THE STATUS QUO

10 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations THE STATUS QUO

The status quo of UN-brokered and monitored ceasefire reflects an uneasy stalemate, in which Morocco and the Polisario hold almost diametrically opposed visions of each other and of the territory’s future.

This section reviews elements of this stalemate including:

• Current status of the Polisario and the cen- trality of independence to the Polisario cause;

• Current status of Moroccan-occupied West- ern Sahara and its ideological centrality to the Moroccan state; and

• How the sides’ perceptions of each other dim prospects of resolving the impasse under current circumstances.

Frente Polisario

The Polisario Front’s legitimacy depends on achievement of its longtime goal: an independent Sahrawi state that controls the territory of the Western Sahara.

Since 1991, it has sought to realize this goal through a referendum on the territory’s future that includes an option of independence.

Formed in 1973, the Polisario Front began a guerrilla warfare campaign against Spanish co- lonial authorities and troops with its focus on obtaining decolonization and the self-determi- nation of the Sahrawi nation. The Polisario re- sembled many contemporary national liberation movements, and aligned itself with the socialist and non-aligned camps during the Cold War. 23 Throughout 1973 and 1974 the Polisario Front gained military capability, capturing weapons from Spanish armed forces. Sahrawi troops defecting from the Spanish armed forces aug- mented this capability. While it never achieved a technological or resource advantage over its enemies, the Polisario’s armed forces mounted a sustained and capable military challenge to its enemies. The Polisario still retains armed forces in the Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the bulk of which are stationed in the Polisa- rio-controlled territory east of the berm.

After Spain withdrew its armed forces from the territory in 1975, increased fighting and Mo- roccan pressure led Sahrawi civilians to flee the territory and settle in refugee camps around the Algerian city of Tindouf. In 1976, the Polisario declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Repub- lic (SADR). The SADR acts as the state-in-ex- ile of an independent Western Sahara and has administered services in the refugee camps and the territory it controls since its formation. The African Union and 85 countries recognize the SADR as the government of an independent Sahrawi state.

Since its formation, the Polisario has dominated the SADR, with Polisario members staffing all senior positions. The Polisario forms its mem- bers (including those who reside in the Mo- roccan-controlled territory and who keep their membership secret) into constituencies that elect delegates to a general congress.

This congress then elects a Politburo and sec- retary general. It also debates and amends the political program for the Front and SADR to pursue until the next congress. The Polisario Secretary General becomes the SADR President and selects a Prime Minister, who then selects a cabinet.

Since 1991 subsequent congresses and the SADR have reiterated their commitment to the ceasefire and UN process.

Throughout this period, both the Polisario and SADR have repeatedly stated that the refer- endum reflects the only mechanism to achieve Sahrawi self-determination. Both have also con- demned terrorism, including public statements after terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003.

Humanitarian Conditions in Polisario Camps

Polisario camps depend on international humanitarian support; insufficient levels of this support have prompted concern over conditions at the camps.

The current population of the Polisario camps is a disputed figure. UNHCR estimates that 173,500 refugees live in the five refugee camps around Tindouf, of whom 125,000 receive food assistance. 24 This figure is disputed by both Morocco and Algeria. While UNHCR refers to these figures as conservative estimates, others, including interviewees, considered this popula- tion estimate to be high.

As the camps are administered by the Polisario and governed according to the SADR constitu- tion, laws, and legal system, the Polisario are re- sponsible for the conditions and any violations that occur within them. However, because the camps are located in Algeria, the Algerian gov- ernment is also responsible under international law. This creates some complications with re- gard to accountability, as both parties are legally accountable.

UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations estimate that over 35 percent of the camp pop- ulation is under age 18. Due to political resis- tance, a precise census has not been possible, and monitoring of human rights presents challenges. While the Polisario has publicly stated its open- ness to monitoring, Algeria often denies access to monitors. Monitors have assessed the human rights conditions in the camps as satisfactory but potentially threatened, and the situation with regard to human rights is generally assessed as being better than in Moroccan-controlled areas.

