Estonian Defence Forces Annual Review 2023

Estonian Defence Forces Annual Review 2023

ESTONIAN DEFENCE FORCES ANNUAL

REVIEW

Photo: Rauno Volmar

TO THE READER

MARTIN HEREM

General, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces

The Estonian Defence Forces Annual Review 2023 provides an overview of the development of Estonia’s military defence during an extremely turbulent time.

Russia is continuing its war in Ukraine, while displaying aggression in both the rhetoric of its ruling elite and society, and is planning to increase the size of its military and the production output of its military industry.

Perhaps it is not wrong to compare the present time with the late 1930s – the prewar era. The military threat to the neighbours of Russia could be calculated using the following formula: - the war in Ukraine + the time required for preparing the aggression - the relatively peaceful state of the world today + Estonia’s (NATO’s) defence readiness = Russia’s aggression against one of its neighbours.

Meanwhile, Russia continues to use hybrid means towards us. Over the past few months, Russian intelligence agencies have recruited and trained saboteurs who, fortunately, have failed. Cyber-attacks have become commonplace and information operations are used to disrupt the unity of societies and nations.

Nevertheless, the Estonian Defence Forces, and indeed the entire state, have taken such threats quite seriously over the past two years. We have significantly improved our maritime capabilities, with the Navy currently equipped with both mines and anti-ship missiles. Together with Poland and the new members of NATO, Sweden and Finland, we should be able to solve one of our key problems: a potential blockade in the Baltic Sea.

As a result, the deployment of anti-ship and air defences in the Baltic Sea becomes

unlikely for the aggressor, which in turn allows us to receive air and naval support from allies.

On land, our progress has also been notable. The Estonian Division, established just over a year ago, has very much proven its worth during exercises. Consequently, we have established command capabilities for both the NATO forces currently stationed here as well as those that may be deployed as reinforcements when needed. This has all been incorporated into the new Alliance defence plans.

Additionally, we have doubled our territorial defence and enhanced both our anti-tank and air defence capabilities. Large-scale procurement of ammunition has commenced. Over the next two years, additional self-propelled howitzers, loitering munitions and multiple-launch rocket systems will be added to the division’s capabilities. The 2nd Infantry Brigade will receive armoured personnel carriers and the Air Force will receive a medium-range air defence system by 2026 and improve its surveillance capabilities.

However, these measures may not be sufficient to deter a potential threat. While our capabilities, combined with those of our allies, can prevent occupation, they may not be sufficient to deter a conventional military assault aimed at destabilisation. We must continue to adapt and make tough decisions.

The existing well-established and convenient standards of operation need to be changed, while non-military activities need to be centralised. All of these efforts are aimed at ensuring that the more critical elements of military defence receive more resources, not only funding but also personnel and time. More difficult and challenging times are likely to lie ahead, but we have more iron, more people and more wisdom than ever before. This instils confidence.

Keep reading to find out for yourself!

Photo: Maria Tammeaid

Play on the 81st anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad in Volgograd.

Alexander Kulikov/AP/Scanpix

Photo:

In the now decade-long Russian military aggression against Ukraine, the unprecedentedly intense phase has persisted for the last two years.

RUSSIA HAS GONE THROUGH A TEMPORARY PHASE OF DISARRAY

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CENTRE

During this period, Russia has attempted to overthrow the Government of Ukraine by military means, destroy its defences and economic potential as well as isolate it from the waters of the Black Sea. Although Russia has succeeded in part in solidifying its occupation of Ukrainian territories, it has so far failed to meet its objectives and achieve its main goal – to break the will of the Ukrainian people to integrate with the West and defend the sovereignty of Ukraine.

It is important to keep in mind that Ukraine is only part of a wider strategic objective of Russia. Revanchist Russia still continues its pursuit to regain control over lost territories and expand its sphere of influence in areas historically dominated by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Alongside this, it seeks to extend its anti-Western security buffer back into countries that have successfully reunited or are in the process of joining the Western value space.

Russia has also not abandoned its longer-term objective of reshaping the European security architecture to better align with its own interests. To this end, Russia hopes that the tensions and fatigue caused by the prolonged and gruelling war will eventually create an opportunity to reach an agreement between all necessary parties. To achieve this objective, Russia is inflicting intolerable pain on its adversary, causing distraction and fostering the illusion of victory. Russia aims to deprive its

opponent of the hope of changing the situation for the better.

To instil this sentiment, it is currently deploying all available means to subsequently establish the conditions necessary for freezing the situation in positions favourable to itself. This would also afford Russia the chance to rebuild its military power without immediate depletion on the battlefield and, to some extent, alleviate domestic social tensions.

The recruitment centre in Rostov-on-Don offers a one-time fee or monthly payment for becoming cannon fodder. Price at the exchange rate of March 2024 – 210,000 roubles equals approximately 2100 euros.

Photo: Sergey Pivovarov/ Reuters/Scanpix

Russia has also not abandoned its longer-term objective of reshaping the European security architecture to better align with its own interests.

The truth is that Ukraine’s remarkably heroic resistance has taken Moscow by surprise. The defensive activities of Ukraine have brought about a certain decline in the

capabilities of the conventional forces of Russia. The situation has forced Russia to allocate resources to the war that it would have otherwise preferred to reserve for a full-scale war (mobilisation, reserve bases, ammunition/missile stockpiles).

On the other hand, it has now created a situation in Russia where the country has concentrated its powers and started to compensate for its losses. In addition, Russia has gone through a temporary phase of disarray during which the operation of many processes was delegated to responsible non-structural actors (eg federal municipalities, large enterprises, the non-governmental sector) who were simply ordered by higher authorities to carry out respective operations or offered a quasi-voluntary opportunity to support the process.

While the latter still play a major role, the responsibility for military preparations and their assurance is starting to shift back

to dedicated national structures. The success of this will, in turn, depend on how intensively it is engaged in the theatre of war in Ukraine and the stability of the domestic security situation. The fragility of the latter was demonstrated by the armed rebellion of June 2023 against Russia’s senior political and military leadership.

THE GROUND FORCES ADAPTED TO THE SMALL UNIT TACTICS

The most significant developments in the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation (RF) in 2023 included the adaptation to small unit tactics and the dissemination of know-how on electronic warfare and loitering munitions (combat drones) in the combat zone.

The construction of a large system of fortifications across multiple lines, which began in 2022 in the occupied territories of Ukraine and which is continuously reinforced with new elements (including

At the so-called Youth Army's pro-Putin parade in St. Petersburg, you won't see particularly enthusiastic faces.

Photo: Andrei Bok / SOPA / Scanpix

industrial concrete structures for defence purposes), can also be considered a certain success for Russia. This has stabilised the front and allowed Russia to maintain its current level of operations in Ukraine.

To replace and increase the number of lost personnel, Russia has organised the first wave of mobilisation and commenced a large-scale campaign in 2023 to recruit contract soldiers. Public estimates suggest that by the end of 2023, Russia had lost 315,000 soldiers in Ukraine. At the same time, the mobilisation initiated in the second half of 2022 resulted in approximately 300,000 replacements. In 2023, approximately 280,000 contract soldiers were recruited, which means that in total Russia has engaged an additional 580,000 persons and increased the number of Russian Armed Forces by 265,000.

Nevertheless, heavy losses have led to some changes in the behaviour of Russian Ground Forces. The Russian Armed Forc-

es have likely modified their attack tactics because the ‘old structure’ did not work. Attacks at battalion level and in larger formations have resulted in significant losses of both equipment and personnel, so the Russian Armed Forces have started to primarily deploy company-sized units for attacks.

To replace and increase the number of lost personnel, Russia has organised the first wave of mobilisation.

Special-purpose assault units or assault groups are established at the company level or even lower, with the primary goal of achieving tactical breakthroughs during attacks. To this end, Russia makes extensive use of the Storm-Z and Storm units.

The recruitment initiated by Wagner in penal institutions has been continued by the Ministry of Defence of the RF, result-

A billboard spreading war propaganda was looted in St. Petersburg.

Photo: Dmitri Lovetsky / AP / Scanpix

ing in the formation of Storm-Z units. The members of the unit primarily comprise prisoners, although persons who have been involved in disciplinary violations or displayed disobedience in regular units are also transferred there. Storm-Z is a light infantry subunit operating predominantly at platoon level, less frequently at company level, which is reinforced with additional fire and combat support elements (including drone teams).

The objective of such light infantry is to capture new positions during the first wave of an attack so that regular armed forces will have more favourable conditions later to fight the enemy. Additionally, they are used to draw out enemy indirect fire and conduct mine-watching in order to spare regular armed forces and better-trained units. In other words, Storm-Z is used as cannon fodder. The military training of Storm-Z units is relatively short, typically up to two weeks, which is probably why they do not attain the proficiency required to carry out missions independently.

At the same time, Storm units are formed within regular units. Generally, the Storm unit is better trained and equipped compared to neighbouring units. The unit is deployed when it is deemed that the objective can be achieved with minimal losses and an assault group, formed as a task force, can be used for that purpose. However, the success of the unit largely depends on the capabilities and competence of the parent unit (brigade, battalion).

The assault group Storm is typically given additional capabilities – organic indirect fire support, fire support group, including anti-tank and armour capabilities as well as combat engineers – to secure captured positions and advance the assault. This often takes place during the second wave after the preparatory operations of Storm-Z.

What both units have in common is that they are formed to carry out a specific task, such as attacking fortified forest and urban areas or seizing the defensive positions of the adversary in geographically complex locations. The main objective is to identify weak spots in the enemy’s defence. Units may also be used in less active frontlines to conduct defensive activities.

"The

Throughout 2023, Russia’s main focus was also on adapting and modernising electronic warfare. The widespread use of unmanned reconnaissance and strike platforms in Ukraine has brought about changes for the Russian electronic warfare units. New tasks, as well as previously required tasks, have been conducted directly along the contact line as well as up to 1,000 km deep in Russian territory.

The situation is caused by the inefficiency of earlier anti-drone systems, Kra-

Russians are changing the world." They are indoctrinated into warfare from childhood.

sukha-4 and Repellent, and their limited capacity to protect frontline units against relatively simple and economical attack drones. In addition to the above equipment, electronic warfare (EW) equipment used at company and lower levels was specifically deployed on the contact line.

The mobile equipment used includes Serp-VS and Ratnik (EW systems) as well as Strizh-3 and Silok systems for object protection. The latter are complemented by so-called drone guns on the defence line

which, unlike the Silok and Strizh-3 systems, use directional antennas to disrupt the navigation of the attack drone in the vicinity of the protected object, within an average radius of 200 metres, during the final flight segment before hitting the target.

The protection of mobile equipment is now being approached comprehensively, incorporating RP-377, Volnorez and Triton electronic protection equipment in addition to improvised or designed protective guards. In addition, a solution is sought

The programme of "cultural and patriotic" events in St. Petersburg is still looking for young men for the front.

Photos: Anatoli Maltsev / EPA / Scanpix

for detecting and neutralising Starlink terminals. For instance, the Borshchevik EW system, designed for detecting and locating Starlink terminals, entered the testing phase at the end of 2022.

The electronic warfare component is also integrated into Russia’s rear security competence, with local authorities or companies possessing essential infrastructure, including the military-industrial complex, responsible for this task. In Russia, this has led to a domestic boom in the development of different civilian anti-attack drone solutions.

In addition to direct object protection, Russia is using signal jamming of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) near areas or objects that are under threat in order

The war will reach home to the Russians. A Ukrainian drone attack set fire to an oil terminal in the port of Ust-Luga on January 21, 2024.

to counter long-range attack drones. GNSS jamming is also the cause of signal interference in areas adjacent to Russian territory.

The Russian Ground Forces have also made significant progress in the use of unmanned aircraft, with the most widely used being the Iranian-produced Shahed-136 (referred to as Geran-2 in Russia) and Lancet series loitering munition (Lancet-1, Lancet-3). Russia has also increasing-

The Russian Ground Forces have also made significant progress in the use of unmanned aircraft, with the most widely used being the Iranian-produced Shahed-136.

Photo by Government of Leningrad Oblast / Scanpix

ly started to convert civilian hobby drones into improvised attack weapons.

Compared to other medium-range precision weapons available to Russia, the relatively inexpensive Shahed-136 attack drones are used against long-range (up to 1,500 km) pre-identified stationary targets.

These systems, equipped with a 40 kg warhead, are employed in tandem with other precision weapons of the Russian Armed Forces for coordinated deep strikes against critical infrastructure targets, as well as for tactical fire missions aimed at high pay-off military targets situated in close proximity to the combat zone.

The target is usually attacked in pairs, a few seconds apart. Such a paired approach

The Shahed-136 drone, which has already acquired cult significance in Russia. Photo: Sobhan Farajvan / SIPA / Scanpix

However, the Ukrainians have to count the dead near Kharkiv after the Russian drone attack.

Photo: Ukrinform / Scanpix

increases the likelihood of hitting individual objects (tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery systems, cars). Although, without jamming, the Shahed-136 is capable of hitting pre-identified stationary targets with up to 100% probability, Ukraine’s sophisticated countermeasures have reduced their effectiveness by nearly 90%, with only one in ten Shahed-136s reaching the target.

Ukraine’s sophisticated countermeasures have reduced their effectiveness by nearly 90%, with only one in ten Shahed-136s reaching the target.

The strength of the system is its immunity to electronic jammers due to the use of an inertial pre-programmed control system. However, its weaknesses lie in the low flight speed and high acoustic and thermal signature. So far, the Shahed-136 has primarily served a disturbing psychological role, perpetuating a state of tension in both the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the society. The Shahed-136 also requires fire groups to be constantly prepared for neutralisation and decisions to be made regarding the prioritisation and implementation of countermeasures when air targets become saturated.

The multiple guided Lancet loitering munition, developed and produced by Russia, is used directly in the combat zone. Flight platforms with a range of up to 60 km are equipped with 3 kg (Lancet-3) and 1 kg (Lancet-1) explosives. Unfortunately, the drones, which have a low thermal signature due to the electric motor and are controllable until the last flight phase, have demonstrated high combat performance.

Lancets are generally operated in pairs with reconnaissance drones such as Orlan-10 or Zala. Reconnaissance drones can maintain longer distances and altitudes to detect targets and their locations. The location of the target is then relayed to the operators of the loitering munition who guide the attack weapon to the necessary strike position. It has an endurance of 40

minutes in autonomous flight mode.

Just as Ukraine has successfully deployed civilian drones (eg first-person view drones, multi-rotor transport drones) as affordable and convenient precision attack weapons, Russia is pursuing similar developments. The training of drone teams has become routine and their gradual integration into the fire support system is underway.

Additionally, Russia has seen the emergence of a large number of small companies that assemble respective drones mainly from components sourced from the People’s Republic of China, augmenting them with different types of explosives or devices manufactured in Russia. The broader deployment of attack drones has so far primarily been hindered by administrative bottlenecks in national procurement procedures, as a result of which the majority of funding for drones reaching the combat zone relies on

Russian marines are trained to throw a grenade.

donations or contributions from the civilian sector. Unfortunately, Russia has demonstrated its ability to overcome such limitations.

AIR FORCE – MANNED AND UNMANNED

In the course of the war in Ukraine in 2023, there have been a number of developments on the battlefield and changes in the armament and tactics of the Russian Air Force. When it comes to the air force, it is important to distinguish between unmanned aircraft, or drones, and manned aircraft, as well as their tactics and modifications. Compared to manned aircraft, the development of unmanned aircraft has been rapid: the field has changed to such an extent that the Armed Forces of Ukraine decided to establish a separate branch dedicated to unmanned aircraft in 2024. Ukraine’s decision to create the Unmanned

Systems Force is of great significance, underlining the growing importance of this field in modern warfare. The development of unmanned aircraft also heightens the risk of these platforms being used for terrorist or asymmetric military purposes.

The development of Ukrainian unmanned aircraft has posed a significant challenge for the Russian Armed Forces, both in the air and at sea. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are increasingly employing unmanned aircraft against strategic targets in the inland of Russia, forcing Russian forces to strengthen their air defence and change their disposition. The attacks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine against Russian inland infrastructure are undermining the long-term air defence capabilities in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine.

The development of Ukrainian unmanned aircraft has posed a significant challenge for the Russian Armed Forces both in the air and at sea..

There was no technical development of manned aircraft in 2023. However, there were upgrades to the munitions they could deploy, resulting in improved lethality and increased likelihood of hitting the target.

While the sanctions imposed at the beginning of the war hindered the development of new systems and the reproduction of existing technologies, they have now been able to circumvent the sanctions and reproduce the necessary precision munitions and even increase the production volume through import substitution programmes.

It should be noted that, instead of using more expensive precision munitions, there has been a tendency to use less expensive munitions as planned bombs. A planning and correction module has been developed for the large-scale deployment of cheaper unguided bombs in situations where the adversary has effective air defence. Bombs equipped with this module are dropped from a combat

Photo: Vitaliy Ankov / IMAGO / Scanpix

aircraft outside the air defence coverage of the enemy.

The effective air defence of Ukraine continues to effectively hinder the use of Russian aircraft for providing air support and achieving air superiority. The successful air defence ambushes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have made the adversary even more cautious. Aircraft deployment and tactics have remained largely unchanged.

Russia is also placing great emphasis on the involvement of long-range aviation in deep strikes against Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure, using both long-range and medium-range precision munitions produced for the air force in previous decades and today. Different types of munitions are used to deliver the strikes, regardless of their original purpose.

Similarly to the tactical air force, they generally avoid entering the long-range air

Ukraine has targeted Russian oil infrastructure with drone attacks. The picture shows a burning depot in Kursk. Photo: AFP / Scanpix

defence coverage area of Ukraine, opting instead to launch fire strikes from deep within Russia or over international waters. Nevertheless, Ukraine has significantly disrupted the operations of long-range aviation through special operations and deep strikes in Russia as well as destroyed or damaged the bombers and control centres of long-range aviation.

