The European Security and Defence Union Issue 16

ISSN 2192-6921

Independent Review on European Security & Defence − Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence

Volume No 16

SPECIAL TOPIC

Strategies in the security and defence sector

Photo: © Astrium / D. Marques / 2011

Promoting international competition – the EU Strategy for Defence Industries The new Communication can open the way ahead

Defence industry is vital for our industrial landscape

Antonio Tajani, Vice-President of the European Commission, responsible for Industry and Entrepreneurship

Michel Barnier, Member of the European Commission, responsible for Internal Market and Services

www.magazine-the-european.com ProPress Publishing Group

Edition 2/2013

Editorial

The EU and peace in the Balkans The governments of Serbia and Kosovo have taken the first step on the path towards normalisation. Serbs and Kosovo Albanians can now start searching for a way out of the historical and political impasse in the relations between their two states.

The European Union has done everything right; but it must continue to provide guidance along the long and difficult path towards peace and stability in the region. During talks facilitated by the High Representative for the CFSP, Lady Ashton, the Union showed that it can still play the role of peacemaker. The credit goes to Lady Ashton, whose offer of future membership prospects for Serbia and an Association Agreement for Kosovo proved to be a weighty incentive. In practice, then, Belgrade is renouncing sovereignty over its “province” in an act of political farsightedness that paves the way for the opening of EU accession talks.

Overcoming nationalism Before the negotiations can start, however, Serbs and Kosovars must prove on a day-to-day basis that they are serious about normalisation and reconciliation. This will not be easy, because the main aim of the 13-point programme will be to dismantle the Serb parallel structures in Kosovo and to integrate the country’s Serb communities into Kosovo while allowing them a high degree of autonomy.

The onus is now on Belgrade and Pristina: there is a lot of psychological resistance to be overcome on both sides. But at least both governments are showing the willingness to turn this page of their history.

But the EU too has a lot of work on its plate. The talks on an

Association Agreement with Kosovo need to be launched, although several EU member states have still not recognised the government in Pristina.

Clearly a number of internal issues have not been settled that should have been.

Hartmut Bühl

The EU as a provider of security Peace for this region and for Kosovo in particular now seems closer than ever before. NATO, which still has 6 000 troops stationed there under the KFOR flag, may well find itself with a second mission to accomplish. But it could also transfer that task to the European Union. It would certainly make sense for the political process of integration and stabilisation and the military presence needed to guarantee it to be placed under a single authority. The EU has the necessary instruments at its disposal; serious thought should therefore be given to its assuming, in the medium term, the overall responsibility for this region of such crucial historical and political importance located right on its doorstep.

For the moment the KFOR troops are stationed in Kosovo.

Their presence serves both to guarantee the protection of the Kosovars against their northern neighbours and to reassure the Serb minority, which would be very reluctant to see the Kosovar security forces suddenly becoming the sole military presence in Mitrovica.

Hartmut Bühl, Editor-in-Chief

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin Headquarters Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Avenue des Celtes, 30, B-1040 Brussels Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135, GMS: 0049/1723 282 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr ; Hartmut.buehl@euro-defence.eu Bonn Office: Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Advertisement Office Bonn: Karin Dornbusch Phone: +49/228/970 97-40 E-Mail: Karin.dornbusch@euro-defence.eu

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris; E-Mail: nannette.b@gmx.net Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berlin Security Conference), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management.

For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.magazine-the-european.com Subscription: This magazine is published in Brussels and Berlin.

The copy price is 16 Euro: 3 copies for one year: 42 Euro (EU subscription) 3 copies for one year: 66 Euro (International subscription) including postage and dispatch (3 issues) © 2013 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin ProPress Publishing Group is the holding of the trade mark BEHOERDEN SPIEGEL.

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Karin Enström Minister of Defence, Sweden

Pieter de Crem Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Beligum

POLICY and POLITICS 3

Editorial

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Michael Gahler MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels, Interview

High voter turnout in defiance of extremist threats A major step forward towards regional stability

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Nannette Cazaubon

The Arms Trade Treaty Ireland signs and sets an example

The European Union 8

Michel Barnier/Antonio Tajani, Brussels

The future of Europe’s defence industry Promoting international competition

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24 The French White paper – the ten main thrusts

Modern Armed Forces for Europe 25

A vision of common security with the Maghreb States The stabilising effect on the continents

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The EU Common Security and Defence Policy: Challenges and Perspectives How to achieve a breakthrough in capabilities

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Giseppi Giaimo, Boston

The future of the CSDP is power projection Setting the sights on global responsibility

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Olivier de Bavinchove, Strasbourg

The Eurocorps, a highly operational multinational headquarters not used by the EU The EU must make use of dormant capabilities

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Dr Arnold Kammel, Vienna

How Austria is preparing for the future The referendum result was a surprise

Security and Defence Pieter de Crem, Brussels

Karin Enström, Stockholm

The Swedish path towards a modern defence force A common vision and the human factor

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Arnaud Danjean MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels, Interview

The future of the CSDP is in the hands of the Member States Bundling forces in mission sharing, pooling and sharing

Ana Gomes MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

Alex Kennedy, Washington

Alain Coldefy, Paris

Consistency for a Defence White Paper – France’s answer Crisis-driven and far away from a breakthrough

European Maritime Security Strategy A global vision of security

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Karl-Erik Goffinet, Paris

The CSDP – a new role for Berlin and Paris Can Paris and Berlin find new common responsibilities?

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Vlastimil Picek, Prague

Interoperable capabilities: a must for the armed forces of smaller nations Genuine efforts for coordinations are crucial

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Tom Middendorp, The Hague

Mission sharing – the fruit of trust between allies The question of sovereignty

Content

Vlastimil Picek Minister of Defence, Czech Republic

Tom Middendorp Chief of Defence (CHOD), The Netherlands

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS EU/NATO

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Hartmut Bühl, Brussels

The human factor in missions abroad There are common standards to be respected

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Christina Balis/Doug Berenson and Aleksander Jovovic, Avascent, Paris/Washington

“Top 5 Trends” in military aviation Competition versus cooperation

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Domingo Ureña Raso, Madrid

Europe needs to preserve technologies, capabilities and talent in defence Creating operational superiority

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Bernd Kreienbaum, Brussels

The role of Europe in NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence There are reasons for the CSDP to engage

Markus Kafurke, Paris

How to reconnect nations with their navies A strong need to promote an EU Strategy

Dr Uwe Nerlich, Munich

Trends and strategies in the international armaments sector Structural problems to be resolved

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Per Espen Hagen, Kongsberg

Integration enhances autonomous minehunting A very much needed capability

Reports on Conferences 27 6th Annual ESRT Conference, Brussels 43 CATO project meeting in Portsmouth 2013 47 EuroDefense France International Presidents Meeting 1/2013, Paris

48 European Defence Agency (EDA) Annual Conference 2013, Brussels

52 AFCEA – TechNet Europe 2013, Warsaw

“The European − Security and Defence Union” is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence

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A stony path towards democracy

High voter turnout in defiance of extremist threats Interview with Michael Gahler MEP, Chief EU Observer to the General Elections 2013 in Pakistan, Strasbourg/Brussels

The European: Mr Gahler, you were appointed Chief Observer for the European Union during the 2013 general elections in Pakistan, having already performed that task once before, in 2008.

Michael Gahler MEP: Yes, I appear to have done a good job in what was an extreme situation in a difficult country. My first stay began on 27 December 2007 with the murder of Ms Bhutto, just two hours before she was due to meet with me.

Since then I have been to Pakistan several times in connection with the implementation of the EU’s 2008 recommendations on democracy building in Pakistan. The upshot is that the framework conditions were better this time than they were five years ago, as regards, among other things, the electoral list, the independence of the electoral commission and the freedom of the media.

The European: Did the violence before and during the election have any influence on voters?

Michael Gahler MEP: The election turnout was higher than last time: about 10 million people more voted this time round. This was a real example of people “voting with their feet” against the extremists, who had declared the elections un-Islamic and carried out acts of violence against the so-called secular parties. Certainly one cannot rule out the possibility that some people stayed at home because of the threat of violence,

Michael Gahler MEP giving an interview to a local radio station Photo: EU Election Observation Mission Pakistan 2013

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Michael Gahler MEP was born in 1960 in Frankfurt/Main. Since April 1999 he has been a Member of the European Parliament. Currently he is a Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Transport and Tourism Committee, and serves as the EPP Coordinator in the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. In addition he is Chairman of the Delegation for Relations with the Pan-African Parliament and was Head of the EU Election Observation Missions in Pakistan, in February 2008, and Tunisia, on 23 October 2011.

particularly in the troubled areas along the border with Afghanistan and in Karachi.

The European: Were there any developments on the gender issue as compared with 2008?

Michael Gahler MEP: This time some 37 million women were registered to vote, a marked improvement as compared with 2008. But there were still 11 million less female voters than there were men. And there were isolated attempts to keep women away from the polling stations.

The European: Will the democratic process have a chance to develop in Pakistan?

Michael Gahler MEP: Since the 2008 elections we have worked intensively with the Parliament, ministries, the electoral commission and civil society. The political will is there. Following the submission of our final report containing recommendations, the EU will make an offer of continued cooperation to the new Parliament and Government. I am confident that if the mainstream parties are able to channel their political will in the same direction it will be possible to improve the democratic framework conditions necessary for good governance.

The European: And what does this mean for the region, in particular for Afghanistan?

Michael Gahler MEP: I hope that a positive development of the situation in Pakistan will encourage those in Afghanistan who want to continue the reform process to pursue their efforts, even after the withdrawal of most of the western troops. The remarks by Pakistan’s Prime Minister-elect, Nawaz Sharif, about his desire to improve relations with Afghanistan and with India in particular are encouraging. If his government were to succeed in normalising relations with India, this would be a major step towards allaying tensions in this region.

Irish Presidency

Minister Costello is signing the Treaty in the presence of UN Under Secretary General for Legal Affairs, Patricia O’Brien and UN High Representative for Photo: Ministry for trade and development , Dublin Disarmament Affairs, Angela Kane

Setting an example for other nations

Ireland signs the Arms Trade Treaty and the EU updates the UN on its “Post 2015 Agenda”

by Nannette Cazaubon, Paris On 3 June 2013, the Minister of State for Trade and Development, Joe Costello T.D., signed the Arms Trade Treaty on behalf of Ireland at the United Nations in New York and updated top UN officials on the EU’s approach to the post 2015 agenda, the negotiations on a new international development framework.

1. Landmark Arms Trade Treaty The document was agreed in April 2013 as a result of over six years of negotiations. The Minister described the Treaty as “historic” and “a milestone in global arms control”, and pledged support for its implementation. With this national act Ireland, which currently holds the EU Presidency, set an example that should encourage other Member States of the Union to quickly sign and ratify the treaty which will enter into force 90 days after 50 states have signed and ratified it.

The Arms Trade Treaty is the first legally binding instrument to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons.

States signing up to the Treaty are prohibited from exporting arms to countries if they know that those weapons will be used to commit gross violations of human rights. The Arms Trade Treaty also obliges states to take steps in order to ensure that

the weapons they export are not sold on the illegal arms market. Speaking at the UN, Minister Costello described the Treaty as a “strong, robust and comprehensive instrument” that “will reduce human suffering and save lives” when fully implemented. The Minister paid tribute to the important role played by civil society in supporting and developing the Treaty, which he described as “a triumph for Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) activists and the indispensable role which they play” as well as an achievement by states.

2. EU approach to development policy While in New York, Minister Castello, on behalf of the EU Presidency, updated top UN officials on the European Union’s approach to the post 2015 agenda, the negotiations on a new agreement to succeed the Millennium Development Goals. The agreement on a unified EU position for post 2015 was reached end of May 2013 at a Council meeting in Brussels.

A unified position means that the EU, delivering over 50% of global official development assistance to developing countries, will speak with far greater authority in these crucial post 2015 negotiations.

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News: Council declaration on Syria Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 27 May 2013

The European Union

“The Council agreed the following elements on the renewal of the restrictive measures against Syria: 1) At the expiry of the current sanctions regime, the Council will adopt for a period of 12 months restrictive measures in the following fields, as specified in Council Decision 2012/739/CFSP: - Export and import restrictions with the exception of arms and related material and equipment which might be used for internal repression; - Restrictions on financing of certain enterprises; - Restrictions on infrastructure projects; - Restrictions of financial support for trade; - Financial sector; - Transport sector; - Restrictions on admission; - Freezing of funds and economic resources.

The challenge for the European defence industry i develop future capabilities and to be competitive a coordinated approach in order to steer the ongo tackle the fragmented nature of Europe’s defence

A lead in defence technology is difficult to develop and is

The future of Europe’s defe

by Antonio Tajani, Vice-President of the European Commission and

Syrian soldier greets UN monitors photo: CC BY 2.0, Louai Beshara

2) With regard to the possible export of arms to Syria, the Council took note of the commitment by Member States to proceed in their national policies as follows: - the sale, supply, transfer or export of military equipment or of equipment which might be used for internal repression will be for the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces and intended for the protection of civilians; - Member States shall require adequate safeguards against misuse of authorisations granted, in particular relevant information concerning the end-user and final destination of the delivery; - Member States shall assess the export licence applications on a case-by-case basis, taking full account of the criteria set out in Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

3) Member States will not proceed at this stage with the delivery of the equipment mentioned above. The Council will review its position before 1 August 2013 on the basis of a report by the High Representative, after having consulted the UN Secretary General, on the developments related to the US-Russia initiative and on the engagement of the Syrian parties.” > Please see also the Council Conclusion on Syria: http://tinyurl.com/kmmect9 Source: Council of the European Union

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Europe is tackling the worst economic challenges it has faced for many years, which has adversely affected many sectors of our economy. Defence is not an exception. The current waves of cuts in national defence budgets will, and are already starting to, have an impact on our industry and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

Does this really matter when Europe has so many other problems and priorities? Yes, because the defence sector is not just another industry. The EDTIB reflects Europe’s industrial capital of capacity, skills and new technologies with which we can ensure the security of our societies. The lack of investment in this capital will undermine Europe’s capacity to act autonomously and effectively within the context of the Common Security & Defence Policy (CSDP).

New threats require state-of-the-art technology The CSDP is about Europe cooperating to meet and overcome its security threats. The need for this is stronger than ever with new forms of terrorism, international piracy and regional

Antonio Tajani has been Vice-President of the European Commission in charge of Industry and Entrepreneurship since 2010.

He has a degree in law, was an officer in the Italian Air Force and also had a career in journalism. He was elected and re-elected to the European Parliament in 1994, 1999 and 2004. He went on to become a member of the Convention on the Future of Europe and of the Bureau of the Group of the European People’s Party. In 2002 he was appointed Vice-Chair of the European People’s Party, a position to which he was reelected several times. Before his current posting, he was Member of the Commission in charge of Transport from 2008 to 2010. Distinctions awarded to him include the Spanish Grand Cross of the Order of Civil Merit and the French Legion of Honour.

Photo: © European Parliament

is to find a way of maintaining a strong industrial base able to e. This can only be achieved through European cooperation and oing change in Europe’s industrial landscape. The EU needs to market and Research & Technology.

s easily lost

ence industry

d Michel Barnier, Member of the European Commission, Brussels

instability. The means to deal with these threats increasingly require state-of-the-art technology, such as in the areas of communications and surveillance, and the use of highly mobile and well equipped professional forces. None of this is cheap.

Today Member States are drastically reducing investment in new research programmes. This puts Europe’s capability to produce the next generation of capacities in question and these will certainly be more expensive than the last. Between 2005 and 2010 there was a 14% decrease in RTD spending at EU level. The gap between US and European RTD spending has further increased, resulting in US spending being seven times larger. This will have important negative effects such as the closure of critical industrial capacities. They will be difficult to recover in the future.

Facing the fall of orders at home, European industry is eyeing new emerging markets such as India and Brazil. The growth in exports has been such that their value is now close to, or has even overtaken, that of domestic procurement. This would be a major turning-point for the business models of Europe’s main defence companies resulting in moving overseas.

In danger of losing technological leadership In the absence of major new European defence and research programmes, we will face the erosion of the EDTIB in the next few years, including closures and moving production overseas, and the loss of Europe’s technological leadership in a number of critical areas. At the same time, we will see the emergence of radically new military technologies which will redefine the meaning of Europe’s strategic autonomy.

But the defence industry does not only concern capacities we need for ensuring this autonomy. It is also a vital component of Europe’s industrial landscape. The industry, with a turnover

Michel Barnier has been Member of the European Commission responsible for Internal Market and Services since early 2010.

His political career began in his late twenties, when he was elected as a Member of the French Parliament. In 1993 he was appointed Minister for the Environment and after that Minister for European Affairs (1995–1997).

In 1999 Michael Barnier resigned from national office in order to join President Romano Prodi’s Commission, where he was responsible for regional policy and institutional reform. Back in Paris, he became Minister for Foreign Affairs (2004–2005) and Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries (2007–2009). In 2009 Michael Barnier led the French Presidential majority’s campaign in the European elections and was the head of the French Delegation of the EPP Group in the European Parliament.

of € 94 billion, is a major industrial sector that generates innovation and is centred on high-end engineering and technologies. Its cutting-edge research has created important spillover effects in other sectors, such as electronics, space and civil aviation, and provides growth and thousands of highly skilled jobs. It is, therefore, a sector that is essential to retain if Europe is to remain a world-leading centre for manufacturing and innovation. The challenge is to find a way of maintaining a strong industrial base able to develop future capabilities at competitive prices. This can only be achieved through European cooperation and a coordinated approach steering the ongoing change in Europe’s industrial landscape.

What needs to be done We need to tackle the fragmented nature of Europe’s defence market and RTD. Europe can no longer afford the overcapacity and duplication inherent in having 27 national markets. Surely equipping our national armies with seven types of combat helicopter, four types of main battle tank and three types of

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fighter aircraft is neither desirable nor sustainable: • Effective and seamless industrial cooperation If we cannot simply spend more, we need to spend what resources we have better and in a more unified way. It has long been recognised that Member States can no longer undertake significant military operations overseas on their own. European armies need to be able to cooperate effectively and seamlessly together. This cooperation, as far as possible and where practicable, should start with more joint research programmes and procurement.

• Maintaining competitive industries We need a European industrial strategy based on increased mutual dependence that will let our Member States maintain competitive industries and provide value for money. Leaving restructuring only to market forces or to national initiatives means losing essential capabilities, skills and technologies. cooperation and specialisation between Member States is the only way to maintain and develop them.

December. This is a valuable opportunity to put the challenges facing Europe’s defence industry on the agenda of Europe’s Heads of State. Our key message will be that it is only through collective action, based on a shared European vision of our security and capability needs, that we will find a way forward to meet future challenges and threats to our continent.

A lead in defence technology is difficult to develop and is easily lost. If the industry is to overcome difficult changes, it should be done with a common understanding of key capabilities that we need for our security, not only today but also in the future. Only then can defence continue to play a critical role in maintaining our strategic posture in the world and continue to create the technology and skilled jobs on which Europe’s industrial future depends.

The role of the European Commission The Commission has an important role to play and we are not starting from a blank sheet of paper. There is already a new legislative framework in place designed to support the competitiveness of the defence industry: • The basis is two important Directives This is based on two important Directives, on defence procurement and transfers of defence-related products, which were adopted in 2009 and have since been transposed in Member States. They are helping to better integrate the European defence market. This modern legislative framework should favour transnational consolidation and cooperation and allow the defence industry to achieve the economies of scale so essential to its global competitiveness. This is also the way to provide governments with the best value for money in their procurement.

• Support SMEs in accessing markets across the EU However, in view of the severe nature of the challenges we need to do more. Through a more targeted use of existing tools, we can better support SMEs in accessing markets across the EU. We can move towards a more European approach to standards and certification thus facilitating cooperation and saving time and money. We can better integrate defence into the domain of other EU policies such as energy or regional policy. We can support research on technologies which can be used both in the civil and military world and, in the same vein, we can use EU-owned space capabilities, for example in the area of space surveillance tracking. Proposals in these and other areas will be set out in a Communication which is due to be adopted shortly.

The new Communication can open the way ahead The Communication will be a key Commission contribution to the planned debate on defence at the European Council in

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Documentation European defence industrial policy At the heart of the European Commission’s defence industrial policy is the “Defence Package” which includes two directives aiming to simplify the transfers of defence-related products within the EU and coordinate procedures for contract awards in the fields of defence and security.

