40
Liberating Kuwait
The Marines of Regimental Combat Team 7 were eager to leave the deplorable conditions of the warehouses. Major Michael F. Applegate of the 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion’s opinion was held by many: “The time we spent in those warehouses was the worst experience of my life. At least in the desert you can move around, and you have the morning and evening breezes.” General Hopkins’s efforts with the Saudis eventually paid off, and the brigade’s ground combat forces began deploying to defensive positions north of al-Jubayl.13 General Hopkins later described his initial defensive plan: There were only about three or four defensible pieces of terrain between the Kuwaiti border and [al-]Jubayl. I went up to Manifa Bay, which is about 70 miles south of the Kuwaiti border. We decided to screen there with the light armored vehicles, and then Colonel [later Brigadier General Carlton W.] Fulford could deploy the mechanized units and the greater part of the Regimental Combat Team by the cement factory, which was 40 miles north of Jubayl and 27 miles or so south of Manifa Bay, where there was some relief in the desert. It was the best defensible terrain and Fulford deployed his Regimental Combat Team there. That was our concept. We would screen as far forward as possible, delay and attrit the Iraqis with airpower, then defend in a main battle area along what became known as “cement [factory] ridge.” The Iraqis had two possible attack routes. We thought they’d either come down the coast or use a route a little bit to the west, but both these routes come together at a junction near the cement factory. If they kept coming, we had drawn a line in the sand by the cement factory. We were going to stay there.14 The performance of the Iraqi military in the Iran-Iraq War (see chapter 1) and its later performance against light armored vehicles of the Marines and Saudis backed by strong air support in the Battle of al-Khafji (see chapters 6 and 7) indicate that the soldiers of the 82d Airborne might have been more than a speed bump, although the Air Force initially did not have the assets or munitions in theater to support the paratroopers as thoroughly as the Marines and Saudis were supported during al-Khafji. But certainly once the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was in position on 25 August, Iraq’s window of opportunity for conquering
a significant portion of Saudi Arabia was gone. The maritime prepositioning system had worked as designed. The only apparent flaw in the system involved the deployment of aviation assets. General Hopkins later said, The fixed-wing was stalled at MCAS [Marine Corps Air Station] Beaufort [South Carolina] and at MCAS Cherry Point [North Carolina]. The Air Force didn’t give us the tankers that we needed to get across the Atlantic. That was my biggest concern, because basically the concept calls for us to be combat ready in about ten days. We were ready on the ground, with the MEB [Marine expeditionary brigade] declared combat ready on 25 August; but the F/A-18s didn’t arrive until around the 23rd, because they were delayed. The Air Force was moving its own aircraft, and that’s one of the weaknesses of the MPF [Maritime Prepositioning Force] concept—it’s not tied together at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level.15
Marines Afloat The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) deployed on a scheduled cruise of the western Pacific Ocean in June 1990. These “WestPac” cruises were an annual six-month deployment that rotated between West Coast Marine units; the deployed units served as the landing force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The expeditionary unit was commanded by Colonel John E. Rhodes. It comprised Battalion Landing Team 1/4, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (Composite) 164, and Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 13. These Marines were embarked on the ships of Amphibious Squadron 5, an amphibious ready group that included USS Okinawa (LPH 3), USS Ogden (LPD 5), USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), USS Cayuga (LST 1186), and USS Durham (LKA 114). The cruise was planned for six months, but the deployment was extended by the crisis in the Gulf by nearly four months. As a consequence, the Marines began calling themselves the “Raiders of the Lost ARG* [amphibious ready group].”16 The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit was designated “Special Operations Capable.” Prior to getting underway, the unit went through a training cycle designed to prepare it to conduct different types of special operations that might be encountered dur*
A humorous play on the title of the popular 1981 movie Raiders of the Lost Ark.