Ukraine has significantly disrupted the operations of long-range aviation through special operations and deep strikes in Russia..

In 2023, the Russian Armed Forces and Air Forces lost a large number of aircraft and helicopters (damaged and downed manned aircraft). Aircraft were also lost due to incidents of friendly fire, meaning they were shot down by the RF’s own air defence.

However, even more significant than the loss of equipment is the loss of experienced flight crews and pilots. While it is possible to restore aircraft in a relatively short period of time (3–4 years), the process of rebuilding flight crews, training them and acquiring experience takes at least two to three times longer.

Although there have been losses of crews and pilots, they are not significant enough to impede the pace of attacks in 2024. In the longer term, the loss of flight crews with combat experience will impact developments in the Russian Air Force, as many experienced pilots who would have shared their skills with the next generation have been lost.

THE NAVY WAS FORCED OUT OF CRIMEA

The ability of Ukraine to use asymmetric means to push the Russian Navy out of Crimea and into other Russian-controlled ports has proven to be a significant blow to the morale of Russia. Throughout 2023, the successful precision strikes of Ukraine have demonstrated that Russia no longer has any secure ports in Crimea.

The same applies to the state of Russian air defence over the northern Black Sea, where Ukraine has expanded its influ-

ence through the recapture of Snake Island and the seizure of oil platforms by special operations forces. This, in turn, has created opportunities for successful attacks against objects in Crimea.

The attack on the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol also received a lot of attention. It comprised a series of different deep strikes against high pay-off targets in Crimea, which, together with all the implemented coordinated measures, precisely hit their targets at designated times.

Russia’s freedom of action in the Black Sea has also been impacted by the activities of unmanned vessels. According to estimates, their impact during 2023 was rather moral in nature and the direct damage was lower compared to that of precision strikes. Nevertheless, their psychological effect has directly affected the daily operations of the Black Sea Fleet. First and foremost, Russia is currently seeking electronic countermeasures against increasingly effective Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles.

Despite the high-profile attacks (cruiser Moskva, submarine Rostov-na-Donu, corvette Askold, large amphibious assault ships), the Black Sea Fleet remains operational both on and under the water, capable of carrying out combat missions in deep strikes and patrol and presence operations.

Russia has harassed and attacked civil vessels bound for Ukrainian ports, which has at times resulted in the suspension of civil shipping to Ukrainian ports.

Russia continues to employ precision weapons such as Kalibr cruise missiles and Shahed drones to target Ukraine’s maritime infrastructure in order to hamper and influence Ukrainian trade. Odessa and the ports located at the mouth of Dnieper are both under constant attack. Russia has harassed and attacked civil vessels bound for Ukrainian ports, which has at times resulted in the suspension of civil shipping to Ukrainian ports. Moreover, it has resulted

in a sharp increase in the risk margin of shipping insurance for vessels operating in the Black Sea, which in any case hampers trade in the entire Black Sea region.

ADAPTATION OF THE MILITARYINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Given the ongoing military euphoria in Russian society and the adaptability of the Russian military-industrial complex, Russia is capable of transforming its forces in these circumstances. The war machine is financed and provided with the necessary resources primarily at the expense of the Russian civil society.

The war machine is financed and provided with the necessary resources primarily at the expense of the Russian civil society.

Unfortunately, Russia’s remarkable ability to regroup will not only allow it in the coming years to restore its capabilities to levels before the aggression against Ukraine but also to create new, affordable offensive capabilities that were previously underdeveloped or untested in combat (unmanned aircraft system or UAS / loitering experience of all levels, electronic warfare, armoured equipment).

With the mobilisation of personnel, the war industry has also increased its production capacity. More money has been earmarked for military industrial companies to hire additional workers and operate multiple shifts. While this may not apply to all companies, it does illustrate Russia’s capability to allocate resources and production capacity to prioritise critical needs when required.

Currently, the main focus is on repairing and upgrading older military equipment stored in reserve bases. At the same time, a considerable number of high-impact weapon systems and battle-proven equipment are being produced. For instance, the Lancet-type loitering munition, which proved to be effective in combat, is currently in mass production despite the sanctions imposed by the West on com-

munications and control equipment and optoelectronics.

To compensate for deficiencies, Russia has also adjusted the import of military equipment. For example, it has sourced munition and tactical ballistic missile systems from North Korea and deep-strike attack drones from Iran.

The artillery ammunition sourced from North Korea, which is often of questionable quality, thus covers the operational needs of the Russian Armed Forces on the Ukrainian front, while Russia’s own artillery ammunition factories produce three times more shells of higher quality to replenish spent reserves. North Korean ballistic missile complexes have also appeared on the front, with North Korea itself interested in their combat effectiveness and telemetry data.

Iran’s Shahed drones continue to fill the gap for carrying out deep strikes at

relatively low cost. Russia is also bypassing import bans by acquiring electronic equipment and high-tech components in violation of declared transit rules, another area where Russia has benefited from Iran’s experience and assistance. Russia is also demonstrating ingenuity by repurposing components of civilian dual-use equipment to create new military machines or using them directly on the battlefield.

For instance, components manufactured in the People’s Republic of China (eg night-vision and thermographic cameras, batteries and other such accessories) are widely used in the assembly of combat equipment. Foreign partners are helping to boost the RF’s war industry to even greater capacities. For example, Russia intends to invest $7.6 billion in drone production and development until 2030. Therefore, it cannot be said that Russia’s technological lag

has increased. In addition to state-organised procurement, private trade also plays an important role.

Russia receives substantial external assistance from Belarus, which is in fact the only country it can call its ally. Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory for attacks against Ukraine. In addition, Russia has received munitions and military equipment from Belarusian warehouses and storage bases.

Without access to Belarusian territory, the Russian Armed Forces would not have been able to launch an attack on Kyiv and advance along the Dnieper River towards the city. Belarus is thus an important ally because its territory can be used to put pressure on both the West and Ukraine. In 2022, Belarus passed a law allowing Russian nuclear weapons to be placed on its territory, as a result of which Russia can use Belarusian territory as a nuclear deterrent against Central Europe. The substantive demilitarisation of Wagner combatants and the provision of shelter on Belarusian territory forms a separate chapter in the Russia-Belarus symbiosis.

THE ROLE OF WAGNER IN THE UKRAINIAN WAR

One episode within the context of the war in Ukraine is the rise and fall of the private military company Wagner. No one could have predicted in 2009, when the need for private military companies (частная военная компания – ЧВК) was first discussed, what it would culminate in during 2023.

The Wagner Group, believed to have been established in 2014 on the initiative of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the RF (GRU), had been active in Ukraine since the annexation of Crimea. However, the company primarily focused its activities in the Middle East (Syria) and Africa (mainly Libya, Central African Republic and Mali), where it provided security services and trained local armed forces.

Over the years, Wagner expanded its reach while also serving as an extension of Russia’s foreign interests, conducting military, intelligence and information operations. For Russia, the use of a private

The Uraltransmash weapons plant in Yekaterinburg is operating at full capacity. Propaganda photo from the Russian Ministry of Defence.

Photo: EPA/Scanpix

military company was particularly advantageous for conducting riskier operations, as it always provided the option to claim plausible deniability and manoeuvre within the international legal space. The strength of the argument in the international forum was bolstered by the fact that private military companies were officially banned in Russia, thus they could not be directly linked to the Kremlin.

The legalisation of Wagner began right at the outset of the aggression against Ukraine in March 2022.

The legalisation of Wagner began right at the outset of the aggression against Ukraine in March 2022: less than a month after the invasion, Wagner units quite openly joined the fighting. Although Wagner was initially used for minor tasks, their prominent spokesman and owner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, had greater ambitions and soon they became one of the most important forces in seizing Popasna.

This was followed by the capture of Soledar in January 2023 and Bakhmut in May. Although the subunits initially involved were highly trained, they were quickly exhausted in offensive operations due to light armament and lack of armoured protection. To compensate for this, Project K was launched, recruiting prisoners to assault units. With the promise of amnesty after six months of service on the Ukrainian front, up to 80,000 prisoners were recruited, according to some estimates, forming the main resource in the high-casualty battles against Ukrainian forces.

Most recruits from custodial institutions had no military training, but there were a lot of them. The groups formed in this manner were sent to undertake the riskiest tasks, where they had to locate Ukrainian defence positions and capture them by storm. Attacking in groups of about ten men, they were able to put continuous pressure on Ukrainian defence positions, causing them to falter in several areas, and by maintaining and increasing

this pressure, they managed to destroy Ukrainian defences in Bakhmut.

Although such a method comes at a steep cost in terms of human resources, it is not the first time the Russians have used this tactic. The commanders of Wagner demonstrated remarkable flexibility in deploying this highly diverse resource to the task at hand. This was Wagner’s strength compared to regular armed forces. Wagner’s firepower was further enhanced by the addition of formally and informally subordinated close air support, armoured manoeuvre and force protection (air defence) assets. This allowed Wagner to plan and conduct a coordinated battle of general forces.

After the capture of Bakhmut, they transferred the positions to the regular units of Russia and retreated to the rear. The reputation and public prestige gained created friction

Candles were lit in memory of Yevgeny Prigozhin in Moscow 40 days after his death. Photo: Natalia Kolesnikova/AFP/Scanpix

...And even before that, the wreckage of his plane was collected near Kuzhenkino, Tver region.

between the Russian senior military leadership and the leaders of Wagner. Additionally, Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Defence of Russia, and Army General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, perceived the senior military servicemen who joined Wagner as a threat to the stability of their own positions.

In mid-June, the Ministry of Defence of the RF announced that all volunteers fighting in Ukraine had to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defence by 1 July. This would have meant that Wagner’s units would also become subordinate to the Ministry of Defence and Prigozhin would have lost control over them. This was likely to have been the primary motivation behind his decision to organise the ‘March for Justice’, during which the headquarters of the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don were captured and a part of the Wagner unit marched on Moscow.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s futile order to halt the ‘March for Justice’ and restore order not only indicated weakness but also showed the president himself as weak. In Russian culture, this incident was humiliating for the president and required an appropriate resolution. The deal which was brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to end the rebellion was clearly a bad one – and as we know, bad deals are often short-lived.

The resolution came on 23 August when a private plane crashed with Prigozhin and Chief Commander of Wagner Dmitry Utkin on board. The disarmed armed formations, left without leaders, were interned in the territory of Belarus and later integrated into other formations of the Russian Armed Forces. This essentially ended Wagner’s involvement in the war in Ukraine and it is very unlikely that Russia will allow an organisation with such powerful military capability to emerge again outside the official force.

Nevertheless, Wagner continues to be active in Africa, maintaining a strong presence in the Central African Republic, Mali and Libya. Although formally Wagner’s role is to strengthen the security of the region in these countries, they actually protect the political regime from both internal and external enemies.

The Russian Ministry of Defence has attempted to get Wagner under control in Africa as well. While they were successful in Ukraine, this has proven to be more challenging in Africa because the countries themselves are not interested in cooperating with the Russian Ministry of Defence, preferring Wagner units. However, Yunusbek Yevkurov, Deputy Minister of Defence of Russia, has made multiple visits to Africa in an attempt to resolve the situation in Russia’s favour. In the future, it is likely that the Russian Expeditionary Force to be set up or a private military company will represent Russian interests in the region.

Wagner has also been successful in conducting information operations that have promoted pan-Africanism and anti-Western sentiment in Africa. This has involved exploiting opinion leaders, responding quickly and creatively to emerging conflicts and establishing personal links with key African leaders.

As a result of all this, the influence of France and other Western countries diminished, existing military support failed and they were forced to leave several countries, leaving them under Russian influence. All it took was for a few Wagner combatants to carry out some suspicious actions near NATO’s borders and a situation arose in Europe where a potential Wagner invasion was discussed. Therefore, Wagner or any other private military company is not merely a military instrument but also a psychological measure.

Private military companies play a specific role in the Russian system, as legally the combatants in these units are not considered combatants but civilians. Private military companies are banned in Russia, which means they cannot operate publicly. Thus their main area of operation is outside Russia’s borders, within its sphere of interest and influence, be it a former Eastern bloc country in Europe or a post-coup junta in Africa seeking allies.

Although Wagner has currently fallen back, the threat posed by these kinds of units should not be underestimated as they can and do operate in the so-called grey area. This is something that always poses dilemmas for Western security forces. ‖

Photo: AFP / Scanpix

Orikhiv is a city in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Russian terrorists have destroyed another residential building.

Photo: Dmytro Smolienko / Ukrinform / Scanpix

LESSONS IDENTIFIED FROM THE RUSSIANUKRAINIAN WAR

At the Estonian Military Academy (EMA), we have been closely monitoring developments in Ukraine for more than two years with a keen eye. In the following article, we highlight some of the key observations that we use in our daily teaching and academic research. Although not all of the above is directly or exclusively relevant to Estonia, we can still provisionally refer to these observations as lessons identified.

ILLIMAR PLOOM

ERIK MÄNNIK

LEENU ORG

MIKK ANTSOV

Estonian Military Academy

POLICY AND STRATEGY: WEST’S CHOICES

The strategy of the Russian Federation has been discussed in the 2022 Defence Yearbook by Erik Männik, Senior Researcher at the EMA, detailing the significant risks Russia undertook to gain political control over Ukraine, alongside strategic miscalculations, including the failure to grasp Ukraine’s centre of gravity. Yet Russia’s threshold for suffering is high, and in the ongoing war of attrition, there are no signs that the Kremlin will abandon its military actions or the goals it has set for itself. The Kremlin’s broader aim is to undermine not only the prestige of the US but also the entire Western security arrangement.

This article analyses and explains the background to the current situation from the perspective of the West, outlining the choices Western societies confront, and the associated challenges. Focused on prosperity, the West has sidelined the development of conventional military capabilities. The crises have also tested the resilience of Western societies and underscored the problems caused

by populists. However, confronted with the challenges posed by autocracy, the democratic system of the West possesses all the necessary elements to find its own internal balance and overcome the obstacles.

Given the situation and its unexpectedness, the West has acted vigorously, showing exceptional unity in aiding Ukraine and sanctioning Russia. Simultaneously, the shortage of arms and ammunition, along with the West’s limited production capacity, has become evident.

Furthermore, political issues have hindered the sustainability of aid efforts. In 2023, Trumpists in the US Congress created lasting problems with the adoption of the Ukraine aid package, and the upcoming presidential elections could bring the unpredictable Donald Trump back into power.

Although the European Union (EU) has faced challenges in ensuring coherence due to Hungary, it has nonetheless managed to adopt its aid packages with remarkable efficiency. In light of events in the US, the EU’s contribution has become particularly crucial.

Transporting the wounded from muddy fields near Bakhmut.

Photo: Anatoly Stepanov / AFP / Scanpix

The political objective of the West is to guarantee Ukraine’s independence. Although the EU’s behaviour was uncertain before 2022, giving the option to treat Ukraine as a buffer state, it is now evident that Ukraine is considered a partner as a candidate country.

Simultaneously, Western elites have struggled to convey to their constituencies the implications of Russia’s actions in indirectly threatening the global security order. Consequently, Western assistance has been primarily limited to supplying Ukraine with the military resources available.

Launching new large-scale investments in the defence industry has proven to be challenging. Although several key countries have stood out with significant investment, the scarcity since the second half of 2023 has provided the Kremlin with room to manoeuvre and placed Ukraine in a relatively challenging position.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, notably the phase that commenced in February 2022, has already had a significant impact on global security and the geopolitical order. While signs of this rivalry previously existed, it is in the last two years that the world has shifted towards a profound rivalry reminiscent of a Cold War-like bloc.

At the heart of the opposition forming around China are partners or vassals that, for the time being, tend to engage with it individually, such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Yet it is the latter two that have been the direct

military supporters of Russia. China has not (yet) opted to directly support Russia. However, broader relations between Russia and China are not devoid of issues, as both sides have displayed at least partial independence from each other’s decisions during the ongoing war.

The political objective of the West is to guarantee Ukraine’s independence.

Just as during the Cold War, each side is seeking support beyond the blocs. Russia’s activities in the Sahel region of Africa are noteworthy. However, unlike the Cold War, there is no ideological confrontation. One evident attitude within the engaged nonWest is anti-Western sentiment, reinforced in developing countries by the legacy of the West’s colonial past.

In this context, the possibility of several simultaneous conflicts, such as the war between Israel and Hamas and its aftermath

A fighter from the 93rd Separate Mechanised Brigade prepares to fly a Furia reconnaissance drone near Bahmut.

Photo: Inna Varenytsya / Reuters / Scanpix

(eg, Houthi activities in the Red Sea), is important.

Arguably, the most significant factor in averting another Cold War is the unprecedented wave of globalisation that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, particularly the integration of companies into global value chains. With a few exceptions (such as North Korea), countries have largely embraced this trend, leading to a high level of economic integration. Such deep interdependence can deter the formation of strict blocs, as disrupting value and supply chains would be catastrophic for all economies.

Every security-related decision has an impact on economic relations.

Examples of this are the supply chain disruptions triggered by the coronavirus crisis and exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, resulting in severe inflation in developed countries. As a result, the majority of political and geopolitical decisions are cast against the backdrop of global value chains. However, the relationship between globalisation and geopolitics goes both ways.

Every security-related decision has an impact on economic relations (with sanctions being the most obvious example). China’s investments in Africa also carry significant geopolitical implications, such as the establishment of technological spheres of influence.

The West must decide whether and to what extent to resist or deter the formation of blocs. The latter approach would foster clarity and dissuade unfriendly countries from adopting Western technologies. Re-shoring has already occurred in critical technologies and key sectors, amplified by the coronavirus pandemic and, most recently, by the Houthis in Yemen.

Security of supply is becoming an increasingly pivotal consideration in economic decision-making. At the same time, the extensive interdependence of economies means that a significant disruption of global supply and value chains would

severely impact the economies of the West too. The current crisis has affirmed that the pain threshold of Western societies is lower compared to that of Russia, and perhaps also to China and other competitors.

