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RISKS TO THE STATUS QUO
24 United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations
RISKS TO THE STATUS QUO
Previous sections examine how the status quo in Western Sahara has remained relatively unchanged since commencement of the 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire.
However, in the coming years, several contingencies may emerge that could significantly alter the conflict’s circumstances, potentially creating windows of opportunity where the U.S. and international community can work to spur resolution of the conflict.
This section reviews several potential contingencies. It categorizes them based on likelihood of occurrence and severity of their impact on the status quo, and then discusses likely implications.
Contingency I: Polisario Leadership Transition
Likelihood: Moderate Impact: High
The advanced age of senior Polisario figures suggests that a new generation may lead the group within decades. From 1976 to 2016, founding Polisario member Mohamed Abdelaziz served as leader of the Polisario and SADR president. After Abdelaziz’s death in 2016, the Polisario elected one of Abdelaziz’s contemporaries and fellow founder Brahim Ghali to lead the group.
As of the date of this report, President Ghali is roughly seventy years old. 52 While President Ghali and the generation of original Polisario leaders may remain in control for several years, demographics suggest that a new generation of the Polisario that did not take part in the conflict’s 1970s-phase will eventually take control of the group. There is also a remote possibility of an unexpected death of one or more leaders, either of natural or unnatural causes, that could lead to an accelerated timeline for transition outside of the normal election cycle.
Ascension of a new generation of Polisario leaders could open an opportunity for renewed negotiations and compromise.
Previous sections have discussed that mutual distrust of the parties makes resumption of the conflict under current circumstances and with current leadership unlikely.
Ascension of new Polisario leadership could facilitate new UN PESG efforts to resolve the conflict, potentially including additional discussion between the parties and review of resolution options that fall short of independence.
The viability of such renewed efforts would depend on (1) greater levels of mutual confidence between the sides, facilitated by conflict mitigation strategies in the years preceding a leadership transition and (2) international assurances for the welfare of the Sahrawi people.
Some sources suggest that a new generation of leadership may be more entrenched in the current position, and would likely be less willing to engage with the UN process. Any contingency planning must take this possibility into account.
Contingency II: Renewal of Polisario Hostilities
Likelihood: Low Impact: High
During interviews, Polisario officials and res- idents in the Tindouf refugee camps reported increasing popular pressure to return to hostil- ities with Moroccan armed forces. While many noted that the Polisario’s official position is to uphold the 1991 ceasefire, several interlocutors noted that frustration with the status quo and the stalled referendum process has led many Sahrawis – especially younger ones – to call for a return to hostilities. As SADR Foreign Minister Mohamed Salem Ould Salek explained, those calling for a return to hostilities note that the ceasefire agreement is conditioned on a referen- dum. Based on this perception, without the referendum, the ceasefire becomes null and void.
Polisario officials and Tindouf residents have spoken about a return to hostilities with Moroc- co in the past. However, longtime observers of the Western Sahara conflict noted that the pres- sure and the threat of hostilities seems to have reached a higher point than they had observed before. Both officials and Tindouf residents pointed to the upcoming Polisario general con- gress beginning December 20, 2019 as a venue to debate and decide on a potential return to hostilities as an official policy. In addition, while Polisario officials claimed that they maintain a high level of discipline over the SADR’s armed forces (the Sahrawi Popular Liberation Army or SPLA), increased frustration with slow progress on a referendum could lead personnel to launch an unsanctioned attack on Moroccan personnel, or otherwise provoke a confrontation. While MINURSO or other channels could help pre- vent an unsanctioned incident from escalating into further conflict, there is a low likelihood that it could lead to a resumption of hostilities between the SPLA and Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR). Similarly, while not likely to hap- pen, hostilities between the SPLA and FAR could inadvertently draw in Algerian security forces, who maintain a robust presence in the border region.
