43
Endnotes 1 A smaller contingent of the graduate students in the
course (who adhere to Recommendation B in the report) believes this counteracts any efforts by the U.S. to be an “honest broker.” Both parties should equally adhere to the ceasefire; if the U.S. issues a particular warning or assurance to only one of the sides, it violates a position of neutrality and hinders negotiation processes.
2
16 Arieff, 3. 17 Arieff, 4. 18 Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations. “Reply of the Kingdom of Morocco to Mr. Baker’s proposal entitled “Peace Plan for the Self-Determination of Western Sahara,” http:// www.mission-maroc.ch/en/pages/253.html.
The smaller contingent of graduate students, supporting Recommendation B, believes a reference to the Moroccan autonomy plan delegitimizes the position of the U.S. as an honest broker, and ought to be avoided in negotiations.
19 Kingdom of Morocco. “Autonomy Plan: Kingdom on the Move.” http://autonomy-plan.org/the-autonomy-plan-for-sahara.
3
Bell, Arvid and Tom O’Bryan. “A Puzzle Too Complex? James Baker’s Mediation Mission in Western Sahara, 1997-2004.” Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government 2019, 3. Theofilopoulou HKS study 3
21 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri.” March 23, 2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/03/158895.html
4
Jensen, Erik, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate, 2nd edition. Lienne Rienner, 2011, 6.
22 Baker, James. Work Hard, Study ... and Keep Out of Politics! Northwestern University Press; First Edition, June 2, 2008, Memoir 354.
5
Jensen, 13.
6
Janis, Mark, “The International Court of Justice: Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara,” Harvard International Law Journal, 609, 1976, 610 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103207.
7
Theofilopoulou HKS study Bell, 4.
8
Theofilopoulou HKS study Bell, 4.
9
Jensen, 14.
10 Zoubir, Yahia, “Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XIV, No. 4, Winter 2007. https://www.mepc.org/journal/ stalemate-western-sahara-ending-international-legality
20 Burns as quoted in Arieff 8.
23 Polisario officials insist that the movement never received weapons from the Soviet Union, and that the movement has moderated its formerly Marxist-socialist roots. Since 1991, they maintain that the movement’s sole focus has been the liberation of the territory held by Morocco, and the establishment of a democratic nation-state. 24 UNHCR, “Sahrawi Refugees in Tindouf, Algeria: Total In-Camp Population,” http://www.usc.es/ export9/sites/webinstitucional/gl/institutos/ceso/ descargas/UNHCR_Tindouf-Total-In-Camp-Population_March-2018.pdf 25 United Nations Security Council S/2019/787. https://minurso.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ sg_report_english.pdf.
11 Zoubir.
26 United Nations Security Council S/2019/787.
12 Arieff, Alexis, “Western Sahara,” Congressional Research Service, RS20962, April 14, 2013. https://fas. org/sgp/crs/row/RS20962.pdf.
27 Arieff, ‘Summary.’
13 United Nations. ”Background: MINURSO,” 2017, https://minurso.unmissions.org/background.
29 Messari, Nizar, “National security, the political space, and citizenship: the case of Morocco and the Western Sahara,” The Journal of North African Studies, Volume 6, Issue 4, 2001. https://www.tandfonline.com/ doi/abs/10.1080/13629380108718450, 48.
14 Zoubir. 15 United Nations Security Council. “Security Council Adopts Resolution 2468 (2019), Authorizing SixMonth Extension of United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara.” | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. United Nations, 2019, www. un.org/press/en/2019/sc13795.doc.htm.
28 Arieff, ‘Summary.’
30 Messari, 48. 31 Morocco World News, “Full Text of King Mohammed VI’s 2019 Green March Speech.”  https://www. moroccoworldnews.com/2019/11/286248/full-textking-mohammed-vi-green-march-speech/.
