Letter from the Editor in Chief Letter from the Directors of"In Relation To"
Rwanda's Prince: What Kagame's Regune Says About Power in Africa by Bella Newell
Spotlight on the Sahel by Lucy Stevens
Interview with Rachel Nolan Changing Power with the Colombian Truth Commission Report
The UN in the Democratic Republic of Congo by Rosalia Inglima
A Pool Party at the President’s House by Madhri Yehiya
A New Global Nuclear Triad by Joseph Su Changing Culinary Landscapes by Katie Dang
Non-Alignment in a New Age by Kevin Clenard
Ramifications of the Yazidi Genocide: by Charlotte Stant
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The Sand is Greener on the Other Side by Najla Alsweilem
Shifting Security Roles in the EU by Kathleen Rouse
NATO: Facilitator or Alleviator of the Greco-Turkish Conflict? by Senthil Meyyappan Meyyappan
The Creeping Arm of Populism in Italy by Erica Macdonald
Exile and Conflict by Thibaut Stussi
Shadow in Ukraine by Amy Graham
What’s in a Word by Azima Aidarov
Foreign Direct Investment as an Opening for Corruption in Guyana by Morgan Cleary Colonial Politics and Economics in the Perpetual Marginalization of Puerto Rican Society by Elio Rodriguez Zeda
Replanting Power by Beaujena Stoyanchev
Photography and Graphics
Senior Editorial Board
Contributing Staff
exciting developments as well. International Relations Review Online, our flagship blog, published roughly five articles a week this semester, and In Relation To , our podcast, launched biweekly episodes, many of which feature scholars and professors.
Dear reader,
Thank you for picking up a copy of the 27th edition of the International Relations Review!
While most journals call for submissions related to a specific topic, the International Relations Review has typically built a title and overarching theme based on our writers’ interests. After reviewing this semester’s article proposals, it was quite clear that nearly all of the articles focused on positionality in the twenty-first century. As students of international relations, our writers are incredibly aware of the growing importance of the study of power dynamics between communities, organizations, and states, especially when deciding what issues they wanted to study this fall. From decolonization
efforts to sovereignty movements, “Perspectives on Power” features scholarship on changing powers and players, and how non-state actors and social movements are changing the narrative of foreign affairs. Our cover, featuring the anti-corruption monument of Rwanda, shows the possibilities of change when we challenge power and push leaders to be better.
Behind the 18 articles featured in this issue, there is a 100-person staff working hard to edit the journal, advertise our writing, and create a community within the publication. The work you see featured in the journal is not just that of our writers but of our entire staff who make the publication what it is today. Outside of our print edition, our other branches have experienced
In my third semester as Editorin-Chief of the International Relations Review, I have continued to grow into a stronger editor and leader through the publication process, and this edition was no exception. And again, thank you for making the effort to support undergraduate scholarship and our publication. I hope this glimpse into our opinions and dedication to international issues gives you the hope that we can create a better future together.
Boston University College of Arts and Sciences, Kilachand Honors College, and Pardee School of Global Studies Class of 2023 and Editor in Chief at the International Relations Review , 2021–23
Over the past two years, In Relation To has had a truly incredible journey for our team. Without the support of the International Relations Review and the Board of Directors, none of this would have been possible. The podcast team consists of a group of passionate and talented individuals who are determined to bring new perspectives to the table. To our hosts Maria and Margherita, sound engineer Rishven, associate producer Andrew, and associate editor Isabella, we are immensely grateful for all your contributions to the podcast. We would also like to thank our audience for tuning in to learn more about global affairs and news developments in an ever-changing world.
This semester, as the podcast celebrated its first anniversary, we had several noteworthy achievements. We joined seven new podcasting platforms spanning a variety of regions in order to expand our global reach. We released a total of seven new episodes, which was the highest-ever number of episodes recorded in a semester. Moreover, in a groundbreaking first for In Relation To , we recorded three fantastic faculty interviews with Professors Wippl, Ambassador Storella, and Ambassador Garčević. The wisdom they brought to the studio was unparalleled and simply elevated the quality of our content. We also expanded our marketing and online presence, grew our listening base, and were featured alongside the IRR’s articles on its website, newsletter, and here in the journal. Lastly, we were able to engage in independently researched topics through our host-led episodes and student interviews that truly highlighted the intellect of our Boston University student body. All of this contributed to In Relation To ’s most eventful semester to date.
Undoubtedly, this is just the beginning. In the future, we aspire to continue making an impact and becoming a premier international relations podcast destination. We will continue to cover a wider range of topics and feature new guests from researchers, ambassadors, and professors to students and alumni. We hope you continue to engage with our podcast and support future episodes!
NEHA DSOUZA
Boston University College of Arts and Sciences, and Pardee School of Global Studies Class of 2025 and Director of "In Relation To" 2022–23
FAIZAAN ALIMOHAMMED
Boston University College of Arts and Sciences, and Pardee School of Global Studies Class of 2025 and Assistant Director of "In Relation To" 2022–23
Rachel Nolan is a historian of modern Latin America. Her research focuses on political violence, Central American civil wars, childhood and the family, historical memory, and U.S.-Latin American relations. Prior to becoming a historian, Dr. Nolan worked as a journalist. Her writing has appeared in Harper’s Magazine, the New York Times, the London Review of Books, and El Faro, among other publications.
In her most recent article with the London Review of Books, Dr. Nolan analyzes the 895-page final report of Colombia’s Truth Commission. The Truth Commission was conceived in 2016, as part of a peace agreement between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC guerrillas. Through an exclusive International Relations Review Q&A, learn more about what the report means for the changing balance of power in the Americas:
Bridgette: Can you tell me a bit about your scholarly work leading up to this point? What are the main highlights, and how did your other work lead you to study the Colombian Truth Commission?
Nolan: My background is strange for a historian. I was trained as a journalist first, and I still write
more journalistic articles in addition to kind of scholarly work. I worked as a freelance journalist in Mexico for a little while; I worked as a freelance journalist in Germany for a little while. When I returned to do a Ph.D. in history, I looked at my language skills, right? Not just my interests, but what languages I had, German and quite fluent Spanish at that stage. And I thought, “Okay, what are some unanswered questions that I can get at through a combination of archival research which is typical for historians, but also through interviews?” And I settled on a subject that I'm finishing a book on right now, which is the history of international adoption from Guatemala. You might wonder: how does one end up writing about the Colombian Truth Commission report from such a different background? The answer is that Truth Commission reports are international. These are a feature of regimes from South Africa post-apartheid, to Guatemala post-civil war, to Argentina post-Dirty War, and now to Colombia, trying to come out of the sixty year confrontation between the government and the FARC. What originally drew my interest was that I had read the Guatemalan Truth Commission in its entirety, which it's enormously long, just like the Colombian report. It's one of the best accounts that we
Rachel Nolan Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston Universityhave of what happened during the [Guatemalan] civil war, especially since the government was inclined to be in cahoots with the military and lie about what had happened, the history of what had happened. So what attracted my interest to Colombia was to see the similarities and differences with [the Guatemala] case.
Bridgette: Do you find your background in journalism helping your work in unexpected ways, and does your work differ from other historians with more traditional historian backgrounds?
Nolan: I think it helps me write faster honestly, or sort of not have writer's block, but as a matter of approach, I actually think that my historical training has informed my journalism more than vice versa. I write a very different kind of journalism now than I think I would
have been able to without the historical training, and no one writes alone. I was discussing this essay in great depth with my friend Rob Karl, who's a historian of Colombia, and his training is entirely historical. We both were noting how the Truth Commission report documents in a kind of similar way as a historian would, which is to kind of triangulate some other sources with what we were seeing in the Truth Commission report. Because the truth is so deeply contested in Colombia, we wanted to know: what are they drawing on to know about the truth? My journalistic training would generally include a lot more calling around interviewing people. But this was not that kind of thing, because I was really trying to write about the Truth Commission report itself. I read some Colombian newspapers, obviously to get some of the political context and talk to a couple of people informally. It doesn't have a journalistic structure in the sense that it doesn't have scenes. I am not in Bogota, sitting in the theater when the Truth Commission report was being presented (as much as I wish I could have been there). I was not there, so it's. It's a kind of different animal. It's neither scholarship nor entirely journalism.
Bridgette: Could you give us a brief overview of what the report is and what its goals are in a few sentences?
Nolan: The importance of the Truth Commission Report can't really be overstated. These are hugely important documents that tend to come out of post-conflict situations. It was one requirement of the historic peace accord between the FARC, the long-standing guerril-
la army in the Americas, and the Colombian Government, that this report would be produced so as to make that clear one of the demands of the FARC. One of the demands of the guerrilla organization, before they would agree to sign the peace accord with the Colombian Government, was that a report would be created in an unbiased fashion to catalog, not just the crimes of FARC against the civilian population, but also the crimes of the military and the state against the civilian population. FARC wanted it on record that they were not the only perpetrators of violence in the conflict, as they knew very well. And now it says in the Truth Commission report, the majority of killings of civilians and other crimes were committed by the State forces or paramilitary groups that were directly linked to the state. It took a huge team of not just the Truth Commissioners, but a lot of researchers to go around the country and interview people, creating an enormous bank of interviews that are now part of the historical record. This is going to be hugely important for victims' families’ questions about repara-
tions and more. On the other hand, it's incomplete because there are still groups that are fighting. FARC is not the only guerilla group in Colombia. There's a splinter group of FARC that wants to continue to fight, although they've said they will come to terms with the new leftwing Colombian President. There's the ELN, which is a group that has also said they'll come to terms with it. As hugely important as the Truth Commission report is, the conflict goes on. So it's a little bit difficult to say exactly what the impact of the report will be because this is not a conflict that is over yet.
Bridgette: While doing initial research on this topic, were there any historical comparisons that could be made? How does this report measure up to similar reports?
Nolan: This Truth Commission report measures up in the first instance at an enormous length. It is much longer than other Truth Commission reports, and that's significant because it's not just an account of what happened and who died. It's an account of the environ-
mental damage that was done. It's an account of specific violence that was perpetrated against the LGBTQ community, against women, against minors. It's just enormously long in a way that other Truth Commission reports from Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina, South Africa, among others, have been criticized. Counting the deaths is hugely important. I would never say that it's not. That was the main function of those Truth Commission reports, and those are numbers that people in Guatemala, for example where the history of the Civil War is highly politicized, people on the left, in particular, can point to the Truth Commission Report and say the UN Back Truth Commission report found that this many people died. That is hugely, politically important to be able to do in Guatemala, so I am criticizing the lack of information about other crimes. But I want to be clear that the Truth Commission reports are hugely important for what they did manage to do, which was already heroic. The
Colombian case goes to another level of discussing environmental damage and sexual violence crimes against children, crimes against LGBTQIA communities I mean. It's just – there's also a museum, there's an archive. It's clear that the Truth Commission Report wants to be so much more than words on a page. It wants to be a teaching tool. It wants to be a permanent archive. It wants to be a kind of ongoing impetus to construct a better society in Colombia. I found it difficult to read because it's so huge. It can be sort of difficult to access, but particularly if you're looking for information about a geographical region or a kind of crime or an event, it's extremely complete and easy to use in that sense. If you're trying to get an overview of what happened, it's maybe not the best place to start.
Bridgette: Do you think there will be other forms of reconciliation as the conflict develops, and potentially comes to a conclusion?
Nolan: If you carefully read what I wrote about the Colombian Truth Commission Report, I think some of my discomfort with the reconciliation meetings might come through. That said, who is it for me to say if the victims want to be involved in those reconciliation processes? I think it's wonderful that that avenue has been opened for them. Some of the victims have found it enormously cathartic to speak to the perpetrators who killed people in their family or made them suffer other harms. Other victims have found it maddening and frustrating that they're asked to appear with these people. There's a wide variety of reactions to those encounters from comfort to discomfort, and the encounters are just one possibility of reconciliation. Reconciliation is a long-term project that is not something that the Truth Commission can snap their fingers and guarantee. So am I in favor of reconciliation? Yes, because like anyone else, I want Colombia to be a place where people can disagree without violence. That's the ideal in most societies. Do I think that the victims who don't necessarily agree with all the reconciliation pressures and processes that they are part of have a point? I do. So, I'm sympathetic, but who am I? My role is more as a translator in that sense: reading something, translating a context rather than giving my opinion, which I don't think in this case is particularly valuable.
Bridgette: What is the significance of the government working with the FARC guerrillas to conceive this report? Will we increasingly see peace agreements between govern-
ments and nonstate actors?
Nolan: I think we're gonna have to [accept the increase in peace agreements between governments and nonstate actors], because in most of the long-burning civil wars around the world, it's not like the U.S. Civil War where one part seceded. It's two so-called governments fighting each other… It's more often a guerilla force or a separatist group that wants to form its own country. I think the answer is: Yes, you have to. You're going to have to see peace processes with non-state actors. We've seen that before, famously in El Salvador. At the end of the peace process, there is FMLN, which was formerly a guerrilla group and transitioned into a political party that is now widely accepted. We've seen that in Northern Ireland as well. So there are other examples of guerrilla forces or insurgent forces kind of using peace processes to enter traditional electoral politics. But in this case, the conflict was so long, and the animosity is so great that it's been kind of extraordinary to see FARC sit down with the government
Bridgette: If these peace processes are politically crucial, do you foresee any socio-cultural struggles or fallout in pursuing these peace processes?
Nolan: There already is a struggle in Colombia over whether the Truth Commission is true. There are already significant sectors of the right-wing on the political side in Colombia, who say that the Truth Commission Report overestimates the crimes of the government and underestimates the crimes
of the FARC, despite the fact that the Truth Commission Report is extremely well-researched with the participation of people from across the political spectrum. I just want to be clear: those complaints are not true. However, it's a political and social reality in Colombia that not everyone accepts the Truth Commission report that was produced. The most obvious example of the social transmission of Colombia is the recent election of Gustavo Petro, who is himself a former guerrilla fighter. He was an armed member of M19. That would almost be inconceivable right before the peace process, because before the pre-peace process any person who was vaguely leftish, left-esque could be tagged as a Communist and sort of sidelined. So having a left-wing President and Colombia is a huge change, and he was elected by a coalition of student activists, environmental activists, Afro-Colombian activists, and young people a quite broad coalition.
Bridgette: The 27th issue of the International Relations Review is called “Perspectives on Power”. How do this report and your research shift the perspective that we have on the memory and contextualization of history?
Nolan: Who has power? When? Why, you know, when does it flip? Who can grab power in different ways? It gets you to economic questions. It gets you the political questions, the social questions, the racial questions. It's often about power and money. So in this case, I see the Truth Commission report as flipping the usual power
configuration and in a really interesting way, because the victims who were telling their stories to the Truth Commissioners, and those who were doing the research were often from rural areas where many Afro-Colombians and Indigenous Colombians were. That's something we haven't mentioned in this interview. There were huge harms committed against Indigenous Colombians, and they were able to say their piece. And now their account of what happened during the Colombian conflict has been elevated to the level of official truth, because a Truth Commission report is about making a claim to official truth. That's their version, and that's been the accepted version of Colombia for a long time. That's really being questioned by the Truth Commission report, and the just official in the form of being a Truth Commission report going out and interviewing people allows that power flip to happen because it's not as if Afro-Colombians and Indigenous Colombians and women and children have not been telling us all along what was happening. This conflict has gone on for 60 years. We knew very well, but the NGOs, the women's groups, they did not have that level of power to be able to say, “This is the narrative. This is what happened. These are the harms.” And they didn't have the level of organization to kind of make the account and give the definitive percentages for the far committed. Yet, the army and paramilitary groups both admitted to many massacres, and that's hugely important. So I see the Truth Commission report as a kind of really necessary power flip.
With the diverse population and backgrounds of Africa, African countries and their various societal structures demand a strong analytical lens to truly understand the sources of power throughout the region.
The following articles use this analytical lens to explore, examine, and critique a variety of African leadership structures. Two articles focus on how global powers, the European Union and the United Nations, have influenced specific African societies, for better and for worse. Another takes a more domestic view of power within Africa, with an analysis of leadership in Rwandan politics. While these articles analyze different styles of African leadership and power, the topics of these articles cannot be determined as unrelated. Themes of security, rebellion, and international influence ring throughout each piece, illustrating the subtle interconnectedness of the African continent. The following articles will add to the story of African leadership, in order to determine how power can demonstrate itself, and the potential consequences of that demonstration.
I thank my team for their hard work this semester in covering these challenging topics. We hope that you enjoy reading this edition’s Africa section.
Africa
by Bella Newell edited by Lenny Adonteng and Libby Egan
In April of 2022, Rwandan President Paul Kagame arrived in Uganda. It was his first official trip to the country in four years, and his presence signaled a noticeably positive shift in UgandaRwanda relations. 1 However, Uganda was not the only country that saw a state visit from Kagame that month. In that same period, he also made state trips to Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Jamaica, Barbados, and Senegal. 2 In the months since, he has ventured outside of the continent to Singapore, Belize, and the United Kingdom. While many politicians choose to spend time gaining support from their constituents, Kagame has looked abroad, making collective endorsements part of his modus operandi. This level of international travel is excessive, even for a world leader, but it has become a trademark of Kagame’s rule. Despite this, he retains a strong hold on Rwanda, regularly winning elections with 98 to 99 percent of the popular vote. 3 Therein lies a phenomenon that requires further investigation: how does Kagame’s pursuit for legitimacy abroad support his power brokering at home?
A quick Google search will not paint a clear picture of Kagame. By all accounts, he is a deeply complex man, one whose very existence is bathed in controversy and contradictions. He was born in the late 1950s to a wealthy Tutsi family, but after the 1959 Rwandan Revolution, he and his family fled to Uganda. 4 There, he was raised in a refugee camp alongside hundreds of thousands of other Tutsis, where he would remain for the majority of his adolescent life. During his time in Uganda, he joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which began as a Tutsi refugee organization, but became increasingly militaristic. 5 Eventually, the RPF planned an invasion
of the country, which led to the 1990 Rwandan Civil War. By this time, Kagame was a well-known leader in the RPF, and he played a major role in the fighting. After several years, a ceasefire was signed, but the agreement eventually proved void when the President of Rwanda was assassinated, precipitating the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. Following the genocide, the RPF transitioned from a fighting force to a political party, and Kagame quickly climbed the ranks. He was appointed Vice President, but it was largely understood that he controlled country policy from behind the scenes. 6 When the President began to be pushed out of power by the RPF, Kagame quickly took his place. 7 At the time Rwanda was still under a transitional constitution, which saw Kagame nominated and elected not by the popular vote, but by the government and Transitional National Assembly. 8 He was then sworn into office on April 22, 2000. At the time of writing, he has been in office for over twenty-two years.
His twenty-two year tenure is full of contradictions. On one hand, Kagame has been praised internationally for his economic planning, which has allowed Rwanda to develop at a rapid pace. To this end, the indicators speak for themselves. Rwanda is the only designated low-income country in the world to place on the World Bank Doing Business Index top 30. 9 The country’s Human Development Index score grew 199% from 1990 to 2019. 10 In 2018 alone, Rwanda’s Development Board registered 2 billion dollars in foreign investments. 11 Despite dips in progress created by the Covid-19 pandemic, Kagame’s economic success has been indisputable. He’s also been applauded for his ability to maintain peace in the country, a feat which many thought would be impossible in the long term because of the 1994 genocide. This partially stems from his background (as a Tutsi and a ranking member of the RPD, Kagame was credited widely as a key “savior” of Rwanda after the conflict) and partially from his ability to keep Rwanda incredibly economically stable. There are almost no wide scale conflicts,
ethnic based or otherwise, within the country today. 12 At large, many Rwandans believe the historic wounds between the Tutsi and Hutu groups have been healed, and they credit Kagame for bringing about this lasting peace. While Kagame’s economic pursuits and peacekeeping attempts have been praised, he has been criticized widely for his disrespect and flagrant disregard of democratic practices in Rwanda. He has used his control over the National Electoral Commission to block many opposition leaders from running against him in the national elections; those who are not officially barred are frequently intimidated through violence or even jail time. 13 Diane Rwigara, who ran against Kagame in 2017, was arrested on charges of forgery and tax evasion shortly after the end of the election. 14 Although she was later acquitted, her case is representative of a trend with Kagame, wherein potential opposition leaders are jailed on trumped up charges before they can ever gain enough power to truly challenge his authority. 15 While elections do occur, they are not free, with frequent ballot stuffing and vote denying being seen by international observers. 16 Media is also heavily repressed, and radio stations, television networks, and newspapers all face government retaliation and intimidation. 17 The government has also been accused of offering bribes to social media bloggers to promote positive news stories and hacking social media sites to find political dissidents. 18 Public gatherings, which were already restricted preCOVID-19 pandemic, are monitored by police and
frequently broken up. Torture, unlawful detention, and disappearances perpetuated by the Rwandan government have also been reported. 19
Perhaps his most obvious skirting of democratic norms is his rewriting of Rwanda’s constitution, which allowed him to legally stay in power for 15 years longer than had previously been permitted. Prior to his changes, the constitution had specifically outlined a two term limit for Presidents (individual terms are seven years), meant to prevent the overreaches of power seen during Belgian colonization or the pre-genocide government. In 2015, however, Kagame challenged these limits and brought forth a successful constitutional amendment which shortened individual terms to five years and extended his eligibility to run until 2034. This amendment, which was approved through a public referendum, is a type of constitutional maneuvering unfortunately common in African governments, with similar actions having already taken place in both Burundi and Uganda. 20 In using Rwanda’s constitution and so-called “democratic” processes to maintain his own power, Kagame has joined the club of African leaders who hide their autocratic tendencies under egalitarian pretenses. By all accounts, his obvious failures have barely impacted his international or domestic standing.
This is not to say that he hasn’t been criticized domestically or internationally. The accounts of governmental abuse outlined in this piece are widely known in the political and academic world, and Kagame has come under fire from many of the very leaders he’s visited. In August, U.S Secretary of State Antony Blinken criticized Kagame to his face while on a state trip in Kigali, stating that Kagame “underscored
[the U.S governments] concerns about the lack of fair trial guarantees” in Rwanda. 21 Exiled Rwandans frequently warn international audiences that Kagame’s reign is as ruthless as it is prosperous. 22 Reputable human rights agencies and reporting services, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, release reputable reports yearly about the dangers of opposing the RPF. 23 Despite criticizing him, international audiences still show up in droves to create preferable deals with the Rwandan government, and frequently praise the ease of doing business in the country. 24 All the while, Kagame flies around the world, engaging in trade talks with high income and low income countries alike, and displaying his Rwandan “miracle” for all to see.
Although it may seem contradictory, Kagame’s multilateral initiatives represent the cornerstone of his (and many African leaders’) strategy to stay in power: the pursuit of legitimacy. His desire for recognition presents a classic political struggle, where in order to remain in power, politicians must be seen as legitimate rulers of their constituents. Although traditional political philosophy tells us that that recognition must come from members of the state, the development of the international order has created a space to supersede this mandate. Today, instead of obtaining support from constituents, all a leader needs to do is lobby for support from the international community to be recognized as the “true leader”. In specific terms, all a country needs is the ardent support of one of the five permanent members on the United Nations Security Council. 25 With this backing, they are able to shield themselves from any true international instigation or intervention. 26 If they also control all of the state’s force apparatuses, they essentially cut off all
challenges to their rule on both levels.
Cutting off these international challenges is Kagame’s biggest goal, and it is one he has accomplished fantastically. His extended term in power and international recognition has allowed him to transform into more than just an office holder: he symbolizes Rwanda itself. By tying his personal identity so closely to that of the state (and by extension, its successes), he makes himself nearly impenetrable to criticism. For many, the uncertainty and instability of what life would look like without Kagame is enough motivation to want him in power indefinitely. This logic, which is frequently used by monarchies, is striking. In a country like Rwanda, where the stakes of instability are known by all, stability (even with repression) is the chief priority.
Kagame couples this posturing in a way many cannot: by being useful. Rwanda’s economic growth alone has made it a favorable trade partner of many high income countries, but Kagame has also worked to make himself strategically indispensable. One of the ways he does this is by skirting the line between his alliances with the West and other authoritarian regimes, namely China. Kagame is an open ally and collaborator with China, and has frequently spoken about the importance of the country on the continent. 27 Rwanda has also been a major recipient of funding through China’s Belt and Road Initiative and other preferential trade deals; in 2019 the Chinese government built a 27 million dollar government complex in Kigali as a “gift” for the Rwanda
government. 28 In many other contexts, this level of cooperation and connection may discourage efforts for the West. In Rwanda, it has only empowered Western countries to pursue even closer relationships with Rwanda. In an international sphere where bloc politics make the “winning” of African allies more important than ever, countries like the United States and United Kingdom see Rwanda as vital to their strategic interests. By playing both sides of each other, Kagame effectively insulates himself on the international stage.
President Paul Kagame is an all encompassing figure, and one whose legacy is not easily describable. His presidential resume is impressive on all accounts, and he has the growth and stability of Rwanda to show for it. Perhaps what stands out most about Kagame is not his mastery of development or even his extensive record of human rights abuses. Instead, it is his ability to grab power and keep hold of it for as long as possible.
By politically maneuvering the international community and manipulating internal Rwandan practices, he’s been able to effectively cushion himself from any threats to his regime. So when the next Rwandan election comes in 2024, he will likely walk away with another 98 or 99 percent win. In an environment so shrouded from criticism, the only thing that may be able to unravel him is the one thing countries refuse to give up: their alliances with Rwanda and legitimization of Kagame’s rule.
1 Al Jazeera, “Rwanda’s Kagame in Uganda on Rare Visit as Ties Warm,” News | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, April 24, 2022).
2 Moses K. Gahigi, “Kagame in Charm Offensive to Expand List of Trade Allies,” Rwanda Today (Rwanda Today, April 25, 2022).
3 Jason Burke, “Paul Kagame Re-Elected President with 99% of Vote in Rwanda Election,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, August 5, 2017).
4 Colin M. Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2004).
5 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s Rebirth and the MAN WHO Dreamed It (Hoboken, N.J: Wiley, 2008).
6 Antonio Cascais, “20 Years under Rwanda’s ‘Benevolent Dictator’ Paul Kagame: DW: 17.04.2020,” DW.COM (Deutsche Welle, April 17, 2020)
7 Prunier Gérard, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
8 Ibid.
9 Daniel Nzohabonimana, “What Makes Rwanda One of Africa’s Fastest Growing Economies?,” What makes Rwanda one of Africa’s fastest growing economies? (TRT World, January 18, 2019).
10 Maxwell Gomera, “Opinion: Other Countries Can Learn from Rwanda’s Development Metrics,” Devex (Devex).
11 Ibid.
12 Iaccino, L. (2015) ‘Rwandan President Paul Kagame third term bid: Millions want constitution changed “only for Kagame”’, International Business Times.
13 Freedom House, “Rwanda: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report,” Freedom House (Freedom House), accessed October 4, 2022
14 Burke, Jason. “Rwandan Who Challenged President Faces 22 Years in Jail as Trial Opens.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 7 Nov. 2018
15 Reuters Staff. “Rwanda Jails Opposition Figures for 7-12 Years for ‘Conspiracy’.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 24 Jan. 2020
16 Ibid
17 Human Rights Watch. “Human Rights Watch Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Rwanda.” Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch, 28 Oct. 2020
18 Mudge, Lewis. “What Press Freedom Looks like in Rwanda.” Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch, 3 May 2021
19 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” U.S Department of State (U.S Department of State, 2021)
20 George Omandi, “The New Assault on Presidential Term Limits in Africa: Focus on Burundi,” African Leadership Centre (African Leadership Centre ), accessed October 4, 2022
21 News Wires, “Blinken Raises Concerns on Rights in Rwanda during Talks with Kagame,” France 24 (France 24, August 11, 2022)
22 Hereward Holland, “Kagame’s Former Allies Warn of Rwanda Violence,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, September 9, 2010)
23 “World Report 2022: Rights Trends in Rwanda,” Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, January 13, 2022)
24 Anjan Sundaram et al., “Rwanda: The Darling Tyrant,” POLITICO Magazine, accessed October 4, 2022
25 Strand, Jonathan R., and David P. Rapkin. “Weighted Voting in the United Nations Security Council.” Simulation & Gaming 42, no. 6 (2011): 772-802.
26 Benard, Alexander, and Paul J. Leaf. “Modern threats and the United Nations Security Council: no time for complacency (a response to Professor Allen Weiner).” Stanford Law Review 62, no. 5 (2010): 1395+.
27 Eric Olander, “Paul Kagame: ‘I Don’t Think China Has Forced Any Country in Africa to Take Their Money,’” The China Global South Project, February 4, 2021
28 Stephen Paduano, “China’s Investments in Rwanda Raise Familiar Questions about Debt,” The Atlantic (Atlantic Media Company, August 5, 2019)
At the edge of the Sahara Desert, a physical barrier dividing the distinct geographies and identities of the deserts of the Middle Eastern linked North Africa from the more tropical fertile lands of the sub-Saharan continent, lies the Sahel region. Sitting at the crossroads of these contrasting cultural influences, the Sahel is a semi-arid geographical belt just below the Sahara Desert spanning east to west across the continent that includes the countries Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. 1 In Arabic, the very name of this region means “shore” or “coast,” furthering the idea that the Sahel holds a significant geopolitical position at the edge of the Sahara. 2 This geographical, political, and economic role is best displayed in the Sahel’s responsibility as an important stop on the historical transSaharan trade route, an “extensive trade network” that spanned the Sahara Desert and connected sub-Saharan Africa to the important trade routes accessed via the countries bordering the Mediterranean coast. 3 Not only did these networks allow for the transportation of goods across far reaching areas of Africa, they also facilitated interaction amongst different individuals, cultures, and languages, helping to establish connections amongst the population of Africa more broadly. Despite this rich history and culture, the arrival of colonial powers and European trading companies in the nineteenth century disrupted
these established connections, with drastic impacts on the region’s stability and prosperity. The European powers not only enacted unsustainable policies of extraction but also contributed to disparate economic development, as they inconsistently built up the infrastructure of areas of the Sahel that best served their interests. 4 Unfortunately, the legacy of this colonial period did not disappear with the independence movements of the 1960s with prosperity continuing to escape the countries of the Sahel. Over the last decade in particular, the Sahel has experienced a period of intense instability and volatility stemming from both physical and social threats that seems far from resolution. Already susceptible to extreme weather given its desert location, ongoing drought has left the Sahel’s food infrastructure weak.
Climate scientists with the National Academy of Sciences have forecasted that as the effects of climate change progress over the coming years, the Sahelian countries will experience further dramatic environmental changes. 5 Principally, the predicted changes to precipitation levels and increased average temperatures will leave the already fragile agroecosystem of the region, as well as the food security and living conditions of locals, threatened. 6 This, in combination with projections estimating that the region’s population will more than double by 2050, point to an environmental crisis on the horizon for the countries in the Sahel, as the physical environment will soon be unable to
support its future population. 7
The social situation across the Sahel similarly does not bear much hope. Social scientists have described a “perfect storm” in the region where “expanding extremist networks and the multiplication of criminal gangs in a deteriorating socio-economic environment” have resulted in almost a decade of closely linked instability across the nations of the Sahel. 8 The epicenter of what the United Nations (UN) has termed ‘The Sahel Conflict’ lies in Mali, where the social fallout from the insurgency that the country experienced in 2012 continues to be felt domestically and within its neighboring countries of Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania.
The 2012 uprising began when a separatist movement amongst the Tuareg minority, a nomadic ethnic community that had historically been alienated from mainstream Malian politics, was able to successfully establish control over an area in the country’s north as their demands for selfdetermination grew. 9 This movement was initially supported by Islamist militant groups. However, ideological disagreements saw the extremist groups shifting their focus to more radical attempts at gaining territory and influence in the region. 10
The strategy of Islamists in the Sahel took on a similar nature to the methods of the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) and their attempts to declare
a recognised anti-Western Islamic state. These militant groups have wreaked havoc throughout the Sahel, taking advantage of weak political institutions and informal social infrastructures to undermine governmental control through “repeatedly target[ing] communities and national institutions [with] coordinated attacks”. 11 Some of the major Jihadist organisations present on the ground have included Al-Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM), its affiliate Jama'at Nasr alIslam wal Muslimin (JMNI), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Niger concentrated Boko Haram. Inter-fighting and contradictory aims amongst these groups have added yet another layer to the chaos they bring, heightening the overall volatility of the situation and making it an extremely violent and unsafe region for the civilian population. This instability continues to characterize the political landscape of the Sahel today, with solutions to the regional crisis appearing more and more distant as the conflict drags on. In May 2021, Mali experienced a military coup against the transitional civilian government that had taken over the year earlier, marking the fifth coup the nation has experienced since independence in 1960 and clearly highlighting the weakness of the political structures in the region. 12 This extremely precarious combination of weak infrastructure, undercut by terror and criminal organisations have, and continue to, render it almost impossible for concentrated efforts towards political progress in the Sahel to achieve any kind of success to date.
One of the most detrimental outcomes of this regional conflict has been the displacement of civilians and the subsequent refugee crisis that has emerged. The lack of structured governance across the Sahel has left “livelihood insecurity” abundant, with increasing weather extremity due to climate change making resources and the chances for economic growth limited. 13 In addition, the lack of trust in weak governmental institutions means that citizens and criminal organizations commonly resort to violence to solve disputes. 14 These factors, in combination with the targeted attacks against civilians by extremist groups, have left many seeking a more prosperous life elsewhere in other areas of the African continent, or, towards the Mediterranean and the routes to Europe it provides. 15 As of August 2022, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that approximately three million individuals have been internally displaced within the Sahel, representing a portion of the five million total population that the UNHCR classifies as being at risk of displacement as a result of this crisis. 16 The extent of this crisis has classified it as one of the worst forced migration events facing our world at the moment, indicating that the situation in the Sahel is far more significant than just a regional African conflict.
The breadth of this ongoing political emergency has led to the involvement of a variety of external actors. International assistance has been present on the ground in the Sahel since 2011, with varying aims of strengthening political institutions, establishing robust infrastructure to address environmental issues, and anti-terrorist missions attempting to prevent the spread of influence of extremist groups in the region. 17 These task forces originate from varied sources with different goals, and as such, coordination across them has been relatively difficult. Internationally, the UN has led the charge with a peacekeeping mission titled the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MUNISMA), which, as of October 2022, deploys approximately 17,000 personnel to the Sahel. 18 France, with its colonial ties to Mali, has played another large role in the international community with Operation Barkhane, a counterterrorist mission that saw approximately 4,000 troops deployed. 19 In a recent development, President Macron announced in February 2021
that France would be withdrawing their troops from Mali given a communication and cooperation breakdown between Paris and Bamako. 20 It remains unclear what the effect of this withdrawal will be, but as this decision is carried out and French troops continue to be removed from the conflict, the outcomes will begin to reveal themselves. More locally, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) have utilised strategic policies to promote stability in the region. These actions have been supported by the efforts of G5 Sahel, an organisation involving the leaders of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, and the G5 Sahel Force, a counterterrorism security force created by the organisation in 2017 to fight militant groups across the region. 21
It would be impossible to discuss external actors in the Sahel without acknowledging the significant role that the EU has played in the trajectory of the conflict. The attentiveness of the EU to the Sahel crisis can be traced to the fact that the region theoretically constitutes a part of the EU’s southern geopolitical border. Therefore, Europe has direct personal interest in restoring stability to the countries of the Sahel, promoting regional peace, and in turn, minimizing the migration of refugees north towards the European continent. 22 Social scientists have concluded that European involvement in the Sahel has been largely “driven by those issues that the Union sees as most relevant for itself: crime, terrorism and migration.” 23 Looking closer at the EU’s policy in this region provides interesting insight into an intersection of two pillars of Europe’s foreign
policy, both in their normative responsibility to encourage peace in their political ‘neighbourhood’, as well as their desire to maintain strong border security and minimise external forces intruding on domestic European peace. Evaluating the strategic policies of the EU in the Sahel illuminates how these actions have been able to change the landscape of the current crisis, and delivers informed guidance into potential solutions that may exist for the future role of the EU in the Sahel region.
The EU involvement in the Sahel began in September 2011 when the European Union published their Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (SSDS), outlining the pillars of their aims in the region. The EU’s strategy focused on building robust “development processes” and the “promotion of good governance” as a way to tackle the region’s poverty and allow “conditions for economic opportunity and human development”. 24 However, a key conclusion outlined in the document was that this could only be achieved in a sustainable way if the weak security infrastructure of the Sahelian countries was similarly strengthened. This led to the EU adopting a “comprehensive approach,” addressing the Sahel conflict in terms of both state development and security strengthening. 25 Further, actions were undertaken by the EU following this document’s formulation. This included the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM), a military training mission established in 2013 where EU forces were deployed to provide “military and training advice to the Malian Armed Forces operating under the control of legitimate civilian authorities”. 26 The EU Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali (EUCAP) laid out similar goals when it was created in 2014. EUCAP aimed to assist “internal security forces in reasserting the State authority” through “improving operational efficacy, re-establishing their respective hierarchical chains, [and] reinforcing the role of judicial and administrative authorities”. 27 These programs continue to hold significance in regard to EU foreign policy as they are repeatedly extended well past their original time frames. Most recently, in 2021, the EUCAP mission and its associated budget was extended until 2023, just under a decade from its predicted
end date of 2014. 28 In April 2021, the Council of the EU also released a revised strategic policy titled the ‘EU’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel’. This updated plan of action echoed many of the goals laid out in the SSDS, concluding that the Union’s continued efforts “reflect Europe's commitment to peace, security, stabilisation and the protection of civilians in the Sahel”. 29 While similar to earlier releases, this latest strategic document provides the most current version of the EU stance on the Sahel and similarly indicates that this crisis remains a relevant topic for the Union’s position in the international community. With each of these missions, weighty goals for a peaceful solution to the Sahel conflict are outlined. However, it is important to consider the underlying EU interests built into these strategies and evaluate whether or not these grand aims are actually met.
The recent decade has dramatically put to test the EU’s immigration policies and willingness to accept refugees. For European policymakers, the rise of terrorist groups and violence across the Sahel from 2011 pointed to another source of displaced individuals that could potentially seek refuge in Europe or allow for the further spread of terrorism that could internally affect the European continent. 30 Despite these clear motivations for the EU to address the displacement that has accompanied the Sahel crisis, the new Integrated Strategy release refers only twice to the issue of migration. The strategic document concludes that “poverty creates inherent instability that can impact on uncontrolled migratory flows” and that moving forward, the EU and its domestic partners in Africa must “continue to promote fruitful cooperation in the area of migration, based on the constructive partnerships established in recent years”. 31 Neither of these statements directly address the dramatic impact the migration patterns caused by conflict in the Sahel could have on the EU. However, the emphasis and effort placed into building the security capabilities of the countries in this region can be interpreted as an implicit effort by the EU to address the imagined threat of refugees. The foundations of the Union’s two main missions in the Sahel, the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and EU Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali (EUCAP), have both been structured largely
towards building the capacity of state security as a method for achieving peace rather than alternative, more civilian focused strategies. In reference to the EUCAP mission, an interview conducted through the Netherlands Institute of International Relations with an unnamed EU member nation diplomat concluded that although “migration [would] not be the main issue in this cooperation, it is the main motivation for the EU”, indicating the true incentive for these security focused task forces. 32 Researchers at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs define this as an example of the EU’s “principled pragmatism” whereby the Union is able to use the normative European values of promoting democracy and peace, but in a way that allows them to promote their own interests overseas. 33
While these self-interested aims behind the EU’s actions in the Sahel are not negative in themselves, given that they represent a state-like organization acting to ensure its own interests abroad, the lack of concrete outcomes from the EU involvement indicates that this strategy may be coming at the expense of actual resolutions in the Sahel. Italian security experts Luca Raineri and Alessandro Rossi state that the EU’s focusing
of funds towards strengthening border security and preventing illegal migratory flows have at times “come at the cost of ongoing and planned development activities” and similarly have “decreased the flexibility and the availability of aid funding for development cooperation”. 34 This sentiment is echoed by Erol Yayboke, Director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies’ Project for Fragility, who argues that “hard security approaches and greater barriers to migration may stop people from migrating the way they used to, but they also push them into more dangerous irregular routes”. 35 This highlights the potential that the EU’s focus on security in the Sahel has for further endangering civilians rather than helping them to find more stability.
In tracing the outcomes of immigration away from crisis areas in Africa, previous research has concluded that overseas migration may actually be a way to promote domestic development given that the wealth accrued by these individuals can “contribute significantly to the sustenance of communities at home” through personal networks. 36 This challenges the EU’s policy of clamping down on and strengthening firm borders
in the Sahel as a way to build lasting stability in the region given that more flexible approaches seem to be more effective for local civilians. If the EU was really interested in promoting peace for the Sahel perhaps they would be more open to these alternative strategies. Echoing a similar sentiment, researchers have concluded that the European “imposed criminalisation of migration” has impacted local dynamics forcing previous movement throughout the region underground, increasing the vulnerability of migrants to exploitation by criminal and terrorist networks. 37 A press release published on June 30, 2020 by the European Council stated that helping to ensure a “prosperous, peaceful and resilient Africa is an essential EU foreign policy objective”. 38 As such, the EU needs to reshape their strategy in the Sahel to reflect this aim. This does not mean that they must throw out all self-interest. But if they are to achieve these kinds of goals, they must recognise how their current methods may have effectively protected their own interests, while simultaneously continuing to fail to create meaningful change in the Sahel.
1 Musilli, Pietro, and Patrick Smith, “The Lawless Roads: An Overview of Turbulence Across the Sahel,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, June 10, 2013, 1.
2 Lang, Matt, Trans-Saharan Trade Routes, Routes of Crosscultural Exchange, New York: Cavendish Square, 2018, 5.
3 Ibid, 5.
4 Ibid, 80.
5 Defrance, Dimitri et al., “Consequences of Rapid Ice Sheet Melting on the Sahelian Population Vulnerability,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS 114, no. 25 (2017): 6533.
6 Defrance et al., “Consequences of Rapid Ice Sheet Melting on the Sahelian Population Vulnerability,” 6535.
7 Graves, Alisha et al., “Avert Catastrophe Now in Africa's Sahel.” Nature (London) 575, no. 7782 (2019): 282.
8 Wilén, Nina, “A Logic of Its Own: The External Presence in the Sahel,” ARI Publication, no. 132 (2020).
9 “Instability in Mali,” Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2022.