Individuals living in Polisario-administered refugee camps rely on external and humanitarian support. Several indicators suggest that current aid streams to camp are insufficient and have led to a deterioration of humanitarian conditions.

An April 2019 UNHCR and World Food Pro- gram nutrition survey found increased malnu- trition indicators in the camps. These included increases in:

• “Global acute malnutrition (from 4 per cent in 2016 to 7 per cent in 2019);

• Stunting (from 18 per cent in 2016 to 28 per cent in 2019),

• Anemia in children (from 38 to 50 per cent); and

• Anemia in women (from 43 to 52 per cent).” 25

UNHCR is “struggling to meet international standards in its life-saving activities in the ar- eas of protection, shelter, water and sanitation, health, nutrition, education, energy, provision of non-food items and livelihoods.” 26 The daily minimum objective of providing 2100 calories per day per person is not constantly sustained, and often falls short because of the lack of a consistent aid pipeline. None of its targets in the above categories were met in 2018.

Lack of UNHCR funding has led to shortages of classrooms and teachers for youth in the camps; children in camps are often forced to drop out of school or attending boarding school if families can support the expense.

Concern over Resumption of Hostilities

Interviews with Polisario officials and Sahrawis residing in the Tindouf refugee camps identified a growing desire to return to hostilities with Morocco.

While the Polisario has officially endorsed the 1991 ceasefire, interviewees stated that many Sahrawis – especially youth – have grown in- creasingly frustrated with the lack of progress toward a referendum and resolution. Many Sah- rawis reported that they consider the ceasefire to be void due to the failure to hold a referendum. Polisario officials and young Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps reported that their frustration has reached a point where it is now possible that the Polisario could decide to return to hostilities

against Morocco.

Certain flashpoints, such as perceived and substantiated human rights abuses by Moroccan security forces or perceived setbacks in the UN process may spark an outbreak of hostilities or other violence. Some interviewees also claimed that Sahrawis residing in Moroccan-controlled territory strongly share this frustration. While the report researchers could not verify these claims, it does raise the possibility of unrest or violence in the Moroccan-controlled territory.

Polisario Perspectives of Morocco

Polisario distrust of Morocco makes it unlikely the group will compromise necessitating an independence resolution.

The Polisario views the Government of Morocco as an illegal occupier of the Sahrawi nation’s territory. In their mind, the 1975 Green March represented part of a coordinated invasion by the Royal Armed Forces. Since then, Moroccan presence in the territory represents continued colonialism, with Moroccan security forces and settlers replacing Spanish ones.

The Polisario’s main focus and effort remains fighting for the liberation of this “occupied territory.” Only replacing Moroccan control with an independent state will realize Sahrawi self-determination, it believes.

The Polisario maintains that the Sahrawi people constitute a different nation from Morocco, with an ethnicity, history, and language. As such, the Polisario views integration into Morocco as antithetical to the desires of the Sahrawi nation. While it tried to create an independent Sahrawi state through armed struggle prior to 1991, the movement now officially considers a referendum on independence to be the proper way to realize this goal. The Polisario remains convinced that Sahrawi public opinion, regardless of location, remains overwhelmingly in favor of independence and would vote accordingly in a referendum.

Polisario interviewees also reported a deep distrust of Morocco. Few believe that the Government of Morocco truly wants to engage in negotiations or can be trusted to adhere to anything it offers in negotiations.

As the Polisario Secretary General and SADR President stated, since the Government of Morocco cannot be trusted to respect political or civil rights, autonomy is akin to integration. Polisario views that the Government of Morocco systematically represses Sahrawis in the Moroccan-controlled territory reinforces this mistrust. Independent human rights monitors’ critical reports on the overall state of human rights in Morocco have also contributed to mistrust.”

