A VIEW ON REGIONALISM THROUGH JAPAN–ASEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS Emese Schwarcz As time passes in the so-called Asian Century and governments are trying to balance national policies in the changing power structure in the East and Southeast Asian region, many questions are raised regarding where to now. The Trump administration brought about considerable uncertainties to the East Asian strategic alignments, without making actual adjustments to them. It goes without saying, however, that the lack of maintenance or enhancement of these security alliances projects a worrying picture of ambiguities, and ambiguities are not what make a secure alliance in a region where nuclear programs are still active and are used frequently. The worries about President Trump’s United States are integral parts of the concept that seems to expand continuously: the idea of economic regionalism in the Eastern part of the globe. Being its integral part means that there are several aspects to consider while examining the reasons for Japan to team up with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In this paper, I will try to identify motivations, rationales, and opportunities on the Japanese part. A BRIEF HISTORY ASEAN was formed in 1967, and Japan endorsed it quite early on.1 Their relations were solidified by 1977 under Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, known for his expertise in finance and economics. He was also known for advocating the Fukuda Doctrine which congealed the Japanese intent for nurturing an active, equal, and cooperative relationship with ASEAN.2 Fukuda was trained by the infamous Kishi Nobusuke, an indicted-but-released wartime economic minister, later to become a post-war prime minister who also happens to be the
grandfather of the current prime minister, Abe Shinzō.3 All three of them are known for their distinct economic policies in which Abe definitely follows the Fukuda line in interacting closely with Southeast Asian countries. The prospect of new trading partners and new markets became especially important at the end of the Shōwa Era (1926–1989) and basically during the whole Heisei Era (1989–2019). When the oil shocks of the 1970s pressured the Japanese “economic miracle” into a halt, major concerns took over the country. The 1990s introduced a long period of economic recession whereby the population started to dwindle, unemployment was on the rise, and the country’s national debt began to grow significantly. While fewer and fewer people were willing to bear children in an insecure economic environment, baby boomers were living longer and longer, which put additional pressure on the country’s finances. In parallel, China, which had been perceived as a cheap alternative for factories and plants due to cheap labour and low costs for a long time, started to develop rapidly, not needing Japan’s long-time provided Official Development Assistance anymore. In the post-war period, after reestablishing relations, China grew to be Japan’s biggest export partner, taking in as much as 20% of the country’s export products with a value of USD 136 billion per year.4 In 2010, however, China rose through the ranks and took over Japan’s place in the global economic ranking, becoming the second-biggest economy in the world. What that entail for Japan are higher costs and more expensive labour. Living standards and market preferences are changing, and, with the chronic economic malaise that Japan has, it is of utmost importance to find new markets and potential bases for assembly factories and facilities. PARTNERS AND INFLUENCES
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