10 Ibid.
11 “Integration for Impact: Interpol and the G5 Sahel,” Interpol, May 2020.
12 “Instability in Mali,” Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2022.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid
15 Adeyemi S Badewa, and Mulugeta F Dinbabo, “Irregular Migration and Regional Security Complex in the Sahel-Lake Chad Corridor: A Human Security Discourse,” Ìrìnkèrindò, no. 12 (2021): 4.
16 United Nations, “Situation Sahel: Coordination Platform for
Forced Displacements in Sahel,” United Nations Operational Data Portal Refugee Situations, September 30, 2022.
17 Bymolt, Roger, and Karlijn Muiderman, “Strategies and Initiatives for Security and Development in the Sahel,” Common Fund for Commodities, 2016, 4.
18 United Nations Peacekeeping, “MINUSMA Fact Sheet,” United Nations, Accessed October 30, 2022.
19 Doxsee, Catrina, Jared Thompson, and Marielle Harris, “The End of Operation Barkhane and the Future of Counterterrorism in Mali,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, March 2, 2022.
20 Ibid.
21 “Integration for Impact: Interpol and the G5 Sahel,” Interpol, May 2020.
22 Aboulghit, Abdelkarim, “Evaluating U.S. and EU Trans Sahel Policies,” Master’s Thesis, United States Army War College (2013): 7.
23 Iso-Markku, Tuomas, and Teemu Tammikko, “The EU’s Role and Policies in the Sahel: the Need for Reassessment,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper 290 (July 28, 2020): 5.
24 Council of the European Union, Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, Brussels (July 23, 2011), 2.
25 Ibid, 2.
26 Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2013/34/ CFSP of 17 January 2013 on a European Union Military Mission to Contribute to the Training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali), Brussels (December 9, 2013): 3.
27 Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014 on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), Luxembourg (April 15, 2014): 2.
28 Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/14 of 7 January 2021 Amending Decision 2014/219/CFSP on the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), Brussels (January 7, 2021): 1.
29 Council of the European Union, The European Union’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel, Brussels (April 16, 2021): 6.
30 D'Amato, Silvia, “Patchwork of Counterterrorism: Analyzing European Types of Cooperation in Sahel,” International Studies Review 23, no. 4 (2021): 1520.
31 Council of the European Union, The European Union’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel, 3 & 15.
32 Van der Lijn, Jaïr, “For the Long Run: A Mapping of Migration-related Activities in the Wider Sahel Region,” Clingendael Institute Report, January 2017, 6.
33 Iso-Markku and Tammikko, “The EU’s Role and Policies in the Sahel: the Need for Reassessment,” 5.
34 Raineri, Luca, and Alessandro Rossi, “The SecurityMigration-Development Nexus in the Sahel: A Reality Check,” Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 1, 2017, 9.
35 Yayboke, Erol, and Rakan Aboneaaj, “Peril in the Desert: Irregular Migration through the Sahel,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, October 21, 2020.
36 Raineri and Rossi, “The Security-Migration-Development Nexus in the Sahel: A Reality Check,” Istituto Affari Internazionali, 7.
37 D'Amato, Silvia, “Patchwork of Counterterrorism: Analyzing European Types of Cooperation in Sahel,” 1527.
38 Council of the European Union. “On the Path to a Deeper and Stronger Partnership, Living Up to the European and African Aspirations: Council Adopts Conclusions on Africa.” Council of the EU Press Release, June 30, 2020.
Maps by: An PhamTo many struggling nations across the globe, the sight of a blue helmet decorated with the large white letters “U” and “N” is a symbol of hope: a vow of safety and a sign that help has come with a mission of peace restoration within a conflict-ridden region. It is a symbol representing one of the strongest multi-national organizations in the world. However, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the opposite sentiments are associated with the blue helmets of the UN peacekeepers. The blue helmets are characterized by empty promises; they represent the failure of peacekeeping and furtherment of existing malcontent.
For decades, the United Nations has funded missions within the Democratic Republic of the Congo to combat inter-communal violence and terrorism that constantly threatens the nation and its livelihood. The rhetoric of their efforts as peacekeeping missions grows increasingly more ironic as the UN logs each day of continued presence in the DRC. In 2022, armed conflict intensified within the DRC, and with it, anti-UN sentiments. Pre-existing United Nations efforts to establish peace in the Congo date back to the year 2000, when peacekeeping efforts were initially approved by the United Nations. 1 Since then, progress has been the furthest thing from linear, as increased UN presence has inversely aggravated
existing tensions. Distrust of the UN within the DRC grows daily, as the disconnect between UN attempts at stimulating peace and the needs of the Congolese people grows larger.
The current peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is known by its acronym, “MONUSCO.”, officially titled, “Mission de l’Organisation des Nations pour la stabilisation en RD Congo” (The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 2 MONUSCO was originally founded in July 2010 to protect civilians from humanitarian crime and protect democracy within the nation. 3 Since then, the mission has been extended several times, with the most recent security report extending the mission to December 2022. 4 As December quickly approaches, and UN efforts show little to no hope for ensuring peace and stability, the failures of MONUSCO allude to the larger issue of growing distrust and anger towards the UN from both citizens of the DRC and Congolese government officials.
The Democratic Republic of Congo has been historically regarded as one of the African nations most impacted by European colonization. Belgium’s conquest of the Congo resulted in the deaths of 20 million Congolese, and effects of colonization are ever-present in Congolese politics, culture,
and rebel group motives. 5 Presently, the M23 rebel group is the driving force of violence in the DRC, as well as the main combatants against the United Nations peacekeeping mission. While the DRC was still under colonial rule, Belgium forcibly resettled hundreds of thousands of Rwandans, both from the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, causing major insecurity along the Congolese-Rwandan border. 6 Conflict consumed the Congo during this period, resulting in the creation of M23’s predecessor, a Tutsi-led rebel group called National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). Following the CNDP’s violent uprisings, a peace agreement with the Congolese government was signed on March 23, 2009, and CNDP members were incorporated into the Congolese military. 7 Shortly after the peace agreement was signed, Tutsis and former CNDP members revolted from the army to form M23, a rebel group whose namesake reflects the date associated with the Congolese government’s attempt at rebel repression. 8 Motivated by a rejection of colonial residue and decades of oppression, M23 swore off further cooperation with the DRC government. The history of blurred border lines and ethnic strife were results of Belgian imperial rule, laying the foundation for M23 to rise. Today, many people, including the Congolese Security Minister Richard Muyej, argue that “M23 is another name for Rwanda. It’s all part
of Rwanda’s Machiavellian destabilisation plan of the east.” 9 Rwandan involvement in M23 efforts is apparent. Rwanda’s current president, Paul Kagame, shares the same Tutsi ethnic background as the M23 group, carrying the dark history of Tutsi-Hutu conflict with that identity. Many point to this as the cause of Rwandan interest in supporting M23. Within Rwanda, Rwandan troops have worked against rebel groups led by Rwandan Hutus, while simultaneously supplying aid to M23 and invading Eastern cities within the Kivu provinces of the DRC. 10 Since June 2022, M23, with the assistance of Rwandan troops, has committed various atrocities against Congolese civilians and military forces, concentrating most of their efforts in Eastern DRC. Since the beginning of M23’s violent efforts of rebellion, fighting between Congolese troops and M23 rebels has forced nearly 200,000 people to flee their homes. 11 M23 has committed numerous crimes against humanity, including torturing and ruthlessly murdering civilians. Typically, these acts are based on wrongful accusations that civilians were informing government troops of M23 positions. 12 Rwandan involvement with the M23 efforts increases concerns of the DRC’s security crisis, threatening the stability of the region. Félix Tshisekedi, current President of the DRC, has condemned Rwanda publicly, notably in front of the United Nations General Assembly in
September 2022. As a result, President Tshisekedi called on the UN, the African Union, and other African organizations to support efforts “increasing pressure on the M23,” in lieu of continued violence towards UN peacekeeping forces. 13 The parallels between current UN peacekeeping in the Congo and UN peacekeeping in Rwanda during the 1990 Rwandan genocide are undeniable. Similar to MONUSCO, UN intervention in Rwanda was viewed globally as a failure of the UN. The mission, called United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), was primarily composed of forces from Bangladesh and Belgium. 14 As Belgium was the colonial power that first began the ethnogeographic issue behind the genocide and civil war, Rwandans rejected Belgian intervention. Violence towards Belgian aid was targeted, as one of the largest tragedies resulted in the deaths of ten Belgian blue helmets, and a temporary hold on Belgian participation in UN peacekeeping missions. 15 As Belgian troops withdrew, and along with them other Western nations including the United States, the UN had virtually no peacekeepers active in Rwanda, leaving no force standing in the way of the genocide. Political commentators, such as Michael Lind, criticized the UN following this disaster, claiming that the UN had been, “finally and completely discredited.” 16 The wounds left from UN failures in Rwanda have still not healed, and today amplify scorn from both Rwanda and the DRC. MONUSCO is viewed as a western power similar to Belgium and UNAMIR, an organization that is again failing the region and contributing to the longevity of conflict. Furthermore, present peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo reveals the sad and under-publicized truth of the United Nations. The United Nations is typically renowned across the globe as a symbol of diplomacy and cooperation between the 193 member states, praised for its sustainable development goals, peace conferences, and aid during global crises such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic. 17 However, successes within the United Nations are mostly limited to occurring between the permanent members of the Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 18 One of the greatest accomplishments of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was
created in 1948 and approved by the UN General Assembly. 19 However, many of these countries, especially those on the Security Council, still held African colonies during this time. Those colonies were not welcomed into the United Nations until after the end of European imperialism in Africa, in 1960. 20 The integrity of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was therefore directly contradicted by the interests and actions of the United Nations. This history of the UN is foundational to the global organization, evolving into current interests of the UN. Countries outside of the General Assembly, or those that are new in comparison as UN members, do not achieve the same successful results in advancing their interests. The example of intervention in the DRC reveals this Euro-centric bias of the United Nations. As stated by Javad Miri, Iranian sociologist and professor at the Institute of Humanities and Cultural Studies, “The UN is obliged to fulfill the requirements of the U.S. and Western countries in most cases,” which leads to an inherent bias in UN priorities and peacekeeping. 21 The priorities of the United Nations contribute to the overarching issue at hand: should a Eurocentric organization be mitigating crises and advancing peace in a region distraught over Afrocentric conflict?
MONUSCO has been deemed incapable of providing aid to the DRC by most Congolese citizens, as the peace-keeping mission has contributed to the deaths of civilians and violence over conflict with M23. One of the greatest failures of MONUSCO resulted in the deaths of 36 people, consisting of four of their peacekeepers and 32 Congolese civilians from protests of anti-MONUSCO Congolese citizens in August
2022. 22 MONUSCO buildings were set on fire and vandalized as citizens “accuse[d] the mission, which has been active for more than 10 years, of failing to protect them from armed gang violence that has long plagued the region.” 23 In addressing this tragic event, MONUSCO spokesperson Mathias Gillmann stated, “We need de-escalation to happen…because both the Congolese army and we [MONUSCO] do not have scalable means, and we cannot guarantee an ultra-efficient presence everywhere at the same time.” 24 Gillmann’s statement revealed the true weakness of MONUSCO, and solidified concerns of the mission’s incapacity to protect. Furthermore, his statement was deemed by the Congolese government as “an admission of impotence.” 25 Former governor of North Kivu, Julien Paluku, stated, “For the Congolese, there is no longer any reason to keep those who say they are incapable of dealing with the rebellion.” 26
Following his remarks, Mathias Gillmann was asked by the Congolese government to leave the country. The official statement read, “The Congolese government considers the presence of this official… is not likely to promote a climate of mutual trust and calm between Congolese institutions and MONUSCO.” 27 These same sentiments have translated into demands from Congolese citizens, protestors, and political groups
for the complete withdrawal of MONUSCO from the DRC. The city of Goma’s youth branch of the ruling political party called on the government to “withdraw [MONUSCO] from Congolese soil without conditions because it has already proved its incapacity to provide us with protection.” 28 The statement was shortly followed by an anti-UN protest in June 2022, resulting in five deaths and 50 wounded in the city of Goma.
The nature of the United Nations, coupled with failing MONUSCO efforts, shape M23’s and Congolese disdain towards Western or European powers. M23 has origins in ethnic conflicts that were created by colonial powers, as Belgium initially created a ethnic hierarchy through appointing Tutsis as authoritative figures in Rwanda during their imperial rule, causing longlasting ethno-geographic conflict. 29 Ultimately, present issues of violence and terror in the DRC are direct products of colonization and insufficient reparations, an experience that is only truly understood by the Congolese and Rwandans experiencing the events and history first-hand.
To rebuild peace in the DRC, the Congolese government places primary trust and responsibility in African organizations to provide aid. Before the 75th United Nations General Assembly session, President Tshisekedi emphasized the importance of inter-regional cooperation, calling on the African Union, East African Community, and Presidents of Kenya and Angola to continue their support and aid in resisting terrorism and violence from M23 and Rwanda. 30 Cooperation between the United Nations and these African powers is vital to properly alleviate conflict between rebel groups and the DRC government, as these issues can only properly be understood and addressed by African nations themselves.
Decline in peacekeeping efforts skews the vision of a peaceful finish line in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The dark history of colonization and imperialism still remains everpresent, contributing to the perpetuity of geoethnic disputes as seen in the DRC. Anti-United Nations attitudes spread nationally, damaging the reliability and capabilities of global organizations that are meant to defend humanitarian values. The state of the DRC serves as a warning sign to the rest of the world that the livelihood of global peace is threatened if not addressed properly. Is peace viable
within the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
The intrinsic Euro-centrism of the world’s most prominent global organizations must be reformed to ensure this.
1 “Timeline - MONUSCO.” MONUSCO. United Nations. Accessed September 29, 2022. https://monusco.unmissions.org/ en/timeline.
2 “MONUSCO - À Propos.” MONUSCO. ONU, August 15, 2022. https://monusco.unmissions.org/%C3%A0-propos.
3 See footnote 9.
4 “Democratic Republic of Congo: Vote on Monusco Mandate Renewal.” Security Council Report. Security Council Report , December 19, 2021. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ whatsinblue/2021/12/democratic-republic-of-congo-vote-onmonusco-mandate-renewal.php.
5 Julien Bobineau. “Retracing Belgium's Dark Past in the Congo, and Attempts to Forge Deeper Ties.” The Conversation. The Conversation US, September 13, 2022. https:// theconversation.com/retracing-belgiums-dark-past-in-thecongo-and-attempts-to-forge-deeper-ties-184903.
6 Michel Thill.. “The M23 Crisis and the History of Violence in Eastern Congo.” openDemocracy. openDemocracy, November 5, 2012. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opensecurity/ m23-crisis-and-history-of-violence-in-eastern-congo/.
7 “Who Are DRC's M23 Rebels?” News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, November 5, 2013. https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2013/11/5/qa-who-are-dr-congos-m23-rebels.
8 See footnote 3.
9 See footnote 2.
10 “Rwanda Backing M23 Rebels in DRC: UN Experts.” Conflict News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, August 4, 2022. https:// www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23rebels-in-drc-un-experts.
11 “DR Congo: Resurgent M23 Rebels Target Civilians.” Human Rights Watch. hrw.org, July 25, 2022. https://www.hrw. org/news/2022/07/25/dr-congo-resurgent-m23-rebels-targetcivilians.
12 See footnote 6.
13 UN Affairs. “DR Congo President Denounces 'Aggression' by Rwanda, Calls on UN to Support African-Led Mediation | | 1UN News.” United Nations. United Nations, September 20, 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1127271 .
14 “Rwanda - UNAMIR.” Peacekeeping - United Nations. United Nations, September 1996. https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamir_b.htm.
15 “Belgium and the United Nations: A Historical Perspective.” Permanent Mission of Belgium to the UN. FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, January 24, 2022.
https://newyorkun.diplomatie.belgium.be/belgium-at-the-un/ historical-perspective.
16 Lionel Rosenblatt and Larry Thompson. “The Door of Opportunity: Creating a Permanent Peacekeeping Force.” World Policy Journal 15, no. 1 (1998): 36–42. http://www.jstor. org/stable/40209567.
17 “Member States.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed September 29, 2022. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/memberstates.
18 “Current Members Security Council.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed September 29, 2022. https://www. un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members.
19 “History of the Declaration.” United Nations. United
Nations. Accessed September 29, 2022. https://www.un.org/en/ about-us/udhr/history-of-the-declaration.
20 “From Independence to Long-Term Stability: United Nations Efforts in Africa.” United Nations. United Nations, September 2015. https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/independence-longterm-stability-united-nations-efforts-africa.
21 Javad Miri.. Basic idea of UN is euro-centric. Other. Tehran Times. Tehran Times , June 29, 2020. https://www.tehrantimes. com/news/449357/Basic-idea-of-UN-is-euro-centric-saysIranian-sociologist.
22 “DRC Expels MONUSCO Spokesman over Deadly Anti-Un Protests in Eastern Kivu Provinces.” RFI. Radio France Internationale, August 4, 2022. https://www.rfi.fr/en/ africa/20220804-drc-expels-monusco-spokesman-over-deadlyanti-un-protests-in-eastern-kivu-provinces.
23 DR Congo Expels UN Peacekeeping Mission Spokesman after Protests.” United Nations News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, August 3, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/3/ congo-expels-u-n-peacekeeping-mission-spokesman-afterprotests.
24 Patrick Ilunga. “DRC Kicks out UN Peacekeepers Spokesman, to Speed up Troops Withdrawal.” The East African. The East African, August 3, 2022. https://www.theeastafrican. co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-kicks-out-monuscospokesman-3901596.
25 See footnote 14.
26 See footnote 14.
27 See footnote 13.
28 “At Least Five Killed as Anti-UN Protesters Overrun Base in Eastern DRC.” RFI. Radio France Internationale, July 26, 2022. https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20220726-at-least-five-killed-asanti-un-protesters-overrun-base-in-eastern-drc.
29 “Who Belongs Where? Conflict, Displacement, Land and Identity in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo.” (14) 2010. Citizenship and Displacement in the Great Lakes Region. International Refugee Rights Initiative, Social Science Research Council. March. http://webarchive.ssrc.org/pdfs/Who%20Belongs%20Where. EN.March2010.pdf
30 See footnote 8.
For the IRR’s 27th edition of the journal, writers of the Asia section explored the implications of food gentrification on Asian culture, the causes of the Srilankan economic collapse, and China’s nuclear weapons policies. These writers have chosen to take on topics that remain extremely prevalent in our society, and approached them through a very unique lens, demonstrating their impeccable analytical abilities.
Katie Dang analyzes how the Asian culinary landscape has evolved as a result of the reimagination and recreation of many traditional dishes, and how this form of gentrification has created debates regarding the authenticity of these foods and in some instances, undermined their importance to many Asian cultures as well. Madhri Yehiya examines the series of events that have caused Sri Lanka’s economy to collapse including the presidency of Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Lastly, Joseph Su’s article explores China’s growing nuclear arsenal and the dynamic changes it will create for China and its relations with the United States.
Throughout the semester, my writers and editors have dedicated so much time, energy, and effort to put their articles together, and it has been incredibly rewarding to help them and oversee the entire process.
MIGENA SATYAL, CAS '24
Senior Editor, Asia
by Madhri Yehiya edited by Ashley Soebroto
Senior Political Science Lecturer, University of Kelaniya
In the last several months, Sri Lanka has made headlines for an unprecedented economic crisis that has left the country depleted of its foreign reserves and in massive debt. Millions were left struggling with severe shortages of basic food, medicine, and supplies. Since late 2021, the South Asian island nation has been plagued with hours-long power cuts, increased crime, school closures, and a rise in the black market. Perhaps most significant was the fuel crisis, which forced millions across the country to park in the polima — “line” in Sinhala, the most commonly spoken language — at the gas station for up to weeks, waiting until the government could afford to bring in another oil shipment. 1 After only a few months of returning to in-person school and work following the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, the lack of guaranteed transportation forced many back online. 2
I landed alone in the commercial capital of Colombo on June 7, 2022. For the next six weeks, I was set to intern at the Migration and Urbanization unit of the Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, an economics research organization. 3 What was supposed to be a hybrid internship quickly turned into eight hours a day, five days a week spent on a laptop in my grandmother’s house, sometimes working for hours by candlelight during a power outage. In the evenings and weekends, I would visit family, go sightseeing, and walk through the no-longer bustling streets filled with hundreds of “tuk-tuk” taxi drivers who had been parked in line for days. Some would soon die of heat exhaustion or a heart attack. 4 Their distressed faces whizzed by one after the other on the rare occasion that I was lucky enough to find a ride with enough fuel. Figuring out a way back home became a problem to worry about later. My
American accent and clothing meant I was charged increasingly exorbitant fares, but I never bartered for what was practically pennies in U.S. dollars. If and when a bus was available, I was lucky to find a spot to stand without being sandwiched between two other passengers. When I went to extend my business visa past its 30 day expiration date at the Sri Lankan Immigration office, crowds of people, many of them prospective migrant workers, filled the streets outside in line for passport applications and renewals instead. 5 It took longer for me to get through the crowd than to get my own paperwork approved — once inside, I was the only one in line. I later heard a relative of mine had been forced to travel to another city’s branch in hopes of a shorter wait, only to be told that a paper shortage would cause further delay. It was jarring compared to my previous trips to the country each summer before the pandemic. “Sri Lanka has lost its charm,” I said to my aunt one day. “What charm?” she asked. She had waited in line for 18 hours for gas the day prior.
Although Western media mainly latched onto the topic by the height of anti-government protests in July 2022, the groundwork for economic collapse was laid several years ago. The former British colony’s economy is heavily dependent on tourism, an industry that took an enormous hit after the 2019 Easter bombings at multiple hotels and churches by domestic Islamist extremists targeting Christians and Western tourists. 6 In 2021, there were a total of 194,495 tourist arrivals — down from 2,333,796 in 2018, a staggering 92 percent drop likely not caused by the COVID-19 pandemic alone. 7 After a thirty year long civil war primarily between the Sinhalese Buddhist majority and Tamil minority who fought to establish their own state, Amresh Gunasingham of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore reported that Sri Lankan Muslims became the new target. 8 Combined with a rise in inflammatory government rhetoric, there was a reported increase in hate crimes and anti-Muslim sentiment that following the post-war period of
growth, drove down the rate of tourism once again in the years leading up to the pandemic.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected president in November 2019, kickstarting many of the direct political and economic decisions that led to the economy’s crash. The brother of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa — hailed as a hero by some for presiding over the end of the civil war — the younger Rajapaksa won partially on the campaign promise of a widespread tax cut in a bid to raise consumption. 9 His administration proceeded to reduce the Value Added Tax from 15 to 8 percent, the Telecommunications Tariff by 2.5 percent, and completely eliminate a number of other taxes. In practice, government tax revenue decreased from 11.6 to 7.7 percent of the GDP in 2021, a lower ratio than many other countries in the region. 10 The island was left struggling to service its debts and purchase foreign goods and services, and domestic investment failed to adequately increase in
the face of mass inflation.
Sri Lanka is also often the textbook example of a developing country involved in several development and infrastructure agreements with China, many of which have seen little financial return domestically. 11 A tragic example of the Belt & Road Initiative's often exploitative impact is the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, funded by high-interest loans from the Chinese government. Built in the southern part of the island, the airport is located away from major industrial activity but in the heart of the Rajapaksa family’s hometown and stronghold. In 2016, a Forbes contributor titled it “the world’s emptiest international airport.” 12 Colombo Port City, set to be “South Asia’s premiere residential, retail and business destination” is yet another ambitious project involving Beijing, this time located in Sri Lanka’s commercial capital. An FAQ page online reads that construction was set to finish in 2020. 13 Walking along Galle Face Green, the center of the protests and adjacent to several administrative buildings that were later stormed, the banks of Port City’s ocean wall, still incomplete, had been covered in graffiti. “Gotagogama” was
emblazoned on everything from bandanas to the protest art on display in the area — “Gota(baya) go home” in “Singlish,” a commonly used mixture of English and Sinhala. 14
Verité Research, a Colombo-based private think tank, published a critical report in August 2022 on a water supply line project that took place through the 2010s with funding from Chinese loans. 15 Although the goal was to provide clean water pipeline access to 400,000 people while fostering an innovative partnership between the National Water Supply and Drainage Board of Sri Lanka and its Chinese counterpart, the result has been a project mired with construction delays, excessive costs, and poor planning. Verité reported that “several weaknesses in the design of the special framework created loopholes that could be exploited or misused by the parties involved.” 16 NWSDB officials apparently did not do their due diligence when setting the terms and conditions of the loans and construction, allowing for vague language and excessive charges. The result was a contract price 33.4 percent higher than originally estimated and evidence that the project was given the go-ahead before it received support from the Sri Lankan Cabinet. 17 In the end, much of the debt became the responsibility of the government as a whole, and having been delayed seven years now, the water pipeline is still incomplete. Unfortunately, the government’s poor economic foresight does not stop there. In May 2021, chemical fertilizers — used by 90 percent of Sri Lankan farms — were banned without advance warning in an attempt to turn Sri Lanka into an organic agricultural producer. 18 In the words of a report from the Research Institute for European and American Studies, the decision resulted in “economic chaos.” 19 Farmers had inadequate time and support from the government in making the switch to an alternative method. Crops failed and food prices soared, setting the tone for economic mismanagement that would continue to escalate in the following months.
The arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic undoubtedly accelerated an already looming economic crisis. The tourism industry all but shuttered completely for months, and with it came a drop in Sri Lanka’s foreign currency reserves. Tourists bring in euros, U.S. dollars, Chinese yuan, British pounds and more — valuable to a developing country whose currency is not accepted in world markets. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka responded by increasing its printing of the Sri Lankan rupee to an astounding $3.4 billion USD in 2021 with the idea that if the country’s reserves were depleted, simply creating more money could spur consumption and prevent total collapse. 20 The move aligned with the Rajapaksa administration’s support of Modern Monetary Policy Theory, a significant departure from classical views on the negative relationship between inflation and investment. 21 Unsurprisingly, inflation skyrocketed, with the value of the Sri Lankan rupee plummeting to its lowest of all time by May 2022, at Rs. 369.54 per 1 USD. 22 The Journal of Contemporary Issues in Business and Government cited data recording the change in prices for basic goods from March 2019 to March 2022. Rice — consumed by almost all Sri Lankan households — practically doubled in price from Rs. 84.1/kg to Rs. 162.52/kg. Turmeric saw a 443 percent increase, and coconut, native to the island, went up by 81 percent. 23
The deteriorating economy and supply shortage forced an increasing number in the middle class to consider leaving the country as migrant workers, often to the Middle East. 24 This trend is a double-edged sword to the Sri Lankan economy: exchange rate charges on migrant worker remittances are a major source of both income and foreign reserves to the government — but only when sent through the formal
channels, such as banks and approved money transfer services. In recent years, however, there has been a steep drop in remittances, one that does not reflect the number of workers sending wages back home. Between 2016 and 2021 there was a 25 percent decrease in the flow of foreign remittances to Sri Lanka. 25 While the repatriation of migrant workers due to the pandemic accounts for part of this drop, if the 2022 rate of remittances reported thus far by the Central Bank continues, the total will be close to a 50 percent decrease compared to each of the previous five years, despite the increase in interest in working abroad. 26 The hawala or undiyal informal money transfer system accounts for this difference, incidentally the focus of recent work by Dr. Bilesha Weeraratne, my internship supervisor at IPS. Rather than losing a certain portion of each paycheck each month, migrant workers
have increasingly asked friends, family, the local Sri Lankan shopkeeper — anyone in their trusted circle abroad — to exchange their remittances at either no cost or a better rate. A housekeeper working for a family in Dubai may give her wages to a friend whose brother runs a hardware store in Colombo, who will then charge a lower rate than a bank to give the money to the housekeeper’s son when he stops by the store. While the difference is fairly small to each individual, the total adds up to millions of rupees lost in revenue as well as foreign currency reserves to the government. 27 The increase in the use of informal channels is due in part to the Central Bank’s decision to artificially fix the Sri Lankan rupee’s official exchange rate over time. While trading through the hawala system may yield 350 rupees per 1 USD based on market supply and demand, the formal channels could go no higher than Rs. 202, at least until March of this year. 28 With better rates available, albeit illegally, the policy only increased the popularity of informal channel use. Over time, the Central Bank has had to devalue the rupee to encourage formal remittances and reflect the reality of the foreign exchange market. 29
Although not as widely reported on, a reason for the Rajapaksa administration’s culpability in the economic collapse stems from a recent political debacle regarding Sri Lanka’s Constitution. Shortly after coming to power, Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s administration abolished the 19th amendment, notable for its democratic reforms such as stricter term limits and a balance of powers. It was instead replaced with the 20th amendment, which consolidated executive power in a number of ways. 30 The Centre for Policy Alternatives, an independent think tank based in Colombo, published an accessible guide to the changes in June 2021. Some of the most significant include the president’s ability to remove the Prime Minister at any time, remove or appoint Cabinet members without the PM’s approval, a ban on any court proceedings against a President during their tenure, and the replacement of the Constitutional Council
with a Parliamentary Council made of only members of parliament for advisory as opposed to oversight purposes. 31 The 20th amendment has been scrutinized by political and religious groups across the spectrum, and rightly so, as the move came on top of years of allegations against the Rajapaksas regarding nepotism, bribery, and money laundering amounting to millions of rupees — no doubt another reason for Sri Lanka’s drained finances. 32 Indeed, over the last two decades, up to 29 members of the family have held senior positions in government, civil service, business, and the media. 33 As the RIEAS report put it, by the height of the crisis it became clear that the country had turned into “the personal fiefdom of a single-family, the Rajapaksas.” 34
In a move that caught the world’s attention, thousands of protestors of all ages, races, and backgrounds descended upon Colombo on July 9, 2022 to remove the president from office. Military and security personnel stood by and watched as they arrived from across the island on whatever transport possible and marched into Rajapaksa’s official residence, chanting from the imposing walls of government buildings and overrunning the streets outside. Instead of damaging what they found, the protestors tried on his clothes, slept on his bed, lounged on his furniture, and swam in his swimming pool. 35 Aware that they were on the way, the president fled the country, eventually submitting his resignation letter from Singapore days later. 36
The night before the takeover, I received warnings from family members and on social media that travel was not advised and the internet may be taken down by the government to prevent protestors from communicating. I was at dinner with a relative when we learned that a curfew had been imposed. I canceled a short overnight trip I had managed to plan for that weekend and turned on my VPN to avoid losing internet access. I awoke the next morning to the same images as the rest of the world, and around 4 p.m., my uncle spared some gas to drive my little cousin and I
into the center of it all.
Thousands of people filled the streets chanting aragalayata jayaweva — “long live the struggle” — in cheer format. Sri Lankan flags were draped like capes around protestors wearing all black. Speeches in Sinhala faster than I could understand were being broadcast on loudspeakers. Traffic moved at 5 miles per hour, marchers surrounding the cars on all sides. The mood was one of jubilant anarchy. People from home texted to ask if I wasn’t safe, if this was a coup, if there was violence on the streets — not at all, I told them. This was retribution. Anger and disappointment toward the government is well-deserved, given that a series of mostly preventable events culminated in the collapse. If Sri Lanka is to dig itself out of this hole once and for all, shortsighted populist policies such as massive tax cuts and the Modern Monetary Policy Theory must be discontinued. Risky and poorly negotiated loans, especially with China, should be avoided, with aid instead coming from India and the West using long payback periods and low interest rates. Indeed, in 2022 alone India has sent tens of thousands of tons of food and
fertilizer as well as millions in economic aid, providing a safety net that — for better or for worse — could eventually usurp China. 37 Excise taxes on goods such as tobacco would be a convenient way to raise revenue, while simultaneously decreasing the use of harmful drugs. 38 A greater focus should be placed on domestic production as opposed to import industries in order to avoid worsening supply shortages during an economic downturn or further increasing the deficit. The independence of the Central Bank should not only be respected by the government but asserted by the Central Bank itself who clearly fell victim to political pressure one too many times during this crisis. 39 With enough recovery only then it will be time to reinvest in the tourism industry and focus on predeparture education and incentivization of the use of formal remittance channels for migrant workers.
Given foreign aid and the removal of the president there has been some improvement in recent months, but there is still an enormous amount of reform that remains to be seen. The former prime minister is now president, who has excessively focused on punishing protestors as opposed to addressing their needs. 40 After decades of civil conflict, however, July 9, 2022 held a moment of national unity like no other. At the end of the day, everyone knew someone who had waited in line for hours at a gas station or passport office or hospital only to be disappointed. Maybe my internship wasn’t the international work experience I expected, and maybe I didn’t explore as much of the country as I would have liked — but when I’m asked now what it was like to be in Sri Lanka this summer, I can honestly say that I have few regrets. I got
more out of doing an economics research internship in the midst of an economic collapse than I ever could have otherwise. “Don’t do an internship in some paradise,” my dad had told me months before. “You’re an International Relations/ Econ major, go somewhere and see how the world is really suffering.” Still, I recognize that it’s easy for me to have taken away so many positives from my experience — at the end of the day I got to pack my bags and leave. Perhaps the silver lining of the Sri Lankan economic collapse will be the collective realization that gross incompetence is fairly impossible to disguise. From the guards who stood aside to the thousands who marched to the parents who lifted their children waving flags to the youth who organized it all, foundational cracks were placed in the cycle of corruption that is Sri Lanka’s politics — the first step of many to igniting real change.
1 “EXPLAINER: What’s happened and what’s next in Sri Lanka,” Associated Press, July 13, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/asia-indiaunited-nations-economy-3f3def44582be83a4bc4e18793f5dc93.
2 “SRI LANKA CRISIS: CHILDREN IN NEED,” Unicef, accessed September 18, 2022, https://www.unicef.org/srilanka/sri-lankacrisis.
3 “Migration & Urbanization,” Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, https://www.ips.lk/research/migration-development/.
4 Mahadiya Hamza, “Sri Lanka fuel queues claim two new deaths, taking total to 10,” EconomyNext, June 16, 2022, https://economynext. com/sri-lanka-fuel-queues-claim-two-new-deaths-taking-totalto-10-95902/.
5 Associated Press.
6 Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority, “Major setback & the impact of tourist arrivals,” (2021): 9-10. https://www.sltda.gov. lk/storage/common_media/new%20year%20in%20review%20 Update%2020213611163389.pdf.
7 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, “Statistical Appendix,” Annual Report 2021, https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/sites/default/files/cbslweb_documents/ publications/annual_report/2021/en/15_Appendix.pdf.
8 Amresh Gunasingham, “Sri Lanka Attacks: An Analysis of the Aftermath.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 11, no. 6 (2019): 8–13. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26662255.
9 “The 2019 Tax Cuts: Causes and Consequences | Daily FT,” https://www.ft.lk/opinion/The-2019-tax-cuts-Causes-andconsequences/14-735669.
10 Soumya Bhowmick, “How Sri Lanka’s tax cuts crippled its economy.” Observer Researcher Foundation, August 2022, https:// www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/how-sri-lankas-tax-cuts-crippled-itseconomy/.
11 Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” The New York Times, June 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html.
12 Wade Shepard, “The Story Behind The World's Emptiest International Airport,” Forbes, May 28, 2016, https://www. forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/05/28/the-story-behindthe-worlds-emptiest-international-airport-sri-lankas-mattalarajapaksa/?sh=fad62007cea2.
13 “CHEC Port City Colombo (Pvt) Ltd - Sri Lanka,” accessed September 21, 2022, https://www.portcitycolombo.lk/ about/.
14 Janani Vithanage, “GOTAGOGAMA in Sri Lanka: what, where, why, who and how,” Sri Lanka Brief, April 25, 2022, https:// srilankabrief.org/gotagogama-in-sri-lanka-what-where-why-whoand-how/.
15 “The Lure of Chinese Loans: Sri Lanka’s experiment with a special framework to finance its infrastructure investments,” Verité Research, (2022): 18-22, https://www.veriteresearch.org/ wp-content/uploads/2022/08/VR_EN_RR_Aug2022_The-Lure-ofChinese-Loans.pdf.
16 Verité Research, 35.
17 Verité Research.
18 Deepak S. Sharma, “The economic crisis faced by island nation - Sri Lanka: An empirical study,” Journal of Contemporary Issues in Business and Government, Vol. 28, no. 03, (2022): 923, https://www.cibgp.com/ article_18176_9787c3ef8018c40d413c4b98d7afa6e7. pdf.
19 Raagini Sharma, “Sri Lanka Crisis 2022: The Biggest Economic Debacle & Political Turmoil Since 1948,” Research Institute for European and American Studies, (May 2022): 7, https://rieas.gr/ images/editorial/srilanka2.pdf.
20 Neil DeVotta, “The Rajapaksas to blame for Sri Lanka’s disastrous 2021,” East Asia Forum, January 19, 2022, https://www. eastasiaforum.org/2022/01/19/the-rajapaksas-to-blame-for-srilankas-disastrous-2021/.
21 “Sri Lanka Modern Monetary Theory experiment could be an untamed demon: Economist,” EconomyNext, January 10, 2021, https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-modernmonetary-theory-experiment-could-be-an-untamed-demoneconomist-77719/.
22 “USD to LKR Chart,” XE, accessed October 19, 2022, https:// www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=USD&to=LKR.
23 Deepak S. Sharma, 923.
24 Bilesha Weeraratne, “Repatriation and Replacement of Lost Foreign Jobs: Handling Labour Migration in Sri Lanka during COVID-19,” Talking Economics, Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, May 14, 2020, https://www.ips.lk/ talkingeconomics/2020/05/14/repatriation-and-replacement-oflost-foreign-jobs-handling-labour-migration-in-sri-lanka-duringcovid-19/.
25 “Flow of Foreign Remittances to Sri Lanka 2015-2022,” Central Bank of Sri Lanka, accessed October 25, 2022, https://www.cbsl. gov.lk/en/workers-remittances/statistics.
26 Ibid.
27 Bilesha Weeraratne, “Black, White and Grey Markets: The Dynamics of Foreign Exchange and Remittances in Sri Lanka,” Talking Economics, Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, December 17, 2021, https://www. ips.lk/talkingeconomics/2021/12/17/black-white-andgrey-markets-the-dynamics-of-foreign-exchange-andremittances-in-sri-lanka/.
28 Uditha Jayasinghe, “Sri Lanka Devalues Rupee, Seen as Step towards Getting IMF Help,” Reuters, sec. Rates & Bonds, March 8, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/ rates-bonds/sri-lanka-allow-rupee-weaken-230-perdollar-2022-03-07/.
29 Ibid.
30 “Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution,” Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, September 22, 2022, https://www.parliament.lk/uploads/ bills/gbills/english/6176.pdf.
31 “A Brief Guide to the 20th Amendment to the Constitution,” Centre for Policy Alternatives, (June 2021): 10-12, https://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/07/A-brief-guide-to-the-20th-Amendment-tothe-Constitution-English-CPA-compressed_compressed-1. pdf.
32 “Sri Lankan ex-president's son accused of moneylaundering,” BBC, August 15, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-asia-37089546.
33 “Infographics: Rajapaksa Family And Nepotism,” Colombo Telegraph, March 20, 2013, https://www. colombotelegraph.com/index.php/infographic-rajapaksafamily-and-nepotism/.
34 Raagini Sharma, 6.
35 “After Sri Lanka protesters lounged in the president's pool, what's next for the country's government?” ABC NEWS. July 13, 2022, https://abcnews.go.com/ International/sri-lanka-protesters-lounged-presidents-poolcountrys-government/story?id=86743582.
36 “Sri Lanka political dynasty ends as Rajapaksa quits,” BBC News, July 15, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-asia-62160227.
37 Rathindra Kuruwita, “Indian Assistance to Sri Lanka: Lifeline or Chokehold?”, The Diplomat, May 25, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/indian-assistance-to-srilanka-lifeline-or-chokehold/.
38 Erandathie Pathiraga, “Taxing Tobacco: Benefits and Burdens of Beedi Taxes to Sri Lanka’s Economy,” Talking Economics, Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, June 20, 2022, https://www.ips.lk/talkingeconomics/2022/06/20/ taxing-tobacco-benefits-and-burdens-of-beedi-taxes-to-srilankas-economy/.
39 Chandrasena Maliyadde, “Central Bank, Its Independence and Us | Daily FT,” https://www. ft.lk/columns/Central-Bank-its-independence-andus/4-737683.
40 Pasan Jayasinghe, “Why Sri Lanka has a tyrant as president — yet again,” Al Jazeera, October 20, 2022, https://
For the past decade, China has been the United States’ primary competitor in the 21st century in all political and economic aspects. While discussions of economic interdependence, shifting global political power dynamics, and conventional warfare in the Pacific over Taiwan and the South China Sea have dominated the public eye, relatively few outside of relevant fields have paid attention to a growing nuclear arsenal which may upset 80 years of a delicate nuclear balancing act.
The largest branch of China’s nuclear forces is the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, which controls land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This force controls roughly 200 to 250 warheads, two-thirds of which are capable of reaching the contiguous U.S. The remaining nuclear forces are intermediate to short-range, which are meant for conflict closer to the mainland and deterrence missions amongst regional nuclear powers.