Moroccan-Controlled Western Sahara

Within Morocco today, Moroccan control of the Western Sahara is a nearly unquestioned and politically sensitive fact of life.

As in 1991, Morocco today controls roughly 80 percent of the Western Sahara, including the re- gion’s population centers of Laayoune, Dakhla, and Smara, along with its coastline.

Morocco considers the so-called “Southern Provinces” to be “part of its sovereign territory.” 27 Protection of its control of these territories rep- resents one of Morocco’s primary domestic and foreign policy concerns. Several interviewees noted that Moroccan representatives prioritize the Western Sahara issue, and are prone to re- act strongly and negatively to any internation- al statements or actions perceived as remotely threatening to Moroccan control of the territo- ry. 28 Morocco has criminalized challenging Mo- rocco’s claim to Western Sahara in the press or social media; state-dominated media coverage tends to relay stories of prosperity in the “South- ern Provinces,” contrasted with characteriza- tions of poverty and distress in the Polisario-run camps.

The state promotes messages of unquestioned Moroccan control. For example, outside Moroc- can borders, popular mapping software “Google Maps” depicts a map of Morocco with a dotted border separating the internationally recognized borders of Morocco with those of the contested territory. Within Morocco, the dotted border dis- appears: a testament to the state’s internal sen- sitivity to and control of the Moroccan public’s perceptions of the issue.

Centrality to the Monarchy

Western Sahara’s Marocanité is as a central pillar of Moroccan national identity and the monarchy’s legitimacy.

In the 1970s, amidst civil and political upheav- al, the Western Sahara issue began to play “a cen- tral role in the survival and legitimization of the Moroccan monarch.” 29 In the years leading up to and following the Green March, King Hassan successfully leveraged the issue to unify political factions within the country behind the monar- chy’s authority.

Subsequent decades codified the territory’s po- litical significance. Current King Mohammed VI, as the son of the King who initiated the Green March and country’s “almost unques- tioned leader in… the Western Sahara issue,” has continued this tradition.

Interviews underscored the territory’s political importance to the King. Several interviewees separately emphasized that the issue serves as one of the few issues within Morocco that enjoys near-complete unanimity of political and public opinion.

This unanimity, however, means that the issue is crucial to the monarchy’s endurance: scholars have suggested that “legitimacy” of the Moroc- can monarchy “relies to a large extent on… guar- anteeing a favorable outcome for Morocco of the Western Sahara conflict.” 30

The monarchy’s hardline on the conflict reflects the issue’s importance. In his November 2019 speech on the anniversary of the Green March, for example, King Mohammed described the territory in the following terms:

“Morocco has always been clear in its position concerning the Moroccanness of the Sahara as much as in its firm belief in the justness of its cause and the legitimacy of its rights … The Au- tonomy Initiative provides for that solution, giv- en that it is not only serious and credible, but also rooted in sound principles. …

It is the only way forward towards a settlement guaranteeing full respect for the kingdom’s na- tional unity and territorial integrity. … Ours is a collective responsibility to safeguard our nation- al unity and territorial integrity, and to promote comprehensive development throughout Moroc- co.” 31

These themes—unity, security, and stability— constitute core premises of the Moroccan state and its unification under the monarchy.

The Kingdom considers international efforts to resolve the Western Sahara conflict via in- dependence referendum as a threat to each of these pillars: it would undermine the Kingdom’s “unity” by splitting off a large territory; disrupt its stability with resultant political unrest; and pose a threat to its security through this unrest and creation of a potentially unstable Sahrawi state to the south. As a result, such efforts are perceived as a direct threat to the monarchy’s le- gitimacy.

Moroccan Investment

The Moroccan government seems willing to indefinitely subsidize settlement and local activities in the Western Sahara.

Since the 1991 ceasefire, the Moroccan govern- ment has spent billions of dollars in investment and military spending into Western Sahara. This funding suggests the Moroccan monarchy con- siders the area a political investment.

