SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS:
Mitigation and Confidence Building The following recommendations serve a dual purpose: preventing a deterioration of the status quo, and shifting the leadership and popular dynamics around the conflict, to create an environment conducive to an eventual resolution of the conflict. Previous sections have discussed how, at present, we assess that neither Moroccan nor Polisario leaders trust the counterparty to negotiate in good faith. Additionally, we assess that Polisario leaders and the Sahrawi population residing outside of Moroccan-controlled territory greatly mistrust the Government of Morocco. Based on this mistrust, they do not view any resolution short of full independence from Morocco as guaranteeing their rights. To allow for an eventual resolution, trust must be built to the point where the Polisario and Sahrawi population can believe that the Government of Morocco will respect their rights. We base this argument on an assumption that Morocco will not accept any resolution that allows for an independent Western Sahara state. Interviews with representatives from the Polisario and Government of Morocco revealed that both view the United States as an “honest broker” in the dispute. To them, the United States has tried to adhere to a fair resolution process through the UN, even as other parties have sought to disrupt it or gain unfair advantage. In addition to its fairness, both parties view the United States as a powerbroker within the UN process – both through its status as a UNSC permanent member and “penholder” on the MINURSO mandate. As both an honest broker and a powerbroker in the conflict, the United States can play a unique role in supporting the UN process. Unlike other parties, it can recommend proposals and be assured that both the Polisario and Morocco will and must seriously consider them. We recommend the United States leverage this unique role to reinforce the UN political process. By proposing measures, the United States will prevent accusations of bias by either party against
the PESG. This will allow the PESG to play a neutral mediator role, changing the dynamic of negotiations and starting to build trust among the parties in the process. While the U.S. Department of State will take the principal role in this policy, it will require support from across the U.S. Government. As such, the Administration should proactively engage with the legislative branch so that the Congress can consult and advise on this policy, and the measures to implement it.
1. Re-initiate the UN process by appointing a “neutral nationality” Personal Envoy of the Secretary General (PESG). The Government of Morocco and the Polisario have both placed restrictions on the nationality of a future PESG. The Government of Morocco has informally refused to accept any U.S. or Northern European (UK, Scandinavian, or German) national as the next PESG. For their part, the Polisario has refused to accept any French, Italian, Spanish, or Middle Eastern nationals, as well as any Muslims, as the next PESG. Moroccan and Polisario interviewees described these restrictions as a necessary precaution to ensure the neutrality of the PESG. In their views, a PESG with those national, geographic, or cultural backgrounds would be susceptible to influence and overly sympathetic to the other side. While these demands are onerous (and unfounded), we recommend that the United States urge the UN Secretary General to respect them in the PESG appointment. Appointing a PESG with a “neutral nationality” will help reinforce the perceived neutrality of the UN process for both parties and publics. Additionally, appointing a PESG with one of the blacklisted nationalities will automatically undermine legitimacy of the UN process for one party.
2. Encourage the PESG to start with good-faith measures. The United States should encourage the new
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