China’s nuclear force capable of reaching the continental United States consists of 20 silobased Dongfeng-5B/C ICBM’s (DF-5B/C) and 72 road-mobile Dongfeng-31A/AG (DF-31A/AG). 12 These are long-range ballistic missiles which act as China’s current land based nuclear deterrent. While the DF-5 is a capable delivery vehicle, it is an outdated system, introduced in 1981, requiring
extensive fueling times. In comparison, China’s newer solid fueled missiles require no fueling and less maintenance allowing for a quicker response time in the event of nuclear attack and matching U.S. and Russian counterparts. However, both of these weapons hold a strategic advantage over their U.S. counterparts. Due to the New START treaty signed in 2011, the U.S. has decided not to retain Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capabilities on its ICBM force, due to numerical limitations and strategic needs. 3 MIRVs are either multiple nuclear warheads on one missile or a singular warhead with fake warheads acting as decoy projectiles to confuse defense systems. Washington opted to retain MIRV capability on its submarine force and allow a larger sea-based force in turn so as to not exceed the numerical limitations agreed upon this treaty. 4
Aside from modernizing its re-entry vehicles, land-based nuclear missiles have also been proliferated by China, in an effort to increase the size of its arsenal. Beginning in 2019 5 and in 2021 respectively, China started manufacturing new, modernized ICBMs and rapidly constructing new silo sites to raise total force numbers. China is currently constructing three new missile fields and a training site, which include 300 new silos for the new Dongfeng-41 (DF-41) near Yumen, Hami, and Ordos, in Northern China. 67 These silos alone nearly triple the size of China’s land based nuclear
forces and bring them much closer to parity with the United State’s 450 deployed/non deployed ICBM force. 8 Additionally, DF-41 road mobile launchers will be slowly rolled out to operational brigades to replace older systems. 9 The DF-41, unveiled in 2019 is China’s third-generation ICBM program meant to replace aging DF-5s and older DF-31s. The DF-41 boasts an increased range of up to 15,000km and an increased nuclear weapons payload. China is clearly seeking parity or to exceed the U.S. land based nuclear force and are on track to do so. Similar to the U.S. force, ICBMs are a critical aspect of China’s nuclear mission and would assure that any ‘first strike’ would have to sink a significant nuclear force to eliminate them, leaving other areas protected. Furthermore, their geographic location lends itself well to further harden them against strike. These silos are located in the Northwestern deserts of China, removed from the range of regional cruise missiles and far away from the heavily populated Pacific coast of China. The U.S. operates their nuclear forces in a similar manner. U.S. ICBM bases are located in North Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana, insulated within the North American continent and far from population centers.
An ICBM force of this size is not a minimum deterrent; it is a drastic shift in policy which departs from 60 years of policy as China seeks to upend the balance of power and the international order.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has historically been the smallest and tightest controlled branch of China’s nuclear forces. However, in recent years, their rapid development has marked a staunch departure from their historical role. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has launched and operates six Type-94 nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) since their satellite spotting in late 2006 which are responsible for carrying China’s nuclear force at sea. However, “The Office of Naval Intelligence reports that it is likely that at least five Type-94 submarines are necessary to maintain a continuous peacetime presence, which falls in line with the generally accepted four submarines for one at sea ratio meaning China likely is only capable of deploying one to two submarines at a time. These submarines are China’s small sea-based deterrent force however
they are outdated and are plagued by geographical and technological challenges. While stable platforms, the Type-94 submarines are reported to be thre-times as loud as US submarines constructed in 1989. This presents a major challenge for China’s sea-based nuclear force. The SSBN's primary advantage is being as undetectable as possible to guarantee a retaliatory nuclear strike. Given China’s geography, these submarines would have to pass by Western-friendly nations risking detection as they pass. Furthermore, these submarines are equipped with 12 JL-2 ballistic missiles with a debated range of 7,000-9,000km. With these ranges, Chinese submarines are not capable of reaching the contiguous U.S. from Chinese waters and are still limited by their technical setbacks. However, in 2020, construction likely began on China’s third-generation SSBN class, the Type-96. While not much is known about the specifications of the Type-96, it assuredly makes leaps to address the previous limitations of the Type-94 and would give China a much more capable and survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent. The DOD projects that China could have eight SSBNs in operation by 2030, bringing that number much closer to the U.S. number of 14. The Type-96 will also carry a next-generation ballistic missile with greater range and survivability. The sea-based nuclear force remains the most survivable, most forward deployable, and most lethal. A growing SSBN force represents a major shift from a policy of minimum deterrence to forward deployed nuclear weapons and a desire to project the pinnacle of military power in support of its political aspirations.
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force
(PLAAF) is the newest and smallest nuclear force amongst the three service branches with a nuclear mission. Revealed in 2019, the PLAAF operates a small force of modernized soviet-era H-6N bombers capable of aerial refueling, long-range strike, and are nuclear mission capable. 10 This new long-range bomber is capable of carrying a modified DF-21 air-launched ballistic missile with a 2,000 km range. 11 While the H-6N would have to fly across the Pacific and past Hawaii to reach the West coast of the continental United States, as well as avoid detection, it does signal a significant development and provide China with a globalstrike capability as well as complete its burgeoning nuclear triad.
The most significant of all though is China’s development and future fielding of the H-20 bomber. 12 Since 1997 with the introduction of the B-2 Spirit, the U.S. has retained a monopoly on flying-wing, stealth, heavy bombers. These bombers are capable of carrying large payloads deep into hostile territory due to their advanced stealth designs to strike strategic targets. Most notably when B-2’s flew over 44-consecutive hours to Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks. 13 The H-20 is China’s version of this capability. A long-range stealth bomber is a massive leap into the 21st century for China’s military clearly aiming for parity with the United States. While this new bomber has yet to be fully analyzed, and given China’s longstanding history of IP theft and failure to replicate and match American aircraft technology, China’s third leg of its nuclear triad
represents a significant departure from homeland defense to power projection abroad. 1415 16
For almost 80 years, the Soviet Union, then Russia, and the United States have had a duopoly on a nuclear force of this scale and crafted a delicate, yet relatively stable relationship in the nuclear world. Arms limitations have brought down respective arsenals by over 80 percent each from their respective peaks at the height of the Cold War. However, China has refused to engage in the international scene and maintained a tight veil over its nuclear weapons, drastically raising the chance for miscalculation and misunderstanding in times of peace which inevitably leads to increased chances of the gravest situation in a potential war. This is not something to be taken lightly. Under the current U.S.-Russian arms agreements, there are mutual verifications and inspections alongside direct lines of communication which are wellestablished and maintain clarity within the realm of the highest consequences. As of now, China has no such procedures and has not entered into dialogue with the United States. In a world where two global superpowers are the future, without communication between them, the challenges become ever so vast. It is clear that China views generating a larger nuclear force as a way to maintain and enable future international priorities from a position of strength and ensure a higher barrier of entry for those who seek to challenge China in the future. While many scholars argue that any nuclear capabilities above ensuring a second strike are excessive, policymakers and military leaders
have historically disagreed. A larger nuclear force inherently enables leverage in times of crisis, coercion in times of peace, and a higher cost of war for opponents. Furthermore, China’s nuclear developments are drastic shifts that do not align with its historical minimum deterrence policy. Modernizing its existing force is one thing, nuclear power projection abroad is another. Nuclear weapons are the pinnacle of military strength and carry exclusive privileges when leveraging them in the global political scene. The examples in recent years are all too present. Russia has repeatedly made reckless nuclear threats to restrain NATO and the US in the Russian-Ukrainian War, North Korea has a history of using its nuclear weapons program as a sanctions relief tool, and Iran has done the same all unified through a shared belief that nuclear weapons act as a protective measure against perceived blackmail by the West. For the most part, it has worked. The U.S. is restrained to certain types of aid in Ukraine, North Korea still has its weapons program, and the 2015 JCPOA has fallen apart with talks stalled.
However, China is the only nation that can truly present a sustained and realistic challenge to the United States across all fronts. With nuclear backing, China can make more aggressive foreign policy goals from a stronger position. This is especially concerning as then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Milley believes China could have the capability to take Taiwan by 2027, while a more concerned Admiral Davidson believes an intent to attack by then. China is constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea and building military installations on them, laying claim, and militarizing international waters. This buildup has massive consequences for American foreign policy in the Pacific. If a conflict arose
in the Pacific, would the U.S. be willing to trade cities like Los Angeles or New York for Tokyo or Sydney? An ever-growing and hawkish China may very well present this very dilemma in the future and seek to erode confidence in the United States’ nuclear protection of its allies in both East Asia and in Europe. In the international political scene, the United States has wielded its military and its guarantees to sway allies and build an alliance network unparalleled in history: will China be able to do the same? Combined with China’s economic and political strength, this nuclear buildup is only one small part of a growing challenge in the Pacific and it comes at a time when America has suffered a turbulent period domestically and internationally. With its own alliances frayed and forced to meet challenges across the globe, the U.S. is at a critical point. With these forces, China is one step closer to parity and its goals of upending the longstanding American-led global order.
1 Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2020) Chinese nuclear forces, 2020, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 76:6, 443-457, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432
2 Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2020) Chinese nuclear forces, 2020, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 76:6, 443-457, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432.
3 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S-RUS, Apr. 10 2010
4 Ibid, 2
5 Missile Defense Project, "DF-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-X-20)," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 12, 2016, last modified July 31, 2021
6 Korda, Matt, and Hans Kristensen. “China Is Building A Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field.” Federation Of American Scientists, July 26, 2021.
7 Korda, Matt, and Hans Kristensen. “A Closer Look at China’s Missile Silo Construction.” Federation of American Scientists, November 2, 2021.
8 Bugos, Shannon. “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START.” Arms Control Association, April 2022.
9 Ibid, 10
10 Ibid, 3
11 Missile Defense Project, "DF-21 (CSS-5)," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 13, 2016, last modified March 28, 2022
12 Ibid, 3
13 Haulman, Daniel L. “44 Hours.” Air and Space Forces Magazine, January 2017
14 “Chinese National Admits to Stealing Sensitive Military Program Documents From United Technologies.” The United States Department of Justice, December 19, 2016.
15 “Jury Convicts Chinese National in Aviation Espionage Case.” AP NEWS. Associated Press, November 5, 2021.
16 Kidwell, Deborah. “Cyber Espionage for the Chinese Government.” Cyber espionage for the Chinese government > Office of Special Investigations > Display, September 17, 2017.
by Katie Dang edited by Jessica Swanson and Julie Lee
Food is more than just a necessity. It serves to create memories, share stories, and define one’s identity. The creation of each dish encompasses the evolution of culture throughout history, providing insight into the interactions between individuals, communities, and states that have influenced the ingredients and flavors of food. As such, food offers the perfect gateway to understanding history and culture. Asia is home to some of the most fascinating cuisines in the world. Asian cultural enclaves such as Chinatowns and Koreatowns are present in many cities worldwide, with foods like sushi, boba, and dim sum deeply integrated into the food scenes of many western countries. However, these foods also undergo food gentrification, the process of replacing traditional ingredients, and preparation methods to provide a more modern and elevated version of commonly known traditional dishes. 1 This represents the growing trend in Asian fusion cuisines pioneered by many chefs and restaurants in the United States and Europe, fueled by globalization and increased cultural diffusion through social media platforms, travel, and cultural diplomacy.
The re-creation of many of these Asian dishes in Western countries represents how various cultures and ethnicities can unite by hybridizing elements of one another's culture. The United States, for example, is often referred to as a ‘melting pot’ of different cultures. First-
generation immigrant Asian-American chefs such as David Chang and Roy Choi are known for providing a modern twist to traditional Asian food and have gained popularity for their creations, yet the craze that chefs get from their innovative food creations does not reflect the disdain that immigrants face when they introduce their culture’s food to their host country. For them, Asian fusion is also reflective of the challenges of diasporic life as immigrants settle into their host country and are forced to culturally assimilate and blur the differences between their host country’s and that of their own. This means altering certain Asian dishes to “cater to the expectations of a white majority -
however ethnically mixed that majority may be 2”, especially because non-Asian customers would prefer the westernized version as it is more familiar with their flavor palette. 3
As Asian fusion cuisine continues to grow in popularity, the tension between cultural assimilation and cultural authenticity remains prevalent. The fusion of western ingredients and techniques in Asian cuisine has the potential to misrepresent how westerners view Asian culture. It reinforces the idea that western culinary culture is seemingly superior and more desirable, and that ethnic Asian food should be altered to fit with western culinary standards. It perpetuates class hierarchy, as most Asian fusion cuisines are a form of class distinction, targeting those who have the means to produce and consume it. 4 Haute cuisine, or fine dining, is one example of how premium ingredients and meticulous cooking techniques are incorporated into food to be consumed by those who have the financial means to afford it - the upper classes. This comes at the expense of immigrant working-class communities since their businesses are displaced with establishments that cater to a more affluent group of clientele. While they may have assimilated into their host country’s culture to an extent, their restaurant businesses are a way to preserve and protect their own culture 5 .
This article aims to explore how Asian food gentrification has expanded ever since its introduction into the western culinary sphere, and its impacts on Asian socio-economic and political discourse over time. The first section provides a historical context of the introduction of Asian food in western countries, followed by an explanation of the development of food gentrification over time. The last section aims to evaluate the socio-economic and political impacts of food gentrification on Asia.
Asian food was first introduced during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The British government was involved in expanding Chinese cuisine within the country. Near the end of the eighteenth century, Chinese sailors arrived in the East End of London. 6 This gave rise to the establishment of Chinese communities in London, then eventually Liverpool, Glasgow, and Cardiff.
Alongside was the 1884 Health Exhibition, an exhibition supported by Queen Victoria and Prince of Wales aimed at showcasing Britain’s momentous strides in technology and public health occurred, the Chinese Restaurant was considered a “popular attraction”. Arrangements for the Chinese Restaurant included employing Chinese cooks from Beijing and Guangzhou. 7 However, the Restaurant was not taken seriously, and its food was mocked as “tasting not unlike that of a turtle”. 8 This hostile sentiment towards the Chinese community continued until the First World War, most prominently seen through the 1911 riot of 30 Chinese laundries in Cardiff. 9 As the number of Chinese seamen and students continued to grow during these years, the number of Chinese restaurants increased, serving dishes such as chow mein, and fried rice. However, the dismissive view persisted: according to a BBC broadcast that introduced Chinese recipes, “[the Chinese] dishes were delicious, and their names sounded exciting, but one had to endure receiving food from one’s host chopsticks and to watch a Chinaman eat was
not a pretty sight”. 10
During the Second World War, more of the British population became exposed to Chinese food, as many servicemen and women had to travel to India and China. By the end of the war, many Britons were familiar with Chinese food, such as chow siu fong and foo yong hai, served at more and more new establishments opened during the post-war years. 11 As most Chinese immigrants were Cantonese, most restaurants specialized in Cantonese cuisine, from dim sum and roast duck to clay pot stews. Sichuanese and Hunan restaurants also began appearing in London, along with increasingly available Chinese ingredients, such as chili bean paste, and street food stalls serving Shanghainese buns and Chongqing noodles to city folk and tourists alike. 12 The U.K.’s Chinese restaurant boom began in the late 1950s and early 1960s when Cantonese immigrants from Hong Kong arrived. 13 Clusters of Chinese restaurants began forming at Gerrard Street in central London and central Manchester, posing as early Chinatowns in each respective city. Immigration was the result of economic woes: rice-growing communities in Hong Kong had to deal with immigrant farmers from mainland China trying to grow vegetables for Hong Kong’s urban market, which put their lifetime businesses at risk. 14 As a result, they immigrated to Britain to find better economic opportunities while preserving their family businesses. Besides, Hong Kong immigrants feared the Commonwealth Immigrants Act and wanted to arrive before it came into effect on July 1, 1962. The act restricted the entry of Commonwealth citizens to Britain unless for those with work permits. 15 In the 1990s, as China opened up, immigrants from other regions, such as the Fujian province, flocked to Britain. 16 As China opened itself up, a new generation of Chinese people traveled and immigrated to places like Britain to seek employment in the food industry. 17 The newly diverse population consisting of Chinese restaurant workers and Chinese customers subsequently contributed to the growth of Chinese food in Britain.
In contrast, the introduction of Chinese food in the United States took place under different circumstances compared to Britain, mainly involving immigrants. In 1849, the discovery of gold in Sacramento Valley in California, U.S., led to a massive influx of immigrants from South China
to the United States. While most were engaged in mining or manual labor, some worked as cooks due to the shortage of women domestic workers. At the start of this rush, America welcomed migrants and their cultures, with San Francisco's Chinatown growing in popularity and Chinese restaurants popping up nationwide. However, “disorder in the mining districts, coupled with anti-foreign feeling” increased racial tensions against the Chinese immigrant population over fear that the Chinese immigrants would take over American jobs. 18 Discrimination towards Chinese immigrants was only exacerbated in 1882, when the U.S. Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, banning entry to all new Chinese immigrants. 19 However, this sentiment began to change in the early twentieth century. The San Francisco earthquake in 1906 led to the creation of a new ‘Oriental City’ that was cleaner and more attractive than the old Chinatown. San Francisco’s Chinatown was part of this renewal, and more Chinese restaurants opened as a result. 20 By the 1920s, Chinese restaurants also started opening in New York and Philadelphia, with Asian food becoming more widely accepted despite ongoing racial discrimination due to the increased assimilation of second-generation Chinese Americans. 21 By 1940, Chinese food was widely accepted in the United States, and the number of Chinese restaurants increased across the country. The recognition of the U.S. and China alliance during the Pacific War against Japan changed American views towards China. Most notably, San Francisco’s Chinatown experienced a 300 percent increase in business between 1941 and 1943. 22
Following the Second World War, Chinese
food became more globalized as more Chinese restaurants appeared in many countries around the world. Globalization was most apparent, though, in the United States and Canada. At first, many Chinese restaurant owners served American food to appease Americans to assimilate into their host. According to Rose Hum Lee, a ChineseAmerican sociologist, cafés and restaurants serving American food run by Chinese people had almost disappeared after the 1940s, making way for “authentic mooncakes, engagement cookies, and muti-course feats for various occasions”. 23Furthermore, awareness of the diversity of Chinese food increased when the banquet menu for Presidential dinner between Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai in 1972, encouraged more Americans to try Chinese regional cuisines instead of only chop suey dishes and fortune cookies, the well-known dishes at the time. 24
As Asian food became deeply integrated into the food scenes of many countries, many chefs decided to take on the rising trend of Asian cuisine and began culinarily experimenting with adding new variations to well-known Asian dishes. Chefs claimed that they were modernizing and diversifying the definition of Asian cuisine by incorporating western techniques with Asian ingredients, feeding into cultural globalization. 25 However, debates about the lack of authenticity and respect for the origins of Asian food reflect its rising gentrification to fit with the rising trend of globalization and cosmopolitanism. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the misinterpretation of Asian cuisines by many
Western chefs, which has furthered the narrative about the inferiority of Asian cuisine.
To understand why fusion cuisine is the basis for food gentrification, it is essential to dive into the origins of fusion cuisine and how it became incorporated into Asian cuisine. Fusion cuisine was a term first coined by Florida chef Norma Van Aken in 1988, referring to the “combinations of flavors and culinary techniques from two or more cultures.” 26 Richard Wing, the chef of the Imperial Dynasty, was considered the pioneer of Asian fusion cuisine with his “chinois” (a French term for Chinese) cooking. He incorporated techniques learned during his career as a personal chef to fivestar U.S. Army General George Marshall during the Second World War. By the 1970s and 1980s, fusion cuisine became celebrated as “the cuisine of choice for young urban professionals,” referencing their ability to “confer a cultural cosmopolitan identity”. 27 Chefs such as Wolfgang Puck and Nobu Matsuhisa carried on the trend when they opened their restaurants in the 1980s – Puck serving Chinese and French-inspired cuisine and Matsuhisa serving Peruvian-Japanese cuisine.
By the mid-2000s, the initial excitement over Asian fusion cuisine changed as critics claimed it was haphazard and inauthentic. Asian hipster cuisine emerged from Asian fusion, taking a different approach of being globally inspired and focusing more on passion than ancestry. David Chang, the founder of Momofuku Noodle Bar, was considered the big brother of Asian hipster cuisine and crafted “high-end Asian-inspired food,” which included fried veal sweetbreads, a Korean-inspired burrito, and a pork belly bun that has since become a massive sensation. Danny Bowein, founder of Mission Chinese Food, on the contrary, took Sichuan cooking and incorporated it into dishes such as “Kung Pao pastrami, mapo tofu, and cumin lamb.” 28 These chefs share an eagerness to experiment, re-imagine Asian ethnic street food, and offer a more gourmet version while using mainly Asian ingredients. However, the incorporation of western techniques in their cooking could indirectly impact how they portray Asian cuisine.
The problem worsens when non-Asian chefs, who have no background or thorough knowledge of Asian cuisine, decide to appropriate Asian food and impart western standards to it.
For example, when Karen Taylor, founder of the company Breakfast Cure, crowned herself with the title “Queen of Congee” because she “modernized [congee] for the Western palette”, it angered many Asians because it perpetuated the notion that Asian food must be influenced by western cuisine to become appealing. 29 Similarly, in 2019 Arielle Haspel, a nutritionist, opened Lucky Lee’s and marketed the restaurant as being a cleaner version of a typical Chinese restaurant that would not make people feel “bloated and icky” 30 after eating. She also came under fire from critics on social media who accused her of cultural appropriation and insensitivity because she portrayed traditional Chinese food as being unhealthy, different to that of her restaurant’s version. These instances show how the whitewashing of Asian cuisine intensifies condescending views toward Asian food, given the backlash many Asians have faced when trying to remain authentic with promoting their food because of westerners' misconceptions.
For decades, cultural enclaves built by immigrants in cities worldwide have contributed to the multicultural fabric of many western countries, such as the U.S. and Britain. For many of those immigrants, protecting the integrity of their cultural practices, including food, has been the main goal, despite the changing nature of the Asian food scene. Unfortunately, the desire for adventure and exotic experiences in food gastronomy by many millennials, along with urban infrastructural developments, is impacting the sustainability of these local businesses. In Flushing, New York, for example, the construction of luxury developments by conglomerates has displaced immigrants and small business owners, disrupting the cultural and culinary landscape. From 2010 to 2015, the number of food and drink retail stores in the area increased from approximately 400 to more than 800. 31 Many of the local restaurants have been replaced with upscale international Asian chains like Papparich and HaiDiLao. The change is intentional: according to Helen Lee, the executive vice-president of the F&T Group, restaurants are leased retail space with the goal of changing Flushing’s “cheap eats” reputation. This, coupled with rising housing prices, has forced many local restaurant businesses to shut down. 32 Disruption
to the culinary landscape of areas like Flushing is a painful reminder of the discrimination many Asians face when consuming their cultural food. Politically, the gentrification of Asian food has impacted how Asian countries aim to portray their cultural and political image: gastrodiplomacy is the result of Asian food growing popular worldwide, but most importantly, it is part of an effort to combat food gentrification and appropriation to “improve the way international audiences perceive [their countries]. 33 In 2009, South Korea launched the Korean Cuisine to the World Campaign, organizing global culinary events promoting Korean celebrity chefs and royal Joseon dynasty cuisine. The government believed that Korean cuisine could also successfully promote Korean culture like TV, movies, and K-pop. Korea is an example of gastrodiplomacy’s growing value in diplomatic relations, where countries use it to improve their visibility on the international stage through recognizable features such as food. The emergence of gastrodiplomacy is a direct result of food globalization, with social media and the internet facilitating the spread of new cuisines; countries have used this to their advantage to expand the global popularity of their food. Given the significance of gastrodiplomacy, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) decided to expand its List of Intangible Cultural Heritage to include
“agricultural practices, food production, and gastronomic traditions”. 34 Inclusion of culinary traditions in this list emphasizes appreciation for a community’s culture, which bolsters a sense of unity and pride along with engagement to keep those culinary traditions alive. In 2013, South Korea’s kimjang, the practice of making and sharing kimchi, successfully made it to the UNESCO list, thus reaffirming kimchi as a central part of South Korea’s national identity. This shows how food is important as a vehicle in promoting history and culture, as it is essential to improving and correcting any misconceptions held about it. 35 The power that food holds should not be underestimated, as it has the ability to reflect history, culture, and subsequently, international relations. While Asian food is popular in western countries, its integration into the western food scene was turbulent for the immigrants that introduced them. When immigrants flocked from all parts of Asia into western countries in the early nineteenth century, they were often subjected to hatred and bigotry. Today, Asian food has become recognized worldwide and integrated into many food scenes, yet this has also given rise to fusion food and culinary appropriation, which feeds into condescending narratives about Asian food. 36 Hence, the debate surrounding the authenticity of these new takes on Asian food is integral to protecting the integrity of Asian food and culture. Chefs who have taken their personal experiences as Asian Americans to create their own take on Asian food also make up the diversity of the Asian community worldwide and should be recognized. At the same time, it is important not to feed into the cycle of perpetuating socio-economic division and class hierarchies resulting from the modernization of Asian cuisine by glamorizing fusion food but simultaneously neglecting traditional food. Preventing the appropriation of Asian food by those who have no background or understanding of it is as crucial, which allows them to impose a westernized view onto Asian narratives. This is how prejudice towards working-class communities occurs, stemming from food – something that is meant to unite, not divide people.
1 Vega, Tanzania. “Understanding Food Gentrification’s Impact on Hunger”. Produced by Ross, Elizabeth, and McAdon, Sarah. The Takeaway, July 18, 2018.
2 LIO, SHOON, and MEGAN BOTT. “From Asian Fusion to Asian Hipster Cuisine: Consuming Cosmopolitanism and Authenticity.” In Chop Suey and Sushi from Sea to Shining Sea: Chinese and Japanese Restaurants in the United States, edited by BRUCE MAKOTO ARNOLD, TANFER EMIN TUNÇ, and RAYMOND DOUGLAS CHONG, 191–210. University of Arkansas Press, 2018.
3 BIRKLE, CARMEN. “‘Stirring the Pot’: Asian Foodways in American Eating Places.” In Chop Suey and Sushi from Sea to Shining Sea: Chinese and Japanese Restaurants in the United States, edited by BRUCE MAKOTO ARNOLD, TANFER EMIN TUNÇ, and RAYMOND DOUGLAS CHONG, 211–234. University of Arkansas Press, 2018.
4 LIO, SHOON, and MEGAN BOTT. “From Asian Fusion” (pp. 209)
5 BIRKLE, CARMEN. “‘Stirring the Pot’” (pp. 213)
6 Ibid., 155.
7 Ibid., 140.
8 Ibid., 142.
9 Ibid., 155.
10 Ibid., 158.
11 Dunlop, Fuschia. “The UK’s Chinese Food Revolution.” The Guardian, September 15, 2019.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Roberts, J.A.G. China to Chinatown: Chinese Food in the West. London: Reaktion Books, 2004 (pp.173)
15 Ibid.,172.
16 Dunlop, Fuschia. “The UK’s Chinese Food Revolution.” The Guardian, September 15, 2019.
17 Ibid.
18 Roberts, J.A.G. China to Chinatown: Chinese Food in the West. London: Reaktion Books, 2004 (pp.136).
19 Mishan, Ligaya. “Asian-American Cuisine’s Rise, and Triumph.” The New York Times, November 10, 2017.
20 Roberts, J.A.G. China to Chinatown: Chinese Food in the West. London: Reaktion Books, 2004 (pp.145)
21 Ibid., 148.
22 Ibid., 152.
23 Ibid., 163.
24 Ibid., 166.
25 LIO, SHOON, and MEGAN BOTT. “From Asian Fusion” (pp. 206)
26 Ibid., 193
27 Ibid., 193
28 Ibid., 199
29 Mark, Julian. “‘Queen of Congee’ Apologizes for Cultural Appropriation but Still Sells the ‘Improved’ Asian Dish.” Washington Post, July 22, 2022.
30 Otterman, Sharon. “A White Restaurateur Advertised ‘Clean’ Chinese Food. Chinese-Americans Had Something to Say About It.” The New York Times, April 12, 2019.
31 “‘Not What It Used to Be’: in New York, Flushing’s Asian Residents Brace against Gentrification.” The Guardian, August 13, 2020.
32 Ibid.
33 Parasecoli, Fabio. “How Countries Use Food to Win Friends and Influence People.” Foreign Policy, August 20, 2022.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Chow, Andrew, and Suyin Haynes. “Fights Over 'Authentic' Chinese Food Have a Long and Complicated History. Now They're Tearing the Culinary World Apart.” TIME Magazine, July 8, 2019.
For the IRR’s 27th edition, the Middle East section has explored the new age of Egyptian Active Non-Alignment, the opportunities for regional cooperation in the Gulf’s transition away from oil-reliance and the fossil fuel industry, and the ramifications of the 2014 Yazidi genocide.
To my writers, I am so proud to have facilitated your research this semester; your dedication and enthusiasm for the region and its politics inspire me every day. To our editors, I couldn’t have asked for a better team to collaborate with on this journey. I can’t wait to see the strides you all make in the future as the brilliant scholars you are, and I hope wherever life takes you, you can find something of value to tap into from your experience this semester with the IRR.
On behalf of the Middle East section, we thank you for your support as readers, and we hope you enjoy these pieces as much as we have enjoyed producing them.
HANADI AMIN, CAS '23 Senior Editor, Middle East
by Kevin Clenard edited by Gideon Gordon and Ava Rheeve
reviewed by AMBASSADOR JORGE HEINE
In the dawn of what political science scholars have called a ‘Second Cold War’ with the rise of China and the current hot war between Russia and Ukraine, states in the Global South have once again found themselves caught in the midst of a struggle between two competing power blocs. 1 In a repeat of history, a third path seems increasingly favorable for these states: Active Non-Alignment. Much like the original Non-Aligned Movement founded in 1961 by key leaders in the Global South who sought to avoid entanglement in the Cold War, today states can choose to remain politically in between the U.S., Russia, and China in an age of new divisions. While literature on current nonalignment has flourished regarding Latin America, Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, there has been little focus on its resurgence in states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, including Egypt. 2
Great power competition has once again become a key feature of Egyptian foreign policy issues, as the country is endowed with a central strategic location astride the vital Suez Canal trade route, as well as economic and historical importance to both blocs. Previously considered a strong U.S. ally in the region since its role in brokering the 1979 Camp David Accords, Egypt has been diversifying its economic and political ties recently via China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), increased investment from Europe, and greater trade with Russia. Such a shift in policy is likely a consequence of the recent reduction in political support and investment from the United States due to American concerns over Egypt’s foreign and domestic policies. Sitting on a line of great power division between American, Chinese, and Russian influences, non-alignment offers Egypt greater opportunities for economic development and domestic
stability through increased autonomy.
Starting in the 1950s with the collapse of colonialism and the emergence of the Cold War, formerly colonized countries began to challenge the emerging division between competing great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Many sought to maintain their newly found independence by refusing to constrict their foreign policy to support for one side or the other.3 As one leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser advocated for pan-Arab and pan-African unity with “techniques of remaining independent from the great powers and, if necessary, playing one off against the other.”4
It is worth noting that non-alignment is not the same as neutrality. According to Ambassador Jorge Heine, a leading scholar on Global South politics, neutrality, “by definition, entails an unwillingness to take positions on international matters.”5 On the other hand, Active Non-Alignment (ANA) refers to, “a refusal to align automatically with one or another of the major powers. It means that governments will put their own national interests front and center, rather than those of foreign powers.”6 Egypt has exemplified such non-alignment, both in the twentieth century and in the modern day. Although the country is still considered a regional security and diplomatic ally of the United States, Egypt has been gradually orienting its economy towards China, and has taken a hesitant stance on the recent war in Ukraine due to economic ties with Russia.
Over the past decade, Egypt has courted the U.S. for both political support and military investment, touting itself as a key regional leader in the War on Terror and multilateral peacemaking efforts.7 For instance, Egypt has received approximately $1.3 billion annually from the U.S. Federal Military Financing program since 1987 as a reward for promoting peace with Israel, particularly with regard to its role in the 1979 Camp David Accords and continued brokering of the Gaza ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.8 This makes Egypt “the second largest recipient of American
military aid, after Israel.”9
However, since the nominal amount of aid Egypt receives from the U.S. has remained relatively unchanged since 1987, Egypt has struggled to afford new American military equipment in the face of inflation and pricey technological advances. In response, the country has turned to alternative sources for weapons.10 Between 2000 and 2009, Egypt imported about 75 percent of its weapons from the United States, yet in the following decade, arms imports from the U.S. only measured 23 percent of the total, with Russia and France taking the top spots.11 Egypt then became the third largest arms importer in the world and one of the most diversified countries in the MENA region in terms of arms suppliers and military equipment/defense procurement.12 Such a drastic shift away from a near U.S. monopoly on Egypt’s arms imports exemplifies Egypt’s economic and defensive non-alignment by breaking exclusivity in favor of better deals elsewhere. This has not gone unnoticed by the American government. In response to a $24 billion arms purchase from North Korea in January 2016, the Trump Administration withheld $65.7 million from Egypt’s yearly aid package, citing human rights concerns regarding the prosecution of Egyptian NGO workers for operating without government approval.13 Additionally, since prior to the Russia-Ukraine War, Egypt has risked substantial economic sanctions under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act if the country commits to purchasing Russian jets.14 More recently, since 2019, members of U.S. Congress have pushed to withhold military aid from the Egyptian government over alleged human rights
abuses, leading to President Biden’s decision to reprogram $130 million initially meant for Egypt’s military.15 In the words of U.S. General Frank McKenzie, “Compared to the amount of other money that’s in play, it’s a very small amount. But I think it’s intended to be a signal…We still have a very robust weapons program with Egypt and we're still very heavily engaged with them.”16 Symbolically, the American aid reprogramming marks a significant public challenge to U.S.-Egypt relations. In this case, Washington has demonstrated that it is serious about clamping down on what it considers unsavory Egyptian domestic policies.
In addition, the U.S. still maintains significant economic and political influence over Egypt through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As of July 2022, the state’s public debt has reached 94 percent of its GDP, a condition the IMF has repeatedly attempted to mend by making loans to Egypt that are conditional upon the country’s commitment to free-market reform.17 This conditionality has strained Egypt-IMF relations, compounding existing mistrust from previous imperial financial control.18 That being said, Egypt has already received three loans since 2016 totaling over $20 billion and has requested further funds in March 2023 to mitigate the effects of the war in Ukraine.19 Yet, according to MENA scholar Michaël Tanchum, these loans come “with the stipulation that [Egypt] cuts spend-
ing on food and fuel subsidies, changes that successive Egyptian governments have been slow to make because of fear of igniting popular unrest,” particularly since the 1977 ‘Bread Riots.’20
Reliance on a U.S.-led institution— such as the IMF—limits Egypt’s autonomy by granting the U.S. significant say in Egypt’s finances.21 Empirical analysis reveals that “movement toward the United States within a defined international political space (like that measured by U.N. voting patterns) can significantly increase a country’s chances of receiving a loan from the IMF.”22 Using channels such as the IMF, Washington focuses primarily on pulling states into its sphere of influence and punishing those who defect, rather than rewarding those consistently loyal to the U.S.23 In doing so, countries with already stronger ties to the U.S. see relatively little rewards for their dedication besides not receiving any punishment through institutional proxies. This explains a trend seen throughout the Global South, wherein wealthy countries’ near absolute control over developing states’ economic institutions have resulted in the degradation of labor rights and environmental regulations in favor of wealthy business ventures.24 Hence, through IMF loans, the U.S. infringes upon Egyptian sovereignty while offering little reward for Egypt’s loyalty in return.
A similar trend in Western political influence through Bretton Woods institutions is also seen in the World Bank’s responses to Chinese foreign aid in Egypt. Empirical evidence reveals that “there might be some limited punishment or signaling of disapproval for recipients of Chinese aid, suggesting some degree of the World Bank serving as a proxy for U.S. power.”25 Preliminary evidence demonstrates that loan conditions for countries throughout Africa worsen in relation to Chinese aid received, while the same countries are more likely to receive full debt cancellation
if Chinese aid is minimal or nonexistent.26 Ultimately, analysis of the IMF and World Bank reveals an intention on the part of the U.S. to exploit such institutions in pursuit of American interests, thus threatening Egypt with economic damage if the country cultivates ties to American adversaries like Russia and China.
As the U.S. has become an increasingly difficult partner to work with, China has presented a valuable alternative for Egypt, particularly in the past decade with the advent of the Belt and Road Initiative.27 However, the origins of Sino-Egyptian relations date to the mid twentieth century, when “Egypt was the first Arab and African country to establish direct diplomatic relations with China in 1956.”28 Egypt was also the first recipient of a Chinese foreign grant, receiving $4.5
million during the Suez Crisis.29 Since then, China has gained significant influence throughout the Middle East and North Africa, thanks to a non-interventionist doctrine coupled with a lack of colonialist history in the region.30 This stands in sharp contrast to the frequent American military interventions that have defined US-MENA policy for over two decades.31 As political scientist Mojtaba Mahdavi of the University of Alberta explains it, “MENA’s unique geostrategic location–a trade hub linking three continents–is of great interest to China, and [China’s] respect for state sovereignty and the non-intervention policy seem to work for both sides.”32
Indeed, China and Egypt have found general agreement on regional policy. Both have committed to a joint communique focusing on economic development and investment to promote stability in the Global South.33 Years after Nasser’s Aswan Dam, Egypt has once more embarked on foreign-funded mega projects, including a high-speed rail line from the Germans and a nuclear power plant from the Russians.34 However, China has taken a prominent lead in these ventures. 35 Most notably, the Chinese State Construction and Engineering Company has a principal role in building Egypt’s new administrative capital outside of Cairo, funding about 80 percent of the $3 billion cost for its central business district.36
China is also the largest investor in the Suez Canal industrial zone, and has actively invested in key Egyptian ports, railway networks, and renewable energy–especially solar under Egypt’s Integrated Sustainable Energy Strategy.37 The latter investment has assisted Egypt significantly in shifting from a nation with chronic energy shortages to one with a surplus which it can now export.38 These Belt and Road Initiative programs boost Egypt’s political and economic status, providing welcome infrastructure for long-run development, an appealing prospect compared to the American model of economic coercion.
U.S.-China competition in Egypt has also influenced the Egyptian arms trade and development banks. In 2018, Egypt made a deal to purchase Chinese drones for their air force, along with a loan agreement for $600 million from the China Develop-
ment Bank.39 Although both the purchase and the loan agreement were relatively small, this partnership has ultimately proved quite beneficial to Egypt in opening the door for further diversification of Egyptian relations beyond US-led institutions. China’s policy of non-intervention and their willingness to support development on a more equal footing has made China significantly more attractive to Egypt as a partner, drawing the country further away from the United States.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has exacerbated great-power tensions, placing Global South countries in a precarious position due to ties to both blocs. On February 24, 2022, Egypt embraced ambiguity with an initial call
for Russia and Ukraine to end the conflict by “following a diplomatic path.”40 However, in response to pressure from the West (particularly the G7 and the EU), Egypt joined a statement on March 1, 2022, declaring support for Ukraine. Shortly thereafter, Egypt voted in the UN General Assembly on March 2, 2022 condemning the invasion and demanding that Russian troops withdraw from Ukraine.41
Egypt’s initial hesitancy to publicly condemn Russia’s actions likely stems from the country’s strengthening its military ties with Russia in recent years, as well as its reliance on Russian trade to feed its domestic population.42 Egypt is the world’s largest importer of wheat and a top-ten importer of sunflower oil, with 85 percent of the former and 73 percent of the latter coming from Russia and Ukraine.43 Michaël Tanchum notes that bread “is a staple of every meal among the country’s poor…Keeping the price of Egypt's staple food affordable has been the bedrock of regime stability since the Free Officers revolution brought then-President Gamal Abdel Nasser to power 60 years ago.”44 A harsher Egyptian stance promoting retribution for Russia due to its belligerence could compound Egypt’s preexisting food insecurity in light of decreased Ukrainian exports from the war.
On the other hand, the Russia-Ukraine war also presents potential economic benefits in terms of Egypt’s relations with Western Europe. The Arab state is currently Africa’s third largest producer of natural gas, and although the move to renewable energy has sparked concerns that this sector will soon decline, the risk that the war in Ukraine may cut Europe’s gas supply from Russia has heightened European demand for natural gas imports.45 Subsequently, Egypt has seen a sharp rise in demand for its own natural gas supply, resulting in a recent deal whereby Egypt and Israel have both agreed to boost exports to Europe in order to prevent widespread freezing in the coming winter.46 By taking a stance
in non-alignment that balances both Russia and the West in the War in Ukraine, Egypt is able to mitigate a potential food crisis while also gaining economically in the market for natural gas.
Egypt’s position as a longtime U.S. ally has shifted in recent years as the country has reemerged as a practitioner of non-alignment via increased ties with China and Russia and a deliberate distancing from Western influence. Through dealing with countries outside the Western bloc, Egypt is able to better guarantee its own interests with beneficial trade deals, rewarding investments, and minimized political exploitation from Western-led international financial institutions. Much like in its past, Egypt’s position at the threshold between multiple regions and their competing interests makes non-alignment a sound method of both cementing peace and stability in Egypt, and increasing economic welfare by refusing to put all its eggs in the American basket. Due to consistent Great Power interest in the region, other MENA countries might consider following suit in adopting a policy of Active Non-Alignment to balance foreign influences and therefore secure further growth both economically and politically.
1 Carlos Fortín, Jorge Heine, and Carlos Ominami P., eds., El no alineamiento activo y América Latina: una doctrina para el nuevo siglo, Primera edición (Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2021); Non-Alignment 2.0, vol. 21 (Beijing, China: Taihei Institute Observer, 2022), http://www.taiheglobal.org/Content/2022/06-30/1115477342.html.
2 Carlos Fortín, Jorge Heine, and Carlos Ominami P., eds., El no alineamiento activo y América Latina: una doctrina para el nuevo siglo, Primera edición (Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2021); Non-Alignment 2.0, vol. 21 (Beijing, China: Taihei Institute Observer, 2022), http://www.taiheglobal.org/ Content/2022/06-30/1115477342.html.
3 “History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement,” Government of India Ministry of External Affairs, accessed October 1, 2022, https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement.
4 Peter Mansfield, “Nasser and Nasserism,” International Journal 28, no. 4 (1973): 676, https://doi.org/10.2307/40201172.
5 Jorge Heine, “The War in Ukraine and the Active Non-Alignment Option,” Taihe Institute Observer 21 (June 2022): 4–5.
6 Heine, 4–5.
7 Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt: Background and US Relations” (Congressional Research Service, July 13, 2022), 9–12, https:// sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf.
8 Sahar Khamis, “Agreements and Tensions in US-Egyptian Relations,” Arab Center Washington DC, December 2, 2021, https:// arabcenterdc.org/resource/agreements-and-tensions-in-us-egyptian-relations/; Sharp, “Egypt: Background and US Relations,” 4.
9 Khamis, “Agreements and Tensions in US-Egyptian Relations.”
10 Sharp, “Egypt: Background and US Relations,” 4.
11 Marina Ottaway, “Egypt and the Allure of Military Power | Wilson Center,” accessed October 1, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/egypt-and-allure-military-power.