Directive 2009/81/EC on defence and sensitive security procurement This Directive introduces at European level fair and transparent rules to help companies access defence and security markets in other EU countries, as well as flexibility for contracting authorities to negotiate in detail all features of complex contracts. It introduces the option for contracting authorities to require safeguards (from suppliers) to ensure the protection of classified information against unauthorised access, and security of supply so that armed forces receive deliveries in time, particularly in times of crisis or armed conflict. > For the Document: http://tinyurl.com/7rlst9p Directive 2009/43/EC on intra-EU transfers of defence products This Directive encourages Member States to replace, as far as possible, their existing individual licences with general licences for those intra-Community transfers where the unauthorised risk of re-exportation to third countries is strictly controlled, such as purchases by armed forces of other EU Member States and transfers to certified companies of components in the context of industrial cooperation. > For the document: http://tinyurl.com/mghrrb8 > More information can be found on the Commission website: http://tinyurl.com/mrq4368

The European Union

Crucial for the EU and Member States for effective coordination

European Maritime Security Strategy (EMSS)

by Ana Gomes MEP, Member of the SEDE Subcommittee and Substitute in the LIBE Committee, Strasbourg/Brussels

The European Union is to adopt, most likely in December, the first European Maritime Security Strategy (EMSS). The EMSS will seek to integrate the assets, capabilities and instruments that already exist in the maritime security and maritime safety fields in order to effectively implement a security strategy on the sea, in the European neighbourhood and elsewhere. As agents for peace and security globally, the Union and its Member States cannot ignore the risks, threats and opportunities that the seas and oceans entail and they cannot continue to waste resources and capabilities by failing to work together.

synergies linking the safety and security dimensions, because the threats to European security and interests are also multifaceted and demand a comprehensive approach. These threats stem, on the one hand, directly from purely security-related problems, such as terrorism, organised crime (involving the trafficking of human beings, arms and drugs) and piracy, which de facto impacts on the safety and freedom of navigation, and, on the other hand, from environmental factors and human action with respect to the environment, such as pollution, spilling disasters, over-exploitation of and competition for resources, etc.

Enable effective coordination In a report of the European Parliament (EP) Subcommittee on Security and Defence on “The Maritime Dimension of the Common Security and Defence Policy” recently adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee, I seek to outline the problems that currently hinder the ability of the EU and its Member States to deal with maritime security/safety challenges. There is an urgent need for effective coordination between Member States and the EU, and most notably, its specialised agencies.

And it is urgent to put into practice the “pool and share” injunction that the financial/economic/budgetary crisis has made even more pressing with respect to European security and defence assets and capabilities in general, which obviously include those needed to face challenges at sea.

The EU’s naval and maritime assets and capabilities are currently concentrated in certain Member States and are also scattered throughout a multiplicity of instruments and EU bodies, leading in practice to lower leverage, poorer implementation and diminished cost efficiency at European level. In times of economic and financial strife in Europe this is a cost burden that simply should not be tolerated - it is time for effectiveness, comprehensiveness and coordination. Europe needs to get its act together in order to enhance the security of citizens at home and in far away places, and to protect the freedoms of navigation and access that are essential for pursuing its economic interests and way of life. And Europe must go beyond a merely defensive endeavour: it needs to pro-actively sustain the vast and diverse resources (biological, mineral, economic, scientific, etc.) that can be drawn from the sea and may become a source of development and wealth for mankind.

A consistent EMSS must call for and deliver on pooling and sharing. And it must be soundly anchored in multifaceted

ATALANTA – successful but limited Operation Atalanta off the coasts of Somalia in the Indian Ocean is the first naval mission to be conducted under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and clearly illustrates the integrated and comprehensive approach required to deal with what initially seemed to be a mere maritime challenge: it was launched to fight acts of piracy against merchant shipping and to secure WFP deliveries to the people of Somalia. It was soon realised how much the overfishing and waste dumping by foreign fleets made possible by the lawlessness in Somali waters and territory had encouraged local communities to engage in piracy, the proceeds of which also feed terrorist activity in the region. Security and judicial arrangements with neighbouring countries were soon also needed in order to ensure that captured pirates would be tried

Ana Gomes MEP Member of the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs and Human Rights, the Subcommittee Security & Defence, and a Subs titute for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Ms Gomes was born in 1954 in Lisbon. In 1979 she graduated in Law from the University of Lisbon where she also received a diploma in Community Law (INA) in 1981, as well as a diploma from the ‘Institut International des Droits de l’Homme’ (Strasbourg) in 1989. From 1982–86 she was diplomatic adviser to the Portuguese President before being posted to the Permanent Mission to the UN and International Organisations in Geneva (1986–1989) and to the Embassies in Tokyo (1989–1991) and London (1991–1994). In 1995 she became Head of Office of the Secretary for European Affairs (1995 – 1996) before becoming Member of Portugal’s Permanent Mission to the UN in New York in 1997–1998. From 1999-2003 she was Ambassador of Portugal to Jakarta.

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and jailed. It did not take much time to prove the limits of the operation, despite coordination with NATO and other countries’ naval projection forces in the Indian Ocean; no matter how effective the policing of the seas, without investment on shore, in the rebuilding of a state order in Somalia, piracy could be somewhat contained, but not eliminated.

An EMSS will enable the EU to put down on paper how Member States - which today hold the main responsibility over their territorial waters and their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) – will coordinate among themselves and with European institutions, so as to make more effective use of the means and capabilities available and, together, build those still missing.

Glaring gaps exist, nowadays. Take, for instance, EMSA, the European Maritime Safety Agency, headquartered in Lisbon – I found out that it has been supplying valuable information to the “Atalanta” mission, but that it does so only on a purely informal basis, since as a civilian agency it does not have a mandate to cooperate with a military mission! An EMSS must sort out these inconsistencies of EU policy and enable Member States and EU institutions to actually foster the synergy between civilian or military means and the expertise of all relevant agencies in the field of maritime security and safety, such as EMSA, the European Defence Agency, the EU Satellite Centre, the Galileo Programme, the European Space Agency and Frontex, among others.

Documentation “The maritime dimension of CSDP: Geostrategic maritime challenges and their implications for the European Union” Study requested by the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence (2013).

(Excerpt) “In order to defend its maritime interests within the more globally connected and hostile international maritime context, EU member states will need to provide naval capabilities that are able to take on an increasingly broad catalogue of tasks. These will range from protection of the seas, through monitoring and safety operations, to securing the seas, through counter-piracy or antiimmigration operations, as well as the ability to project power on land and to potentially far-away region. This requires modern, multipurpose platforms that are able to stay at sea for extended periods of time and are interoperable with each other and potential third parties. In the face of declining defence budgets, the only way of providing these capabilities and maintaining a credible deterrent is through greater pooling and sharing amongst EU member states. Moreover, the potential of acquiring certain “common use” assets, such as drones, surveillance satellites or hospital and anti-pollution ships, should be taken seriously in the long run. Measures to incentivize a further integration of the European naval shipbuilding industry also need to be considered further.” > The study is available at: http://tinyurl.com/krlackz

EMSS will lend to operability in the CSDP The implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy depends partly on an effective EMSS - there are not many doubts about this in the EP, the European External Action Service or the European Commission. If founded on the principles of international and European law, and assuming that the Member States do not run away from their common responsibilities, the EMSS will lend operability to the CSDP in maritime terms. But, indeed, this effort will depend on how committed national governments are to working in common to direct their defence spending towards this European endeavour, in a true European way. The financial crisis, leading to defence cuts in almost all Member States, could have been an opportunity to further the smart defence and the pooling and sharing initiatives; but the sad truth is that, so far, not much is to be seen.

Yet, the reality is that, in one way or another, most Member States today are engaged in port and maritime security, either in territorial waters (preventing human or drugs trafficking in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, for instance) or they are engaged in naval operations off the western or eastern coasts of Africa - fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden and fighting organised crime and terrorism in the Gulf of Guinea, where piracy is just starting to occur. Furthermore, the enlargement of the Panama Canal, due to be completed next year and

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Source: European Parliament

meant to facilitate shipping between the Atlantic and the Pacific, is bound to increase both trade and economic opportunities, but also the safety and security challenges directly and indirectly facing Europe. The same can be said about the environmental changes occurring in the Arctic Ocean, that are already fuelling a scramble to assert national claims in the region.

The EMSS is a must for the CSDP Remarkably, an EMSS it is not only about safety and security: facing the challenges, seizing the momentum and the opportunities on the seas will also mean business and economic gains for Europe. And finding new sources of development and competitiveness is particularly important for those Atlantic and Mediterranean Member States currently enduring crippling austerity, like my own country, Portugal.

An EMSS is a must in order for Europe to ensure its safety and security and protect its immediate and long-term interests, either in its territorial waters, in its neighbourhood or in far away oceans. The EU cannot be a global actor and provider of security without organising its means, capabilities and goals in the framework of a proper EMSS.

The European Union

Choosing cooperation over conflict

A vision of common security with the Maghreb States

by Alex Kennedy, President, Kennedy Consulting International, Washington

Algiers, Algeria, May 2025 – The Maghreb Union is a united political block after Algeria and Morocco resolved their differences through the 2018 European Union-backed Treaty for Western Sahara Autonomy. Multiple rounds of democratic elections in the Eastern Maghreb mean civilian democratic participation is developing apace in Tunisia and Libya. Vibrant secular and Islamist-themed parties have taken root in a German-style federative parliamentary system blending quasireligious and secular parties loosely or tightly aligned by region and issue.

In early 2025, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, with strong backing from the rotating European Union Presidency held by Turkey, are admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

To form a stronger collective defense and to ensure common human security, NATO has opened itself further to nations with access to the Atlantic Ocean. Common security is enhanced as NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause spreads to the European Union periphery. Social influences follow collective security with effects such as the liberalization of trade tariffs in oil and gas, and more collective strides towards ensuring human rights concerns are integrated into the political life of Maghreb nations.

Following the European Recession of the mid-2010’s, Spain and France pulled a 180 degree turn in their security and immigration policies due to economic necessity. Investment and tourists flow from Europe into North Africa and vice versa.

A demographic crunch means Western Europe has to accept labor from the Maghreb - the low-wage, high-skill workers of the future come from Algeria and Morocco as much as from Poland and Serbia.

Europe in North Africa: Back to the Future?

There are parallels between post-War Europe and post-Arab Spring Maghreb security. The impact of the Arab revolutions will be long-lasting as were the aftershocks of World War II. An Arab World Marshall Plan is needed - the Deauville Partnership is a good place to start. This would not require a large investment of capital, like the U.S. into Europe after the War, but rather a focused opening of the Maghreb societies to freeflowing global influences. Global influences on these societies could accelerate the pace of democratic change over the next 15 years. The underlying systems of the European Union are applicable to North Africa today as in post-War Europe. From the ashes came the European Coal and Steel Community

Alex Kennedy President of Kennedy Consulting International, which he founded in September 2012. He studied Arabic at Georgetown University and International Relations and US Foreign Policy (focus on Europe and the Middle East) at the American University School of International Service. Previous positions include that of Coordinator for the Foreign Policy Program, Council for the US and Italy at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., Deputy Director, Executive Council on Diplomacy and International Business-Government Council in Washington, D.C. and Staff Assistant, Foreign Policy Program at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. He was previously a Fellow with the US-Qatar Business Council.

(ECSC) focusing on economic integration between France and Germany as an antibody to further conflict. As the ECSC was the precursor organization to the European Union because old enemies France and Germany chose collaboration over conflict, the EU, Maghreb Union and NATO could collectively work on a Maghreb security framework, planting seeds for Moroccan-Algerian peace.

Evolutions to be considered There are lessons for the Maghreb societies to be taken from the foundational period of the EU (approx 1950-90), but there are more recent lessons drawn from the EU’s actual implementation of stabilization programs addressing the Balkans conflicts (approx 1985-1999: disintegration of Yugoslavia to NATO air campaign in Kosovo). As the nations of the Maghreb open up, they will require new security and economic cooperation mechanisms that have not traditionally been present in the recent history of these nations. To consolidate democratic gains and prevent human insecurity (violent revolution in Libya, Western Sahara stalemate) the European Union and NATO could focus on a more holistic approach to security in the region. To ensure the stability of post-revolution Maghreb countries the EU can apply similar mechanisms and processes as applied to the Balkan nations through the Stabilization Pact for South Eastern Europe. This all-encompassing plan addressed international, regional and local aspects of the integration (or reintegration) of a region of countries back into the European fold. It paved the way for Turkish EU Accession talks improving regional security. This Stability Pact used a mistake-

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

and-learn approach with various “baskets” of programs (civil police training, tariffs trade reduction, judicial and educational capacity-building programs) where if certain programs were measured as ineffective their resources were applied elsewhere. With security ensured, the education and judicial systems of the Balkans nations are able to develop freely.

More cohesion and EU integration To give guideposts for the path ahead in the Maghreb, the EU should implement lessons learned and best practices developed from the experiences of post-war Europe in collaboration with new democratic nations. The collapse of the Berlin Wall, the fall of communism and the break-up of Yugoslavia have rough parallels with what we are witnessing in the Maghreb nations today. Successful implementation of post-conflict and post-economic transition lessons comes from the experience of nations like Croatia, Albania, Kosovo, and Slovenia. The international community and the European Union can apply lessons and best practices from experience with the Balkans to the Maghreb.

For Europe to reach beyond its far-flung borders and solve regional problems it will need to strengthen integration of its own economic system. Viviane Reding, European Commission Vice-President, wrote in “Why we now need a United States of Europe” from the previous issue of this publication: “There is a common European currency, but no substantial common European budget that can be used efficiently to achieve economic policy goals”. A strong peacekeeping and social policing program is not enough. The European Union should continue to project force and further collectivize the interoperability of the Continent’s armies to remain a contributor to global security. If the European Union is able to act as a stabilizing force in the Maghreb and wider Pan-Sahel region, it could spread the social benefits of ‘unionizing’. As the Union expands outward, it could facilitate acceptance of democratizing influences by the peoples of the Maghreb region.

Security and Defence

The budget crisis is dragging the Common Security the contrary, the EU Member States must use the c tative leap forward by building on the foundations bitions in the field of security and defence. The civ

The Member States must reconcile European solidarity and

The EU Common Security a

by Pieter De Crem, Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of D

In this radically and fundamentally changing world characterised by many new and highly unpredictable events, the European Union has to be prepared for a wide range of security threats. The need for a cross-border approach and state-ofthe-art military capabilities is greater than ever. However, recent crises have demonstrated that Europe often experiences significant difficulties with acting in a consolidated way.

European cooperation in security and defence – a long-winded effort…

If we want to maintain the peace and stability that Europe has worked so hard to achieve, we have to be able to effectively tackle such threats. The time has therefore come for the

The longing for dignity The first section of this article is a vision of what is possible. It is a potential future scenario for European involvement in the Maghreb region. It is in the global interest for European states to take a stronger supporting role in the Maghreb. Civil society will flourish in the Maghreb nations and the experience of European integration can serve as an easy model. Despite negative feelings of a heavy-handed European colonial past by older Maghreb generations, the unshackled youth of the revolution are more likely to adopt European democratic values. As American interests aligned with helping Europe back to its feet after World War II, the Arab Spring gives Europe an opportunity to bookend its post-colonial past. Now is time to start a new chapter working towards a common security with the Maghreb states.

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Minister De Crem in Mali, talking with a Belgian helicopter crew. photo: Malek Azoug ©Belgian Defence

Photo: isafmedia/cc by 2.0/flickr.com

e

y and Defence Policy (CSDP) down. But now is not the time to let up our efforts. On crisis as an opportunity to forge ahead with common projects and to make a qualis laid down in the Lisbon Treaty in order to assume global responsibilities and amvil and military capabilities are there: they just need to be brought together.

d national sovereignty

and Defence Policy: Challenges and Perspectives

Defence

Pieter De Crem European Union to make a qualitative leap so that it may realise the foreign policy ambitions bestowed upon it by the Lisbon Treaty, underpinned by the necessary military capabilities, and also act responsibly as a “security provider” in the framework of the United Nations. The only way to achieve this is to strengthen our cooperation in the field of security and defence. Over the last few years, EU Member States have clearly shown their will to reinforce cooperation on security and defence matters. Several regional initiatives in particular have enabled important progress to be achieved. However, we are only at the beginning of what will be a long-term process that which require our permanent attention and effort.

has been Belgian Deputy Prime Minister since March 2013 and Minister of Defence since 2007.

He was born in 1962 in Aalter, East Flanders. He obtained a Master’s degree in Romanic philology from the University of Leuven and in international and European Law from the Vrije Universiteit in Brussels. From 1989 to 1992 he was an attaché in the private office of Minister Wilfried Martens and Minister Leo Delcroix. His political career began in 1989 when he was elected Chairman of the Young CVP (Christian People’s Party), section Ghent-Eeklo. In 1994, he was elected Mayor of Aalter. As a young mayor he ran in the federal elections as the CVP candidate for the constituency of Ghent-Eeklo. Once elected to Parliament he became a member of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence. Mr De Crem was also a member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

… that will strengthen the EU and Member States Major difficulties still stand in the way of close cooperation and the most severe financial and economic crisis of the Union’s history is having obvious repercussions for the defence budgets of all European countries. However, difficulties are there to be surmounted, and we need to turn challenges into opportunities. Under the Belgian EU Presidency in 2010 the “Ghent Framework” was born, giving new impetus to the concept of “Pooling & Sharing” of military capabilities. Although this concept was quickly accepted as the way ahead, all too often EU Member States still lack a multinational mindset in the field of security and defence and stick to the idea that military cooperation implies a loss of national sovereignty. Shared sovereignty among EU states may be much stronger and surer.

Redefine the role of the EU as a security guarantor Therefore, 2013 must become a pivotal year in the sense of a new departure that will allow us to better reconcile solidarity and sovereignty. The European Council discussion at the end

of the year must result in concrete deliverables and a clear and unambiguous long-term vision of and commitment to European defence cooperation. In this discussion, it is also important never to lose sight of the fact that 21 EU Member States are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Duplication between both organisations is pointless and costly, and must be avoided at all times.

We also need a better understanding of how the European Union and NATO can mutually complement and reinforce each other. A strong Europe is also in the interests of our transatlantic partners and will allow us to bear a more equitable share of the security burden. We must ask ourselves which role we want the European Union to play in this world. If we want Europe to remain a strong and reliable global player, we have only one option, and that is to join our efforts. If not, the Union’s role as a global guarantor of peace and stability will wane. We cannot and must not jeopardise our future and that of the generations to come.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

To be a global player the EU needs a complete power projection instrument

The future of the CSDP is power projection

by Dr Giseppi Giaimo, Independent Security Consultant, Boston When one thinks of what the European Union represents, almost instinctively one conjures up images of cultural supremacy, of an economic engine that has created an expanding and strong trade bloc; however one does not immediately imagine a strong defence apparatus – this is normally associated with the United States. There is often a wide gap between perceptions and reality; and the same can be said with regard to the EU’s situation today. So how do we stand at present as regards the capacity for a Common Security and Defence Policy?

European security policy in the face of reality In most EU capitals there is now recognition of the political necessity of an EU defence apparatus and an expression of the political will to develop such a capacity. But is the EU ready to assume defence ambitions and missions in a volatile world, dominated since World War II by a forceful US and a passive EU? One needs only to look at the comments expressed by EU officials or to the EU’s past and future missions for an answer.

In a move that would perhaps have been unthinkable just a decade or even a few years previously, when Germany took over the EU Presidency it placed Kosovo, Bosnia, Lebanon and Afghanistan at the heart of its defence agenda. So what exactly does all that translate into? Well, according to Andrew Rettman, a journalist for the EU Observer, the EU now has two units that can be deployed for crisis management anywhere in the world 10 days following a unanimous vote by the Member States on a decision that would “as a rule” follow a UN Securi-

Unloading material in Bamako for the French-Malian photo: Bundeswehr/F.Bärwald joint forces

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Dr Giseppi Giaimo based in Boston, Massachusetts, is an independent security consultant for strategic analysis for stakeholders in the area of security and defence. He studied in Paris for his M.A. (at the Schiller International University) and PhD (at the Centre d’Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques) in International Relations and Diplomacy. From 2002 to 2003 he worked in Paris for the Notre Europe think tank (founded by Jacques Delors) as an Analyst and Consultant on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and NATO. In 2006 he was a conflict resolution and security consultant for the Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit of the United Nations Development Programme in Kampala, Uganda. In 2009 he worked for the Transnational Crisis Project in Washington, D.C. as Deputy Analyst for the Niger Delta.

ty Council resolution but that could also see the EU go it alone in what is known in EU parlance as “variable geometry”. Each EU battlegroup will comprise 1 500 soldiers from at least two or three different countries, who will partake in joint military exercises and wear both national and EU insignia.

Who can be a peacekeeping force?

Before turning to the issue of a CSDP capability, it should once again be pointed out that the EU, and the EU alone, is the last bastion of hope for countries immersed in conflict like that which we are witnessing in Mali today. The UN is flawed from top to bottom, both politically and militarily, although in recent years it has conducted a much-needed reform in an effort to address its shortcomings. Nonetheless much remains to be done in order to make the UN truly effective as a peacekeeping force. Given the many political challenges that this poses for the UN, it is unlikely that the serious issues will ever be addressed, at least in the foreseeable future. The US, for its part, cannot effectively tackle world conflict due to the overwhelming importance it attaches to geo-strategic resources and to governments, preventing it from being an honest broker and a successful peacekeeping force. This leaves us, finally, with the African Union, unable to act as an effective fighting force to clamp down on African conflict. We recently witnessed the ineffectiveness of this force in Sudan and Somalia due to its lack of resources and manpower, and of fighting troops with practical peacekeeping experience.

A favourable role for the EU The EU, particularly in light of its historical colonial ties, is the only one with both the real ability and the willingness to

Security and Defence

effectively help a troubled region.

But this also fits the EU’s own agenda perfectly: through Africa it has found a new “power projection” role with which it can forge a perception of itself on the world stage that better mirrors its new-found reality, not just as an economic and trading power but also as an emerging political power with foreign policy strength backed up by military muscle, enabling it to effect change – real change – where others cannot.

