40
United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations
LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATION B:
Resolution via Referendum With Independence An alternative resolution recommendation, supported by a smaller contingent of students in the course, is that the U.S. urge the UN PESG and Security Council members to issue a referendum with options for: (1) independence, (2) autonomy, and (3) integration, preceded by a period of territorial power-sharing – as captured in the 2003 Baker Plan. A resolution to the conflict that neglects the Polisario’s interest of self-determination by not including an option for independence and ignores international law sets a dangerous precedent for U.S. policy. Additionally, supporting a resolution that grants Moroccan sovereignty prematurely is not the most durable solution to this conflict. The risks include: • Rewarding Morocco’s unwillingness to comply with international law; • Removing the ability of the United States to be perceived as an honest broker and play a productive role in the resolution of this conflict by changing long-standing U.S. policy towards the conflict; • Weakening the United Nations by undermining the promotion of international law; • Damaging relations with countries that recognize SADR, including Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa which are important countries for U.S. policy in the African continent; and • Pushing the Polisario away from the UN system, and increasing the costs of maintaining stability by disincentivizing Sahrawis to engage productively and peacefully in the resolution of the conflict. This recommendation rests on a fundamental respect for international law, human rights, and humanitarian affairs. It also recognizes that a resolution to this conflict, which affirms the principle of self-determination, contributes to regional security, stability, and prosperity. The proposed resolution will likely face resistance
from the U.S. Congress, particularly members that believe that Moroccan control of the territory contributes to long-term stability in the region. While a shift in Moroccan policy would preempt this resistance, the Administration should prepare to explain the necessity of retaining the United States’ reputation as an honest broker and upholding international law, and adjust policy based on congressional advice. This recommendation asks the U.S. Government to follow through on its commitments to the UN system. The MINURSO mandate still issues a call to “organize and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results.”59 Organizing a referendum will restore the credibility of the UN, and affirm longstanding U.S. policy on the issue. The most durable resolution that keeps the parties engaged in the UN system would be a version of the 2003 Baker peace plan because it requires both Morocco and the Polisario to try to win over the population though referendum after a period of territorial power-sharing. This recommendation aligns with the same U.S. policy interests: • Security: The U.S., Algeria, Morocco, and the Polisario share an interest in continued and improved counterterrorism efforts in the region. Polisario intelligence is currently underutilized, yet they possess a comprehensive understanding of arms dealing, drug smuggling, and movement around their territory. By allowing the drug trade to proliferate beyond and through its borders, Morocco is undermining its own security and that of the region. • Stability: Moroccan stability could be enhanced if it were not in stalemate with the Polisario on its border. Furthermore, Algeria has repeatedly demonstrated interest in improving its trade and bilateral relationship with Morocco, which would enhance territorial and economic security. Coordinated effort from the U.S. and others would encourage Morocco and Algeria to build cohesion across the larger Maghreb region. Most importantly, status quo conditions in the
