REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL CHANGE IN COLOMBIA - FARC

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REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL CHANGE IN COLOMBIA

all of Latin America – a status that has for the most part remained consistent (Avilés, 2006: 91; see also Coghlan, 2004: 153; Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, 2004; Contraloría General de la República, 2004: 43, 44). During the first few years of the 2000s Gini coefficients averaged 0.570 (World Resources Institute, 2003: 2). The current figure is between 0.591 and 0.576 (Rojas, 2006: 3). Brazil holds the greatest rate of economic disparity in Latin America, but its distribution figures have remained stable (Sachs and Santarius, 2007: 15). Meanwhile Colombia’s rates of inequitable income distribution continue to rise, resulting in ever greater disparities between rich and poor. Aside from monetary divergences, people in rural Colombia have experienced extremely inequitable distribution of land ownership (and of natural resources) for decades. During the 1950s, 0.7 percent of latifundios controlled an estimated 41 percent of arable lands, with 0.06 percent consolidating 63 percent a decade later (Shaw, 1976: 27, 112; see also Powelson, 1964: 36). John Gerassi (1965: 154) documented, over four decades ago, that “3.5 percent of landowners control 65 percent of the land” (see also Duff, 1968; Smith, 1967; Fluharty, 1957; Smith, Rodríguez, and García, 1945). In 1966, only 1.1 percent of all agricultural-based families controlled more than 45 percent of the nation’s arable lands (Christodoulou, 1990: 27). When looking at land concentration based on plots of land less than 10 hectares, Sanders (1981: 90) discovered that in the 1960s roughly 76.5 percent of the population (small producers and/or peasants) had access to a mere 8.8 percent of available land. This inequitable distribution saw a minimum shift during the 1970s, when 73.1 percent had access to only 7.2 percent of arable land (see also Powelson, 1964: 36). If we exclude farm size from the ratio, 6.9 percent of large landowners had access to roughly 75.8 percent of land during the 1960s, with the 1970s seeing the ratio equal 8.4 percent to 77.7 percent (Sanders, 1981: 90). The 1980s saw a rise in land concentration, with roughly 3 percent of the landed elite owning over 71 percent of arable land, while 57 percent of the poorest farmers subsisted on less than 3 percent (Washington Office on Latin America, 1989: 9; see also Taussig, 2004a: 13; Giraldo, 1996: 14). In 2003, Clark wrote that: in the midst of this vast potential for social and economic justice, the human condition in Colombia is desperate. Per capita income is barely over $2,000 Table 4.2 A quarter-century of Colombian Gini coefficients Time period

Gini coefficient

1980 1989 1994 1999 2004 2006

0.518 0.532 0.505 0.566 0.562 0.584

Source: Rojas, 2006: 3; Ramírez, 2005: 83; Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, 2004; Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2000: 10–11.


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Articles inside

Bibliography

1hr
pages 298-346

Index

19min
pages 347-353

Notes

2hr
pages 253-297

Between a rock and a hard place: the realities of contemporary global capitalism

8min
pages 249-252

A stick with no carrot: supporting revolutionary alliances

2min
page 248

A potential for collapse

14min
pages 242-247

The FARC-EP’s aptitude to take state power: The DIA bombshell

9min
pages 238-241

elections, 1970–86 (UP–1986

25min
pages 226-236

7.1 The percentage of women in the FARC-EP since 1964

18min
pages 212-219

7.3 MBNC (PCCC) model of political organization

1min
page 237

in selected Latin American countries

7min
pages 223-225

How the FARC-EP has affected politics

7min
pages 220-222

How the FARC-EP has affected culture

17min
pages 205-211

The media’s structural silencing of Colombia’s revolution

11min
pages 186-190

since 1958

4min
pages 184-185

JACs and political pacification

13min
pages 178-183

to revolutionary community-based institution

4min
pages 176-177

The FARC-EP’s contestation of urban-centric power theories The transformation of JAC: from pacifying state mechanism

5min
pages 174-175

The AUC’s structural connection to coca

4min
pages 161-162

US links to Colombia’s narcotic political economy and paramilitarism

7min
pages 158-160

The role and relation of the coca industry to the paramilitary and guerrillas

9min
pages 154-157

violations against non-combatants in Colombia

8min
pages 150-153

Colombian fascism in action

4min
pages 148-149

1980s

4min
pages 146-147

narcobourgeoisie, and the AUC

4min
pages 144-145

The AUC: An appendage of Colombian fascism The historic interconnections between land, the

4min
pages 142-143

The MAS/ACCU partnership and the manifestation of fascism via the AUC

2min
page 141

The MAS/ACDEGAM’s formation of MORENA

4min
pages 139-140

The reactionary formation of the MAS and ACDEGAM

4min
pages 137-138

Colombian economy

6min
pages 103-105

The Castaño connection

4min
pages 135-136

4.4 Incremental leaps in inequitable income distribution

4min
pages 101-102

Colombia in 1960

14min
pages 89-94

Colombia

4min
pages 95-96

percentages

2min
page 99

state power and revolutionary social change

3min
pages 78-79

4.2 A quarter-century of Colombian Gini coefficients

4min
pages 97-98

The potential for dual power in Colombia

2min
page 77

Colombia

11min
pages 72-76

The FARC-EP as a unique Marxist social movement

16min
pages 59-66

Becoming the people’s army: The evolution of the FARC(-EP

4min
pages 42-43

1 Class-based taxation model employed by the FARC-EP 101

2min
page 22

2.4 The FARC-EP’s interlinking support and solidarity structure

13min
pages 53-58

geography

2min
pages 35-36

with a conventional armed forces structure

4min
pages 45-46

extension, late 1950s to mid-1960s

15min
pages 26-32

1 Varying approaches toward (and outcomes from) the taking of

2min
page 20

An evaluation of civilian support for the FARC-EP

14min
pages 47-52
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