One such example of this emerging EU prowess was in the Horn of Africa.

Horn of Africa – a crucial test for CSDP missions

A400M transport aircraft

photo: Bundeswehr

The French MISTRAL projection and command vessel

corresponds to the raison d’être of Frenchmen like former Government Minister Bernard Kouchner, who was famous for his public displays of humanitarianism, one that other world leaders, most notably the US, are unwilling to accept. The French have traditionally provided the backbone for operations when it has been urgently necessary for the EU to fill the void left by a disinterested or distracted US and an incapable UN, in order to resolve conflicts and put a stop to the human misery that they inevitably bring in their wake.

Variable geometry – the future of the CSDP

photo: Yannick Le Bris, GNU Free Documentation license

The EU, unbeknownst to most, had In my opinion and that of many already achieved a degree of power others, a ray of hope for the future projection in military terms some of the CSDP has already begun to time before the CSDP missions of shine thanks to its use of “variable recent years. In fact, the key player in geometry”; it must continue to grow the Horn of Africa was not the US or towards greater power projection.

NATO, but, indeed, a new force on France and Germany are clearly the scene: the EU. American comindispensable for that purpose; they mentators have often criticised have been the locomotive for EU European nations for not pulling integration since the days of the their weight in defence matters. But European Coal and Steel Communithere is no question about whose ty. The axis has been further navies have the main role in the strengthened by the recent British waters off the Horn of Africa. Most support for the CSDP as well as by Middlesized cargo helicotper CH 53 G for operational Americans, or Europeans for that the reforms to the EU Treaty. The UK photo: Bundeswehr/Herholt cc logistics matter, do not have a clue about the and France are the most influential EU’s ability to project military power EU members in military terms and far beyond its borders. Indeed, those who are critical of the their cooperation is necessary in order to overcome the imEU’s CSDP capacity would be surprised to learn that since passe that has periodically arisen since St. Malo in the efforts December 2008, the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) to push the CSDP forward towards greater strategic autonomy. has been involved in Operation Atalanta off the coast of Today with the group of five – France, Germany, Spain, Italy Somalia and in its coastal and internal waters in order to and Poland – we are witnessing renewed calls for strategically combat piracy, protect World Food Programme shipments and located military headquarters to become operational. I see monitor fishing activity. Germany, a country not generally variable geometry as the only way forward towards an auperceived as a projector of military force, is continuing to tonomous CSDP. The EU is heading towards a situation in match its economic prowess with military projection, strengthwhich its economic, political and increased foreign and miliening the CSDP as a result. Currently, Germany is providing tary weight will give it greater equality with the US; a more both one vessel and one aircraft in a rotating mission for stable and peaceful world will most certainly follow. The which an EU state normally provides only one or the other. absence of a stronger power projection role by the EU is a recipe for instability in a world in which future conflicts will continue to unfold if the necessary peacemaking mechanisms The CSDP and humanitarianism are not in place due to an indifferent US, an incapable UN and Piracy does not stop at merchant shipping but is increasingly an increasing focus on the part of other world leaders on targeting humanitarian missions, making it necessary for securing economic growth for the benefit of their citizens EUNAVFOR to protect shipments to Somalia. In addition, the alone.

UN has a Responsibility to Protect, or “R2P”, that in turn

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

There is a potential which could be a core military asset for the European Union

The Eurocorps, a highly operational multinational headquarters not used by the EU Interview with Lieutenant General Olivier de Bavinchove, Commanding General, Eurocorps, Strasbourg

The European: General, you have been Commander of the Eurocorps in Strasbourg since 1 July 2011. Just a few weeks ago you brought your troops back safe and sound from a one-year stint in Afghanistan. You were the Chief of Staff of the ISAF mission, as the Commander of a European Army Corps that was conducting its fourth NATO mission. But what about the EU? General de Bavinchove: Born from a French-German political initiative in 1992, the Eurocorps is a rapid reaction corps that is certified as such by NATO and meets the European Union’s requirements. The Eurocorps is fully dedicated to operations and can cover a broad spectrum of missions ranging from stabilisation to coercion. It can be deployed for UN, EU or NATO operations. A so-called SACEUR Agreement was signed with NATO back in January 1993 in order to make the Eurocorps available to the North Atlantic Alliance, which certified it as a rapid reaction corps in 2002. Its deployment in Afghanistan in 2012 confirmed its operational status and gave it credibility in the eyes of NATO. The European: But there has been no such cooperation between the Eurocorps and the EU. General de Bavinchove: You are right. The Eurocorps was indeed deployed four times with NATO, partially or as a whole in Bosnia (1998), in Kosovo (2000) and Afghanistan (2004 and 2012). In 2007 and 2010 it manned the core of the NATO Response Force (NRF). It is true that Eurocorps has never been used by the EU: but it is quite ready for that. Moreover, if you look closely at the ISAF mission you will see that all EU member states were involved in this 50-nation coalition.

The European: But the 1993 agreement with NATO remains fully valid, whereas the agreement signed the same year between the Eurocorps and WEU has vanished, following WEU’s dissolution after Lisbon. So who in the EU is responsible for the Eurocorps?

General de Bavinchove: The Common Committee composed of the Chiefs of Defence (CHODS) and the political directors of the foreign affairs ministries of the framework nations – Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and Spain – is responsible for the Eurocorps. Over the next two years they are to be joined by a key new framework nation: Poland.

The European: Clearly any Eurocorps engagement requires a decision by each participating nation: it is exactly the same as for NATO missions. But even if there is no executive institution

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Lieutenant General Olivier de Bavinchove has been Commander of the Eurocorps, Strasbourg, since July 2011. He graduated from the French Military Academy at Saint-Cyr in 1978 and attended the French Army Command and General Staff College. He was deployed in Afghanistan from October 2011 to January 2013, where he was simultaneously Chief of Staff of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander of the French Forces in Afghanistan. Previously, he was appointed as Chief of Staff of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) between August 2008/2009.

within the EU, should not someone in the EU be in charge of the Eurocorps, at least for planning purposes? After all, the Eurocorps founding text – the La Rochelle Treaty of 1992 – gives it a clearly European character!

General de Bavinchove: Our forces have to train within NATO procedures and all European forces have to be interoperable in order to be committed in the framework of either NATO or the EU. I will not enter into the debate about Berlin Plus and the EU C2 capabilities. I can only assess and testify to the benefits of a military structure being able to participate either in a NATO or in an EU C2 organisation.

The European: I would like to come back to your HQ. What are its most important skills and does it have qualities that other HQs do not have?

General de Bavinchove: The Eurocorps is by nature fully multinational (the most multinational in its category), fully dedicated to operations and deployable at short notice. Since its creation it has been continuously adapted and modernised: its location in Strasbourg close to such bodies as the European Parliament and France’s National School of Administration and Institute for Political Studies has been a particular advantage in that respect. Moreover, it is the only one to have its own field equipment, which makes it fully sustainable and immediately available.

The European: So finally, then, General, what is the legal basis for the Eurocorps?

General de Bavinchove: The 2010 Treaty of Strasbourg gives the Eurocorps full legal and financial autonomy. It is the only

Security and Defence

Closing ceremony for the exercise Joint Efforts in May 2013 at the HQ Eurocorps in Strasbourg photo: Eurocorps

unit with such a status, which makes for flexibility and reactivity. Finally, as I already told you, it is directly subordinated to a Common Committee, which facilitates the decision-making process.

The European: Back to operational considerations. What about the famous French-German Brigade?

General de Bavinchove: Eurocorps is the only corps in the High Readiness Force HQ community to have an operational brigade and a multinational command support brigade permanently assigned to it. Indeed, the French-German Brigade, created three years prior to Eurocorps, is permanently assigned to this headquarters. In operations its main task will be to function as an early entry force, the spearhead of the troops under Eurocorps command. With its 6000 troops consisting of French and German combat units and due to its very high operational level it is well adapted for this task.

The European: Very convincing, General, but how many nations can be supported by your HQ? Wouldn’t it be easier and perhaps more efficient to have only three or five nations?

General de Bavinchove: The Eurocorps, which started out as a French-German unit, truly paved the way for Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation while being open to other nations. This is where we stand at present: • Since 1996, the five framework nations share the burden and responsibilities on an equal basis.

• The personnel of four associated nations (Greece, Italy, Poland and Turkey) have also been incorporated into the staff.

Poland’s integration as framework nation of the Eurocorps will be officially completed in 2015 but in practice it has already joined, since it is directly subordinated to the Chiefs of Defence and already has a significant air operations capacity. This will facilitate the evolution of the corps to the operational level.

• Finally, we have offered an associated nation status to the United States, as well to Romania. This should occur in 2013.

The arrival of seven American officers will bring a new level of expertise, which will be much appreciated in a changing environment marked by ever-shrinking resources.

The European: I would like, finally, to come back to your experience in Afghanistan. What are the chances for future stability and what is your wish for the Afghans?

General de Bavinchove: Afghanistan today is a deeply traumatised and corrupt society but it has a powerful, dynamic and inventive demography. The insurrection is weak and localised: 80% of population does not suffer from violence because Al Quaeda has only a very residual presence – it is a threat that is moving out of Afghanistan.

The European: And what about the Taliban?

General de Bavinchove: The Taliban can be divided into two different groups: A first group composed of locals, 20 000 farmers who are fighting near their home and who do not represent a high risk for the future of Afghanistan.

A second group composed of radicals – 6 000 fighters mainly from the two Shuras of Quetta and Peshawar – with a more powerful network but one which has been considerably weakened. Provided there is political will, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will be able to face the threat.

The European: What challenges will Afghanistan have to face?

General de Bavinchove: Well, there are three main challenges.

Firstly, the country must absorb the shock caused by the sudden arrival of modernity in Afghan society, creating a gap between generations. It is now time for absorption and “Afghanisation”.

Secondly, it needs to fully assume all its state prerogatives: the fight against corruption, which is even more of a strategic threat than the insurrection, the establishment of a fair judicial system which is strongly needed by the Afghan population, bringing the ANSF up to full strength (attrition – recruitment).

Thirdly, in the field of governance and development, it must assume a transfer of tasks from ISAF and to be prepared for the 2014 elections.

The European: General, thank you for being so frank.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Cop-out policies are no longer an option

The CSDP – a new role for Berlin and Paris

by Karl-Erik Goffinet, General Manager K.E.G. Stratégie Conseil, Paris

The Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States will be holding a Defence Council meeting in December 2013.

This recent initiative promoted by many European leaders is to be welcomed: the defence sector faces tough strategic challenges in all areas – operations, capabilities and industry – as well as in terms of political vision. At the same time Europe’s defence community is showing signs of disillusionment. Europe undoubtedly stands at a crossroads and major political decisions are now urgently required.

Common trends, national solutions Most European countries face the same challenges, but national responses continue to be the main driver for strategic and defence policy.

Firstly, there is a general trend in Europe towards a reduction of public deficits. Never before has the defence sector been under such extreme budget pressure, with significant reductions in most EU countries. Strategic reviews and restructuring actions are under way, essentially at national level. Up until now no joint policies or even common consultations have been organised at European level for the purpose of coordinating, on the basis of adapted global roadmaps, the different national adaptation processes in the field of defence.

Secondly, the scarcity of resources is leading increasingly to national solutions. In particular, public opinion in the different EU countries is stepping up the pressure with regard to jobs and the use of public funds. While such a trend is easy to understand in a depreciated economic environment, the consequence might be to cancel out the huge political investment made over a period of decades in the field of European cooperation.

Thirdly, as regards the lack of prospects at European level,

Karl-Erik Goffinet Karl-Erik Goffinet is the founder of the K.E.G Stratégie Conseil company of which he has been General Manager since January 2010. He was born in Paris in 1966 and started his professional experience in 1988 at the office of the French Prime Minister as a strategic analyst involved in German and Russian affairs. From 1992–2008 he was Director General of the French land defence industry association (GICAT). K.E.G. Stratégie Conseil company is specialised in international, strategic and public affairs. The key positioning of K.E.G. Stratégie Conseil is to support both governments and the strategic industries in the effort to establish dialogue and cooperation, in particular at European level.

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On the 50th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty, the German Chancellor and the French President promised to further the European project photo: Bundesregierung/Bergmann

particularly in the field of new capabilities, programmes and projects, the natural trend for defence industries is either to refocus on the national market or to expand their activities to potential non-EU growth markets. The current situation is all the more unsatisfactory in view of the need for EU countries to adapt their capabilities to the new threats and risks.

Growing threats, lack of vision All decision-makers agree on one point: the current strategic environment is more dangerous than ever, with emerging threats overlapping and interacting with the negative consequences of the international financial and economic crisis.

There can be no doubt that the political authorities face key challenges on both fronts.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been a crucial part of the EU political project from the moment of the Union’s creation. Since then there has been progress in a number of areas, including common operations, specialised defence institutions (creation of the European Defence Agency), cooperative armaments programmes and mergers between European industries (creation of EADS).

Although all these are positive steps, the European Union has unfortunately not yet attained its objective of becoming a respected and influential political power at international level.

Fragmented policies and diverging interests at national level are well-known key factors in this situation, but the solution has yet to be found. Even more worrying are the resignation with which some member states contemplate the feasibility of a strategic future for Europe and the risk of an internal decoupling of member states’ views and policies with regard to the development of the European security landscape.

Security and Defence

Conceiving a common strategic future Most European countries continue to be hard hit by the huge financial and economic crisis. This situation clearly continues to be a major impediment to progress by the EU member states on defence issues. It is nonetheless urgent to overcome the current fears and difficulties: 1. the United States’ strategic shift towards Asia and its decreased focus on world leadership represent a strong signal that it is time for Europe to come into its own. The move towards a more responsible Europe is encouraged by the US and the EU member states must rapidly and accurately measure the importance of this development.

2. while the recent development of bilateral and trilateral defence agreements among European countries may be a pragmatic response on the part of some EU member states to the need to move faster, close attention must be paid to preserving the coherence and autonomy of the overall EU political project.

3. the political framework for Europe’s security and defence architecture is changing and the desire of countries such as Turkey or Russia to be more involved in certain areas of EU policy will need to be taken on board in future EU strategic reviews.

Last but not least, new approaches to the development of the European technological and industrial base should be identified; they should entail not only further progress with regard to the European market but also a better and more balanced access to and control of non-EU markets.

Paris and Berlin are called upon to play their role French-German relations have been particularly affected by the financial and economic crisis. In particular, the amplitude of the crisis has so far led France and Germany to focus more on solving their internal problems than on identifying new common goals for Europe.

In the strategic and defence areas the relations between the two countries are in a slow-down phase: a number of differences of approach are perceptible at the strategic level and it has been a long time since any major joint progress was achieved in the fields of capabilities, programmes and relations at industry level. However, although an exclusive approach is no longer valid, France and Germany are more than ever called upon to play their traditional role in preserving European unity.

In order to achieve this goal, national survival strategies should be rapidly replaced by a common will on the part of the two countries to rally the support of motivated EU partners for a confidence-building process coupled with a new strategic ambition.

Time is running out fast and it is urgent to move quickly in order to give a new European direction to future choices in the areas of strategies, capabilities and industry. A failure on the part of France and Germany to launch new, substantive and open initiatives could call into question the future of Europe.

Cop-out policies are no longer an option.

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Security and Defence

Constrained by the economic and financial crisis

Consistency for a Defence White Paper – France’s answer

by Admiral ret. Alain Coldefy, Director of the “Defense Nationale” magazine The 2013 White Paper on Defence and National Security is set apart from its predecessors by the severe economic and financial constraints it is under in terms of debt and deficit.

The defence budget shows a marked reduction as of 2015, with an average of €30.14 billion (in current terms) until 2025.

France has now been overtaken by Germany and its defence budget has fallen to third place in Europe.

In spite of those budget cuts, France’s overall strategy has not changed. Its nuclear deterrent with its two components protects the country against an attack by a state against its vital interests. France’s capacity for external action gives it greater strategic depth, which in turn strengthens deterrence and provides the best possible protection against other forms of aggression. France, then, wishes to remain a military power that is medium-sized but as complete as possible, and to maintain a minimum capacity to exert influence over world affairs in the framework of the Alliance and in support of its commitment to Europe.

Admiral (ret.) Alain Coldefy is now Chairman National Defence Review.

Alain Coldefy entered the French Naval Academy in 1965 and also graduated from Naval War College and High Military Studies College.

Admiral Coldefy’s major unit commands at sea include DDG Du Chayla (D630), CV Clemenceau (R98) and as commander French Carrier Group, he was Commander FR UK Task Force 473 in support of “Allied Force” (Kosovo 1999) aboard CV Foch. His shore tours include service in the Navy Staff and the Minister of Defense Staff. As a flag officer he served in the Navy as Director for Naval Operations and Logistics and in the Joint staff as Deputy Chief of the Joint Operational Center, Deputy then Director for international affairs (J5) and Vice Chief ot the Defence Staff. His last appointment was as General Inspector of the French Armed Forces.

expected from the distinction that is made between conventional coercion operations, on the one hand, and crisis-management operations, less demanding in all respects, on the other. Expensive capabilities will only be funded “where they are necessary”; the White Paper is also counting on a “relative specialisation of forces” in order to make savings.

Hence the first guiding principle for its armed forces model is the capacity for autonomous assessment, decision-making and action, and the five strategic functions remain unchanged: This is obviously a big mistake, for two main reasons. The first knowledge and anticipation, deterrence, protection, prevenis that nowhere is there a “two-speed” army that remains tion and intervention. And emphasis is at last given to cyber homogenous, coherent and well defence and intelligence (in particular trained. The second is that armed drones). forces are designed to win wars rapidly, To keep within the budgetary envelope, “Nonetheless it is also a at the lowest possible cost in terms of operational contracts must be reduced White Paper that “keeps the human lives and equipment. A strong by half, with a direct impact on force capability differential offers those sizes and troop numbers. tools intact” in the hope of advantages that are decisive for crisis better days to come.” operations, as France recently saw for Land forces will comprise 66 000 deitself during the operations in Côte ployable troops (compared with a d’Ivoire, Libya and Mali. strength of 88 000 in 2008), 200 heavy Conversely, the reference to an innovative defence industry tanks (as against 250) and 7 joint brigades (as opposed to 11, that generates exports and creates highly skilled jobs that are this being the most significant reduction). Naval forces not at risk of relocation is a welcome new development. equipped with 4 SSBN, 6 SSN and 1 aircraft carrier will reduce the number of frigates (from 18 to 15) and BPC (projectable In summary, this White Paper is very tough on the armed command) vessels (from 4 to 3). Air forces will go from 300 to forces, constantly being subjected to restructuring that they 224 combat aircraft (Air Force and Navy), from 14 to 12 multiare the only social institution in France to accept, in an interrole tanker aircraft and 70 to 50 tactical transport aircraft. The national context which is not becoming any more peaceful. qualitative leap to a generation of more modern aircraft Nonetheless it is also a White Paper that “keeps the tools (Rafale and M200OD, A400M, A330 MRTT) will partially offset intact” in the hope of better days to come. those large quantitative reductions. Furthermore, savings are

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ANALYSIS

The French White Paper – the 10 main thrusts (ESDU/Hb) On 29 April 2013 the President of France released the White Paper on Defence positioning French defence in the national and international context. The European – Security and Defence Union presents its own brief initial analysis of the essentials.

1. National Security Concept Aims to allow France to ward off direct or indirect threats and risks and threats likely to endanger the nation by mobilising the entire State assets, including armed and civil security forces, and to guarantee the security of Europe and the North Atlantic area in cooperation with partners and allies. A special interest is the stabilisation of the Mediterranean region and Africa.

2. The European Union (EU) and NATO are the two strategic pillars of France’s strategy, which aims to: • Promote a pragmatic re-vitalisation of the CSDP; • Give a strong role to NATO and overhaul its means of action.

3. Threats and risks stemming from: • power issues, through the resurgence of inter-state conflicts; • weakness, through failed states; • terrorism and cyber attacks; • organised crime; • economic globalisation; • natural or man-made disasters.

4. General Strategy • protection of the nation’s population and territories; • nuclear deterrence; • external intervention by armed forces.

These priorities give rise to five tasks: Knowledge & anticipation, deterrence, protection, prevention and intervention.

5. Military Strategy The strategic context gives rise to four

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guiding principles for the new armed forces model: • Strategic autonomy whenever it may be deemed necessary to take the lead in coalition engagements; • Consistency of the armed forces model confronted with a diversity of possible engagements; • Differentiation of forces according to their function and specialisation; • Pooling of capabilities to create new capacities.

6. Capabilities in financial crisis • Maintenance of a substantial defence effort; • Recognition of an industrial imperative; • Re-definition of an armed forces model.

7. Armed forces model The reduced armed forces must conduct a broad spectrum of engagements: (1) A deterrence task based on two components: protection of the population and territory as a whole while protecting land, air and sea approaches with 10. 000 troops and their respective naval and air components; (2) Engagement in international crisis management where necessary in three theatres with 7000 troops, the combined naval assets of the support and command vessels group and 12 fighter aircraft; (3) Engagement in major coercive operations involving the special forces, up to two combat brigades with 15. 000 land forces, 45 fighter aircraft and a naval aviation group.

