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REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL CHANGE IN COLOMBIA
García, general secretary of the ACDEGAM, openly declared, “if fascism implies defending private property and the family with vigor and energy, defending the state, defending democracy and shaking off the dangerous specter of communist totalitarianism, then let them call us fascist” (quoted in Pearce, 1990a: 250). Certain members of the Colombian state had begun to fear a loss of electoral seats to the new party, and that international trade might erode as support grew for ACDEGAM/MORENA (and quietly, the MAS). It was well known that the ACDEGAM had already created a pseudo-state in Puerto Boyacá.22 As Colombian General Miguel Maza Márquez put it, the drug traffickers no longer operated like ordinary criminals, like the mafia. They were becoming a small state within the Colombian state .… This small state has a very organized military infrastructure and a political arm in formation in the MORENA party in the Magdalena Medio region. (quoted in Pearce, 1990a: 3) Alongside the organization having “links with all the region’s political representatives, including Congress,” it was recognized that “the paramilitary groups had become as important as the guerrilla with regard to their affect on Colombian society” (Pearce, 1990a: 247; Kline, 1999: 75). As members of the ACDEGAM, such as Luis Alfredo Rubio Rojas who won a mayoral election in March 1988, were becoming politically successful prior to the formation of MORENA, it was assumed they could do so again, albeit as representatives of a fascist party.23 Soon after its formation, Rubio announced his membership and potential candidacy via MORENA. Resistance quickly poured out against Rubio from the rural poor, echoed by some in government (Pearce, 1990a: 248; Kline, 1999: 77–8).24 Wishing to diffuse the potential power of MORENA, sectors of the state capitalized on the grassroots protests. The sitting Barco administration realized there were few ways of restraining MORENA from legally conducting its “political” activities in preparation for the elections (Kline, 1999: 77–8). Therefore, knowing MORENA would not agree to such conditions, Barco ordered prospective parties to severe all ties to unsanctioned paramilitaries, agree to endorse all national laws, and follow the rules of the Colombian constitution (Simons, 2004: 58). In response and protest, “MORENA leaders replied that if it were not approved as a political party, it would be a clandestine group” (Kline, 1999: 77–8). While the legislation did facilitate the demise of MORENA’s legitimacy, it could not ensure the end of the fascistic ideologies from some members of the elite. These people simply shifted their far-right sympathies toward expanding the breadth of paramilitarism across the country. THE MAS/ACCU PARTNERSHIP AND THE MANIFESTATION OF FASCISM VIA THE AUC During the MAS’s formation a working relationship had formed with the Castaño brothers (and the ACCU).25 The Castaño brothers increasingly
