Energy Security and Conflict on the Nile By Henry Levinson
Henry Levinson is a MA student in International Peace & Security within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Originally from Los Angeles, his research interests focus on the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. He is particularly interested in climate change as a driver of conflict, conflict transformation and post-conflict reconciliation.
two things: how quickly the reservoir will be filled, and the consequent impact on the Blue Nile’s flow during the filling period.
E
thiopia faces major challenges in meeting daunting residential and industrial electricity demands. Home to more than 110 million people, 70% of Ethiopians are not connected to the power grid. [1] As the country’s economy continues to grow, universal electrification has become a cornerstone policy objective for the government since 2017, following the launch of the National Electrification Program (NEP). To meet this target, the federal government is building a massive hydroelectric project spanning the Blue Nile, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Upon completion, GERD will be Africa’s largest such structure, forming a reservoir with a volume of 74 billion cubic meters [2], comparable to that of Lake Mead behind the Hoover Dam. The dam itself is expected to produce 5,150 Megawatts of electricity. [3] Moreover, Ethiopia stands to generate a power surplus from the dam. [4] Not only will this bolster the country’s economy by increasing productivity in previously unconnected rural areas and, hopefully, catalysing industrial investment, but it will also situate Ethiopia as a power exporter in a region with high demands for cheap, clean energy.
Egypt sees a disruption to the flow during filling as an existential threat as 90% of the country’s freshwater comes from the Nile. [5] Relations between Egypt and Ethiopia have been hostile as the two vie for control of the Nile’s waters. Egypt argues it holds veto power on any projects impacting the flow of the Nile per a 1929 British-sponsored treaty of colonies along the river, to which Ethiopia was never party. [6] Ethiopia has staunchly rejected these claims, and does not see itself bound by the treaty, thus justifying its right to constructing across the Blue Nile. Both countries have sizable populations and compete for regional influence. With Egypt’s population at nearly 100 million people, 95% of whom rely on freshwater from the Nile, the security risk of having an upstream rival with its hand on the tap is obvious.
There has been much talk of the potential for conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia over the dam’s construction. Egypt boasts Africa’s largest standing army [7], controls vital Red Sea shipping routes through the Suez Canal, and is a close strategic ally of the United States. However, it is Sudan that now plays an Despite the numerous benefits for Ethiopia and the region, Egypt increasingly central role in regional staand Sudan have long voiced legitimate concerns around the pro- bility since the outbreak of the Tigray ject. Negotiations between the three are primarily concerned with conflict in northern Ethiopia.
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