A return to hostilities – either sanctioned by the Polisario or as an escalation from an unsanc- tioned attack – would significantly change the status quo. Militarily, the FAR would likely de- feat the SPLA, and would use the resumption of hostilities to extend Moroccan control over the remainder of the territory. The FAR has greatly increased their military capabilities since 1991, while the SPLA would likely have to rely on the same equipment and low level of training that they had in 1991. By 1991, the berm’s effective- ness had ended the SPLA’s ability to launch guerrilla attacks in Moroccan-controlled terri- tory, and increased technological enhancements have likely decreased the SPLA’s ability to con- duct an effective guerrilla campaign.
A resumption of hostilities would threaten U.S. interests. While a military takeover by the FAR would present a de facto resolution to the con- flict by bringing the entire territory under Mo- roccan control, such a move would not confer international legitimacy or recognition of Mo- rocco’s sovereignty. Morocco would continue to face questions about the legality of its control over the territory, and could face diplomatic re- percussions or economic sanctions from states or organizations that recognize the SADR.
A return to hostilities would also undercut re- gional stability and the use of internationally sanctioned methods to resolve conflicts. While unlikely, setbacks or defeat by the FAR would undermine the stability of Morocco, and could potentially require the United States to com- mit additional military assistance to the FAR. While also similarly unlikely, hostilities between Morocco and Algeria could lead to a wider re- gional conflict, threatening both regimes’ sta- bility. A resumption of hostilities would also divert resources away from counterterrorism in the region. The collapse of the UN-monitored ceasefire and UN political process would also undermine belief in the ability of internation- ally recognized mechanisms to resolve conflicts.
Wreckage from the hostilities between Polisario and Morocco, outside the Museum of the Resistance outside Tindouf. Source: Mark Jahnke.
situation in the Tindouf refugee camps, as the SADR’s attention and resources turn to fighting with Morocco. While hostilities should not interrupt the distribution of food and other services to non-combatant Sahrawi refugees in Algeria, the SADR will likely have less personnel and capability to devote to providing services. Algeria and humanitarian organizations may also face increased scrutiny to ensure that aid does not reach combatants or SPLA personnel. Together, this would likely cause a further deterioration in living conditions in the Tindouf refugee camps and lead to a humanitarian crisis.
Contingency III: Polisario-Linked Terrorism in Morocco or Western Sahara
Likelihood: Low Impact: High While an armed group, the Polisario has historically always limited its employment of violence to guerilla or unconventional military actions, not terrorism. The Polisario has never engaged in and strictly denounces terrorism, including the 2003 terrorist bombings in Casablanca.
Moroccan attempts to link the Polisario to al-Qaeda and/or ISIS have not been materially substantiated. A very limited number of Sahrawis have left the camps to join al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)-related groups in Mali, and the Western hostages eventually transferred to jihadist group Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa were captured in the camps in 2011 while working as humanitarian staff. 53
However, the Polisario leadership spoke openly of the camp’s simmering tensions as a driver of youth radicalization, suggesting that a lack of progress may lead radicalized youth to resort to violence or even terrorism in the future over the Polisario leadership’s objections. While it may be true, the argument has the structure of blackmail – that the Polisario leadership will be “unable to control their people” unless conflict is resolved to their liking. Moreover, if taken at face value, it calls into question the Polisario claim that they are capable of functioning as a state, if they cannot prevent even the limited territory of the camps from being used as a base for terrorism.
A Sahrawi separatist terrorist element would be greatly destabilizing for the Polisario. The most likely terrorist is one operating independently of but ideologically aligned with the Polisario. Any such act of terrorism would throw the Polisario into a legitimacy crisis. If the leadership did not immediately denounce the terrorist attack, the Moroccan government could leverage the attack to pressure the international community to cut off the Polisario as a tacit acceptor – if not outright supporter – of terrorism. However, if the Polisario did immediately denounce the attack, they risk alienating their own youth and the loss of their monopoly on fighting for Sahrawi independence.
