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REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL CHANGE IN COLOMBIA
Table 2.2 Hierarchical leadership structure of the FARC-EP (in comparison with a conventional armed forces structure)
FARC-EP’s organic structure
Equivalent in a conventional armed forces structure
Combatant Candidate for commander Squad deputy Squad commander Guerrilla deputy Guerrilla commander Company deputy Company commander Column deputy Column commander Front deputy Front commander Block deputy Block commander Central High Commander deputy Commander of the Central High Command Commander-in-chief of Central High Command
Soldier Sub-official Corporal 2nd class Corporal 1st class Sergeant 2nd class Sergeant 1st class Sergeant Major Sub-lieutenant Lieutenant Captain Major Lieutenant-colonel Colonel Brigadier-general Major-general Three-star general No equivalent
Source: Adapted from information obtained through observational research alongside documents provided by the FARC-EP in 2004; see also FARC-EP, 2001c.
percent of its formal members coming from the countryside – 12 to 13 percent derived from various indigenous groups13 – and the remaining 35 percent from urban sectors. The current membership is dominated by subsistence peasants and small producers, but has grown to incorporate indigenous populations, Afro-Colombians, the displaced, landless rural laborers, intellectuals, unionists, teachers, professionals, doctors, lawyers, priests, and sectors of the urban workforce (Petras et al, 2005: 118; Petras, 2003: 24–5, 99; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003a: 178–9; Richani, 2002a: 63; Wickham-Crowley, 1992: 214). Attention has also been paid to gender equity with respect to both the rank and file and leadership. Currently, 50 percent of FARC-EP members are female, with 30 to 55 percent of comandantes being women, depending on the region (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008: 10; O’Shaughnessy and Branford, 2005: 27; Galdos, 2004; Richani, 2002a: 62).14 Such sociocultural compositions demonstrate how the FARC-EP “became an army of the whole people” (Petras, 2008). From being heavily centered in the countryside, the expansion of the FARC-EP into the cities is of tremendous importance.15 For decades it was argued that Colombia’s cities remained largely immune from the civil war (see Williamson, 1965: 41).16 Some analysts even claimed the FARC-EP lacked any formal strength because it had yet to develop urban support (Rochlin, 2003: 143). However there is substantial evidence that over the past two decades the FARC-EP has acquired clandestine allies and constructed counter-hegemonic networks in various cities. The FARC-EP has formed a number of urban
