THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION
Competing strategic visions in the Asia-Pacific Photo: Monica Volpin, pixabay.com
Cultural differences are reinforced by China’s growing economic capabilities
by Barry Desker, Ambassador (ret), Distinguished Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore*
T
he American-dominated regional order in east Asia has been facing a growing challenge since the end of the Second World War. East Asian economic growth and the consolidation of post-independence states over the past seventy years occurred under the umbrella offered by the dominance of the US hegemon in the region. Today, the rise of China, the isolationist America First instincts of the Trump administration, and rising domestic criticism of the close affinity between the policies of regional governing elites and American strategic interests has led to a weakening of the ‘hub and spoke’ system which has characterised the American presence. A second important feature has been the emergence of alternative visions of strategic order as American domination in east Asia gives way to a growing willingness from China to challenge the status quo.
There are growing criticisms of the debt burden caused by Chinese loans, as seen in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Laos. Nevertheless, China has demonstrated a commitment to supporting development projects around the region, even though the contracts may be going to Chinese state-owned enterprises. By contrast, the new American strategic doctrine is not accompanied by a similar willingness to extend support to America’s partners in the region. President Trump has called for a sharp increase in Korean and Japanese contributions to maintain the American military bases in these countries. He indicated a
In the world that is emerging, China will be a “major strategic, political, and economic power.”
Alternative visions of a strategic order Chinese President Xi Jinping promotes China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as “open, green and clean”. The BRI was included in the Charter adopted at the 19th Communist Party of China National Congress in October 2017, ensuring its prominence among long-term Chinese development objectives. Although ASEAN members as well as many other states in Asia and Africa have responded positively to the BRI initiative, there are growing concerns about the dependence on China which would arise from a successful China-centred BRI. By contrast, the United States emphasises its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. The American perspective focuses on its partners in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India and Japan) and excludes ASEAN and South Korea.
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illingness to reduce the American military presence, despite w the ongoing threat to South Korea and Japan posed by the North Korean nuclear arsenal. This creates the impression that the American military presence is not related to the larger issue of US strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific concept Three points regarding the Indo-Pacific concept deserve consideration. First, it looks like an American effort to pitch India as an ally of the United States. President Trump and Prime Minister Modi have promoted the American/Indian partnership. It occurs at a time when India’s relationship with its South Asian neighbours is fraying as a result of the Modi administration’s Hindutva policies emphasising the role of Hindu nationalism in India’s secular state. Secondly, it highlights the importance of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), especially unrestricted passage through