Such investment could be intended to achieve several interrelated goals for the Moroccan state:

• To improve living conditions for the territo- ry’s inhabitants;

• To attract additional settlers from Morocco and incentivize Polisario defection;

• To further cement Moroccan control of the region and bolster the monarchy’s continued claims of control; and

• To demonstrate to the international com- munity that Moroccan administration of the territory is benevolent and worthy of interna- tional recognition.

Moroccan-controlled portions of the territory reflect this sustained and direct state attention. Such areas have “some of the highest per-capi- ta rates of housing, electrification, and roads in Morocco.” 32

Interviews suggested that those living in the territory generally pay no taxes and receive gov- ernment-subsidized wages, housing and goods. Moroccan officials touted a proposed “New Model for the Southern Provinces,” which in- cluded almost 700 projects worth an estimated 7 billion euros. Such projects entail additional infrastructure investments, including construc- tion of roads, housing, universities, and massive expansions of ports in Laayoune and Dakhla.

Morocco also controls the bulk of the territory’s natural resources: phosphate deposits, abun- dant natural fisheries, and potential offshore oil reserves. Revenue from exploitation of such resources help offset the costs of state invest- ment, but scholarly research has suggested that the state’s “stated civil expenditures” exceed the “gross market value of the territory’s principal resources.” 33

Moroccan officials assert that these investments are driven purely by wholehearted government desire to improve living conditions for people living in the territory, including Moroccan Sah- rawis. This may indeed be the case, but such efforts also appeared to portray Morocco as “making good” on its control of the territory. The activities of Morocco’s Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP Group) exemplify this state focus. OCP Group, through its fully owned sub- sidiary Phosphates de Boucraa SA (Phosboucraa), carries out active phosphate mining efforts at Western Sahara’s major mine. Interviews with OCP officials suggested that the company makes disproportionate investments in the Western Sa- hara, driven by a model which prioritizes duties to so-called “stakeholders” rather than tradition- al fiduciary duties to shareholders.

Company representatives emphasized that OCP’s approach is “not about the money,” and was instead focused on a range of local activities, including youth initiatives and scholarships.

goals of the Moroccan state: to improve living conditions for the territory’s inhabitants; incentivize Polisario defectors; and demonstrate the state’s benevolence to outsiders.

Moroccan Perceptions of the Polisario

The deep trust deficit between Morocco and the Polisario impedes possibilities of resolution.

The UN’s latest renewal of MINURSO’s mandate calls upon Morocco, the Polisario, Algeria, and Mauritania to “cooperate more fully with each other, including through building additional trust… to achieve progress towards a political solution.” 34

Deep distrust between the parties complicates attempts to build such cooperation and manifests in perpetual Moroccan skepticism of international, Algerian, and Polisario motives and actions relative to the conflict.

In stark contrast to Polisario narratives, the Moroccan state and interviewees repeatedly and consistently denied existence of a “Sahrawi people.” Instead of a distinct nationality, Moroccans characterized Sahrawi as an identity—one element of the many different tribes present in Morocco, the Western Sahara, and other countries throughout North Africa. In such a conception, being a Sahrawi is a subset of being a Moroccan; just as, in other areas, one could be Sahrawi-Mauritanian, or Sahrawi-Algerian.

Within this Moroccan narrative, Sahrawis are not considered “others” but as parts of the Moroccan whole—“Moroccans from the Southern Provinces.” This logic denies the possibility that the Polisario could reflect genuine desire of a Sahrawi people for independence.