Thus, it may be in the West’s interest to at least maintain the current global order, or at the very least prolong the transition period. While Cold War-style bloc formation may appear inevitable, a more realistic perspective is to consider a spectrum of options ranging from greater to lesser separation. Non-bloc countries are still making choices to hedge risks, rather than aligning themselves with particular sides.

It would be in the West’s interest to avoid bloc formation, as the current world order is still fundamentally centred on international law and human rights. Economic and

security policies mutually underpin this system.

In light of the above, including the shift of US focus to Asia, the EU must also begin to think and act geopolitically. Thus far, the EU has functioned in a peacetime capacity, serving as a security community. The EU has pursued its foreign and security policy interests by projecting its “normative” or soft power, leveraging its ability to offer favourable trade agreements.

The geo-defence policy has not aligned with the structure of the EU, leaving the overall view and responsibility to NATO. However, in today’s world, the balance

of power has shifted. China, Russia, and other non-Western countries have grown economically more prosperous, developed their military capabilities, and become increasingly assertive in advancing their interests. Hence, the geopolitical focus of US interest has shifted towards Asia. This necessitates greater geopolitical responsibility from the EU, particularly within its own region. The crux of the matter lies in the defence capabilities of EU Member States. The modest role of these EU countries within NATO, the historically restrained development of their own military capabilities, not to mention their subsequent decline, no longer provide the West with the same level of confidence in securing its interests globally.

The West requires a clear and cohesive strategy regarding Ukraine. Nevertheless, the West’s interests and choices appear intricate. Globalisation allows us to understand this. According to retired US General Ben Hodges, while the West is opposed to a Russian victory in Ukraine, it does not seem to be in favour of a complete collapse of Russia, because the latter would increase the risk of nuclear conflict or play Russia into China’s vassalage.

However, Hodges critically finds that this should not become a form of self-discouragement for the West. It has also been argued that the West as a whole is characterised by avoidance of escalation risk. Nonetheless, the West is rightly cautious about disclosing its technological advantages on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Observing Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine prompts the question of to what extent the war of attrition that has developed is a consequence of the impact of battlefield technologies utilised in the conflict. To what extent has it evolved as a result of Russia’s choices, and to what extent by chance, but also due to the West’s self-imposed restrictions (such as assurances not to intervene in Ukraine) and limitations imposed on Ukraine (such as restricting the range of weapons and withholding certain weapons)?

Yet, considering the avoidance of bloc formation, wouldn’t a war of attrition have a crippling effect on the sustainability of

An apartment building in Odessa destroyed by a drone attack. Eight people, including two children, were killed in the attack.

Photo. Nina Liashonok / Ukrinform / Scanpix

Russian society and the economy, potentially driving it closer to China?

One of the most credible initiatives aimed at shaping a coherent strategy for the West is a recent reflection paper from Estonia (Setting Transatlantic Defence up for Success: A Military Strategy for Ukraine’s Victory and Russia’s Defeat, Ministry of Defence 2023). It lays out clear objectives, shows the need for assistance, considers the capabilities and will of the opponent, and charts a path towards achieving the objectives.

One of the notable strengths of the strategy is its comprehensive forecasting, which demonstrates that with a relatively modest level of expenditure, the West can provide Ukraine with sufficient weaponry, thereby enabling Ukraine to attain the necessary strategic superiority. In this manner, Estonia’s proposed strategy elucidates one of the most significant paradoxes within the context of the

Russian-Ukrainian war: how an economy approximately 15 times smaller can attain military equivalence or even superiority against a more powerful bloc.

The West’s, particularly European, weapons and ammunition stockpiles have proven to be scarce both in terms of assisting Ukraine and in terms of establishing an independent defence capability. The aid provided to Ukraine has underscored a harsh reality. In the context of the euphoria of a post-Berlin Wall era of peace and a series of crises, defence spending has been severely cut, and the sector as a whole has been underfunded for a long time. As a result, there has been no renewal of the reserves needed for an independent defence capability. However, this does not imply that democracy lacks advantages over autocracy. Democracy can be slow due to its emphasis on deliberation, consensus-building, and adherence to the rule of law. These are the strengths that place the idea of indi-

Valentyna Nasirova mourns her husband Nodar, who fell in the ranks of the Georgian Legion, in Zelenyi Bir, Kyiv region.

Photo: Valentyn Ogirenko / Reuters / Scanpix

vidual autonomy at the core of all Western life. It is precisely this notion of autonomy, or freedom, that enables the West to leverage the full potential of its people in pursuit of its chosen objectives, and has, among other factors, contributed to its technological superiority over autocratic regimes. The question is, how long will it take to fully unleash this potential for the benefit of security?

Hence, it’s possible to understand why the West finds it challenging to pull itself together. In democracies, unlike in autocracies, politicians must be capable

of persuading voters about the reality of a distant yet systemic threat and the necessity to reinforce the re-establishment of defence capabilities. This is challenging because the West has historically been oriented towards economic growth and international trade, with the development of conventional military capability not being a primary focus, with the main exception being the US.

Firstly, Western societies are fragile, with populations accustomed to the relatively high incomes and living standards of their welfare states. Their modest yet consistent growth does not tolerate significant fluctuations or setbacks. Furthermore, the downturn accompanying the war is not the sole or initial setback.

Firstly, Western societies are fragile, with populations accustomed to the relatively high incomes and living standards of their welfare states.

It has followed the devastating financial and economic crisis of 2008–2012, which internally divided many Western societies, entrenched unusually high levels of inequality, and underscored the systemic threat to democracy posed by this division, emanating from more or less radical rightwing populists.

The economic crisis that originated in the West, along with its mediocre resolution, demonstrated to Russia and China that the Western model is not necessarily the only possibility and that the Western countries possess vulnerabilities against which to position themselves. The West also suffered significantly during the coronavirus crisis, which damaged the economy through supply chain disruptions and subsequent inflation. Furthermore, Western societies are averse to war, let alone nuclear war. In contrast, democracy relies on the necessity for political elites to convince voters to take escalation risks. Here lies an important explanation for the West’s cautious approach in Ukraine, its failure to leverage its strengths, and the emergence of a war of attrition.

A monument made by sculptor Oleg Tsoh in Kiev to Ukrainian prisoner of war Oleksandr Matsiyevski, who was murdered by the occupiers during interrogation.

Photo: Eugen Kotenko / Ukrinform / Scanpix

Residents who lost their homes in a drone attack look at the ruins of their houses in Dnipro.

Photo: Mykola Miakshykov / Ukrinform / Scanpix

If the West possesses weaknesses, history has demonstrated democracy’s remarkable capacity to rectify them. In the long term, the West will need to navigate towards a balanced and socially inclusive development akin to the post-World War II era. In the short term, addressing autocracy is essential.

Revving up the defence industry to full capacity requires both time and financial investment. Securing funds can prove particularly challenging within a democracy, as in today’s financial framework (budget deficits and loan limits), investing in the defence industry entails diverting resources from other sectors of the economy. The UK, for example, is planning to reduce its ground forces in order to find funds for the necessary defence investments. In extraordinary circumstances, fostering the development of defence capabilities could be viewed as a driver for economic growth, and fiscal constraints should be set aside, as already suggested by the European Commission.

To a certain extent, the conventional ownership structure of the Western defence industry also presents a hurdle, as highlighted by Estonia’s permanent representative to NATO, Jüri Luik, on Kuku radio’s “Välismääraja” on 8th February 2024. Private property requires equal treatment, entailing lengthy bureaucratic procedures and enduring guarantees. However, there are mechanisms in place to address this issue, such as Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which provides for exceptions allowing public contracts to be awarded to domestic companies in order to safeguard security interests.

West will need to navigate towards a balanced and socially inclusive development.

Estonia has also demonstrated proficiency in this domain by convincing the EU to propose the one million shells pledge. Even if the target is not met by the set deadline, it plays an important catalytic role (Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur on ERR on 8 February 2024).

After all, Estonia has already learned one lesson of strategy and has applied it more broadly (Martin Herem, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces, in Eesti Päevaleht on 8 February 2024) by persuading its NATO allies. Namely, Estonia has argued that instead of the current deterrence by punishment, NATO allies in countries bordering Russia should adopt a deterrence-by-denial posture, focusing on direct defensive action.

Here, the keyword is the forward defence concept, familiar from the Cold War era. In addition to Russia’s substantial personnel and the considerable conventional force at its disposal, nuclear deterrence has also come to the fore. As in the Cold War, the West must convince the Kremlin that it is prepared for nuclear escalation. ‖

A fighter of the 12th Special Operations Brigade Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine prepares to fire a 155mm M109 Paladin self-propelled gun.

Photo: Efrem Lukatsky / AP / Scanpix

LESSONS IDENTIFIED FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

When describing the most important lessons identified at the operational and tactical level of the war in Ukraine, we must start with a clarification that is frequently heard in military action assessments. Namely, the strength of the air defence on both sides has been such that neither air force has been able to effectively suppress or destroy it, significantly shaping the course of the war. NATO’s air force is unquestionably more capable than that of Ukraine or Russia, thus the nature of a NATO-led war could be different.

On the other hand, can such an assessment be accepted as an established fact? Military history abounds with examples where the realities of war quickly disproved numerous pre-war assessments and assumptions, compelling warring parties to seek new solutions and paths to victory. Therefore, it is always crucial to consider all developments and potential solutions that can enhance one’s own defences and combat capabilities.

Arguably, the most remarkable event of 2023 in the war in Ukraine was the counter-attack by the Ukrainian armed forces, commencing in early June and lasting until October. Ukraine launched attacks in three directions: Tokmak-Melitopol, Berdyansk and Bahmut. It was arguably the first instance in this war where Ukrainian artillery outnumbered the enemy and fired more shells than them (over 200,000 shells per month).

Within an area up to 10 kilometres from the contact line, the movement of both equipment and personnel is challenging.

The attack was a challenging one: small infantry units (attempts to attack with larger mechanised units led to a rapid increase in casualties) persistently advanced

through minefields and plantations, capturing Russian positions through intense combats. The opponent launched continuous counter-attacks and heavily utilised close air support. According to some data, the advance rate of Ukrainian units ranged from 700–1200 metres every five days. In five months, they managed to penetrate 17 kilometres into the Russian units’ defences.

There are several reasons for the limited success of the attack. Combat operations in Ukraine are characterised by the high effectiveness of the “sensor-fire” system and the ability of both sides to open fire on an unexpected target within minutes. 70–80% of the losses in the Ukrainian war are attributed to artillery (compared to 60–70% in the First World War). There are between 10 and 50 unmanned aircraft in the air for every 10 kilometres of frontline, providing both sides with excellent situational awareness both day and night.

Within an area up to 10 kilometres from the contact line, the movement of both equipment and personnel is challenging, making unit concentration unfeasible. Therefore, tanks are frequently employed for fire support missions, utilising both semi-direct aiming and indirect fire.

Both sides are employing mines, and in certain areas, the width of minefields in front of Russian defences has been expanded to 500 metres to avoid fast demining, with more than one mine per square metre in some instances. Both sides have also continually developed and saturated their units with electronic warfare (EW) tools.

The latter have become an increasingly integral aspect of warfare due to the utilisation of unmanned aerial vehicles of all kinds. Combat operations have witnessed the extensive use of FPV drones at distances of up to 25 kilometres and the use of the Russian Federation’s stealthy Lancet

air-to-air missile at distances of up to 70 kilometres. The utilisation of unmanned aerial vehicles (as opposed to artillery) is greatly influenced by the weather and the enemy’s EW capability.

In the Russian Federation’s order of battle, there is one large electronic warfare complex for every 10 kilometres of frontline, but significant efforts have been made to enhance their survivability by relocating antennas away from them. According to some estimates, the intensive development and use of EW tools may have reached a stage where the most effective period for FPV drones at the current technological level may be over. FPV drones / unmanned aerial vehicles may need to be upgraded to a new technical level to address this issue.

The limited success of the Ukrainian attack also highlighted the importance of well-prepared fortifications and defence lines, especially in situations where the ad-

versary lacks superiority in the air. Additionally, with good situational awareness, advanced command systems, minefields, guided anti-tank missiles, and artillery, crossing uncharted terrain becomes a very difficult task, and armoured vehicles have proven vulnerable. For this reason, the warring parties have revisited past strategies and avenues for success: assault infantry troops have been deployed once more, and attempts are made to attack the opponent from underground along communication routes (at populated points) or by constructing special tunnels.

In air and naval warfare, unmanned and precision-guided weapons have also played a pivotal role. Adversaries conduct air strikes that penetrate each other’s defences utilising unmanned aerial vehicles, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles launched from their own territory and airspace. The remarkable accuracy of

missiles launched from aircraft directed towards the naval base at Sevastopol. As a result, Ukraine has forced the Black Sea fleet to leave its main base.

Russia, on the other hand, has deployed mines in the waters of the Black Sea, both from ships and aircraft, resulting in significant disruptions to maritime traffic and thereby inflicting damage on Ukraine’s economy. Ukraine has also used mining to deter potential naval operations by the adversary.

The limited success of the Ukrainian attack also highlighted the importance of wellprepared fortifications and defence lines.

The situation on the Ukrainian front has occasionally been described as a war of stalemate and attrition. It can indeed be labelled as attrition warfare, and it is precisely that. Russia leverages its superior resources and is willing to incur losses to diminish the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian armed forces by targeting personnel and equipment during military operations.

An officer from the 80th Airborne Brigade relays target coordinates to a D-30 howitzer crew.

Photo: Efrem Lukatsky / AP / Scanpix

air strike weapons has led to a situation where the capability to counter them has increased.

On 23 November 2022, 19 cruise missiles penetrated Ukraine’s air defences during a Russian air strike, resulting in a complete blackout in 11 Ukrainian oblasts.

In the realm of air defence, several modern air defence systems have proven highly effective in countering cruise missile attacks, yet only the Patriot air defence system has demonstrated the capability to intercept ballistic missiles.

At sea, Ukraine has effectively countered Russia’s Black Sea fleet by employing anti-ship missiles launched from shore, unmanned watercraft, and cruise

At

sea, Ukraine has effectively countered Russia’s Black Sea fleet by employing anti-ship missiles launched from shore.

It is not a stalemate; however, Ukraine’s resources are more limited, and if it is not given sufficient support, it is only a matter of time before it loses the ability to counter conventional warfare.

Thus, it can be argued that 2023 demonstrated that in order to defeat Russia’s armed forces in the ongoing war, Ukraine requires additional resources and the capability to keep pace with the military-technical race of the war. Military research and development, along with the military industry of the countries supporting Ukraine, must operate at a pace that secures victory in the war. ‖

LESSONS IDENTIFIED ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

The lessons identified from the war in Ukraine in the area of the Law of Armed Conflict are deeply concerning. It is worth mentioning the two most important aspects that Russian entities have consistently demonstrated in Ukraine over the past two years.

First and foremost, Russia routinely and systematically violates the Law of Armed Conflict, and such actions can be viewed as a method of warfare. Secondly, the deliberate targeting of emblem bearers with protected status (eg, medics) has created a situation where wearing the emblem is more dangerous than not wearing it.

The fact that wars are accompanied by a great deal of destruction and loss of life is not news to anyone. Violations of the Law of Armed Conflict are typically a characteristic of wars, but in the case of developed countries, they are primarily committed by isolated units or individuals.

Russia’s violations of the Law of Armed Conflict and war crimes are primarily either directed by the country’s leadership or senior officials or, in extreme cases, known to senior officials. The massive and systematic commission of war crimes began in the very first month of the war and continues to this day.

This includes the killing and torture of civilians in many settlements occupied by Russia (such as Bucha, Irpin, Izyum, Lyman, Kherson, and Mariupol), the bombing of critical civilian infrastructure, organised theft of crops, the bombing of civilian structures, deliberate obstruction of humanitarian aid, obstruction of evacuations, widespread sexual violence, targeting of medics and hospitals, deportation of civilians and children, and so forth.

The scale and systematic nature of these war crimes signal a deliberate disregard for the rules of the Law of Armed Conflict and represent a Russian form of warfare aimed at demoralising the entire Ukrainian society, weakening its will to de-

fend itself, and crushing its resistance.

The numerous war crimes committed by Russia must be prosecuted. Ukraine has initiated investigations of 120,000 war crimes in total. Ukraine collaborates with the International Criminal Court and other nations in war crimes proceedings.

This volume of proceedings strains the entire national judicial system. The Republic of Estonia Prosecutor’s Office, as the head of the pre-litigation procedure, emphasises that soldiers in the field can hold a crucial role in documenting the sequence of events and in securing and preserving primary evidence.

Even pictures and videos taken by soldiers on their phones, along with reporting the location of the crime, are helpful. It remains to be seen, of course, how many war

A Russian attack drone set fire to a bus near Bahmut.

Photo: 10th Mountain Assault Brigade/AP/Scanpix

criminals will actually end up behind bars.

War crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction, meaning that these crimes are not statute-barred, and all states have an obligation to prosecute war criminals. So, even if war criminals are not brought to justice in the near future, at least preparations are in place and there is hope that they will face justice in the future.

Russia’s methods of warfare, involving large-scale violations of the Law of Armed Conflict, have prompted a reassessment of the implications of using protective emblems (eg, the Red Cross emblem). As of February 2024, Russian units had carried out at least 1,365 attacks on hospitals, medical facilities, and medics.

Medics, medical vehicles, and units are protected under the Law of Armed Conflict

and may not be attacked. They must be marked with a red cross or crescent emblem, as appropriate. If Russian units are deliberately targeting medics and medical structures, the question inevitably arises as to whether it would be better to remove the medics’ emblems.

If the emblem is removed from an arm or a medical vehicle, they no longer have legal protection status. The question arises, however, which is more important: legal protection or actual protection from bullets? This is the dilemma medics face on the battlefield in Ukraine every day. But in the future, all countries that come into conflict with Russia will have to consider this.

