30
REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL CHANGE IN COLOMBIA
transformed into a national political-military social movement illustrating a vision of alternative development through a socialist society via armed struggle (Ortiz, 2002: 130–6; Pearce, 1990a: 283). A growing minority of the FARC-EP are outside the country’s many small villages and towns (Petras, 2003: 99). By constructing a support base, extensive geographical breadth, and an expanding ideological model of emancipation, the FARC-EP has proven the ability to move its revolutionary ethos beyond the countryside. AN EVALUATION OF CIVILIAN SUPPORT FOR THE FARC-EP In her book My Colombian War, Silvana Paternostro (2007: 212) wrote that the FARC-EP has “less than 1 percent approval by the population … perhaps the least-liked revolutionaries in history.” These comments were not new, as many have claimed that the guerrillas have very little support from the general public. Such claims are however simplistic, and it could be argued that they are false representations of the realities in parts of the country. Although it is popular to claim there is little support for the FARC-EP, this does not explain why many Colombians choose to keep their political cards close to their chests. There is also evidence of alliances between the insurgents and sectors of the civilian population (Petras, 2003: 24; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001: 90). We now look at support for the FARC-EP, and how the insurgency can be seen as a people’s army. According to Marx and Engels (1976c: 495), a revolution must be backed by those most exploited under the current political-economic system. In 1966, the FARC-EP (and the PCC) stated that “the guerrilla movement is well aware that it alone cannot carry out the revolution” (Pomeroy, 1968: 312). The leadership of the FARC-EP recognized that the insurgency, in its infancy, had yet to form an Ejército del Pueblo. They understood that the support of the people was needed in order to create a true emancipatory society. Only through this process could the FARC-EP “play a decisive role in winning power for the people” (Pomeroy, 1968: 313; see also 310). The simple continuity of the guerrilla movement demonstrates that substantial solidarity has existed at a local level (see Johnson, 1966: 160–3). Contrary to Paternostro’s statement, it has been shown that the FARC-EP gained the most support of any guerrilla movement in Latin America during the 1960s (Paige, 1988: 153; see also Vega, 1969: 120). The 1970s then saw peasants (even those of a right-wing political ideology) showing relative, if not extensive, support of the guerrillas based on the revolutionaries’ integrity and defense against reactionary forces. Communist guerrillas were fairly well received by the peasants in the central part of the country (south of Tolima, northern Huila and Caquetá, southern Meta, northeastern Cauca, the present-day department of Quindío), and avoided useless deaths and pillage, devoting themselves principally to fighting the Army. The Army, in turn, launched further
