SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS: Mitigation and Confidence Building

the PESG. This will allow the PESG to play a neutral mediator role, changing the dynamic of negotiations and starting to build trust among the parties in the process. While the U.S. Department of State will take the principal role in this policy, it will require support from across the U.S. Government. As such, the Administration should proactively engage with the legislative branch so that the Congress can consult and advise on this policy, and the measures to implement it. 1. Re-initiate the UN process by appointing a “neutral nationality” Personal Envoy of the Secretary General (PESG). The Government of Morocco and the Polisario have both placed restrictions on the nationality of a future PESG. The Government of Morocco has informally refused to accept any U.S. or Northern European (UK, Scandinavian, or German) national as the next PESG. For their part, the Polisario has refused to accept any French, Italian, Spanish, or Middle Eastern nationals, as well as any Muslims, as the next PESG. Moroccan and Polisario interviewees described these restrictions as a necessary precaution to ensure the neutrality of the PESG. In their views, a PESG with those national, geographic, or cultural backgrounds would be susceptible to influence and overly sympathetic to the other side. While these demands are onerous (and unfounded), we recommend that the United States urge the UN Secretary General to respect them in the PESG appointment. Appointing a PESG with a “neutral nationality” will help reinforce the perceived neutrality of the UN process for both parties and publics. Additionally, appointing a PESG with one of the blacklisted nationalities will automatically undermine legitimacy of the UN process for one party. 2. Encourage the PESG to start with good-faith measures. The United States should encourage the new The following recommendations serve a dual purpose: preventing a deterioration of the status quo, and shifting the leadership and popular dynamics around the conflict, to create an environment conducive to an eventual resolution of the conflict. Previous sections have discussed how, at present, we assess that neither Moroccan nor Polisario leaders trust the counterparty to negotiate in good faith. Additionally, we assess that Polisario leaders and the Sahrawi population residing outside of Moroccan-controlled territory greatly mistrust the Government of Morocco. Based on this mistrust, they do not view any resolution short of full independence from Morocco as guaranteeing their rights. To allow for an eventual resolution, trust must be built to the point where the Polisario and Sahrawi population can believe that the Government of Morocco will respect their rights. We base this argument on an assumption that Morocco will not accept any resolution that allows for an independent Western Sahara state. Interviews with representatives from the Polisario and Government of Morocco revealed that both view the United States as an “honest broker” in the dispute. To them, the United States has tried to adhere to a fair resolution process through the UN, even as other parties have sought to disrupt it or gain unfair advantage. In addition to its fairness, both parties view the United States as a powerbroker within the UN process – both through its status as a UNSC permanent member and “penholder” on the MINURSO mandate. As both an honest broker and a powerbroker in the conflict, the United States can play a unique role in supporting the UN process. Unlike other parties, it can recommend proposals and be assured that both the Polisario and Morocco will and must seriously consider them. We recommend the United States leverage this unique role to reinforce the UN political process. By proposing measures, the United States will prevent accusations of bias by either party against

UN PESG to begin their term by focusing on good-faith measures. Previous PESGs have started their tenures by seeking to restart negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. However, given the current trust deficit between the two leaderships (and their populations), restarting negotiations would not be productive. An administrative building in the Raabouni refugee camp, outside of Tindouf, Algeria. Source: Toshiro Baum

Some policymakers previously engaged in the conflict questioned the role of good-faith measures, stating that they became a distraction to the main goal of conflict resolution, a “new topic to bicker over.” However, because of the intractable nature of the conflict and the total lack of trust between the two parties, we believe goodfaith measures are one of the only practical measures available to begin to repair relations between the parties.

The United States can play the role of proposing these measures, especially the most controversial. This will allow the PESG to mediate a negotiation between the parties on their implementation. Acting as a mediator on a U.S. proposal (rather than proposing it themself) will preserve the PESG’s neutrality.

Instead, the newly appointed PESG should focus on stabilizing the current status quo through good-faith measures. Over time, successful goodfaith measures will also change trust perceptions and build foundations for future negotiations.

Good-faith measures should focus on providing a tangible benefit to addressing the conflict’s effects on the population. Doing so will help mitigate potential conflict, as a return to hostilities or violence would jeopardize the good-faith measures’ continuation. Additionally, good-faith measures with a tangible benefit for the population will help address mistrust of the counterparty. Addressing mistrust among the Sahrawi population living in the Tindouf refugee camps will be especially important to future negotiations, and this population’s relatively small size means that even limited measures can have a large per capita impact.

Suggested good-faith measures include:

a. A resumption of the family visit program

MINURSO previously supported a family visit program that brought Tindouf camp residents to Laayoune to meet with family members living in the Moroccan-controlled territory. In unison with the family visit programs should be the revival of the UNHCR-managed cultural seminars that brought Sahrawis from both sides of the berm to conduct exchanges on various aspects of Sahrawi culture.

b. A UN human rights monitoring mechanism separate from MINURSO

While the parties differ on the exact nature of the mechanism, both agree on conducting human rights monitoring under UN auspices.