Adherence to the rules of the Law of Armed Conflict has enabled Ukraine to cultivate a positive image.

The consequences of compliance and/ or non-compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict also extend to the strategic level. While Russia’s war crimes have damaged the country’s image, Ukraine has been able to leverage the Law of Armed Conflict to its advantage. Adherence to the rules of the Law of Armed Conflict has enabled Ukraine to cultivate a positive image and has supported its access to foreign assistance.

Western countries must refrain from providing arms to any country that uses them to violate human rights and the Law of Armed Conflict. If Ukraine were to similarly commit war crimes on a vast scale, Western aid to Ukraine would be reduced.

The image of being a so-called good country also facilitates broader support from societies in other countries, which in turn influences national attitudes towards both Ukraine and its refugees.

A positive reputation for compliance with the rules of the Law of Armed Conflict will eventually have a ripple effect on the tactical level as well, resulting in more equipment and weapons being available for fighting in the field. ‖

LESSONS IDENTIFIED IN THE FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

The key lesson identified in the field of technology and innovation is the first large-scale deployment of unmanned systems in the Ukraine-Russia conflict to perform a variety of tasks on the battlefield and in the rear.

These tasks include intelligence, observation, and attack, as well as deception and defensive activities. Even more important is the expansion of situational awareness of what is happening on the battlefield to provide commanders with real-time information on enemy manoeuvres and movements on the frontline. On the fronts,

drones are constantly flying in real-time, and any activity is immediately visible to both the enemy and their own forces, making concealment or shielding very difficult. The situation doesn’t improve at night due to the drones’ thermographic capabilities.

To counter this capability, both the Ukrainians and the Russians are developing suits that can effectively conceal combatants from this observation tool, and their use on the battlefield has already been documented.

Recently, Russian units infiltrated Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka thanks to these suits. Fortunately, this capability is

not yet widespread due to the high cost and clumsiness of the suit, but development is underway.

The role or effectiveness of certain types of drones has also changed dramatically since the beginning of the war. An example of this is the Bayraktar TB2, which initially showed itself to be a potential “game changer” by destroying and disrupting Russian troops at the beginning of the war. However, the frequency of its use

steadily decreased by the summer of 2022 precisely because of the Russians’ more effective air defence and electronic warfare capabilities.

The role or effectiveness of certain types of drones has also changed dramatically.

At present, the systems are used only for short surveillance flights and, in some cases, for attacks for up to 30 minutes, which is a fraction of the maximum flight time of the drone. This suggests an increasing transition from large controlled fixed-wing drones to controlled quad-rotor systems, which are no longer small in size but are capable of carrying heavy anti-tank mines to demolish heavily fortified positions.

For the first time in history, the role of unmanned air systems as precision weapons in both offensive and defensive operations has been revealed on the Ukrainian battlefield. It is in this respect that FPV drones have proven themselves on the battlefield. Typically, these drones are equipped with relatively inexpensive and basic explosive charges (such as trinitrotoluene stick or plastic explosives with nuts or ball bearings for infantry, or RPG explosive charges for armoured targets), which an experienced operator launches at the enemy.

Both the Ukrainians and the Russians are developing suits that can effectively conceal combatants from.

Such uses of drones compensate for the shortage of ammunition, as they are capable of fulfilling the role of precision ammunition. In its favour is also the fact that the price of a drone is several times lower than that of a shell, which raises its own questions about the role of artillery on the battlefield. Just as heavy weapons are employed in defensive operations against infantry, Ukrainian FPV drone operators pursue enemy infantry, armoured vehicles, and tanks with comparable effectiveness and lethality.

Launching the reconnaissance drone Furia in the direction of Bahmut.

Photo: Inna Varenytsya / Reuters / Scanpix

The Ukrainians are increasingly refining their tactics of combined use of drones with different attack systems in military operations on enemy-occupied territory. In January 2024, during an assault on the Crimean Peninsula involving both air and sea drones simultaneously, it was observed that certain air drones managed to evade Russian air defences, revealing a gap in the air defences.

The development of naval drones has advanced to the point where they are capable of launching missiles at distant warships.

It is worth noting that the development of naval drones has advanced to the point where they are capable of launching missiles at distant warships. The enemy’s vulnerability was promptly exploited by deploying Storm Shadow, SCALP, anti-radar, and decoy missiles to dismantle control points, warehouses, and notably strategic targets, such as anti-aircraft radars and the communications control centre responsible for managing air defence operations in Crimea. This action notably reduced Russian air defence capabilities in the operational zone.

The Russian attempt to close the gap with an A-50 aircraft proved unsuccessful, as the aircraft was destroyed by a Patriot system stationed in southern Ukraine. As a consequence of the operation, the enemy’s air defences in this operational area were markedly diminished.

This example directly illustrates how sacrificing a relatively inexpensive drone to gather intelligence on the enemy’s air defence capabilities led to enhanced situational awareness. When combined with a high-tech and innovative attack, this intelligence was immediately utilised to diminish Russian tactical success in Crimea.

The significant presence of Ukrainian and Russian unmanned aerial vehicles operating in the area has also resulted in instances of confusion on the frontline. This is because fighting units may not always

Fighters of the 93rd Individual Mechanised Brigade of Holodnyi Yar prepare their anti-aircraft artillery for action near Bahmut. Photo: Anatoly Stepanov / AFP / Scanpix

have a clear understanding of which side’s drones are operating around their fighting positions.

There are numerous instances of FPV drones flying into or attacking Ukrainian positions during combat operations. In other words, it is not possible to visually differentiate the drones flying during these moments on the battlefield to determine their ownership. In such cases, units must quickly communicate with their drone operators to ascertain the whereabouts of their drones on the battlefield.

To mitigate instances of failing to respond to enemy attack drones, it is imperative to adopt appropriate behaviours and actions to distinguish one’s own drones from those of the enemy and enhance the survivability of one’s own units.

In summary, unmanned aerial drones have demonstrated significant potential as a force multiplier on today’s battlefield, capable of fulfilling various roles in defence, offence, and other operations. Considering its low cost and simplicity, we must adopt the perception that the drone is a consumable item and should be treated accordingly.

Sacrificing or losing a drone for the purpose of enhancing situational awareness must become the norm, rather than the exception. The Estonian Defence Forces must shift their mindset, recognising that fearing the loss of equipment in training may lead to a deficiency in skills during actual combat, potentially resulting in the death of a soldier. ‖

The Joint Headquarters building of the Estonian Defence Forces in the fall of 2023.

Photo: Ardi Hallismaa / EDF

The war in Ukraine has caused tensions in international relations, added to the cost of living and stress, exacerbated shortcomings, and torn off masks. Yet, in light of all this, the Estonian Defence Forces have made dizzying progress, paving the way for introducing new capabilities not included in the plans just a few years ago.

ON THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ESTONIAN DEFENCE FORCES

ENNO MÕTS

Major General, Chief of Staff of the Estonian Defence Forces

There is no doubt that 2023 has been a challenging year, not only for the headquarters but also for other structures of the Estonian Defence Forces, the institutions under the Ministry’s jurisdiction, and society at large.

Active servicemen received a pay rise and changes were made in salaries while teachers had to go on strike. The Estonian Defence Forces do not exist for the sake of ourselves; we do not serve ourselves but society, the Estonian state, and we must maintain solidarity in our expectations and demands. However, we do have a moral obligation to prepare for military defence and, in light of this, to provide military advice to political decision-makers.

We are the experts.

The headquarters started the year with a split. I use this word with cautious humour. It was a planned restructuring to consolidate the staff of the Estonian division. The military created the division out of necessity, as it was the only logical and viable solution. We have now evolved to the point where this was possible. This was not the case five years ago.

Naturally, the structural units had to contribute to staffing the division. The headquarters support the chief of defence, responsible for preparing the country’s

military defence, while the Estonian division is in charge of direct military action on Estonian soil. The chief of defence, together with the headquarters, must prepare the troops, maintain combat readiness, and implement the military defence of the country.

The chief of defence, together with the headquarters, must prepare the troops, maintain combat readiness, and implement the military defence of the country.

To this end, the envisaged forces will be handed over to the NATO command based on the operation plan, and the operations will be secured and reinforced with national and international support. To date, the chief of defence has approved the Defence Action Plan. This plan focuses on the strategic-operational level and does not rely on the scheme of manoeuvre of brigades, unlike previous practice.

We have grown, improved, and matured.

Although at the national level, the HQ is the highest military staff, we are not a joint force staff and do not plan joint operations. Important elements of the Estonian Defence Forces are already operating in NATO’s chain of command in the land, sea, and air domains, as well as in special operations, which is why the combined battle plan covering Estonia will be drawn up as

joint operations at NATO’s Brunssum Allied Joint Force Command.

Our country’s independence needs collective protection, as it has throughout history, and it makes sense to follow best practices. It is crucial to maintain unity with our allies, both in our actions and our words.

We are not creating a window of opportunity that the enemy can exploit.

Estonia does not foresee a solution in which our national military units start military defence activities, and NATO forces join later. No, we will start together because we are NATO, and there is no staggering. The Allied forces are already in Estonia and have been practising defending the country with us for years. We are not creating a window of opportunity that the enemy can exploit.

The HQ has changed its operational focus, reflected in the renewed statute, which sets out the eight tasks of the national higher military staff. These are more detailed descriptions of the basic tasks set for the headquarters in the Estonian Defence Forces Statute. The fine-tuning of the roles of the headquarters and the division staff is still ongoing.

This is natural for major reforms. The lack of human resources has become evident simply because the Estonian Defence Forces have grown bigger every year. New forces also need personnel. The devil lies in the details, and some functional solutions only come with practice.

The HQ has changed its wartime composition and command post structure based on lessons learned from the Russian-Ukrainian war. Our cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and the Government Office has resulted in a structural solution to ensure the exchange of national military-strategic information and coherence in the war situation.

As a separate priority, I am working on creating formats for national institutions and agencies to support military action during a

Encouragement and appreciation ceremony at the Defence Forces General Staff on August 30, 2023.

crisis. These formats need to be implemented. An important systemic addition is the reorganisation of the operational rhythm and work processes of the headquarters, both for operation planning within the Estonian Defence Forces and for regular coordination with NATO’s higher staff.

At the same time, several planning teams, including representatives of the

The anniversary line-up of the General Staff of the Defence Forces in October

Photo: Hans Vega Lehepuu / EDF

Estonian Defence Forces’ structural units, are planning and coordinating activities between the Estonian Defence Forces and armed services, using information from the respective NATO staff. The HQ also prepares reports on the performance of the main activities of the Ministry of Defence in matters concerning the Estonian Defence Forces.

Awareness of the objectives set by the Minister of Defence and their targeted implementation within the Estonian Defence Forces must be increased. We need to better synchronise the efforts of the Estonian Defence Forces and the Ministry to focus on critical developments. Planning, assurance, and financial management reforms are underway to improve military capacity and are still being analysed.

One of the basic principles is freeing up servicemen for military activities and handing over specific areas of the civilian sector to the Ministry. The past year has been extremely busy and fast-paced. We provided military advice to the Ministry’s development plan, to support Ukraine’s military activities, to international military operations, but also to NATO staff elements, etc.

A large part of the workload of the headquarters is focused outside the Estonian Defence Forces, ie developing cooperation with the Ministry of Defence, NATO staff elements, military coalitions, the Government Office, and other state agencies. There is a lot to do, but not enough people. In this situation, we have to admit that we did not finish all the tasks set and in hindsight, there were several things that could have been improved on to achieve a better outcome.

We must keep in mind that perfectionism is a dangerous disease that undermines the soul, spirit, and body. Therefore, we must see beyond tensions and obstacles. As planned, the Estonian Defence Forces organised the preparation of our reserve forces, including military training for Ukrainians, and improved cooperation with allies. Throughout the major changes and divisions, our core activities were never interrupted.

At the reception organised in the Stenbock House, the Prime Minister thanked the Estonian Defence Forces who have participated in foreign missions.

The heads of departments and chiefs of staff at headquarters are leaders of the field and development across the Estonian Defence Forces. Our staff and the Estonian Defence Forces as a whole have worked hard. We have the same goal and we can only achieve it by working together. Together, we are strong. The motto of the headquarters is ‘United forces’. Thank you to all elements of the organisation for your excellent cooperation! ‖

October 2021.

Photo: Valner Väino / EDF

Photo: Ardi Hallismaa / EDF

Iris-T SLM

• Medium-range air defense system

• Manufacturer: Diehl Defence (Germany)

• Tactical Operations Centre

• Multifunctional fire control radar

• The launcher can hold up to eight missiles

• Missile range up to 40 km horizontally, up to 20 km vertically

Looking back on 2023, I am pleased that we have made several conscious choices in shaping the supply chain of Estonia’s national defence.

THE FORMULA FOR THE SUCCESS OF DEFENCE INVESTMENTS INCLUDES A DELIBERATELY CHOSEN STRATEGY

MAGNUS-VALDEMAR SAAR

Director General of the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments

The strategy adopted by the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (RKIK) is known as the ‘price leader strategy’. This involves opening projects to competition, purchasing products over the counter, managing data and metrics, assessing outputs based on their effectiveness, testing, and utilising the engineering potential of the suppliers.

Additionally, the strategy aims to increase the contracting authority’s influence in the market. Secondly, our supply chain is pretty much shaped by the current security environment and the resulting need to deliver capabilities and materials faster than usual.

What have these choices entailed? First, our supply chain is global thanks to these choices. The suppliers of materials necessary for Estonia’s protection include about a quarter of the world’s nearly two

hundred countries, plus or minus a few depending on the year. Of the six continents, our suppliers are located on four. Among others, we have suppliers from Asia, South and North America, Africa, and even Oceania. Naturally, most of our suppliers are close to us and our well-known allies. The top three have always been the United States, France, and Germany.

The supplier base is, therefore, very large: currently, our customer base includes the business names of almost 3,000 companies, about 800 of which are active suppliers, meaning they will deliver something to us this year. If we include first-level sub-suppliers, we have about 10,000 companies on the register.

As always, the Pareto rule is in effect here, and most of the monetary value is made up of a dozen major suppliers. In 2023, these were Rafael, MBDA, Nexter, Saab, Rheinmetall, Instalaza, Diehl Defence, Expal, Thales, and Nammo. You can figure out which delivered goods are behind their names. The first Estonian

company, Europarts Autodet, was left out of the top ten, but its role in ensuring the availability of the Estonian Defence Forces’ technical fleet is crucial.

The Pareto rule also applies if we proceed from the number of transactions. Of course, in this case, the list of top suppliers differs quite a bit – it is ruled by our equipment repair and maintenance partners who receive a little more than half of all the orders placed. In total, the RKIK submitted more than 3,000 orders in 2023.

Where we source the material from and our commitment to competition has a huge impact on our decisions. The price leader strategy requires involving the widest possible range of providers, solutions, and supplier innovations – that is, innovative solutions to old problems. In the first year of operation of RKIK, a large number of procurements had only one tenderer, and the average number of tenderers was approximately 1.5. However, in 2023, the average number of qualified tenderers was eight, and the number of corresponding tenders was nearly four per procurement.

We have implemented various measures to encourage competition. For instance, we prepare output-based technical specifications to the fullest extent possible, involve external experts, conduct open market research, hold information days, and regularly simplify our documentation and process to facilitate tender submissions.

At the same time, it means that suppliers will bear a large part of the responsibility for system integration. Due to the constant development of more advanced technology, there has been a rapid increase in demand for engineering competencies. Meeting this demand through our own resources is almost impossible. RKIK is becoming more connected and adept at involving external experts with each new project.

We are one of the few procurement organisations in Europe that has been able to anticipate market demand and turn a growing defence budget into actual supplies.

The deteriorating security situation and our aggressive neighbour in the East require that Estonia must consider the possibility of using the created capabilities. The sense of danger forces us to have supplies delivered earlier, and the growing defence budget is rapidly increasing the number of projects and, at the same time, the administrative burden.

RKIK now partners with large system integrators rather than suppliers or intermediaries who operate in narrow niche fields.

Consolidating our orders and aggregating procurement projects into the procurement of complete systems increases our market influence. This means that RKIK now partners with large system integrators rather than suppliers or intermediaries who operate in narrow niche fields.

The new situation requires more flexible methods. Implementing the strategic sourcing model has been crucial to maintaining the pace of improvement at RKIK. This means that as the needs grew, we did not start sourcing but turned opportunities created by framework agreements into industrial orders.

We are one of the few procurement organisations in Europe that has been able to anticipate market demand and turn a growing defence budget into actual supplies. For example, the ammunition stockpiling package concluded in February 2022 has been largely delivered to date, as have several elements from the second additional package, such as man-portable air-defence systems, 155 mm precision ammunition, etc. As a result, we have also found several clients from outside Estonia. . ‖

Blue Spear 5G SSM

• Anti-ship missile system

• Manufacturer: Proteus Advanced Systems (Israel and Singapore)

• Hitting distance up to 290 km

LAST YEAR WAS A GOOD YEAR FOR MAJOR PROJECTS OF THE ESTONIAN CENTRE FOR DEFENCE INVESTMENTS

In 2023, four major projects that are unlikely to be completed in the near future were included in the contract: the biggest ever defence investment in medium-range air defence systems, procurement of loitering munitions, procurement of armoured vehicles for the 2nd Infantry Brigade, and a framework contract for military vehicles. Only a few similar projects have been undertaken in the past, such as the CV90 support armoured vehicles, the HIMARS multi-missile system, and the Blue Spear anti-ship missile system, but never several simultaneously.

KEY DELIVERIES IN 2023

• Coastal defence (missile systems and mines), partners IAI and Forcit, full capability to be delivered by the end of 2024, cost EUR 50 million this year, total cost over EUR 100 million.