12 Ottaway; Thomas Clayton et al., “Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy,” n.d., 15.
13 Sharp, “Egypt: Background and US Relations,” 11; Declan Walsh, “Need a North Korean Missile? Call the Cairo Embassy,”
The New York Times, March 3, 2018, sec. World, https://www. nytimes.com/2018/03/03/world/middleeast/egypt-north-koreasanctions-arms-dealing.html; Amina Ismail and Haitham Ahmed, “Egyptian Court Acquits 40 NGO Workers Whose Case Strained Ties with U.S.,” Reuters, December 20, 2018, sec. Emerging Markets, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-usa-idUSKCN1OJ0WR.
14 Sharp, “Egypt: Background and US Relations,” 7–8.
15 Siobhan O’Grady, “Biden Administration Set to Withhold $130 Million from Egypt over Human Rights Concerns,” Washington Post, accessed October 2, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/28/egypt-human-rights-military-aid/; U. S. Mission Egypt, “EGYPT 2021 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT,” U.S. Embassy in Egypt, July 17, 2022, https://eg.usembassy.gov/ egypt-2021-human-rights-report/.
16 Phil Stewart and Aidan Lewis, “American General in Egypt for Talks after U.S. Cuts Military Aid,” Reuters, February 9, 2022, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/american-general-egypt-talks-after-us-cuts-military-aid-2022-02-09/.
17 Sharp, “Egypt: Background and US Relations,” 24; Michaël Tanchum, “The Russia-Ukraine War Has Turned Egypt’s Food Crisis into an Existential Threat to the Economy,” Middle East Institute, March 3, 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-ukraine-war-has-turned-egypts-food-crisis-existential-threateconomy; Steven A. Cook, “Egypt and the IMF: It’s Complicated,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 10, 2012, https:// www.cfr.org/blog/egypt-and-imf-its-complicated.
18 Sharp, “Egypt: Background and US Relations,” 24; Tanchum, “The Russia-Ukraine War Has Turned Egypt’s Food Crisis into an Existential Threat to the Economy”; Cook, “Egypt and the IMF.”
19 “IMF: Prioritize Social Protection in Egypt Loan Talks,” Human Rights Watch (blog), April 4, 2022, https://www. hrw.org/news/2022/04/04/imf-prioritize-social-protection-egypt-loan-talks.
20 Sharp, “Egypt: Background and US Relations,” 24; Tanchum, “The Russia-Ukraine War Has Turned Egypt’s Food Crisis into an Existential Threat to the Economy.”
21 Strom C. Thacker, “The High Politics of IMF Lending,” World Politics 52, no. 1 (1999): 41–42.
22 Thacker, 67–69.
23 Ibid.
24 Jason Hickel et al., “Imperialist Appropriation in the World Economy: Drain from the Global South through Unequal Exchange, 1990–2015,” Global Environmental Change 73 (March 1, 2022): 9, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102467.
25 Anne Malin Marie Schuemann, “World Bank Reactions to
Chinese Aid in Africa: A Story of Great Power Competition?,” June 2022, 40–41, https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/3769/ files/Schuemann%20Thesis%2C%20CIR%2C%20June%202022. pdf.
26 Schuemann, 40–41.
27 Thacker, “The High Politics of IMF Lending”; Schuemann, “World Bank Reactions to Chinese Aid in Africa: A Story of Great Power Competition?”; Hickel et al., “Imperialist Appropriation in the World Economy: Drain from the Global South through Unequal Exchange, 1990–2015.”
28 Mohamed El Dahshan, “Egyptian Exceptionalism in a Chinese-Led World,” Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, February 10, 2021, https://www.chathamhouse. org/2021/02/egyptian-exceptionalism-chinese-led-world.
29 El Dahshan.
30 Mojtaba Mahdavi, The Triple Pillar of Sino–MENA Relations in the Age of Neoliberalism (Brill, 2022), 18, https://doi. org/10.1163/9789004510005_003.
31 Mahdavi, 18.
32 Ibid.
33 Yossra M. Taha, Sino–Egyptian Relations and the New Regional Dynamics of the Middle East (Brill, 2022), 224, https://doi. org/10.1163/9789004510005_013.
34 Sean Mathews, “The Competition for Egypt: China, the West, and Megaprojects,” accessed September 1, 2022, https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/15/the-competition-for-egypt-chinathe-west-and-mega-projects.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Mathews; John Calabrese, “Towering Ambitions: Egypt and China Building for the Future,” Middle East Institute, accessed September 1, 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/towering-ambitions-egypt-and-china-building-future.
38 Mathews, “The Competition for Egypt”; Calabrese, “Towering Ambitions.”
39 Taha, Sino–Egyptian Relations and the New Regional Dynamics of the Middle East, 225.
40 “Egypt Calls for Diplomatic Solution for Russian-Ukrainian Crisis,” State Information Service, February 24, 2022, https:// www.sis.gov.eg/Story/163585?lang=en-us.
41 Khalil Al-Anani, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: Egypt’s Limited Room for Maneuver,” Arab Center Washington DC, April 6, 2022, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/russias-war-on-ukraineegypts-limited-room-for-maneuver/.
42 Khalil Al-Anani, “Growing Relations between Egypt and Russia: Strategic Alliance or Marriage of Convenience?,” Arab Center Washington DC, September 27, 2021, https://arabcenterdc.org/ resource/growing-relations-between-egypt-and-russia-strategic-alliance-or-marriage-of-convenience/.
43 Tanchum, “The Russia-Ukraine War Has Turned Egypt’s Food Crisis into an Existential Threat to the Economy.”
44 Ibid.
45 Rehab R. Esily et al., “The Potential Role of Egypt as a Natural Gas Supplier: A Review,” Energy Reports 8 (November 2022): 6826–36, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2022.05.034.
46 Sarah El Safty and Ari Rabinovitch, “EU, Israel and Egypt Sign Deal to Boost East Med Gas Exports to Europe,” Reuters, June 15, 2022, sec. Energy, https://www.reuters.com/business/ energy/eu-israel-egypt-sign-deal-boost-east-med-gas-exports-europe-2022-06-15/.
Maps by: Sam WuAs global temperatures rise and nations around the world face ever intensifying environmental hardship, it is clear that minimizing oil reliance remains the key to ensuring a prosperous future for generations to come: the Gulf region, with its historic dependence upon oil for both energy and trade, is no exception.
Due to the region’s historical ties to the oil industry, energy and energy governance in the Gulf have cultivated strong alliances, power dynamics, and economic and social systems that dictate foreign relations. Ultimately, a country’s performance in the oil industry and, by extension its wealth, determines the political hierarchy of the region. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Oman, contribute to one fifth of global oil production, 1 wherein 691,000 barrels of crude oil are exported daily to the United States. 2 The GCC was founded in 1981 with headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 3 With the exception of Bahrain and Oman, all GCC countries are also members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Collectively, the GCC countries in OPEC produce roughly 15.9 million barrels of oil per day. 4 Ultimately, oil abundance and high export rates heighten GCC member states’ responsibility to transition to more sustainable sources of energy, a move which presents opportunities for economic gain, such as a diversified investment portfolio and a first mover advantage presaging a global shift
away from oil dependency.
According to the International Energy Agency, “CO2 emissions from energy and industry have increased by 60 percent” since 1992, 5 while global CO2 emissions in 2021 have reached their highest levels. 6 Moreover, the humanitarian and environmental costs make oil prosperity a finite economic security solution. Ultimately, countries transitioning to clean energy should embrace cooperation and multilateralism on an international scale, but more importantly, at the regional level. Regional cooperation in the Gulf can ensure a secure and stable transition period, while also allowing GCC states to capitalize on their shared cultural values in a self-sustaining future economy.
All six GCC countries have signed onto the Global Methane Pledge (GMP), launched in November 2021. The pledge aims to reduce “global methane emissions” and “keep the goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius within reach.” 7 According to the GMP, methane’s short life expectancy has accounted for 50 percent of the net rise in global average temperatures since the pre-industrial era. 8 Following the October 2021 announcement that Saudi Arabia will be joining the GMP pledge, Saudi Minister of Energy Khalid Al-Falih noted in that year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference that “more than 53 Saudi initiatives have been published, with more than 185 billion dollars of investment,” to help
facilitate the pledge’s ambitions. 9 Furthermore, the UAE has successfully reduced the quantity of natural gas flared in its domestic energy sector by 90 percent over the past five decades 10 and invested in “$17 billion in clean energy projects in six continents around the world.” 11 Bahrain, although responsible for only 0.07 percent of global emissions, aims to reach net-zero emissions by 2060, while decreasing emissions to 30 percent by 2035 through decarbonization efforts. 12 According to the US Department of State, the Global Methane Pledge promotes “renewable expansion” in oilproducing countries that can “reduce domestic gas consumption and free up gas for export at today’s high market prices.” 13
During the Middle East Policy Council’s 109th Capitol Hill Conference, Laura Lochman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy Diplomacy at the US Department of State, applauded the Gulf partners joining the Methane Pledge. However, she encouraged Gulf countries to join the methane Pledge Energy Pathway as well, which focuses on lowering methane emissions in the fossil fuel industry. 14 Additionally, Lochman honored the GCC’s commitment to devote 3 billion dollars in
support of projects that align with the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII), which supports sustainable infrastructure development in developing nations.
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates comprise three out of the six members of the Net-Zero Producer Forum (NPF), who strive to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 via “methane abatement, advancing the circular carbon economy approach, and the development and deployment of clean-energy and carbon capture and storage technologies.” 15 The NPF was launched in April 2021 by the collective energy ministries of Canada, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. 16 Achieving net-zero emissions requires stabilizing the atmosphere by offsetting–or canceling out–greenhouse gas emissions. 17 In other words, according to National Grid ESO, “(members will) reach net zero when the amount of carbon emissions we add is no more than the amount taken away.” 18 Adam Sieminski, senior advisor to the Board of Trustees of King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center (KAPSARC), emphasizes that the NPF is built on “fostering cooperation” to support the GCC’s sustainability
goals. 19
Other regional strategies include a collaborative effort between the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) and the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) to “develop the Gulf electricity interconnection system and connect it to the southern Iraq network.” 20 Electricity interconnection systems’ high-voltage cables make use of surplus power that is sustainably generated from solar and wind energy, and can be shared among countries. 21 During this summer’s Exploring Potentials of GCC Interconnection forum held in Bahrain, energy leaders across the GCC announced that the interconnection system has ensured 100% power supply and remains a critical step towards ensuring regional energy security. 22 The GCC connection grid has helped reduce Iraq’s dependence upon Iranian energy imports and, according to the Qatar Fund, has granted economic savings worth $3 billion for all GCC countries. 23
Today, transitioning to sustainable energy is as difficult as ever. With the Russia-Ukraine crisis underway and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, global reliance on fossil fuels has only increased. After the Russian government’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western sanctions against the regime have interfered with the clearance of Russian oil transactions. 24 Prior to the war, Russia accounted for approximately 10% of the global oil supply, and 40 percent of the EU’s supply. 25 Although Russian oil is still being imported throughout the world, trade is occurring at a much slower rate, resulting in a large gap in global oil supply. Although the United States has responded to this crisis by requesting increased oil production from OPEC countries, Saudi Arabia released an unexpected announcement on October 22 revealing the Kingdom’s decision to cut 2 million barrels of oil per day going forward. 26 According to Fahad Nazer, official spokesperson for the embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC, “[Saudi Arabia’s] decisions on production levels are strictly determined by supply and demand, … political issues, political considerations, do not take effect.” 27 Regardless, the cut severely threatens international oil supply, and has already caused gas prices to spike again. 28 Ultimately, Although the Kingdom's
motivations for decreasing its oil exports don’t appear to be environmentally driven, proponents of sustainable energy in the Gulf can take advantage of this momentum in pursuit of a stronger transition towards cleaner, safer energy throughout the region.
A central feature of the transition towards cleaner energy sources among the GCC members is cooperation. The Gulf countries have the advantage of sharing close traditions, cultures, and linguistic heritages. 29 Additionally, the countries’ geographic proximity to one another is coupled by possession of similar resources, both naturally and economically. Similarly to the European Union, 30 Gulf Cooperation Council member states form a political and economic bloc, resulting in a unified economic identity. 31
Alejandro Foxley, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, reveals in a 2010 study that “regional trade agreements reach their full potential when the political and ideological differences among participating countries are minimal.” 32 Thus, the Gulf’s collective identity provides a unique economic opportunity for political cooperation. In addition to recent examples, the GCC boasts a history of multilaterlism at the core of the region’s stability and innovation efforts. In 1983, member states ratified a free trade agreement facilitating the movement of goods across nations without the need for individual states’ customs duties. In 2003, GCC countries established a customs union, and in 2008, a common market. Economic unity has garnered economic prosperity for the Gulf region as a whole:
GCC Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Negotiation Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg claims that “combined GCC GDP is about $1.6 trillion, representing eightfold growth” from 1981, when the council was originally formed. 33 Furthermore, the volume of trade exchange between member states has ranked ninth globally at roughly $1,000 billion as of 2021. 34
The numerous initiatives ratified and the regional cooperation they have inspired have been immensely beneficial to the Gulf countries. However, such projects cannot be sustained in the absence of adequate human capital. The conversion to sustainable energy must be accompanied and supplemented by advances in the labor force, investments both internal and foreign, and the development of initiatives that generate income through non-energy sectors. For instance, rebuilding the Gulf economy on knowledge-based rather than oil-based foundations, as professors Walter W. Powell and Kaisa Snellman at Stanford University explain, would cultivate “a greater reliance on intellectual capabilities than on physical inputs or natural resources.” 35 Developing a knowledge-based economy entails subsidizing and encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) in areas like the educational sector. 36 Such efforts are exemplified in the GCC’s various national visions, such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar’s Vision 2030, Kuwait Vision 2035, UAE’s Vision 2021, and Oman’s Vision 2040. Each of these projects aim at decreasing oil-dependence through human development. For instance, Qatar’s Vision 2030 asserts that “future economic success will increasingly depend on the ability of the Qatari people to deal with a new international order that is knowledge-based and extremely competitive.” 37 Additionally, each GCC country has agreed to provide a government-funded scholarship program for selected students studying abroad, which includes a monthly stipend and health insurance. 38
By offering citizens the tools to gather knowledge from other developed countries, the GCC is investing in the recirculation of that knowledge back into the Gulf economy. The majority of the Gulf’s population is under the age of 40, granting the region a unique advantage
in a population that is capable of integrating into the workforce and aiding in economic progression that accelerates the transition to clean energy. 39 Undoubtedly, it is crucial to ensure that such initiatives are well structured and managed efficiently, which requires a solid telecommunications framework. Moreover, strengthening the knowledge sector and subsidizing the educational field should also be coupled with ensuring there are sovereign wealth funds (defined by International Monetary Fund as “special investment funds created or owned by governments to hold foreign assets for long-term purposes” 40) to stabilize the economy on a long-term basis.
Importantly, investing in non-energy sector fields, like tourism and entertainment, aids in solidifying a national source of income that is non-reliant on natural resources and can generate more employment opportunities. Saudi’s Vision 2030 focuses on developing cultural tourism by capitalizing on the nation’s traditions and tribal heritage to attract tourists from abroad, while also motivating citizens to travel domestically. 41 The UAE’s entertainment sector is estimated to expand at a compound annual growth rate of 9 percent from 2021 to 2028. 42 Additionally, the UAE is striving to become the region’s motion picture hub under the Abu Dhabi Film Commission’s production incentives. 43 For instance, the commission provides a 30 percent cashback rebate on feature films, television dramas, commercials, and etc. 44 Furthermore, in 2019, Abu Dhabi agreed to waive licensing and registration fees for companies and freelancers for their first two years of work as a means to attract foreign direct investment. 45 In Kuwait, revenues from travel and tourism are expected to rise to $1.13 billion by 2025, creating greater demand for hotels and resorts, and encouraging foreign direct investment. 46 Environmental concerns aside, Bahrain has recently launched a $427 million waterfront development project encompassing luxury hotels, restaurants, and other attractions, as well as an exhibition space worth $221 million that is expected to be the largest in the Middle East. 47 Lastly, Qatar is home to two of the world’s largest international broadcasting companies, Al
Jazeera and beIN Media Group. 48 Prior to the FIFA World Cup, Qatar had announced its launching of an “entertainment island” called Qetaifan Island North and Fuwairit Kite Beach. 49 Capitalizing on the growing prevalence of entertainment in an individual state’s economy may sustain future growth for all GCC countries developing their entertainment industry.
Similarly, tourism fuels economic growth by generating employment opportunities. According to the World Travel and Tourism Council, “tourism is a driver of job growth and economic prosperity, accounting for one in ten jobs worldwide and delivering one in five of all new jobs created in 2017.” 50 Furthermore, according to the World Tourism Organization (WTO), the opportunities for women in the tourism industry are steadily increasing in the Middle East. The WTO’S Regional Report on Women in Tourism in the Middle East, published alongside the Ministry of Tourism in Saudi Arabia in 2021, highlights the inclusion of women in the region’s tourism sector. Investing in domestic tourism also aids in retaining more money within the GCC. Gulf nationals have a history of spending their disposable income abroad on leisure and travel; for instance, Saudi tourists have spent over a billion dollars in the United Kingdom in 2017, 51 while Qatari investors by 2017 have owned more property in the UK than the late Queen Elizabeth II. Keeping more money within the country means that the funds can recirculate back to the economy and aid in funding institutions that develop human capital.
As global leaders in oil production and exports, how will the GCC countries’ geopolitical standing change once they can no longer depend upon fossil fuels? Investments in sustainable energy and the signing of regional agreements that capitalize on the cooperation between Gulf countries aid in decreasing the Gulf’s dependence on oil. Investments in non-oil sectors and foreign direct investment in developing fields create a strong foundation for sustaining the transition toward clean energy. Furthermore, such initiatives and investments must be backed up by a skilled workforce that is capable of executing and integrating the projects into the GCC’s economy. Although the shift away from fossil fuel production will present challenges to the GCC, the region must act quickly towards decreasing oil-dependency.
1 Ling Zhu Tokhir N Mirzoev, “The Future of Oil and Fiscal Sustainability in the GCC Region,” IMF, accessed September 26, 2022, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/DepartmentalPapers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2020/01/31/The-Future-of-Oiland-Fiscal-Sustainability-in-the-GCC-Region-48934.
2 “U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIAIndependent Statistics and Analysis,” EIA, accessed September 26, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/opendata/v1/ qb.php?category=1039874.
3 “GCC.” The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, June 23, 2021. https://www.gcc-sg.org/en-us/Pages/ default.aspx.
4 “U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIAIndependent Statistics and Analysis,” EIA, accessed September 26, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/opendata/v1/ qb.php?category=1039874.
5 “Net Zero by 2050 – Analysis,” IEA, June 1, 2022, https:// www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050.
6 “Global Energy Review: CO2 Emissions in 2021 – Analysis,” IEA, accessed September 27, 2022, https://www.iea.org/reports/ global-energy-review-co2-emissions-in-2021-2.
7 “United States, European Union, and Partners Formally Launch Global Methane Pledge to Keep 1.5C within ReachUnited States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State, November 2, 2021), https://www. state.gov/united-states-european-union-and-partners-formallylaunch-global-methane-pledge-to-keep-1-5c-within-reach/.
8 “Homepage: Global Methane Pledge,” Homepage | Global Methane Pledge, accessed September 28, 2022, https://www. globalmethanepledge.org/#pledges.
9 Unfccc.int, accessed September 30, 2022, https://unfccc.int/ documents/310876.
10 “UAE Joins Global Methane Pledge, Expanding on Legacy as Regional Leader in Methane Reduction,” wam (WAM, February 14, 2022), http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302988050.
11 “United Arab Emirates- High-Level Segment Statement COP 26,” United Nations Climate Change, 2021, https://unfccc. int/documents/311017.
12 “Transitioning to Carbon Neutrality in Bahrain: A Policy Brief,” Arab Gulf Journal of Scientific Research, accessed October 31, 2022, https://www.emerald.com/ insight/content/doi/10.1108/AGJSR-03-2022-0004/full/ html#:~:text=Bahrain%20has%20set%20a%20national,in%20 Bahrain%20can%20be%20achieved.
13 “U.S.-EU Joint Press Release on the Global Methane Pledge Energy Pathway - United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State, June 17, 2022), https://www.state.gov/u-s-eu-joint-press-release-on-the-globalmethane-pledge-energy-pathway/.
14 “U.S.-Gulf Relations,” U.S.-Gulf Relations | Middle East Policy Council, July 29, 2022, https://mepc.org/hill-forums/usgulf-relations.
15 “Joint Statement on Establishing a Net-Zero Producers Forum between the Energy Ministries of Canada, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United States,” Energy.gov, accessed September 30, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/ joint-statement-establishing-net-zero-producers-forumbetween-energy-ministries-canada.
16 Ibid.
17 Sam Fankhauser et al., “The Meaning of Net Zero and How to Get It Right,” Nature News (Nature Publishing Group, December 20, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558021-01245-w.
18 “What Is Net Zero and Zero Carbon?: National Grid
Eso,” What is net zero and zero carbon? | National Grid ESO, accessed October 8, 2022, https://www.nationalgrideso. com/future-energy/net-zero-explained/net-zero-zerocarbon#:~:text=Net%20zero%20is%20all%20about,is%20 given%20off%20at%20all.
19 Adam Sieminski, “Pathways to Meeting Climate Goals with Clean and Affordable Energy,” Taylor & Francis, September 22, 2022, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422 .2022.2107550.
20 “Qatar Fund for Development,” Qatar Fund For Development, August 2, 2022, https://qatarfund.org.qa/en/ qatar-fund-for-development-qffd-cooperates-with-the-gulfcooperation-council-interconnection-authority-gccia-todevelop-the-gulf-electricity-interconnection-system-andconnect-it-to-the-southern-i/.
21 “What Are Electricity Interconnectors?,” National Grid Group, accessed September 30, 2022, https://www.nationalgrid. com/stories/energy-explained/what-are-electricityinterconnectors#:~:text=Electricity%20interconnectors%20 are%20high%2Dvoltage,traded%20and%20shared%20 between%20countries.
22 “Gulf Electric Interconnection Ensures 100% Power Supply,” awsat, 2022, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3732611/ gulf-electric-interconnection-ensures-100-power-supply.
23 Ibid
24 Shanti Menon, “War and Gas: What Russia's War on Ukraine Means for Energy Prices and the Climate,” Environmental Defense Fund, May 9, 2022, https:// www.edf.org/article/war-ukraine-driving-gasprices#:~:text=Second%2C%20the%20conflict%20in%20 Ukraine,have%20a%20gap%20in%20supply.
25 Ibid
26 Person and Alex Lawler Ahmad Ghaddar, “OPEC+ Agrees Deep Oil Production Cuts, Biden Calls It Shortsighted,” Reuters (Thomson Reuters, October 5, 2022), https://www.reuters. com/business/energy/opec-heads-deep-supply-cuts-clash-withus-2022-10-04/.
27 Fahad Nazer, Twitter (Twitter, October 17, 2022), https:// twitter.com/KSAEmbassySpox/status/1582014515855577088.
28 Ibid
29 “Gulf Cooperation Council,” Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc.), accessed October 9, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Gulf-Cooperation-Council.
30 “EU: GCC Summit Is 'a Very Positive Sign',” GCC News | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, December 5, 2017), https://www.aljazeera. com/news/2017/12/5/gcc-and-eu-compared-how-they-workand-why-they-exist#:~:text=The%20GCC%20is%20a%20 political,ties%20between%20the%20member%20states.
31 “What Is a Trading Bloc (Everything You Need to Know in 2019),” WWG, January 18, 2021, https://wwg.eu.com/newsblog/what-is-a-trading-bloc-everything-you-need-to-knowin-2019/.
32 Alejandro Foxley, “Regional Trade Blocs: The Way to the Future? ,” 2010, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/regional_ trade_blocs.pdf.
33 Talat Hafiz, “GCC's 40 Years of Remarkable Economic Achievement,” Arab News, June 2, 2021, https://www.arabnews. com/node/1869471.
34 Ibid
35 Walter W. Powell and Kaisa Snellman, “The Knowledge Economy - Harvard University,” 2004, https://scholar.harvard. edu/files/kaisa/files/powell_snellman.pdf.
36 Ibid
37 “Qatar National Vision 2030,” accessed September 30, 2022, https://www.gco.gov.qa/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/GCO-
QNV-English.pdf.
38 “Safeer,” Safeer, accessed November 1, 2022, https://safeer2. moe.gov.sa/Portal.; “Scholarships,” The official portal of the UAE Government, accessed November 1, 2022, https://u. ae/en/information-and-services/education/scholarships.; “Omani Government Scholarship Program for Bachelor's Programs,” U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State, September 6, 2018), https://educationusa.state.gov/ scholarships/omani-government-scholarship-programbachelors-programs.; “State of Kuwait - Kuwait Government Online,” Kuwait Government Online Scholarship List, accessed November 1, 2022, https://e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/Pages/ eServices/MOHE/ScholarshipList.aspx.; Qatar scholarships, accessed November 1, 2022, https://www.qatarscholarships.qa/ en-US/.; “Scholarships,” Kingdom of bahrain - egovernment portal, accessed November 1, 2022, https://www.bahrain.bh/ scholarships.
39 M.S. Rahman, “(PDF) Age Distribution Model for GCC Countries - Researchgate,” Research Gate, accessed October 1, 2022, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/297678126_ Age_Distribution_Model_For_GCC_Countries.
40 “IMF Global Financial Stability Report -- Financial Market Turbulence: Causes, Consequences, and Policies, October 2007 -- Contents,” International Monetary Fund, accessed September 29, 2022, https://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/ GFSR/2007/02/.
41 Najla Alsweilem, “Will Culture Sell? Saudi Arabia's Take on Tourism,” International Relations Review, 2022.
42 “Investing in Media and Entertainment in the UAE - Ministry of Economy UAE,” accessed October 9, 2022, https://www.moec.gov.ae/documents/20121/0/2022+03+04_ Entertainment+Media+Heat+Map+in+English+2. pdf/280d6734-7c02-460a-f75d-2ca27ec26269?t=1647236818695.
43 Ibid 44 Ibid 45 Ibid
46 “Investing in Kuwait,” Kuwait Direct Investment Promotion Authority, September 25, 2022, https://kdipa.gov.kw/.
47 Nadia Leigh-Hewitson, “New Beaches and the Largest Exhibition Center in the Middle East: Can Bahrain Become a Tourist Hotspot?,” CNN (Cable News Network, March 29, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/29/middleeast/bahraintourism-waterfront-development-spc-intl/index.html.
48 “Ongoing Investments in Qatar's Media Sector Point to an Evolving Market,” Oxford Business Group, April 19, 2017, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/spotlight-ongoinginvestments-point-towards-evolving-market-sector-looksestablish-itself-global.
49 Qatar Tourism, “Five Major Tourism Developments Opening in Qatar before the FIFA World Cup 2022™,” GlobeNewswire News Room (Qatar Tourism, July 20, 2022), https://www.globenewswire.com/en/newsrelease/2022/07/20/2482756/0/en/Five-Major-TourismDevelopments-Opening-in-Qatar-Before-the-FIFA-WorldCup-2022.html.
50 World Travel & Tourism Council, “Tourism Provides Jobs Where They're Needed Most,” Medium (Medium, June 18, 2018), https://worldtraveltourismcouncil.medium. com/tourism-provides-jobs-where-theyre-needed-most200f11ac2029.
51 Charlie Neyra, “London Calling as Saudi Tourists Flock to the British Capital,” Arab News (Arabnews, March 8, 2018), https://www.arabnews.com/node/1261611/saudi-arabia
In August 2014, the Yazidi population, an ethno-religious minority group indigenous to the Northern Sengal (‘Sinjar’ in Arabic) Mountain Region of Iraq, experienced insurmountable change and collective trauma. On the morning of August 3rd, members of the Islamic State, a global terrorist organization concentrated primarily in Iraq and Syria, seized control of Sengal, deploying truckloads of IS militants, who would subsequently launch a violent genocide campaign against the Yazidis. 1
During the Yazidi genocide, men, women, and children were forcibly separated from their families. Men and boys over the age of six were required to convert to Islam and join the Islamic State as military fighters, 2 while women and young girls, also subjected to forced conversion, were captured as hostages and sold into sex slavery, after which they would be trafficked across the Middle East. 3 Many Yazidis attempted escape by migrating up the mountain only to become trapped, facing starvation, dehydration, and inevitable capture. 4 Seven years after the genocide, an estimated 3,000 captured Yazidis were still missing in 2021. 5
The origins of the Islamic State, previously known by the acronyms ISIS or ISIL, trace back to the early 2000s and are rooted in another terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda. 6 IS’ founder, Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, had been a member of Al-Qaeda, but eventually broke away from the group to set up an Islamic ‘caliphate,’ an objective IS has held ever since. The formation of a caliphate would entail a united sovereign state governed by a single Islamic ruler. 7 The Islamic State’s extremist ‘jihadist’ ideology promotes violence as the primary mechanism to achieve political, religious, and territorial ambitions. 8 As the group began to conquer territory in Iraq and Syria, IS’ intolerance toward any individual not considered a ‘true’ Muslim according to its criteria created an environment in which the Yazidi population signified an obstacle to IS’ pursuit of religious homogeneity and, thus, an immediate target for territorial conquest and subjugation. 9
One of the most tragic instances of violence targeted against the Yazidi population is the rape, sexual torture, and enslavement of Yazidi women captured by IS during the genocide. Personal accounts from survivors revealing the level of organization in their transport and containment methods suggest that IS likely premeditated the sexual enslavement of Yazidi women prior to the attack in August. 10 In describing their experience, the majority of victims have maintained that the facilities they were initially brought to had been thoroughly prepared to hold prisoners. 11 Others recounted the transportation mechanisms following their ini -
tial capture: women were forced into large white vans with no windows, ensuring invisibility on the journey. 12 IS’ meticulous planning suggests that the purposes of the Yazidi genocide were not limited to achieving territorial gains in Iraq, but included the additional goal of forcing Yazidi women into the market for sexually enslaved women.
The Islamic State’s atrocities against the Yazidi population are rooted in religious misconceptions and historical tensions in Iraq between Islam and Yazidism, the Yazidi belief system. With around 550,000 followers worldwide (predominantly located in Iraq, Turkey, and Northern Syria 13), Yazidism boasts origins as early as the twelfth century and is thereby considered one of the oldest religions in the world. 14 Dating back to the sixteenth century, when the region was governed under Ottoman rule the persecution of Yazidi people is largely attributed to their worship of the first of seven sacred angels, Taus Malik. According to Yazidi beliefs, Taus Malik fell from the sky and now resides under Mount Sengal, amplifying the spiritual significance of this mountain to the Yazidi population. 15 16 However, this ‘fallen angel’ is interpreted as Satan or the Devil by many monotheistic religions, 17 and the subsequent misinterpretation of the Yazidis as ‘devil worshippers' has isolated the population and subjected them to centuries of faith-based violence. More recently, in the 1970s, the Iraqi government attempted to expel the Yazidi
community from the country by forcing them to migrate away from their ethnic homeland. 18 Scholar Majid Hassan Ali explains how in some cases, non-Yazidis were explicitly encouraged to settle in or around Yazidi villages with the aim of subjecting them to religious violence. 19
In June 2014, two months prior to the Yazidi Genocide, the Islamic State had captured Mosul, Iraq, and was continuing their territorial conquest eastward towards Mount Sengal. 20 As IS moved into the region, they were met with little military resistance. 21 By August of that year, the only defensive force left in Northern Iraq was the Kurdish Government force known as the Peshmerga. 22 The Sengal region is classified as disputed territory by the Iraqi Constitution, and although the area is considered a part of the Niwea Providence, the Kurdish Regional Government had controlled it from 2003 until the summer of 2014. 23 Eventually, and for reasons still unknown today, the Peshmerga deserted their military outposts, leaving the Yazidi population unaware of the incoming attacks and without a safe evacuation route. 24 This rendered the Yazidis completely defenseless in the face of IS’ invasion. 25 Peter Nicolaus and Serkan Yuce have theorized that the Kurdish military forces strategically allowed the Islamic State to invade Sengal in hopes of reconquering the Yazidi held territory after a possible IS defeat down the line. 26 The Peshmerga’s assumed desire for territory likely stems from the large population of Kurdish people inhabiting the area near and around the town of Sengal in Northern Iraq. 27
Ultimately, the Peshmerga’s abandonment had cataclysmic consequences for the Yazidi population and directly threatened the relatively peaceful relations the Yazidis had held previously with their surrounding neighbors. 28 For example, in accordance with Yazidi tradition, the father of a family unit is responsible for selecting a male non-relative as the kefir (or ‘blood brother’) of their son. 29 This process occurs when a young male undergoes circumcision, or sunnat . 30 After the kefir is established, a reciprocal obligation of protection emerges between the Yazidi son and his chosen male protector, 31 which creates a blood-brotherhood, or kerefat , between the men. 32 This partnership is held in fortune and misfortune, and creates kinship between the two families. 33 Traditionally, many Yazidis have chosen Arab and Kurdish individuals to fulfill the role of the kefir , ensuring that the family maintains good relations with its Arab and Kurdish neighbors, yet these bonds have seemingly diminished since IS’ invasion in 2014. Since the genocide, it has been reported that many fathers now select only fellow Yazidi men for this position. 34 This shift in such a salient aspect of Yazidi familial identity is a clear demonstration of the Yazidis’ increased ethnic and religious isolation in response to recent violence.
Regarding the Islamic State’s tolerance and justification of slavery, the terrorist organization employs internal “war spoils” departments responsible for coordinating the flow of natural resources, as well as the sale and movement of enslaved captives throughout conquered territory. 35 Since 2014, this department has organized the capture, sale, and distribution of enslaved Yazidi women, subjecting them to sexual violence sans consequences. 36 Moreover, the classification of Yazidis as religious ‘infidels’ has led to notable discrepancies between the treatment of Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic groups in the territories seized by IS. For instance, Yazidis were not subject to the minority tax ( jizya ) offered to Christians when IS captured the city Mosul in June of 2014. 37 The jizya permitted Christians to maintain their religious faith through monetary compensation and protected them from enslavement. 38 Instead, Yazidis were forced to convert to Islam in place of execution. 39 Obligatory conversion derives from the fact that Yazidis are not considered ‘people of the book’ (a Quranic classification
reserved for Christians, Jews, Muslisms, and occasionally Zoroastrians). 40 Ultimately, the refusal to recognize Yazidism as a legitimate religious affiliation forms the ideological foundation for the violent treatment they have been subjected to throughout history, including during IS' recent genocide. 41
Iraq has refrained from ratifying the Rome Statute, meaning the International Criminal Court (ICC) faces notable challenges in prosecuting the Islamic State for its actions against the country’s Yazidi population in 2014. 42 However, scholars Peter Nicolaus and Serkan Yuce note that the Iraqi Government has formally recognized the attacks on August 3rd as genocide. 43 Additionally, Iraq has been party to the United Nations Genocide Convention since 1959, yet, the government lacks the legislation and judicial recourse required to properly prosecute the Islamic State. 44 Therefore, if the United Nations Security Council were to refer one of the prosecution cases from Iraq to the ICC, the prosecutors of the ICC would be able to begin collecting evidence for trial. 45 Of equal importance is the international prosecution process for those guilty of committing sexual violence and enslavement during conflict. In May of 1993, the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) formally classified rape a crime under international law. 46 This decision signified a landmark moment in interpreting the atrocities of wartime rape as acts of violence rather than as acts against one’s honor and social status. 47 Furthermore, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum indicated in a report in 2016 that there exists ample evidence collected from survivors that the sexual violence, rape, and slavery experienced by Yazidi women qualifies as a prosecutable offense under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 48 The ICC Rome Statute defines “crimes against humanity” as including the forcible displacement of a civilian population. 49 The statute further classifies “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”, as such crimes. 50 One of the most jarring pieces documenting the traumatic and violent enslavement of Yazidi women is a highly circulated video of IS members openly discussing the buying
and selling of Yazidi women as sex slaves. 51 One IS member stated, “Today is the day of [female] slaves and we should have our share.” 52 Another individual can be heard saying, “Where is my Yazidi girl?” 53 The lack of international accountability against IS members is no less inexcusable when recorded footage such as this exists.
In Rukmini Callimachi’s article with the New York Times, she describes an interview conducted with a 12 year old Yazidi girl who successfully escaped her enslavement. 54 The girl recounts the religious-based ‘justifications’ an IS fighter repeatedly vocalized after violently abusing her. 55 Ultimately, he maintained that her status as a non-believer meant that it would not be considered a sin for him to subject her to rape and sexual torture. 56 IS fighters have continuously justified the enslavement of Yazidi women with the perception of non-Muslims as non-human, a line of thinking that represents an extreme and thoroughly opposed misinterpretation of Islam. 57 IS’ unfounded and warped claims about Islam serve as catalysts for the organization’s violent activities, not as accurate representations of the vast majority of those who practice Islam. 58
In addition to the physical trauma inflicted upon Yazidi women through rape, the sexual enslavement of a Yazidi woman is believed to strip her of her honor, a value of extreme importance in Yazidi culture. 59 After the genocide initially began,
widespread fears emerged that women who escaped captivity would not be permitted to re-join their community due to their honor being violated in the eyes of her community. 60 Such exclusion risks severely impacting the birth rate of the Yazidi population, threatening the extinction of the community since conversion into Yazidism is not permitted. 61 (In an attempt to mitigate this risk, Yazidi leader Baba Sheikh issued a religious exemption in 2015 which explicitly allowed for survivors to rejoin the community and participate in a cleansing believed to restore the religious honor of victims of sexual assault and enslavement. 62) The culmination of video evidence and survivor interviews possibly illuminates the true intent behind the systemic sexual abuse of Yazidi women: to ethnically cleanse the Yazidi population through rape, torture, and enslavement.
Beyond holding identified IS members legally accountable for their crimes, Francis O’Connor and Rosa Burç of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt emphasize the importance of a collective international effort to re-establish a politically and economically secure homeland in the Sengal region for the Yazidi community. 63 The forced regional displacement of Yazidis since the capture of their homeland has sparked a mass refugee crisis: around 300,000 Yazidis have been relocated to approximately 20 refugee camps within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG). 64 These locations are
overcrowded with refugees from various countries, severely underfunded, and lack the resources to adequately care for asylum seekers. 65 The severe loss of infrastructure in the Northern Senegal region also represents a barrier to the Yazidi population achieving stability in Iraq. Thus, it is vital that the Iraqi government re-establish border security at Sengal to allow the Yazidis who are willing and able to return to do so while mitigating future security risk. The creation of an autonomous territory and the protection of their primary holy site Mount Sengal will enable the Yazidis to restore their community and prevent their ethnic identity and cultural traditions from future erasure.
On a personal level, Yazidis face severe psychological barriers to their return to a state of stability. It is estimated that up to 50 percent of the population has experienced various forms of traumatic and post-traumatic stress disorder. 66 For a report issued by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 2015, interviewers traveled to various camps across Iraq and Syria to speak with genocide survivors. Every single Yazidi they conversed with named a family member or friend who was missing or reportedly kidnapped. 67 Although humanitarian assistance directed towards Yazidis thus far has overlooked treatment for genocide-inflicted trauma, a program launched in Germany seeks to mitigate this scarcity.
In 2015, Professor Jan Kizilhan, a Yazidi expert and psychologist, established a special visa arrangement for Yazidi women and children to be brought into Germany and receive psychological care. 68 The project was initially created for a group of around 1,000 Yazidis. 69 In a live interview with a German newspaper, Kizilhan explains the features of his program and the necessity to combat multi-generational and genocide related trauma within the Yazidi community. 70 He places emphasis on survival and reveals that the Yazidi population has experienced 74 genocides in the last 800 years, which have left lasting impact on individuals’ mental and emotional wellbeing. 71 While Professor Kizillhan’s program specifically focused on assisting young Yazidi women who had escaped the captivity of IS members, his approach serves as a model for long-term psychological care and intervention on behalf of the Yazidi population.
In her formal address to the United Nations in 2019, Amal Clooney amplifies pleas from sur -
vivors to prosecute IS members and declares that, regardless of the decline in territorial and political power of the Islamic State, no individual who participated in the Yazidi Genocide should live free of consequence. 72 In order to successfully aid in the recovery from the physical, psychological, and sexual trauma that the Yazidi community has faced since the Islamic State’s attack in August 2014, the international community must take decisive steps to prevent the continued endangerment of the population. The first move towards accountability would be the prosecution of identifiable IS militants, leaders, and members who participated in the genocide, sexual enslavement, rape, and human trafficking of the Yazidi people. Legal action could take place within Iraq’s national courts, or the United Nations Security Council and the ICC could sponsor and supervise the collection of evidence for trial within the ICC’s court. 73 The second step towards recovery would entail the Iraqi government securing Mount Sengal by granting the Yazidis politically autonomous status over the territory. 74 This would grant the community safe return and minimize security risk. Further, it would provide Yazidis a safe environment to rebuild political and cultural stability within, thus strengthening their ethnic identity and recultivating their sacred relationship to the mountain. Thirdly, it is vital to provide the community sufficient treatment with which to recover from the psychological trauma accompanying the experience of genocidal attack. Professor Jan Kizilhan’s treatment program represents a strong reference point that can initiate the process of providing Yazidis the psychological care necessary to alleviate the trauma IS has inflicted upon the community. While the scars and trauma of the Yazidi genocide will never fully heal, it is the duty of the international community to ensure that events like these cease to take place without consequence or accountability.
1 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç. “ENDANGERED FUTURE: Yezidis in Post-Genocide Iraq and the Need for International Support.” Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24412.
2 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce. “Sex-Slavery: One Aspect of the Yezidi Genocide.” Iran & the Caucasus 21, no. 2 (2017): 196–229. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44631115.
3 Rukmini, Callimachi, “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape”, The New York Times, August 13th, 2015, https://www.nytimes. com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theologyof-rape.html.
4 Abouzeid, Rania. “WHEN THE WEAPONS FALL SILENT: RECONCILIATION IN SINJAR AFTER ISIS.” European
Council on Foreign Relations, 2018. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/resrep21655.
5 Arraf, Jane, and Sangar Khaleel. “3,000 Yazidis Are Still Missing. Their Families Know Where Some of Them Are.” The New York Times. The New York Times, October 3, 2021. https:// www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/world/middleeast/yazidismissing-isis.html
6 Johnsen, Gregory D. “The Rise of ISIS.” Great Decisions, 2016, 13–24. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44214817.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Rukmini, Callimachi. 11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç.
