EU–ASEAN TRADE RELATIONS: BEYOND THE IMPASSE Bárbara Teixeira de Sousa Sénécaut The EU’s relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) date back to 1977, making it one of the oldest models of interregional cooperation. These relations have since developed to cover a wide array of subjects ranging from trade to security cooperation. In 2006, the EU released its communication called Global Europe which identified, among others, ASEAN as a preferred partner thanks to its market potential and its protection level for EU exporters. In 2007, negotiations for an interregional EU–ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA) were launched. A regionto-region agreement was deemed favourable due to the complexity of establishing multiple FTAs with Southeast Asian countries that already found themselves in the midst of a complex web of trade agreements. However, the talks were halted after seven rounds of negotiations in order to allow reflection on a more appropriate format. While the originally envisaged interregional negotiations have remained suspended to date, ASEAN continues to be an important region for the EU as its third-largest trading partner after the United States and China. As for ASEAN, the EU is its secondlargest trading partner. The EU’s strategy has, therefore, changed towards conducting bilateral negotiations with the individual member states of ASEAN in the hope that they would serve as building blocks for an eventual region-to-region agreement. Up until recently, the EU–Singapore FTA (EUSFTA) and the Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) remained the sole examples of strong EU–ASEAN trade relations. The focus on Singapore was an obvious choice for the EU in its bilateral arbitrations following the breakdown of interregional negotiations, as it is the EU’s biggest trading partner in Southeast Asia.
Similarly to how the ten thousand EU companies present on Singaporean soil function as forward bases set for regional operations, the EU has drawn on Singapore as a stepping stone to further relations with nearby countries. The EUSFTA has also been playing a direct role in economically bridging both regions via the “ASEAN cumulation.” This allows other ASEAN members to enjoy tariff concessions when their materials are incorporated into Singaporean final products. The EU hoped that this would lead to the rapid establishment of other bilateral FTAs within the region, but that has proved to be a misconception. For a long time, many believed this would not be replicable in other ASEAN countries because of Singapore’s high level of liberalisation and its rapidly growing and dynamic market. The stalling and interruption of the other bilateral negotiations—because of multiple nontrade barriers—demonstrated that the EU’s expectations and demands in the negotiations with the ASEAN countries had been rather unrealistic and unattainable. After an extended lull in Europe–Asia relations, both the European Parliament (EP) and the Vietnamese National Assembly ratified the EU–Vietnam FTA and IPA. Following a dozen rounds of negotiations spanning eight years, Vietnam became the second ASEAN country to sign such agreements with the EU. This illustrates both regions’ interest in furthering ties, particularly at a time of economic crisis after months of lockdown across the globe. A rapprochement would be beneficial for both regions, but the last attempt at finding common agreement in 2019 resulted in ASEAN’s unilaterally and indefinitely postponing the signing of the Strategic Partnership, an informal prerequisite for trade negotiations. The question remains whether the successful PARTNERS AND INFLUENCES
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