DOMINANT CLASS REACTIONISM
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Unless we are clear about the nature of the real enemy in this historical moment in Colombia’s democratic development – the narco-fascist paramilitary project ... An increasing number of political crimes will continue with impunity until home-grown fascism strikes its final blow. (Child as quoted in Pearce, 1990a: 266–7) THE ROLE AND RELATION OF THE COCA INDUSTRY TO THE PARAMILITARY (AND GUERRILLAS) The appellation of “narco-fascist paramilitary” is significant; therefore, it is important to address how and to what extent the AUC aligned itself with the drug trade, particularly to coca. During the 1970s the Castaño brothers became deeply involved in narcotics, and later in assisting other localized narcobourgeoisie and large landowners to expand their wealth through increased land acquisitions by displacing peasants and securing increased shipping/smuggling routes. However, by the early 1990s, pressure from the United States and the Colombian state toward narcotrafficking hit new heights. For more than a decade a central goal of the international war on drugs waged by the United States was to reduce the supply of illicit drugs being cultivated and exported from the Andean region of South America. In the case of Colombia in particular, for most of the 1990s this strategy involved pressuring the government to go after the leaders of the cocaine cartels based in the provincial cities of Medellín and Cali. Washington thought that this “kingpin strategy,” if successful, would deal a mortal blow to the cartels’ ability to ship drugs to the United States. In many ways the strategy worked. By 1995, all of the Cali and Medellín cartel leaders were either dead or in prison in Colombia or the United States. (Crandall, 2005b: 179) Working together, Washington and Bogotá deconstructed the two infamous cartels by aligning with those who had once worked closely with them (Dudley, 2004; see also Scott, 2003: 89; Taussig, 2004b: 18; NACLA, 2003: 2). The Castaños were quick to support this top-down approach both ideologically and materially, as both brothers had reasons for cutting ties with the cartels, particularly with Escobar. Fidel felt Escobar had watered-down his stringent anti-communist ideology, while Carlos saw the drug lord withdraw his once extensive support for the MAS (Kirk, 2003: 156). The brothers then re-routed their approach to the industry by working with “the police, the Cali Cartel and dissidents from the Medellín Cartel (Henao brothers) to defeat Pablo Escobar” (Livingstone, 2003: 133; see also Avilés, 2006: 71–87; Peceny and Durnan, 2006: 102; Bowden, 2001). Upon the demise of the cartels a looming void was left vacant for the drug trade to redevelop itself in the pursuit of supplying the global demand for cocaine.45 With Fidel dead (in 1994), and the paramilitary needing an
