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EESTI ELU reedel, 29. juulil 2022 — Friday, July 29, 2022
Nr. 30
Canadian sanctions exemption enables Putin to fund his barbaric war
English-language supplement to the Estonian weekly “EESTI ELU” Tartu College Publications Founding Chairman: Elmar Tampõld Editor: Laas Leivat 3 Madison Avenue, Toronto, ON M5R 2S2 T: 416-733-4550 • F: 416-733-0944 • E-mail: editor@eestielu.ca Digital: www.eestielu.ca
Will Putin’s colossal miscalculation with Ukraine whet or dull his appetite for the Baltic states? Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, in a New York Times op-ed in March, stated that irrespective of Russia’s monumental blunder, the Kremlin must not be allowed to enjoy even the tiniest delusion that their aggression was justified and successful. Kallas put it bluntly: “Mr. Putin cannot win this war. He cannot even think he has won, or his appetite will grow.” When the Soviet Union im ploded, we were convinced that the Cold War was truly over. It seems that it was just dormant. We expected Europe to be free and undivided. The blitzkrieg invasion of Georgia in 2008 shaped Russia’s ‘new normal’ with the West. The punitive sanctions imposed then were upgraded in severity after Russia’s an nexation of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. The Western counter measures proved ineffectual. This, coupled with Mr. Trump’s attempts to weaken NATO uni ty, assisted with his bizarre co ziness with Putin helped to embolden Russia to maintain its unhindered aggressiveness to ward its formerly subjugated states. It’s totally understandable that the Baltic states see them selves on the front lines with Ukraine. They are the loudest voice in Europe in support of Ukraine’s fight, calling for in creased military support. They have been the most insistent in advocating EU membership for Ukraine. Estonia, Latvian and Lithua nian expatriates abroad have joined in solidarity with Ukrai nians in fundraising, de monstrating, lobbying for the Ukrainian cause. This identification with Ukrainians stems from a com mon history of shared tragic experiences during the Soviet occupation, especially under Stalin. It was the Holodomor for Ukrainians and the mass de portations for the Baltic nations. It’s easy to see the common uneasiness as a basis for a common mission. When the Russians occupied Crimea in 2014, Lithuania was the first to
supply Ukraine with lethal weapons. After Russia invaded on February 24 of this year, Estonia was the first NATO member to call for a no-fly zone in Ukraine. Latvia and Lithuania followed shortly thereafter. The eight-year long war with Ukraine from 2014 on did in fact contribute to Baltic security. Russia’s massive blunder with the current wholesale attack has made the issue even more acute. NATO did increase its presence and is enhancing it now. This is seen as an effective deterrence, at least for the time being. There still remains another potential source that may be cause for serious concern in the Baltics countries, one that Putin could (and has) used as justifi cation for a repeat performance. Ethnic Russians there, with drastically different perceptions of the past, interpretations of history that the Kremlin has exploited could be harboring sufficient sympathies for Rus sia. They see the Soviet past positively, just like Putin. We could ask, to what extent have they been susceptible to the Kremlin’s lies in its reasoning for a ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine? Could a clue be found from the recent Covid vaccination choices? At the height of the pandemic, in all three states, substantial parts of Russian speakers (in Lithuania, Polish speakers) preferred Russianproduced Sputnik vaccine. This was a demonstrable show of trust for Russia in something that was still considered to be not as reliable as vaccines from the West. However, one cannot draw solid conclusions from this. Most research on attitudes and opinions in the Baltic states indicates complex, multi-dimen sional differentiations among non-native speakers. One clear split occurs between older and younger Russian speakers which also includes support or condemnation of the current war. The older generation view the Soviet past not as harshly and are inclined to support Putin’s Russian hegemony. One other division is seen in
Vladimir Putin sees energy as a commodity and a weapon that can be used to coerce and threaten European states to advance the interests of his regime Marcus Kolga, The Toronto Star Canada’s decision to grant Vladimir Putin a two-year sanctions exemption that will allow Russia to send turbines from Nord Stream 1, a Gaz prom majority-owned pipeline, for repairs in Montreal risks prolonging his war against Ukraine by enabling his capacity to fund it. That exemption must be revoked immediately. The Russian bombs that have turned Ukrainian schools, hos pitals and homes into rubble over the past five months are funded by Russia’s European gas revenues. It also helps pay the salaries of the Russian neo-Nazi mercenaries who have executed civilians and engaged in the systematic rape of Ukrainian women. The gas that Russia sells to Europe is pumped across thou sands of kilometres undersea through the Nord Stream pipe line, which runs beneath the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has complicated this the local Orthodox churches. In general, those that are still under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate support Putin. (In Lithuania, all are aligned with Moscow, not Constantinople.) Other Ortho dox Churches condemn the war, but don’t see Putin as the insti gator. In broad terms, there has been a decrease in