64
Liberating Kuwait
Colonel Robert J. Garner’s 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit was originally intended to replace the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit in the Gulf, but its units formed the core of General Rowe’s brigade instead. Loading and organization were designed so that Colonel Garner could break his unit out from the brigade and operate independently if required, however. It comprised Battalion Landing Team 3/1, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (Composite) 268, and Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 11 and was embarked on Amphibious Squadron 1, commanded by Captain Michael D. Barker, USN. The vessels earmarked for Captain Barker’s squadron were the New Orleans, Denver, Germantown, Peoria, and Mobile. In the event, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit and Amphibious Squadron 1 did not break off from the brigade until March, after hostilities in the Gulf were over.27 The 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade set sail on board Amphibious Group 3 from the West Coast on 1 December. The group traveled west to Hawaii and then to the Philippines on its way to the Persian Gulf, conducting extensive training on board to make up for the training precluded by the hurried departure. The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit was ordered to return to the Gulf from the Philippines in company with the brigade, rendezvousing at sea, and the two amphibious forces joined Central Command’s forces in the Arabian Sea on 14 January 1991.28 As the landing force of Naval Forces Central Command, the two Marine expeditionary brigades and a Marine expeditionary unit formed a very large amphibious force. Major General Harry Jenkins, the senior Marine afloat, suggested to General Alfred Gray that the forces be formally designated as the IV Marine Expeditionary Force, with an appropriate staff deployed. General Gray approved the idea, but the war was over before this change could be made.29 The Marine Corps was not required to activate any of its Reserves for the Desert Shield deployment, aside from a few individual billets filled voluntarily. But the president’s 8 November reinforcement order required a Reserve call up that would eventually number 30,000 reservists. Of these, over 11,000 would serve in the Persian Gulf region. As noted above, most of these reservists were activated with their units, and these companies, battalions, and squadrons were assigned to Marine air-ground task forces as needed. One regiment, the 24th Marines, deployed as well. Other reservists were assigned individually to fill out units already deployed or preparing to deploy, especially in the 5th Marine Ex-
peditionary Brigade. Over 99 percent of the Marines recalled to active duty responded to the call and entered hurried training and orientation courses prior to deployment; they then deployed and served with enthusiasm, despite early administrative issues that left many reservists facing temporary financial hardship at the beginning of their tours. The Reserve Marines proved the value of the Reserve program, and Colonel Gangle of the 5th Marines spoke for many when he reported that after a few weeks’ time he could not tell the regulars from the reservists.30
Iraq’s Defenses Throughout the fall of 1990, Iraq responded to the international condemnation of its invasion of Kuwait with bluster and counterclaims. Saddam Hussein believed that Iraq could outlast the UN sanctions imposed on it in the wake of the invasion and that the Coalition of Western and Arab states that opposed him would inevitably break part. Nonetheless, Iraq prepared for the confrontation to turn violent and readied its defense in Iraq and Kuwait. In that event, Iraq expected a prolonged “prewar bombardment” by Coalition air forces, which Saddam expected to endure successfully based on his Iran-Iraq War experience, followed by a Coalition assault into Kuwait.31 As noted in chapter 1, the Israeli air strike on the Osirak in 1981 inspired Iraq to upgrade its air defenses, centered on the French-made Kari integrated air defense command and control system activated in 1986. This system organized four of Iraq’s five air defense sectors (the fifth was Kuwait), consisting of over 7,000 pieces of air defense artillery and over 100 surface-to-air missile batteries. Iraq’s surface-to-air missiles were, like most Iraqi weapons, primarily supplied by the Soviet Union. Iraqi surface-to-air guided missiles included the S75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline*), Isayev S-125 Neva/Pechora (SA-3 Goa), 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful), 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko), 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin), and 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher). The French-made Roland was Iraq’s only non-Soviet surface-to-air guided missile. Iraq’s air defense artillery included many diverse types, but the most dangerous was the ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled, radar-guided antiaircraft weapon system. Iraq also fielded thousands of portable, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, all 9K32 Strela-2s (SA-7 Grails) and 9K34 Strela-3s (SA-14 Gremlins). Despite this quantita*
The names in parentheses for these missiles are their NATO reporting names.
