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United States Policy on the Western Sahara Dispute: Overview and Recommendations
RISKS TO THE STATUS QUO Previous sections examine how the status quo in Western Sahara has remained relatively unchanged since commencement of the 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire. However, in the coming years, several contingencies may emerge that could significantly alter the conflict’s circumstances, potentially creating windows of opportunity where the U.S. and international community can work to spur resolution of the conflict. This section reviews several potential contingencies. It categorizes them based on likelihood of occurrence and severity of their impact on the status quo, and then discusses likely implications.
Contingency I:
Polisario Leadership Transition Likelihood: Impact:
Moderate High
The advanced age of senior Polisario figures suggests that a new generation may lead the group within decades.
From 1976 to 2016, founding Polisario member Mohamed Abdelaziz served as leader of the Polisario and SADR president. After Abdelaziz’s death in 2016, the Polisario elected one of Abdelaziz’s contemporaries and fellow founder Brahim Ghali to lead the group. As of the date of this report, President Ghali is roughly seventy years old.52 While President Ghali and the generation of original Polisario leaders may remain in control for several years, demographics suggest that a new generation of the Polisario that did not take part in the conflict’s 1970s-phase will eventually take control of the group. There is also a remote possibility of an unexpected death of one or more leaders, either of natural or unnatural causes, that could lead to an accelerated timeline for transition outside of the normal election cycle. Ascension of a new generation of Polisario leaders could open an opportunity for renewed negotiations and compromise. Previous sections have discussed that mutual distrust of the parties makes resumption of the conflict under current circumstances and with current leadership unlikely. Ascension of new Polisario leadership could facilitate new UN PESG efforts to resolve the conflict, potentially including additional discussion between the parties and review of resolution options that fall short of independence. The viability of such renewed efforts would depend on (1) greater levels of mutual confidence between the sides, facilitated by conflict mitigation strategies in the years preceding a leadership transition and (2) international assurances for the welfare of the Sahrawi people. Some sources suggest that a new generation of leadership may be more entrenched in the current position, and would likely be less willing to engage with the UN process. Any contingency planning must take this possibility into account.
Homes of Sahrawi refugees living near the camps outside of Tindouf. Source: Mark Jahnke.