14 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Yazīdī." Encyclopedia Britannica, September 5, 2022. https://www. britannica.com/topic/Yazidi.
15 “They Came to Destroy: IS Crimes Against Yazidis”, United Nations High Commision, Human Rights Council, 15 June 2016, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/ HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf.
16 “Yezidis Faith ديانتنا.” Yezidis, Yazidi International , http:// www.yezidisinternational.org/abouttheyezidipeople/religion/.
17 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia.
18 Ali, Majid Hassan. “The Forced Displacement of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Disputed Areas in Iraq: A Case Study of the Post-2014 Yazidi Minority.” AlMuntaqa 5, no. 1 (2022): 76–89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48677172.
19 Ibid.
20 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç.
21 “They Came to Destroy: IS Crimes Against Yazidis”.
22 Ibid.
23 Abouzeid, Rania.
24 “They Came to Destroy: IS Crimes Against Yazidis”.
25 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç.
26 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.
27 “Who Are the Kurds?” BBC News, BBC, 15 Oct. 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440.
28 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.
29 Ibid.
30 Nicolaus, Peter. “Yezidi Circumcision and BloodBrotherhood (Including the Circumcision of the Dead).” Iran & the Caucasus 20, no. 3/4 (2016): 325–45. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/44631091.
31 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.
32 Nicolaus, Peter.
33 Ibid.
34 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.
35 Ibid.
36 Chertoff, Emily. “Prosecuting Gender-Based Persecution: The Islamic State at the ICC.” The Yale Law Journal 126, no. 4 (2017): 1050–1117. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44863340.
37 Ali, Majid Hassan. “The Forced Displacement of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Disputed Areas in Iraq: A Case Study of the Post-2014 Yazidi Minority.” AlMuntaqa 5, no. 1 (2022): 76–89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48677172.
38 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.
39 Ali, Majid Hassan.
40 Ibid.
41 “The People of the Book and the Hierarchy of Discrimination.” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2015. https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/ iraq/case-study/background/people-of-the-book.
42 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. 45 Ibid.
46 Jarvis, Michelle. “PROSECUTING CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE CRIMES: HOW FAR HAVE WE PROGRESSED AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
SOME THOUGHTS BASED ON ICTY EXPERIENCE.” In Imagining Law: Essays in Conversation with Judith Gardam, edited by Dale Stephens and Paul Babie, 105–32. University of Adelaide Press, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.20851/j. ctt1sq5x0z.9.
47 Ibid.
48 Kikoler, Naomi, “Our Generation Is Gone” the Islamic State Targeting of Iraqi Minorities in Ninewa. 2015. United States Holocaust and Memorial Museum, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide. https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/IraqBearing-Witness-Report-111215.pdf.
49 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, Article 7, para 4.
50 Ibid.
51 Winer, Stuart. “IS Fighters Talk of Buying Yazidi Girls as Slaves for $100-$300.” The Times of Israel, November 5, 2014. https://www.timesofisrael.com/is-fighters-talk-of-buying-yazidigirls-as-slaves-for-100-300/.
52 Ibid. 53 Ibid.
54 Rukmini, Callimachi. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid.
57 “Jan Kizilhan: On the Yezidi Trauma.”
58 Halimi, Mahfuh Bin Haji, and Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman. “RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM: CHALLENGING EXTREMIST AND JIHADIST PROPAGANDA.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 13, no. 1 (2021): 112–17. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26979991. 59 Nicolaus, Peter, and Serkan Yuce. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid 62 Ibid. 63 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç. 64 Ibid 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid 67 Kikoler, Naomi. 68 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç. 69 Ibid. 70 “Jan Kizilhan: On the Yezidi Trauma.” De Balie, January 27, 2021. https://debalie.nl/programma/jan-kizilhan-on-the-yeziditrauma-10-12-2019/. 71 Ibid.
72 United Nations Security Council Open Debate: Women, Peace and Security- Sexual Violence in Conflict, Remarks by Amal Clooney, April 23rd, 2019, https://www.doughtystreet. co.uk/sites/default/files/media/document/FINAL%20 Security%20Council%20speech%20230419%20.pdf. 73 Ibid. 74 O’Connor, Francis, and Rosa Burç.
Europe today faces unprecedented struggles. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war, the energy crisis and food insecurity caused by that war, the proliferation of arms, and political turmoil particularly related to the increase in populist movements are only the tip of the iceberg.
The writers of the Europe section chose to highlight topics related to these challenges. Katie Rouse maps out the EU’s path towards centralized European Defense with the European Defense Fund, Senthil Meyyappan captures the ongoing tensions between Greek and Turkish relations, and Erica MacDonald raises questions over Italy’s new populist premiership. Overall, the Europe section this semester shows the unity and disunity in the pursuit to develop a shared European identity.
I thank them for their hard work, effort, and dedication in providing a snapshot of Europe’s current crises in this semester’s issue. We hope you enjoy their pieces.
FIONA CAPTAN, CAS '23 Senior Editor, Europeto you by
Brought
by Kathleen Rouse edited by Jessica Swanson
"
When, if not now…do we lay the foundations for an enlarged union of freedom, security and democracy? Who, if not us, could protect and defend Europe’s values, both internally and externally?” 1 These questions, posed by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in his speech at Charles University in Prague on August 29, 2022, reflect the growing debate about the European Union’s (EU) role in subsidizing its member states’ defense capabilities. After Russia’s attack on Ukraine catalyzed the movement for a unified EU defense effort in February 2022 , the controversy over whether or not to expand European centralized defense came to a head. The EU’s decision to jointly fund arms for a conflict for the first time and the subsequent delivery of weaponry to Ukraine from EU member states sparked a revisiting of the structure and budget for the European Defence Fund (EDF). 2 Launched in June 2017, the EDF is the latest battleground for the defense debate. As part of a chain of EU-sponsored defense spending programs, the EDF suggests an EU priority to expand its involvement in member states’ military oversight, an issue becoming more and more relevant in European politics in light of questions concerning the extent of the EU’s role in providing aid to Ukraine. However, critics fear the EU’s burgeoning central power and possible encroachment on individual countries’ defense strategies and independence.
Foundations of the ED F: Politicians are working to shift popular opinion surrounding the militaryindustrial complex within the purview of the EU toward a more favorable view of government intervention since the EDF was first implemented. In his 2016 Statement
to the Union address, former President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Junker stressed that “Europe can no longer afford to piggy-back on the military might of others.” 3 He argued that “for European defence to be strong, the European defence industry needs to innovate,” leading to his proposal for the application of the EDF “to turbo boost research and innovation.” 4
The EDF pushes two main agendas: to “strengthen the military capabilities of the EU member states” and by extension, their strategic autonomy, and to “contribute to growth and jobs in Europe” by encouraging competition and innovation in the defense sector. 5 By distributing public funding to largely for-profit, private companies and applied research groups for military research and development (R&D), the EDF will concentrate on developing and producing cutting edge technologies. Examples of 2022 EDF project proposals include R&D of covert sensing, advanced radar technologies, hidden threats detection, sustainable components for underwater applications, airborne electronic warfare, semi-autonomous vessels, naval collaborative surveillance, and tactical cargo. 6 Research continues into new project areas such as autonomous systems, cybersecurity, maritime security, and intelligence-surveillance, foci that show a growing emphasis on conflict preparedness for both physical and cyber attacks.
The EDF works in complement with the European Peace Facility (EPF), which increases the EU’s support to peace operations by third parties worldwide. An off-budget funding mechanism for the EU, it aims “to cover joint costs of Common Security and Defence Policy military missions, to enable the EU to engage in broader actions aimed at supporting partner countries; armed forces with infrastructure, equipment, or military technical assistance.” 7 The EPF works to supplement EDF defense action funding with the goal of avoiding conflict and building peace. The use of EU funds for the military sector is not unprecedented. Between 2007 and 2020, the
EU budget allotted €3.1 billion to the European Security Research Programme, and the Internal Security Fund received €3.8 billion for 2014 to 2020. The Preparatory Action on Defense Research (PADR) is a direct precursor of the EDF and included a provision that limited funding exclusively to defense technologies and systems, rather than military operations, and was followed by the European Defense Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP). 8 However, unlike prior similar legislation, the EDF does not include any limitations on spending on military operations, possibly due to the changing view of the role of the EU in the defense industry. It does include other safeguards to prevent misuse of its funding power. For example, only collaborative projects with participation from at least three different member states of the EU are eligible to receive funding. Focus areas set with member states define projects’ scope, with priority given to solidifying and bolstering security and defense interests of the Union. 9 These broad goals give EDF funds the potential to be put toward a wide variety of enterprises after the projects are selected
Funding cycles typically span three years. The first is spent on administrational preparation, followed by calls for proposals and submission of proposals the next year, concluding the cycle with selection of projects and grant agreements in the final year. A new cycle commences annually, meaning that at any given time, procedures for each of the three respective phases will be occurring simultaneously. 10 The EU itself will also not own any capability of the products manufactured. Development of common prototypes will only be funded with the intent of member states purchasing the final product or using the technology. 11
Given varying timelines for designing and producing a working prototype on top of a threeyear selection process, it will be years before any of the projects reach completion and the Union sees any of the results used. These lengthy timelines could prove problematic for the defense industry as technology advances and what is needed to
effectively fend off threats continues to change rapidly, potentially rendering projects obsolete before they even reach the production line. The results may also be required sooner rather than later, and the EU may not be able to wait so long to make use of the results.
Between 2017 and 2020, the European Commission allocated €590 million to the Fund’s military industry budget, with plans for continued future funding and expansion. Over the next seven years, the EDF is budgeted to receive €8 billion: €5.3 billion for “collaborative capability development projects” and €2.7 billion for defense research to address emerging future challenges and threats from hostile world actors. 12 The latest development is the acquisition of €500 million from the EU budget between 2022 and 2024 for the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). Established by the European Commission this past July as a “short-term financial instrument worth €500 million to incentivise common defence procurement among Member States,” it was designed as an interim solution to allow for a quick response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. 13
In light of member states’ independent responses to the conflict between Russian and Ukraine, the question of a necessary centralized defense has been pushed to the forefront of security issues. Commission Executive Vice President Margarethe Vestager attributes the desire for such a unified defense spending body to a sense of reciprocity; “Member States have taken bold steps by transferring urgently needed defence equipment to Ukraine. In the same spirit of solidarity,
the EU will help member states replenish supplies by incentivising joint procurement, allowing the European defence industry to respond better to these urgent needs.” 14 In this context, Vestager is referring to joint procurement as the process by which states cooperate to acquire goods and services necessary for their armed forces. She argues it will benefit member states’ defense capabilities by allowing for more coherent, coordinated defense efforts. Vestager also contextualizes the creation of the EDIRPA within a larger agenda, praising it as a “historical milestone in establishing the EU Defence Union, increasing the security of EU citizens and making the EU a stronger partner for our allies.” After Juncker’s call in 2016 for an expanded EDF and the EU’s general role in member states’ military capabilities, proponents have advocated for a streamlined, internationally-cooperative approach to defense as the best way to be prepared against future threats from other nations, including the growing nuclear threat from Russia and possible conflicts
with China. They argue that the combined forces of the EU operating in a cohesive manner would be much more effective than stunted efforts of individual nations.
European popular support for collective EU defense has consistently polled above 70 percent in the last five years. 15 However, passionate discourse over the degree to which the EU should be involved in independent states’ defense is still taking place among EU citizens. On the other side of the controversy, there are those that argue it is a tremendous overstep for the EU to continue to allocate such massive budget funds to defense, a tenet of governing historically left up to sovereign states. There are also concerns about how far this funding will go, and how much will ultimately be put toward the military industry. Critics raise doubts about the possibility of the EDF evolving into a fully fledged Defense Union or military alliance, overstepping the bounds of the role Europeans believe the EU should play in member states’ defense. Though anything similar in scale to NATO is unlikely to develop for the foreseeable future, some Europeans are fearful of how and why unified military efforts might eventually be used.
Another issue raised by EDF expansion opponents is the diversion of funds from civilian tax-funded facets of the EU budget, including portions of the environmental protection budget. This is especially troubling to them because the budget is also suffering from the effects of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, an estimated €10 billion annual net loss. All national contributions to the EDF budget have been made voluntary, causing many to fear that funding for public works and existing civilian programs will continue to be depleted. Challengers also question the extent to which EDF contracts will serve wealthy megacorporations as opposed to small businesses with money raised from taxpayers. Funding is mainly provided through grants which recipients are not expected to reimburse. This means the military-industrial complex is simultaneously “benefiting from extremely favorable conditions regarding ownership of results,” since due to intellectual property rights, only the private companies will own what’s produced – not the EU or its member states. 16 Despite these advantages, projects still do not need to meet all award criteria to receive funding. This is another point of contention, as critics feel that given the freedom with public funds that the contracts allow, the proposals should be required to fulfill all standards. There is also pushback against the argument that new funding will provide new jobs in addition to the 1.4 million people already directly or indirectly employed by the defense sector. 17 Critical analysts claim that investments in military R&D would only serve to shift jobs from civilians to the military labor pool. Defenders of this ideology maintain that rather than shore up jobs for that target audience, the money would be better spent developing new jobs for civilians, as Europe lacks highly-skilled workers in engineering and technological research. They also feel military personnel are better suited to retrain for jobs in other sectors. 18
Economically, a collective fund would save money across all member states. According to the EU, inadequate or nonexistent defense and security cooperation between member states costs an estimated €25 billion to €100 billion annually because of “lack of competition, costly duplication, lack of interoperability, technological gaps, and insufficient economies of scale.” 19 Projections claim up to 30 percent of annual defense expenditures could be saved through joint procurement. 20
Strategically, the disconnect between EU members’ military efforts also detrimentally affects military preparedness and functionality. “Dysfunctional cooperation and EU-wide fragmentation in defense,” or countries’ inability to share information and collaborate effectively, inhibits the EU’s ability to deploy large numbers of troops worldwide. This is demonstrated in sending approximately 40,000 EU men to Europe’s border with Russia versus 100,000 American troops. 21
Developments in Ukraine have accelerated Europe’s EDF expansion debate by encouraging member states to support unified military action in response. The EU responded swiftly first through the use of economic means, imposing asset freezes and travel bans on 1,212 Russian officials and legislators, freezing the assets of 108 entities as of July 2022. It also expanded sanctions on Russia’s financial sector, including debt and equity restrictions on certain banks and companies. 22
Despite a history of intense debate of whether the EU should be directly involved in conflict, military aid was passed soon after, but the EU struggled to provide Ukraine with the heavy weaponry many believed was required without direct funding designated for conflict aid. This lack of organization and resources fueled
calls for a better equipped EU military reserve to be established for use in times of crisis. “It’s been argued for a very long time that if [the EU member states] work together, if they cooperate, they’ll be one of the world’s biggest military forces. But that cooperation has been very slow in coming,” Naomi O’Leary, Europe correspondent for The Irish Times, says of the hesitation prior to the conflict. 23
After Russia’s invasion, EU members shifted toward a much more cooperative approach, coming to an incredibly quick agreement to jointly dedicate €450 million for arms in Ukraine through the European Peace Facility. This sudden unity stems from the implications of the conflict for the EU. As Russia became bolder in blatantly attacking Ukraine and threatening the use of nuclear weapons on the rest of the world, it inched the country closer to war with Europe and the United States. The EU
found it necessary to act quickly in efforts to curb Russia’s aggression before it extended any further. One aspect of that strategy included the EPF. Designed and passed last year, the EPF had never before been used for lethal aid, or military aid designed to kill people. Under that program, antitank systems from the Netherlands among other weapons systems reached Ukraine in February. 24 Though there are concerns about member states being forced to participate in such efforts, they have already been proven unfounded. Ireland, Malta, and Austria, traditionally neutral countries, opted out of contributing funds to military aid through a process known as constructive abstention, which allows individual countries to abstain from voting while permitting others to make a decision on the basis of unanimity. 25
Still, citizens worry that the EDF’s very existence signifies the abandonment of the peaceful basis upon which the EU was founded – a protest that might have some truth in it. Historically, the EU was a civilian project, originally proposed as an economic union to prevent war in 1950 by then French minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman, who likened it to “a first step to a federation of Europe, to change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacturing of war materials, of which they themselves have been the most constant victims.” 26 In recent years, defense has become an increasingly sizable focus area as more defense spending programs are established and subsidized, a trend likely to continue as the EDF procures more funding.
The EDF is evidence that the EU is taking concrete steps to redefine European defense efforts. Given the exponential growth in funding for member states’ military capabilities in the past five years, programs like the EDF represent a turning point toward more open and invested EU participation in the oversight of member states’ militaries and defense capabilities. In the shortterm, this funding will change how member states will respond to conflicts in the near future, but
more lasting impacts are still up in the air. Upon the resolution of the crisis in Ukraine, it remains to be seen whether EU representatives will continue to cooperate on the expansion of defense spending and unification of military efforts. It is possible that without a common cause, the debate could regress into a stalemate. But there is also the possibility that Ukraine will permanently alter how Europeans view their role in defending other nations, generating an invigorated rigor for a defense union. As tension between China and Russia and their western adversaries continues to brew, the long term implications of this legislation on Europe’s role in the global defense industry remain to be seen.
1 Scholz, Olaf. “Rede Von Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz.” Webseite Der Bundesregierung | Startseite, 29 Aug. 2022, https:// www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/rede-vonbundeskanzler-olaf-scholz-2079752.
2 Scheimer, Dorey, and Meghna Chakrabarti. “Inside the European Union’s Response to the Russia-Ukraine War.” Inside the European Union’s Response to the Russia-Ukraine War | On Point, WBUR, 28 Feb. 2022, https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2022/02/28/ europe-response-russia-eu-invasion-ukraine-putin.
3 “The State of the Union 2016: Towards a Better Europe – A Europe That Protects, Empowers and Defends.” European Commission - European Commission, 14 Sept. 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_3042.
4 Ibid.
5 “All You Want to Know about the EU Defence Fund, and Why This Is Not Good for Peace nor for Jobs and Growth.” European Network Against Arms Trade, 12 July 2019, http://enaat.org/eudefence-fund#part1.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 “Preparatory Action on Defence Research (Padr).” Defence Industry and Space, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/ eu-defence-industry/preparatory-action-defence-research-padr_en.
9 “The European Defence Fund (EDF).” Defence Industry and Space, European Commission, 30 June 2021, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en.
10 “European Defence Fund: Ground and Air Combat.” EuroSatory, European Commission, 2022.
11 “The European Defence Fund (EDF).” Defence Industry and
Space, European Commission, 30 June 2021, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en.
12 “The European Defence Fund (EDF).” Defence Industry and Space, European Commission, 30 June 2021, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en.
13 “Stronger European Defence.” European Commission - European Commission, 8 Aug. 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/stronger-european-defence_en#timeline
14 “Press Corner.” European Commission - European Commission, 19 July 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ IP_22_4491.
15 Bergmann, Max, et al. “The Case for EU Defense.” Center for American Progress, 1 June 2021, https://www.americanprogress. org/article/case-eu-defense/.
16 “All You Want to Know about the EU Defence Fund, and Why This Is Not Good for Peace nor for Jobs and Growth.” European Network Against Arms Trade, 12 July 2019, http://enaat.org/eudefence-fund#part1.
17 “All You Want to Know about the EU Defence Fund, and Why This Is Not Good for Peace nor for Jobs and Growth.” European Network Against Arms Trade, 12 July 2019, http://enaat.org/eudefence-fund#part1.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 “The European Defence Fund: Questions and Answers.” European Commission - European Commission, 7 June 2017, https:// ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pl/memo_17_1476. 21 Ibid.
22 “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: European Union Responses and Implications for U.S.-EU Relations.” Congressional Research Service, 28 July 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/ pdf/IN/IN11897.
23 Scheimer, Dorey, and Meghna Chakrabarti. “Inside the European Union’s Response to the Russia-Ukraine War.” Inside the European Union’s Response to the Russia-Ukraine War | On Point, WBUR, 28 Feb. 2022, https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2022/02/28/ europe-response-russia-eu-invasion-ukraine-putin.
24 Ibid.
25 “Constructive Abstention - Euabc.” EUabc.com, http://en.euabc.com/word/221.
26 European Network Against Arms Trade, 2019.
reviewed by DR. KOSTAS
IFANTIS
Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Athens Director of Research, Centre for Policy Analysis and Planning, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
AOn August 30, 2022, a Twitter post by the official North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) read “TODAY IS THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF TURKISH INDEPENDENCE.
WE JOIN OUR TURKISH ALLIES ACROSS NATO & BEYOND IN CELEBRATION OF THEIR VICTORY AND TURKISH ARMED FORCES DAY.” A mere day later, NATO had deleted the post following a Greek diplomatic statement calling it insensitive and unacceptable behavior from the organization. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan responded by accusing Greek politicians of manipulating their country’s history to continue hostilities towards Turkey when none were needed. 1 Erdogan went on to accuse Greece of repeating a mistake made back in the early 1900s during the Greco-Turkish War.
In 1952, Greece and Turkey both joined NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an alliance consisting primarily of Western allies who came together after World War II to pledge their support economically, militarily, politically,
and diplomatically to one another. Presumptively led by the United States, the alliance has fronted cooperation and collaboration to the rest of the world, but tensions such as this have brought to attention the underlying conflicts, competing interests, and grudges threatening what appears to be on the surface an assortment of countries tethered together by a mutual vision of world politics. But is NATO truly as unified as it projects itself to be? A deeper look at this question will reveal whether NATO as an institution is merely a facade for global politicking or actually a platform of deliberation and cross-continental diplomatic cooperation. Further, what role does and should NATO play in intervening in its member-states’ affairs, both currently and historically, particularly when they clash with one another? The answers to these questions will undoubtedly necessitate a deep look into modern Greek and Turkish politics, but the root cause of these strains between Greece and Turkey will provide insight on NATO’s role in these two countries’ relationship.
Asia minor has been plagued with
violence, disputes, and the absence of regional cooperation since the Greco-Persian Wars of the 500s BC. In 1897, Greece saw the small pro-Greece rebellion on the island of Crete as enough of an invitation to finally annex the island. 2 Greece, militaristically unprepared at the time, was unable to overcome the more prepared Turkish army as well as pressure from nearly all the European powers to not escalate tensions in the Balkan region. Greece pulled out and signed a treaty conceding indemnities to Turkey, relinquishing much of its financial sovereignty to the European superpowers. During World War I, Greece and the Ottoman Empire took opposite sides, making use of the opportunity of a global conflict to justify their bilateral one. Following the abdication of Greek King Constantine I, who had been sympathetic to Germany, in 1917 as a result of intense pressure from Britain, France, Russia, and Italy, Greece naturally slid to the Allied Powers. 3 The Ottoman Empire, at the time declining in power and influence over the Asia Minor region, conveniently took sides with the Central Powers. When the Allies emerged victorious, they imposed their will on the defeated powers, failing to consider how this might exacerbate future tensions. Similar to how France released decades of rage on the Germans by crippling post-war Germany in
the Treaty of Versailles, Greece was able to force concessions out of a defeated Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Sèvres, which ceded several territories in the Mediterranean to Greece. 4 Immediately after the war, Greece sought to expand these territories further east of Thrace and Izmir, formerly known as Smyrna, which reached onto the Anatolian peninsula. However, when Greek forces continued to advance, the Turkish national movement led by Mustafa Kemal, or Kemal Atatürk—a group that rejected the legitimacy of all documents signed by the Ottomans, including the Treaty of Sèvres that gave Greece Thrace and Smyrna in the first place—successfully halted the Greek advancements at the Sakarya River in 1921. Two years later, the First Greco-Turkish War ended with the Treaty of Lausanne, which returned several islands in the Turkish Strait, as well as Anatolian districts such as Smyrna, back to Turkey 5 It is the final months of this conflict in August-September of 1922 where the Asia Minor Disaster took place as the series of events surrounding the Greek retreat from Izmir following their defeat to Atatürk’s Turkish nationalist forces at the Sakarya River. Izmir is a city in Turkey with a majority of Christian ethnic Greeks, but is surrounded entirely by districts with a Muslim Turk majority. When the Greek army retreated
from the ports of Smyrna—unable to defend its interests, territorial claims, and ultimately peoples in Turkish lands—many of the Christian Greeks left with the Greek army in fear of persecution at the hands of Turkish nationalists after the skirmish. Shortly after the retreat, Turkish forces burned the city to the ground, killing thousands of Greeks and Armenians. The city was all but incinerated as the Allied powers watched on, hesitant to intervene in a matter they had determined bore little significance to them. Many ethnically Greek and even Armenian men were deported back into central Anatolia where they faced even stronger persecution while many Greek women endured sexual violence on the shores where they were stranded. 6 The incident further fueled political turmoil within Greece, as angered military leaders demanded Greek King Constantine to abdicate over his failure to protect ethnic Greeks and Greek interests overseas. The King was forced into exile, and over the next several months a massive population exchange took place; hundreds of thousands of ethnic Turks residing in Greece left for Turkey and over 1.5 million ethnic Greeks residing in Turkey left for countries such as Greece, Russia, and even Australia as well as the United States.
Following WWII, Greco-Turkish animosities were renewed through the identity duality of the island of Cyprus, which held both inhabitants of
both Greek and Turkish identities. With differing political and diplomatic priorities to each of those populations, both Greece and Turkey saw ownership of the island as key because of their constituents and its geostrategic significance in the Mediterranean. Despite British control, Greece sent soldiers into Cyprus when the pro-Greek Cypriot rebellion emerged. Turkey feared the brutalities that a majority Greek-Cypriot government would impose on the minority Muslim Turkish population by virtue of blatant persecution and responded by themselves persecuting ethnically Greek residents in Istanbul through pogroms in 1955. In 1959, though, the Zurich-London Agreements settled the conflict by declaring Cyprus an independent state altogether, thereby relieving it of all occupations from Britain, Greece, and Turkey. 7 Still, all three nations were named as guarantors of Cyprus’s political integrity and safety moving forward.
In 1974, Cyprus’s new government was overthrown by a brutal dictatorship that had gained power in Greece. This led to Turkey invoking its prerogative as a protector and sending in troops to occupy northern Cyprus. With mounting international pressures, the conflict ended in a ceasefire, but Turkish soldiers remained on the justification of needing to protect ethnic Turks concentrated in the northern segments of the island. By 1976, Greek forces had left the island
and the original President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III returned to power. However, tens of thousands of Turkish soldiers remained in northern Cyprus on the premise that their departure would result in the continuation of communal riots. Supported by these forces, Turkish Cypriots even declared a Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC); to date, only Turkey has recognized the sovereignty of such a state. Regardless, UN buffer zones maintained a relative sense of peace and civility between the borders dividing what is being claimed as the TRNC and what is not being claimed as the TRNC.
Even throughout the Cold War, Greece and Turkey remained on hostile terms despite neither willing to take opposing sides. The United States, de facto leader of the NATO bloc, had arranged through its Truman Doctrine for $400 million to be sent to Greece and Turkey in order to assist them in resisting communism in 1947. Truman’s speech that year urging the public to support the bill outlining the transferral of this aid was tremendously successful and Congress approved the plans with speed. Apart from that and intervention in the Cypriot matter, Greece and Turkey saw little to no attention from NATO and its members during the Cold War.
Since then, Greece has frequently alluded to enosis, the idea of a Greco-Cypriot union, and Turkey has frequently intervened with the justification of needing to protect the island’s Muslim minority through inflammatory actions. For example, in 1976, under parliamentary mandate, Turkish ships and seismic vessels were sent to the Aegean Sea where Greece had planned to drill oil in with the intention that if Greece extended their territorial presence into parts of the Aegean that Turkey believed fell under their jurisdiction, they would retaliate with military force. 8
While Cyprus has acted as a singular avenue for materializing Greco-Turkish tensions, the two countries continue to spar and clash over a variety of issues and for a variety of reasons, among which is the renewal of the Asia Minor Disaster. Greece and Turkey have since maintained starkly differing accounts of the Asia Minor disaster, each purporting its own innocence and justifiability. However, most of the international community acknowledges the great sum of deaths of innocent
Greeks at the hands of Turkish nationalist soldiers in Izmir after the Greek army’s retreat. This conflict, though catastrophic, held great significance: it was the end of Greek presence in Anatolia for the first time in thousands of years. Turkey had finally ‘gained independence’ from its primary regional competitor, hence celebrating this moment as Turkish Armed Forces Day, or Victory Day, on August 30th. It is within this context that the official NATO Twitter account extended its wishes to Turkey on the day of the Asia Minor Disaster for having gained independence. In the Greeks point of view, this was received as a NATO stamp of approval for the events that transpired that day. For Greece, it was a sign that NATO was openly greenlighting what it saw as Turkish tyranny and cultural cleansing of ethnic Greeks. With all of this put into perspective, it becomes evident as to why NATO’s position between two of its member-states in Greece and Turkey is highly complicated. While NATO or the global ideological divide justifying its creation had not yet existed at the time of the Asia Minor Disaster, the organization nonetheless bears responsibility for the persisting tensions amongst its members as a result of the event. On the one hand, it must maintain strong ties to Greece, an EU and eurozone country on a European continent that is otherwise strongly aligned diplomatically, militarily, and economically with the U.S. On the other hand, it cannot alienate diplomatic relations with Turkey, a country constantly in risk of being friendly with NATO geopolitical enemy Russia. Moreover, GrecoTurkish tensions have evolved and grown since the Asia Minor Disaster through conflicts like the Cypriot crisis and sovereignly recognized Exclusive Economic Zones in the Mediterranean. From this arises NATO’s predicament and to some extent, insufficiencies as an alliance. While it has served well its purpose as a defense alliance, it has not fared as well in projecting itself as a front unified on levels beyond this. Ideological differences fueled by cultural fragmentation such as the one between Greece and Turkey have demonstrated the fragility of cross-national cooperation and understanding between NATO members.
In the past, NATO has almost unequivocally hidden behind the veil of neutrality in Greco-Turkish confrontations. Even in the Cypriot conflict, NATO declined to intervene,
though the United States did demand a Turkish ceasefire and encouraging Turkey and Greece to solve the Cypriot crisis through dialogue. However, the veil has since eroded as a result of circumstances; NATO cannot continue to use neutrality as an excuse to avoid confronting and addressing the glaring rigidity between its member-states. Doing so abrades its legitimacy, since it has shown to accomplish nothing other than breed a reputation of disunity. Additionally, NATO risks vulnerability to Vladimir Putin and Russia. Paradigmatic of this is Turkey’s flirtation with Putin in the past few years. In 2020 the US imposed sanctions over Turkey for its purchase of billions of dollars of missile systems from Russia. 9 Turkey has also been significantly less active in condemning Russia for its annexation of Crimea or aggression against Ukraine when compared to other NATO allies. If NATO is unable to reconcile the differences and hostilities between Greece and Turkey, it may jeopardize its membership’s security to the threat of Russian regional domination Turkey has also been significantly less active in condemning Russia for its annexation of Crimea or aggression against Ukraine when compared to other NATO allies. If NATO is unable to reconcile the differences and hostilities between Greece and Turkey, it may jeopardize its membership’s security to the threat of Russian regional domination.
To return to the matter of what role NATO should play in the political affairs of its member-states, the fragile relationship between Greece and Turkey over the past century reveals a key component of what it means to be unified. While NATO exhibits military unity aimed at a mutual assurance of safety between Western allies, it fails to take into account the plethora of note-worthy sociocultural fractures within its intricate membership network. Paradigmatic of this is the Greco-Turkish antipathy, since much of it traces its roots to hostilities shared between two countries at the border of two continents containing sharply contrasting cultures, ideas, beliefs, and political systems. Turkey has evolved to uptake the role of spearheading Asian, Muslim, and Eastern values whereas Greece has evolved to uptake the role of spearheading European, Christian, and Western values in the region.
NATO feigns unilateral coopetition, yet the larger mistake it appears to be making is failing to address this facade behind-the-scenes by at least
attempting to force dialogue as well as bridge the gap between Greece and Turkey. Not only is NATO not pushing the strained relationship between the two countries in a positive direction towards cooperation, but it is actively worsening it through acts of incompetence and ignorance as evidenced by its tweet on August 30th for Turkish Victory Day. Even if complete Greco-Turkish friendship is not within sight of the foreseeable future, NATO should at least pinpoint areas in which it can keep the tension between the two countries stable by avoiding inflammatory actions and encouraging across-theaisle deliberation. It need not firmly pick a side, but simply seek to understand, validate, and give value to the perspectives taken by both parties. An excellent starting point might be restricting social media accounts to wishing those who celebrate a Merry Christmas, Eid Mubarak, or Happy New Years.
1 Tasos Kokkinidis, “Erdogan Warns Greece of Making Same Mistake That Led to 1922 Disaster,” GreekReporter. com, accessed October 23, 2022, https://greekreporter. com/2022/08/31/erdogan-warns-greece-hostile-act/.
2 “Greco-Turkish Wars,” Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed October 23, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/GrecoTurkish-wars.
3 “Greece Declares War on Central Powers,” History.com, accessed October 23, 2002, https://www.history.com/this-dayin-history/greece-declares-war-on-central-powers.
4 “Greco-Turkish Wars,” Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed October 23, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/GrecoTurkish-wars.
5 Ryan Gingeras, “Dogfight over the Aegean: Turkish-Greek Relations in Light of Ukraine,.” War on the Rocks, accessed October 23, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/ dogfight-over-the-aegean-turkish-greek-relations-in-light-ofukraine/.
6 Philip Chrysopoulos, “The Greek Genocide as Recorded in US Navy Diaries,” GreekReporter.com, accessed October 23, 2022, https://greekreporter.com/2022/09/01/the-greekgenocide-as-recorded-in-us-navy-diaries/.
7 George Meneshian, “Greek-Turkish Relations: History, Issues and Perspectives,” LYMEC, accessed October 23, 2022, https:// www.lymec.eu/greek-turkish-relations-history-issues-andperspectives.
8 Ibid.
9 Amanda Macias, “U.S. Sanctions Turkey over Purchase of Russian S-400 Missile System,” CNBC, accessed October 23, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/14/us-sanctions-turkeyover-russian-s400.html.
Italy just elected its most far-right Prime Minister since Mussolini, and the global news cycle is spinning with concerns about parallels and accusations about the neo-fascism. These fears have been lurking for years, especially with populist parties starting to poll with significantly higher numbers. With populism on the rise across Europe and the United States, centrists and leftists are more apprehensive than ever about far-right stances and the politicians that champion them. Giorgia Meloni and her campaign in Italy are prime examples of the new age of far-right politics. Will she take after Mussolini, lean more Trumpian, or neither? Meloni’s brand of populism feeds off existing discontent among the Old Guard of Italy—calling forward traditional and regional ideals to blockade internationalist progressive politics. Populism’s roots in Italy span decades, and the progression of its popularity can be somewhat linearly tracked. For the purposes of investigating the modern iteration of Italian populism, most academics start at the fall of the Berlin Wall and the genesis of the Italian Second Republic in the 90s. This marked a shift from ideological based politics to a gradual refocusing on “issue-oriented” politics. 1 Voters associated themselves less with a strict political identity and more with a stance on a topic; their opinion varied play-by-play. This often goes hand-in-hand with the personalization of politics, where individual politicians associate themselves strongly with certain viewpoints, and thus become widely associated with them. If the politician becomes a conduit between the voter and their goal, they can become inseparable
from the movement itself. This personalization works particularly well in populism because the foundation of populism is an “us” (the underrepresented general public) versus “them” (the corrupt, bureaucratic elite), with the populist politician serving as a political Robin Hood. 2 This dynamic is even easier to foster in Italy, where only five out of 16 government coalitions since 1994 have been recipients of the majority vote in elections, and the image of a disingenuous, self-interested elite political class thrives. 3 With these factors, it’s not surprising that Italy has the predisposition to favor populist movements in recent years. The people feel their values aren’t reflected in their politics.
“Italy and Italians first!” promises new Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. 4 Her words are steeped in populist sentiment but have even darker implications for some Italian residents. Meloni runs her political platform as an advocate for native Italians and ultraconservative
agendas. Looking at her career, this dual-pronged approach is unsurprising. At just fifteen years old, Meloni joined the youth wing of the Italian Social Movement party, which has been hailed as neofascist, nationalist, and nationalist-conservative— all of which aligns with her current public stances. 5 She has led far-right movements for decades, was elected to the Italian Parliament’s Chamber of Deputies in 2006, and by 2008, became Italy’s youngest minister. 6 Her position as Youth Minister was engineered that very same year by Berlusconi’s government. 7 Her trajectory only grew, with her Brothers of Italy party gaining larger percentages at each poll, especially once they became the only opposition to Draghi’s coalition government. Some suggest that it was the novelty of her as the opposition to a disliked government that landed her this election, not resolute support for her party personally. 8 Yet, even if she was elected for her contrarian policies to Draghi, Meloni’s “Italians first” has a broad, but divisive appeal. Meloni co-founded Brothers of Italy, which stands on the pillars of national conservatism, nativism, Euroscepticism, and opposition to immigration. The party aims for less European bureaucracy, low taxes, and a halt to immigration, as well as the opportunity to renegotiate EU treaties. 9 Meloni has yet to outline the specific nature of her objections to the EU, and the ambiguity has Europeans wary. 10 However, there are positions that Meloni has made startlingly clear. Meloni was quoted from her speech to a far-right Spanish party, outlining her stances as such: "Yes to the natural family, no to the LGBT lobby, yes to sexual identity, no to gender ideology... no to Islamist violence, yes to secure borders, no to mass migration... no to big international finance... no to the bureaucrats of Brussels!" 11 These stances are aligned with familiar conservatism trends we see in the United States and across Europe. Her talk of borders and anti-immigration is certainly reminiscent of Trump. But most of all, in one sentence, Meloni invalidated the idea of a diverse Italy. Meloni, and her party, have made it clear they want their Italy their way: homogenous and anti-pluralist. With the recent election, Brothers of Italy is now the majority party, and its ideals will undoubtedly form the political climate of Italy while it’s in power, raising red flags for many in the international community. In the wake of Meloni’s
election, France’s Prime Minister, Elisabeth Borne, notably said Europe must be watchful and careful that states continue to respect human rights, including abortion access. 12
In Italy itself, those who belong to atrisk communities are more concerned than the general Italian population. Predominantly, this includes immigrants, members of the LGBTQ+ community, religious minorities, etc.—all of whom are more likely to face discrimination and feel the ramifications of bad policy. Statements made in the wake of her election by minority group members tend to express wariness, as they wait for the breadth of her discriminatory stances to be made apparent in law. Human Rights Watch has even identified some of her rhetoric as a potential challenge to human rights. 13 Italian Jews, many of whom fear the fascist political legacy of parties like the Brothers of Italy, have adopted a “wait and worry” approach regarding Meloni’s policy. 14 According to former board member of the Jewish community of Milan, Stefano Jesurum, “some Italian Jews are willing to overlook the fact that far-right leaders are ‘intrinsically fascist,’ focusing on their parties’ championing of Israel.” 15 In this way, populist leaders like Meloni sometimes tamper down outrage across their constituencies—by appealing to specific issues that garner support, but don’t necessarily reflect the general leaning of their stances. The Italian Jewish community is not the only community unwilling to outright condemn Meloni’s party. Some in the international relations sphere caveat the neo-fascist rumors by offering Meloni’s pro-Ukrainian and pro-NATO stance as ideological proof that she is unlike other neofascist and populist parties abroad. Meloni herself utilizes this stance to deter fascist and authoritarian comparisons, particularly when compared to Mussolini, Hitler, and Putin. 16 But suffice to say, one deviation from the party line does not bolster that much confidence.
Perhaps the line Meloni is most famous for is “I am Giorgia, I’m a woman, I’m a mother… I’m Christian.” 17 This line delivered at a rally became somewhat of a meme in Italy; a sound bite was created with a techno beat and her words overlayed. It may have been a joke back then—but the reality is quite serious now. Meloni’s rhetoric here appealed to a larger audience than the younger generation that was turning her line into an
amusing audio clip. Her words appeal to the older Italian voters that strongly prioritize a sense of Italian identity. Meloni’s statement creates distinct self-identifiers that are very traditional and quite aligned with Italian values that have often reigned supreme during conservative, populist, or even fascist eras. Her statement reinvigorates labels that Italian nationalists perceive as “lost” to the “bland, unisex form of identity” that is advanced by the European Union. 18 Meloni, with her viral phrase, asserted that she stands for all those traditional principles—including a nationalistic outlook—a win for the Eurosceptics.
