154
Liberating Kuwait
Marine Corps Art Collection
Fire Mission by Sgt Charles G. Grow. An M198 155mm howitzer of Battery E, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, fires against Iraqi forces in late February 1991.
ful, as there were numerous secondary explosions on the target compound. Battery E conducted a second raid later in the day on 20 February, destroying two more sets of buildings with 70 high-explosive rounds between 1600 and 1700.55 On 22 February, the last of the combined artillery/air raids was conducted by Battery E and Task Force Troy. Over 100 rounds were fired on four targets, destroying vehicles and buildings.56 These deceptions appear to have had some impact, but at least some in the Iraqi high command were skeptical. A “foreign source” passed information to the Iraqi Directorate of General Military Intelligence that an amphibious landing would occur north of Kuwait City, supported by an American armor feint through the Wadi al-Batin (at the Iraq-KuwaitSaudi border). If the amphibious landing failed, “A direct assault by infantry into the teeth of the Iraqi defense south of Kuwait City near al-Wafra[h] would occur.” Despite this information, and despite the evidence Iraq had of American plans for an amphibious operation, Lieutenant General Sabir Abd al-Aziz (director of Iraq’s military intelligence) was not con-
vinced. He felt the Coalition would not risk the heavy casualties an amphibious operation would entail.57 It is not clear that these doubts were ever communicated to the Iraqi III and IV Corps commanders. Many of the III Corps divisions remained in defensive positions dug in along the coast, and sand tables captured in Kuwait after the war showed how extensively the Iraqis planned to defend against an amphibious assault. But even if they had seen through the deception efforts, the Coalition air campaign would have made shifting forces on a large scale nearly impossible.
The Battles of 19–23 February From 19 to 23 February, the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions moved up to the berm along the KuwaitiSaudi border and cut through it, and then they moved into Kuwait and prepared for the offensive against Iraqi forces there. First Marine Division’s Task Force Taro, commanded by Colonel John Admire and built around his 3d Marines, took up positions on the eastern flank of the division’s breach to protect the flank of the division during the infil-