• Ammunition:

1) 155 mm long-range Vulcano missiles, partner Diehl Defence, cost EUR 60 million;

2) 155 mm ammunition, partners Expal and Rheinmetall, cost 23 million;

3) Instalaza single-use TT grenade launchers C90, partner Instalaza, cost EUR 47–51.5 million (2023–2025), of which EUR 17.6 million in 2023;

4) Antitank systems Spike (SR, LR), partner Eurospike, EUR 10 million in 2023; total cost EUR 120 million in 2023–2025;

5) Antitank grenade launcher Carl Gustaf ammunition, partner SAAB, cost EUR 10–20 million in 2023–2026, of which EUR 2.2 million in 2023;

6) 81 mm ammunition for mortar, EUR 6 million;

7) 120 mm mortar, cost EUR 28 million, of which EUR 12 million in 2023;

8) A large quantity of handgun ammunition, partners Nammo, CBC, Fiocchi Munizioni, cost EUR 22 million.

• Handguns:

1) Negev NG7 machine guns, partner IWI, cost EUR 9 million;

2) Assault rifles, partner Lewis Machine & Tool Company, cost EUR 1 million.

• Man-portable air-defence system Piorun, partners PGZ

and MESKO, cost EUR 3.2 million (total contract value EUR 100 million).

• Various defence charges, partner Estonian Arsenal, cost EUR 9.6 million.

• K9 self-propelled howitzers, partner Hanwha, cost EUR 34 million.

• Integration of K9 into Estonian systems, partner GoCraft, 17 units delivered, cost EUR 3.5 million (24 units), 12 more will be added soon.

• Rebuilding of support armoured vehicles, 15 delivered, 31 delivered in total, due summer 2024, total contract value EUR 40 million.

• The new vehicle repair and maintenance contract has significantly improved our capability. With numerous partners onboard, the obstacle to the repairs is no longer the number of vehicles. However, the Defence Forces’ ability to take vehicles out of military training and put them into service remains a challenge.

• Many different types of communication equipment

• Passive radar Vera NG, partner ERA, cost approximately EUR 10 million

• Military equipment for participants in Operation Parseltongue cost EUR 25 million, and there were multiple partners (Tamrex, Varanus, FRC, etc.)

• Barrier equipment: concrete blocks, dragon’s teeth, etc; multiple partners all over Estonia, total cost approximately EUR 5 million, deliveries already started in early 2022 and the last ones will take place in November 2023.

SIGNIFICANT CONTRACTS SIGNED IN 2023

• Medium-range air defence system, partner Diehl Defence, cost EUR 350 million, deliveries until the end of 2025 (with some more in the future).

• Armoured vehicles, partners Nurol Makina and Otokar, cost EUR 220 million, deliveries until autumn 2025.

• Loitering munitions, partner IAI, cost EUR 100 million, deliveries in 2024

• Military vehicles, partners Scania, Volvo, and Mercedes Benz; framework contract for Estonia EUR 390 million, the first order is being finalised, containing approximately 300 vehicles.

• Framework contract for large-calibre ammunition, partners Nexter, MSM, Rheinmetall, Expal, Nammo, Elbit, Junghans, MKE, framework contract value EUR 2.5 billion.

• Radars, partner Thales FR, cost EUR 35 million.

• Framework contract for armoured equipment, partners BDT, Estmil, Milworks, cost EUR 200 million.

• Food supply contracts, multiple partners, mainly Estonian food companies, eg Salvest, Orkla, Nõo, etc, cost EUR 60 million (they also offer the possibility of purchasing the supplies, not only storing them).

• Machine guns, partner IWI, cost EUR 20 million.

• Sniper rifles, partner Sako, cost EUR 9.9 million.

• Helmets, multiple partners, cost EUR 17.5 million.

2023 WAS A BUSY YEAR IN CONSTRUCTION

The years 2023 and 2024 are important for infrastructure construction. Contracts worth over EUR 300 million have already been signed for construction projects. In total, more than 50 projects are under construction, most of which will be completed by the end of 2024.

The largest developments underway or about to start are in South Estonia, Võru County, and Tartu County. In

total, we will invest around EUR 300 million over the next five years. Another important development area is West Estonia. Buildings and facilities worth nearly EUR 100 million are already under construction there.

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Western region

Buildings completed in 2023:

• Ämari warehouses extension, 14 completed (the whole site will be available for use in Q2 2024) partner Nordecon AS, cost EUR 21 million.

Southern region

Buildings completed in 2023:

• Cyber lab of the Estonian Military Academy (completed in August 2023), partner Telegrupp AS, cost EUR 0.8 million

• Preparatory works and lease for the construction of the Raatuse container campus (completed in July 2023, lease period until September 2024), partner Ramirent Baltic AS, cost EUR 1.1 million.

• Memorial for Johannes Kert in Võru (to be completed in August 2023), Kivikuvand OÜ, cost EUR 0.1 million.

• Preparatory works and lease for the construction of the Taara container campus (completed in July 2023), partner Ramirent Baltic AS, cost EUR 2.7 million.

North and Northeast region

Buildings completed in 2023:

• 5K building on Filtri tee (to be completed in Q4 2023), OÜ Nordlin Ehitus, cost approximately EUR 6.2 million.

• Reconstruction of the CR14 basement floor (2023, Q4), Tarrest LT OÜ, cost approximately EUR 0.9 million.

• Maintenance and training workshop and four shelters in Tapa (2023, Q4), AS Megaron-E, cost approximately EUR 5.4 million.

• Concrete square for the allies in Tapa (June 2023), Viaston Infra OÜ, cost approximately EUR 1 million.

• Six buildings and a petrol station for the Tapa RSOM (July 2023), Merko Ehitus AS, cost approximately EUR 8.5 million.

• Tapa heavy weapons repair hall (2023, Q4), Revin Grupp OÜ, cost approximately EUR 4.3 million.

TRAINING FIELDS

Buildings completed in 2023:

• Access road of the Sirgala training field (Feb 2023), KMG Infra OÜ, cost approximately EUR 3.9 million.

• Rabasaare urban warfare base (May 2023), Yit Estonia, cost approximately EUR 4 million.

CATERING

More than half of the Estonian Centre for Defence Investment’s staff—nearly 250 people in total—work in catering. We offer catering to nearly four million people a year. ‖

4 x 4 Nurol Makina

• Armoured vehicles with four-wheel drive

• Manufacturer: Nurol Makina (Türkiye)

• Gross weight of the vehicle: 14.5 tonnes

• Accommodates up to seven people or 2.5 tons of equipment

• 300 hp Cummins diesel engine

• 12.7 mm machine gun

6 x 6 Arma

• Armored vehicles with six-wheel drive

• Manufacturer: Otokar (Türkiye)

• Gross weight of the vehicle: 23 tonnes

• Accommodates 11 people

• 450 hp Cummins diesel engine

• 12.7 mm machine gun

Photos: Kermo Pastarus / RKIK

Anti-tank weapon Spike LR II

• Manufacturer: Rafael Advanced Defense Systems (Israel)

• Weight: 12.7 kg

• Effective firing distance from the ground: 5.5 km

• Effective shooting distance from the helicopter: 10 km

• Targeting in dual version - modern electro-optical and IR sensors

• Warhead: tandem multi-purpose HEAT Smart fuze

Completed facilities

• Rabasaare urban fighting town in Tapa municipality (above)

• Lieutenant General Johannes Kert's monument in Võru

• The new building of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn

• Cyber lab at the Defence Academy in Tartu

Machine gun Negev

• 7.62 mm light machine gun

• Manufacturer: Israel Weapon Industries

• Overall length of the weapon: 1,020 mm

• Effective firing distance from the pitchfork: 600 m

• Technical firing rate: 600�800 l/min

• Weapon weight without tape: 8.6 kg

• Tape bags with 60 or 120 cartridges

Photos: Ardi Hallismaa / EDF

VEIKO-VELLO PALM

Reserve Major General, division commander in 2023–2024

In 2023, we quickly launched the recreated division and set it on the right path for development.

Actually, we were doing several things simultaneously. Our primary task was to ensure Estonia’s continuous defence and the reserve army’s combat readiness, which included developing and operating

military training. Secondly, we established and developed the division’s staff while taking a leading role in multiple exercises. Thirdly, we demonstrated with actions and contributed with information to clarify the division’s goals and its role in strengthening Estonia’s and NATO’s defence capabilities. We managed, but the construction and development of a division or another such dynamic and evolving structure can never truly be finished. I have repeatedly emphasised that if we can cope with extensive

The President of the Republic Alar Karis visited the headquarters and met with the division leadership on February 6, 2024.

Photo: Ardi Hallismaa / EDF

and strenuous exercises, I will promise even more strenuous and long working days in the future. Indeed, many innovations were made in the division’s first year of operation, and the poor security background motivated us to act faster and more decisively.

Last year, a number of exercises took place, some of which were relatively technical or so highly specialised that their coverage would not bring much necessary knowledge to the public.

The Spring Storm 2023 (KT23) exercise continued the traditions of two decades, while last year’s Spring Storm offered many new and innovative things. For the first time, KT23 was an exercise led by a division of the Estonian Defence Forces, with nearly 14,000 participants from 11 countries.

In terms of military training, we continued with live fire exercises using division and brigade support weapons. The purpose of the Spring Storm live fire exercises was to practise defence using fire and pioneer support, counterattacks, and support from armoured units. The exercise provided an opportunity for divisions of infantry battalions to participate in live fire exercises within the framework of the brigade.

During Spring Storm, the public’s attention is primarily focused on units manoeuvring on the landscape, which is also known as close combat. However, the main goal of each division staff on a daily basis is to plan and support close combat with deep operations while also securing the rear area.

Compared to past exercises, the higher staffs focused less on the direct battlefield and more on defeating the enemy on a deeper level. It was necessary to weaken the opponents before close combat to give our troops a better chance of winning.

In addition, the division sees things more widely than only what is happening on land. The division employs air, sea, cyber, and information strikes to defeat the enemy. Over the past year, our division has demonstrated the ability to implement this comprehensive approach.

We needed to effectively manage and test our collaboration with the international Allied forces, who possess significant firepower and enhance their understanding of our landscape and the environment at large.

The feedback from allied units on Spring Storm has been highly positive. With these exercises, we are allowing Estonia to use our skills in practice with our forces, and the interest of allied forces in practising with us is undoubtedly important. I cannot thank enough our state institutions, private companies, and society as a whole for allowing us to conduct such complex and large-scale exercises outside the training areas of the Estonian Defence Forces. This is extremely rare in Europe, but it shows once again both the functioning of our comprehensive national defence and people’s support for the Estonian Defence Forces.

One of the division’s tasks is to enable the Estonian civilian authorities and Defence Forces to jointly defend the Estonian state. The regional commands cooperate closely with the Police and Border Guard Board and the Estonian Rescue Board.

We organised the exercise Decisive Lancer 2023 to check the performance of this task and hone our skills and cooperation. The aim of the exercise is to practise

During the urban battles of the 2023 Spring Storm exercise in Kadrina.

Photo: Robert Markus Liiv / EDF

the support of regional commands for the Ministry of the Interior agencies during emergencies and periods of increased defence readiness, while preparing for military defence.

We practised aspects of cooperation between the division, regional commands, and civilian agencies throughout the entire cycle of a possible conflict, both in times of crisis and war. In addition to the regional commands, the command elements of prefectures and emergency response centres were involved. During the exercise, we strived to ensure that command posts could function effectively during crises and war situations, and cooperation between the different actors of national defence was improved. Mentors and observers helped with the exercise by guiding participants and providing ongoing feedback.

In total, almost 1,000 people were involved in the exercise. The best indicator of the success of the exercise is the plan of the Ministry of the Interior to participate in 2024 with even larger forces.

The Warfighter programme is the largest endeavour in 2023 and 2024 that requires adaptation and effort from the division. We joined the U.S. Army’s training and evaluation program, where the American Army occasionally trains or updates its corps and divisions.

A corps is a unit that includes several divisions. This military training has been very intense. It is worth noting that the

Defence Forces Division is the third foreign military unit to participate in the Warfighter programme. By completing the series of exercises, we gain the required experience to plan and conduct operations successfully. This experience also helps us to earn the trust of our allies, proving that we can efficiently manage both Estonian units and additional Allied units. This, in turn, adds a mark of quality to our reputation.

One of our division’s goals is to inspire confidence in our allies to support us. We undergo critical learning processes to use our abilities and show that we know how to apply those abilities.

The division’s staff started the Warfighter programme in June 2023, when they participated in the exercise DE23 M3 CPX in a simulation environment in Germany without units. In August, the division’s staff went to the United States, where we studied and practised with our good friend, the 1st Infantry Division of the US, which strongly supported our development.

At the end of 2023, the exercise module started in Estonia, where we were already operating in our command networks while participating in the U.S. Army’s exercise in the United States, Germany, and Poland. In addition to testing the content of the exercise, we also tested the compatibility of our control systems. The exercise module was completed successfully, giving us confidence in our ability to coordinate commands and work together effectively, even when serving in units from different countries thousands of kilometres apart.

The final exam of the Warfighter programme for American units and the major exercise for our quality recognition will take place in March 2024. This can be called our certification exercise under the United States system and is part of the broader Austere Challenge 2024 exercise between the US and NATO, during which cooperation between US and NATO forces in defending Europe is practised.

What happens next? Our exercise schedule for 2024 is equally packed, if not more so. We must successfully complete the Warfighter programme, manage Spring Storm 2024 even more effectively, and be ready to defend Estonia at all times if necessary. ‖

NATO FORCES IN ESTONIA: A YEAR OF CONSOLIDATION, EVOLUTION AND SHAPING FOR THE FUTURE

THORIR GUDMUNDSSON

Stratcom adviser to Hq. CABRIT

For the NATO forces assigned to Estonia, 2023 was shaped by the decisions of the two NATO summits held after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; the 2022 summit in Madrid and the 2023 summit in Vilnius.

In Madrid, NATO members decided to strengthen the Allied battlegroups in the three Baltic states to brigade level and in Vilnius they agreed on new Regional Plans. These and several other consequential decisions set the course for the work of Hq. CABRIT, the UK-led military headquarters in Tallinn.

‘For the British army, the visit of the Chief of the General Staff in February really kicked off the work for us to reflect on the journey we’ve been on since 2017, but given

the renewed threat from Russia, how we move forward with the new concept of Forward Land Forces (FLF) and the Strategic Reserve Corps,’ notes Hq. CABRIT Chief of Staff Major Jean-Sebastien Cormier.

‘The year has been both about consolidating our existing footprint and setting a pathway to the future in a more sustainable way for the UK’s and NATO’s presence here in Estonia,’ Cormier adds.

The eFP battlegroup in Estonia underwent changes in composition, after a new Danish government decided to consolidate its troops in Latvia, pulling them out of Estonia, and the French government decided, already by 2022, to establish an enduring presence after rotating against Danish forces. Hence, at the end of 2023, eFP forces consisted of British and French troops as well as an Icelandic civilian officer.

The establishment of the Estonian Division was a wa-

Shooting exercises of the French unit in Estonia with the FN Minimi machine gun.

Photo: Adrien Cullati / French Army

tershed moment in Estonian defence, also affecting Allied troops in the country.

‘The Estonian Division is on its US Warfighter pathway and in the UK, with the UK 3rd Division undertaking a similar validation process, we understand this is a huge demand signal,’ believes Cormier, adding:

The establishment of the Estonian Division was a watershed moment in Estonian defence, also affecting Allied troops in the country.

‘The UK has committed to supporting the development of the Estonian Division. Primarily, we have done that, in the first phase, with the provision of additional staffing and mentoring support but also with a regular series of engagements with 3 UK DIV and wider stakeholders across the British Army in terms of subject matter expertise. We fundamentally understand that this is a journey for Estonia and it is geared towards bringing all the parts of Estonia’s defence together and making it

larger than the sum of its parts.’

In May, exercise Spring Storm brought more than 13,000 Allied troops to the villages, fields and beaches of Estonia, fighting mock battles in a realistic scenario of how NATO would respond to external aggression.

The Estonian Defence Forces‘ biggest annual military exercise also rehearsed the reinforcement of the enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup (eFP) in Estonia to brigade-level strength. In the words of Brigadier General Giles Harris, Commander of Hq. CABRIT: ‘That is a key shift – the extra layer of capability in time to be part of the in-place force prior to the outbreak of a conflict.’

The two-week-long exercise was an effective demonstration of NATO’s determination to defend every inch of its territory – and its resolve to have the necessary forces in place, trained, and at the ready to do so.

In the three Baltic countries, Allied forces deepened their cooperation with regular meetings between commanders of both framework nations and host countries.

Shooting exercises with automatic weapons HK416F.

Photo: Adrien Cullati / French Army

‘What we are seeing across the region is everybody going through a similar journey,’ states Major Cormier. ‘What I would call that journey is, fundamentally, operationalisation, taking what were standing commitments and preparing them for the operational challenges which Russia could present.’

‘In the three countries, each of us is developing in a slightly different way. We need to ensure that we are both developing in line, but also at points converging, because ultimately – if it comes to that –we will all have to fight in a way that complements one another,’ Cormier concludes.

In a shift that signifies a longer-term consolidation of British forces in Estonia, the UK commitment was delegated down from the joint headquarters to the Army. With that comes a commitment to making the deployment of troops more sustainable with, for example, improved welfare facilities in Tapa.

In addition, some key appointments in Tallinn have been turned into two-year deployments rather than six months for all but the Commander as previously. The headquarters were significantly upgraded as well, now being commanded by a brigadier general as previously opposed to a colonel.

These developments take place as Ukrainian soldiers fight for their country’s survival after the illegal Russian invasion of 24 February, 2022.

‘I believe it is of real importance over the next 24 months to extract as many lessons as possible from the combat operations currently going on in Ukraine,’ states Major Cormier. ‘It is vital that we see how the Russians not only fought the first engagement but now are evolving. The baseline assessment is that their attempt to fight a new way of war didn’t really work and that they are reverting to a previous

type. What I would say is that our combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq certainly developed us, and we must be mindful that the experiences of the Russians are going to make them better. This war is building a corpus of battle experience that will present a challenge to us.’