Meloni is not just her words; she has enumerated plans that bolster her traditional principles. She published a program consisting of 25 points that outlined her party’s initiatives. One very prominent feature is her plan to boost Italy’s fertility rate. 19 As seen in other European nations like Germany, falling birth rates can, over time, skew the old-age-dependency ratio. This means the population that is over 65 is unequally supported by a shrinking younger generation. This can cause major issues within the welfare system, and eventually, spell disaster for the workforce. There is no debate that a falling birth rate can cause a country some real complications, but Meloni is keen to address it from the angle of a politician, not with her experience, knowledge,
or potential empathy as a woman. Her parenting plan incentivizes and rewards families having children, even including monthly bonuses for parents of children under six. 20 This platform had great success for Meloni, but it seems to be more about populist politics than supporting women in the workforce having children. According to some Italian women, Meloni’s views on the traditional family may actually contradict the advancement of women’s rights. 21 Meloni has made it clear that she is not a feminist 22. Her stances on Italian abortion laws are vague and undefined but have caused concern amongst women about maintaining accessibility to safe, legal abortions. In a much more defined stance, Meloni has said she is against the so-called ‘pink’ quotas in the workforce. 23 She does not believe in the Italian government’s diversity initiatives for women, citing herself as evidence that there is no disparity anymore. 24 Meloni’s populism is anti-feminist enough that areas where Italy has lagged behind its European neighbors (women in the workforce, female CEOs, women with economic independence) are likely to remain stagnant, and in the worst case scenario, Italy could be subject to a regression of women’s rights. 25
Another one of Meloni’s identity platforms is her nationalism, which often teeters over the edge
to xenophobia. The Brothers of Italy have promoted policies that are undoubtedly discriminatory. They want “Muslim religious services to be conducted in Italian not Arabic, and to limit the number of foreign pupils in schoolrooms.” 26 Meloni has taken numerous hard-line stances against immigrants and anyone outside what she deems the Italian ideal. Yet another of her slogans has sparked great controversy: “Dio, Patria. Famiglia” or God, Homeland, Family. 27 The language is evocative of one of Mussolini’s slogans—a fact not unremarked upon by those who worry about Meloni’s potential neo-fascist leanings. 28 But the slogan itself aside, the ideals it promotes are a threat. Meloni, and the Brothers of Italy, have been quite vocal on who does and does not fall into the acceptable bounds of “Dio, Patria. Famiglia.” According to Italian author and essayist Roberto Saviano, Meloni’s is pushing a conservative and discriminatory agenda: “God, for her, does not seem to represent faith, but rather a brand of Catholicism imposed as the only religion worthy of rights. The homeland’s borders must be defended, with violence if necessary, and the family is not the cradle of affection, but of imposition, obligation, and prescription. The family is always heterosexual, its children born and recognised in the imposed form.” 29 This is not a progressive Italy, a European Italy, a diverse Italy. It is a nationalist Italy that is beginning to resemble its EU counterparts—like Hungary—facing democratic back-sliding. Many fear Meloni will go the way of Victor Orban in Hungary, but such fears have been
tempered by Italy’s position in the European Union, and Meloni’s apparent strength in supporting Ukraine, as previously mentioned. Meloni has declared that her government will be both proNATO and a part of Europe. 30 Time will tell if that is a mere placation rather than a good omen. Italy’s election of Giorgia Meloni packs a punch. Although unsurprising, as the strength of populism in Italy has been growing for years, the election still rocks the boat of what the world has come to consider European democracy. Nationalist initiatives that impede European integration will always alarm those working towards a deeper, wider EU. There is a whirlwind of fears surrounding Meloni—many of them legitimate—but the initial outrage over her election may have focused too heavily on neo-fascism and neglected the very real implications of right-wing populism itself. Meloni doesn’t have to be the next fascist Mussolini to incur damage, being an anti-democratic like Trump will suffice in regressing Italy’s policies. With her ultraconservative ideals, hard-line approach regarding immigrants, and limited definition of ‘Italy’ whilst championing “Italy and Italians first!”—there’s plenty to be concerned about all on her own. 31 Even if her plans can’t progress too far due the oversight of Brussels and the multi-party nature of Italian politics, Meloni has the potential to grow her platform and change the political geography of Italy, pushing it once again into the arms of the far right.
1 Chiapponi, Flavio. “The Main Roots of Italian Populism.” TruLies Europe, The Institute for European Politics, Berlin, http://trulies-europe.de/?p=611.
2 “Populism.” ECPS, European Center for Populism Studies, 28 Dec. 2020, https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/ populism/.
3 Chiapponi, Flavio.
4 Riegert, Benrd. “Italy Election: Who Is Giorgia Meloni, the Star of the Far Right?: DW: 26.09.2022.” DW.COM, Deutsche Welle , 26 Sept. 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/italy-electionwho-is-giorgia-meloni-the-star-of-the-far-right/a-62604896.
5 Riegert, Benrd.
6 Riegert, Benrd.
7 “Italian PM Launches Strategic Guidebook to Support Youth.” Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/516074. shtml.
8 Mounk, Yascha. “Italians Didn't Exactly Vote for Fascism.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 26 Sept. 2022, https:// www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/09/italy-election-farright-winner-giorgia-meloni-fascism/671556/.
9 Riegert, Benrd.
10 Wintour, Patrick. “EU Holds Its Breath as It Waits to Discover Giorgia Meloni's True Political Identity.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 26 Sept. 2022, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/26/eu-giorgia-melonitrue-political-identity-italy-elections-far-right.
11 Kirby, Paul. “Giorgia Meloni: Italy's Far-Right Wins Election and Vows to Govern for All.” BBC News, BBC, 26 Sept. 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63029909.
12 “How Are European Politicians Reacting to Italy's Election Result?” Euronews, 27 Sept. 2022, https://www.euronews.com/ my-europe/2022/09/26/how-are-european-politicians-reactingto-italys-election-result.
13 Tranchina, Giulia. “The New Italian Government Poses a Human Rights Challenge.” Human Rights Watch, 29 Sept. 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/28/new-italiangovernment-poses-human-rights-challenge.
14 Somekh, Simone, et al. “Italian Jews Worry and Wait as Giorgia Meloni, Far-Right Leader, Prepares to Take Power.” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 30 Sept. 2022, https://www.jta. org/2022/09/30/global/italian-jews-worry-and-wait-as-giorgiameloni-far-right-leader-prepares-to-take-power.
15 Somekh, Simone, et al.
16 Riegert, Benrd.
17 Chotiner, Isaac. “‘I'm a Woman, I'm a Mother, I'm Christian’: How Giorgia Meloni Took Control in the Italian Election.” The New Yorker, 28 Sept. 2022, https://www. newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/im-a-woman-im-a-motherim-christian-how-giorgia-meloni-took-control-in-the-italianelection.
18 Chotiner, Isaac.
19 Binnie, Isla. “Leading Lady of Italy's Right Campaigns for A Baby Boom.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 31 Jan. 2018, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-election-meloni/leading-ladyof-italys-right-campaigns-for-a-baby-boom-idUSKBN1FK21S.
20 Binnie, Isla.
21 Povoledo, Elisabetta, and Gaia Pianigiani. “Giorgia Meloni Could Be the First Woman to Lead Italy. Not All Women Are Happy.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 23 Sept. 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/23/world/europe/ giorgia-meloni-italy-women.html.
22 Povoledo, Elisabetta, and Gaia Pianigiani.
23 Povoledo, Elisabetta, and Gaia Pianigiani.
24 Povoledo, Elisabetta, and Gaia Pianigiani.
25 Povoledo, Elisabetta, and Gaia Pianigiani.
26 Binnie, Isla.
27 Saviano, Roberto. “Giorgia Meloni Is a Danger to Italy and the Rest of Europe .” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 24 Sept. 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ commentisfree/2022/sep/24/giorgia-meloni-is-a-danger-toitaly-and-the-rest-of-europe-far-right.
28 Saviano, Roberto.
29 Saviano, Roberto.
30 Amante, Angelo, and Crispian Balmer. “New Italy Government Will Be pro-NATO, pro-Europe, Says Meloni.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 19 Oct. 2022, https://www.reuters. com/world/europe/new-italy-government-wont-be-the-weaklink-west-says-meloni-2022-10-19/.
31 Riegert, Benrd.
At a time where Russia and the former Soviet Union region have been thrust back into the global spotlight, I am excited to present the contributions of the IRR’s Russia & FSU team to the school of political thought that surrounds this tumultuous part of the world. Within this edition’s overarching theme of power, few regions have more stories to tell than the former Soviet Union, where Soviet and Russian power have a long history of seeking to achieve political and economic dominance.
Thibaut's piece on the Crimean Tatars analyzes the past and present of a community that has stayed resolute in their fight to achieve self-determination through a history of deportation and struggles for basic human rights and recognition of personhood. Azima examines the role of language in Kazakhstan and the obstacles presented by the continued prevalence of the Russian language—a contentious point in the country's education and government sectors—which impacts the development of a strong national identity. Amy’s article, scholar-reviewed by Henry Foy of the Financial Times, looks toward the future, and the alarming possibility of increased arms trafficking following the inflow of weapons shipments to Ukraine and the lack of accountability and oversight in the process.
Throughout the publication process this semester, my writers and editors have worked tirelessly to meet deadlines, conduct research, and put forward their best work possible. I am extremely proud of all the hard work put in by everyone on my team, and beyond grateful to our Editor-in-Chief, Bridgette, and everyone at the IRR who worked on the design, layout, and launch of this semester’s issue, Perspectives on Power.
Senior Editor, Russia and Former Soviet Union
Crimea is a land of beautiful landscapes and rich history, but more than ever, it’s the story and home of a people–the Crimean Tatars–fighting for their right to self-determination and freedom. Descended from the armies of the Golden Horde of the Mongols, the Tatars are Crimea’s indigenous people occupying the region for nearly a thousand years. 1 They quickly organized in the region following the collapse of the Golden Horde in the 15th century, as they broke away from the surviving rump states to fight for control over their land and people. 2 While ruling themselves, the Tatars came under Ottoman vassalage only a few decades later, consequently falling under Russian rule in 1774, henceforth dictating Tatar history. Russian discrimination resulted in persecution, forced exile, and deportation, which today shapes the worldview of Tartar people and creates a desire to return to a homeland free of outside rule. 3
With Crimea and Ukraine lying in an area of geopolitical significance, the Crimean Tatars endured a series of changing foreign rulers, each vying to gain the region for themselves from the Russian Civil War onwards. Initially, Tatars reclaimed their statehood, declaring the Crimean People’s Republic in 1917 and attempting to make a place for themselves in the world away from Russian dominion, 4 yet, only a year later, the Bolsheviks invaded and took power whilst leaders of
the Crimean People’s Republic were murdered. 5 In its place rose the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, an autonomous republic of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic under a semi-autonomous deal that lasted into the Second World War. 6
This deal soon come to a brutal end at the hands of Nazi occupation. Invaded by the German army, Wehrmacht, for its strategic importance, Crimea became the stage of fierce fights between the Allied and Axis powers. In the ensuing conflict, tens of thousands of soldiers perished, many of them Tatars. 7 As Germany solidified its control over the region, Nazi ideology called for the extermination of ‘untermenschen,’ or undesirable groups, of which the Tatars ranked even lower than Slavs. However, in a reversal of Nazi-era policy, German generals saw an opportunity to use Tatars as their enforcement arm, just as they had in other states across Eastern Europe. 8 At the same time, there was the recruitment of Soviet prisoners of war captured by Axis forces, who viewed fighting as preferable to starvation, to create the Crimean Tatar Legion within the German Army to fight partisans in the Eastern Front. 9
At the same time, Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups were positively depicted in the Soviet
media early in the conflict to push the idea of the Red Army as multicultural force against Nazi Aryan supremacy. 10 As the Red Army liberated most of Crimea, Russian media began depicting Tatars as ethnic collaborators with the Nazi regime. 11 This negative portrayal in the heavily organized Soviet press, resulted in hatred and violence against Tatars that resulted in reprisal killing by the liberating Red Army, despite acknowledgement by Soviet officials that the collaborationists were evacuated by the fleeing ‘wehrmacht’. 12
However, Stalin’s desire to expel the Tatars was not solely based on their collaboration, but instead had a strategic reason: his future plans with Turkey. Stalin had eyes on invading Turkey to gain control over the previously ceded regions of Kars and Ardahan, as well as the Dardanelles. 13 The region was vitally important for the Soviet Union, who hoped to use the territory to place bases during the Second World War, as well as to ensure transit protections from the Black to Mediterranean Seas. 14 To achieve this, Stalin noted that he would have to deal with the sympathetic pro-Turkish Muslim ethnic groups in the region in order to create its
true goal of an Armenian and Georgian uprising in the region. 15 Despite the cooling down of the situation in Turkey in the coming years, the Soviets still laid claims of treason against these Turkish Muslim groups, beginning their deportation towards other regions of the USSR. 16 This change in perception of Crimean Tatars, coupled with Stalin’s hoped international gains, led to the forced deportation of the entire Tatar population in 1944 by the NKVD, Stalin’s Secret Police, under Decree 5859ss. 17 With little warning, they were expelled to the Uzbek SSR, a Soviet republic in Central Asia, and ‘resettled’ into Soviet collectivized farms. They were only allowed to bring with them select household items and food. 18 Dubbed the ‘Sürgün,’ or exile, by Tatars, the expulsion removed all trace of them from Crimea and the Soviets created an all-Russian people’s republic in their place. 19 Due to these two reasons for deportation, the Tatars were stuck in a precarious situation. They were used as geopolitical pawns and as targets of post-war anger against collaboration within the USSR. This resulted in a combination of persecution and deportation that would come to dominate their lives after liberation from the Nazis, and forever change and shape their lives and future outlooks.
Following the declaration, Tatars were effectively unpersoned by the Soviet state apparatus, their autonomous republic dismantled, and mentions of
them stricken from Soviet literature and academia. 20 Deportation fragmented communities as Tatars were spread all over Uzbekistan and Central Asia with thousands dying on the journey. 21 AntiTatar propaganda was spread amongst the local Uzbek population by the NKVD in hopes to further destroy social cohesion, which resulted in the deaths of 40,000 more Tatars from state and local violence within the first two years of deportation. 22 However, NKVD propaganda soon failed, as the local Uzbek and Tatar communities
communities, attempting to reinforce their culture while longing for a return home. 25
It took until 1989 under Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost policies for them to be allowed back into their homeland–without reparations–and roughly half of the displaced Tatars took up the offer. 26 However, return was not the glory that they had hoped for, as local elites and commoners alike fought against the Tatars’ reintegration. 27 The former lands of the Tatars were now taken over by local Ukranians and Russians, who were not keen to give up their land to perceived newcomers and World War Two traitors. 28
formed a shared bond over their Islamic beliefs and traditions and over disgust for the Soviets deporting mainly women, children, and army veterans. 23 The shared grief and abuse of deportation and death would go on to shape their experience within their new home. Tatars created an idealized narrative over their homeland of Crimea, viewing it as their paradise on earth and their birthright to return. 24 They organized into their own settler-
The collapse of the USSR did not create the situation to change these underlying problems. Instead, the collapse of the USSR, and the move to market economics has drastically changed Ukraine and Crimea, helping exacerbate the preexisting problems in the region. When privatization occurred within Ukraine, farmland was divided among members of collectivized farms. Since Crimean Tatars arrived so late, they were not members of these farms, leaving them with no land post-privatization. 29 This left the Crimean Tatars to occupy what little land remained around the cities in squatter towns or forced away from the coast to the unoccupied interior. 30 This left the Tatars in a precarious position that only furthered poverty within their group. 31 Despite support from the Ukrainian government, Crimean Tatar communities lacked many of the basic necessities of modern-day life, such as education, gas, telephone lines, and health services. 32 The tension between the Ukrainian and Russian immigrants and the newly arrived Crimean Tatars did not subside but continued as Tatars continued to try to reclaim their stolen lands and property, much to the
opposition of settled locals. 33
The Crimean Tatars worked to increase their political linkages with the newfound Ukrainian state through the creation of local Tatar governing structures called ‘mejlis’ which, in the absence of national statehood, provided a degree of selfgovernance. 34 The ‘mejlis,’ a primarily secular body, was used as a forum to promote increased national identity and solidarity, but also to commemorate and acknowledge the collective trauma of deportation, as well as religious openness. 35 The role of Islam in the lives of Tatars became an increasingly touchy subject, as the more secular-focused ‘mejlis’ acted as a balancing force. 36
As time progressed and the politics of Tatars evolved alongside the Ukrainian state, they began to take an increasingly pro-European stance due to the internationalist stance of Tatar organizations and as a counter to Russian influence. 37 Following the outbreak of the Ukraine Euromaidan protest in 2013 to 2014 and subsequent events, a power vacuum took shape within Ukraine, in which the territorial integrity of the Crimean peninsula was challenged. 38 Within Crimea, masked individuals seized government buildings and Russia prepared the legal ground for annexation, which would soon come to haunt Crimea. 39
These events led to the unfolding of the largest shift in the status of Crimea since the collapse of the Soviet Union: Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. The annexation and conflict led to the expulsion and flight of many Tatars who saw parallels between these actions and the 1944 ‘Sürgün.’ Tatars faced repression and intimidation by pro-Russian ‘people’s defense forces’ and the Russian government, whilst vehemently denying the legitimacy of the annexation referendum over
claims of irregularities and fears over returning to Russian colonial and imperial rule. 40 With fears of reprisals and a repeat of the past, thousands of Tatars self-exiled themselves in mainland Ukraine, marking yet another instance of Crimean Tatars leaving their homeland. 41 The fears of repression were not unfounded, as Russia soon began to act against the ‘mejlis’ due to its activism against annexation and for the rights of Tatars, banning them on the grounds of being an “extremist organization.” 42 Russian authorities worked to hinder the efforts of Tatar organizations, restricting the publication of Tatar media, and the Spiritual Board of Muslims in Crimea coming under increased scrutiny and Russian State observation looking for “extremist materials.” 43
The events of 2014 mirrored those of the Sürgün decades prior, with the same anti-Tatar propaganda and messaging spreading while persecution increased.
Tatar homes were again being targeted by pro-Russian forces who compiled lists of Tatar residences. 44 Tatar news outlets began to be placed under a Russian pressure campaign, while houses were marked with “X” carvings on the entrances, a bleak reminder of the prelude to deportation by pro-Russian residents. 45 In a shift from being ignored by the Russian state apparatus, now Crimean Tatars were the center of negative attention. Russians viewed the Crimean Peninsula as they had during the post-WWII period, as a Russified territory, and the presence of Crimean Tatars undermined this, requiring the de-emphasization of Crimean Tatar identity and working towards its erasure within Crimea. 46 Unlike Ukraine which seeked to make amends for the ills of the past, Russia refuses to make amends for the past, instead viewing the peninsula as solely Russian. 47
Outside of Crimea, Tatars have increasingly campaigned for their right to a homeland and recognition of their repeated repression at the hands of the Russians. Mustafa Djemilev, the former leader of the ‘mejlis’ organized a “Muslim Batallion” north of Crimea to act as a symbol of Ukrainian defiance against Russia 48 while also joining the Ukrainian military and engaging within counterterrorism operations in Donbas. 49 The Ukrainian State is actively trying to rebuild bridges with Tatars in hopes of gaining its support for the fight against Russian separatism. This fight has gained the support of the elite within the Tatar community, as Ukraine works to integrate Ukrainians more with the state including recognizing them as the indigenous group of Crimea. 50 This contrasts with Russia, who actively subverts Tatar narratives and people to
perpetuate the claim of Crimea as an all-Russian republic of the Russian Federation, just as had happened after the Sürgün. All of this considered, the Crimean Tatar community and its political leaders made the decision to align with Ukraine when Russia invaded in February 2022. When Russia began its campaign, Tatars saw potential to re-achieve their national aim: going back to Crimea. The Ukrainian government, realizing this, declared that part of its duty is to liberate Crimea for the Crimean Tatars. 51 Recollecting on past trauma with Russian expansion, the Crimean Tatars have continued their active and passive resistance against Russian occupation from the annexation period into the current conflict. 52 International activism has again placed a spotlight on Crimea, with the UN General Assembly passing a resolution affirming Ukrainian territorial integrity, and thus claims of Crimea, only days after the invasion. 53 This puts Crimea back in a spotlight that, alongside the recent illegal annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts, they hope would unify both the war and Crimea under a single banner. 54 This unique overlapping of the same issues–land falling under Russian occupation and annexation–gives Tatars more leverage in their fight for the liberation of their homeland by unifying it with the larger, internationally supported, coalition for the fight against Russia. At the same time, anti-Russian activism by Tatars within Ukraine is taking two new faces–anti-war activism and combat. Tatar activists within Ukraine, Crimea, and Turkey are actively organizing protests against the war that merges with eight years of systemic human rights abuses against Crimean Tatars. 55 These protests have led to the repeated arrest of Tatars for anti-Russian action and unfounded accusations of sabotage and “extremism.” 56 As for combat, existing fighters from groups established during the 2014 war in the Donbas have continued their fight, while others have just joined the fight against Russia, including high-ranking Tatars, such as Said Ismagilov, Mufti
of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Ukraine. 57 This is coupled with fears stemming from Russia’s recent mobilization campaign, which has disproportionately targeted Tatar families within Crimea. 58 An estimated 90 percent of those conscripted by the Russian military within Crimea are Tatars despite the fact that they make up only 13 percent of the total population of Crimea. 59 This is furthering the claims made by Tatars that Russia is not only trying to destroy the Crimean Tatar culture and identity but persecute and kill its people as well through conflict and conscription. 60 While these claims were more merited during the 2014 annexation of Ukraine, the more holistic approach of the recent invasion of Ukraine has changed the narrative towards one of more generalized attacks on Ukraine as a whole. However, Crimean Tatars are again finding themselves used as the geopolitical pawns of Russia to achieve its own military goals, while the plight of their people is ignored
as the focus shifts to the larger Ukraine conflict.
Compounded with the increase of war is the increase of repression by Russian authorities against Crimean Tatars. Within occupied cities, Russian authorities are cracking down on influential Tatar figures, just as they had within occupied Crimea in 2014. 61 Prominent activists are jailed under suspicion of acting for the Ukrainian government, while Russian media perpetuates a narrative that likens them to a “terrorist people.” 62 Authorities have also levied the claim of sabotage against Tatars to further arrest their prominent leaders during the war, claims which activists and Kyiv claim are in retaliation against them increasing the visibility of Crimea. 63 With an increased spotlight now being shown on the Crimean Tatar cause, they are organizing for a fight to regain their land. With many fighting within the military and others arguing on the diplomatic and social side, the war in Ukraine has galvanized the movement for
the liberation of the Tatars. International forums undertaken during the conflict with the exiled leader of the Mejlis, Ukraine, Turkey, and others have already undertaken steps to formalize the place of the Tatars within a de-occupied Crimea, with the protection of their national identity at the forefront of thinking. 64 For Crimean Tatars, the war is a continuation of the repression of the past, with a new face. State-sanctioned repression by Russian authorities continues, but there is light at the end of the tunnel, wars can be won and land can be reclaimed, using history as a guide. 65 As Mark Twain says, history never repeats itself, but it does often rhyme.
1 Brian Glyn Williams, “The Ethnogenesis of the Crimean Tatars. an Historical Reinterpretation,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 11, no. 3 (2001): pp. 329-348, https://doi. org/10.1017/s1356186301000311, 333.
2 Ibid. pg. 334
3 Elmira Muratova, “The Transformation of the Crimean Tatars’ Institutions and Discourses after 2014,” Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics 13, no. 1 (January 2019): pp. 4466, https://doi.org/10.2478/jnmlp-2019-0006, 45.
4 Aykol, U. “Kırım Ahalî Cumhuri̇yeti̇ ve Kırım Da İlk Bolşevi̇k İşgali̇ (1917-1918)”. Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih (2019 ): 76
5 Ibid. pg 76
6 “Decree on the Autonomous Crimean Republic,” Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, September 1, 2015, https:// soviethistory.msu.edu/1954-2/the-gift-of-crimea/the-gift-ofcrimea-texts/decree-on-the-autonomous-crimean-republic/.
7 Brian Glyn Williams, “The Hidden Ethnic Cleansing of Muslims in the Soviet Union: The Exile and Repatriation of the Crimean Tatars,” Journal of Contemporary History 37, no. 3 (2002): pp. 323-347, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009402037 0030101, 327.
8 Ibid. pg. 328
9 Boshyk, Yury, Roman Waschuk, Andriy Wynnyckyj, and Mark R Elliott. “Soviet Military Collaborators during World War II.” Essay. In Ukraine during World War II: History and Its Aftermath: A Symposium, 89–104. Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1986.
10 Korostelina, “Mass Deportation to Hardships” 38. 11 Ibid. pg. 38
12 Brian Glyn Williams, The Crimean Tatars: From Soviet Genocide to Putin’s Conquest (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), https://diasporiana.org.ua/wpcontent/uploads/books/20315/file.pdf, 96.
13 Ibid. pg. 98
14 Özkan Behlül, “The 1945 Turkish-Soviet Crisis,” Russia
in Global Affairs 18, no. 2 (2020): pp. 156-187, https://doi. org/10.31278/1810-6374-2020-18-2-156-187, 165.
15 Williams, From Genocide to Conquest, 97-98.
16 Ibid. pg. 97-98
17 “Decree No. 5859SS,” Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, October 1, 2015, https://soviethistory.msu.edu/19432/deportation-of-minorities/deportation-of-minorities-texts/ decree-no-5859ss/.
18 Ibid.
19 Williams, From Genocide to Conquest, 115-116.
20 V. Stanley Vardys, “The Case of the Crimean Tartars,” Russian Review 30, no. 2 (1971): pp. 101-110, https://doi. org/10.2307/127890, 103.
21 Williams, From Genocide to Conquest, 101-102. 22 Ibid. pg. 102-103 23 Ibid. pg. 103-104
24 “Sü rg ü n: The Crimean Tatars’ Deportation and Exile,” Portail Sciences Po (Science Po, June 16, 2008), https://www. sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/fr/ document/suerguen-crimean-tatars-deportation-and-exile. html.
25 Conquest, Robert. The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities. London: Macmillan, 1970. Pg. 186-187
26 Ibid. pg. 345 27 Ibid. pg. 345-346
28 Eftihia Voutira, “Ideology, History, and Politics in Service of Repatriation,” Focaal 2014, no. 70 (January 2014): pp. 3748, https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2014.700104.
29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Karina Korostelina, “Crimean Tatars from Mass Deportation to Hardships in Occupied Crimea,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 1 (2015): pp. 33-47, https://doi. org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.1.1319, 35.
34 Muratova, “Transformation of Crimean Tatars” 49. 35 Ibid. pg. 50
36 Ibid. pg. 51 37 Ibid. pg. 51
38 Anton Bebier, “Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict,” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 15, no. 1 (2015): 35-54, 40 39 Ibid. pg. 41 40 Ibid. pg. 43
41 Korostelina, “Mass Deportation to Hardships,” 42. 42 Sławomir Dębski, “Banning the Majlis: Another Manifestation of Russian Repression of the ...,” ed. Katarzyna Staniewska, Polish Institute of International Affairs, March 18, 2016, https://www.pism.pl/upload/images/artykuly/legacy/ files/21822.pdf, 1.
43 Ibid. pg. 2
44 Natalia Antelava, “Who Will Protect the Crimean Tatars?,” The New Yorker (The New Yorker, March 6, 2014), https:// www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/who-will-protect-thecrimean-tatars.
45 Ibid.
46 Filiz Tutku Aydin and Fethi Kurtiy Sahin, “The Politics of Recognition of Crimean Tatar Collective Rights in the Post-Soviet Period: With Special Attention to the Russian Annexation of Crimea,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 52, no. 1 (2019): pp. 39-50, https://doi.org/10.1016/j. postcomstud.2019.02.003.
47 Andrew Wilson, “Imagining Crimean Tatar History since 2014: Indigenous Rights, Russian Recolonisation and the New Ukrainian Narrative of Cooperation,” Europe-Asia Studies 73, no. 5 (August 2021): pp. 837-868, https://doi.org/10.1080/096 68136.2020.1867709, 2.
48 Sławomir Dębski, “Banning the Majlis,” 2
49 Denis Brylov, “Transformed Perceptions of Islam and Muslims in Ukraine in the Wake of the Social and Political Changes Caused by Euromaidan,” Islam, Religions, and Pluralism in Europe, 2016, pp. 267-284, https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-658-12962-0_21, 272.
50 Ibid. pg. 278
51 Ukrinform, “Liberating Crimea Ukraine’s Duty before Crimean Tatars - Podolyak,” Ukrinform (Укринформ, August 19, 2022), https://www.ukrinform.net/rubricpolytics/3553794-liberating-crimea-ukraines-duty-beforecrimean-tatars-podolyak.html.
52 Mariia Shynkarenko, “Compliant Subjects?,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 55, no. 1 (January 2022): pp. 7698, https://doi.org/10.1525/j.postcomstud.2022.55.1.76, 77.
53 General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1, Aggression against Ukraine, A/77/ES-11/1 (2 March 2022)
54 Crimean Platform, “Joint Statement of the International Crimea Platform Participants,” Crimean Platform (Crimean Platform, 2022), https://crimea-platform.org/en/jointstatement-of-the-international-crimea-platform-participants.
55 ”Highlights: Ukraine Crimean Tatar Media 2-8 Jul 22.” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, Aug 01, 2022. https:// ezproxy.bu.edu/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest. com%2Fwire-feeds%2Fhighlights-ukraine-crimean-tatarmedia-2-8-jul-22%2Fdocview%2F2696817424%2Fse2%3Faccountid%3D9676.
56 Rfe/rl. “Russian Intelligence Accuses Crimean Tatars of Pipeline Sabotage after Kyiv Riposte.” RadioFreeEurope/ RadioLiberty. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 7, 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-crimean-tatarssabotage/31448494.html.
57 Micah Reddy and Anastasia Levkova, “The Ukrainian Muslims Fighting against Russia,” Russia-Ukraine war | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, August 4, 2022), https://www.aljazeera. com/features/2022/8/4/the-ukrainian-muslims-fightingagainst-russia.
58 Walker, Shaun. “‘a Way to Get Rid of Us’: Crimean Tatars Decry Russia’s Mobilisation.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, September 25, 2022. https://www.theguardian. com/world/2022/sep/25/a-way-to-get-rid-of-us-crimeantatars-decry-russia-mobilisation.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, “Russia’s Crackdown
on Crimean Tatars Foreshadows Wider Repression,” RussiaUkraine war News | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, March 12, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/12/russia-ukrainecrimean-tatars-dissent-repression.
62 Mansur Mirovalev, “Russian Court Sentences Crimean Muslims to Jail: Activist,” Russia-Ukraine war News | Al Jazeera (Al Jazeera, May 12, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2022/5/12/russian-court-jails-crimean-muslims-amidcrackdown-activist.
63 Rfe/rl. “Russian Intelligence Accuses Crimean Tatars of Pipeline Sabotage after Kyiv Riposte.” RadioFreeEurope/ RadioLiberty. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 7, 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-crimean-tatarssabotage/31448494.html.
64 Crimean Platform, “«Colonization of XXI Century: Recovery Plan and Restoration of the ...,” Crimean Platform (Second Summit of the Crimean Platform, August 23, 2022), https://crimea-platform.org/en/events/kolonizaciya-xxistorichchya-podolannya-naslidkiv-ta-vidnovlennya-pravkrimskotatarskogo-narodu-yak-instrument-deokupaciyikrimu.
65 Ashish Kumar Sen, “Crimea in Ukraine’s Crosshairs, Say US Generals,” CEPA (Center for European Policy Analysis, September 28, 2022), https://cepa.org/article/crimea-inukraines-crosshairs-say-us-generals/.
As Russia ignited war in Ukraine, the world first sent outpours of solidarity; and then the world sent guns. While Putin’s campaign may have been foreseeable by world leaders, they were swift to emphasize how critical the war would be. Any collateral of this war dominates the media, ranging across the spheres of European energy security or nuclear war; the world is unwilling to let the war slip into its periphery. NATO and EU countries have remained firm that an outcome that gives rise to Russian hegemony is an outcome that threatens democracy and sovereignty worldwide. For many world leaders and decision-making bodies, military assistance to Ukraine was not a question of should we but of how much. The allied decision—both by individual nations and through affirmations by international organizations— to send weapons to Ukrainians was not as controversial as it was unprecedented. But while the consensus remains relatively clear—that Ukraine needs international help—the massive flow of arms poses an overlooked question: where might they all end up?
Recently overlooked is Ukraine’s
reputation as a hub for arms trafficking and organized crime. Vladimir Putin has already cemented his position as Europe’s deadliest antagonist, but he is not the only adversary in Ukraine; the other threats simply remain out of the frame of current dialogue. Terrorists, insurgents, and other violent nonstate actors have kept the demand for weapons high, and the world’s arms support for Ukraine is increasing that supply fortuitously; but no good deed goes unpunished. If the war in Ukraine follows the pattern of recent post-conflict states, it may be poised to proliferate the market for illicit weapons regionally and worldwide.
Approximating the aid sent to Ukraine is not an exact science, and the sum dollar figure varies among sources. Additionally, countries continue to pledge new aid as the war continues, meaning that estimations change constantly. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, based in Germany, is one of the many organizations that is attempting to calculate the total and has assembled
a ‘Ukraine Support Tracker’ that quantifies and categorizes international aid to Ukraine. 1 The United States remains the biggest benefactor, and as of October 11, has committed roughly $52 billion in humanitarian, financial, and military aid to Ukraine, $28 billion of the $52 billion being military aid. The runner-up, denoted as ‘EU Institutions’ by the Kiel Institute, falls about $35 billion behind the U.S., at just above $16 billion. Dissimilarly to the U.S., EU contributions consist mostly of financial aid, and only $2.5 billion of their $16 billion total is in the form of military aid. At least 28 countries have sent weapons to Ukraine, 25 of them being NATO countries. 2 For many of these nations, the most important task is maintaining Ukraine’s ability to compete with the quantity, caliber, and technology of the Russian military.
A threat more dire than exacting dollar amounts, though, is the ambiguity surrounding the transfer process in its entirety. Analysts and officials have sounded alarms about the real possibility that the weapons sent to Ukraine will fall into rogue hands. Interpol chief Jurgen Stock sees this as a certainty, having stated in June that “once the guns fall silent, the illegal weapons will come.” 3 Just under five months later, the U.S. Department of State finally addressed the concern, and on October 27, 2022, published the “US Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons in Eastern Europe.” 4 Although not the first time the US has had concerns about arms transfer to Ukraine—in the 2018 government spending bill, Congress went as far as to include an arms embargo specific to Ukraine’s far-right Azov Battalion 5—it is the most substantial. The proposal includes a three-pronged approach to mitigate the risk of arms trafficking, consisting mainly of assisting Ukrainians to account for weapons, strengthening border security, and aiding security forces in deterring, detecting, and stopping trafficking. The proposal, however, does little to reassure those assessing the risk of trafficking potential.
Among the vaguely actionable proposals includes the promise of end-use verifications, a promise made previously by a Department of State spokesperson who stated that the 2022 military aid includes signed agreements that “do not allow the retransfer of equipment to third parties without prior U.S. government authorization.” 6 This
describes end-user certificates, which are included in all international arms transfers. The Department of Defense Trade Control (DDTC) is responsible for overseeing these agreements but falls short of actually stopping end-use transfers from taking place, because violations are not often followed by any sort of action. In April 2022, the U.S. violated a similar agreement when it approved a shipment of helicopters to Ukraine that were originally purchased from Russia, which included the same provision in the terms of the sale. 7 EU countries have similar provisions in place, but they face the same issues with consequences for violations: it was only in 2021 that the EU committed to—in the future—developing uniform standards for enduse monitoring with the objective of curbing arms trafficking. 8
A further shortcoming of the plan is its sole emphasis on “sensitive and advanced conventional weapons,” specifically man-portable air defense systems (such as shoulder-launched missiles, like Javelins) and anti-tank/all-purpose tactical guided missiles. 9 The plan does not, however, place any emphasis on small arms (traditionally understood as more conventional ‘guns’) which are the most easily trafficked weapons. Further assurances include the loosely defined promise to strengthen border security, which was undertaken by the EU
in July when it launched a ‘support hub for internal security and border management’ in Moldova with the aim of curbing trafficking, and continuing to “scrutinize requests to transfer defense articles… to screen for parties that may pose an unacceptable risk of diversion.” 10 Still, recent U.S. efforts to enforce these initiatives have been largely unsuccessful as masses of arms have fallen into the wrong hands. Following the departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, billions of dollars worth of weapons were left behind and subsequently used by the Taliban against Afghan forces. 11 The U.S. encountered the same issue in Iraq when it lost roughly 360,000 U.S.-provided small arms despite having thousands of its own troops present to avoid this very issue. 12
Soviet delimitation, historical border disputes, and chaotic transitions towards independence resulted in numerous conflicts between and within former Soviet states. This flurry of conflict in the region meant that arms left behind by the Soviet Union were in high demand. Similarly, the poor quality of transition governments left states in need of economic gain by whatever means necessary. The massive stockpiles of arms were lucrative and made for relatively easy profit. 13 Between 1992 and 1998, the Ukrainian military “lost” $32 billion of military equipment: equipment that had a habit of emerging in conflicts within Africa. 14 Specifics surrounding illicit arms transfers, especially recent ones, are scarce at best. Details related to the greater arms trafficking market are difficult to pinpoint because, by nature, an illegal arms transfer is only successful when undetected. Most data relevant to the illicit arms market in Europe is revealed only when weapons have been seized, at which point authorities are able to trace them back to the country and conflict of origin.
‘A Russian Oblast called Ukraine’ is a vision either forethought or enabled by Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Crimea’s occupation did not just make way for today’s war, it was also succeeded by a civil war in the Donbas region. Donetsk and Luhansk held questionable Russian-backed referendums in which each voted to secede from Ukraine, resulting in two self-declared separatist states. 15 Armed conflict
rapidly followed these results, and Ukrainian troops fought the Russian-assisted separatists. In 2015, France and Germany helped Ukraine and Russia broker a ceasefire and bring an end to the active conflict. 16 However, the separatists' proclamation of independence never came to a formal resolution, and the Donbas region remained troublesome. The illegitimacy of these states after the attempted secession created a fundamental barrier to maintaining a healthy economy and foreign investments, thus fostering an economy based largely on criminal markets. 17 Before the 2022 war in Ukraine, illicit weapons seizures allowed for approximations of trafficking routes across and out of Ukraine. Poland and Belarus emerged as common exit routes, with a notable 2,000 percent increase in seizures. 18 The Ukrainian market for illicit arms, while not the most prominent in Europe, is comparable to the much larger Balkan market, as both primarily trafficked small arms. Following several consecutive wars in the Balkans, former Yugoslavia has been traced as the source of many illicitly obtained arms. The region is often provided as a case study in the danger posed by surplus weaponry after conflict. In the past, Ukrainian illicit arms fueled conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 19 In addition to other types of trafficking and organized criminal activity, such as drugs, cigarettes, and counterfeit money, black markets have been a crutch for the Donbas’ economy. 20 The outcomes of the Russian invasion may be crucial in determining the existence of organized crime within Ukraine. Since the beginning of the invasion, the armies of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) have joined Russian troops, although seemingly to little avail. 21 Following months of failure to take full control of the separatist regions, Russia staged new illegal referendums in these areas and declared them to be under Russian control. It is unclear whether civilian opinion in the DPR and LPR reflects the results of the referendums, but Russian and separatist military authorities are known to stifle dissent and very likely coerced civilians to ensure a vote for secession. 22
The gravitation of former Soviet Union
states towards conflict has remained a challenge— although a laudably consistent one—in Europe and Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. If a war in Ukraine was not indicative of declining stability in the region, then a resumption of fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan in NagornoKarabakh or a death toll nearing 100 after border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan certainly are. The presence of geopolitical violent conflict invites arms trafficking for two primary reasons. First, and perhaps obviously, violence requires weapons. While fighting between two legitimate governments may not require illegal arms, instability paves way for militant groups that don’t often have legitimate means of purchasing weapons. Second, the financial incentive for groups in states with troubled economies–especially those actively declining–is often hard to resist. Continued clashes in Central Asia would contribute to arms trafficking risks in Ukraine. A case study in geopolitical turmoil begetting trafficking is found in South Asia. The region is home to a major nexus of trafficking between several countries in the area, all embroiled in some type of conflict and each with a specific geographic paradigm. Trade between India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, is made easy by the nations’ shared land borders, while the Bay of Bengal serves trafficking among Southeast Asian countries as well. 23 The India-Pakistan conflict, the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and its spillover into Bangladesh, and spillage from Afghanistan keep the demand for weapons high in the region. 24
To draw similarities between the former Soviet Union and this model, it’s worth noting that both Armenia and Tajikistan have previously accepted ‘covert’ arms transfers from Russia to aid in Armenia’s fight against Azerbaijan and the Tajik civil war, respectively. 25 If this pattern of rising conflict continues in the region, it leaves nations vulnerable to the risks of arms trafficking. Insurgency forces or rogue actors in these nations could become potential customers for ‘leaked’ Ukrainian arms. Alternatively, the countries could serve as intermediaries along trafficking routes, as some historically have. The financial incentive for states with troubled economies–especially troubled by conflict–is often hard to resist.
Another troubling repetition of history in Ukraine is the presence of foreign fighters. The Wagner Group, a clandestine Russian private
military company has recruited mercenaries from Syria and Libya to abet their war effort. 26 The Wagner Group unsurprisingly does an excellent job of obscuring its activities and understanding its nexus is a project on its own. Wagner employs a convoluted network of actors, including, but not limited to, other Russian and foreign private military/security companies, legitimate companies in related industries, and individual contractors and mercenaries – all spanning across the scale of legality and legitimacy. The Wagner Group fights far beyond Russia’s borders though. In recent years, Wagner has been quietly fueling conflict in Syria and African nations such as Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Libya. 27 While the group primarily provides additional manpower, private military companies are also involved in supplying weapons, very often in violation of embargoes. 28 Given Wagner’s ongoing engagements in conflicts in Africa, this poses a risk of further arms and conflict spillover. A 2022 report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime details the ways in which small arms proliferation has given rise to a lucrative black arms market in Somalia, which has in turn fueled other regional conflicts, such as the Ethiopian civil war. 29 One associated organization, Russia’s (legitimate) Moran Security Company, saw nine of its guards arrested by the Nigerian government on gun-smuggling charges. 30 While these companies aren’t legally considered to be partners, lots of crossover can be found among their personnel and geographic activity.
Unfortunately, infrequent headlines about these military and security companies are typically the only concrete insight into their illicit dealings, and hard proof of their involvement in any type of organized crime is non-existent. However, even looser affiliations shed light on Russia’s otherwise opaque military-industrial complex, and many realities of Ukraine’s war suggest that to be wary of the Wagner group’s presence is not to be overly cautious. Three things should be examined as related circumstances. First, the Wagner Group is financed and armed by the Russian government, and as such is a tool for their agenda, including the promotion of their arms sales. 31 Second, Russians have been the “main vector of diversion so far.” 32 Any trafficking-related arrests while the conflict is active have mostly been—and will
likely be—Russians or Russian sympathizers. 33 Third, Russia’s defense production cannot keep up with the current rate of conflict and will likely continue to struggle to supply adequate numbers of munitions. 34 These three facts contextualized against each other suggest that the idea that Wagner and Russians could play a mutually beneficial role in trafficking arms is not entirely unreasonable. Yet the density of Wagner mercenaries fighting in Ukraine is unknown, as is the ratio of Russian manufactured against illicitly supplied weapons in their armaments. But most importantly, the presence of foreign fighters is known to assist in the proliferation of arms following conflicts, and the Wagner group's global network raises concern. 35
It’s rather easy to consider warnings about arms trafficking potential only in the context of Russian false-flag operations, designed to vilify Ukraine in a desperate attempt to slow the world’s military aid. And while it is true that Russia has already attempted to convince Ukraine’s allies of manufactured examples of arms trafficking, the only prop that could bolster Russia’s disinformation campaign is the possession of actual weapons from the battlefield; a threat that the Department of State already flagged in their anti-diversion plan. 36 This example serves to underscore the most important reality: demand for trafficked weapons is virtually ubiquitous. And yet, revelations on the abundance of risk factors in Ukraine were superseded by incomprehensive preventative measures. Gaining enough knowledge on trafficking routes to significantly inhibit them or uncover them while they are in operation is incredibly difficult. An underlying theme in attempts to understand arms trafficking, though, is a proliferation of small arms and light weapons following conflict. States engaged in or recovering from conflict are in no position to take effective control over loose weapons, and this period is the opportune moment for weapons to fall into non-state hands.