8. Cyber Defence procure France with the most modern technology and combine the strategy with the intelligence strategy.

9. Priority to intelligence: • Improving governance by strengthening the role of the National Intelligence Co-

ordinator reporting to the President of the Republic; • Extending the role of parliamentary delegation to enable Parliament to exercise scrutiny of government intelligence policy; • Allocation of budgets to provide all kinds of space and air components for imaging and electromagnetic interception, diversification of sensors, notably with drones, light surveillance aircraft and payloads on air, naval or land platforms; • Using those assets in a pooling mode against cyber attacks and intelligence services.

10. Human Resources • Personnel: The process already launched in 2008 aimed at a radical change in the living conditions and morale of the women and men serving in defence will be reinforced with a view to recognising the full citizenship status of military personnel. They must be able to benefit from general social trends creating personal rights in order to better reconcile the demands of their professional and private lives while encouraging self-expression and modernising consultation procedures; • Reductions: Between 2014 and 2019 the Ministry of Defence must reduce total staff numbers by 34 000, excluding outsourcing; • Reserves: The importance of trained and well-equipped reserves is explicitly recognised.

10. Industrial imperative Defence industries are recognised as essential for France’s strategic autonomy and a substantial volume of public funds is earmarked for the preservation of crucial expertise in key sectors.

Photo: US Army Africa/flickr.com/CC BY 2.0

Modern Armed Forces for Europe The European Union has for a long time overestimated its political and military potential in the area of security and defence. For most Member States NATO continues to take priority. The recent change in US strategy, with a major shift of security and defence interest to the Pacific region, calls for a serious discussion not only about EU-NATO relations, but also capabilities.

It is a crucial year for the CSDP

The future of the CSDP is in the hands of the Member States Interview with Arnauld Danjean MEP, Chairman SEDE Subcommittee, European Parliament, Strasbourg/Brussels

The European: You are known in Brussels and beyond as a convinced European who looks resolutely towards the future, and who is unsparing in his efforts to move forward with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). But during parliamentary debates and conferences these past few weeks we have heard some rather pessimistic comments from you about the future of the CSDP. Arnaud Danjean MEP: Yes indeed! We have every good reason to move ahead towards a European defence policy: the US shift towards Asia, financial constraints, the instability in our direct vicinity... and despite all these well-known parameters, there is a patent lack of political will on the part of the member states.

It is hard to find any ambition in any of them, above and beyond conventional slogans and superficial commitments.

The European: Why is it, do you think, that the nations attach less importance to the CSDP than they do to their national interests or to NATO? Are we so lacking in geopolitical or geostrategic insight that we are unable to frame common European objectives and strategies? I’m thinking here of Libya and Mali.

Arnaud Danjean MEP: I think that there are two main reasons: firstly, member states have other priorities than defence. They are struggling with an unprecedented economic and social crisis that leaves very little room for other concerns at the top of governments’ agendas. The second reason is that strategic changes are under way, but our mindset and defence policies are not adapting as fast as one might hope. It is easier simply to rely on NATO and the US, as Europe has done for the last 60 years, than to spend a lot of effort (and money!) on building a

Arnauld Danjean MEP Chairman of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) since 2009. He was born in 1971 in Louhans.

1994–2004, Ministry of Defence, Paris. 2004– 2005, Representative of the Secretary-General of the EU-Council/HR for the CFSP in Kosovo.

2005–2007, Adviser in the private office of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Director-adviser, EZL Consulting, Paris. Mr. Danjean is Member of the National Council of the UMP (Saône-et-Loire) and he is an elected member of the Bourgogne Regional Council.

new system, in which NATO would remain an important pillar, but where the Europeans themselves would shoulder more responsibility. Defence policy is about anticipating the world strategic environment in the coming decades. But due to the crisis, our governments’ horizon does not seem to stretch much beyond the weekly business. This is hardly compatible with defining a strategy and the corresponding defence capabilities.

The European: The US is moving away from Europe and towards Asia because it thinks that the European countries are now able to take charge of their own security; moreover, they have NATO. In one respect such confidence in the EU is a good thing; but is the EU indeed capable of delivering common security in Europe and its immediate neighbourhood?

Arnaud Danjean MEP: That is indeed one of the key challenges faced by Europe. For the first time in decades, there is a posi-

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tive mood in Washington towards any project that would enhance European capabilities and make European defence policy more robust. This should encourage Europeans to assume their responsibilities. We have seen this in Libya and Mali. The European reaction was not satisfactory, in the sense that on both occasions it was an ad hoc response by some European states only, and with no real collective impetus or any real role for the EU as such. I see these as missed opportunities for the EU to assert a greater role in security and defence.

The European: All eyes in the field of security are now turned towards the “defence summit” of heads of state and government to be held in December of this year. Are you expecting any major developments?

Arnaud Danjean MEP: On the one hand yes, since defence is not that often on the agenda of a European summit. This is valuable in itself and one can expect some positive developments. On the other hand, due to the bleak picture with respect to European defence policy, raising overly high expectations could prove counter-productive and disappointing in the end.

So let’s remain realistic. It will not be the great day for European defence. But it can nevertheless pave the way for some improvements, especially in the field of capabilities and the defence industry. If heads of state could come out of this summit with an agreement on some programmes (such as airto-air refuelling, drones...) and with a more concrete commitment to launching cooperation programmes, this would already be an achievement. But what is also important is the process: the summit must be a starting point for a new phase, not a oneoff event with no follow-up.

The European: What pragmatic approaches are possible? Do you see any real opportunities for forging ahead with the CSDP? Where do things stand with the “structured cooperation” foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty? And what about the Weimar Group, Lancaster House and the Elysée Treaty?

Arnaud Danjean MEP: We have reached a point where we have to be pragmatic, including, even, in our reading of the Treaty provisions. Some instruments, like permanent structured cooperation, have been paralysed by a theoretical debate on who can participate: must it be inclusive from the start, or should we begin with some countries only?

The same goes for bilateral cooperation. The Franco-British treaty was badly perceived within the EU, as it was not part and parcel of a broader collective policy.

But ultimately what really matters is the readiness of European states to commit resources and to show the political will to develop capacities and to deliver results, operationally and in terms of capabilities. This is the meaning of a pragmatic approach. If we dedicate too much energy to theological debates about whether such and such an initiative has a sufficient “EU flavour“, we are wasting time and spreading scepticism within Europe and among our partners about our ability to tackle the really urgent challenges. So, all in all, any bilateral or multilat-

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eral cooperation that ultimately leads to more responsibility being assumed by European countries is a positive step.

The European: I would like to put a few questions about the three decisive member states, starting with Germany, then France and the United Kingdom.

Arnaud Danjean MEP: These three countries are indeed decisive, but some other countries also have a major role to play.

We must find a way to avoid controversies about inclusiveness in our defence policy. Everyone has something to bring at some stage in order to build this policy. But we must also acknowledge the leading role of those who make the biggest budgetary and capability contributions.

When it comes to France, the UK and Germany, it is unfortunately hard to find a way to accommodate national priorities, procedures and traditions – in London there is ideological reluctance towards an EU defence policy, in Berlin clear priority is given to NATO and France wants to design a CSDP closer to its own interests. So we face a big challenge! I think we can build bridges through cooperation on capabilities and certain operations. The three nations are currently working very well together in the Horn of Africa as well as in the Sahel.

The European: Germany, a regular participant in EU operations, is constantly being criticised for its “parliamentary army”, and the fact that its forces are therefore not adapted to rapid-reaction operations. For many years Berlin was reproached for underfunding the Bundeswehr. Now the defence budget is being increased. Then in Munich the German Defence Minister said that the EU must focus on its own assets and use available capabilities to the full. What do the Germans want?

Arnaud Danjean MEP: That is a question you need to ask in Berlin! My impression is that Germany has been more focused on industrial challenges in the field of security and defence than on the potential operational developments of CSDP, with an emphasis on civilian missions rather than military operations. This is largely due to the constitutional constraints you mentioned. But things will evolve. Since capabilities will probably become the main target of the CSDP, there is room for cooperation.

The European: France is a pillar of the CSDP, always ready to shoulder its responsibilities towards the rest of the world.

However the operation in Mali shows that it is stretched to the limit: there is a lack of sustainability and the country is also faced with major budgetary problems. The latest White Paper clearly shows that it may only just be possible to maintain the status quo. The French Government has signalled a readiness for cooperation but apart from its good intentions has put little by way of practical proposals on the table; or have I got this wrong?

Arnaud Danjean MEP: France’s strategic interest has always been to preserve its ability to act alone when necessary and to have at its disposal the whole range of capabilities needed to assert its strategic autonomy. But many assets are designed in

Modern Armed Forces for Europe

a cooperative way in terms of industry and programmes. NH90 helicopters and FREMM frigates are a case in point, not to mention certain kinds of ammunition. So it would not be fair to depict France as hostile to cooperation. But Paris rightly insists on ambitious cooperation projects, rather than seeing cooperation as a way to downgrade ambitions. And there is also the question of the partners’ political will and effective capacities.

Indeed, unfortunately we see many European countries expressing a political commitment without having the capacities needed to live up to it.

The European: The United Kingdom is a difficult partner. It sets little store by the CSDP and sees its salvation rather in NATO. Nonetheless, when it comes to capabilities, the UK is irreplaceable. However, the UK Government is finding it financially difficult to keep its forces up to scratch – could this be an opportunity for the EU and hence for the CSDP? Arnaud Danjean MEP: Your question is very much to the point!

Developing any European defence policy without the UK would be rather peculiar. And at the same time, we know the limits of the UK’s commitments. But I am confident that if the EU does

show its relevance in some operations (as it is already doing in the fight against piracy, with an HQ based in ... England!) as well as in certain capability programmes, the UK Government will perceive the advantages and added value of sticking to a European approach.

The European: The budgetary problems confronting practically all countries could be a factor for progress in the area of common projects. Could this be a positive approach that all nations should take on board so that something good comes from the crisis?

Arnaud Danjean MEP: We are in the habit of saying that a crisis is also an opportunity to find new solutions. So theoretically, the answer is yes. But practically and politically, it is a different story. This will probably be the major and most pressing issue at the EU’s December summit. If EU countries fail to pave the way for some significant and visible common projects, the relevance of European defence projects in general will be called into question.

The European: Thank you for your frank answers.

CONFERENCE REPORT

CSDP perspectives in the light of the December summit 6th Annual ESRT Conference, Brussels, 30 May 2013 The European Security Round Table Annual Conference organised in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Brussels, and bringing together the relevant stakeholders from the Brussels security and defence community, examined the perspectives for CSDP in the light of the December summit.

The first panel on defence industries, chaired by former MEP, Karl von Wogau, discussed the role of the European Commission in European Defence. Joaquim Nunes de Almeida (DG Internal Market) and Slawomir Tokarski (DG Enterprise) gave some insight into the Communication on an EU Strategy for Defence industries to be issued by the Commission in the coming weeks and which will be its contribution to the December summit.

In a lively debate during the second panel on the future of the CSDP moderated by Martin Winter, correspondent for the Süddeutsche Zeitung, MEPs Arnaud Danjean,

Panel II, ESRT at the Annual Conference 2013 photo: Frédéric Remouchamps, ESRT

Andrew Duff and Maria Eleni Kopaa discussed the need for a stronger political commitment. There is clearly a need for a stronger political commitment. Ms Koppa said that the EU has reached a turning point with the CSDP, which does not seem to be fulfilling the expectations of EU citizens. Arnaud Danjean expressed his concern that the CSDP, while it might not be officially abolished, may be at risk of losing all substance. Mr Duff referred to the

implications of austerity measures for European Defence.

In the third panel on European cooperation, Lt.General ret. Jean-Paul Perruche, President of EuroDefense France, discussed proposals for enhancing cooperation. He raised the question of why the CSDP lacks credibility and what practical measures might improve the situation.

With reference to the report on the EU military structures that had been voted in the AFET Committee, the Rapporteur Marietta Giannakou MEP as well as Michael Gahler MEP underlined the need for common command and planning structures.

Jacques Cipriano, Vice-President of the Safran Group, criticised the fact that reductions in defence budgets have only affected equipment and missions, that 40% of defence spending in Europe now goes on overheads and a duplication of structures: “Pooling and Sharing” should target not only capabilities but also overheads.

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From neutrality to active international solidarity

The Swedish path towards a modern defence force

by Karin Enström, Minister of Defence, Stockholm

Today's security challenges are dynamic and complex. While some threats are traditional in nature, others are not limited by the boundaries created by states or institutions. Dealing with a security environment of growing complexity requires broad and flexible capabilities. No country in Europe can meet these challenges alone. Sweden’s integration into Europe accelerated during the 1990s and our accession to the EU symbolises how we became one of the most globalised countries.

New international responsibilities

Karin Enström has been Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden since 2012. She was born in 1966. She studied at the Swedish Royal Naval Academy, Karlskrona (1985–1987), the Swedish Royal Naval War College, Berga (1988) and the Swedish Royal Naval War College, Näsby Park (1993).

Before taking up her current post, she was Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament (2010-2012) and Chair of the Swedish Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (2012–2012).

Previous parliamentary positions include Chair of the Swedish Defence Committee (2008-2012), Member of the Defence Committee (2002– 2010), Deputy member of the Committee on Social Insurance (20022006) and Deputy member of the Committee on Justice (2000–2002).

The successive interconnectedness with Europe and other partners implied new responsibilities for Sweden, including for security in our region and for our interests abroad. In the early years of the new millennium, it became clear that the concept of neutrality that had characterised Swedish defence policy during the cold war was no longer compatible with or relevant to our situation. Consequently, Sweden abandoned the route of neutrality and chose to embrace solidarity, cooperation and building security with our Nordic neighbours, and with our European and transatlantic partners. Although Sweden is still militarily non-aligned, threats to peace and security are managed in partnership and cooperation with other countries and organisations. The most significant manifestation is the Swedish Solidarity Declaration stating that: Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is similarly affected.

operational defence adapted to current threats, was a necessity. We need a defence that, unlike the old model, can be rapidly deployed, when and wherever needed. The security policy outlined in the national defence bill of 2009 requires an accessible defence system adapted to the current threats.

Consequently, Sweden is in the midst of an historic and radical defence reform. Evolving from a territorial defence in which quantitative numbers mattered more than quality, the reform will lead to a usable and available military more capable of meeting current and future challenges. It will further strengthen Sweden’s contribution to international peace and security, as well as its ability to respond to threats at home and beyond.

From pure home defence to operational strategy

The defence reform

The reform of Sweden’s defence from a territorial defence, shaped by the threat of invasion during the cold war, to an

The defence reform is the sum of several parts. Changing our manning system is pivotal. The new defence is based on a

The Swedish Gripen fighter aircraft participated in the crisis-management operation in Libya Photo: Billy Johnston/U.S. Air Force

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Modern Armed Forces for Europe

single set of forces and voluntary recruitment, and consists of standing and reserve units with high readiness. With the reform, we now have a system of officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and other ranks in place that is much like that of other countries’ armed forces.

The transformation of the manning system is aimed at creating a military force capable of acting at short notice, on our own territory, in our vicinity or globally. All operational forces, except the Home Guard, will be able to deploy abroad. Availability, usability, flexibility and modularity are the key features of our new defence. Another important part of the reform involves changes in logistics and support functions to the Armed Forces, and a new strategy for procurement.

The upgrade to the next generation of the Gripen fighter jet is an example of the new procurement process. We will upgrade an existing, strong and cost-efficient system – Gripen – and we will do so together with a partner country, Switzerland.

In developing the capabilities for conducting international crisis management, or in developing our own national defence capability, we strive for cost-effectiveness and efficiency.

Whether in a Nordic context, within the EU or as part of the Smart Defence initiative in NATO, the aim is to increase our capability in order to deliver effects.

The Connected Forces Initiative Sweden’s land, maritime and airforces, supported by the Armed Forces Logistics Organisation, have a significant capacity for autonomous and effective joint action, concluded a recent international assessment of Swedish defence. After restructuring, re-equipment and modernisation, Sweden’s land forces will be able to contribute to the full range of missions inside Sweden or elsewhere. This confirms that our reform is going in the right direction.

Sweden continues to shoulder its responsibilities Sweden is constantly seeking new avenues for strengthening cooperation. In 2015, for the third time, we will act as the framework nation for one of the EU battlegroups, the Nordic Battlegroup. Finland, Norway, Estonia and Ireland will also participate, just as they did in previous Nordic Battlegroups, and we are pleased to have Latvia and Lithuania on board this time. Our joint commitment strengthens the military cooperation in the Nordic-Baltic region.

Balancing the demands of taxpayers to spend money wisely with the need to protect national interests and to cooperate and exercise with partners represents a challenge for every government. My government has chosen to uphold responsibility as a guiding principle: responsibility to our taxpayers, troops and veterans, and to international peace and security, in solidarity with our Nordic neighbours and the EU Member States.

Swedish combat aircraft at the top Interview with Håkan Buskhe, CEO, Saab, Stockholm

The European: Mr Buskhe, you are President and CEO of Saab, a defence, security and aeronautics company with Swedish roots.

What is the history of your company?

Håkan Buskhe: Our company was founded in 1937 at the behest of and on the basis of a resolution adopted by the Swedish Parliament, which makes the company rather unique.

With the Second World War looming and the hard times ahead, the Parliament decided that the country needed its own capacity for the production of fighter aircraft. Thus we started during the war the production.

The European: Do you export your flagship, the Gripen?

Håkan Buskhe: Yes, we are now in the 2nd generation of Gripen and are developing the new Gripen version, called the Gripen E/F. We have sold the Gripen aircraft to five countries: South Africa, Thailand, Hungary, the Czech Republic and of course Sweden, and the test pilot school in Great Britain is using the Gripen for end flight evaluation and training. In total we have built around 270 Gripen, of which some 100 are currently in service within the Swedish Air Force and 66 in the other user countries.

The European: The Gripen is an excellent fighter aircraft but fairly inexpensive. How come?

Håkan Buskhe: We have an extremely good aircraft that compared to our competitors’ products is above all extremely costeffective. And I think that this is the future for everyone: we need a product that can “win the war”. We cannot compromise on quality but at the same time we cannot make our nations bankrupt by building excessively expensive products. This is how you put the industry in the right context with respect to society – we are here to help.

The European: Finally, I would like to turn to a political issue regarding the EU's work on Centres of Excellence and the consolidation of supply and demand. What do you think about this?

Håkan Buskhe: As I understand it, the EU is among other things encouraging the establishment of Centres of Excellence. But this mean that the politicians would be the ones to decide where production is to take place, which to me is reminiscent of the economic policy of the former Eastern Bloc. I am attached to the idea of free trade and open competition based on a Level Playing Field, which for me is the best way to find out where such “excellence” is located and to determine who should produce what, including on the European defence market. The EU’s and the Commission’s job should rather be to foster better conditions for competition.

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A new Security Strategy is needed

How Austria is preparing for the future

by Dr Arnold H. Kammel , Secretary General of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES), Vienna After regaining its independence with the State Treaty of 15 May 1955 and following the adoption of the first Wehrgesetz of 7 September 1955, Austria started rebuilding its armed forces.

Looking back – the history of conscription in Austria The 1975 revision of the Austrian Federal Constitution included the introduction of Article 9a declaring the concept of a comprehensive national defence (CND) to be a national policy objective. Its stated aim is to guarantee the independence of the Republic and to defend Austria’s neutrality. Generally speaking, the CND concept comprises the military, psychological, civil and economic dimensions of national defence. This concept was then extended to include comprehensive security provision (CSP). As regards the organisation of troops, Article 9a lays down the basis for the Austrian conscription system.

Also in 1975, community service (lasting two months longer than military service) was introduced as an alternative to military service. In 2006, the conscription period was shortened from eight to six months for military service and from twelve to ten months for community service. Currently, some 22 000 young men are drafted into the military each year.

In 2010 the debate on whether to continue with the present system or to replace it with a professional army was reopened.

Dr Arnold H. Kammel has been the Secretary General of the Austrian Institute for European Security (AIES), Maria Enzersdorf, Vienna, since 2007. He studied Law and Political Science in Graz, Vienna and Alcalá de Henares (Madrid), and holds a Doctor of Law of the University of Graz. He also obtained a M.A. in Business from the University of Applied Sciences in Eisenstadt. In 2004, Arnold Kammel became a research fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES).

Prior to joining the AIES he was a research fellow at the Institute of Austrian, European and Comparative Public Law and Political Science at the Karl-Franzens-University of Graz.

His research covers the topic European Integration (focussing on EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy) as well as EU Governance and the EU Mediterranean Policy.

Interestingly, the positions of the two governing parties, the SPÖ (Social Democrats) and ÖVP (People’s Party), had changed completely. Whereas the SPÖ had always been in favour of the conscription system, in the 1990s the ÖVP had envisaged the introduction of a professional army in the context of a possible NATO rapprochement.

Austrian National Parliament in Vienna : A new Security Strategy is currently being debated

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photo: B.Dach/Behörden Spiegel

Modern Armed Forces for Europe

Austrian KFOR soldiers at a check point in Kosovo photo: Bundesheer

The outcome of the deadlock within the government on this issue was an agreement between the two coalition parties to hold, at the beginning of 2013, the first legally non-binding referendum in Austrian history on the issue of military conscription. The two parties had promised to abide by the result, although they would have needed the consent of a third party in order to obtain the constitutional majority required to change the system.