Assuming that no group claims responsibility or issues a public manifesto, the Moroccan government may be faced with a choice in ascribing responsibility. Historically, there is evidence that the Moroccan government may exercise discretion in ascribing responsibility for terrorism (e.g., the Moroccan government blamed AQIM for the 2011 Marrakesh bombing, despite the group denying involvement). 54
Faced with a Sahrawi separatist attack, the Moroccan government may ascribe responsibility— to the Polisario, to independent Sahrawi separatists, or even to uninvolved jihadist groups—to maximize its own political gain, either domestically or internationally. Given they have not historically attempted to frame the Polisario for terrorism, there is little reason to believe they consider that either a workable or advantageous strategy. However, it is unclear what exactly they would see as best serving their interests should such an attack occur.
Any evidence of a direct Polisario-linkage – while highly unlikely – would tie the hands of the U.S. Clear evidence of a direct Polisario link to a terrorist attack would lead to significant and legitimate pressure to declare the Polisario a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The knock-on effect of such a designation would be to not only legally prevent U.S. engagement with the Polisario, but also delegitimize any calls on the Moroccan government to engage in direct negotiations with the Polisario.
Moreover, a direct Polisario linkage would create a self-defense justification under international law—if tenuous—for the Moroccan military to complete the destruction of the Polisario military and government. The Polisario, however, is undoubtedly aware of the implications of this line of action—which their long-standing strict disavowal of terrorism demonstrates.
Likelihood: High Impact: Moderate
The Tindouf refugee camps are reliant on diminishing supplies of humanitarian aid; reports and interviews suggest basic human needs are not being met.
UNHCR and the World Food Program (WFP) administered a nutrition survey in April, finding that all malnutrition indicators increased, including “global acute malnutrition (from 4 per cent in 2016 to 7 per cent in 2019), stunting (from 18 per cent in 2016 to 28 per cent in 2019), anemia in children (from 38 to 50 per cent) and anemia in women (from 43 to 52 per cent).” 55 Additionally, UNHCR failed to meet its targets for 2018, and falls short of meeting international standards in “protection, shelter, water and sanitation, health, nutrition, education, energy, provision of non-food items and livelihoods.” 56 Field interviews with the Sahrawi Red Crescent
indicate that the funding gap could be closed with additional support in the $30-$60 million dollar range, a relatively small figure in the con- text of international humanitarian aid.
The refugee situation poses concern because the duration of the conflict has led to donor fatigue and increased Sahrawi calls for a return to vio- lence. If conditions in the camp continue to de- teriorate, it could exacerbate the risk of conflict by augmenting the sense of despair and hope- lessness among the Sahrawi youth. A general perception among people in the camps is that war could present the best way of increasing as- sistance because it would get the international community’s attention. Donors are perceived as more likely to donate to places experiencing vi- olent conflict.
The risk of violent conflict could require a U.S. policy response, given U.S. interests in regional stability.
Contingency V: Moroccan Leadership Transition
Likelihood: Low Impact: Low
Transition in Moroccan leadership would likely result in little change to Moroccan policies on the conflict.
Moroccan King Mohammed VI is fifty-six years old. The report will not speculate on King Mo- hammed’s health; regardless, if some event were to result in a transition of Moroccan leadership to his son, Prince Moulay Hassan, this likely would not result in significant or immediate change in Moroccan policy on the Western Sa- hara, and no change that would facilitate reso- lution.
A military coup in Morocco is highly unlike- ly and probably would not result in significant change in the state’s Western Sahara policy. A military regime would likely retain or take an even harder position on maintaining Moroccan control of the territory. As reviewed in previous sections, Moroccans in all walks of life consider Western Sahara and the Sahrawi people a historical part of the kingdom. A new regime is unlikely to escalate tensions with Algeria but would likely seek to assert its power by not ceding ground in any front.
