A FROZEN CONFLICT

6 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations A FROZEN CONFLICT

For almost fifty years, the Kingdom of Morocco (Morocco) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have contested control of the roughly 266,000 square kilometer territory of Western Sahara. The respective parties of the conflict justifiably argue that it must be considered in the context of its deep historical and cultural roots, which stretch back centuries. While a full history is beyond this report’s scope, the territory’s phase of colonization serves as the starting point of this analysis.

Colonial and Pre-War Period

The Berlin conference of 1884-1885 granted Spain control of two Northwest African regions, Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro, that togeth- er comprised the “Spanish Sahara” 3 and roughly included the territory today known as Western Sahara. After the Second World War, Spain con- solidated these holdings into the “independent entity of Spanish West Africa.” 4

This inaugurated a phase of tension between the region’s colonizing powers of France and Spain and local populations, punctuated by—among other events—Moroccan independence in 1957; the Ifni War of 1957-58; the “Sand War” between Morocco and Algeria in 1963; and eventually, es- calating tensions aimed at forcing Spanish with- drawal.

In 1974, in response to significant pressure from groups in and around the Spanish Sahara (in- cluding Morocco and the Polisario) and inter- national actors, Spain announced that it would relinquish control of the territory and issued a report “in favor of Sahrawi self-determination.” 5

Absent a comprehensive plan to facilitate such self-determination, however, the situation de- teriorated. Shortly after Spain’s announcement, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that, while there were legal ties between the ter- ritory and both Morocco and Mauritania, these ties were “insufficient to justify decolonization of the territory by any means other than a popu- lar referendum.” 6

Green March and Open Warfare

Both the Polisario and Moroccans heralded the ICJ ruling as vindication of their claims to the territory. Moroccan King Hassan II, how- ever, seized on the moment to call for a “Green March,” where 350,000 Moroccans traversed the Kingdom’s southern border in an attempt to claim the territory for Morocco.

The Green March constituted “one of the most controversial and divisive events in the region’s history,” becoming key to subsequent Moroccan efforts to cement and justify their control of the territory. 7 Conversely, the March galvanized the Polisario, spurring its “own efforts to recruit guerilla combatants to fight against the occupa- tion.” 8

Shortly after the Green March began, represen- tatives from Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain agreed to the Madrid Accords, which divided the territory between Morocco and Mauritania. 9 In Western Sahara, open hostilities erupted as Morocco, Mauritania, and the Polisario each at- tempted to gain control over the territory. Mau- ritania abandoned the fight and Morocco occu- pied the southern area awarded to Mauritania.

The open warfare period lasted sixteen years, until UN intervention in 1991. The active con- flict took place in a cold war paradigm, with Morocco “unequivocally anchored in the West- ern camp” and Algeria “perceived as an ally of the former Soviet Union.” 10 In this context, the United States provided Morocco with support including “large-scale economic and military aid, military advisors and logistical assistance.” 11

The warfare period resulted in significant dis- placement of civilians, particularly Sahrawis, “a reported majority” of whom fled to refugee camps in Algeria and Mauritania after Moroc- co dropped napalm and phosphate bombs on the original camps. 12 Both sides were reported to have used arbitrary detention, torture, and

other methods in violation of international human rights standards, and both sides took considerable numbers of prisoners of war. While the Polisario released the last of these prisoners in 2005, it is unclear if Morocco still holds prisoners of war from this period. Both sides also accuse each other of deliberate targeting of civilians during and after the warfare period, but this has not been conclusively documented by monitoring organizations.

Morocco eventually adopted a defensive strategy premised on construction of a 900-mile long sand wall separating areas under Moroccan and Polisario control. By 1991, this “berm” facilitated Moroccan control of roughly 80 percent of the territory, including its major population centers, natural resources, and coastline. The Polisario retained control of the remaining 20 percent of the territory, primarily desert.

Ceasefire and Settlement Plan

In 1988, after thirteen years of open warfare, UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and Special Envoy for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) proposed to Morocco and the Polisario elements of what became known as the “Settlement Plan.” This plan led to a ceasefire in 1991, which was intended to lead to a definitive resolution within 24 weeks of implementation.

As set forth in UN Resolution 690, the plan established the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). MINURSO’s primary responsibility was to organize and supervise a “referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco.” 13 To do so, the UN’s original plan called for two separate phases:

1. UN peacekeepers would monitor the ceasefire while a commission determined which Sahrawis would be eligible to vote in the referendum; and

2. Those qualified to vote would be authorized to return to Western Sahara under MINURSO’s supervision. This initial “settlement” plan was intended to be implemented under the authority of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which requires the cooperation of the parties to the dispute in order to resolve it.

Reliance on Chapter VI reflected potential optimism that the parties themselves might resolve the conflict but may also have indicated division on the UNSC.

This division stems from geopolitics, which remain key to the stalemate’s endurance. Throughout the conflict, Morocco has “benefited from the support of three powerful members of the UNSC: France, the United States and Great Britain.” 14 In particular, France serves as Morocco’s foremost international backer, holds a permanent UNSC seat and therefore can veto any proposal it perceives as harmful to its Moroccan interests.