The referendum on military conscription The referendum took place on 20 January 2013. The question was whether the current system of six months’ compulsory military service for all young men in an army staffed by professional officers should be replaced by an all-professional army, and conscription abolished. The question was not that simple, because with the community service being offered as an alternative to military service, abolishing conscription would have meant leaving rather essential social service providers without their main source of labour.

The referendum took the form of a two-choice question: should the current system be retained? or should it be replaced by an all-professional army and a government-funded voluntary year of community service for anyone under 30? The main arguments of the two camps were as follows: the Social Democrats argued that the current make-up of the armed forces would not work in the 21st Century and that a professional army was needed in order to cooperate more effectively with other European armies. Opponents feared the move would not only prove more costly at a time when Austria was trying to cut national spending, but would also push the country towards NATO membership, thereby abolishing the neutrality that it had observed since 1955.

Consequences for security and defence policy Contrary to expectations, the outcome of the referendum was clear-cut: nearly 60% of Austrians voted in favour of maintaining the status quo, while the turnout, at 50%, was higher than expected. After the referendum, the two governing parties agreed on the need to reform the present system and to make

the conscription system more attractive. This includes measures on such issues as the provision of sporting activities and general training and the stronger involvement of conscripts in military affairs. Reforms are scheduled to start before the next parliamentary elections in September 2013. However, Austria’s military budget is constantly shrinking; at its current level of €2.1 billion, or 0.6% of GDP, it is one of the lowest in the EU. At the political level, a new Security Strategy stating the goals and tasks of Austria’s security and defence policy and armed forces has been drafted and is currently being debated in Parliament. Whether it will be adopted before the next elections remains unclear.

In terms of the substance, it does not differ very much from its predecessors. As regards the deployment of troops abroad, the situation has not changed and the Federal Constitutional Law on Cooperation and Solidarity in Deploying Units and Individuals Abroad remains in place. Paragraph 1 of that law permits the deployment of Austrian troops for peace operations in the framework of an international organisation and for the provision of humanitarian aid and support during international crisis-management exercises. Paragraph 4 lays down the principle of the voluntary nature of deployments abroad.

The political framework for security and defence For Austria, the main frameworks for cooperation in the area of security and defence remain the EU and the UN. Alongside CSP, international engagements have been a core task for the Austrian armed forces. Taking into consideration the budgetary constraints, it will thus be necessary to bring the conscripts closer to the troops or to deploy them more effectively in disaster relief missions in order to relieve the professional military formations of certain tasks.

Austria has so far been actively involved in the development of a genuine European security and defence policy; it has actively supported CSDP missions and operations and will continue to do so. However, a real reform is necessary in order to guarantee that both elements, CSP and international engagements, can continue being conducted in times of austerity.

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BSC Berlin Security Conference 12th Congress on European Security and Defence

Post-Afghanistan – new requirements – new opportunities for politics, military and industry

26 – 27 November 2013 andel’s Hotel & Convention Center Berlin

ABOUT THE CONGRESS • One of the largest events on European Security and Defence • Meeting place for about 1.000 participants from more than 50 countries • International Forum for members of the armed forces and security organisations, for members of

Advisory Board

parliaments, politicians and industry • Keynote speeches by Ministers/State Secretaries,

Claude-France Arnould Chief Executive, European Defence Agency (EDA)

Arnaud Danjean MEP, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament

EU Commissioners and CEOs • Main programme and Panel Sessions with international political, military, business leaders and international experts

Dr. h.c. Susanne Kastner MP, Chairwoman of the Defence Committee of the German Bundestag

Prof. Dr. Hans-Gert Pöttering MEP, President of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and 2007 2009 President of the European Parliament

Michael Link Minister of State for Europe, Commissioner for Franco-German Cooperation, German Federal Foreign Office

Dr. Karl von Wogau Secretary General of the European Security Foundation (ESF), 2001 – 2011 Congress President

Robert Walter MP, Vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, President European Security and Defence Association (ESDA), Congress President 2012 and 2013

• Partner in 2013: United Kingdom with high-ranking speakers • Supported by an Advisory Board of distinguished international personalities • Organised by the Behörden Spiegel – Germany’s leading independent Newspaper for Civil and Military Services • Congress Languages: English and German

WWW.EURO-DEFENCE.EU

BSC Berlin Security Conference 12th Congress on European Security and Defence

Impressions BSC 2012 / Topics 2013

TOPICS 2013 • Twelve years of involvement in Afghanistan • New Challenges beyond Afghanistan – Middle East and Africa • The Crises around Europe – Europe’s role to play • 10 years Common Security and Defence Policy – balance and perspectives • The EU Industry Strategy for Security and Defence – a new focus on implementation and cooperation

PANEL SESSIONS • The Use of Space • Missile Defence • C4ISR in future missions • Protection of Crisis Management Forces • Horizon 2020 • Cyber – a new Cold War • Safe City • Future Air Systems 4 Europe – UAS • CBRNe Protection • Regional Cooperation of SMEs • Comprehensive Approaches – civil-military capabilities

For further information please see

www.euro-defence.eu

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

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Modern Armed Forces for Europe

There are multiple reasons for interoperability being high on the agenda

Interoperable capabilities: a must for the armed forces of smaller nations

by General (ret.) Vlastimil Picek, Minister of Defence, Prague

Interoperable capabilities are an obvious prerequisite for functioning military coalitions. This is particularly relevant for smaller nations that do not dispose of a full spectrum of forces but need to participate in multinational military endeavours.

Over the past two decades, European nations and their transatlantic allies have proved capable of operating together and their militaries have achieved a high level of interoperability. Yet the evolving strategic environment requires that we pay constant attention to further increasing interoperability.

Challenges to military capabilities There are multiple reasons for interoperability being high on the agenda. First, most European countries have faced dramatic defence budget cuts, the full impact of which still remains uncertain. Moreover, the existing structure of defence budgets is not helpful either, as the rising personnel costs in many European countries leave ever smaller financial room for capability development.

Second, with the ISAF operation ending in 2014, we need to find a way to replace this crucial interoperability generator.

Operations have been the driving force for transforming the armed forces of participating nations and for enhancing their interoperability. Although ISAF’s demise is approaching, we still have not agreed with our American allies on a training programme that is efficient and intensive enough to sustain the interoperability level achieved in Afghanistan.

Third, the United States is reducing its permanent military

Military oath in front of the Prague Castle, the seat of the Czech photo: www.army.cz/en/ministry-of-defence Republic’s presidency

Vlastimil Picek has been Minister of Defence of the Czech Republic since March 2013. He was born in 1956 and studied at the Military Academy in Brno and later pursued postgraduate studies at the Czech Technical University in Prague.

Before being appointed as Minister of Defence, he served as the First Deputy Minister of Defence (2012–2013). Previous positions include Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (2007–2012) and Chief of the Military Office of the President of the Czech Republic (2003–2007).

presence in Europe, particularly when it comes to land forces.

It remains to be seen how the changing role of the US in European security will impact the ability of American and European forces to operate together.

Why do we need interoperable capabilities?

From the perspective of the Czech Republic, military interoperability is of particular significance in the context of collective defence and deterrence. Developing interoperability can be seen as a proof of collective defence being taken seriously. At the same time, it is the smaller nations’ way of contributing to it, given their limited resources.

Moreover, interoperability is crucial for the smaller nations’ ability to participate in multilateral crisis-management operations, which is their key practical instrument for contributing to Euro-Atlantic security and demonstrating their strategic maturity and reliability.

Last but not least, developing and exercising interoperability can also be seen as a goal per se, helping to build closer contacts among EU and NATO nations, strengthen internal cohesion of each of the two organisations and enhance cooperative security and stability in the broader Euro-Atlantic area through practical cooperation with partners. There are several means of building interoperable capabilities. At our national level, we will keep reforming our defence vigorously with the aim of spending the money we have as efficiently as possible.

We will also strive to achieve a better balance between personnel costs and capability development. Like many other nations, the Czech Republic plans to use its financial resources so far devoted to operations for this purpose.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Logically, the central element of interoperability development is bilateral and sub-regional cooperation. There are a number of initiatives driven by sub-regional groupings of smaller nations such as the Visegrad Group.

How to maintain and develop interoperable capabilities Joint activities that contribute to increasing interoperability range from common capability development projects, cooperation in the field of training and exercises and the affiliation of national armed forces to multinational corps, all the way to contributing to the multinational high-readiness response forces of the EU and NATO. Specialisation represents another impetus for interoperability development. Few countries in Europe still maintain a full range of forces, which means that the capabilities developed today need, by definition, to be interoperable so that they can be used jointly. To this end, multinational initiatives such as Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence are useful tools. But we should equally strive to make the best use of the regular coordination and planning mechanisms at the EU and NATO

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levels in order to ensure that the capabilities we build are interoperable. In this regard, I see the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) as a particularly valuable asset that should be used by European countries to coordinate the development of interoperable capabilities.

Last but not least, in the context of the US military presence in Europe being reduced and the ISAF operation about to be terminated, I consider it crucial to set up a robust training programme that will replace these two key practical sources of interoperability. The NATO Training Concept 2015-2020 currently being developed is a promising step if complemented by a genuine effort to coordinate national training plans across Europe and North America to the maximum possible extent.

Increasing interoperability is a difficult but vital task. Despite the challenge of finding new frameworks to replace large operations and the declining US presence in Europe as transformational drivers, there are means to achieve this goal so that we, EU and NATO members, remain well equipped for operating together in the current strategic environment.

Modern Armed Forces for Europe

The sharing of high-cost services enables us to maintain our core capabilities

Mission sharing – the fruit of trust between allies

by General Tom Middendorp, Chief of Defence (CHOD), The Hague

History holds few examples of conflicts between just two adversaries. Having allies strengthened the position of a country when countering threats and was seen as crucial to survival. Throughout history, alliances were built on the same key factors that are still relevant to effective cooperation in today’s missions: mutual trust, respect and interest; a degree of pragmatism; and the awareness that mission objectives cannot be achieved by going it alone. It is about teamwork, and thus interoperable capabilities.

Defence cooperation through the years Consequently cooperation is a principle for all seasons. However, the playing field has recently changed and the players must therefore adapt to the new conditions.

Prior to the 21st century, the overall characteristics of conflicts were relatively straightforward. Threats were highly visible and citizens of nations in conflict could “feel” the threat. They knew that their peaceful existence was at stake if the alliance their country was part of were to lose the conflict. Our grandparents’ generation would have had no doubts in expressing both the necessity of allies and confidence in alliances. Times have changed. Most Europeans now do not have the same fear for their existence that our grandparents had. Former adversaries are now allies and threats are not as visible or as close to home.

of the resulting threats originate from non-state actors and we see their effects in terrorism, piracy, cyberspace etc. In facing these threats, we need to stand shoulder to shoulder alongside each other, now more than ever. Not just because we feel the limitations caused by shrinking national defence budgets, but simply because it is the most effective way of protecting ourselves and because our mutual interests are at stake.

Building capabilities and confidence There are many aspects of defence cooperation. For me as Netherlands Chief of Defence, the most pressing area of cooperation is that of our common operations. We have to be able to conduct combined operations, increasingly also on the tactical level. Wherever our men and women operate, be it at sea, in the air or on the ground, flawless cooperation and interoperability are crucial for the successful delivery of desired effects and for keeping our troops as safe as possible. In this context, net-centric “plug and play” operations demand a high level of interoperability.

At the pragmatic level, away from policy considerations and debates, our military organisations already successfully demonstrate interoperability and smooth and respectful cooperation on a daily basis. It works because they know that they can rely on each other and have confidence in, among other things, the skills, equipment and mindset of partners.

But that is not something that can be taken for granted. It is

New challenges in the 21st century People are now focused on other problems, such as the current economic crisis. In such a climate, it is tempting to take our security for granted and to shift our focus to seemingly more urgent national matters. Some might even argue that dangers are now at a minimum, and that consequently all countries should easily be able to fend for themselves.

But is this true? Although no direct threat of a large-scale conflict may be foreseeable in the near future, such a threat cannot be entirely discounted. Meanwhile, new threats have come to the fore and our security and welfare have become more dependent on stability in other regions in the world.

Through globalisation, the world has become a complex of sub-systems in which interdependence has increased and traditional boundaries are fading. Though less visible and with more indirect effects, new sources of insecurity are emerging all over the world, especially in fragile and failed states. Many

General Tom Middendorp has been Chief of Defence (CHOD) of the Netherlands since June 2012. He was born in Rheden, the Netherlands, in 1960. His military career began in 1979 at the Royal Military Academy in Breda. In 1997, he was assigned the post of military assistant to the Deputy Chief of the Netherlands Defence Staff. As first commander of 101 Engineer Battalion in Wezep, he was responsible for commanding it through 14 deployments as in Bosnia, Macedonia, Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 onwards. After his promotion to colonel, he was posted to the Ministry of Defence as policy coordinator, advising the Minister on national deployment of the armed forces. Towards the end of 2006, he was deployed to Afghanistan as Senior Political Adviser and Deputy NATO Senior Civil Representative (SCR). Prior to being appointed Director of Operations at the Defence Staff in The Hague General Middendorp was Commander Task Force Uruzgan in Afghanistan.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Ceremony in honour of the German Netherlands Corps and work in the headquarters

photos: German/Netherlands Corps, cc

something that we have to invest in. As soon as we are able to have full confidence in each other, at all levels, we will be able to deliver maximum output in operations and crises.

Widespread and diverse cooperation International military cooperation, then, is not just an option, but a necessity. Not only during missions such as Atalanta, ISAF and KFOR, but also in developing and sustaining our capabilities. The Netherlands is in favour of a healthy mix of both the top-down and bottom-up approaches. With the topdown approach, we see good opportunities in the fields of interoperability, knowledge and doctrine, shared services and niche capabilities. Together, we can afford capabilities that we cannot afford separately. Together, we can maintain the knowledge base needed to both develop doctrine and exploit technological developments. Together, we can share high-cost services enabling us to maintain our core capabilities.

The bottom-up approach is more appropriate at the tactical and operational levels between neighbouring countries, where distances are short, language and cultures are similar and defence cooperation is more intensive. Areas such as education and training, sustainment, tactical doctrine and crisis response are most suitable for this type of approach. As far as the bottom-up approach is concerned, the Netherlands has successfully engaged in projects, in particular with Germany and the BENELUX partners, while at the same time exploring possibilities for further projects. BENESAM, 1 (NL/GE) Corps, CIMIC CoE, SAC C-17, EATC and the UK/NL Amphibious Force are among the most well-known examples of cooperation with strong Dutch involvement. For us, the long-lasting fighter training programme with the US at Fort Hood is a good example of vital bi-national cooperation. The Netherlands is willing to take things a step further and move from cooperation to

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integration of capabilities, seeking the boundaries of sovereignty. Important potential areas for enhanced collaboration in this respect are, for example, cyber defence, fire-support, UAS and the air-to-air refueling project, where France, Germany and the Netherlands provide a platform for pooled procurement and operation of this important capability. In all of these projects, mutual trust and a steadfast will to make things work are the keys to success.

To deliver or not to deliver – that is the question Defence cooperation also faces risks and challenges. Firstly, it is not a one-way street; it gets tricky when partners do not benefit equally and no longer see cooperation as a unity of effort. It is crucial to focus on critical shortfalls and identify win-win situations, from which we all benefit.

Having collective capabilities but no common political ground to actually use them would lead to ineffective defence cooperation and could even create a false sense of security, as the means may be available but not easily deployable. What is key is the willingness to seek the limits of sovereignty and to focus on identifying and further exploiting win-win situations where every participating nation delivers and receives its fair share.

European defence is on the table Defence cooperation in the field of capability development will be addressed during the December 2013 EU Council Summit. A rare chance and opportunity to underline the importance of an active Common Security and Defence Policy and to do justice to the importance of the topic that is on the table today: European Defence. Here, we should be ready to answer the abovementioned challenges. As the Netherlands Minister of Defence, Mrs Hennis-Plasschaert, rightfully pointed out at the recent Munich Security Conference: “What we need above all is leadership, long-term commitment and courage”.

Modern Armed Forces for Europe

Fundamental rights are essential for military personnel

The human factor in missions abroad

by Hartmut Bühl, Brussels The “European – Security and Defence Union” magazine, in addition to addressing the grand political concepts and strategies for the security and defence of the European continent, also looks regularly at the situation of the men and women sent by their countries on civil and military crisis-management missions abroad. They work and fight as part of joint multinational headquarters or task forces, or are deployed on national operations. All of them put their lives on the line. Only now is there a dawning realisation of the psychological and social consequences for the people concerned. But this is not the case in all countries.

In order to gain, as far as possible, a Europe-wide perspective on some of the problems, I visited EUROMIL President, Emmanuel Jacob, at his Brussels office. I wanted to ask him whether EUROMIL is making any progress with respect to its call for the freedom of association laid down in Article 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and about the human factor during operations, all of this in the light of the budgetary restrictions affecting the armed forces of practically all EU member states.

Associations are often still seen as undesirable President Jacob did not see why freedom of association should be negatively affected by the current financial crisis, which he thought should, on the contrary, have a federating effect.

He underlined that, unfortunately, over half of European countries’ armed forces personnel still do not enjoy the right to set up and join associations: in some EU countries, the chairmen of military associations are even prosecuted for denouncing certain social or economic conditions, which constitutes a clear discrimination against EU citizens.

He put EUROMIL’s limited progress in this area down to cultur-

al or traditional factors in many nations’ armed forces, whose first contact with modern human resources management methods of the kind applied within the armed forces of northern European countries often takes place within multinational headquarters.

The counteracting forces of military culture “Some nations have come to the conclusion that this idea of the soldier as a social being does not fit into their particular organisational structures, which are not at all geared to participative forms of cooperation. So their first reaction is to go on the defensive”. He considers that the main reason for this is in many cases their particular conception of the soldier’s duty of absolute obedience, and their firm belief that no-one can take care of the interests of military personnel better than their own hierarchy.

New challenges for the associations and EUROMIL At present the main challenge to be tackled is the negative impact of the economic and financial crisis on defence budgets. Emanuel Jacob firmly believes that the resulting cutbacks in national defence spending and in the numerical strength of armed forces have created new challenges for the national associations and for EUROMIL. He argued: “Soldiers pay for the crisis twice. Firstly, we pay our share in the form of new taxes, income reductions, cuts in our national social security systems and other government measures resulting from the crisis. Secondly, as soldiers, we again pay the price of reductions in our defence budgets!”

In answer to my question as to who and what precisely is affected, Mr Jacob was categorical: “When governments decide to make budget cuts, there is not an infinite number of

Military and political personnel demonstrate in favour of freedom of association.

Source: EUROMIL

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

possibilities”. He said that whichever way you look at it and whatever the decisions taken, military personnel ultimately bear the brunt of such cutbacks. “Either budget cuts result in poor training and preparation for military operations abroad, putting our personnel in danger, or the lack of investments leads to soldiers being deployed on missions with inadequate equipment, which is also detrimental to their safety”.

New threats in operations Mr Jacob explained that the threats facing crisis-management forces deployed on multinational missions have changed: over the years they have become more complex, with soldiers and civilian personnel facing delicate political situations in the areas of operations. We live in a world of asymmetrical threats; moreover, in certain regions of the Middle East and North Africa, “personnel are confronted during operations with CBRN threat scenarios”, something that for a long time was no longer imaginable. He refuted my objection that military personnel are, after all, well trained for that purpose, explaining that there was no standard quality of training and equipment even among the forces of the different countries themselves: “Civilian forces – and here I’m thinking of some NGOs – in most cases do not have any protection at all”.

With a view to the comprehensive approach enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, Emanuel Jacob pointed to the need to formulate, in the context of the CBRN Action Plan, common requirements for nations as regards the level of training and equipment. “One day there may even be common European equipment adapted to the requirements of civil and military forces”, he said. Asked who should take the initiative, he designated this a political task for the European Parliament.

International recommendations are to follow Emmanuel Jacob pointed out that EUROMIL has drawn up widely accepted recommendations concerning the points to be taken on board for multinational crisis-management and peacekeeping missions (see insert). His organisation’s calls to adapt equipment and training to new threats are, he says, now being heard: “EUROMIL has for a long time been asking for priority to be given to protective equipment and logistic supply, as well as to armour-plating for vehicles”. While implementation is the responsibility of individual nations, he calls for the joint training of troops in the run-up to a given operation, in order to create synergies and give troops on the ground the ability to adapt in the interests of efficiency. “Those who work together should train together”, he said. Finally, President Jacob stressed a point of particular importance to him, one, moreover, that concerns the deployed personnel of all nations: “Political situations in the areas of operations are always delicate for those who have to be protected, as well as for the protectors themselves. That is why impeccable behaviour on the part of our own personnel in the different theatres – and above all the military personnel who may have to use weapons

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Documentation EUROMIL’s 10 recommendations In the pre-mission phase EUROMIL advocates: 1 That political mandates best reflect the reality of the theatre and the mission, that the number and effect of national caveats are reduced, and forces operate according to common rules of engagement.

2 That adequate pre-deployment training – including the use of identical types of combat gear, equipment and systems as in the mission area- is provided to enhance the skills, effectiveness and safety of the individual soldier and the unit.

3 That appropriate instruction is provided on international law, language skills and cultural awareness during pre-mission training.

4 That combined pre-deployment training of multinational troops occurs in order to optimise the cooperation and interaction of different national contingents in theatre.