Led by Brigadier Harris, Hq. CABRIT is determined to play a part in learning the lessons of Ukraine.

‘What we cannot afford to do is sit here and not continue to develop and accelerate the rate of development. We need to

work with the Estonian Division and the wider Estonian defence forces to make sure that the lessons that the UK is learning, and the lessons that the French and US are learning, are talked about, shared and – consequently – to then look at how we shape subsequent Spring Storm exercises. We need to make sure they are challenging us in the appropriate way to meet future challenges.’ ‖

Sniper with a rifle PGM Hécate II.

Photo: Adrien Cullati / French Army

The 2nd infantry brigade’s main activities in 2023 included constant ally presence, reservist training, military training, and giving the name Kuperjanov to all manoeuvre battalions.

ALLIES AT THE 2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE

HANNES PARMO

2nd Lieutenant, Information Officer of the 2nd Infantry Brigade

Last year, the 2nd Infantry Brigade increased the number of reservist training sessions. The primary focus was to improve wartime plans by refining group-level plans and better integrating manoeuvres with barriers. Combat infrastructure assets were pre-stored on the landscape to expedite deployment if necessary.

Additional training was provided in the use of new or upgraded weapon systems. The largest reservist training exercise for the 1st Kuperjanov Infantry Battalion was the 2023 Spring Storm exercise, and its performance was highly regarded. More than a thousand reservists from all brigade units attended the reservist training.

The most significant changes in military training were preparations for the transition to a mechanised infantry structure. A set of one company’s PASI XA-180 armoured vehicles was brought to the Taara base camp to better prepare reservist units for armoured vehicles arriving from Turkey. It also gave the active servicemen of the Kuperjanov Infantry Battalion the experience of training with a mechanised unit.

Another change was that all the manoeuvre battalions now bear Kuperjanov’s name. All three battalions are trained in the peacetime Kuperjanov Battalion. They can proudly continue to wear the same emblem, expressing their united spirit and mind, and carry on the legacy of the battalion that Actions of Kuperjanov Battalion fighters on the terrain.

Photo: Robert Markus Liiv / EDF

earned a glorious name in the War of Independence. ‘Fatherland or death!’

The permanent presence of the allies in Southeast Estonia began in 2022 with the battalions of the United Kingdom. In 2023, the United States took over the responsibility, sending airborne battalions here.

The effectiveness of relations between allies is determined in many ways by their ability to cooperate with each other.

Thanks to the continued presence of our allies, the brigade’s ability to integrate allies into peacetime activities, including training, and wartime plans has been greatly advanced.

An excellent example of cooperation with our allies was the Spring Storm exercise, where the 2nd Infantry Brigade in-

cluded, in addition to the Estonian units, a Danish infantry battalion and reconnaissance company, a UK reconnaissance battalion, a US airborne battalion, an Italian armoured company, a Canadian artillery battery, and a Polish reconnaissance section. Within two days, the allies were integrated, both technically and procedurally, and went to ‘war’.

The effectiveness of relations between allies is determined in many ways by their ability to cooperate with each other. The principle of working as a team applies not only to the military but also to medicine. In the Ukrainian military conflict, the importance of collaboration between civilians and the military in the medical field has become evident. In times of crisis and military conflict, the defence forces depend heavily on civilian medical institutions. Therefore, it is crucial to engage NATO allies in similar cooperative exercises. This will enable

Americans marching in the Victory Day parade on June 23, 2023 in Viljandi.

Photo: US Army

them to integrate into our civilian medical system in due course.

One exercise in the cooperation between civilians and the military is the simulated evacuation of victims by helicopter which also involved civilian hospitals. In the past, the evacuation of victims by helicopter has mainly been organised in cooperation with the North Estonia Medical Centre and allied units based in Tapa. Such exercises have improved the cooperation between civilians, the Estonian Defence Forces, and the allies and introduced the capabilities of our civilian hospitals to the allies.

The 2nd Infantry Brigade decided to conduct a series of helicopter exercises in cooperation with the medics of the US unit based in the Taara base camp and with our major hospitals. The purpose of the exercises was to familiarise the medics from the US unit with the capabilities of major civilian hospitals. They were also trained in the procedures for evacuating a person wounded in the field by helicopter to a civilian hospital. In addition, the exercises focused on practising the procedures for transferring and receiving the victim in the hospital and the methods of communication.

Similar exercises were organised at the Tartu University Hospital (TÜK), the North Estonia Medical Centre (PERH), and the Kuressaare Hospital. Apart from hospitals and their emergency medicine departments, Tartu Ambulance Service and the PERH ambulance service were also involved.

The Estonian Civil Aviation Administration’s air traffic control centre and the Emergency Response Centre were involved in the exercise to practise communication methods.

The exercises fulfilled their purpose, and all participants were satisfied with the results. Medics from the United States were impressed by the trauma treatment and modern equipment of our civilian hospitals. The involvement of the air traffic control centre and the Emergency Response Centre helped identify bottlenecks in communication that are currently being addressed. This series of exercises allowed the US allies to be better integrated into our medical system and also played a valuable role in cooperation between civilians and the military in the medical field. ‖

Action in the Spring Storm battles phase.

Photo: US Army

Operation Inherent Resolve

The servicemen from the Estonian Defence Forces have participated in various missions for nearly 30 years. Estonia’s previous experience with missions in Iraq includes the operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from 2003 to 2009, NATO Mission Iraq from 2005 to 2011, and from 2018 to the present. The Republic of Estonia already decided to join the

US-led military coalition in Iraq in Operation Inherent Resolve in August 2016. The operation will be carried out as part of an international Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).

Up to 110 Estonian servicemen will participate in the operation, rotating every six months. The main tasks of the Estonian contingent are to provide military advice and

strengthen cooperation and relations with the US. They are also responsible for providing base support at the Erbil base and a rapid reaction force. Additionally, they provide close support for the movement of key personnel and during meetings. The contingent also plans for the necessary equipment and coordinates the transport of goods and people.

The main part of the unit that was deployed to Iraq on 26 April 2023 and took tasks over from the Dutch on 1 May was made up of the reduced infantry company ESTCOY-18 of the Scouts Battalion. The contingent to serve in Iraq included combatants from the infantry battle unit, the national support element as a rear area element, and staff officers and NCOs.

Estcoy-18 transferred responsibility in Iraq to Estcoy-19.

Photo: EDF

The coalition led by the United States calls the Estonian Defence Forces Task Force in Iraq Task Force Stone, a name with an honourable historical background.

STEADFAST ESTONIAN SOLDIERS DEFENDING FREEDOM OUTSIDE THE BORDERS OF THEIR HOMELAND

MARTIN ABRAM

Major, Chief Officer of the Estonian contingent of the first rotation of Operation Inherent Resolve in 2023.

The first Estonian military unit in Iraq was Estpla-7, which served in 2003 in Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. Just like today, the Estonian soldiers were part of the American-led coalition, and during the first Iraqi operation, they earned the nickname Stone’s section from the Americans.

This is part of the tradition in the United States Army, where each section or company has its own nickname. For many Americans, the word stone may have been associated with the country name Estonia, but on the other hand, it referred to the men who appeared to be as resilient as stone when surviving numerous conflicts during the operation and were respected by both the allies and the enemy.

In 2023, the Estonian Defence Forces sent their largest contingent yet to Iraq to participate in the international military operation, Inherent Resolve. This invitation was extended by the Americans and over 25 allies are participating in this multinational coalition. The objective of Operation Inherent Resolve is to provide guidance and assistance to local security forces until they can independently defeat the terrorist group Da’ish (Dawlat al-Islamiyah, or the Islamic State), thereby paving the way for additional security cooperation.

Actually, Estonia had already decided to join the US-led military coalition in Iraq in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in 2016. At that time, only a few members of the Estonian Defence Forces were involved in the work of the higher command there. However, the Estonians impressed both the Americans and other coalition members, opening the door to broader cooperation. At the end of 2022, the Americans invited more members of the Estonian Defence Forces to participate in the operation, which suddenly presented us with a quick and serious choice, as the need for support was urgent.

In 2023, the Estonian Defence Forces sent their largest contingent yet to Iraq to participate in the international military operation, Inherent Resolve.

The deployment of the Estonian Defence Forces to an international military operation in early 2023 was uncertain. Possible participation in various foreign operations was being considered, and preparations were being made in the background. Heading out to Iraq at the invitation of America, our close ally, in such a short time and with a company-sized unit – the parliament authorised the deployment of up to 110 servicemen – was quite a challenge.

The decision to participate was taken by March, and this is when the serious work of assembling, equipping, and training the first rotation unit began. We had to provide as much intelligence as possible to describe the situation on the ground.

Commanders had to be particularly careful to ensure that the soldiers remained vigilant and did not become too comfortable.

The contingent serving in the foreign operation in Iraq includes an infantry company called Estcoy, based on the Scouts Battalion, a national support element, and staff officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to the higher international unit.

Our infantry company, stationed at the Erbil airbase, has taken over duties from

the Dutch company. The company is responsible for three main tasks. First, it ensures the security of the base by controlling all entries and exits.

Second, it provides immediate response with a section-sized unit to any attack, accident, or incident involving allied forces, both inside and outside the base. Third, it conducts intensive personal protection operations to protect key personnel, mainly in northern Iraq’s Kurdistan region.

The first two tasks proved easy for the Scouts Battalion soldiers. However, this meant that commanders had to be particularly careful to ensure that the soldiers remained vigilant and did not become too comfortable.

Servicemen from the Estonian Defence Forces gained experience in personal protection from serving in Afghanistan. In Iraq, as in any other operation, the national support element ensures the supply, logistics, and sustainability of the unit in the execution of its tasks.

Medical exercise of Estcoy-18 soldiers serving in Iraq under US Navy medics.

Photo: EDF

Servicemen from the Estonian Defence Forces serving in the military advisors staff of the higher international command are supporting the Iraqi security forces in developing their capabilities and are engaged in military planning for the operation.

Photo: EDF

Events during the second rotation

JANARI KINTSIRAUD Major, Information Officer of the Estonian contingent

The second rotation in Iraq lasted from 1 October 2023 to 19 March 2024. The Iraqi Estonian contingent included staff officers and NCOs in the military advice group, the infantry company Estcoy-19, and the national support unit. The contingent was led by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Kolotõgin.

With the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October, attacks on coalition forces in Iraq also increased. The threat level increased significantly in the Erbil Air Base (EAB). The uniform posture changed and combat equipment became mandatory on the EAB territory (previously, only pistols were required).

The Estonian Defence Forces had unusually little time to make the necessary preparations and deploy units to Iraq.

The Estonian Defence Forces had unusually little time to make the necessary preparations and deploy units to Iraq. Given the order to take over combat responsibility from the Dutch company by 1 May, preparations for our contingent’s first rotation had to be made in March-April. However, this was not a major problem, as the units already had experience of participating in foreign international military operations and the relevant skills, which meant that everything was done on time thanks to their commitment.

The military training, which lasted just under two months, consisted of, in order of importance, firing training, special military training for personal protection tasks, and group-level military training in preparation for the mission. The combat medicine course is an essential part of pre-mission training, and no compromises can be made in its completion. In hindsight, we should have had better driving training to

Between 1 October and 31 December 2023, there were 134 attacks on coalition forces in Iraq and Syria. Suicide drones, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and rockets were used in the attacks. The Erbil airbase was attacked with suicide drones. By the end of December, the EAB had been attacked at least 15 times. Throughout the period, defensive measures and actions were stepped up and the air defence operated at full strength.

As the heightened threat situation continued, the core tasks of the Estonian contingent became more important. Greater emphasis was placed on SECFOR drills to prevent unauthorised persons from entering the base territory. It was suspected that the locations of the targets of the attacks had been identified based on inside information.

Additional training was given in marksmanship, driving, and medicine to further improve the skills. Personal protection and cooperation with other units were also practised. Estcoy-19 successfully maintained the excellent reputation established by the previous company. Estonian soldiers and units have been praised for their professional attitude and hard work. ‖

Estcoy-18 instructors travelling to a shooting exercise in Iraq.

handle the chaotic traffic culture. After all, our soldiers have to carry out their tasks in armoured SUVs in special formations, making their way through aggressive and confusing traffic.

For that reason, we organised on-site refresher training for all drivers with the help of military police officers, based on exercises intended for emergency vehicle drivers. Each subsequent rotation will be able to build on the experience of the first unit to prepare much more thoroughly. However, in addition to training, the medical screening and vaccination of soldiers and the assembly and deployment of all mission-specific equipment for the unit must always be considered.

Although the wheels of the main section’s aircraft touched down in Iraq on 26 April, a small advance section had arrived a week earlier to prepare for the arrival of the main unit. Since none of us had been there before, we had enough time that week to familiarise ourselves with the situation on the ground.

We also had to ensure that we were able to take over the combat responsibility from the Dutch. The soldiers of the unit would call the home base at the Erbil airbase their home for the next six months.

In just a few days, crucial information was obtained and essential resources were secured for the arrival of the main team and the beginning of the mission. They first established communication with Estonia, ensured living conditions, then took possession of armoured vehicles, and coordinated activities with higher units.

As per the best military practices, we conducted a thorough rehearsal of all the upcoming procedures with the Dutch forces, both theoretically and practically. This was done in preparation for the arrival of the main unit, which would spend a week practising all the tasks together and settling in. In reality, it only took a few days for the Estonians to take over all the tasks, allowing their Dutch comrades-in-arms, who had made thorough preparations, to go on a well-deserved vacation.

Celebration of August 20 in Iraq in 2023. Photo: EDF

The first months flew by. Everyone assumed new roles and focused on their tasks, leaving no time for distractions. Not only were our soldiers thousands of kilometres away from home, but they also found themselves in a completely different cultural environment that they had to get used to.

As the first rotation, we did not have the usual standardised procedures for handling tasks, situations, or even certain technical problems. Everything was new, from the tasks to the equipment, and there was a lack of everything from knowledge to sleep. However, it was a very exciting and developing stage, full of new experiences and new knowledge every day.

New instructions were drawn up for each operation, procedure, and item of equipment, and then they were checked and tested and also discussed and improved with fellow combatants in Estonia. For example, the last cooperation agreements with key service providers in the local area were only signed in September, around the time the first men were preparing to return home. So, laying the

foundations for the following contingents took almost the entire first rotation.

Estonian soldiers are always appreciated and praised. We have set ourselves higher standards than others, and I believe that our hard work is also behind the support of our allies. We’ve been said to ‘achieve things quietly’ without any complaining or big demands. We just turn up, do our jobs, and always maintain discipline.

This even applies to something as simple as wearing combat gear on guard at all times, in all weathers, despite the 55-degree heat. This also confirms to our allies that Estonian combatants are experienced and understand their tasks and the environment in which they serve very well.

Without even realising it, we have built strong partnerships with our allies over the years, which also contributes to our strength and has a positive impact. When our soldiers arrived in Iraq, they often encountered soldiers from other countries with whom they had previously trained or been on missions. ‖

Land defence emblem on the hand of a fighter from the Defence League’s Tartumaa unit.

On the 104th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia something extraordinary happened, changing our world and requiring us to prepare for war more quickly than anticipated.

REINFORCEMENT OF THE SAFETY BLANKET, OR OPERATION PARSELTONGUE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE ESTONIAN DEFENCE LEAGUE

RAIN JANO

Head of the Operational Section at the Headquarters of the Estonian Defence League

It had been so long since the last major war in Europe that people could not comprehend the signs leading up to another war, nor the outbreak of it. Due to the Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine, the Estonian Defence Forces and the Estonian Defence League had to respond quickly.

In the early spring of 2022, the Estonian Defence Forces decided to increase their wartime staff significantly. After careful consideration, it was determined that doubling the wartime staff of the Defence League, which is responsible for territorial defence, was the best solution. The Chief of Defence, General Martin Herem, set a goal that the new territorial defence force should be fully manned, equipped, and trained by no later than 24 February 2024. The objective was to ensure that the force was ready to perform combat tasks for the defence of Estonia.

The Estonian Defence League, with the support of the Estonian Defence Forces, successfully began strengthening the safety blanket that covers the entirety of Estonia. Building a new capability from scratch to achieving full combat readiness was a task requiring extraordinary dedication and effort. Its impact on what had been planned so far was reviewed and additional analysis was carried out to ensure that the execution of all tasks could be reasonably staggered and the objectives set could be met within the given timeframe.

It was decided that the ‘Ussisõdalased’ unit would be made up of reservists who had previously been part of the general reserve. The general reserve is a wartime force that is not assigned to any particular unit and for whom no peacetime reservist training is held. Most of these reservists served 15 or more years ago, and many of them have never attended reservist training before.

The principle was that men should prepare for combat in their home area, and this was followed as much as possible when sending out invitations to the reservist training. It was impossible to fully comply

Photo: Karl Heinrich Arras /EDF

with the principle due to more than half of Estonia’s population living in Tallinn, Harju County, and Tartu County. Therefore, some of the reservists living in the Regional Command North and South were assigned to the Regional Command Northeast.

It was decided that the reservists would be equipped with individual protection equipment.

It was decided that the reservists would be equipped with individual protection equipment, including the three-in-one system, ie a harness, a splinter-proof vest with the possibility of adding bulletproof padding, and an AK-4. Equipping the entire

force in less than a year and a half was a very difficult task for logisticians.

Military training was organised at the reservist training in the summer and fall of 2023. Each regional command had its own action plan for organising military training, and Regional Command South was the first to begin training the reservist commanders on the second weekend of August. The reservist commanders gained much-needed experience and confidence for the reservist training and for the military training and leading of their teams.

The military training programme included a ten-day training module for commanders. The first three days were solely dedicated to training commanders, after which the other ranks joined in on the fourth day. For the remaining seven days, the command-

Medical education of the Northern

Harjumaa unit’s fighters in the exercise Parseltongue.

ers and other ranks were trained together. Military training for all reservists culminated with force integration training of sections and platoons in their actual areas of responsibility.