Polisario representatives and Tindouf camp residents repeatedly expressed a desire for a human rights monitoring mechanism during interviews.

Most expressed a desire to expand MINURSO’s mandate to include human rights monitoring, and noted that MINURSO is one of the only UN peacekeeping missions that does not have human rights monitoring included in its man- date.

The Government of Morocco has repeatedly expressed opposition to including human rights monitoring in MINURSO’s mandate. However, during interviews, Government of Morocco rep- resentatives noted that human rights in Morocco are already monitored under other UN agencies, like the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and treaty bodies.

We recommend that the United States propose a UN monitoring mission under the Human Rights Commission, and have the PESG mediate a negotiation between the parties on its mandate and implementation. The mission should mon- itor the human rights situation in the Tindouf camps, in Polisario-controlled territory east of the berm, and in Moroccan-controlled territory west of the berm.

Having an additional independent human rights monitoring mechanism will help rein- force popular trust in the UN process, while also addressing Sahrawi popular mistrust in Moroc- can authorities and vice versa. Additionally, an independent monitor will help mitigate poten- tial violence that could be driven by anger over perceived human rights abuses.

c. A multi-party effort to document the fate of victims of the conflict.

All of the parties to the conflict accuse the oth- er sides of human rights abuses and war crimes against civilians and military personnel, a significant number of which have been substantiated by independent monitors. These include forced disappearances, torture or illegal punishment of detainees, illegal executions, and forced dis- placement. These abuses, along with others that have not been substantiated by independent monitors, have become central to popular and leadership narratives about the conflict, who cite them as a reason to mistrust the counterparty. While not all of the accusations have been cor- roborated by international monitors, there exist a significant number of confirmed violations by all parties to the conflict.

As an initial step to begin addressing the mis- trust between the two sides’ leaders and popu- lations, we recommend forming a commission with Moroccan, Polisario, and Spanish represen- tatives that seeks to determine the fates of con- flict victims. The effort must also include rep- resentatives from the UN and INGOs or other nationalities to serve as experts or reinforce the commission’s impartiality.

Including Spanish representatives and extend- ing the scope of the commission to include con- flict victims from the colonial independence struggle will help insulate the commission from the current impasse, and reinforce the common ground for truth and reconciliation.

Importantly, the governments represented by the commission should agree to some form of amnesty for those involved in abuses. This un- derstanding will help reinforce candor in the process, and allow honest documentation with- out fear of legal or other consequences that could polarize the proceedings. If the governments are not willing to accept full amnesty, they could agree to limited amnesty, which would allow citizens to file suit for damages with their own governments.

The United States could also convene interna- tional donors to create a compensation fund for the victims of the conflict. In addition to pro- viding a financial incentive for participation, the fund would help reinforce the conciliatory pow- er of the multi-party commission, by providing symbolic compensation for families’ losses.

4. Assess and address humanitarian conditions in the Tindouf refugee camps

Interlocutors from the SADR government, hu- manitarian donors, humanitarian organizations, and the diplomatic community shared that liv- ing conditions have deteriorated in the Tindouf

refugee camps. In their assessment, decreased funding for refugee services and food assistance have impacted vulnerable populations, particu- larly infants and children under five and preg- nant and nursing mothers. If left unaddressed, this trend could result in a wider humanitarian crisis.

The report researchers did not have the means to independently assess humanitarian condi- tions in the Tindouf refugee camps, but sever- al international human rights watchdogs have documented the urgency. The reported urgency of a potential humanitarian crisis justifies U.S. Government preventative action.

As a first step, the United States should push for an accurate count of refugees starting with an examination of the 2018 UNHCR report’s methodology. Next, a formal review of human- itarian assistance distribution should be con- ducted by UNHCR and WFP with some sup- port from the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) as needed. Lastly, the United States should en- courage contributions from potential donors for support of the Sahrawi refugee camps.

5. Issue clear public and private statements to prevent the resumption of hostilities

Polisario and Tindouf camp residents suggested in multiple interviews that pressure to return to hostilities with Morocco has grown. In addition, long-time observers of the Western Sahara, in- cluding former PESG Ambassador Chris Ross, reported that this pressure appears higher than in years past. In particular, interlocutors ex- pressed concern that this pressure could lead the Polisario to shift its policy and potentially declare a return to hostilities when the five-year Polisario general congress convenes on Decem- ber 20, 2019.