In the mission phase EUROMIL advocates: 5 That priority is given to the provision of appropriate personal combat equipment and to ensuring that the standard of armour protection of vehicles is commensurate with the mission, and that logistic supply structures are effective and appropriate.

6 That the families of soldiers are at the outset involved in all support and adaptation programmes in each deployment stage.

7 That appropriate physical and psychological medical care is ensured during military operations.

In the post-mission phase EUROMIL advocates: 8 That long-term medical surveillance and treatment of returning soldiers and veterans is guaranteed through military medical facilities and/or the civilian health care system. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) should be recognised as an occupational sickness of peace-keeping veterans.

9 That vocational and retraining schemes are set up, which facilitate the employment of veterans in the public administration or civilian labour market.

10 That employment and training schemes are established, which permit seriously injured military personnel to be employed by the public/military administration or civilian labour market. source: EUROMIL

– has become more important than ever, for the mission success is affected by the increased publicity brought by the internet and satellite communications”.

Taking care of veterans In response to my last question about the issue closest to his heart, the President of EUROMIL showed no hesitation in replying: “The recognition of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a vocational illness of peacekeeping veterans”. He underlined that the post-deployment phase is more than just the end of the soldiers’ mission during which their health and lives are placed at risk. “The wrap-up phase is also the beginning of diverse processes such as the reintegration into life back home, rebuilding psychological stability, recuperation or creation of self-esteem and pride, future preparation for new contracts or other professional choices”.

Modern Armed Forces for Europe

Certain trends can be turned to our advantage

Trends and strategies in the international armaments sector

by Dr Uwe Nerlich, Director, CEES, Munich

Policymakers, the armed forces and industry have the task, with their differing perspective and interests and against a backdrop of radically different framework conditions and reduced investment in the area of armaments policy, of ensuring that nations are provided with the capabilities that guarantee their long-term capacity for action in an unstable and changing strategic environment.

The framework conditions for investment policy Long-term defence equipment requirements must be assessed in the light of the political, strategic and industrial framework conditions. This entails exploiting other potential uses of equipment in order to increase the margin for manoeuvre in the area of armaments policy and also identifying possibilities for cooperation in order to cover future requirements. There is a need for a far-reaching political and strategic reorientation of armaments policy on one hand, while having to allocate funds and consolidate budgets, leading in the longer term to a reduction of investment capacity, on the other hand. This balancing act is made even more difficult by three additional factors: • NATO’s and the EU’s control over events is reduced and depends increasingly on the capacity and willingness of the leading European powers to take action; • political and social acceptance of military power and protection is declining; • the viability of the defence industry is at risk.

This limited scope for planning is leading to a deterioration of the framework conditions for armaments policy.

Discourse on Germany This is particularly true of Germany, one of the pillars of European defence, due to its traditional culture of military restraint combined with its ongoing lack of an industrial policy.

In Germany, unlike in the US and the UK, but also France, cooperation between government and industry – and the defence industry in particular – remains insufficient.

Today, however, with a view to the development of mutually beneficial strategic as well as product-oriented cooperation extended to include important partner countries, industry, as far as it is strategically relevant, must fulfil several different roles at once. It must be all at once a supplier of capabilities, a provider of services, a provider of security and a strategic

Dr Uwe Nerlich since 2006 partner and founding director of the Center for European Security Strategies (CESS), Munich, an SME with an international network for research and consultancies in support of governments, international organizations, industries and media, drawing down on expertise in many countries and disciplines based on a flexible structure for project work and cooperative ventures.

Dr. Nerlich, studied philosophy and mathematics in Frankfurt/M and Cambridge/England, he has held various fellowships at Harvard University, at the Stanford Center for Advanced Studies et al.. He has served before as Senior Vice-President of IABG, member of the SWP Directorate and chairman of a variety of international and national research His publications cover international security issues as strategy development, geopolitical assessments, decision-making in security organisations, risk-assessments, control of nuclear weapons and materials, national postures, crisis management et al.

partner. The Letter of Intent (LoI) partnership provides one possible model for cooperation. With the extensive reorientation of capabilities and armaments policy, the industrial framework conditions increasingly present a creative challenge: the relationship between the state’s desire to intervene and control on the one hand, and industry’s capacity for action (above all on the part of the remaining companies with a prime contractor capability), on the other, calls for cooperative solutions. This is even more difficult in Germany, with its decreased scope for investment planning combined with the endangered viability of the defence industry.

Structural problems It is becoming increasingly difficult to deal with the armaments sector in isolation. The growing military relevance of the new technologies and their applications is leading to an expansion of this branch to embrace new companies, often small, but also large, defence equipment companies corresponding to its portfolio. With defence budgets dwindling and orders becoming scarcer, the number of SUME (single-use military equipment) companies is likely to further decrease.

In major partner countries the share of outsourced services has grown considerably, increasing the risks for these compa-

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"With the financial crisis there is a risk of nations cutting R&T, an easier measure to take than cuts in the area of personnel or contracts (…). But if the number of military programmes decreases, so does companyfunded R&T, because enterprises can only invest in R&T if there is a prospect of a programme.

The problems compound each other".*

nies, in particular with respect to staffing and planning. This makes international cooperation more difficult, amongst both industries and armed forces. On top of this, the high percentage of COTS products means that there is less room for singleuse military products.

Technological developments in the civilian sector Technological developments in the civilian sector will have currently unpredictable but undoubtedly far-reaching consequences for industrial and armaments planning, because with reduced R&T investment, companies are increasingly opting for the acquisition of foreign high-tech companies, especially in the US, to the detriment of their own R&T investment.

This makes for a greater interest in exports or in an industrial presence on foreign markets, again preferably in the US, as a way of securing technological know-how, which in turn contributes in the medium and longer term to the development of the importing countries’ own industries. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) with their own expanding defence equipment industries, are competitors offering cheaper and more robust platforms and other defence equipment that could be attractive for European companies.

Internationalisation The major cuts in American defence spending will make it even more difficult for European companies to gain a foothold on the US market. Internal competition between European companies on third markets and the failure to focus for each area on one European flagship system in the way that was intended with the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) impose further limitations on European defence equipment industries.

This stands in the way of the international mergers that offer better access to third markets but which do, it is true, tend to

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Claude-France Arnould

weaken the national industry and labour market.

The extension of companies’ activities to include the security sector tends either to weaken industry’s commitment to the defence sector or to create internal structural problems within companies (“two cultures”). This is aggravated by the fact that in the security sector, unlike in the defence sector, there is generally no principal contracting party on the domestic market. In the longer term there could be stronger integration at EU level in this area.

Approaches There are basically four possible approaches: If a country renounces having its own industrial capacity in the defence sector, this also means giving up a considerable amount of technological know-how and becoming more dependent on countries like the US. While in the medium term this may reduce costs, it makes little sense in political and strategic terms; If certain countries, like Germany, continue to renounce having national champions, large companies will lose their ability to become prime contractors and big companies in France and the US will be the ones to dictate the industrial framework conditions for other nations, including in the subcontracting area.

Cooperative solutions are practically impossible without prime contractorship capabilities, i.e. without a quid pro quo, and also uncertain, as illustrated by the example of France, which for every new project for a European system, continues to come up with its own national project, although this is precisely what the EDA was supposed to avoid.

In the case of more radical solutions such as major mergers (EADS/BAE), the state’s interest in intervention and control further reduces the scope for entrepreneurial action.

Modern Armed Forces for Europe

CONFERENCE REPORT

Assessment With the continued reduction of systems capability including for medium-sized enterprises in the armaments sector, the competence for core and stand-by capabilities is also dwindling. Above all this means losing the possibility of reinvesting saved budgetary resources and of taking up production again when there is a future need, while incorporating technological improvements.

Security and defence In both sectors – security and defence – and in most countries, both governments and companies are insufficiently aware of the new roles that are developing for industry.

In the defence sector there are considerable differences between the European partner countries. But in the area of private military services a range of additional tasks is developing, for example in the fields of logistics, energy and communications.

For the purpose of international cooperation at industry level appropriate cooperation at government level could have a structuring effect.

Both sides must be open to broader cooperation in more informal structures, as has been the case for many years – to great effect – with the Defense Science Board (DSB) in the United States. Moreover, with respect to the development of PPP, industry does not take sufficient account of the fact that more than 80% of the critical infrastructure for IC and energy supply is privately owned, which means that enterprises are increasingly themselves becoming security providers.

Technological potential and new options Technological developments are considered to be drivers. But there is a vital difference between technologies that target the effects of products and those contributing systematically to the development of capabilities, thereby opening up new political and strategic options. Technological developments aimed at optimising product effects can generate savings (manpower, logistics, etc.) and to that extent are relevant for capability/armaments planning. But only the latter technological developments are drivers.

Technologies need to be considered as possible drivers for new protective functions, for new environments (e.g. urbanisation), for strategically relevant interactions or for competing parallel developments. The evaluation process must not be confined to assessing their potential for optimising available operational assets.

* In: Défense N° 160/2013, Paris page 9

CATO project meets in Portsmouth

CATO Conference 2013 in Portsmouth photo: © Simon Winson

The 2nd User Advisory Group (UAG) meeting organised by the CATO project took place in Portsmouth, United Kingdom, on 12–13 March 2013.

CATO – which stands for CBRN crisis management: Architecture, Technologies and Operational procedures – is an R&D project funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme (FP7). The project is now in its 2nd year. CATO is developing a holistic open toolbox for dealing with CBRN crises caused by terrorist attacks using non-conventional weapons or on facilities with CBRN material. It addresses the issue of how to overcome the fragmentation in CBRN preparedness and response in particular.

The interaction between users and technology developers is at the core of CATO’s strategy. The CATO consortium includes practitioners from key user categories such as policy and decision makers, incident commanders, first responders and health responders, cooperating with CBRN experts, ethicists, public communication specialists and technologists. To complement this expertise and as part of its strategy to develop an international CBRN CATO Community the CATO consortium regularly interacts with external advisors to collect their feedback on project results.

During the Portsmouth meeting the invited advisors saw an early demonstration of the first CATO Decision Support System functionalities. The Portsmouth invitees were highly animated about the tool, discussed key features and suggested future improvements, notably on the system look and feel.

The 1st CATO Laboratory release, featuring a broad range of CATO tools, will be launched in June 2013. The CATO solution will then be improved until the project end through continued interaction with an increasingly large user and expert community. > Learn more about the CATO project: http://www.cato-project.eu/

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Budgets in the US and Europe will remain constrained for years to come, accelerating a number of paradigm shifts in military aviation. Sophisticated aircraft may be increasingly designed and produced by emerging powers, and the number and nature of both manned and unmanned platforms will change in the coming decade. At the same time, greater efficacies and savings will be sought at both ends of the aircraft lifecycle, resulting in more fuel-efficient engine design and greater competition for the increasingly important maintenance, repair, and overhaul market.

Shifts in funding and requirements drive changes in military aviation

“Top 5 Trends” in military aviation

by Christina Balis, Doug Berenson and Aleksander Jovovic, Avascent, Paris/Washington

The future of aviation is as much about predicting obsolescence as it is about imagining the “next big thing.” Five trends, in particular, illustrate the underlining shifts in supply and demand within a rapidly globalizing military aviation market.

1. Fighters vs. Logisticians Notwithstanding the attention paid to global fighter jet competitions – from India to Brazil to South Korea – transport and cargo aircraft of various sizes have shown considerably more staying power. Economics explains much of this trend. While the unit cost of fighter aircraft has grown exponentially in line with their growing sophistication, production volumes have steadily declined. In 1980, an F-16A could still be acquired at a

price tag of less than US$ 20 million and produced in very large volumes (175 aircraft for the US Air Force alone). By 1993, the inflation-adjusted unit cost of an F-16C had exceeded US$ 42 million (based on a US production volume of just 24 aircraft). In fiscal year 2013, the US Air Force expects to pay more than US$ 176 million per aircraft for 19 F-35 (in anticipation of an overall production run of 1,763 for its own requirements and nearly 700 F-35B and F-35C aircraft for the Marine Corps and Navy, respectively). Even light attack aircraft such as India’s Tejas or Korea’s TA-50 have proven costly, and relatively cost-effective options like Sweden’s Gripen will likely satisfy the needs of only a small number of countries. Moreover, as emerging countries like India, Turkey and Korea have

The French fighter aircraft Rafale in the naval version landing on the runway of aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle

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photo: Pascal Subtil

Photo: Airbus

Airpower and its role in conflicts

Airpower and its role in conflicts

ploughed significant funds into costly and uncertain fifth-generation Research & Development programs, upgrades and life extension of existing aircraft become increasingly preferable.

Transport aircraft, on the other hand, have fared well in the era of expeditionary warfare. In addition to new offerings by established players such as Lockheed Martin and new entrants such as Airbus’s A400M, suppliers from Russia, China and Brazil are entering the fray. Beyond their relative affordability, the increasingly multi-purpose nature of such aircraft – ranging from combat support and maritime patrol to search-and-rescue operations and disaster response – accounts for much of their attractiveness.

The authors are senior staff members at Avascent (www.avascent.com), a leading strategy and management consulting firm specialising in defence, security, and government-driven markets.

Christina Balis is a principal and heads Avascent’s European operations.

Doug Berenson

2. A shifting battlefield for UAS Even before last month’s cancellation of Germany’s Euro Hawk program, France’s decision to procure Reaper surveillance drones – a potential setback to the development of a European alternative – and US president Obama’s national security speech on 23 May marking a shift in US policy for drone strikes, the future for the relatively new breed of remotely piloted aircraft looked uncertain. The next five years are unlikely to be a repeat of the past five years, when unmanned aerial systems (UAS) saw a near-doubling of spending. The obstacles are as much political and regulatory in origin as they are economic and technological in nature. High-end systems, in particular, will face significant challenges. The next wave of UAS and high altitude long-endurance (HALE) systems, such as Boeing’s Phantom Eye and QinetiQ’s Zephyr, are early in their lifecycle and will require significant investment to materialize.

Budgets in the US and Europe will remain constrained for years to come, risking further delays for some programs. More likely in the near term is the conversion of a large part of the existing UAS inventory, originally designed for fairly benign

is a partner and leads the firm’s military aviation and Avascent Analytics practice areas.

Aleksander Jovovic is a senior associate and co-leads the firm’s international defence activities.

environments, to more capable aircraft through hardening of communication links and improving survivability.

3. The rise of the rest In few areas is indigenization among emerging countries more uncertain, and yet potentially most disruptive to established procurement patterns, than in the aviation space. Aspiring powers across the globe are investing in advanced aircraft

The Ukrainian airlifter Antonov 124, the biggest transport aircraft in service around the world

photo: Dave Ashton

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Data captures investment spending in 42 of the world’s largest defence markets, excluding China and Russia, accounting for more than 90% of the industry-addressable market.

Source: Avascent Analytics

designs in an effort to strengthen indigenous industrial capabilities. Bolstered by their experience in commercial aerospace, local government support, and defence offset programs, firms such as Korea’s KAI, Turkey’s TAI, India’s HAL, Brazil’s Embraer, and China’s AVIC have embarked on complex and tenuous military aviation programs. In many instances the end-state remains unclear: are these countries simply priming their industrial base or will these programs result in true platforms? Some countries may split the difference opting for a hybrid solution, as is the case with India’s fifth-generation fighter aircraft, largely based on a Russian design. Others may in the end settle for proven foreign solutions. The day, however, when emerging countries will be able to showcase their own successful advanced military aviation programs is not too distant.

future acquisition programs is greater fuel efficiency. Like their civilian counterparts, military aircraft operators are looking for ways to reduce total cost, to which fuel is a key contributor.

Military planners, however, have additional operational challenges to contend with, including fewer available domestic and foreign air bases and increased loads in terms of sensors and weapons. One current example is the US Air Force’s ADVENT program, aimed at deriving 25 per cent fuel efficiencies, likely through a sophisticated combination of high- and low-bypass turbofan technology. For most countries, however, the answer lies in commercial engine improvements that can trickle down to the military aircraft market. Even China, rare in its willingness to invest significant resources in new jet engine development (estimated by some at €37 billion over the next two decades), will sooner or later have to grapple with the more mundane challenge of fuel efficiency.

4. Fuelling efficiency While Western Research & Development spending on new military aircraft engines is fairly meagre, one trend driving

Eurofighter Typhoon over Austria

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photo: Max Pfandl, cc

5. The next race: MRO Over the past decades, air forces have amassed an impressive inventory of fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft. Lockheed F-16s and C-130s, Boeing F-15 variants, Bell Hueys, Sikorsky Blackhawks and Eurocopter Cougars, trainers like the BAE Systems Hawk and Embraer EMB-312 Tucano and EMB-314 Super Tucano, and MiGs of various designations – to list some notable ones. The sheer diversity of these platforms, combined with countries’ increasing propensity to upgrade legacy aircraft rather than procuring new platforms, suggest strong future demand for maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) requirements, ranging from life extension to capability upgrades and outright repurposing. The 2012 award to BAE Systems to upgrade more than 130 F-16s in South Korea’s fleet was the first time such a major contract on a military aircraft went to a firm other than the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). While this may set only a limited precedent for combat aircraft, platforms closer to commercial technical standards can be expected to attract strong competition by non-OEMs relatively early in their lifespans.

Airpower and its role in conflicts

CONFERENCE REPORT

EuroDefense Council of Presidents Meeting Paris, 17-19 April 2013 From 17 to 19 April, the French EuroDefense association welcomed the EuroDefense Council of Presidents in Paris, where the meeting took place. EuroDefense is a network of national associations represented in 13 EU Member States1, whose main objective is to contribute to the debates on European security and defence, but also to draw the attention of relevant political actors to this topic and inform European citizens about the stakes, challenges and determining factors which condition its effectiveness. EuroDefense members debate, conduct common studies on various aspects of European defence and the EuroAtlantic relationship, and organise na-

tional and international seminars and events in which aspects of European defence are brought up for discussion.

The last President meeting in Paris offered the opportunity to get informed about the various activities of the national ED-associations, but what is more to elaborate a common contribution of the EDNetwork to be sent to President Van Rompuy in preparation of the December 2013 European Council on defence. This document focuses in particular on the need to clarify the level of Member State and European Union’s ambition concerning the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the conditions that are to be fulfilled to make the EU’s rapid response capabilities more effective, and the importance to strengthen the C2 struc-

Conference Reports tures and to implement an efficient European defence industrial and technological basis.

On the second day an interesting visit to the MBDA office was organised – whose level of European integration must be underscored – followed by a seminar at which participants could discuss the problematic of achieving the European necessary capabilities for defence.

The next international EuroDefensemeeting will take place in the Netherlands in October 2013.

1 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Nederland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, United Kingdom.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

CONFERENCE REPORT

Real progress hampered by national interests European Defence Agency (EDA) Annual Conference 2013 (Hb) This was a meeting of all those with any say in the debate about European security and defence policy. Never before had an EDA conference seen such a high density of top-ranking experts as this one, organised with a view to the Defence Council of Heads of State and Government in December of this year, and bringing together 500 participants.

But speakers’ calls for some progress at last to be made in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) were sobering. It soon became clear that ultimately everything depends on the Member States with their primary focus on national interests, and for which a common European defence takes a back seat.

EDA Chief Executive Claude-France Arnould stressed the importance of innovation and cooperation in times of financial austerity. She called for attention to be paid to European industrial and technological potential, which needed to be steered in the right direction. She sketched a critical picture of the possibilities left open to the agency by the nations, but nonetheless noted the highly positive results in specific areas such as pooling and sharing.

More realism and farsightedness European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton stressed that rather than bemoaning shrinking defence budgets we needed to make the most of existing resources. Capabilities needed to be pooled and shared and made available to the EU for a rapid political and military response.

There were three aspects to the CSDP: • A political component, concerning the will to fulfil Europe’s ambitions on the world stage • An operational component: ensuring

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burial of the CSDP. It was time to set the course for common action; too much time had already been wasted.

Conference Reports that Europe has the right military capabilities to be able to project its power • An economic component, which was about jobs, innovation and growth Fulfilling common responsibilities EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy said he realised that for the nations, defence meant national defence as much as deploying abroad. What was really important was to define “under what conditions we can fulfil our separate and joint security responsibilities”. Everything depended on the nations, which were the ones “in the driver’s seat”. They were the ones with the capabilities, whereas the EU was there as a facilitator and to help build trust.

Technological innovation – the basis for progress In many areas of defence cooperation the EU was still hardly at the beginning, he explained. This was true above all in the area of technological innovation for the European Technological and Industrial Base (ETIB) but also in that of procurement. If you leave things too late they will cost you more money: “reluctance becomes unaffordable”, he noted.

Scant hope of progress The Chairman of the EP Subcommittee on Security and Defence, Arnaud Danjean MEP, was sceptical about the future development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). If European governments did not show a real will to cooperate and continued to give priority to fine words and declarations of intent, he said, we might in a few years’ time witness the

Experience Leading political, military and industrial representatives gathered in panels to discuss the future of the CSDP. In the first panel, EADS President Dr Thomas Enders openly expressed his disappointment at the fact that there were no longer any flagship projects in Europe in the field of security and defence. Facing a decade of a further decline in defence budgets, “we need to provide EDA with ‘serious’ money and some ‘serious’ instruments to try to push forward decisions”, he said. EU Military Committee Chairman General Patrick de Rousier spoke in the second panel in a similar vein. To find future common projects that lived up to nations’ expectations was difficult enough, but for any long-term project it was also necessary from the outset to ensure that it was explained to the public.