In order to organise the military training effectively, active servicemen and volunteers of the Estonian Defence Forces and the Defence League were involved, which supported the implementation of the planned activities and facilitated the achievement of the final objectives.

The morale of the men who attended the military training was high.

Regional Command North started the military training of reservists on 28 August 2023, when the commanders of platoons and sections were mobilised in Tallinn, followed by other ranks in the same location three days later. They received primary training and practised shooting in the central range, followed by force integration training in Tallinn. The whole month of September was a very intense period of reservist training. That month, reservists in Regional Command Northeast and West were trained. At the end of September and beginning of October, reservists were trained in Regional Command South.

All the reservists were trained by 8 October 2023 when the last participating reservists returned to their homes. A great deal of work to maintain their ability still lies ahead. The command element of the Commander of the Defence League ensured that the Commander of the Defence League offered leadership support and was aware of the situation, working 12 hours a day in the Headquarters of the Estonian Defence League and being on call at all times.

None of the 9,330 reservists trained were active members of the Estonian Defence League. The seven or ten days of close cooperation with the Estonian Defence League resulted in over 200 reservists who attended the reservist training joining the Estonian Defence League. Major Gener-

al Riho Ühtegi, Commander of the Defence League, instructed that anyone who wished could become a member of the Defence League, and their original post as part of the reservists section would be maintained during wartime. Maintaining the structure of trained sections creates better prerequisites for preserving team spirit and the ability of sections to act in the future.

Planning and organising future military training is important for maintaining the combat capability of reservists. A model was developed according to which other ranks are invited to military training or reservist training at least once every four years. It is preferable for the training to take place in the year when the respective regional command is scheduled to undergo its main training and evaluation.

However, there are small exceptions to this due to the active cooperation with our allies and participation in the exercises of the Estonian Defence Forces and our allies. We understand that the current situation requires everyone to contribute more than usual to national defence, and we appreciate the understanding of reservists.

According to the plan, reservist commanders will receive military training more frequently, at least every other year, to maintain and develop their battle command skills. All reservists will also be provided the opportunity to participate in military training events organised by the Estonian Defence League on a voluntary basis.

I would also like to highlight the mentality of the reservists who participated in the reservist training. The military skills and knowledge of the men, who had been reservists for 15 or more years, were certainly not the most up to date. The morale of the men who attended the military training was high. They quickly regained their skills and based on the feedback received, it can be confidently stated that the reservist training was a success. They are now prepared to defend Estonia with weapons in their hands.

As a result, we now have 9,330 additional men who are trained in their area of responsibility and understand their combat duties. Together, we can better guard and protect Estonia ‖

Northern Land Protection District.

Photo: Marcus Liinamäe / EDF

Photo: Ilya Korjukin / EDF

The

has received his

reservist

equipment at the Tapa Mobilization Centre during the 2023 Parseltongue exercise.

Photo: Ardi Hallismaa / EDF

If one were to ask what the Estonian Defence Forces and the Estonian Defence League will remember most from 2023, the answer would undoubtedly be the Parseltongue (Ussisõnad) exercise. It stands out as potentially the largest military logistics operation in the history of the Republic, naturally planned and implemented by the Support Command.

PARSELTONGUE: 500,000 ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME

TANEL KURISOO Major, Staff Officer of the Support Command

On the one hand, the command executed its task par excellence, as prescribed in the logistics rules of the Estonian Defence Forces in Latin. On the other hand, the operation posed an unprecedented challenge even to experienced logistics experts. There was a huge amount of equipment, but there were fewer people and less time available for its handling than desired.

To summarise the statistics in figures, let us begin with the fact that there were just over half a million items of equipment to be handled. If all this equipment was placed on pallets, it could form a row of about three kilometres, or alternatively, approximately 50 vehicles would be required to transport it as semi-trailer loads.

All sorts of towers and piles of equipment could be built, but I must also highlight the significance of the number 2,018 – that is how many soldiers the Regional Command North-East mobilised in a single day at one mobilisation station. It is unlikely that any mobilisation station in Estonia has reached such a high number in a single day before, and this record will likely endure for a long time, as typically only a few hundred reservists need to be armed in a single day.

Another classic summary format, aside

from figures, involves outlining three positives and three negatives, but as is often the case with positives, there may be fewer negatives to mention. Let us start with the negatives.

Let us begin with the fact that there were just over half a million items of equipment to be handled.

Some of the equipment did not arrive in time for the exercise. The reasons behind this delay are no longer pertinent. This forced the Support Command to find equipment from its own reserves, borrow from other units of the Estonian Defence Forces or to use the supplies of the regional commands that are sooner or later fielded by the mobilised unit. To this end, some of the equipment had to be sent for urgent maintenance so that it could be reissued to the next unit after washing. This was an additional burdensome task.

A great deal of equipment arrived at the warehouse of the command at the very last moment. This situation led to significant time pressure for build-up and delivery, necessitating a lot of overtime work during critical moments, with stress and fatigue contributing to mistakes. Fortunately, no major tragedies occurred and we were able to correct minor errors once discovered.

When it comes to the positives, we must, above all, praise the people involved.

The entire team at Loo deserves all the praise and a special mention, including the commanders, those responsible for materials, asset accountants, the warehouse team and conscripts. The latter were the ‘first class’ of soldiers serving in the warehouse in peacetime. and looking back, it is hard to imagine handling such a volume of equipment without them. The task-oriented mindset was impressive, with several working days extending into the next, yet in return, not a single outbound shipment remained unassembled by morning.

We successfully completed our main objective and managed to dress and equip all participating reservists.

The positive and helpful attitude of the rest of the personnel involved. I do not believe it was solely about following the orders of the Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces, as nearly every unit I approached for assistance provided very kind advice and support. While a slight ‘us-and-them’ attitude may occasionally be perceived here and there within the Estonian Defence Forces, during the Parseltongue exercise, both the Estonian Defence Forces and the Estonian Defence League were all one big ‘us’.

We were able to collect extensive and up-to-date logistical data on reservists. The insights gained from the Parseltongue experience will benefit the planners of logistics operations for many years to come. The most valuable insight I wish to highlight is that we identified the numeric curve for reservists involved in the exercise, ie men aged 30–45.

The Parseltongue exercise posed a great challenge for the Support Command, and despite a few difficulties, we successfully completed our main objective and managed to dress and equip all participating reservists. However, the mark left by the exercise is so great that it will continue to significantly impact the activities of the command even this year. ‖

The effort of the warehouse staff was the key to the success of the exercise's

Flow of logistics to Ukraine in 2023

TOOMAS PÄRNPUU Major

As in the previous year, the provision of military assistance to Ukraine continued in 2023. Transport related to the Estonian Defence Forces was managed and coordinated by the Movement and Transport Service of the Support Command.

Compared to the past, routines and procedures for moving military aid have been established, resulting in smoother and faster transport operations. The use and development of the established logistics chain, including logistics hubs, continued.

The International Donor Coordination Centre (IDCC), established in spring 2022, played an increasingly significant coordinating role in international communication and logistics. Compared to the first year of the war, Ukraine received increased support in the form of armaments, including fire support weapons and ammunition, and less in the form of other military equipment.

In 2023, we also had more time and opportunities to exchange information with our Ukrainian partners and receive the bloodearned lessons identified, which we can analyse within the framework of our own defence activities.

In 2023, the following were transported to Ukraine approximately 2,000 pallets of armaments, ammunition and other military aid, for example:

• individual combat equipment for winter

• artillery ammunition

• personal protective equipment

• approximately 50 units of artillery

• approximately 35 units of vehicles

• one mobile field hospital

Other law enforcement structures were also supported with transport, including the provision of demining equipment and mini-excavators from the Estonian Rescue Board.

In 2023, the following were transported from Ukraine to Estonia:

• more Ukrainian learners than in 2022

• one Russian T-72 tank for the Estonian War Museum exercise's logistics.

Photo: EDF

CYBER COMMAND ORGANISED ITS RANKS

RENÉ INNOS Colonel, Cyber Command commander

The Cyber Command experienced several significant changes last year. The first of these was related to the creation of the Estonian Division, where the Staff and Signal Battalion moved from the Cyber Command to the Division. Although the overall tasks of the command did not change significantly with the Battalion’s movement, the separation of structures created a temporary discord in the organisation because it became apparent that we were highly dependent on the Staff and Signal Battalion. By now, the situation has stabilised for both units, and constructive working relationships in the new setup have been restored.

The Cyber Command had an excellent opportunity to focus on introspection and streamlining its ranks. While the provision and development of IT within the Ministry of Defence have been consolidated into the Cyber Command since its inception, conventional tactical communication technology was still awaiting its turn. Preparations began last year to consolidate under Cyber Command the Signal Repair Workshop and central signal depots along with the corresponding administration. This consolidation was realised on February 1, 2024. This year, the communication logistics processes are being reorganised in order to be ready for the integration of newly acquired capabilities into the defence forces.

One lesson from the Ukrainian war is that close cooperation between different branches is the key to success on the battlefield. The Cyber Command has a crucial role to play here, being responsible for creating a cyber environment where all units would converge for information Activities

of the Cyber Command's fighters during the Must Kast 2024 exercise.

Photo: Ardi Hallismaa / EDF

sharing and coordination. The creation of the Estonian Division and the need to integrate it with allies gave a strongly international dimension to the assured cyber environment.

Creating such a system takes at least two to three years from planning until the first prototype.

Thus, at the beginning of 2023, the development of the corresponding communication and IT system, the Estonian Mission Network (EST MN), began to create opportunities for joining with allied systems. It is worth mentioning that, based on the experience of allies, creating such a system takes at least two to three years from planning until the first prototype.

The term ‘mission network’ indicates that the system’s structure is based on the guidelines, rules, and principles developed by the NATO Federated Mission Network community. Systems based on a unified set of rules allow for quick compatibility and ensure the reliability of systems, which is crucial in an international environment. Moreover, unified principles provide the opportunity for automated information sharing among the allies’ different battle management systems.

As of the end of 2023, the Estonian Mission Network is in daily use at the division level, and the integration with the first allied system has been completed. In the coming years, the system’s expansion will continue both horizontally, into other branches of the military, and vertically, to different subunits, and the number of integrations with allies is increasing.

The Ukrainian war has taught us that the resilience of all communication and IT systems needs even more attention than before. While the cyberattacks accompanying Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 have re-

ceived diverse and extensive coverage worldwide, less attention has been given to the physical destruction of various communication and IT systems and their components, using indirect fire or even sabotage.

A reminder – the cyber environment is a human-created artificial environment, broadly consisting of data centres, network switches, communication networks, and various data processing environments and tools. All of the above require electricity to operate, and the absence of the latter can lead to the disappearance of the cyber environment.

Therefore, when planning system architecture, both potential cyber and physical threats must be considered. The Ukrainian experience is particularly valuable in this regard because the best practices widely used in the civilian IT world today prioritise cost-effectiveness over resilience.

While we are relatively resilient in the cyber environment, we must also consider physical defence, and here, comprehensive national defence is crucial, where the public, private, and military sectors must closely collaborate.

While we are relatively resilient in the cyber environment, we must also consider physical defence.

The best solution is a symbiosis of all parties’ systems and capabilities. This creates a situation where it is very difficult for the adversary to destroy communication systems or completely eliminate them, as dispersal has been achieved, making positioning and targeting difficult.

Abundance and versatility of opportunities make us stronger. This is also one of the Cyber Command’s biggest goals for the upcoming year – to achieve even better and more fruitful cooperation among different parties. To disperse risks and be more resilient. ‖ Communication school training

training at the Defence Academy.

Photo: Martin Pedaja / EDF

The reservists of the Air Surveillance Division got acquainted with US aircraft at the

Pärnu airfield during the 2022 Siil exercise.

Photo: Aarne Seppel / EDF

The year 2023 was a turning point for the Estonian Air Force as, with the decision of the Republic’s government in 2022, funds were allocated for the creation of medium-range air defence capabilities.

AIR DEFENCE STRENGTHENS SIGNIFICANTLY

TOOMAS LENTS

Major, Chief of Staff of the Air Defence Division in the tasks of the Commander of the Air Defence Division

Led by the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (ECDI), a procurement contract for the IRIS-T SLM (InfraRed Imaging System Tail/Thrust vector-controlled Surface-Launched Medium range) medium-range air defence missile systems was concluded with the German defence company Diehl Defence in September 2023.

To implement the new capability and ensure its effective functioning, the Air Defence Division was established within the Air Force from July 1, 2023. Its mission is to protect the population, critical infrastructure, and armed forces against air attacks within the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS).

The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, began conventionally with air and missile strikes, and air attacks have been ongoing daily. This has once again demonstrated that air defence is of critical importance for protecting the population, military units, and infrastructure against air attacks.

The significantly deteriorated security environment gave Estonia the final push to fill the gap in its medium-range air defence capability. However, the cost of modern mobile air defence systems is quite high for a small country, necessitating the sourcing of additional funds. In September 2022, the Estonian government decided to allocate additional funds from the state budget for the procurement.

Latvia also lacked medium-range air defence, and defence cooperation with our southern neighbour provided an opportunity to save money by jointly purchasing a larger number of systems. In June 2022, at the NATO summit in Madrid, Estonia and Latvia signed a joint procurement intention protocol for medium-range air defence systems, and the ECDI signed an agreement the following month with the Latvian Ministry of Defence to start the joint procurement.

However, the cost of modern mobile air defence systems is quite high for a small country.

Under the leadership of the ECDI, procurement conditions were developed, bids were evaluated in collaboration with representatives of the armed forces, and negotiations were held with the bidders. The identical medium-range air defence systems acquired by Estonia and Latvia within NATINAMDS have created the opportunity for active air defence planning and operations, promoting interoperability, conducting joint training, sharing experiences, and exchanging spare parts and ammunition.

The ECDI conducted a comprehensive market study to identify a successful bidder, involving communication with six international companies. The selection of the best bidder took into account the system’s technical capabilities, total cost, lifecycle cost for the next 30 years, delivery time, and the involvement of local industry.

The goal of the procurement was to obtain the best medium-range air defence

missile system as quickly as possible at the best price. The bids from defence companies were thoroughly screened, and Diehl Defence’s final offer for the IRIS-T SLM systems best met the aforementioned criteria. The next task is to ensure that the first systems arrive in Estonia on time.

With the procurement costing approximately 400 million euros, this is the largest defence contract in Estonia’s history to date.

With the procurement costing approximately 400 million euros, this is the largest defence contract in Estonia’s history to date. The cost of creating medium-range air defence capability includes missile systems, missiles, supporting elements, training, equipment, infrastructure, personnel costs, and other associated costs. The framework agreement signed by the ECDI with Diehl Defence provides the possibility to add various modifications to the system in the future, including long-range capability, using the launchers with IRIS-T SLX missiles.

System IRIS-T SLM is effective for destroying manned and unmanned aircraft, winged missiles, guided weapon systems.

The acquired medium-range air defence missile system IRIS-T SLM is effective for destroying manned and unmanned aircraft, winged missiles, guided weapon systems, and certain types of ballistic missiles. In other words, the system is efficient for neutralising fighters, bombers, and helicopters, and preventing many other air attacks, including attacks with lurking air-launched munitions (such as the Iranian-origin Shahed 136).

Several of these German-supplied systems are in use in Ukraine, including for the defence of Kyiv. In a short time, over 110 targets were successfully hit, the majority being winged missiles, including Ka-

Medium-range air defence missile system.

Photo: Diehl Defence

libr. The precision of hits was almost 100 percent, and among other successes, the IRIS-T system effectively thwarted Russia’s attack with 12 winged missiles on Kyiv in early 2023. The IRIS-T SLM air defence systems have thus proven themselves in battle against Russian air attack assets, and Ukrainian representatives have praised the effectiveness of the systems.

The IRIS-T SLM weapon system consists of a radar, a fire control centre, launchers, and other supporting elements (such as loading equipment, mobile spare part containers, and workshops). The components of the system are mobile and quickly relocatable, using high-throughput vehicles. The radar of the system can detect, track, and classify various rapidly manoeuvring targets up to 250 km away.

The IRIS-T SLM weapon system consists of a radar, a fire control centre, launchers, and other supporting elements.

The fire control centre has multiple (data) communication connections, built-in capabilities for mission planning, air surveillance, task execution, and control of various launchers. The launcher itself carries up to eight missile containers and is capable of firing in a 360° range, affecting multiple targets simultaneously, and quickly neutralising threats up to 40 kilometres away and 20 kilometres high.

Maintenance-free and long-life sealed missile containers enable rapid loading and low lifecycle costs. The IRIS-T SLM missiles are an advancement of the air-to-air missile IRIS-T and the surface-to-air missile IRIS-T SL. The short-range air-to-air missile IRIS-T is, in turn, a joint project developed by six European countries under the leadership of Diehl Defence. It is still the most advanced and widespread fifth-generation air-to-air missile, with over 5,000 produced since 2005.

The IRIS-T SLM mid-range missile features a solid-fuel, smokeless rocket motor with controllable gas flow, enabling

speeds of over three times the speed of sound and achieving extremely high manoeuvrability to engage all designated targets. The missile has a data link connection, allowing commands to be sent to the missile from a fire control centre. Near the target, the air resistance-reducing nose cone that covers the missile’s jamming-proof infrared targeting device is ejected, and in the final phase, the missile homes in autonomously.

The medium-range radar-guided missiles IRIS-T SLX with a more powerful engine and firing range of 80 km and firing height of 30 km are under development. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, only a few countries had acquired IRIS-T SL surface-to-air air defence missile systems.

However, since then, besides Germany, Estonia and Latvia and Slovenia also announced their purchase.

The list of system buyers is expected to grow further as, under Germany’s leadership, the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) was established in October 2022. The initiative aims to promote air and missile defence, with IRIS-T SLM as one of its components.