Without UNSC pressure, full cooperation between MINURSO, Morocco, the Polisario, and other actors never materialized. A range of factors, including mutual distrust between Morocco and the Polisario and skepticism of the “integrity and transparency” of MINURSO’s process, indefinitely entangled implementation of the Settlement Plan.

After years of arbitration of both sides’ appeals and grievances with the pre-referendum process, the UNSC suspended the referendum process, while stating that the international community’s overarching goal remained to facilitate “a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution to the question of Western Sahara.” The list of eligible voters, as determined by the UN Identification Commission, sent the voter rolls to Geneva for safekeeping in March 2004. 15

The Central Question of Independence

Such a “realistic, practicable and enduring political solution” to the conflict has yet to be found The report contends that the conflict remains stalemated for two primary reasons:

1. The parties’ irreconcilable positions on the central question of independence and resulting domestic political constraints; and

2. The inability or unwillingness of UNSC members (including the United States) to

compel the parties to compromise from their hardline positions on the topic.

The Polisario rejects any proposal that does not include a referendum on independence; Morocco now rejects any proposal that broaches such an option.

This key question has remained unanswered despite efforts of four UN Personal Envoys of the Secretary General (PESG). Most notably, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s seven-year tenure as PESG culminated in two proposals that epitomize the independence/autonomy split.

Subsequent sections examine the failure of negotiation efforts to resolve this “central question.”

Baker I: Autonomy and a Referendum

Baker’s first proposal, offered in June 2001, called for a period of territorial autonomy, in which eligible Sahrawi voters (including both the Polisario and Moroccan settlers in the territory) would elect a local government responsible for most aspects of the territory’s internal governance, while Morocco would retain overall control and responsibility for its foreign relations.

After a period of transition, a referendum would take place in which an electorate of Sahrawis comprising both those remaining in Western Sahara and the Polisario would select between continuation of this autonomy or independence. Morocco “indicated it would accept” this proposal, but “Algeria and the Polisario were critical, in part because it did not spell out the options for the final status of the Western Sahara.” 16

Deadlocked, the UNSC asked Baker to try again.

Baker II: Independence, Autonomy, or Integration

Subsequently, in May 2003, Baker proposed a UN-organized referendum in which the broader electorate of Sahrawis (including Moroccan settlers in the territory) would “choose between integration with Morocco, autonomy, or independence.” 17

Under Algerian pressure, the Polisario accepted this proposal. But despite French lobbying, Mo- rocco ultimately rejected the second Baker plan. Failing to obtain Security Council support, Bak- er resigned.

Shortly thereafter, Morocco declared that it would accept only an autonomy solution, and that the Kingdom categorically would not “en- gage in negotiations with anyone over its sover- eignty and territorial integrity.” 18

The 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Proposal

Subsequent negotiations have done little to al- ter the parties’ positions. In 2007, after years of pressure from the United States, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Morocco proposed an updated framework for autonomy, the “Mo- roccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Status for the Sahara.”

Like the initial Baker proposal, the Moroccan plan proposed establishment of a “Sahara Au- tonomous Region,” in which the territory’s in- habitants would have primary responsibility for self-governance under broad Moroccan sover- eignty. The plan stated the provisions for auton- omy “shall be submitted to the populations con- cerned for a referendum” to ratify them. 19

U.S. response to the Moroccan plan was laudato- ry: U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns described the Moroccan plan as “a serious and credible proposal.” 20 Years later, in 2011, Secre- tary of State Hillary Clinton referred to the Mo- roccan autonomy plan as “serious, realistic, and credible – a potential approach to satisfy the as- pirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity.” 21

Independence, however, remained the key dis- tinction between Baker’s initial proposal and the Moroccan plan.

While Baker’s referendum proposal included independence as an option, the Moroccan plan gave Sahrawis the option of either territorial au- tonomy or direct integration into the Moroccan state; in either case, Moroccan sovereignty was non-negotiable. Immediately before the Moroccans public- ly released their second proposal, the Polisario submitted its own. This proposal reiterated the group’s long-held position that an independence referendum was the only acceptable means to resolve the conflict.

The Polisario offered what it characterized as “a mutually acceptable” solution by claiming that if Sahrawis voted for independence, the resulting government would offer citizenship to everyone currently living in the territory, and seek security and economic cooperation with the Moroccans.

UN PESG Peter van Walsum convened the par- ties four times in 2007 and 2008 to discuss the proposals, but positions remained hardened: the Moroccans would not consider a plan that in- cluded an independence referendum, while the Polisario would not consider one without the in- dependence option.

Stalemate

The question of independence remains the cen- tral point blocking resolution.

Today, despite decades of negotiation and sub- sequent efforts of two more UN PESGs (former U.S. Ambassador Christopher Ross and former President of Germany Horst Köhler), the con- flict remains essentially unchanged.

Decades of de facto control of the bulk of the ter- ritory, as well as U.S. and French statements de- scribing the autonomy proposal as “serious and credible,” have calcified Moroccan resolve that their “territorial sovereignty” is non-negotiable. The Polisario position remains similarly static: an independence referendum, or nothing.

These positions, along with French ability to veto any UNSC proposal Morocco deemed prej- udicial, have led to frustration on the part of UN PESGs: on his resignation in 2004, James Baker wrote that the “UN will never solve the Western Sahara without requiring that one, or the other, or both of the parties do something they do not wish to voluntarily agree to do.” 22