In the panel on defence cooperation with Dassault President Eric Trappier, the discussion focused on putting existing agreements within the EU into practice: the Code of Conduct or, in the field of procurement, pooling and sharing, were a case in point. In this respect industry too must play its part.

Looking ahead Notwithstanding this critical assessment of the situation, this conference was clearly focused on the future. It was a timely event that should bring some influence to bear upon the December 2013 summit.

Airpower and its role in conflicts

News: Reconstruction and Democratisation in Mali European Parliament Motion for Resolution, 4 June 2013 (Excerpts) The Parliament 1. Stresses its commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali; welcomes the French intervention in support of these principles as a first step towards the reconstruction and democratisation of Mali; calls for strong EU involvement in this process; 2. Supports a Malian-led political process enabling the country to achieve long-term political stability and economic prosperity; underlines the importance of inclusive national dialogue, and of the reconciliation process, in the effort to reach a genuine and democratic political solution to the country’s recurrent crisis; welcomes, in this context, the establishment of a Commission for National Dialogue and Reconciliation, and expresses hope that it is rapidly made operational; welcomes the nomination of a woman and a Tuareg as vice-presidents of this Commission as a sign of a commitment to inclusiveness and plurality in the political process; (…)

4. Urges swift implementation of the

roadmap, in order to sustain the transition until the constitutional order and the rule of law has been re-established throughout the country through the organisation of democratic, free, fair and transparent elections in 2013; welcomes the commitment on the part of the Malian authorities to move rapidly towards the elections, as well as the declarations by leaders of the transitional government not to stand for election; acknowledges the challenges that the organisation of the elections pose, including tasks such as ensuring security in the northern areas, issuing biometric voter cards and registering refugees on the electoral rolls, and calls on the EU and its international partners to step up their support for the upcoming electoral process; welcomes, in this respect, the intention of sending an EU electoral observation mission, as requested by the Malian government; (…)

7. Insists that any political solution to rebuild Mali needs to be accompanied by a clear and sustainable economic development strategy that addresses the problem of unemployment in order to improve the livelihood of the

population, and stresses that the provision of basic services such as health, education, water and sanitation must be resumed as they are essential to the stability of the country; believes that institutional reforms are necessary to ensure political stability and to allow the Malian community as a whole to be involved in building the country’s future; (…)

12. Stresses that security and development in the Sahel are mutually reinforcing; welcomes the initial intervention by France, reinforced by the AFISMA, to halt further destabilisation and to counter extremist forces; underlines the important complementary role of the EU Training Mission (EUTM Mali) in providing decisive assistance in building the longerterm capacity of the Malian army; recalls that longer-term stability, security and territorial integrity of the country requires not only that violent and radical extremists – and traffickers in arms, drugs and people – are defeated but that alternatives to the illegal activities of impoverished people and unemployed youth are promoted; Source: European Parliament (…)

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

A new large aerospace programme will strengthen and streamline the industry

Europe needs to preserve technologies, capabilities and talent in defence

by Domingo Ureña Raso, CEO, Airbus Military, Madrid

Once again, Europe has the opportunity to build a common approach to its defence policy. This December the EU Council should agree to address key topics that will shape the capabilities of the Union in Defence and Security for the coming decades, precisely at a time of economic constraints and growing doubts about the role of the European institutions.

The aim of this Council will be to increase the effectiveness and enhance the development of capabilities and to strengthen Europe’s defence industry, and we fully support this.

We need some common sense agreements to tackle this issue: we must protect technology and capabilities to generate innovation, avoid wasteful duplication in those capabilities, create or reinforce a truly European Defence Agency (the EDA could be the basis for this, or an amalgamated EDA/OCCAR) and define some large transversal and multinational projects that will foster technology and help bond industrial capabilities, as has happened in the past.

The market demands a European champion We need common sense agreements Despite discussions in 2005, no clear progress has been made since on the matter. The issues that Europe will have to face are well known: the national interest placed above the European interest; protection of the national champion as a matter of national pride, a very fragmented market with unlimited local specifications, and above all no European vision able to provide clear guidelines to the industry for the future.

The first A400M delivered to the French Air Force

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The consolidation of the defence industry in Europe is a pending issue that must be resolved. Duplication of efforts increases costs and reduces efficiency. Competition is good, but the market demands a real European champion with enough power to be able to compete on an equal footing with its mainly American rivals.

Also, the industry needs to be managed on more commercial terms. We all know and accept that the defence industry

© Airbus Military 2013, by e m company / A. Doumenjou

Airpower and its role in conflicts

Domingo Ureña Raso requires strict regulations and all the necessary approval and controls from the authorities for its exports, but at industrial and operational level too much governmental interference only increases complexity and reduces efficiency. EADS is a good example of this, as well as some of the big aerospace programmes that European industry has developed.

The defence industry has a great capacity for innovation The defence industry in Europe has demonstrated a great capacity for innovation over the years and has been able to create new technologies, thanks to the talent and dedication of hundreds of thousands of highly skilled professionals. This capacity to generate innovation and technology must be preserved, even in times of budget constraints. If we lose the talent now, it will be almost impossible to recover it when the need arises in the future. Over time, the industry has demonstrated that it is well prepared to work in a cooperative mode and to bring to the market products that are at the forefront of technology. The A400M is the latest of those achievements and is a clear demonstration of innovation, despite difficult conditions and specifications to suit the needs of seven countries.

The reduction in the defence budgets at European level makes it even more urgent to take measures to increase the efficiency of the defence sector. For this, collaborative programmes across Europe are a key instrument: they are the only way to be financially sustainable and are paramount for strengthening and streamlining the industry, as well as for preserving technologies, capabilities and skilled human resources.

Pooling and sharing is the right way Besides this, there is a need to rationalise assets and for this the “pooling and sharing” concept would be an efficient solution for the EU. The agreement on the joint use of air-to-air refuelling aircraft is a good start, but this should be extended to other capabilities, offering gains in efficiency and availability. The A400M is a good example, but why not apply the same concept in the fields of Search and Rescue, Maritime Patrol, etc.?

And additionally, these joint agreements can perfectly be extended to the area of support services. The new generation of aircraft such as the A400M and A330MRTT have superior reliability, closer to that of their commercial counterparts, and greater flexibility. Governments are currently starting to outsource more and more support services. The scheme selected by the Royal Air Force for the air-to-air refuelling capability could show the path, and the industry must be prepared to deliver.

Managing Director, Airbus Military and member of both the EADS and the Airbus Executive Committee since February 2009.

He was born in Camarena (Toledo) and graduated in 1982 from the Polytechnic University of Madrid 1982 started his career as an engineer in CASA in Spain. 1989 Airbus Industrie, Toulouse.

1998 CEO and Member of the Board of Aircelle’s joint venture between Airbus Industries and SNECMA. 2002 CEO of the first privatised defence company in Poland, PZL, and then Member of the Board for the Eurofighter programme, Munich. 2004 Restructuring EADS Defence division. 2006 Airbus Industries Toulouse as Head of the Airbus Industrial Strategy team. 2007 in charge of the vital Airbus “Power 8” turn around programme.

Europe today is a relatively secure place. But if we want to keep our society secure, European institutions and governments should be ready to invest enough. The protection of Europe by US forces is a thing of the past, while the threats to the EU continue and are growing in sophistication.

We must invest in security and force projection In addition, it is increasingly necessary for Europe to protect its citizens abroad; it must provide credible force projection with increased and modern capabilities if it wishes to play a role on the global scene.

Conflicts like Afghanistan, Libya or Mali have shown, on the one hand, the need for and determination of Europe to intervene to safeguard its own interests or to support its allies. On the other hand, they also showed the gaps in Europe’s ability to execute missions and the poor strategic punch it has. These limitations have an impact on agility and on the capability to fulfil the mission and increase the risks for European troops on the field.

In the future, Europe will need to act in other scenarios and must be prepared to support complex operations far from home. Mali, just 2 000 kilometres away, shows the European gaps, but also offers a great opportunity. In this case, the solution now exists. The A400M and MRTT would have dramatically changed the way in which this operation could have been performed, saving time, and probably lives. With the upcoming first delivery of the A400M and the recent start of operations of the A330MRTT, more efficient tools will be available for forces.

In summary, Europe needs a clear path in the area of defence policy over the coming decades. This is the stepping-stone to determining future needs and will show the industry where we need to invest and preserve knowledge. December 2013 is a great opportunity to take the appropriate decisions and to protect European interests and the European citizens.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

CONFERENCE REPORT

BIG DATA – Security Challenges/Demand for Spectrum AFCEA – TechNet Europe 2013, Warsaw 27 to 28 May 2013 TechNet Europe 2013, opened by the General Manager of AFCEA Europe, Major General (ret.) Klaus Peter Treche, focused on the challenges that powerful communications and information applications have to cope with today and in the future: Security Challenges in an era of cyber threats and increasing demand for spectrum resulting from advanced communications and IT applications. He explained to the some 250 participants from both sides of the Atlantic that the challenge of the conference on highly topical big data issues, addressing opinion-leaders and decision-makers in government and industry as well as representatives of academia, was to find “practical answers” to the many open issues related to the conference theme.

“The theme of this year’s TechNet Europe 2013 was chosen at a very good moment, since interest in this issue is growing (...)

Opening On behalf of the Polish Ministry of Defence, Vice Admiral Waldemar Glusko, Vice Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, said he was happy to host TechNet Europe 2013 in Poland’s capital Warsaw. The conference theme was highly topical, because the Polish Armed Forces were facing the same problems as

“Big data are highly varied high-volume, high-speed information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight and decision-making.” Gartner Inc we are all engaged in the race against time. Cyber attacks are on the increase and we cannot exclude acts against critical infrastructure”, commented Polish Member of the European Parliament Krzystof Lisek in his welcome address.

Technical presentations by industry and specialist debates alternated with highlevel panel discussions and so-called “eye-openers” describing big data scenarios in a dense programme that set the political and industrial scene and captivated the audience during this two-day conference.

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all the partner nations and were looking for partners in order to solve the evolving issues, taking into account the fact that military operations today and in the future would always be accomplished in coalitions and would therefore require “common solutions”.

Mr Rini Goos, Deputy CE of the European Defence Agency (EDA), responding to

Conference Reports

General Treche’s and Admiral Glusko’s comments on the need for reliable communications both for ongoing military engagements and in the run-up to future missions, said: “A Common Operations Picture and Situation Awareness are the main drivers of the trend of ‘whatever, wherever, whenever’, but data centres are a challenge. Data storage is a huge weapon, creating possibilities for cross-checking information, but also creating dependency and vulnerability”. He underscored the high price to be paid for ubiquitous connectivity. Thus cyber security has become a top priority for the nations and EDA. Setting the scene To set the scene, Petr Jirásek, Cyber Security Adviser and Chairman of the AFCEA Cyber Security Group, led a Panel composed of Eurocorps Commander Lt. Gen. de Bavinchove, NATO’s Director General International Military Staff Lt.Gen. Bornemann and John Palfreyman from IBM UK. Mr Palfreyman discussed the global technology needed for defence transformation, while General de Bavinchove drew on his 12 months’ experience as ISAF Commander to advise industry on communication and cyber protection issues.

General Bornemann explained how NATO intended to tackle the problems posed by the financial crisis.

Big data in the field of security, business and defence During three panels moderated by former RAF Air Commodore Bruce Wynn, Mr Christop De Preter from LUCIAD, Belgium, and German Navy Captain Jörg Hillmann, industry representatives discussed big data prospects in the area of security, business and defence. Firstly focusing on Homeland and Border Security issues, secondly on questions resulting from multinational military operations and

Airpower and its role in conflicts

folk/VA, which extended the debate to NATO’s conceptual ideas on cooperation with industry and first deliberations on a post-horizon 2025 strategy.

thirdly on technical solutions in the fields of cross-domain guards, cyber resiliency and cyber espionage. While the defenceoriented panel dealt predominantly with operational aspects and the need for increased spectrum availability, the business-oriented panel focused on secure networks and data storage.

In particular, ORACLE Austria elaborated on the use of big data for intelligence and event management at the 2012 NATO Chicago Summit and LUCIAD Belgium on the challenges and opportunities arising from big data storage in the cloud. In spite of the many theoretical aspects to be discussed in the panels, the predominant issue in all sessions was that of the practical options for handling big data in the era of cyber threats.

Summarising the application panels, Professor Holger Mey, chief strategic planner of CASSIDIAN, provided a future-oriented industry perspective on security and defence, calling on politicians to meet the

Major Gen. (ret.) K.-P. Treche and General Mieczyslawik Bienek. photo: Cezary Reginis, Norfolk

challenge of keeping strategic processes flowing at a time of growing threats and diminishing security and defence budgets.

Conclusions The closing highlight, picking up on the remarks about lessons learned by the Polish Armed Forces during ISAF operations, was the keynote address by General Mieczyslawik Bienek, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Nor-

Finally, the President of AFCEA International, Kent Schneider, underlined in his closing remarks that there was clearly no single answer to the issue of dealing with big data. Nonetheless, he said, there had been a good discussion with the representatives of NATO, EDA, the Polish General Staff and the Warsaw Military University and a wide spread of industry perspectives. “I encourage you to continue discussing this issue”, he said.

Conference organiser Klaus-Peter Treche expressed his satisfaction with the depth of the discussions and excellent level of participation. He extended invitations to the AFCEA TechNet International to be held on 23-24 October 2013 in Lisbon, again to be organised in cooperation with the NATO Communications and Information Agency.

Participants’ opinions: Miss Zoë Williams, you are CEO of Carlton Connections, a SME in the UK. What field does your company work in?

Carlton Connections specialises in helping companies increase their business in international organisations and governments.

Key to the success of this undertaking is a wide understanding of perspectives and developments in industry and academia, as well as the operational needs and requirements of organisations and governments.

So what is the added value of Technet Europe 2013 for you?

Technet is the ideal conference to understand these things. I leave with a better understanding of the big data area: the increasing challenges and the future possibilities.

Kent Schneider, you are the President of AFCEA International and you came to Warsaw to observe TechNet 2013. Did the Conference give you an answer to big data issues?

Yes, the number of views on the implementation and governance of big data was impressive.

There was also a good deal of discussion on security in a big data environment.

Many issues associated with big data were explored were explored, many solutions were suggested and case studies reported.

While the big data issue does not lend itself to a single answer, this has been a useful and productive conference.

AFCEA Tech Net International 23-24 October 2013, Lisbon Congress Centre, Portugal

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

A European BMD architecture must be transparent and take the issue of Russia on board

The role of Europe in NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence

by Bernd Kreienbaum, Execrutive Advisor IABG for Defence and Security, Brussels

In March 1983, US President Ronald Reagan launched the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Initiative called the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), which became known as “Star Wars”.

30 years and about US$ 200 billion later, BMD has reached Europe as a NATO programme. Since 2002 the US Missile Defence Agency (MDA) alone has spent US$ 90 billion on BMD and is continuing to spend more than $8 billion per year for the development of land-, sea-, and space-based sensors to track missiles, as well as ballistic missile interceptors and a battle management system. Now, the overarching questions for Europe are: what is the price Europe has to pay for building a European BMD capability in the next two decades and will it become a “buy American” solution only, or is there a chance for European technologies and true participation?

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit the NATO Heads of State and Government (HOSG) agreed on a risk perception focused on Iran, without naming that Islamic state, and defining BMD in a “top down” process as an “essential military mission”1 and as a new Alliance focus. The NATO Secretary General even declared BMD to be a “game changer” in the relations and cooperation with Russia. The objective of the NATO BMD programme is to defend Europe indivisibly by intercepting missiles of all ranges at all stages of flight.

At the 2012 Chicago Summit a first operational BMD Interim Capability was declared and praised. Certainly more a political manifestation than one of operational relevance, it shows that a BMD capability for Europe is under way. This is underlined by the fact that NATO has just started the process for releasing, in autumn 2013, some €68 million for a contract award to BMD System Engineering and Integration (SE&I).

NATO’s objective is to defend Europe indivisibly Before Lisbon the political argumentation was based on the assumption that the lion’s share of BMD would be paid for by the US through its Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), building in four steps on sea- and land-based AEGIS systems with SM-3 interceptors of different types as a national contribution to the European BMD System. This US contribution would provide, in steps, full “upper layer” coverage (exo-atmospheric interceptors) indivisibly for all European populations, territory and forces. NATO would pay a common amount of no more than €200 million in addition to the ongoing Theatre BMD Pro-

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Bernd Kreienbaum Mr Kreienbaum is the Brussels-based representative of IABG, the German Technology Think Tank and Simulation & Integration Company. He studied Electronic, Radar & Communication Engineering. He served previously in various positions in the German Air Force and Ministry of Defence. Since 2010, alongside his US counterpart, BG (ret) Bob Dehnert (Raytheon), he has been the European coChair of the NATO Industrial Advisory Study Groups (SG-151/172) on industrial and technology BMD aspects. He served for nine years, up to January 2007, in the NATO International Staff, Defence Investment Division, as Deputy Head Joint Armaments Section and Special Programme Coordinator, covering also NATO’s major Missile Defence and Theatre Missile Defence activities. At the AIAA Multinational Missile Defence Conference in September 2007 he received the prestigious David R. Israel Award for his meritorious achievements in Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence during his tenure at NATO.

gramme, while the European partners may contribute with some “lower layer” (Patriot/MEADS) and gap-filling capabilities on a voluntary basis, and that’s it.

Reality and consequences This strategy worked well to get the programme launched, but in the meantime there is clearly a change of awareness and some political and military illusions are fading away. The US PAA will certainly remain a key element and a welcome contribution to the European BMD capability, but it does not provide indivisible protection for the whole of Europe and is limited against longer-range and faster missiles, as well as being far from robust in military terms. The recent cancellation of PAA Phase IV – addressing some longer-range intercept capabilities – was evidence that an “adaptive approach” is not a commitment and that it is vulnerable to political changes and budget constraints. The argument that dropping this phase would make no difference for Europe is factitious. If North Korea’s ICBM2 are a threat for the US, then the same is true for Europe. If we assume that PAA IV would have included some kind of ICBM defence capability, then its termination is taking this capability away from Europe. What are the key issues?

1. For the moment the architecture of the future European BMD system with the US PAA and beyond is undefined and consequently the costs are unknown, not only for Europe but also

Airpower and its role in conflicts

The exo-atmosphere: artist's impression Source: NIAG

for the US. What BMD and PAA III will finally look like and how the gaps, not only as regards longer-range threats, may be closed is a matter of speculation regardless of volatile political statements. The system’s full cost is unknown because there was no agreed definition of its elements, or in other words of the architecture. And this is the key problem of the NATO BMD Programme: the lack of a NATO Staff Requirement (NSR) beyond the Command & Control (C2) Functions defining a BMD system of systems embedded in European geography and also mapping European elements in a flexible architecture.

It is obvious that BMD is becoming a multi-billion exercise for Europe as well, and that Germany and France in particular will have to bear a significant portion of the costs. The US is no longer ready to pay for Europe; as the Chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee (Michael Turner) stated last spring: “the United States can no longer afford, if it ever could, to pay for Europe’s missile defence all by itself, especially not if it means neglecting the missile defence of the American people”.

Concerns are being raised about the Command & Control (C2) cycle, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the NATO European influence on the Concept of Operations. Many of the assumed intercepts may occur over Russian territory, but in a European security environment BMD cross-border operations need to be coordinated and agreed with all nations that may be affected: it is not a NATO Article V issue only. In this regard the role and involvement of the Russian Federation is still fuzzy. As yet there has been no visible progress with respect to the Lisbon Summit promises of NATO-Russia cooperation on BMD.

A European influence on the BMD architecture?

It will be imperative to understand what the European BMD capability should look like and what needs to be built in the coming decades, depending on the evolving risks. It will be

essential to define one or more target architectures for a robust European BMD System that clearly goes beyond the US PAA in substance. To do so, the players must agree on a comprehensive requirement for all necessary elements, comprising sensors, Command & Control, interceptors, and support assets including European contributions. Finally they need to agree on an implementation roadmap clearly beyond the assumed timelines of PAA and defining the architecture evolution plan, the transatlantic balance and the European contributions. At the same time they must clarify the role and contributions of Russia. This will only be feasible if “Burden and Benefit” sharing in terms of technical and industrial participation is taken seriously.

Can Europe’s CSDP3 continue to ignore BMD? This question has been explored in depth by several European nations4 and further analysis is ongoing. In parallel a NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) Study delivered in the run-up to the 2012 Chicago Summit also gave a good picture of European industrial capabilities.

This study performed by about 40 transatlantic industries from 12 nations was pretty impressive, showing that Europe too has a significant range of BMD capabilities and technologies to offer. It provides a compendium of some 50 national, European and transatlantic projects that can be used as toolbox for the development of a robust BMD architecture, covering the main fields of Sensors, Command and Control and Interceptors.

Here are just a few examples: - shared European deployment of a synergetic Space Situation Awareness (SSA) and BMD Radar network serving interagency (civil/military) requirements, which would even be more profitable if done together with Russia; - shared development of a European space-based Early Warn-

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

also other European nations in the way of a smooth and ing and Tracking (EW&T) capability putting an to end Eusuccessful programme planning and management process. rope’s full dependence on foreign sources; Moreover this would have an overall negative impact on the - sharing of the new Dutch sea-based long range Radar development of a European security identity involving Russia.