Contingency VI: Natural Disasters Affecting Tindouf Camps
Likelihood: Moderate Impact: Moderate
A re-occurrence of a natural disaster similar to the 2015 floods around Tindouf could have implications on humanitarian conditions in the camps
In 2015, Tindouf experienced catastrophic flooding that affected all five camps and im- pacted upwards of 57,000 people. These floods damaged and destroyed homes, crippled schools and health centers, interrupted food supply, and threatened water contamination. They were the result of rains that delivered the equivalent of ten years of the typical annual rainfall seen in the region – a scenario that could repeat itself due to climate change. 57
The outcome of this scenario follows the trajec- tory laid out above regarding a deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the Tindouf camps.
Contingency VII: Moroccan Leadership Transition
Likelihood: Moderate Impact: High
idency. A tweet from President Trump recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara remains possible, particularly in light of Secretary of State Pompeo’s visit to Morocco in early December. This would mark a distinct change to U.S. policy on the issue and would likely elicit the following responses:
1. Morocco would immediately acknowledge and promote the President’s policy statement, as it is consistent with the central national belief that Western Sahara is a part of the Moroccan state.
The Moroccan government would expect clear actions from the United States demonstrating the change in policy position and would pressure other allies to take the same position. The Moroccan government would likely seek to memorialize the policy change within the UNSC, as Moroccan officials consistently expressed the desire for the conflict to be resolved through a UN process.
However, if the UN does not acknowledge Moroccan sovereignty over the territory alongside the United States, it is likely Morocco would still enact measures to consolidate its sovereignty knowing it has the backing of the United States. If the United States did not take action to support Morocco in enacting its sovereignty over Western Sahara, Morocco would react negatively and accuse the United States of not honoring the close partnership between the two countries as well as potentially enact measures to hurt U.S. priorities in the region.
2. The Polisario would react negatively to a public change in U.S. policy.
The Polisario considers the United States a potential honest broker in the situation and a recognition of Moroccan sovereignty would betray that position. Polisario leadership would likely lobby U.S. sympathizers and international allies to make stronger statements regarding the Sahrawi right to self-determination of Western Saharan sovereignty and intervene against efforts to memorialize
A sign in the center of the MINURSO team site, Smara. Peacekeepers from around the world are stationed at the small site. Source: Lorraine Keeler.
this position in the UNSC. They could also call for public demonstrations against the position in Western Sahara or in Morocco, which could risk turning violent. 3. Algeria would likely support the action the Polisario took in response to the statement.
Such a tweet would demonstrate a significant change in the U.S. position on the issue. Given the strong relationship between the United States and Morocco and Moroccan sensitivity on the issue of Western Sahara, U.S. actions would need to change to match its change in rhetoric. This may include extending counterterrorism support and US
AID and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects into Western Sahara, as well as continuing to stand by the claim of Moroccan sovereignty over the territory in the UN and other international forums.
Sensitivity of the Moroccans to this issue and any changes in U.S. position on it would necessitate expedient action among agencies in Washington and U.S. Embassy Rabat to demonstrate commitment to any new U.S. position. Recognition of Moroccan sovereignty could also create tensions with or further antagonize U.S. relations with the 42 UN Member States which currently recognize the SADR, including Iran, Mexico, and others.
Contingency VIII: President Trump Tweets Demand for Independence Resolution or Other Support for the Polisario
Likelihood: Low Impact: Moderate
Should Trump express demand for an independence resolution, it would likely inspire the Polisario to push for greater progress within the UN System—but it is difficult to predict the long-term implications of such a move.
If Trump’s tweet is perceived as a shift in U.S. neutrality, the Moroccan government may react by temporarily cutting off ties or threatening intergovernmental cooperation. However, Trump has become notorious for spontaneously tweeting his opinions; parties could view his expression as just another whim with no serious implications.
If this contingency emerges, it is important that the U.S. State Department and U.S. Mission to the UN retain their position as an honest broker to the conflict. While this would pose a credibili- ty issue, they must reassert their commitment to the UN process, and ensure both parties that— despite what is posted on Twitter—the U.S. position will remain deliberative, careful, and in pursuit of the most amenable resolution.