While battles persist in Ukraine, and perhaps even dwindle, the massive stock of arms will still be there, and many actors stand to gain from their exploitation. While there may be recognized governments that seek to profit off of or obtain illegally sourced weapons, such as Russia, the greater threat is in organizations that are more difficult to see. The relative carelessness of status quo arms transfer procedures is staging
Europe for an explosion of new weapons entering the black market, and end-use agreements will not stop unlawful actors from seeking out a profit. Of course, a flawless approach towards mitigating this risk is unrealistic, but continuing the U.S.’s approaches ought to adapt from previous failed protocols in past conflicts and move to trying future mitigation strategies. An honest assessment recognizes that Ukraine’s collateral violence would insignificantly affect the United States, but greater stability, especially in Europe, is desirable for any well-intentioned nation. An explosion of small arms across Europe, Asia, and Africa could disrupt any fragile balances and exacerbate any existing conflicts. Sympathy for a war-torn nation’s plight is admirable, but forethought extending beyond the timeframe of an active war is a responsible foreign policy.
1 Katelyn Bushnell et al. “Ukraine Support Tracker,” IFW, Kiel Institute for World Economy, last modified October 11, 2021, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukrainesupport-tracker/
2 Hanna Duggal and Marium Ali, “What weapons has Ukraine received from the US and allies?” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera Media Network, June 15, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2022/6/15/infographic-what-weapons-has-ukrainereceived-from-the-us-and-al
3 Kim Willsher, “Arms sent to Ukraine will end up in criminal hands, says Interpol chief,” The Guardian, Guardian News & Media Limited, June 2, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2022/jun/02/ukraine-weapons-end-up-criminal-handssays-interpol-chief-jurgen-stock
4 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Weapons in Eastern Europe,” U.S. Department of State, October 27, 2022, https:// www.state.gov/u-s-plan-to-counter-illicit-diversion-of-certainadvanced-conventional-weapons-in-eastern-europe/
5 Congress.gov, "Text - H.R.2471 - 117th Congress (20212022): Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022," March 15, 2022, pp. 136, sec. 8141, http://www.congress.gov/
6 John Hudson, “Flood of weapons to Ukraine raises fear of arms smuggling,” The Washington Post, The Washington Post, May 14, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalsecurity/2022/05/14/ukraine-weapons-trafficking/
7 Ibid.
8 “Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/28,” Office Journal of the European Union, January 15, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021D0038&from=EN
9 B “Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/28,” Office Journal of the European Union, January 15, 2021, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021D0038&from=EN ureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Weapons in Eastern Europe,” U.S. Department of State, October 27, 2022, https://www.state. gov/u-s-plan-to-counter-illicit-diversion-of-certain-advancedconventional-weapons-in-eastern-europe/
10 “Informal Home Affairs Council: EU launches the Support Hub for Internal Security and Border Management in Moldova,” European Commission, European Union, July 11, 2022, https:// ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_4462
11 Jack Detsch, “The U.S. Left Billions Worth of Weapons in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, The Slate Group, April 28, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/28/the-u-s-left-billionsworth-of-weapons-in-afghanistan/
12 A. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, “Risky Business: The role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Cato, Cato Institute, March 13, 2018, https://www.cato.org/policyanalysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy?TB_ iframe=true&height=658.8&width=370.8
13 Berryman, J. "Russia and the Illicit Arms Trade." Crime, Law, and Social Change 33, no. 1-2 (2000): 85-104. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-94-015-9335-9_3
14 Rachel Stohl and Elias Yousif, “The Risks of U.S. Military Assistance to Ukraine,” Stimson, The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 13, 2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/the-risks-of-u-smilitary-assistance-to-ukraine/
15 Shaun Walker, Oksana Grytsenko, and Howard Amos, “Ukraine: pro-Russia separatists set for victory in eastern region referendum,” The Guardian, Guardian News & Media Limited, May 12, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ may/11/eastern-ukraine-referendum-donetsk-luhansk
16 “Conflict in Ukraine,” CFR, Council on Foreign Relations, last updated October 20, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/globalconflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine
17 Anna Arutunyan and Mark Galeotti, “Rebellion as Racket: Crime and the Donbas conflict, 2014-2022,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Global Initiative, July 11, 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/ uploads/2022/07/GITOC-Donbas-Rebellion-as-racket.pdf 18 Ibid
19 Rachel Stohl and Elias Yousif, “The Risks of U.S. Military Assistance to Ukraine,” Stimson, The Henry L. Stimson Center, July 13, 2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/the-risks-of-u-smilitary-assistance-to-ukraine/ 20 Ibid
21 David Axe, “In 100 Days, a Separatist Army in Ukraine Lost Half Its Troops,” Forbes, Forbes Media, June 13, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/06/13/aseparatist-army-in-ukraine-lost-half-its-troops-in-100days/?sh=545e436a3dbe
22 Pavel Polityuk, “Russia holds annexation votes; Ukraine says residents coerced,” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, September 24, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainemarches-farther-into-liberated-lands-separatist-calls-urgentreferendum-2022-09-19/
23 Mohammed Sinan Siyech (2022) Arms Smuggling in India: Exploring Links between Crime and Terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 45:5-6, 445-462, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678875
24 Reinier Bergema, Tanya Mehra, and Meryle Demuynck, “The Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance,” ICCT, International Center for Counter-Terrorism, September 28, 2020, https://icct. nl/app/uploads/2020/09/SALW-Synthesis-Report.pdf
25 Berryman, J. "Russia and the Illicit Arms Trade." Crime, Law, and Social Change 33, no. 1-2 (2000): 85-104. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-94-015-9335-9_3
26 Tanya Mehra and Abigail Thorley, “Foreign Fighters, Foreign Volunteers and Mercenaries in the Ukrainian Armed Conflict,” ICCT, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, July 11, 2022, https://icct.nl/publication/foreign-fighters-
volunteers-mercenaries-in-ukraine/
27 Declan Walsh, “Putin’s shadow soldiers: how the Wagner group is expanding in Africa,” New York Times, The New York Times Company, May 31, 2022, https://www.nytimes. com/2022/05/31/world/africa/wagner-group-africa.html
28 Damien Lilly et al., “Private Military Companies and the Proliferation of Small Arms: Regulating the Acts,” Biting the Bullet Briefing 10, International Alert and Saferworld, 2001, https://gsdrc.org/document-library/private-militarycompanies-and-the-proliferation-of-small-arms-regulating-theactors/
29 Jay Badhadur, “The Price of Civil War: A survey of Somalia’s Arms Markets,” Global Initiative, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, April 19, 2022, https:// globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Price-of-civilwar-13.04-web.pdf
30 Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (2018): 181-204. https://doi.org/10.1080/106058 6X.2019.1591142
31 Candace Rondeaux, “Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare,” New America, Arizona State University Center on the Future of War, November 5, 2019, https://efile. fara.gov/docs/6170-Informational-Materials-20200227-287. pdf
32 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Weapons in Eastern Europe,” U.S. Department of State, October 27, 2022, https:// www.state.gov/u-s-plan-to-counter-illicit-diversion-of-certainadvanced-conventional-weapons-in-eastern-europe/
33 Lara Jakes and John Ismay, “U.S. Program Aims to Keep Sensitive Weapons in Ukraine,” New York Times, New York Times, The New York Times Company, October 27, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/27/us/politics/weapons-aidukraine-russia.html
34 Eric Tegler, “A New Kremlin ‘Committee’ Won’t Accelerate Production of Weapons for Russian Troops in Ukraine,” Forbes, Forbes Media, October 26, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/ sites/erictegler/2022/10/26/a-new-kremlin-committee-wontaccelerate-production-and-delivery-of-weapons-for-russiantroops-in-ukraine/?sh=35150ae54ef3
35 Kerry Chavez and Ori Swed, “Weak states and loose arms: lessons and warnings, from Afghanistan to Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, Metamorphic Media, https://warontherocks. com/2022/07/weak-states-and-loose-arms-lessons-andwarnings-from-libya-to-ukraine/
36 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Weapons in Eastern Europe,” U.S. Department of State, October 27, 2022, https:// www.state.gov/u-s-plan-to-counter-illicit-diversion-of-certainadvanced-conventional-weapons-in-eastern-europe/
Originating from a novel written by one of the most well-known authors from Central Asia Chinghiz Aitmatov, mankurtism is a term that describes the Russification of the people from Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 1 “Mankurtism” stems from the word “mankurt,” a slave who can no longer think for himself after his memory is completely wiped through intense physical torture. 2 Aitmatov explained this term as the loss of one’s sense of connectedness to their own culture and the loss of remembrance of the history that contributes to one’s sense of identity. Furthermore, this term also encapsulates the effects of standardization of language, culture, and more from Soviet times, where citizens of the region had no choice but to conform. 3 The Central Asian nation of Kazakhstan, is a country in which the remnants of mankurtism can be seen in the present day, especially in relation to language.
T he prevalence of the Russian language in Kazakhstan can partially be traced back to its roots in its Soviet history. Russian was the dominant language for all of the Soviet nationalities; language was a tool used to unite all of them as one and deepen their shared sense of identity. Because Russia was the most powerful country in the USSR, it imposed its language on other ethnic groups for the sake of homogeneity. 4 As a result, even upon the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Russian was still the dominant language in the post-Soviet space. People continued to be educated in Russian, consumed media in Russian and communicated
with each other in Russian, among many other facets of day-to-day life. Uplifting the native languages of post-Soviet nations has proven to be difficult, as Russia continues to play a massive role in the economic, political, and cultural spheres of life in these countries. In Kazakhstan, the Russian language is a critical tool of soft power for shaping public opinion and maintaining strong ties between the Kazakh and Russian governments. Article Seven of the Kazakh Constitution designates Kazakh as the official state language but places the Russian language “on equal grounds” with Kazakh. 5 When the Kazakh Constitution was created in 1995, there was a great deal of ambiguity over the issue of language. In the years prior to 1991, it was unclear which languages would be considered the “state language,” “the official language,” or the “language of cross-national communication.” 6 Kazakh was then designated as “the only state language,” but many concessions were made in favor of Russian because of the power imbalance between the states and it was declared the “language of cross-national communication.” 7 Ultimately, by 1997, the status of Russian as the language of cross-national communication was renounced but it was stated to be used “on par” with Kazakh. 8
Government stances on the Russian language for the post-Soviet republics have been far from uniform. This variation applies to Central Asian countries, as not all of them share ties with Russia to the same extent. Some, like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have kept Russia as a key ally,
while others, like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have been more distant. Uzbekistan, in particular, underwent an extreme process of de-Russification after the breakup of the USSR. Article Four of Uzbekistan’s Constitution designates Uzbek as the official state language and makes no mention of Russian. 9 In Tashkent, the capital, more people speak Uzbek at home than Russian. Uzbekistan also has a relatively small Russian population, and most of the Russians that do live there are populated in urban areas, allowing for Uzbek to be widespread across most of the country. 10 When it comes to relations with its allies, Uzbekistan’s government has turned to Islamic states like Turkey instead of Russia, decreasing its need to maintain the usage of the Russian language. While Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan became states in 1991, Uzbekistan’s history is tied to the Khanates of Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara, out of which came many notable Uzbek literary works and writers. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, lacks this level of “national consciousness,” due to its history as a territory settled by nomadic tribes and not an official state. 11 As such, it didn’t have pre-existing regional networks and ties, in turn resulting in a less defined sense of national unity. 12 The territory was then incorporated into the Russian Empire, the process of which began in the eighteenth century and then into the Soviet Union in 1936, after which its borders were drawn by Moscow. Even upon its emergence as an independent state in 1991, the systems engrained in it by Russia had stayed and left a lasting impact, as there were no previous Kazakh systems to use as historical models. This has been adverse to the process of ‘Kazakhization’ of the Kazakh people and the development of the usage of the Kazakh language among them. It is important for the people of a state to speak their own national language for them to feel connected to their culture, roots and ancestors, thus strengthening their sense of a unique national identity. Dr. Suleimenova, an expert on linguistics, has said, "Knowing another language helps you understand the heart and soul of people. Language is the medium of mutual understanding and a source of unity." 13 In addition, this fluency opens up more doors for the country to be viewed as an equal in the international community, rather than simply a subordinate to a great power. Making changes to the status of Kazakh as the national language
is possible, but there are important obstacles to consider that stand in the way of this, given Kazakhstan’s long history with Russia. Economic reliance is one of the primary obstacles to decreasing the usage of the Russian language in Kazakhstan. Russia and Kazakhstan have strong economic ties — Since 1998, exports from Russia to Kazakhstan have been increasing at a rate of about eight percent per year. 14 Forty percent of Kazakhstan’s imports come from Russia and any economic changes that occur in Russia directly affect Kazakhstan. 15 This strong economic relationship is partially due to Kazakhstan’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, along with Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. The goal of the union is to bring these countries closer together economically through the removal of trade barriers. 16 Kazakhstan, along with most of the post-Soviet republics, is also a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), which is an association that was formed in 1991 and covers issues including economics, immigration, and environmental policies. 17 Talks at economic forums, negotiations and agreements are settled in Russian. At a CIS summit in October 2021, President Vladimir Putin of Russia, said, “As a minimum, knowing the Russian language is a must. You need to understand what Russia is.” 18 Putin also emphasized that Kazakhstan is “a Russian-speaking country in the full sense of the word.” 19 This demonstrates how, in the words of William Fierman, a professor on Central Eurasian Studies, “it is as difficult to separate Kazakhstan from Russia in language as it is in terms of politics or economics.” 20
A nother obstacle is the significant lack of resources available in Kazakh — in order to boost the prevalence of the Kazakh language, it needs to be supported through education, especially from an early age. After the breakup of the USSR, textbooks in the native languages of Central Asia often didn’t have “standardized terminology” and students usually took classes in their native language only during their first two years of education. 21 Afterwards, Russian was the dominant language in their education. Even as late as 20052006, fifteen years after the Soviet split, nineteen percent of Kazakhs studying in secondary schools were still being educated in the Russian language. 22 In urban areas of Kazakhstan, schools have been more equipped to teach Russian due to previous curriculum planning, in addition to a shortage of textbooks written in Kazakh. 23 This impacted citizens’ ability to speak their native language as they progressed through their education and then their career. Those working in high-level positions, including in government, could only speak Russian which further helped facilitate the widespread usage of Russian. 24 After a lifetime of education in Russian, it is difficult to expect a sudden switch to Kazakh. Finding a solution to this is crucial for laying a foundation for Kazakhs to develop and maintain proficiency in their own language.
Perhaps the most prominent sphere in which the division over language is seen is in governmental affairs. Nursultan Nazarbayev, who was president of Kazakhstan for nearly thirty years and resigned in 2019, used both Kazakh and Russian when giving speeches. During his presidency, members of the cabinet and parliament
used both languages interchangeably in their meetings. In 2017, there was even a statement issued by Nazarbayev’s office that called for the use of only Kazakh in conversations among members of the government. 25 The severity of this statement was quickly retracted, however, and the word “only” was removed. 26 The Pravda newspaper referred to the statement as “silent de-Russification,” a phenomenon that explains the distancing of postSoviet countries from Russia through various policies. 27
Aside from government, the continued dominance of the Russian language in Kazakhstan is largely a social issue, with the degree of fluency in Russian being associated with one’s social status. Russian fluency signifies elite status, due to the advantages it provides for both educational and job opportunities. It is seen by most in Kazakhstan as “a language of progress, prestige, and urbanity.” 28 In contrast, Kazakhs with limited or no proficiency in Russian are looked down upon and considered uneducated and even “backward.” 29 In comparison to other Central Asian states, Kazakhstan has the greatest number of students who are educated in the Russian language, the number being 800,000 as of 2018. 30 In regards to language usage among ethnic Russians, almost four million Russians live in Kazakhstan and most of them don’t speak Kazakh. 31 As of 2018, only two percent of Russians living in Kazakhstan spoke Kazakh fluently. 32 A large part of this can be explained by the condescension that Russians feel towards Central Asians. Essentially, the question reflective of their views is, “Why should we study this language if we, the Russians, gave them civilization?” 33 Russians also fear “soft assimilation,” a term that, in this case, would describe the assimilation of Russians into a society outside of Russia. 34 Because Russian nationalism is exceptionally strong, most ethnic Russians are likely to oppose signs of soft assimilation. According to William Fierman, “change in attention to one language often has implications for the other.” 35 If more people speak Kazakh, the popularity of Russian will decline and ethnic Russians are likely to view this as a threat, potentially bringing them one step closer to soft assimilation.
In the past, economic and political constraints have prevented former president Nursultan Nazarbayev’s from making investments
in the promotion of Kazakh — constraints included his “nation-building project” and the need to maintain good relations with the elites of Russia, who would’ve preferred to see the status quo. 36 Over time, however — with 2007 being a turning point — interests changed and the focus shifted to build towards a more “Kazakhocentric nationbuilding project.” 37 Materials were distributed to assist workers in gaining fluency in Kazakh and the improvement in the economic conditions in the country led to higher disposable income, allowing more people to buy products that were developed in Kazakh. This demonstrates the convergence of economic and political interests and the importance of both in the development of a nation establishing its own national identity. 38 Though a complete transition to the Kazakh language is unlikely in the near future, what is possible is focusing on how to make Kazakh have more of an equal status with Russian and providing citizens resources to gain fluency. 39 Kazakhstan is making progress towards this and is currently set to switch from the Cyrillic script to the Latin script by 2025, potentially as a way of distancing itself from the Kremlin. 40 Nazarbayev explained this declaration by stating, “The youth must know that without the knowledge of the state language [Kazakh] it will be impossible to work in the state structures, law-
enforcement agencies, service sector and in the judicial system.” 41 Though not a complete rejection of the Russian language, it is an important move towards lessening its influence.
In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, there has been a greater emphasis among residents of Kazakhstan on the need to know the language of their home country. A project started by Aleksei Skalozubov, an ethnic Russian living in Kazakhstan, has been spreading across the cities of Kazakhstan. Its goal is to promote knowledge of the Kazakh language and give people the opportunity to practice speaking in an “informal setting.” 42 The project is called “Batyl Bol!” which translates to “Be Courageous!” and is one of the major catalysts that is changing the dynamic in Kazakhstan in relation to language. 43 Skalozubov has been using social media to amplify his message and has gotten many positive reactions from both ethnic Russians and Kazakhs who haven’t been able to learn Kazakh to the fullest extent. One of the members of the project has said that the Ukraine war has changed her view of the importance of knowing Kazah, sharing, “Before, we probably regarded Kazakh as a somewhat secondary language that you didn’t have to learn. Now, I realize that Kazakh is important.” 44 Another member, who is ethnically Azerbaijani, has shared,
“It’s important for me to be able to speak with the locals in their own language”. 45
The status of the Kazakh language is everchanging, but the changes in peoples’ attitudes that are starting to shift represent recognition of one’s connectedness to their native language and home country. As the situation evolves and more people become involved in pursuing greater fluency in Kazakh, one day, after a lot of time and energy invested into this venture, Kazakh, rather than Russian, may very well be the primary language spoken in Kazakhstan. Knowledge of one’s titular language has enormous geopolitical consequences and a strong sense of national consciousness through language is necessary for the future of Kazakhstan.
1 Pavlenko, Aneta, and Анета Павленко. 2008. “Russian in Post-Soviet Countries (Русский язык в пост-советских странах).” Russian Linguistics 32 (1): 59–80. https://www.jstor. org/stable/40297130.
2 Rouland, Michael. n.d. “Untitled Document.” Sites.pitt.edu. https://sites.pitt.edu/~filmst/events/TurkmenFilmSeries/ mankurt.htm.
3 Doraiswamy, Rashmi. 2005. The Post-Soviet Condition: Chingiz Aitmatov in the ’90s. Google Books. Aakar Books.
4 Ornstein, Jacob. 1959. “Soviet Language Policy: Theory and Practice.” The Slavic and East European Journal 3 (1): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.2307/305536.
5 “The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan — Official Site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.” 2020. Akorda.kz. 2020. https://www.akorda.kz/en/official_ documents/constitution.
6 Fierman, William. 1998. “Language and Identity in Kazakhstan: Formulations in Policy Documents 1987–1997.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31 (2): 171–86. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609353?seq=5#metadata_info_ tab_contents.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Pavlenko, Aneta, and Анета Павленко, 59–80.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Pavlenko, Aneta, and Анета Павленко, 59–80.
13 American Councils Editorial Staff. 2015. “The State of Language in Kazakhstan.” American Councils. 2015. https:// www.americancouncils.org/news/across-globe/state-languagekazakhstan.
14 American Councils Editorial Staff. 2015. “The State of Language in Kazakhstan.” American Councils. 2015. https:// www.americancouncils.org/news/across-globe/state-languagekazakhstan.
15 The World Bank in Kazakhstan. 2022. “An Overview of the World Bank’s Work in Kazakhstan.” Http://Www.worldbank. org/Kazakhstan. April 2022. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/ doc/0422edb5f0972729406365facd126cce-0080012022/original/ KAZAKHSTAN-Snapshot-SM2022-en.pdf.
16 Fierman, William, 1077–1100.
17 Britannica. 2022. “Commonwealth of Independent States | Facts, Members, & History.” Encyclopedia Britannica. September 20, 2022. https://www.britannica.com/topic/ Commonwealth-of-Independent-States.
18 Hashimova, Umida. 2022. “2021: Another Year of the Russian Language in Central Asia.” Thediplomat.com. January 3, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/2021-another-year-of-therussian-language-in-central-asia/.
19 Ibid.
20 Fierman, William, 1998, 171–86.
21 Fierman, William. 2012. “Russian in Post-Soviet Central Asia: A Comparison with the States of the Baltic and South Caucasus.” Europe-Asia Studies 64 (6): 1077–1100. https:// www.jstor.org/stable/23258311?seq=20#metadata_info_tab_ contents.
22 Ibid.
23Pavlenko, Aneta, and Анета Павленко, 59–80.
24 Fierman, William. 2012, 1077–1100.
25 Reuters Staff. 2018. “Kazakhstan Says Russian Not Banned from Government after All.” Reuters, March 1, 2018, sec. APAC. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-language/ kazakhstan-says-russian-not-banned-from-government-afterall-idUSKCN1GD5HP.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Pavlenko, Aneta, and Анета Павленко, 59–80.
29 Dotton, Zura. 2016. “Language Policy and Language Planning in Kazakhstan: About the Proposed Shift from the Cyrillic Alphabet to the Latin Alphabet Item Type Text; Electronic Dissertation.” https://repository.arizona.edu/ bitstream/handle/10150/621896/azu_etd_15169_sip1_m. pdf?sequence=1.
30 Bekmurzaev, Nurbek. 2019. “Russian Language Status in Central Asian Countries.” CABAR.asia. February 28, 2019. https://cabar.asia/en/russian-language-status-in-central-asiancountries.
31 The International Crisis Group. 2015. “Russian Speakers of the Kazakh Steppe.” Www.crisisgroup.org. April 7, 2015. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/ kazakhstan/russian-speakers-kazakh-steppe.
32 Sharip, Farkhad. 2018. “Language-Motivated Emigration of Russians Causes Shortage of Qualified Workers in Kazakhstan.” Jamestown. November 1, 2018. https://jamestown.org/ program/language-motivated-emigration-of-russians-causesshortage-of-qualified-workers-in-kazakhstan/.
33 The International Crisis Group.
34 Ibid.
35 Fierman, William, 2012, 1077–1100.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Pavlenko, Aneta, and Анета Павленко, 59–80.
40 Bekmurzaev, Nurbek. 41 Ibid.
42 Najibullah, Farangis. 2022. “Kazakh-Language Club a Hit with Russian Speakers in Kazakhstan, amid Ukraine War.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. October 28, 2022. https:// www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-language-club-russia-ukraineinvasion/32105411.html.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. 45 Ibid.
For the IRR’s 27th issue, the Americas section unravels the lasting impacts of colonialism and corruption on the agency and vitality of local communities in Latin America and the Caribbean. With unique insights into the power dynamics dictating disaster relief, investment, and climate change mitigation efforts, our writers delve into questions of decolonization, democratic transparency, and decentralization.
Elio Rodriguez-Zeda confronts the lasting legacy of Puerto Rico’s colonial relationship to the United States and the marginalization of Puerto Ricans from participating in the law-making process that both commands their economy and fails to include them. Disenfranchised and left with a derelict power grid, Puerto Rico is continuously devastated by economic travails punctuated with seasonal, disastrous hurricanes. Morgan Cleary delves into the implications of Chinese foreign direct investment in Guyana’s oil sector, illuminating the need for government transparency to combat corruption and reinvest funds back into Guyanese communities. Beaujena Stoyanchev explores community-led conservation efforts in Mexico and Guatemala as a way for Indigenous communities to reclaim power over natural resources and to decentralize forest management.
It is with much gratitude and appreciation that I introduce these pieces. Thank you to everyone who contributed to the Americas section, as well as to the journal as a whole. We hope you enjoy these perspectives on power.
Senior Editor, Americas
by Morgan Cleary edited by Max Ferrandino and Guillermo Bichara Guzman GIS by
On the northeastern edge of South America, bordering Brazil, Suriname, and Venezuela, the small, relatively unknown country of Guyana is beginning to get involved in the international system again, as the small country has sparsely been able to do before. For much of its history, dependence on the export of raw materials sequestered Guyanese markets and left it one of the poorest countries in South America. 1 This left Guyana vulnerable to the desires of stronger regional powers, such as Venezuela, a country that repeatedly threatened Guyana over their clashing territorial claims to the Essequibo region. Furthermore, this complex ensured that Guyana remained susceptible to U.S. influence and ‘guidance.’ That is, until 2015, when rich oil deposits were found off the coast of Guyana, and the power dynamics of the country began to shift. 2
With this oil came the attention of world powers—the first of these being gas giant Exxon-Mobil. Since this major oil discovery off the coast of Guyana by the Texas-based corporation in 2015, Guyana has become the global leader in total offshore discoveries. 3 Exxon estimates that by 2035 production could be 1.7 million barrels of oil per day. 4 This projection puts Guyana fourth on the list of the largest global offshore oil producers, ahead of regional peers like Mexico and the United States, according to Rystad Energy, the Norwegian energy consultancy and analyzing firm. 5 With this discovery and the optimistic estimate of oil production increase comes attention and development investments in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). As FDI increases exponentially, so does the country’s GDP and standard of living, a vital point of importance for the third poorest country
in the Western Hemisphere. 6 Given this surge in oil wealth and foreign direct investment, Guyana is now estimated to be one of the fastest growing economies in the world. 7 While much of this money has been reinvested in the country, such a large shift in income flow does arouse suspicion for a country that has notoriously been corrupt in the past. 8 This issue came to center attention with the presidential election of 2020 when President Irfaan Ali won office under a promise of increased “transparency of revenues” and a multifaceted approach to reinvesting funds back into Guyana. 9 This transparency is vital and ensures the country is maintaining a functioning, inclusive democracy, yet is something that Guyana continues to grapple with.
This case study will analyze the role of foreign direct investment in Guyana, highlight the prospective benefits and disadvantages of this foreign direct investment, and analyze the global geopolitical implications that increased FDI could have in oil-rich countries. Most importantly, it will emphasize the need for transparency in countries such as Guyana whose economies have experienced sharp turns in performance. Investments have been made into a variety of different sectors in Guyana, but most of these investments have been in the infrastructure sector. 10 The financing of numerous infrastructure projects has affected indigenous rights and lands, Guyana’s unspoiled portion of
the Amazon rainforest and its biodiversity, and resource security of Guyana’s people. Consequently, this affects Guyana’s democratic tradition and socioeconomic equality. The rationale and gains made from these investments must equally be addressed, however, as Guyana has made rational decisions for its long-term development. The previous relative insignificance of Guyana in the international system is changing, and by studying foreign direct investment in Guyana, one can better understand the vulnerabilities and potential lack of transparency that this may cause. From this, one can derive larger global implications for similar underdeveloped countries who might experience economic booms in the future.
Contemporary aversions to geopolitical pawnshop in Guyana can best be understood through former imperial intrusions, wrongdoings upon which Guyana has been built. The Dutch first colonized the modern day area of Guyana in the late sixteenth century. While the Spanish had spotted the coastal area early on in their voyages to the Americas, it was only the Dutch that sought to utilize the ‘Wild Coast’. 11 Like the other Caribbean nations of the same age, African slaves were imported in droves for the cultivation of sugarcane. From here onwards, the French and British
traded ownership until 1831, when the British incorporated the area of Essequibo (modern day Guyana) into British Guiana. 12 Shortly thereafter, slavery was prohibited in British dominions and the nearly one hundred thousand Black slaves working on plantations were emancipated. For the next century, laborers from the Indian subcontinent were brought in to replace the liberated laborers of the colonial past and provide cheap labor. 13 Through the discovery of gold in 1879, British Guiana became a ethnic mixing pot of Mestizo, Mulatto, Indian, African, and individuals of various Indigenous descents.
It was not until 1970 that Guyana formally achieved independence from the British Empire, yet its entanglements with the world powers did not end here. Guyanese connections with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were interpreted as communist sentiment by Western powers, which tangled the small country in the large, complex web of the Cold War. 14 Guyana’s then President Cheddi Jagan, considered the father of Guyana much in the same vein as Gandhi in India, sought policies of democratization and economic reform in attempts to liberalize the Guyanese economy but also fostered a relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). CIA and British intelligence, fearful of Bolshevik associations, meddled in Guyanese politics, overthrowing Jagan and positing authoritarian rule until 1992 when democracy successfully reemerged. 15 Real change only occurred in 1999 with the election of Bharrat Jagdeo, the long-time president and current vice president of Guyana. 16 Jagdeo’s administration entered immediately with a vast variety of problems from violent crime, mass protests, and ethnic tensions, as well as economic and environmental problems that had already
long plagued Guyana. It was only by the end of the 2000s that the economy began to improve with investments in infrastructure, oil exploration, and the agricultural sector. 17 Throughout all of this, Guyana remained one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere with limited prospects outside its commodity-export based market. This changed in 2015, when ExxonMobile discovered a rich oil field in the Stabroek region off the coast of Guyana. 18
Initial investments from Exxon were only around $106 million, yet even this small amount raised economic prospects for the former British colony. 19 Despite apprehension towards large sums of foreign direct investment, Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo, stressed the importance of jumping on the “economic window of opportunity,” while also highlighting a development plan that placed importance on the maintenance of environmental resources. 20 A spectrum between oil
revenue, environmental maintenance, and longterm development was thus created. Since then Exxon and its partners have invested around $10 billion in Guyana, and the former British colony readily jumped on the foreign direct investment 21 . Furthermore, it opened the door for multinational companies to bid on future infrastructure projects, a process which Jagdeo affirmed as utmostly deliberated and unprejudiced 22
The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) bought a 25 percent share, investing $5.25 billion of its own capital in the Exxon-Mobil led consortium that controls the Stabroek oil fields. 23 While this was surprising, it is in line with Chinese-Guyanese relations dating back to Guyanese independence. Nonetheless, this was China’s first major investment in Guyanese oil, and this was followed by $1.5 billion in infrastructure investments, with the largest portion of $750 million going towards the Amaila Falls Hydropower dam constructed deep within the Amazon rainforest. 24 The project has long been proposed by various governments but has
continually lacked the transparency that the public desires. 25 Other portions of the expenditure are planned to go towards highways that would link the country together as well as provide easier access to northern Brazil. 26 High expenditures in development following oil booms is typical, as the potential for further business expansion is high. Moreover, Guyana is comfortable borrowing at a two percent concessionary rate when oil revenues are estimated to be as high as $2 billion in 2022. 27 Infrastructure development speeds up further development exponentially, allowing more trade to occur in Guyana and creating a more businessfriendly environment.
When former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Guyana and Suriname in September of 2020 he warned that, “We’ve watched the Chinese Communist Party invest in countries, and it all seems great at the front end and then it all comes falling down when the political costs connected to that become clear.” 28 As Exxon, the CNOOC, and Chinese development banks transform the Guyanese economy, Pompeo’s words ring ever clearer. Furthermore, they apply to the ominous joint role that Exxon and the CNOOC hold over Guyana. While Guyana’s eager acceptance of Chinese investments goes against U.S. preferences, there is a bigger case for why transparency in government is important and why this is especially important in economies that experience a sudden upheaval like that of Guyana.
Guyana is a country that has been notoriously corrupt and opaque with its actions through the twenty-first century. Calls for the publication of the 2016 contract that Exxon made with Guyana were only answered in 2017, after months of persistence. 29 Kaieteurnews, a major Guyanese news publication, analyzed the contract in 2019 as compared to 130 other oil contracts and found that the contract was highly exploitative of Guyana. 30 These provisions included
income tax exemptions, low employment obligations, deferral of unsuccessful well costs, no increase in royalties if production improved, as well as public contributions to the decommissioning of facilities once no longer in use. However, these contracts remained relatively small. Exxon misstepped by investing large portions of their wealth in green energies directly before the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, which forced them to divert their strategy and reinvest in promising oil prospects. 31 Therefore, 2020 saw a nearly $10 billion increase in Exxon’s investment in Guyana, as well as a new government in Guyana that won by only a one percent margin. Questions about the new government’s authority to make such large decisions while barely winning the election loomed large, while demands for transparency beckoned ever stronger. Appeals were made to the peoples’ fears of corruption, yet corruption continued to remain entangled in Guyanese politics.
Since Irfaan Ali, leader of Guyana’s People’s Progressive Party (PPP), and Jagdeo have entered office, media censorship has decreased, petroleum contracts have become publicly available, the Integrity Commission has been reestablished—while a State Assets Recovery Agency has been erected for the first time, activating anti-money laundering laws—and whistleblower protection legislation has been passed. 32 Despite this enormous amount of progress, the public has expressed concern over a lack of new bribery prevention institutions, something that Vice President Jagdeo has been accused of recently in an exposition done by Vice News. 33 Specifically, several wealthy Chinese businessmen were recorded on camera boasting about their personal connections to Jagdeo, his immense power
in the country, and their ability to easily circumvent Chinese and Guyanese financial legislation and access Jagdeo in pursuit of their own benefit.
Despite a longstanding relationship with China and U.S. fears over new, heavy spending in Latin America, the main issues faced by Guyana are the amount of money available to the government to spend in the public and private sectors, as well as the continued issues of corruption and lack of transparency. When the government is only elected by a one percent lead, full transparency is paramount to maintaining democracy. This sense of transparency should only be heightened by the great vulnerability of Guyana at this vital turning point in its development. With the discovery of oil came the
quick development of the necessary infrastructure that the oil business requires, and while this is important, it is equally important that the diverse constituents of Guyana are heard. Over 90 percent of Guyana’s population lives in its coastal lowlands, lands that are endangered by imminent sea level rising. 34 Flooding will become more frequent, and the places most easily inhabited will become unlivable; this includes Guyana’s capital of Georgetown. 35 The population will concentrate, economic development will stall, and living conditions will deteriorate. Tensions will rise, order will be unsettled, and the most marginalized populations will feel this pain. Furthermore, Guyana’s large indigenous population often feels the pressures that development pushes onto society, especially in regard to environmental concerns associated with hydropower dams and general maintenance of their portion of the Amazon.
The late, great former Ghanaian politician
Kwame Nkrumah said, “As long as capitalism and imperialism go unchecked, there will always be exploitation and an ever-widening gap between the haves and have-nots, and all of the evils of imperialism and neocolonialism which breed and sustain war.” 36 Guyana finds itself in a crucial point of its long-term development, yet it is wellpositioned. Its protectorate relationship with the U.S. is still friendly and its relationship with China economically beneficial. However, with a new administration and the sharp turn that its economy has taken, the need for transparency in the government has never been higher. The people of Guyana deserve to know where money is going within their country, and it is only by transparency that capitalism can function without the intervention of bribery and corruption. If it is able to do so, Guyana will become a model for future economic-boom countries within Latin America and around the Caribbean.
References
1 US Department of State. (2022). 2022 Investment Climate Statements: Guyana, Executive Summary
2 Ibid.
3 Review of The Fight against Corruption. 2022. Guyana Chronicle. The Guyana Chronicle. June 6, 2022. https://guyanachronicle. com/2022/06/28/the-fight-against-corruption-2/.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 US Department of State. (2022). 2022 Investment Climate Statements: Guyana.
7 Ibid.
8 Valérian, François. 2021. Review of In Depth: Guyana’s Oil Makes the Case for Publishing Public Contracts. Transparency. Transparency International. February 26, 2021. https://www. transparency.org/en/blog/in-depth-guyanas-oil-makes-the-casefor-publishing-public-contracts.
9 Lenton, Christopher. 2022. Review of Guyana Preparing for Oil Boom, Positioning Itself as Key Player in Regional Energy Security. Natural Gas Intelligence. NGI. July 26, 2022. https://www. naturalgasintel.com/guyana-preparing-for-oil-boom-positioning-itself-as-key-player-in-regional-energy-security/.
10 Ibid.
11 Guyana - Independence.” n.d. Encyclopedia Britannica.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Stabroek News. 2022. Review of Guyana-China friendship has stood the test of time. Stabroek News. Stabroek News. June 29, 2022.
15 “CIA Covert Operations: The 1964 Overthrow of Cheddi Jagan
in British Guiana | National Security Archive.” 6 April, 2020. Nsarchive.gwu.edu.
16 Jagdeo, Bharrat. 2021. Review of VP Jagdeo’s Interview with Vice News Interview by Isobel Yeung. Vice News. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=5iOKue0kP_g.
17 “Guyana - Independence.” n.d. Encyclopedia Britannica.
18 Smith, Matthew. “Guyana’s Oil Boom Has Been Amazing for Its Economy.” February 8, 2022 OilPrice.com. Accessed October 9, 2022. https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Guyanas-OilBoom-Has-Been-Amazing-For-Its-Economy.html.
19 Marks, Neil. 2022. “Guyana Gets $106 Million from Exxon for Oil from Newest Offshore Platform.” Reuters, April 24, 2022, sec. Energy. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/guyana-gets106-million-exxon-oil-newest-offshore-platform-2022-04-24/.
20 Jagdeo.
21 Fellows, University of Houston Energy. n.d. “As Guyana’s Oil Business Booms, Could a Potential New Deal with Exxon Loom?” Forbes. Accessed October 9, 2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ uhenergy/2022/06/22/as-guyanas-oil-business-booms-a-potential-new-deal-with-exxon-looms/?sh=1062b8887cdb.
22 Jagdeo.
23 Ellis, Evans. “Chinese Engagement in Guyana: An Update.” 2021. Diálogo Américas. December 7, 2021. https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/chinese-engagement-in-guyana-an-update/#. Y0NHWXbMI2x.
24 Stabroek News. 2021. Review of The China Loan. Stabroek News. Stabroek News. November 6, 2021. https://www. stabroeknews.com/2021/11/06/opinion/editorial/the-chinaloan/.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Stabroek News.
29 Valérian, François.
30 Ibid.
31 Dembicki, Geoff. 2020. Review of Exxon’s Massive Offshore Oil Project Is a “Carbon Bomb”: Environmental Group. Vice. Vice News. September 1, 2020. https://www.vice.com/en/article/ qj4a97/exxon-oil-guyana-climate-change.
32 Valérian, François.
33 Yeung, Isobel. 2021. Review of Undercover in Guyana: Exposing Chinese Business in South America Video. Vice News. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=sOOFSJqBYTY&t=122s.
34 US Department of State. (2022). 2022 Investment Climate Statements: Guyana.
35 Ibid.
36 Nkrumah, Kwame. (1967). Challenge of the Congo. Nelson, 1967.
reviewed by DR.
CARLOS E. RODRIGUEZ-DIAZAssociate Professor and Vice Chair, George Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health
On nearly the fifth anniversary of Category 4 Hurricane Maria’s decimation of its electric power grid, Puerto Rico was again reminded of the cyclical tragedy of its unique colonial existence. On September 18, 2022, the Category 1 Hurricane Fiona battered the unincorporated U.S. territory with a torrential deluge between 12 and 20 inches and a complete island blackout. 1 11 days later, 266 thousand customers still remained without power, while 106 thousand customers continued to experience intermittent access to water service. 2 Puerto Ricans are all too familiar with the consequences of their fragile power infrastructure; in the wake of 2017’s Hurricane Maria, it took the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) eighteen months to fully reconnect the Commonwealth’s 1.5 million customers to power services. 3 Even after the government-contracted private consortium LUMA Energy assumed PREPA’s power distribution and transmission responsibilities in June 2021, power outages
appeared to be worsening in the summer months before Fiona. Though there seems to be greater disaster recovery success this time around, between a relatively more prepared grid repair effort under LUMA and an appropriate response in FEMA aid, these institutions still inherently represent interests which perpetuate colonial oppression of the island. Puerto Rico’s paltry median household income (about $50,000 less than the national average), its 40.5 percent poverty rate, and a 20 year exodus of its population portray a destitute society under direct U.S. administration. 4 Concerning disparities in diagnosis and mortality rates for, among other conditions, HIV and diabetes and an overreliance on federally-capped Medicaid coverage even before Hurricane Maria’s landfall confirm the international community’s concerns about the island’s human rights conditions. 5 Further, the U.S. government’s promotion of unpopular austerity and privatization measures through an imperious, unelected, and
unrepresentative Fiscal Control Board dispels any narrative that the U.S. has heeded United Nations calls for decolonization through Puerto Rican selfdetermination. 6 7
The convergence of these socio-economic, political, and health crises are the long untreated symptoms of Puerto Rico’s exploited territorial possession by the American Empire. Therefore, redressing Puerto Rico’s intersectional plight first necessitates a reflection on and repudiation of this peculiar colonial relationship. This article aims to expose the living legacy of U.S. imperialism and colonialism on a paralyzed Puerto Rican society through the context of hurricane recovery. First, a comprehensive assessment of the 1920 Merchant Marine Act’s effects on the Puerto Rican economy will evaluate the consequences of an archaic federal statute on the island’s access to domestic goods during normal and emergency circumstances. Then, an analysis of Puerto Rico’s anachronistic territorial status as an ‘unincorporated territory’ will enunciate the systematic legal mechanisms which impose federal governance on the people of Puerto Rico without the consent of the governed. To this point, the article will highlight the exact ways in which the island’s 3.2 million residents, who are American citizens by law, are marginalized from the federal policy-making arena. These two colonial instruments—economic relegation under a century-old cabotage law and a repressive political status devoid of any meaningful representation or legal power in Washington—reflect a reality in which Puerto Rico is asphyxiated in its asymmetrical, unconsenting relationship with the United States. Thus, this article asserts that Puerto Rico’s exemption from the Merchant Maritime Act and the amplification of the territory’s political power within the federal government are requisite steps first for the improvement of Puerto Rico’s material conditions, and eventually for the overdue realization of its self-determination.
