include:

• Rewarding Morocco’s unwillingness to comply with international law;

• Removing the ability of the United States to be perceived as an honest broker and play a productive role in the resolution of this conflict by changing long-standing U.S. policy towards the conflict;

• Weakening the United Nations by undermining the promotion of international law;

• Damaging relations with countries that recognize SADR, including Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa which are important countries for U.S. policy in the African continent; and

• Pushing the Polisario away from the UN system, and increasing the costs of maintaining stability by disincentivizing Sahrawis to engage productively and peacefully in the resolution of the conflict.

This recommendation rests on a fundamental respect for international law, human rights, and humanitarian affairs. It also recognizes that a resolution to this conflict, which affirms the principle of self-determination, contributes to regional security, stability, and prosperity. The proposed resolution will likely face resistance from the U.S. Congress, particularly members that believe that Moroccan control of the territory contributes to long-term stability in the region. While a shift in Moroccan policy would preempt this resistance, the Administration should prepare to explain the necessity of retaining the United States’ reputation as an honest broker and upholding international law, and adjust policy based on congressional advice.

This recommendation asks the U.S. Government to follow through on its commitments to the UN system. The MINURSO mandate still issues a call to “organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results.” 59 Organizing a referendum will restore the credibility of the UN, and affirm longstanding U.S. policy on the issue. The most durable resolution that keeps the parties engaged in the UN system would be a version of the 2003 Baker peace plan because it requires both Morocco and the Polisario to try to win over the population though referendum after a period of territorial power-sharing.

This recommendation aligns with the same U.S. policy interests:

• Security: The U.S., Algeria, Morocco, and the Polisario share an interest in continued and improved counterterrorism efforts in the region. Polisario intelligence is currently underutilized, yet they possess a comprehensive understanding of arms dealing, drug smuggling, and movement around their territory. By allowing the drug trade to proliferate beyond and through its borders, Morocco is undermining its own security and that of the region.

• Stability: Moroccan stability could be enhanced if it were not in stalemate with the Polisario on its border. Furthermore, Algeria has repeatedly demonstrated interest in improving its trade and bilateral relationship with Morocco, which would enhance territorial and economic security. Coordinated effort from the U.S. and others would encourage Morocco and Algeria to build cohesion across the larger Maghreb region. Most importantly, status quo conditions in the

• Resolution: Maintaining the status quo guarantees the continued denial of human rights and humanitarian considerations, and further threatens regional stability and security interests. countries like China for support and reliance. Morocco also receives substantial development assistance from the U.S., which it should not risk losing. As of 2017, total U.S. foreign aid to Morocco neighbored $491 million, the seventh highest in the Middle East and North Africa region. About 97 percent of U.S. assistance to Morocco is economic, and only 3 percent is military. The bulk of the foreign aid is through the Millennium Challenge Corporation of about $450 million aimed at improving access to higher quality education, workforce development, and land productivity. USAID is implementing $30 million worth of initiatives focused on strengthening primary education and improving youth wellbeing. Morocco also benefits significantly from the Free Trade Agreement and the Science and Technology Cooperation (S&T) Agreement, which have helped increase foreign direct investment in the country by improving the business environment. The U.S. is an important partner for Morocco’s development goals. The perceived damage to Morocco-U.S. bilateral relations from including independence in a conflict resolution proposal is overstated, as Morocco would not risk losing its vital partnership with the U.S. Nonetheless, the U.S. should tread carefully in its negotiations. One way the U.S. can get Morocco to shift poWhether the results entail autonomy, independence, or integration, tensions will not dissolve until the UN confirms its credibility and commitment. • Respect: U.S. commitments to self-determination, human rights, and the betterment of humankind are inscribed in international law and the mandates of U.S. institutions. As the situation currently stands, Sahrawis living under Moroccan control face ongoing human rights violations. Although there are more documented abuses on the Moroccan side, the Polisario has also been accused of violating human rights. Until a resolution is reached, this reality will persist. By adhering to international law and longstanding UN policy, this alternative recommendation affirms the position of the U.S. as an “honest broker.” However, it does raise the question: why would Morocco agree to, or even consider, a proposal that cites independence as an option? There are several reasons why Morocco might change its position. First, as previously outlined, the costs of Moroccan investment in the region supersede the benefits to its own economy. The gains from natural resource exploitation do not compensate for Morocco’s extensive civil expenditures. Second, framing this discussion of a referendum as a long-term, multilateral vision for the region would pull in support from Algeria, the African Union, and Morocco’s European allies. The parties should be urged to think about the improvements to security and economic conditions that could come from settling this conflict in a peaceful manner that complies with international law. Third, Morocco should be reassured that the outcome of the referendum is not pre-determined, and Morocco has an opportunity to win over the entire electorate by pursuing genuine trust-building efforts and continuing to provide resources and opportunity to the territory.

Additionally, the U.S. maintains significant leverage in its bilateral relationship with Morocco. Morocco remains an important counterterrorism partner, and it is unlikely to turn to

sition on including independence in a referendum is to increase its economic assistance.

It is also unclear whether Morocco’s claims to existentialism are exclusive to the monarchy, or if public opinion actually possesses this view. If the monarchy changes its position on the Western Sahara, it may also be able to substantially shift public opinion. One can argue that Morocco has built this narrative of existentialism. King Hassan II was reportedly open to considering a referendum with the option of independence, whereas King Mohammad VI considers the territory existential to Moroccan territory and identity. Although it should be noted that, depending on the referendum outcome, the presence of an independent territory in what Morocco considers sovereign land does pose a risk of encouraging self-determination in the Rif area of Morocco; this is a possible source of instability if the kingdom does not message the change effectively.

Lastly, Morocco has been trying to reposition itself as a leader in African political and economic affairs. Morocco joined the African Union in 2017 after a 33-year absence and has actively tried to advance its economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa through business deals and diplomacy. It is currently in negotiations to

join the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the hopes of expanding its economic ties with West African states. Despite these efforts, the ongoing dispute over Western Sahara will continue to restrict trade with African states that recognize SADR and question the legality of Morocco’s claim to the territory, posing as a major roadblock to its economic aspirations in Africa. The SADR signed on to ratify the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), which signals the extent of recognition of SADR in the continent. Working with the SADR and the African Union may enhance Morocco’s leadership and image in regional and multilateral forums, given that so many African countries already recognize the Polisario.

This recommendation raises a second important question: if the referendum resulted in independence, would an independent Polisario-run state even be realistic? This is a major consideration, since there is no accurate way to pre-assess the outcome of the vote. Despite difficult conditions, observations from the refugee camps indicate that this may not be entirely unfeasible.

Since declaring itself a government-in-exile, SADR has established and operated—for decades now—a system of governance and institutions that serve as the foundation of a state. The Polisario has its own Congress, foreign ministry, an expansive diplomatic strategy, a defense ministry, military personnel, vibrant civil society, and even a human rights commission which has led to substantial progress in protection of rights relative to the Moroccan-controlled territory— despite ongoing challenges.

Undoubtedly, an independent Polisario state would entail an exercise in state-building, but the institutional basis for a sustainable state—as well as a young population eager to participate politically and economically—is present and cannot be denied. After an adjustment period that would require UN and Algerian support, an independent Polisario-run state could still contribute to a more stable region and could garner financial support and economic cooperation among the many countries that officially recognize the SADR.