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Liberating Kuwait
tiple mid-air collisions, and I am not exaggerating that at all. Oh, there were a lot of people that came back with religion [after that mission].”40 In the morning on 24 February, Saddam Hussein noted at a command meeting that “the enemy continues to drown in his own blood and shame in front of our [frontline] units. . . . Despite all that took place, our faithful men were able to drive out the first surprise attack. . . . Generally, our units are in the best shape possible under this kind [of attack]. The enemy’s attack has failed completely.” The III Corps commander, Major General Salah Aboud Mahmoud, was better informed of events in Kuwait, but none of the Iraqi leaders appear to have realized how badly the first day of the Coalition attack had gone for the Iraqi forces. Even General Salah Aboud later noted that “in spite of the enemy’s huge penetration to many locations . . . I made sure that the enemy’s troops suffered the most casualties.”41
25 February On 25 February, the XVIII Airborne Corps’ 24th Infantry Division advanced toward the Euphrates valley while the rest of the corps continued to screen to the north and west of the Coalition advance. The VII Corps continued its advance into southeastern Iraq as it drove across the desert toward the Republican Guard. As it advanced, the VII Corps de-
stroyed the divisions of the VII Corps charged with defending the Iraqi western flank as they were encountered.42
The Battle of Burqan During the afternoon and evening of 24 February, General Salah Aboud revised his plan for a counterattack against the advancing Marines. The plan called for a pincer attack, with the 7th Infantry Division attacking from the north into the 2d Marine Division’s area of operations while the 5th Mechanized Division attacked in the southwest, out of the al-Burqan oil field, with al-Jaber airfield as its objective. The 8th Infantry and 3d Armored Divisions would reestablish defensive lines behind the counterattack. The Iraqis began moving long before dawn on 25 February, slowed by extremely poor visibility in the smoke-filled night.43 Shortly after 0100, General Myatt was convinced from captured Iraqi maps, prisoner interviews, and radio intercepts that an Iraqi counterattack was imminent and that this attack could come “out of the fire” of the al-Burqan oil field. At this time, Task Force Shepherd was screening Task Forces Ripper and Papa Bear along the al-Burqan flank, but General Myatt’s forward division headquarters was set up right next to the oil fields, with only Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, as a security force.
Marines of the 1st Marine Division board CH-46 helicopters. The blowing dust and poor visibility highlight the difficulties helicopters encountered in the desert. Photo by LtCol Charles H. Cureton
