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Railroad Safety’s Half Century Wait
Runaway policies rollin’on Thomas Block, Middlefield, OH
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n 1969, four passengers on two colliding Penn Central Railroad trains were killed and 43 were injured. In 2008, 25 were killed and 102 were injured. And then in July of 2013, 47 people were killed in the Canadian town of Lac Megantic orphaning 27 children and incinerating much of the town due to a runaway train. A year later, Lynchburg, Virginia nearly suffered a similar fate when tank cars from a CSX train derailed. Had the train derailed to the right instead of to the left, over 50 children visiting a museum —plus diners on an outdoor patio— could have been incinerated by over 29,000 gallons of Bakken crude oil. And then, the 2009 derailment of sixteen cars in Paulsboro, New Jersey, was reduced to only four cars in a preview performance of a yet-to happen 2012 mess—except the 2012 derailment punctured one of the four cars releasing thousands of gallons of vinyl chloride, a known toxic carcinogen. While the number of train related deaths increases spasmodically and slowly, when will too many be too many? Since 1969, 146 accidents killing 335 people and injuring 6,578 others have occurred due to the rail industry’s dallying with the National Transportation Safety Board’s recommendation of implementing an industry-wide system of Positive Train Control (PTC)1. By 2018, as trains approached lengths of three miles with over 200 cars, safety was still lacking2. In 2020, safety is discretionary. The aforementioned dallying has not been exclusive to the industry. After the 2008 calamity, Congress passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act. While it passed immediately after, it was not formally decreed until 2010, after which amendments were added in 2012 and 2014, to clarify requirements for implementation3. In the 1980s, Burlington Northern Railroad devised and installed the ARES (Advanced Railroad Electronics System) on some of its trains in Minnesota. ARES “accomplished many of the functions of the modern train safety system.” A technology such as ARES to stop trains from colliding “was feasible”4. While federal agencies favored the
Seguridad Ferroviaria Espera por Medio Siglo
Políticas descarriadas aún en la vía
technology, “railroads failed to buy in,” and by 1993, Burlington Northern, after spending more than $15 million, killed the project (Ibid). But, ATC (Automatic Train Control) systems were far from doomed. Not “as aggressive as PTC (Positive Train Control) in all cases” Alstom’s and PHW’s Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System has been employed on parts of Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor, and Webtec’s Electronic Train Management System is found on segments of BNSF Railway, Communications-Based Train Management on CSX Railroad, Advanced Speed Enforcement System for New Jersey Transit, etc. – piecemeal attempts to solve a nation-wide problem. Still, since the 1990s and with blessings from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Transport Canada, the rail industry continued on next page has often resisted the
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n 1969, en un choque de dos trenes de Penn Central Railroad murieron cuatro pasajeros y 43 resultaron heridos. En 2008, 25 murieron y 102 resultaron heridos. Y luego, en julio de 2013, 47 personas murieron en la ciudad canadiense de Lac Megantic dejando huérfanos a 27 niños e incinerando gran parte de la ciudad por causa de un tren fuera de control. Un año después Lynchburg, VA, casi sufrió un desastre similar cuando los vagones-cisterna de un tren del ferrocarril CSX descarrilaron. Si el tren se hubiera descarrilado a la derecha en lugar de a la izquierda, más de 50 niños que visitaban un museo, además de comensales en un patio exterior, podrían haber sido incinerados por más de 29,000 galones de petróleo crudo Bakken. Y finalmente en 2009, el descarrilamiento de dieciséis carros en Paulsboro, Nueva Jersey, redujo el tren a solo cuatro en un pre-estreno de lo que ocurriría en el 2012, excepto que el descarrilamiento de 2012 horadó uno de los cuatro vagones y liberó miles de galones de cloruro de vinilo, un conocido tóxico carcinógeno. Mientras el número de fatalidades aumenta lenta y espasmódicamente ¿cuándo serán demasiadas? Desde 1969, han ocurrido 146 accidentes que mataron a 335 personas e hirieron a otras 6 578 debido a que la industria ferroviaria ignoró la recomendación del Directorio Nacional de Seguridad del Transporte de implementar un sistema de Control Positivo de Trenes (PTC)1 en toda la industria. Para 2018, a medida que los trenes llegaban a medir tres millas de largo y más de 200 vagones, todavía no se han aplicado medidas de seguridad 2. Para hoy, el 2020, la seguridad es opcional. Ese desdén mencionado arriba no ha sido exclusivo de esta industria. Después de la calamidad de 2008, el Congreso aprobó la Ley de Mejora de la Seguridad Ferroviaria. Pero, aunque se aprobó inmediatamente después, no se decretó formalmente hasta el 2010, después de lo cual se agregaron enmiendas en 2012 y 2014, para aclarar los requisitos de implementación3. En la década de 1980, Burlington Northern Railroad diseñó e instaló el ARES continúa a la vuelta (Advanced Railroad novemBER 2020 Joaquín 11