(SMART-ELR) amongst European Navies as a provision for a forward-based BMD sensor; In conclusion - shared development of a European exo-atmospheric interThe Lisbon NATO decision in favour of a European BMD capaceptor to cover BMD territorial requirements beyond the bility is now a fact that can scarcely be reversed without limited SM-3 performance.

The reasons why the EU must inevitably formally engage in damaging NATO, whereas the US PAA’s performance is limited BMD are its overarching goal of a Common Security and and European contributions will be essential to provide indiDefence Policy (CSDP) and its growing responsibility for space visible security for Europe. matters. The EU mandate for the development of a European A NATO/European BMD Roadmap timeline is needed, matching Space Policy and Strategy, the tasking of the European ComEuropean contributions until 2030 and beyond, while taking mission (EC) with developing a Space Situational Awareness the current US PAA scope as an important building block in the (SSA) Capability and ensuring space infrastructure safety start-up phase. But it is an absolute prerequisite for European already constitute BMD-relevant BMD architecture to take the elements. Furthermore, the EU issue of Russia on board and to European industries have to initiative for the development of provide operational transparenacknowledge that BMD and related fields an “International Code of Concy as a baseline for a cooperawill become one of the very few growing duct for Outer Space Activities” tive and interoperable aphas an indirect link with BMD, proach. investment areas for NATO and the prompting US officials to particiEuropean industries are getting European Defence Community. pate in and monitor this activity ready to play a role in BMD on closely.

B. Kreienbaum the basis of available technoloIt has to be assumed that Eurogies and focused developpean Space capabilities in the ments; they seem open to security and defence domain have the same strategic relemultinational and transatlantic cooperation efforts that invance, which has forced Europe to invest in the Galileo indeclude Russian industries. They have to acknowledge that BMD pendent Navigation System, ensuring that its contributions and related fields will become one of the very few growing make Europe a relevant partner for NATO and Washington. investment areas for NATO and the European Defence Community. They face demanding challenges along the way ahead towards BMD in Europe. The alternatives are “to provide A role for Russia? budgets or to lose sovereignty”. Either Europe plays the role NATO and national BMD architecture and performance studies of “gap-filler” for the US PAA, which is insufficient for the came to the conclusion that the use of Russian territory and indivisible defence of Europe, gives it a very limited say in the radars and interoperability with Russia’s capabilities would architecture design and means buying US Systems, or else make a huge difference, offering a better defence (in terms of Europe engages as a NATO partner and strives for an “open & depth and performance), less strain on architectures and, in indivisible” architecture with European contributions and particular, lower costs.

Russian cooperation. European agencies like the European Taking into account that many intercepts in the defence of Defence Agency (EDA) and OCCAR5 are well suited for the Europe would occur over Russian territory and that boosters acquisition and management of BMD “pooling & sharing” and debris would fall on its territory, the NIAG BMD Study efforts in support of relevant NATO activities.

Group recommended follow-on efforts to determine the impact of Russian territory and technology on the European BMD design, as well as the continuation of a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) TMD interoperability study, which should be expanded to investigate industrial cooperation opportunities with 1 Lisbon Declaration No. 36: “...we have decided that the Alliance will develop a Russia. missile defence capability to pursue its task of collective defence.”

It must be realised that if NATO and Europe – including Russia 2 ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.

– are not able to agree on a stepped approach towards an 3 The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a major component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and was formerly known as the interoperable and cooperative BMD System, this could beEuropean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). come a birth defect with fatal consequences for the NATO BMD 4 Example: Report by Hubert Védrine to the French President, 14.Nov.2013. programme. If no solution to the Russian issue is found, 5 OCCAR: Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d’armement (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation) political hurdles are likely to be placed not only by Russia but

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Visit us at Europe’s leading event on Civil Protection!

www.civil-protection.com

9th European Congress on Civil Protection

Top-Speakers

Klaus-Dieter Fritsche, State Secretary, Federal Ministry of the Interior

18th – 19th September 2013 Mag. Mag. (FH) Harald Kogler, Director General for Public Security, Ministry of the Interior, Austria

Maritim Hotel Bonn The European Congress on Civil Protection This specialized congress for disaster-management and civil protection as well as

Dr. Florika Fink-Hooijer, DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), European Commission

The Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, as well as the Federal Agency for Technical Relief have an advisory role in the programme design. Fire Brigades and Relief Organizations support this congress as well. This congress welcomes about 700 participants from more than 20 countries every year.

Focus this year » 1st day: Education and Training in national and international Civil Protection » 2nd day: Population Health Protection Contact:

Verena Müller, verena.mueller@behoerdenspiegel.de, Phone: +49(0)228/970 97-35

Photos: Digitoxin/Flickr.com, Archiv, Ministry of the Interior, Austria, European Commission

civil-military cooperation focuses on national and European topics. Since 2005 these topics are discussed at the two-days main programme as well as in the several panel sessions.

Sea blindness? – Few people realise how much the prosperity of every single European country depends on the sea: the safety of shipping lanes, unrestricted maritime transport around the globe and lawful, uncontested access to marine resources are paramount.

The sea offers a huge potential

How to reconnect nations with their navies

by Markus Kafurke, Commander (Germany), Naval Staff, Paris (edt.) The Chiefs of European Navies (CHENS), meeting in Athens on 10 May, endorsed a report entitled “How to reconnect our nations with their navies”, whose objective was to present the framework for a coherent European Sea Vision. The report was drawn up by a multinational CHENS working group on strategic communication chaired by French Navy Commander Philippe Minon. The Rapporteur was Commander Markus Kafurke of Germany, who presents a summary of the report.

At present, two thirds of the world’s population live within 80 km of the coast. However, the importance and the influence of the sea for the economy extend far beyond those 80 km.

The sea as a source of prosperity and resources The economies of countries all over the world are tightly interconnected in complex, time-critical ways: containers, and the ships that carry them, are the storage depots and warehouses of today’s businesses; production facilities are moving closer to resources (natural resources or work forces); supply chains

Markus Kafurke German Navy Commander Markus Kafurke, born in 1971 near Frankfurt, Germany, currently works in the plans and policy department of the Naval Staff of the Marine Nationale, Paris. In this capacity he is the main point of contact for the members of the CHENS forum and the Rapporteur for the working group on strategic communication. After joining the German Navy in 1990, he pursued a career in naval aviation as a Lynx helicopter pilot. Before his current posting, he attended the Advanced Staff Training Course (19th graduating class) at the Ecole de Guerre in Paris.

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are getting longer and inventories are getting smaller. Despite all this, productivity is rising and costs are falling, because every part of the production process can take place where conditions are best. All this is held together by affordable and reliable maritime transport!

Transport of oil and gas In addition to the goods that are shipped back and forth, one more essential item is required in order to guarantee productivity and development: energy. Oil, gas, coal and uranium, to name just four components, are important resources that are not readily available in every country. This uneven distribution creates a large-scale and complex import and export programme for all sources of energy. Any disturbance of these flows will directly affect energy prices; this happened during the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, when the oil price doubled within a year, a development that would rapidly jeopardise our current standard of living by making heating and transportation more expensive. In the case of oil, providers are limited in number, as well as in their geographic location. Those providers face a huge number of consumers with different demands, sometimes several thousand kilometres away, a challenge that could not be met without reliable maritime transport. What does it take to ensure that maritime transport remains unrestricted and reliable?

Renewable energy The sea is a very promising source of renewable energy. The production of electricity at sea is already at an advanced stage thanks to the use of offshore wind turbines secured on the ocean floor. The development of a floating type will reduce the limitations in terms of water depth, allowing wind turbines to

Photo:

Maritime Security

Maritime Security

be installed in a considerably larger part of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In addition to wind power, electricity can be produced using wave or tidal energy as well as the difference in water temperature between the surface and the deep sea. These forms of energy production are still in a developmental stage, but the first results are very promising.

However, any offshore production of energy will result in the installation of critical and expensive infrastructure, sometimes far off the coast; this infrastructure needs to be patrolled or protected to ensure energy security.

Resources Advances in the field of offshore energy will help to diversify the geographic distribution and increase the number of oil and gas producers. But oil and gas are not the only resources to be found at sea; there are also considerable mineral deposits on the ocean floor. They range from possible new energy sources in the form of methane hydrate or hydrogen, to deep-sea nodules containing different metals as well as rare-earth elements, the latter being extremely important for high-tech industries such as the telecommunications and renewable energy sectors. Last but not least, the sea is a source of food.

For many countries, the exploitation of fish resources in the exclusive economic zone is not only an important source of food, but also a major source of income. Exploiting, managing and protecting the fish resources therefore contributes directly to the prosperity of these countries. However, with the right to exploit the resources in the exclusive economic zone comes the responsibility to protect them against over-exploitation. Without sustainability there can be no long-term development.

What does it take to protect natural resources against unlawful or unsustainable exploitation?

Developments endangering the current situation The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in 1982, sets the limit for the exclusive economic zone at 200 nautical miles.

Increasing competition for resources at sea However, the exploitation of resources on or under the ocean floor is limited to the continental shelf, which can extend beyond 200 nautical miles. Within the last decade, several countries have requested the extension of their continental shelf to up to 350 nautical miles!

The extension of the maritime limits in the quest for natural resources or renewable energy will provoke greater strategic tensions. The expansion of areas of influence, including the redrawing of borders, has often been a cause of war on land.

The same potential exists at sea. This leads to diplomatic tensions that are hard, if not impossible, to resolve.

Increasing importance of the routes to Asia A closer look shows the importance of Asia to be increasing more rapidly than that of any other region, for four key reasons: the plentiful supply of certain resources (rare earths), the production sites (India, China), the logistic hubs (ports) and the rising demand for raw materials and resources for the quickly growing economies there. This dependence on the free flow of goods along the maritime routes to and from Asia means that local economies all over the world are very vulnerable to any potential disturbances of these vital sea lanes.

In consequence, even though a disturbance might actually happen at a considerable distance from the country itself, it will have a strong local effect after only a very short lapse of time. It is therefore more than prudent to carefully consider this dependence and to closely monitor the developments in this

Unrestricted maritime transport around the globe and the protection of sealines by military means, here Aircraft Carrier Charles de Gaulle (right). photos: S. Desch/Marine Nationale (left) and Jacques/Marine Nationale (right)

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The CHENS-Paper in short The economy depends on maritime transport.

The critical infrastructure for offshore energy production needs to be protected.

The responsible exploitation of resources at sea offers a way to reduce the dependency on a single source or region and thereby leads to a more stable and more secure supply.

The prospect of harvesting resources from the sea leads to an increasing territorialisation of the sea and might lead to conflicts.

European economies are increasingly at risk through disturbances of the global maritime sea lanes; even though such a disturbance may materialise a considerable distance away, the local impact will be immediate.

New routes that become available due to environmental changes might relieve existing routes, but might also increase the competition for access to resources and demand localised supporting infrastructure.

To safeguard against piracy, terrorism, and unlawful acts at sea, a certain capacity to protect, control, pursue and intervene is, and will remain, essential.

Certain countries are markedly increasing their naval potential in order to assert their claims or to protect their prosperity or sovereignty.

European countries continue to reduce the number of naval units; this creates imbalanced naval forces and may lead to a complete loss of certain capabilities that cannot be easily compensated.

Environment In addition to ships, goods and infrastructure, the environment too is at risk. Unlawful activities like illegal fishing, illegal extraction of resources and pollution expose a weakness of the high seas: they are an ungoverned space whose use for peaceful purposes depends on the compliance of the ships’ masters and flag states. Experience shows that unlawful activities will increase as the capacity to control and protect decreases! With offshore mineral extraction pushing beyond the limits of a state’s EEZ or continental shelf, more and more ships and installations will be present on the high seas, a fact that deserves special attention.

The increase in globalisation will bring about an even greater volume of maritime traffic. This alone requires a lot of attention to avoid delays or even accidents.

Increasing number of naval assets The growing importance of marine resources has led some countries to shift the focus of new developments and procurements to naval assets. Additionally, many developing countries use their revenues to increase their number of military assets; military power goes hand in hand with economic power – or it is deemed necessary to protect economic power.

This development affects the whole spectrum of naval assets – from small, lightly armed units to enforce/protect sovereign rights closer to the coast, all the way to large, heavily armed units capable of operating on the high seas, such as aircraft carriers, amphibious assault craft or even nuclear submarines.

This is particularly prevalent in the countries bordering the South China Sea; while one country is increasing its naval assets to support its claims, the neighbouring countries are increasing their assets to counter this increase in assets on the part of the former!

One of the main reasons given for the development of nuclear submarines in Brazil is “[…] to protect riches located on the continental shelf and discourage any aggressive foreign actions in Brazilian waters”2. It is probable that these countries already recognise that a global capacity to protect and intervene is indispensable for prosperity and sustained economic development in this globalised world.

Piracy While criminal acts at sea have always existed, the increase in shipping combined with the availability of navigation equipment and automatic weapons makes piracy a promising line of business. Piracy cannot be countered by political measures alone: the close cooperation of three navies was a major deterrent to pirate activity in the Strait of Malacca1. The disruption of maritime transport, by accidents, by attacks at sea, through the blocking of vital choke points, or by the mining of important ports, could send shock waves through the local

The danger of falling behind While some Asian and South American countries are markedly increasing the quantity and quality of their naval assets, EU countries are continuing to reduce the number of units. That trend towards a smaller number of units will only be aggravated by the ever-tighter budgets resulting from the financial crisis. However, it remains to be seen whether these smaller numbers of expensive, albeit high-tech units can provide the same presence.

In some areas, the small numbers might suggest completely

region. The effects of global warming will eventually open up the northern passages: new routes towards Asia via the Arctic that will greatly reduce transit times and fuel costs. While the opening of the northern passages provides a back-up for the existing routes, and a shorter one at that, it will also create new problems at a strategic level, e.g. an increase in maritime traffic, further exploration and exploitation of fish and undersea resources, and the need for new infrastructure and support for this previously unseen level of maritime activity.

Activities at sea are increasing, but so are the risks

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economies and even, depending on the level of disruption achieved, throughout Europe.

Maritime Security

News: EU fight against piracy giving up a certain capability. This is not a decision to be taken lightly, especially where highly complex systems like submarines or aircraft carriers are involved! In these areas the loss of operational, technical, or industrial expertise cannot be reversed quickly when the financial situation improves. Once such a capability is completely lost, it can take a long time to rebuild it; in the case of aircraft carriers, it can take up to 20 years!

A possible solution Two key questions are raised in the report: - “How to ensure unrestricted maritime transport?” and - “How to protect marine resources from unlawful exploitation?”

For both questions there is an answer: this is what the Navy does!

Every day, on every mission, naval units patrol the maritime spaces in the air, on the surface and below the surface as well.

These units represent the sovereign right of each country to control its maritime spaces, to enforce international rules and regulations, and to protect its assets and interests at sea.

Every day, naval units track shipping traffic, help people in distress and work to protect shipping lanes against threats – even far away from their respective countries. This great spectrum of tasks requires a matching spectrum of capabilities.

Smaller, lightly armed units might be enough to protect resources against unlawful exploitation; but ensuring unrestricted global maritime transport requires larger, high-seas-capable units.

To remain a credible player in the global quest for resources and economic development requires a well-balanced mix of resources; this includes a certain level of high-end military capabilities. Furthermore, these high-impact units enable each country to perform rather traditional Navy missions3 – from internationally mandated operations such as the one in Libya to national operations, for example the evacuation of citizens from a crisis region.

Conclusion The sea is pivotal to economic development and prosperity in a globalised world as a means of affordable, effective and reliable transport. The sea is also a source of food, minerals and energy, with many resources yet to be discovered. The increasing scarcity of land resources will shift the focus more and more to the sea and lead to increased competition or even conflicts at sea.

Unrestricted and lawful access to sea lanes and marine resources are therefore of strategic interest for all European countries!

In order to safeguard economic prosperity and participate in a responsible exploitation of new resources, a credible and

New EU funding to support Eastern and Southern Africa On 21 May 2013, the EU announced a new funding of some €37 million to strengthen the fight against piracy in several Eastern and Southern African countries through support for the Programme to promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE).

The new programme will help to develop the legal and judicial system of countries in the region, so that they are better equipped for the arrest and transfer of pirates. In Somalia, in particular, the programme will also carry out anti-piracy awareness campaigns in areas where piracy is prevalent. Andris Piebalgs, Commissioner responsible for development said: “This new European support marks a step forward in the fight against piracy because it demonstrates the EU’s on-going commitment to combating this complex problem. Strengthening security in the maritime routes is crucial for us because it will help boosting trade and growth in the region, which would enormously improve people’s lives.” High Representative Catherine Ashton said that “this money will help to build on the progress we have made by strengthening legal systems, improving financial controls and training young men to find alternatives to piracy.”

Increase of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) published a policy brief on the situation in the Gulf of Guinea. The document states that “following a spectacular decline in the Gulf of Aden, incidents of armed robbery at sea and piracy (which legally refer to attacks beyond territorial waters) are now on the rise in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2012, the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre recorded 58 attacks, including 10 hijackings.

Nigeria is the most affected country, with 27 attacks in 2012 (almost three times more than in 2011), and 11 already reported for the first quarter of 2013. Most of the attacks target vessels connected to the oil industry, but they also disrupt trade and transport in the region as a whole, thereby posing a security threat to the international community as well as African states. “ > The EUISS brief is available at: http://tinyurl.com/mbgdlhs

coherent capability to protect and intervene is essential if CHENS countries are to be able to meet their strategic aims.

The CHENS navies provide such a capability to protect and intervene, if they have the right equipment. With this capability to protect and intervene, CHENS navies ensure prosperity and future development.

1 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1893032,00.html, access 22.02.2012 2 http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-06/why-does-brazil-neednuclear-submarines, access 17 January 2013 3 The CHENS Maritime Operational Concept (cf. note 5) groups possible naval activities in the maritime security spectrum into the following 4 groups : 1. Maritime Defence, 2. Maritime Security Operations, 3. Crisis Response Operations, 4. Naval Diplomacy

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Higher performance through technological breakthrough

Integration enhances autonomous minehunting

by Per Espen Hagen, Senior Principal Engineer, Kongsberg Maritime, Kongsberg

Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) systems are already in operational use in many Navies for duties including minehunting. They reduce risk by keeping men out of the minefield, increasing the survivability of personnel and high-value assets. Furthermore, AUVs can easily be transported and operated from crafts of opportunity or from shore, making them rapidly deployable to remote locations.

New capabilities through enhanced technology Previous generations of AUVs only perform detection and classification in one mission. New technology enables identification to be performed in the same mission. Synthetic Aperture Sonar (SAS) allows detection and highly reliable classification over a very wide swath. Real-time SAS processing facilitates the use of automated target recognition to locate possible mines. The AUV can then autonomously re-plan and acquire high-quality optical imagery of any targets detected and classified.

The system The Kongsberg HUGIN 1000 MR is a multi-role AUV suitable as part of a mobile, deployable MCM system. It is equipped with a HISAS 1030 SAS, facilitating mine detection and classification with an area coverage rate of approximately 2 km2/hour.

The standard sensor suite also includes a still image camera for identification, and an EM 2040 multibeam echo sounder that functions as gap filler and as a complementary identification sensor. If the area of operations is not mined, the system can determine this with high confidence; if the number of

Per Espen Hagen has been Senior Prinicpal Engineer at Kongsberg Maritime since 2008. He received his MSc in Signal Processing from the Norwegian Institute of Technology. In 1990, Hagen was employed as a scientist at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), where he worked on AUV related projects dealing with autonomous missile navigation, guidance problems, sonar image analysis, non-traditional navigation, operator interfaces, and synthetic aperture sonar.

Joining Kongsberg Maritime, he is now in charge of System Architecture at the AUV Research and Development Department.

mines is small, a safe route may be found. In other cases, mine disposal will be necessary. Traditionally, this will require the presence of clearance divers or a fully equipped MCMV – which may significantly delay e.g. an amphibious landing operation.

In an effort to overcome this, Kongsberg has designed a complete, integrated, modular, mobile MCM system. It is based on a HUGIN 1000 MR AUV for detection, classification and identification, and Minesniper expendable mine disposal vehicles for identification and disposal.

The operational performance The whole system can be operated from one 20’ and one 10’ ISO container. Vehicle launch, recovery, charging and maintenance takes place from the 20’ container, while the 10’ container is used for planning, mission control and post-mission analysis (PMA). The system is self-contained; only deck space and power are needed. The system may be transported by air, sea or land. When a target has been classified from HUGIN data, it is sent to the Minesniper system at the click of a button. A Minesniper vehicle can then be guided automatically to the target location with a second click. The operator can compare real-time sonar and video images from the Minesniper with HISAS and still image camera data recorded by HUGIN.

Successful tests

Successful tests of the MCM-System, 2011

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photo: Kongsberg Maritime

The integrated system has been tested in conditions ranging from arctic to tropical. In February – March 2011, the MCM system was transported from Norway to Cairns, Australia and mobilised on board a Royal Australian Navy vessel. Successful demonstrations took place in water depths from 8 to 400 metres; though mainly 15-50 m. Demobilisation took less than a day.

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