Russian speakers supporting Russia’s aggression. But it’s expressed in a “it’s not our war” and “not supporting either side” manner. Putin has long taken advantage of socio/political differences within the populations of other European countries. How concerned are people in general about Russia’s aggres sion? An April survey by Ipsos indicated that fully 61% of 19,000 adult respondents from 27 states think Russia poses a significant risk to their country and 82% indicated the war in Ukraine poses a risk for the world. However, global public opinion on how to respond to Russian aggression is mixed. Not surprisingly, most people in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and India, and half in Mexico, Israel and Argentina state that “the problems of Ukraine are none of our business and we should not interfere”. This very same stance is prevalent among Hungarians – yes Hungarians! For people from eight EU member states and from the UK, USA, Canada, Australia,
arrangement for Germany and other European countries, who allowed themselves to become dangerously dependent on cheap Russian energy a decade ago. The political cost of Germany’s unprincipled deci sion to sole-source most of its energy to a corrupt criminal authoritarian regime is now emerging, and Canada has been involuntarily drawn into this debacle. Germany and its European neighbours are now enduring what many Eastern European states have faced for years: Russian energy blackmail. Vladimir Putin sees energy not just as a commodity but as a weapon that can be used to coerce and threaten European states to advance the interests of his regime. Over the past months, Putin has cut off gas supplies to numerous European states in hopes of wearing down their support for Ukraine. Russia has cut the flow of its gas to Europe by 60 per cent. Ukraine’s European supporters are concerned about dwindling gas supplies ahead of the Japan and South Korea, any where from 65% to 80% disagree with being just an on-looker, detached from the war. But Hungarian respondents reject the notion that inaction in Ukraine will encourage Russia to attack other countries. As a contrast, over 75% in the UK, Japan, the USA and Australia believe otherwise. According to the survey, in many other aspects of Europe’s reaction to Russia’s invasion, Hungarians stand alone in choosing the weakest response. Putin has been systematically working to handicap European unity for decades. But a country such as Hungary, by lacking sufficient foresight has allowed itself to become an ‘energy hostage’ to Moscow and has been cowed into a half-hearted opponent of Putin. This still isn’t enough to destroy Europe’s collective will to withstand Russia. Western leaders are nearly unanimous in their longterm commitment to provide military technology and enforc ing sanctions in support of Ukraine. For now, Moscow and Kiev both predict their own victory once hostilities end. But the key to removing any possibility of Moscow’s repeating its incur sions elsewhere is its total defeat in Ukraine, rendering Putin’s claims of victory an in disputable lie. At this juncture of the war, this goal seems very distant. LAAS LEIVAT
coming winter. Canadian sanctions, enacted after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, ban the delivery of technology to Russia, including turbines used in the Nord stream pipeline. Those turbines are serviced outside of Montreal by Germany’s Siemens. The Kremlin has claimed that Canada’s failure to release one turbine led to a reduction of the flow of Russian gas to a trickle. For Russia, such dis information and deception are normal operating procedures. Documents available on the Nord Stream website state that turbines in eight compressor stations are used to compress gas before it enters the pipeline. Recent reporting states that those turbines are maintained on a rotating basis, which would indicate that the absence of one turbine would still allow the pipeline to operate normally. Furthermore, pipelines that transit Poland and Ukraine can be used to transport gas from Russia to Europe. Europe’s energy crisis is being caused by Putin, not Canada. By granting Russia a sanc tions exemption for Nord Stream, Canada too has become a victim of Putin’s energy blackmail and deception. Ukrai nian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned on Monday that “if a terrorist state can squeeze out such an exception to sanctions, what exceptions will it want tomorrow or the day after tomorrow?” By compromising our own sanctions policy, we may also be compromising our credi bility. Russian activist and chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov told me that if Canada and the democratic world “want to stop Putin and the criminal savagery of his regime in Ukraine, we have to target Russia’s oil and gas industry, which is vital to Putin’s survival. Starving this industry of Western technologi cal support will put significant pressure on the Kremlin to modify its behaviour.” Kasparov warned that “Canada’s decision to return these gas turbines to Russia via Germany helps Putin continue his energy warfare against Europe and funds the war machine that is slaughtering Ukrainians every day. Canada may as well be sending Putin missiles and bombs.” Canada can contribute to European energy security by developing infrastructure to export Canadian natural gas to Europe. Compromising our own sanctions strategy to sustain Russia’s barbaric war against Ukraine contributes to Putin’s goal of undermining and desta bilizing democracies worldwide. (Marcus Kolga is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Centre for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad.)