On September 25, 2022, just days after Hurricane Fiona, a shipping vessel which bore the flag of the Marshall Islands was barred from entry at Puerto Rico’s port in Guayanilla after it had departed from Texas City. This ship, with a cargo of 300 thousand barrels of diesel fuel, could
have provided urgent aid to maintain generators at a time when hundreds of thousands of residents still remained without access to electricity and water. 8 Instead, it was forced to wait days for U.S. Federal Government approval for an exemption to a century-old federal cabotage regulation. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, or the Jones Act, has long disproportionately affected non-contiguous American states and territories—Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico—that depend most on waterborne cargo transportation, and it especially plays a role in encumbering Puerto Rican relief efforts.
The Jones Act is a product of post-WWI bipartisan nationalism to address a perceived security weakness from the U.S.’s wartime reliance on foreign-flagged ships to ease strains on its ship capacity. 9 This maritime cabotage law governs which ships are qualified to transport goods from one U.S. port to another; qualifying ships must be U.S.-flagged, at least 75 percent U.S. owned, 75 percent staffed by Americans, and created entirely in the United States. 10 In prohibiting certain, unqualified ships from domestic trade, the Jones Act inhibits Puerto Rico’s ability to capitalize on international water routes. 11 For example, a Brazilian-flagged ship—which would not be Jonescompliant—originating from a Brazilian port to Miami would not be allowed to first stop in Puerto Rico before embarking for its final destination; alternatively, an American-flagged ship from Miami to Rio de Janeiro that is not 75 percent crewed by American citizens would be prohibited from first docking at another U.S. port, such as any in Puerto Rico.
Vocal critics like Cato Institute’s Colin Grabow have long attacked the economic ramifications of such a restrictive cabotage law for non-continental territories. These territories, which have no alternative mode of domestic cargo transportation, must depend on Jones Actqualifying maritime vessels for intra-U.S. domestic trade amid a time when the U.S. shipbuilding industry has long declined. 12 Consequently, the act’s strict specifications for domestic trade limit competition in both shipbuilding and in the maritime transport of goods, which allows a select few American carriers to “charge rates substantially above comparable world prices.” 13 New York’s Federal Reserve Bank corroborated this point when it assessed that a twenty-foot container of goods
from the American East Coast to Puerto Rico “costs an estimated $3,063,” while “the same shipment costs $1,504 to nearby Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) and $1,687 to Kingston (Jamaica).” 14 U.S. shippers, not subject to international market rates, leverage Puerto Rico’s reliance on domestic maritime trade and the lack of competition with foreign carriers from the continental U.S. to charge predatory costs for shipments to Puerto Rico. Critics like Grabow further assert that these consequences on Jones Act shipping costs are eventually passed down to retailers and intermediary producers, who then pass the costs to consumers. 15
As an island with a fossil-fuel reliant energy sector, the Jones Act’s disproportionate limitations on domestic trade has driven Puerto Rico to sustain its electrical sector entirely through international
fuel imports. In the 2021 fiscal year, fossil-fuelpowered energy plants generated 97 percent of the island’s total electricity, of which natural gas and petroleum-powered plants represented 44 percent and 37 percent of the Commonwealth’s electricity respectively. 16 Since imported petroleum accounts for two-thirds of Puerto Rico’s total energy consumption, the island’s power prices fluctuate with fickle international oil prices. 17 Consequently, the island’s average electricity price in 2020 was “higher than in all but two U.S. States, Hawaii and Alaska,” two states that are disproportionately affected by the federal Jones Act due to their geographical distance from the continental Union. 18 Regardless of any meritable arguments from Jones Act proponents in their circuitous debate about the law’s net effects on the U.S., their primary claims in its defense—the creation of “650,000
American jobs” with shipyard construction and repair services, and the resulting “$150 billion in economic benefits each year”—are all irrelevant to Puerto Rico’s case. 19 After a century under the Jones Act, how has Puerto Rico benefited from “American job” creation when the island’s sole shipyard opened in August 2022? 20 Further, any purported economic output or tax revenue generated under the Jones Act means nothing when Puerto Rico’s health and economic poverty has not been alleviated under the administration of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful nation.
The exacerbation of economic distress in the aftermath of 2017’s Hurricane Maria or 2022’s Hurricane Fiona accentuates the Jones Act’s detriment to the Puerto Rican people.
In 2021, Congress’s ratification of the Defense Spending Authorization Act eliminated the federal government’s authority to grant exemptions to long-term cabotage regulations except to “address an immediate adverse effect on military operations.” 21 Since the Marshall Island-flagged ship containing three hundred thousand gallons of diesel did not relate to immediate military operations, its Jones Act waiver was subject to a dragged out case-by-case review by the Biden Administration.
Puerto Rico should not have to wait for a painstaking bureaucratic review of an archaic law to receive the necessary fuel aid to address power and water inaccessibility for hundreds of thousands of its people. Even a slight delay of fuel delivery engenders a life-or-death urgency for citizens particularly vulnerable to extended blackouts. 22 Fuel inaccessibility, in a society where the main energy infrastructure and even backup generators require the supply of imported fuel, jeopardizes lives: it threatens the ability for hospitals to perform needed functions, spoils produce and certain drugs in groceries and pharmacies, prevents citizens from storing food perishables in their own refrigerators, and relegates personal medical machines like respiratory devices inoperable. 23
As this analysis on the Jones Act delineated, this federal cabotage law, in its disproportionate ramifications on Puerto Rico’s economy, encapsulates the flagrant tradition of U.S. colonialism which exerts nationalistic interests over that of the Puerto Rican populace. It curtails domestic trade with the continental U.S., which in turn incentivizes Puerto Rico’s reliance on volatile international prices of imported, nonrenewable energy. It further hinders relief efforts from nonJones Act compliant domestic transportation during emergency relief efforts while sharing with Puerto Rico none of its supposed benefits. Though responsibility for Puerto Rico’s economic woes and its energy dependency on international fossil fuels extends far beyond just the 1920 Jones Act, it is clear that this statute has contributed to the deterioration of Puerto Rico’s material conditions. A complete exception for Puerto Rico from the Jones Act, or at the very least an expedited waiver process, would provide a more consistent, domestic supply of energy during the respites between severe natural hazards, and would ensure the unimpeded delivery of crucial relief during crises.
The true pervasiveness of the federal government’s economic laws on Puerto Rico derives from Puerto Rico’s suppressed political voice as an “unincorporated U.S. territory.” To abridge a long and convoluted legal history of the land formerly known as Borikén to the indigenous Taínos, Puerto Rico was a colonial possession of a declining
Spanish Empire until the Spanish-American War saw the island’s ownership transferred to the United States in 1898; decades of American occupation ensued, where an insular government appointed directly by the U.S. federal government was liberalized in incremental stages over subsequent decades. 24
In the Insular Cases of the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court notoriously distinguished “incorporated territories,” acquired territories like Hawaii predetermined for U.S. statehood, from “unincorporated territories” like Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Puerto Rico, which was designated into the latter category, was absorbed into an age of fledgling U.S. imperialism without a clear path to statehood. 25 Puerto Ricans, denied accession into statehood and placed into a nebulous legal standing of “unincorporation,” were further discriminated against when they were stripped of the full protections outlined in the U.S. Bill of Rights. In the 1922 Supreme Court case Balzac v. People of Porto Rico , Chief Justice Howard Taft delivered the unanimous opinion that Puerto Ricans on the island were not entitled to the 6th Amendment right to an impartial trial by jury, among other Constitutional assurances not deemed “fundamental.” 26 While the federal government has long rescinded many of these restrictions on Puerto Rico’s Constitutional rights, these judicial decisions nevertheless enforced a precedent of Puerto Ricans having to fight to qualify their merits as Americans to a reluctant government.
Puerto Rico’s longstanding absence of representation in the federal government reaffirms this peculiar legacy of unincorporated, second-rate citizenship. With Congress’s passage of the Foraker Act in 1900, Puerto Rico gained its first form of popular, elected “delegates” from legislative districts to form a unicameral legislature. 27 The island was also granted a non-voting member in the U.S. House of Representatives, a quadrennially-elected official called the Resident Commissioner who happens to still be the only “representation” Puerto Rican residents receive in the U.S. Congress. 28 Their only real power is the ability to sponsor legislation and serve on committees as an official Member of Congress, but they do not have a final vote on the House floor. 29 Therefore, Puerto Rico and its residents do not possess any true and meaningful representation in the federal Congress’ votes for
bills that concern them, like the 1920 Jones Act. Worse still, Puerto Ricans possess restricted, if any, representation in the election of the U.S. President and its Executive Administration. The Jones-Sharoth Act of 1917 endowed Puerto Ricans, both living and future, with U.S. citizenship and the ability to migrate to the rest of the Union freely and legally. 30 This freedom to migrate to the Union’s states unlocks Puerto Ricans’ only way to participate in the general election. As an unincorporated territory, the Commonwealth is not entitled to any electors in the U.S. Electoral College; therefore, the power of 3.2 million American citizens to make their voices heard through the federal ballot is contingent on their ability to relocate and have “official residency” in the states or Washington D.C. 31 Puerto Ricans’ disenfranchisement symbolizes a federal administration ruling without the consent of the territorial citizens it governs, which becomes especially egregious when the U.S. President wields
their extensive unilateral powers for policies specifically concerning Puerto Rico, like for the discretion to authorize FEMA’s deployment for hurricane relief. As the people of Puerto Rico experienced with the Trump administration’s delayed responses to Hurricane Maria, their living conditions and the recovery of their postdisaster society lies at the mercy of a foreign bureaucracy and an often indifferent head of state with no political incentive to support their nonconstituents. 32
These instances of disenfranchisement and powerlessness systematically deprive Puerto Rico’s residents of their political agency at each facet of the federal government. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions, which relegated Puerto Rico to an inferior legal classification of an “unincorporated territory,” continue to confuse puertoriqueños as to what rights they possess through their unique citizenship; Puerto Rico’s sole Congressional representation is essentially a symbolic gesture that has no final vote on behalf of the Puerto Rican people when a bill is voted on in Capitol Hill; and the sitting U.S. President, who retains the power to either sign or veto these bills while wielding unilateral Executive Actions, is truly not beholden to represent the permanent residents of a territory that does not have the power to vote the president in or out of office. This thorough political marginalization, which epitomizes the United States’ longstanding colonization of Puerto Rico, is incongruent with the hyper-romanticized democratic values of equality, representation, and voting rights it claims to embody.
The U.S. must redress its open descrimination of American citizens by ending its discriminatory treatment towards its arbitrailydefined unincorporated territories. If America’s overseas colonies are subject to the will of federal policymakers, they should be granted representation with an accessible presidential ballot in their territories and an elected, voting member in Congress. The approval of the 23rd Amendment in 1961, which granted District of Columbia voters participation in presidential elections and electoral votes equal to the least populous state, serves as a legal precedent that proves that the U.S. government could grant presidential voting rights to non-states. 33
Enshrined within United Nations Resolution 1514 (XV) is the foundational declaration that “all peoples have the right to selfdetermination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.” 34 Yet despite its international recognition, the right to self-determination is not afforded to “the world’s oldest colony.” 35 U.S. institutional measures—from the Jones Act’s multifaceted afflictions on economic and disaster relief efforts to the systematic marginalization of the unincorporated territory from federal policy-making—hinder Puerto Rican material progress. The humanitarian implications of its economic and health crises, exacerbated by the likely effects of anthropogenic climate change on intensifying hurricane seasons, can not be remedied without a conscientious recognition and denunciation of this denigrating colonial relationship. This article has already presented pragmatic solutions, like an expedited Jones Act waiver process and the island’s presidential participation through the same political process as enfranchised voters in the nation’s capital, to meet the immediate concerns of Puerto Rico’s people. Hopefully, it may be through palatable, incremental progress that Puerto Rico may finally steer its own political future away from the cyclical, colonial trap it has long been relegated to.
1 Jaclyn Diaz, “5 numbers that show Hurricane Fiona’s devastating impact on Puerto Rico,” NPR, September 23, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/09/23/1124345084/impacthurricane-fiona-puerto-rico.
2 Gobierno de Puerto Rico, “PREPS Puerto Rico Emergency Portal System,”September 30, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220927115333/https://www. preps.pr.gov/, as of October 1, 2022.
3 Jim Wyss and Michelle Kaske, “Hurricane Fiona Exposes Puerto Rico’s Failure to Fix Frail Power Grid,” Bloomberg, September 19, 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2022-09-19/hurricane-fiona-exposes-puerto-rico-sfailure-to-fix-power-grid.; Associated Press, “Puerto Rico Power Fully Restored 18 Months After Hurricane Maria Wiped Out the Grid,” The Weather Channel, March 21, 2019, https://weather. com/news/news/2019-03-21-puerto-rico-power-restoredhurricane-maria.
4 U.S. Census Bureau, “Population Estimates, July 1, 2021 (V2021) Puerto Rico,” Quick Facts, accessed October 23, 2022, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/PR/ PST045221.; U.S. Census Bureau, “Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2021”, Press Release Number CB22-153, September 13, 2022, https://www.census. gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022/income-poverty-health-
insurance-coverage.html; Frances Negrón - Muntaner, “The Emptying Island: Puerto Rican Expulsion in Post-Maria Time,” Hemispheric Institute, Expulsion 14, no. 1 (2018), accessed November 5, 2022, https://hemisphericinstitute.org/en/ emisferica-14-1-expulsion/14-1-essays/the-emptying-islandpuerto-rican-expulsion-in-post-maria-time.html.
5 Samantha Rivera Joseph et al. “Colonial Neglect and the Right to Health in Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria,” American Journal of Public Health 110, no. 10 (Oct 2020), accessed November 6, 2022. https://ajph.aphapublications.org/ doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305814.
6 Jose Caraballo-Cueto, "The Economy of Disasters? Puerto Rico Before and After Hurricane Maria," CENTRO: Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies 33, no. 1 (2021). Gale Academic OneFile (accessed November 7, 2022). https:// link.gale.com/apps/doc/A668270706/AONE?u=mlin_b_ bumml&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=9b21b467.;
7 UN 2022 Session, 6th Meeting (AM), “Special Committee on Decolonization Approves Resolution Calling Upon United States to Promote Process for Puerto Rico’s Self Determination, Eventual Independence,” United Nations, June 20, 2022. https:// press.un.org/en/2022/gacol3360.doc.htm.
8 Jose A. Delgado, “La administración de Biden aprueba una exención en las normas de cabotaje para permitir la entrada a Puerto Rico del barco con diésel,” El Nueva Dia (Guaynabo, PR), Sep 28, 2022. https://www.elnuevodia.com/ corresponsalias/washington-dc/notas/la-administracion-debiden-aprueba-una-exencion-temporal-en-las-normas-decabotaje-para-puerto-rico/.
9 Jeffrey Pagel, Brannon Ike, and Kashian Russ, “Jones Act: protectionist policy in the twenty-first century,” Maritime Economics & Logistics, 21, no. 4 (2019), 441-442, https:// doi.org/10.1057/s41278-019-00123-9 (accessed October 20, 2022).
10 Constantine G. Papavizas, “Public Company Jones Act Citizenship,” Tulane Maritime Law Journal 39, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 384-386, accessed October 18, 2022, https://heinonline. org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/tulmar39&i=3.
11 Grabow, “Jones Act: A Burden”
12 Colin Grabow, Inu Manak, and Daniel J. Ikenson, “The Jones Act: A Burden America Can No Longer Bear,” Cato Institute, June 28, 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/ policy-analysis/jones-act-burden-america-can-no-longerbear.
13 Joseph T. Francois, Hugh M. Arce, Kenneth A. Reinert, and Joseph E. Flynn, “Commercial Policy and the Domestic Carrying Trade,” The Canadian Journal of Economics, 29, no. 1 (Feb. 1996): 183, accessed October 25, 2022. https://www.jstor. org/stable/136158.
14 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Report on the Competitiveness of Puerto Rico’s Economy, June 29, 2012, 13, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/regional/ PuertoRico/report.pdf.
15 Ibid.
16 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Puerto Rico Energy Profile.”
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Roger Wicker et al. “Why the Jones Act is still needed 100 years later,” DefenseNews, June 5, 2020, https://www. defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/05/why-thejones-act-is-still-needed-100-years-later/.
20 Marian Díaz, “Porta Ship opens the first shipyard in Puerto Rico,” El Nuevo Día, August 29, 2022, https://www.elnuevodia. com/english/news/story/porta-ship-opens-the-first-shipyard-
in-puerto-rico/.
21 Jose A. Delgado “La Administracion de Biden”
22 Daniella Silva and Nicole Acevedo, “Lack of power in Puerto Rico creates life-or-death situations for those with medical needs,” NBC News, September 23, 2022, https://www. nbcnews.com/news/latino/lack-power-puerto-rico-creates-lifedeath-situations-medical-needs-rcna49151.
23 Ibid.
24 Office of the Historian and Office of the Clerk U.S. House of Representatives, Hispanic Americans in Congress 1822-2012 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013), Appendix I, 746, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPOCDOC-108hdoc225/pdf/GPO-CDOC-108hdoc225.pdf.
25 Juan R. Torruella, “Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases,” Yale Law & Policy Review, 73-74, https://openyls.law. yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/17212/04_32YaleL_ PolyRev57_2013_2014_.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.
26 Cornell Law School, “BALZAC v. PEOPLE OF PORTO RICO (two cases),” Legal Information Institute, sec. 18, https:// www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/258/298.
27 Fifty-Sixth Congress. “Chapter 191” in The Statutes At Large of the United States of America From December 1899 to March 1901, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), 82-83, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llsl//llsl-c56/ llsl-c56.pdf.
28 Ibid.
29 “What is the Resident Commissioner,” About, U.S. Congresswoman Jenniffer González-Colón, accessed October 25, 2022, https://gonzalez-colon.house.gov/about.
30 Library of Congress, “1917 Jones-Shafroth Act,” accessed October 25, 2022, https://guides.loc.gov/latinx-civil-rights/ jones-shafroth-act.
31 “Can citizens of U.S. Territories vote for President?,” Electoral College Frequently Asked Questions, National Archives, accessed October 25, 2022, https://www.archives.gov/ electoral-college/faq#territories.
32 Dave Graham, “Puerto Ricans say Trump’s disaster response was too slow, too clumsy,” Reuters, September 28, 2017, https:// www.reuters.com/article/usa-puertorico-trump/puerto-ricanssay-trumps-disaster-response-was-too-slow-too-clumsyidINKCN1C33DL.
33 Constitution of the United States, “Twenty-Third Amendment,” Constitution Annotated, accessed November 6, 2022, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/ amendment-23/.
34 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, December 14, 1960, https://www.ohchr.org/en/ instruments-mechanisms/instruments/declaration-grantingindependence-colonial-countries-and-peoples.
35 Jana María Giles, “Puerto Rico The Disappeared: The World’s Oldest Colony in the World’s Youngest Empire,” Journal of Contemporary Thought, Special Issue on ‘Actually Existing Colonialism’(March 2006), https://www.academia. edu/1788738/_Puerto_Rico_the_Disappeared_The_World_s_ Oldest_Colony_in_the_World_s_Youngest_Empire_Special_ Issue_on_Actually_Existing_Colonialisms_.
Maps by: An Pham
FForests provide a number of invaluable ecosystem services that maintain cleaner air and water, provide medicinal and fuel materials for surrounding communities, and are among the most important hosts to global biodiversity. 1 Alongside their services to local communities, forests are a part of a global system of carbon sequestration and forest conservation that represents the cheapest strategy towards mitigating climate change in many countries—particularly developing countries around the world. 2 Despite their invaluable services, deforestation and degradation rates persist. Globally, approximately five million hectares of forest are lost annually to human activity. 3 With approximately 30 percent of global carbon emissions stemming from landuse change and deforestation, global conservation efforts seek to reverse the trend of rapid degradation and promote sustainable practices in communities. 4
The United Nations Decade on Ecosystem Restoration (2021-2030) promises to “prevent, halt, and reverse” the degradation of our ecosystems, recognizing that we could have “nine years left” to save our planet from permanent damage as a result of extensive climate and ecosystem degradation. 5 The UN’s #GenerationRestoration project calls upon our “Action, Choices, and Voices,” focusing on changing the behavior of individuals and our contributions to reducing our contributions to climate change. 6 Other frameworks—such as the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) Reduced Emissions in Deforestation and Degradation Framework (REDD+)—seek to incentivize forest regeneration and protection through results-based financing. While these frameworks seek to address present and prevent future degradation through a variety of financial incentives and policy shifts, global conservation strategies have failed to address underlying structural inequalities that affect the ecological conditions of communities. As a result, global conservation strategy has failed to produce sustainable results on a broad scale.
In Latin America, environmental conditions and policies are directly correlated with the social and political landscape of the region. Lasting colonial legacies and structural imbalances regarding land distribution and control of natural resources continue to leave rural and Indigenous communities vulnerable to inadequate conservation policy. 7 As such, successfully proposed solutions regarding forest conservation and restoration in Latin America require a comprehensive understanding of where power lies, who takes part in crafting solutions, and how the solution will be implemented. In Guatemala and México, however, a conservation model that has seen the most profound success has undeniably been Community Forest Management (CFM). Exploring cases of its implementation in Guatemala and México demonstrates CFM’s strength against other
methods of conservation in its support of a holistic conservation model that elevates community voices and maximizes national and international resources.
In the last decade, the value of forests and their importance towards fighting climate change has been officially worked into the UNFCCC Paris Climate Agreement. The emergence of the Warsaw REDD+ Framework in 2009 reveals the recognition of forests, particularly tropical rainforests, as crucial tools of sequestration and development. 8 The framework was designed to provide financial incentives to developing countries to conserve and restore their forested areas as well as disincentivize deforestation. The framework creates pathways of payments in exchange for proof of results—that is, a nation that sees a decrease in forest-based emissions will receive financial compensation and the ability to place these carbon credits on the voluntary carbon market. 9
Frameworks such as REDD+ seek to strike the crucial balance with sustainable development, economically empowering a nation while promoting a sustainable model of ecosystem protection. However, results from the last decade of its implementation have produced a variety of unintended negative results and, in turn, isolated the very communities it was designed to uplift. Indeed, a key criticism of initiatives like REDD+ and other UNFCCC prescribed solutions is that in practice the implementation of these initiatives can require a large level of government intervention to an extent that overpowers community voices and needs. 10 Frameworks like REDD+ successfully use financial incentives to incentivize governments and under-resourced communities to restore their forests; however, an unintentional side effect is the potential over-involvement of the state, leaving communities excluded from decision-making. In certain cases, proposed top-down solutions can overlook the complex networks of power, asymmetrical resource governance, or alreadyestablished forms of management. In its attempt to create sustainable change, these solutions perpetuate established inequalities rather than guarantee that communities reap project benefits. 11
Conservation frameworks like REDD+ recognize the financial and ecological benefits of forests and seek to create mutual benefit for communities through forest conservation and
regeneration. However, this mode of incentivizing conservation through the lens of economic development can lead to a disconnect between state interests in forest conservation and the forest’s significance to its inhabitants and surrounding communities. 12 Often under-recognized in the context of global conservation strategy, forests hold a cultural and spiritual significance for many—especially Indigenous communities, as their relationship with the specific land they live on is crucial to their cultural identity and community survival. The intricate relationship between communities and their natural surroundings can be better leveraged in the context of sustainable development and conservation in the form of Community Forest Management (CFM). Community Forest Management is a form of “collective governance of a common territory or property” where decisions regarding forest monitoring, usage, and natural resource management lie in communities. 13 Through CFM, communities will “manage their territories in a way that ensures the conservation and sustainable use of nature alongside the social, environmental, cultural, and even economic benefits.” 14 The framework is flexible and takes on a unique form depending on the social, political, and cultural context of the community. In some cases, it can uplift pre-colonial traditions of land management, and in others it creates new pathways towards power and governance through the granted access to community land and resources. For states like México and Guatemala, Community Forest Management has come to define a method of regaining power and stewardship over natural resources and land that has long been manipulated by government intervention. Communities build the capacity to be able care for land through ancestral knowledge, driven by a need for the resources within the land and connection to the land, and as a result create new understandings of what “sustainable development” can really mean. A core benefit to community-led conservation is its ability to adapt based on the political, cultural, and historical context of a community’s needs. In Guatemala’s Totonicapán Department specifically, community forest management is a way of life, embedded in the cultural fabric of the Maya K’iche community which inhabits the forest and has managed it for
over eight centuries. Further north, in México, communities have adopted the framework over the last century after a historical protest for agency over their own land, and have utilized it as a method of economic empowerment. Across these varying implementations of the model, however, is the notion that humans are an integral component to their natural environments, and that removing people in the name of conservation only promotes a deeper disassociation from our role in environmental protection.
Historically, conservation solutions can be oriented to separate people from nature, and hone in on the negative impacts of human activity on environmental communities. It emphasizes that threats to the environment are humancaused; thus, humans must be removed, or their presence lessened, in order to protect the natural environment. Across Central America, this logical framework has provoked the state-led removal of Indigenous and rural communities from their ancestral lands, where the coexistence of people and nature forms a crucial component of their cultural identity. 15 In this context, Community Forest Management seeks to leverage human-led solutions, transforming extractive perspectives of land to one of mutual benefit.
For Guatemala and México, forests have become a symbol of ongoing struggle for community autonomy and control over natural resources that has produced powerful protests and shifts in land rights and policies over the last century. 16 Indeed, in Guatemala “the contestation and negotiation of conservation policies has been a key context through which Maya autonomy, cultural identity, and traditions of environmental stewardship were articulated” over the course of the last century. Forests cover 33 percent of Guatemalan land, and the nation's very name translates to “the place of many trees” in the Nahuatl language. 17 One of the nation’s most prominent forest reserves is the Maya Biosphere Reserve, a community-managed area of over four hundred and fifty thousand hectares. 18 It is noted as one of the world’s most successful community forest experiments. Communities were granted communal ownership after a two-decade long struggle for rights to the land between the state and the inhabitants of a forest that the state sought to create into an untouched reserve. 19 Now, the
communal forests maintain the lowest rates of wildfire and deforestation in the forest reserve while also providing employment opportunities for local community members through sustainable timber extraction.
Likewise, México has been a global pioneer in Community Forest Management. Over two thousand land holdings are in the hands of communities, known as ejidos, where a historical fight for land rights now leaves 18.2 million hectares of forest under community management. 20 CFM in México originates from a community response to the state-permitted logging and extraction in forests across México throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. States across México—for example, in Sierra Juárez de Oaxaca—organized in fierce protest until rights were temporarily transferred to Indigenous and rural communities. 21 Furthermore, CFM in Mèxico represents an established, technically-advanced example of the practice when it is properly supported with technical and financial assistance from the state and
local organizations.
Beginning in the 1950s, a state-sponsored paper company was rapidly cutting down trees in the region, provoking local communities to organize in protest. The afflicted communities organized in protest and made a number of constitutional appeals to halt the government concession to the company and achieve official recognition of their territory. 22 The success of this movement created the conditions for a successful implementation of CFM. The government took a temporarily ‘hands-off’ approach, believing the communities would fail this experiment of communal management. 23 When the state saw success in the structured models of community organizing, where forest lands were managed via traditional networks of community assemblies and were additionally advised by forest management specialists, they supplemented the community frameworks with new programs such as the Forest Resources Conservation and Sustainable Management Project (PROCYMAF). México’s experience with Community Forest Management demonstrates how the framework offers opportunity for political empowerment and economic opportunity.
Within this conservation model, sustainable management also involves an active timber industry, managed by community members at various scales. 24 Through this, CFM restores a relationship with the land that allows populations to take what they need and take care of what they leave. Indeed, expert David B. Bray notes that “in these communities, both a culture of industrial forestry and a culture of forest conservation have become part of the traditional culture.” 25 CFM incorporates careful monitoring of the forest to ensure that trees being cut down for sale still leave a stable amount to sustain the ecosystem.
An example of Community Forest Management as a cultural, and spiritual practice alongside a tool of economic and political empowerment can be found in the department of Totonicapan, Guatemala. Located in the Western Highlands, the Totonicapán forest spans twenty-one thousand hectares in Western Guatemala and sustains over one hundred and fifty thousand people. 26 For centuries, the Maya K’iche populations that inhabit the area have cared for the forest and sustained themselves through an intricate
resource management system. They are guided by an Indigenous worldview known as the Mayan Cosmovision. For Indigenous Meso-Americans, it is a view “that integrates the structure of space and rhythms of time into a unified whole.” 27 Rather than considering humans separate from their natural environment, it emphasizes humans as a part of nature, and thus plays a crucial role in taking care of it.
The 48 Cantones is the traditional governing body in Totonicapán that has been serving local communities for over eight hundred years. The core component of Totonicapán’s management is its practice of K’ax K’ol, a cycle of unpaid community service which all community members are obligated to fulfill. While serving K’ax K’ol, the service delegates will continue monitoring the forest through regular patrolling, maintain its land and regenerate depleted areas where necessary. 28 The specific area it manages is known as the Communal Forest of Los Altos de San Miguel or Kachelaj in K’iche, and the regional municipal park (RMP) Los Altos de San Miguel in Totonicapán, is amongst the largest communal landholding in the highlands. 29 The park was created in 1997 in collaboration with state agencies, local municipal politicians, NGOs and local representatives with the intention of providing opportunities for communal ownership, though designated boundaries often remain overlapping and contested, with ongoing pressures for the privatization of water resources and other services offered by the forest. 30
In general, the cultural values and established systems of management in Totonciapán make the region resistant to frameworks like REDD+ or other global initiatives to incentivize conservation. However, the community forest framework can legitimize community voices in interactions with municipal and state government interactions and prevent their needs from being overlooked. A sustainable framework to support the implementation of CFM recognizes the need for the balance between broad-based institutional support from international institutions, government structures, and NGOs who can support the implementation and sustain the success of these communities by providing resources and aid where necessary. 31 A core force of empowerment within CFM is how it allows communities–who have the highest knowledge and understanding of their
land–to advocate for their specific needs within this context.
In general, the cultural values and established systems of management in Totonciapán make the region resistant to frameworks like REDD+ or other global initiatives to incentivize conservation. However, the community forest framework can legitimize community voices in interactions with municipal and state government interactions and prevent their needs from being overlooked. A sustainable framework to support the implementation of CFM recognizes the need for the balance between broad-based institutional support from international institutions, government structures, and NGOs who can support the implementation and sustain the success of these communities by providing resources and aid where necessary. A core force of empowerment within CFM is how it allows communities–who have the highest knowledge and understanding of their land–to advocate for their specific needs within this context.
Local and non-state organizations can step in to support communities with supplementary financial and technical assistance, so long as it remains on the community’s terms. For example, the EcoLogic Development Fund works to enhance local community capacity through increased access to technologies and expertise while simultaneously
elevating community voices. EcoLogic is a U.S.based NGO with a regional office in Guatemala’s Quiché department. As a small non-state organization, EcoLogic functions within a network of actors, such as the local municipal government and the paralleled Indigenous governance, while being inevitably influenced by national policy to a certain degree. However the community and its needs are at the center of the decision-making process.
In Totonicapán, EcoLogic supports efforts to restore depleted forest areas. Working with ninetyfive communities in the department, EcoLogic has supported the restoration of 537 hectares, with 1,363,010 trees planted for reforestation purposes. 32 While the community structure and cultural practice remain in place, EcoLogic is able to supplement with technical assistance that further builds the capacities of communities to operate without wholly relying on the government. The decentralized power structure evolving in Totonicapán represents a compromise between independent community management and supplementary technical and financial assistance that is on the community’s terms.
Far beyond recognizing the material value of the forest and its contributions to mitigation, CFM brings new meaning to the notion of “sustainability.” The model recognizes that each
community will have different priorities, practices, and needs based on cultural specificities and the varied terrain they are protecting. It encourages a sustainable development model that supports solutions and conservation strategies, rather than prescribing them in a top-down model. Investing in community empowerment creates a network of collaboration, active participation, and support that can be seen and felt on a broad scale. It is a solution that redistributes aspects of that centralized power to individuals and individual communities, who both know their land better and, in the process of monitoring their land, will learn their land better. Communities become active participants in the maintenance and protection of their ecosystems while sustaining the integrity of the natural space. Likewise, CFM embeds the cultural and spiritual significance of the forest into the solution, restoring an ancient relationship with the land that had long been interrupted by outside influences and intentions. Most importantly, CFM can take a different form in each community it approaches, allowing climate solutions to emerge from the minds and hearts of the communities who know their land and their needs best.
1Frances Seymour and Jonah Busch, “Why Forests? Why Now? The Science, Economics, and Politics of Tropical Forests and Climate Change” (Washington DC: Center for Global Development, 2016), 7, accessed 5 October, 2022, https:// tinyurl.com/yc4926at.
2 Ibid.
3 Amy Collins, “How community forest management performs where REDD+ payments fails,” Environmental Research Letters no. 3, 17 (2022): 1, https://iopscience.iop.org/ article/10.1088/1748-9326/ac4b54/pdf.
4 EcoLogic Development Fund, “Climate Change,”accessed 30 October, 2022. https://www.ecologic.org/our-impact/ challenges/climate-change.
5 United Nations Environment Programme, “Preventing, Halting, and Reversing the Degradation of Ecosystems Worldwide,” accessed 20 September, 2022, https://www. decadeonrestoration.org/.
6 United Nations Environment Programme, “Ecosystem Restoration Playbook: A Practical Guide to Healing the Planet,” accessed 20 September, 2022, https://www.decadeonrestoration. org/publications/ecosystem-restoration-playbook-practicalguide-healing-planet.
7 Tracey Osborne, Samara Brock, Robin Chazdon, et al. “The political ecology playbook for ecosystem restoration: Principles for effective, equitable, and transformative landscapes,” Global Environmental Change, no. 70 (2021): 2. doi:10.1016/j. gloenvcha.2021.102320.
8 United Nations Climate Change, “What is REDD+?” UNFCCC, accessed 20 September, 2022, https://unfccc.int/
topics/land-use/workstreams/redd/what-is-redd.
9 Micah L. Ingalls, Michael B. Dwyer, “Missing the Forest for the Trees? Navigating the trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation under REDD,” Climatic Change 136, (2016): 354. https://tinyurl.com/ycxk3h55.
10 Osborne et al. “The Political Ecology Playbook,” 7.
11 Tracey Osborne, Samara Brock, Robin Chazdon, et al. “The political ecology playbook for ecosystem restoration: Principles for effective, equitable, and transformative landscapes,” Global Environmental Change, no. 70 (2021): page number. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2021.102320.
12 Ingalls et all, “Missing the Forest for the Trees?,” 360.
13 David Barton Bray, “The Community Forests of Mexico : Managing for Sustainable Landscapes” (University of Texas Press, 2005), 4, accessed October 16, 2022 http://ebookcentral. proquest.com/lib/bu/detail.action?docID=3443010.
14 Javier Baltodano, “Community Forest Management (CFM): An Opportunity to Preserver and Restore Vital Resources for the Good Living of Human Societies,” Friends of the Earth International, September, 2015, accessed September 20, 2022 https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ Community-forest-management_an-Opportunity_EN.pdf.
15 “48 Cantones” directed by Thomas and Julian Moll-Rocek (2014; Daily Motion, 2014), https://tinyurl.com/yjhufn32.
16 Brian W. Conz, ‘Conservation and Maya Autonomy: The Case of Totonicapán’. In “Indigenous Peoples and Protected Areas: New Perspectives on Conservation and Rights” Stan Stevens, editor. (Tuscon, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 2014), 242, accessed 20 October, 2022.
17 René Zamora-Cristales et al, “7 Ways Governments Can Invest in Farmer-led Land Restoration,” World Resource Institute, 8 February, 2022, accessed 16 October, 2022, https:// bit.ly/3FwchHN.
18 Ibid.
19 Fred Pearce, “Parks vs. People: In Guatemala, Communities Take Best Care of the Forest,” Yale Environment 360, Yale School of the Environment, 18 June, 2020, https://bit. ly/3DQa7lh.
20 Thelma Gómez Durán,“Mexico: Community forestry boosts conservation, jobs, and social benefits,” trans. Sydney Sims, Mongabay, 22 January 2020. https://tinyurl.com/mw9zxkvn. 21 Ibid.
22 David, Bray, “Sierra Norte de Oaxaca: el manejo forestal comunitario,” La Jornada, 30 September, 2018, accessed 20 October, 2022. https://www.jornada.com.mx/2018/09/30/ opinion/016a1pol.
23 Gómez Durán,“Mexico: Community Forestry,” https:// tinyurl.com/mw9zxkvn.
24 Bray, “Sierra Norte.”
25 Ibid.
26 EcoLogic Development Fund “What We Do: Totonicapán,” accessed 30 October, 2022 https://www.ecologic.org/what-wedo/projects/totonicapan.
27 Moll-Rocek, “48 Cantones.”
28 Julian Moll-Rocek, “Challenging the ‘tragedy of the commons:’ new documentary explores how humans and nature can coexist,” Mongabay, 20 August, 2014, https://bit. ly/3Wo9I0o.
29 Conz, ‘Conservation and Maya Autonomy: The Case of Totonicapán,’ 243. 30 Ibid.
31 Osborne et al. “The Political Ecology Playbook,” 4. 32 EcoLogic, “Totonicapán,” https://www.ecologic.org/whatwe-do/projects/totonicapan.
Cover: Regan M
Interview: Ricardo Gomez Angel, Flavia Carpio
Africa: Johnnathan Tshibangu (Regional Cover), Jannik Skorna, Dieuvain Musaghi, Hanna Morris, Jeanne Menjoulet, Ferdinand Reus, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Aminah51, Kaysha, Aboodi Vesakaran,
Asia: Tharoushan Kandarajah (Regional Cover), Gemmafjam, Eddy Billard, Benjamin Strick, Madhri Yehiya, Ulrich Mareli, Getty Images, Global Times, Kees van Londen, Jaredm Mitchell, Noel Y. Calingasan, Frank Muller, Kevin van Emburgh
Middle East: Darcey Beau (Regional Cover), World Integrated Trade Solution, World Integrated Solution, Alex Azabache, World Integrated Trade Solution, Sherif Moharram, Jack Krier, Gordon Tang, Iraj Mehregan, Rahul Naduvath, Levi Meir Clancy, Levi Meir Clancy
Europe: Marios Kanellos (Regional Cover), Frederic Koberl, Lewis Grant, Bakhrom Tursunov, Liilia Moroz, Estonian Foreign Ministry, Vox Espana, Gennarco Cri, Marco Verch
Russia & FSU: Nikolay Vorobyev (Regional Cover), Vadim Artyukhin, Hippopx, Adam Jones, Adam Jones, Tasha Jolley, Kaktuse, Pxhere, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Ted Eytan, Vitolda Klein, Mariusz Kluzniak, Kalpak Travel
Americas: Parker Hilton (Regional Cover), Dan Lundberg, Dan Sloan, World Bank Institute for Reconstruction and Development, Dan Lundberg, World Bank Institute for Reconstruction and Development, Alex Mnatsakanov, Galen Crout, United States Government Accountability Office, Sydney Angove, Andres Sanz
All maps made with Natural Earth, free vector and raster map data at naturalearthdata.com.
Figure 1 and 2
UNHCR. "UNHCR RBWCA - Monthly Statistics - September 2022." Accessed November 1st, 2022. https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/96354.
Figures 1, 2, and 3
World Integrated Trade Solution. "Egypt, Arab Rep. Imports by country and region in US$ Thousand 2012-2020." Accessed November 1st, 2022. https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/EGY/StartYear/2012/EndYear/2020/TradeFlow/Import/Partner/ALL/Indicator/MPRT-TRD-VL#.
Figure 1 (FDI
World Bank Institute for Reconstruction & Development. "Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) - Guyana." Accessed November 1st, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=GY.
Figure 2 (Fuel Exports)
World Bank Institute for Reconstruction & Development. "Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) - Guyana." Accessed November 1st, 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL. FUEL.ZS.UN?locations=GY.
Figure 1
United States Government Accountability Office. Jones Act Carriers’ Container Shipping Routes between the United States, Puerto Rico, and Other Caribbean Destinations [map]. In: GAO 13-260. United States Government Accountability Office. Washington, D.C., 2013, page 12. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13-260.pdf.
BRIDGETTE LANG
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FIONA CAPTAN
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BRIGETTE LANG
Editor in Chief
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ITZEL SANTANA
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The IRR is set in Minion 3, an expanded and updated version of the serif typeface designed by Robert Slimbach and released by Adobe Systems. It is based on late Renaissanceera type for extended reading, and named for the traditional nomenclature for type sizes, in which minion is between nonpareil and brevier at 7pt.
The IRR is set in Minion 3, an expanded and updated version of the serif typeface designed by Robert Slimbach and released by Adobe Systems. It is based on late Renaissanceera type for extended reading, and named for the traditional nomenclature for type sizes, in which minion is between nonpareil and brevier at 7pt.
The IRR also sets titles in Brandon Grotesque and our logotype in Baskerville.
The IRR also sets titles in Brandon Grotesque and our logotype in Baskerville.
Composed in Adobe InDesign and using Adobe Photoshop, Adobe Illustrator, and Adobe InCopy by the IRR Editorial Board at Boston University in Boston, Massachusetts. Printed and bound by Boston Business Printing in Boston, Massachusetts. April 2022.
Massachusetts. November 2022.
ISSN (Print): 2151-738X
ISSN (Online): 2151-7398
LCCN: 2009202836 irreview.org | irr@buiaa.org