We recommend that the U.S. Government issue public statements calling on both parties to ad- here to the ceasefire. These statements should be coupled with an assurance that the Unit- ed States will support the right of Morocco to self-defense, to reinforce to Polisario leaders and Tindouf camp residents that resuming conflict will not serve their interest. Statements can be issued publicly by the U.S. Mission to the UN and in private to Moroccan and Polisario repre- sentatives by the U.S. Embassies in Rabat and Algiers. Swift action by the U.S. Government can help prevent a potential resumption of hos- tilities, and ensure that the ceasefire, a key com- ponent for gradual progress toward a resolution, remains in place.

6. Increase regular contact with Polisario representatives in Algiers, New York, and Washington.

U.S. Embassy Algiers staff acknowledged that they have limited means to assess popular opin- ion in the Tindouf refugee camps. Similarly, means to understand the Polisario leadership’s thinking remains limited. Adequate and accu- rate information will be crucial to mitigating and preventing any potential deterioration of the status quo, including a return to hostilities. Similarly, gaining a better understanding of Polisario leadership policy shifts will be crucial to supporting a negotiation and conflict resolu- tion process.

We recommend regular contact between U.S. Government representatives, Polisario repre- sentatives and Tindouf camp residents. This in- cludes ramping up regular working-level contact with SADR representatives in New York and Washington, and exploring information sharing with U.S. Government Department of Defense or law enforcement personnel on security issues such as trafficking.

The Government of Morocco may raise some objection to wider contact with the Polisario. The U.S. Government (particularly the U.S. Ambassador to Morocco) should be prepared to confirm to the Government of Morocco that these contacts do not constitute recognition of the SADR, and that U.S. diplomats meet regu- larly with a variety of groups.

Building sustained and wider contact with the Polisario will not only provide the U.S. Govern- ment with information, but also relationships it can leverage. Such leverage may be crucial to the success of eventual negotiations on a resolution, or during contingencies that may require Polis- ario restraint or action to avert a deteriorating situation.

7. Encourage the Government of Morocco to clearly and publicly protect free speech and other fundamental human rights in the territory,.

Achieving a resolution to the conflict will de- pend on popular trust of the Government of Morocco’s respect for legal and human rights, and, by extension, respect for any agreement negotiated between the parties. Without it, the Polisario leadership and Sahrawi population will not accept any resolution short of full indepen- dence, as they will not be able to trust Morocco’s commitments under any plan that involves Mo- roccan sovereignty over the territory.

In the current connected age and polarized at- mosphere, even isolated incidents or unsanc- tioned abuses by Moroccan security forces can reinforce the perception of Moroccan authori- ties as untrustworthy. The Tindouf camp pop- ulation’s recent connection to the internet has only further fueled this perception through increased sharing of stories, videos, and live streams of demonstrations over social media.

To address this popular mistrust, U.S. Govern- ment representatives should encourage their Moroccan counterparts to proactively foreswear political repression, human rights abuses, and use of excessive force by security forces in the Saharan territory under their control. Senior U.S. Government representatives (particularly the U.S. Ambassador to Morocco and Assistant Secretary for NEA) should deliver this message in private to the Moroccan Minister of Interior and the Royal Palace.

Applying this sort of pressure without damag- ing the bilateral relationship requires that the pressure be contextualized as collaborative. The United States should suggest that, as a treaty ally, it is committed to helping Morocco achieve its own ends. Addressing the Polisario and Sahra- wi mistrust of the Government of Morocco will boost the credibility of any legal commitments Morocco proposes in negotiations, and augment the chances that the other side will accept a Mo- roccan proposal. This will help provide Morocco with credibility that it will uphold fundamental rights and respect any agreement between the parties.

In addition, the United States could suggest that the Government of Morocco augment the reach and impact of its commitment by considering additional third-party monitoring. U.S. repre- sentatives can offer assistance in public diplo- macy and social media outreach efforts, or other initiatives aimed at addressing perceptions of untrustworthiness.

While Moroccan interlocutors will likely claim that Morocco has always and continues to en- force their laws in accordance with legal stan- dards for protecting human rights, U.S. rep- resentatives should stress the importance of perception rather than legal technicalities. As further evidence, U.S. representatives can point to specific ongoing issues (such as the trials fol- lowing the Gdeim Izik camp protests) as exam- ples of ways Moroccan actions continue to fuel the trust gap.

In private, U.S. representatives can encourage their counterparts to consider accepting politi- cal behavior (such as organizing protests or ques- tioning the territory’s status) that might seem threatening—and might well cross the line else- where in Morocco. U.S. representatives should encourage their interlocutors to see public demonstrations, peaceful unrest, and political speech not as threatening, but as opportunities to publicly demonstrate that the Government of Morocco can be trusted to respect the rule of law and human rights. Given the Tindouf camps’ re- cent connection to internet access in the camps, this key population will witness and respond to a Moroccan change in behavior.