Instead, scholarly accounts and interviews suggest that most Moroccans consider Algeria, not the Polisario, as the actual opposing party to the conflict. In this “Moroccan official discourse” adopted by the Kingdom’s leadership and promulgated through the state’s media channels, the Polisario “is a mercenary group financed by Algeria.” 35

Within Morocco, interviewees repeatedly emphasized their belief that the Algerian government deliberately caused the conflict and is manipulating Sahrawis in Tindouf toward an actual, malicious goal of destabilizing Morocco. Interviewees asserted that the Polisario are Algerian puppets, sponsored and propped up by the Algerian state in order to constrain Moroccan political and economic development. 36

Such widely promulgated Moroccan narratives appear intended to achieve two Moroccan political goals:

1. To invalidate Polisario claims to be the true representatives of the Sahrawi people.

By attributing actual responsibility for the war and ceasefire to Algeria, the Moroccan narrative delegitimizes the Polisario, and characterizes the overall conflict as a question not of self-determination but as a malicious Algerian attempt to destabilize Morocco.

Is the fall of the Moroccan Monarchy a Legitimate Threat?

A broad range of histories and analyses of the Western Sahara conflict speculate that loss of control of Western Sahara could have significant consequences for the Moroccan monarchy – potentially undermining its legitimacy and sparking civil unrest.

Does this represent a real concern for U.S. policy, or an overstated worry?

This question is by nature speculative so it cannot be answered conclusively. Some workshop interviewees posited that territorial independence would indeed undermine the monarchy. Others speculated that, while independence would threaten the monarchy, the Moroccan state could manage impacts through public messaging.

While in Morocco, the workshop team repeatedly queried interviewees on whether the monarchy’s legitimacy indeed depended on retaining control of Western Sahara. Responses from Moroccan sources universally indicated apparently sincere concern for the monarchy’s stability if the territory were to gain independence. Some cited possibility of mass civil unrest; others flatly asserted fear that “the King may lose his throne” if he were to lose the territory. Responses from Moroccan sources must of course be taken with a grain of salt; such individuals likely have incentive to portray the issue as non-negotiable.

Ultimately, absent strong interests or evidence of deception, the report contends that the U.S. should extend benefit of the doubt to Moroccan claims that the Western Sahara issue poses an existential threat to the monarchy. While U.S. policy sometimes should diverge from the preferences of allies, those divergences must be justified with tangible interests that outweigh damage caused to the alliance. In this case, U.S. interests in changing the status quo do not outweigh an ally’s claim of an existential threat. Subsequent sections discuss these interests further.

The alternative proposal for conflict resolution expressed in this paper challenges this acceptance of Morocco’s claims to existentialism. While the monarchy has positioned the Western Sahara conflict as a matter of identity and existence, our field research could not accurately glean how the Moroccan public perceives the issue. If the monarchy reversed its position on the issue, it is also possible that it could affect public opinion in the same direction. 2. To cast Sahrawis as “victims” of Algeria, leaving open the possibility of a “return home.” In such narratives, most in the Polisario did not “choose” to leave Western Sahara but were forced to do so by Algeria.

By placing responsibility on Algeria, the Moroccan narrative is intended to allow Sahrawis in camps to return “home” to Morocco without broaching the difficult subject of the Polisario’s often-stated denunciations of the Moroccan state and monarchy.

Interviews and research suggest that such viewpoints are widely held in Morocco. This paradigm leads Moroccans to automatically construe Polisario or international actions relative to the conflict in bad faith.

Hardened Perceptions Counteract Change

Entrenched, mutual distrust between the Polisario and Morocco make peaceful resolution by the parties alone unlikely under current circumstances.

The conflict between Morocco and the Polisario today reflects two fundamentally different worldviews: one in which Morocco maliciously occupies the territory in order to prevent the self-determination of its rightful occupants, and one in which Algeria manipulates Sahrawis into acting against their own interests and preventing reconciliation with Morocco.

Individuals in Morocco and the Tindouf camps repeat their respective versions with deep belief and earnest fervor.

Absent a significant change in the circumstances of the conflict, such entrenched narratives make it unlikely that Moroccan or Polisario officials will compromise from their hardline positions. Potential domestic consequences for such compromises—whether a threat to the Moroccan monarchy’s legitimacy or backlash from a Polisario official “giving up” on the movement’s independence dream—are too severe.