According to the plan, the ESSI covers various layers of air and missile defence. The ESSI has been joined by Estonia and 20 other European countries, including Austria and Switzerland, who are not NATO members. Thanks to the ESSI’s activities, cooperation capability is improved, and overall European air defence is strengthened. ‖

Air Defence Division Established

By government decree starting from July 1, 2023, a new military unit – the Air Defence Division (ADD) – was established within the Air Force to ensure the integrity of the Estonian airspace by planning and conducting active air defence operations. Permanently located in Ämari, the ADD consists of the staff and missile batteries. The ADD will soon introduce the acquired mobile air defence missile systems IRIS-T SLM to prevent air attacks on friendly units, key objects, and Estonian residents in the areas where the systems are currently deployed.

Additionally, ADD missile batteries restrict the freedom of action of adversary air attack assets. The air defence missile systems are also quickly relocatable, allowing for responsiveness to changing situations and immediate needs. The ADD will fulfil assigned air defence tasks in collaboration with other Estonian Defence Forces and allied units, as it can integrate them into its operations. Furthermore, the ADD will train air defence division reservists during conscription.

Ardi Hallismaa / EDF

The acquisition of medium-range air defence missile systems IRIS-T SLM, demonstrated as effective for combat in Ukraine, is of symbolic importance for Estonian national defence. It is an unprecedentedly extensive project that also significantly strengthens Estonia’s security. Although air defence is costly, it is of critical importance to the military and allies stationed in Estonia to protect Estonian residents and civilian-military infrastructure from air attacks. Russia’s continuous missile attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population and infrastructure have convincingly demonstrated this. ‖

Arrival of a plane at Ämari air base.

Photo:

The ceremony of joining the fleets of the PPA and the Navy.

Photo: Martin Pedaja / EDF

THE NAVY IN 2023: ANTI-SHIP CAPABILITY SEES A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE

JÜRI SASKA

Commodore, Commander of the Estonian Navy

The year 2023 was eventful for the Navy. The year got off to a turbulent start, as the much-anticipated and long-discussed merger of fleets took place in the first days of January. The fleets of the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB) and the Navy were merged with the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF), as a result of which the EDF now has about 80 new servicemen serving on ships and shore duty. In addition to vessels, the coastal surveillance system was also transferred to the EDF.

The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre of the PBGB and the Maritime Operations Centre of the Navy were moved to the same premises, which greatly enhanced the exchange of maritime security information. These changes also included a marine pollution response, a field the Navy has no previous experience with. Fortunately, specialists in this field were also transferred, ensuring a smooth transition without any gaps.

The merger of fleets created good conditions for the efficient use of state resources and the flow of information in complex circumstances. One might ask why we hear so little about it if it is all so good. The simple answer is: we do not hear about it because it has been going so well. After years of discussions, it has also finally been established who is responsible for maritime situational awareness in Estonia – the Navy.

Another important change that enhanced defence capabilities was the delivery of anti-ship missile systems and the establishment of the Coastal Defence Squadron. The anti-ship missiles, coupled with the previously procured mines, will elevate the Navy’s kinetic capability to unparalleled levels. The combination of mines and missiles presents a serious dilemma for any potential aggressor

concerning the possibility and feasibility of attacking Estonia from the sea. The increase in the number of conscripts is also notable, reaching almost 300 people per year.

In early June, a conference was held to launch the active phase of the BALTOPS 2023 exercise. It was the largest conference hosted by the Navy since the restoration of independence 30 years ago. More than 30 NATO warships and over 3,000 officers, seamen and soldiers visited Tallinn’s ports. The Navy’s small yet well-organised team did an excellent job coordinating the conference, in collaboration with other units of the EDF, of course.

Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline by unknown parties, critical maritime infrastructure has been the object of particular attention. We are now more closely monitoring maritime activities, especially around maritime infrastructure. The damage to the Balticconnector and Elisa communications cable in October served as a wake-up call, reminding us that this is not something that happens to someone else far away, but right here, under our noses, to our own connections.

We can now say that we are getting better and better at both domestic and international crisis management. From the point of view of the Navy, I can proudly say that we successfully accomplished our tasks. Our minehunters and divers are still the best: it is only with their help that underwater anomalies can be mapped and identified. Technologically, there is certainly room for improvement, but we are still in a strong position.

Over the past year, we also launched a pilot programme in cooperation with Jakob Westholm Upper Secondary School, introducing service in the Navy as part of national defence studies classes. Initial feedback indicates that the start has been successful and educational for both parties. ‖

Boat exercises for conscripts of the naval defence unit.

Photo: Aleksander Espenberg / EDF

EML Ugandi breaking waves.

Photo: Allar Vaha / EDF

The recent years have brought significant changes for NATO. The new 2022 NATO Strategic Concept, the deterrence and defence posture, the associated family of plans, and the new forces model have all been approved.

THE EVOLVING ROLE OF NATO FORCE INTEGRATION UNITS

PEETER IVASK

Navy Captain, Head of the NFIU Estonia

The updated threat assessment defined in NATO’s strategy provides a clear direction for collective defence and unequivocally identifies Russia as the main and direct threat to allies.

Russia has proved this by its aggressive expansionist policies, notably with the widespread attack on Ukraine initiated on February 24, 2022. This is just a brief overview of NATO’s transformation. After political decisions are made at summits, NATO’s staff and command units have a busy time preparing for the implementation and execution of the decisions. Planned changes also affect NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU), and their crucial role has been emphasised in several strategic-level documents.

NATO Force Integration Units were established based on the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) approved at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. This plan includes two main sets of measures: NATO Assurance Measures and Adaptation Measures. The NFIU played a part in both sets of measures. NATO’s permanent presence with Force Integration Units and its flag confirm NATO’s support for all allies through Assurance Measures. Simultaneously, the main task of NATO Force Integration Units to rapidly and smoothly plan, coordinate, and prepare for the movement of allied units is part of the Adaptation Measures.

The NATO Response Force, created after the Wales Summit, consisted of approx- President Alar

Karis visiting NFIU EST.

imately 40,000 personnel. However, with the new NATO force model, discussions revolve around a force size of up to 500,000 soldiers. In light of the current changes, it can be asserted that the role of NFIU is not diminishing, and NATO faces even more challenges related to forces deployment.

The main task of NATO Force Integration Units to rapidly and smoothly plan, coordinate, and prepare for the movement of allied units is part of the Adaptation Measures.

NATO has also initiated fundamental changes in its concept of logistics, moving from the national support of forces previously used in missions to a concept of collective, multinational logistics. Several support and logistics headquarters have been established by NATO to ensure the movement and subsequent sustainment of forces. The Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) was established in Germany, and separate Joint Logistics and Support Group Headquarters (JLSG HQ) were created for the Allied Joint Force Commands Brunssum and Naples.

This headquarters manages and coordinates the movement and support of allied forces.

Estonia is under the JLSG HQ Brunssum, located in the Netherlands. The transition of the command of the movement and support of operational theatre forces from the Multinational Corps Northeast to the JLSG HQ Brunssum on January 1, 2024, is a significant change.

This headquarters manages and coordinates the movement and support of allied forces ranging from Estonia to Hungary. The new concept was tested during the command post exercise Steadfast Jupiter 2023, and subsequently it was decided to subordinate NATO Force Integration Units to the JLSG HQ Brunssum.

Photo: Merle Norit / NFIU EST

Members of the NATO headquarters element and Brunssum joint logistic support group getting to know the southern port of Paldiski.

Photo: Merle Norit / NFIU

For the rapid and smooth deployment of forces, it is necessary to plan and prepare the appropriate infrastructure and resources. Additionally, coordination of activities and ensuring situational awareness is essential for managing the movement and providing subsequent support. As allied forces’ movements are planned for multiple different countries, it is crucial for the JLSG HQ Brunssum to have staff elements in these countries that support management, planning, coordination, and situational awareness based on each country’s specifics.

This has been the main task of NATO Force Integration Units since their establishment, and therefore, changing the chain of command was a logical step. NFIUs are like adapters that make NATO requirements understandable to countries and, conversely, make countries’ specifics a unified information source for NATO. Whilst NFIUs could previously be viewed as independent units supporting the movement of the NATO Response Force to a specific country, they are now an essential part of the entire operational theatre logistics network, managed by the Joint Logistics and Support Group Headquarters.

NATO’s logistical concept is divided into four lines. The first and second are tactical support, overseen by tactical

units. For example, a division is responsible for supporting its brigades, and a corps supports divisions. The same applies to the air and naval forces.

The third line is the operational theatre logistics, overseen by the Joint Force Command. This is implemented by the Joint Logistics and Support Group Headquarters through units subordinated to it. The third-line logistics and support include the movement of forces within the operational theatre, establishing the logistics base, creating and managing the Joint Logistics Support Network (JLSN), providing medical support, organising support from the host nation, and coordinating national support elements.

The task of the third line is to create connection between the fourth and second-line logistics. This means that corps and divisions receive their supplies on time from the operational theatre logistics base, and the wounded are evacuated. At the same time, additional units and supplies sent by countries move to designated areas or storage locations.

An essential part of third-line logistics is also coordinating and managing movements. Given that this is likely to be a conflict area, and large quantities of goods, equipment, and units need to be moved simultaneous-

ly, organising this is of key importance. Coordination and synchronisation of civil supplies needed for the country’s functioning are also crucial, mostly using the same infrastructure.

What then will be the renewed role of NATO Force Integration Units? The year 2024 is one for implementing changes for NFIU, as the new chain of command with the JLSG HQ Brunssum needs to be completed, and therefore, NATO’s operational and tactical plans also need to be updated. The renewed role of NFIU in Estonia will focus on supporting the JLSG HQ, organising NATO’s third-line logistics. This does not only involve activities taking place on Estonian territory.

This means planning and coordinating the operational theatre logistics base, joint logistics and support network, and coordinating with the defence forces and other state institutions, defining the host nation’s support, and monitoring and coordinating the movements of allies. A crucial part is maintaining continuous situational awareness to ensure readiness for the rapid movement and support of allied forces.

Considering Estonia’s geographical smallness, lack of operational depth and limited resources, it is already nec-

essary to ensure the readiness of the joint logistics and support network in peacetime. This helps the country to be prepared to receive and sustain allied units in crisis situations. The role of the NFIU Estonia also includes coordinating with neighbouring countries’ NFIUs, thereby providing greater situational awareness of the movement of arriving units or equipment for the Estonian Defence Forces.

The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO will add our northern neighbours to this coordination. The main role of the Force Integration Unit is to integrate NATO’s operational-level logistics management with the Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces and the Support Command.

The JLSG HQ Brunssum, being inherently small, necessitates the indispensability of the NFIUs to maintain contact with the host nation’s structures, create situational awareness, and coordinate activities on the ground. Therefore, the role of NATO Force Integration Units is to represent the Joint Logistics and Support Group Brunssum Headquarters in the host country and support the development of NATO’s tactical support plans, coordinating them with the host nation’s defence forces and other state institutions. ‖

A moment from the graduation ceremony of the SLC and CSELC courses of the Baltic Defence College at the Ministry of Defence.

Photo: Mihkel Leis / EDF

In June 2023, I had the honour of assuming the command of the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) from Major General Ilmar Tamm. I took pride in accepting the responsibility and opportunity of guiding the education of the officer corps of the three Baltic nations, along with their allies and partners.

THE FUTURE-ORIENTED BALTIC DEFENCE COLLEGE

ALVYDAS ŠIUPARIS

Brigadier General, Commandant of Baltic Defence College

The history of the BALTDEFCOL reflects the persistent challenges and opportunities confronting the militaries of the Baltic states and their governments. The BALTDEFCOL has consistently aimed to be at the forefront of professional military education (PME), ensuring its graduates are adept at addressing challenges across the spectrum of crisis, war, and peace throughout their careers. Within a year after reclaiming their independence, the Defence Ministers of the three Baltic states agreed to cooperate in officers’ education. This collaboration was formalised in 1998 through the signing of the agreement on establishing the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia.

The BALTDEFCOL aspires to be a modern, future-oriented, attractive, and competitive international defence college conducted in English, with a regional focus and Euro-Atlantic scope. Functioning as a PME institution, the BALTDEFCOL imparts knowledge at the operational and strategic levels, applying the latest educational principles, effective management, and the optimal utilisation of intellectual and material resources.

In my role as the Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, my intention is to continue to provide an Educational Programme composed of the Joint Command and General Staff Course (JCGSC), the Civil Servants’ Course (CSC), the Higher Com-

mand Studies Course (HCSC), the Command Senior Enlisted Leaders’ Course (CSELC), and the Senior Leaders’ Course (SLC). The default approach involves delivering education through internal human resources, with outsourcing only considered in exceptional cases to uphold the quality of education. This goal is achievable contingent on utilising top-tier faculty members from Framework Nations and Contributing Nations.

The BALTDEFCOL aspires to be a modern, future-oriented, attractive, and competitive international

defence college.

The journey of the BALTDEFCOL has been marked by a commitment to serve the ever-growing ambitions of our primary stakeholders, the Baltic states. We have not only witnessed a significant increase in the number of students but have also extended our services to accommodate NATO countries and partners beyond the Baltic region.

Over the past five years, the BALTDEFCOL has pioneered initiatives, including the ground-breaking Command Senior Enlisted Leaders’ Course, now an integral part of the college curriculum. Additionally, the new quality concept of the Civil Servants’ Course was introduced during this time, and various shorter courses have been developed and incorporated into the NATO course catalogue. Our dedication has garnered recognition from our allies, with NATO ACT certifying the Baltic Defence College as a NATO Accredited Education and Training

facility. Given its international character, the BALTDEFCOL serves as an attractive partner for other PME institutions, championing the Framework Nations’ contribution to education and research within NATO. A tangible testament is the Letter of Intent signed with the Polish War Studies University (WSU) and Finnish National Defence University (FNDU) to collaboratively plan and execute the Combined Joint Staff Exercise JOINT RESOLVE within NATO Article 5.

The BALTDEFCOL is committed to actively contributing to its international recognition as a central hub of knowledge on regional security and Russia. In 2015, the BALTDEFCOL initiated the inaugural Conference on Russia, which has since evolved into a prominent fixture of the academic year, forming an integral part of the BALTDEFCOL’s curricula and subsequently being incorporated into the educational programme of the Estonian Military Academy. The Conference convenes high-level military and civilian experts and decision-makers.

The BALTDEFCOL is committed to actively contributing to its international recognition as a central hub of knowledge on regional security and Russia.

The 2024 iteration of the Conference carries the theme ‘The Russia Paradox: Between Total Control and Complete Chaos’ (https://www.rusconf.eu/). Its primary objective is to stimulate debate on developments in the security environment, placing a particular emphasis on the role of Russia and the security architecture of the Baltic Sea Region.

The Conference has proven to be a valuable platform for the exchange of ideas in the field, gaining prominence among security conferences in the region. This underscores the recognition of the BALTDEFCOL as a professional military education organisation actively contributing to research within the security domain. Since 2021, the BALTDEFCOL has complemented the Conference with the publication of an

edited volume, warmly received by the international academic community.

The BALTDEFCOL’s educational outreach extends significantly through the Annual Baltic Military History Conference as well, conducted in collaboration with the Estonian Military Academy and the Estonian War Museum. The 14th Military History Conference, entitled ‘Military Thought and its Transformation in the Newly Independent States of Europe in 1918–1940,’ took place in October 2023 in Tartu. The forthcoming edition is scheduled for autumn 2024 (https:// baltmilhist.eu/).

Since 2019, the BALTDEFCOL has been actively contributing to scholarly discourse through the publication of two

Graduation ceremony of Baltic Defense College courses.

academic journals: The Journal of Baltic Security and Ad Securitatem. The former is a peer-reviewed academic journal, featuring research that delves into defence and security issues within the wider Baltic region. The latter compiles the best research papers from the academic year from the JCGSC, the HCSC and the CSC. The BALTDEFCOL faculty has enriched academic discussions in the security domain by publishing research papers that extend beyond the immediate Baltic Sea Region, contributing to a much broader understanding of security dynamics.

The BALTDEFCOL has sustained its commitment to supporting the evolution of the educational programme at the National Defence University of Ukraine (NDUU), as part of

the professional military education reform under the auspices of and funded by the NATO Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP).

This involvement encompasses inhouse workshops conducted by the BALTDEFCOL, invitations for the NDUU Faculty to participate in stand-alone courses like the NATO Comprehensive Operational Planning Course, and opportunities to observe or participate in select Modules within BALTDEFCOL courses.

An important collaboration was the participation of the NDUU faculty in the Combined Joint Staff Exercise JOINT RESOLVE 2023, which was conducted in cooperation with the War Studies University in May 2023. This engagement provided them with valuable interactions with highly experienced Senior Mentors, Subject Matter Experts, and faculty from both PME institutions. The exposure to the exercise setting and scenario supported the development of the NDUU cadre of instructors, enhancing their capacity to deliver operational planning courses.

In an era marked by the perpetual evolution of the contemporary battlefield, our responsibility extends to providing our students with more comprehensive insights and considerations, especially concerning the concept of Multi Domain Operations. Furthermore, we must delve into the significance and impact of Artificial Intelligence, digitalisation, and other emerging technologies within the domains of operational planning and execution. Accomplishing these goals requires an intensified focus on extracting valuable lessons from the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The year 2024 holds special significance for the Baltic Defence College, as it celebrates its 25th anniversary, coinciding with the city of Tartu, the BALTDEFCOL’s hometown, being designated the European Capital of Culture. Additionally, it marks the 20th anniversary of the Baltic states joining NATO and the European Union. This commemorative year provides an opportunity for prideful celebration and serves as a platform to strengthen partnerships and connections within the region and with the broader international community. ‖

Photo: Mihkel Leis / EDF

Published by Strategic Communication Departement, General Staff, Estonian Defence Forces

Produced by Strategic Communication Centre, Cyber Command, Estonian Defence Forces

Translated by Välek OÜ

Edited by Heiki Suurkask

ISSN 2613-4934